Syria: National Security and State-Building
Dr. Volker Perthes

Syria, as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has enhanced and maintained its security. Its emergence as a strong, secure state is directly related to the militarization of the country in preparation for war.

Citizens are incorporated into institutions. Syria can withstand external interference because of internal autonomy (unlike in the 50s). It has, however, attempted to manipulate Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinians and Jordanians.

National and regime-related security issues are high priorities in the various spheres of Syrian politics. Syria was a weak player between 1963-70 because of the internal fragmentation, but since 1970, a coherent structure of power and control has developed under an unchallenged president. While local men of power lost their independence vis-à-vis the state as different organizations became extensions of its power, the concept of Syria as a nation state was gradually accepted by the majority of its people. The Syrian regime has built a strong state based on its control over society in the face of external threats.

The militarization of the state has entailed directing resources to military purposes, and this has had a clear influence on economic trends within Syria, where discourse is focused on being fit for the ma’rakah (battle) against Israel. The military buildup is quite clear. In 1970, Syria had 80,000 troops and 13 Syrians out of every 1,000 worked for the security apparatus. In 1990, it had 430,000 troops while 35 Syrians out of every 1,000 worked for the security apparatus. The buildup was a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Between 1979-82, Syria came close to a civil war. Following the battle of Hammah, which ended in 1982, the Syrian army was de-ideologized; it no longer has an ideological project that contradicts the state, but has become a state institution, controlled by the political leadership. The unification of the military command took place in preparation for the coming ma’rakah.

The system is totally authoritative - a form of dictatorship - and the army has wide control. The Ba’ath Party is organized in a military structure (from the top to the base). The party is related to security functions such as examining the security profiles of citizens.

Syria’s social structure is built on the fact that almost half of all state employees work in the security forces: 15% of the Syrian labor force work for the security establishment. The militarization is legitimate, in as much as there is a credible external threat.

Syria has devoted much of its economy to the military system and consequently has a standing debt of US$11 million to Russia. Arab states have donated a huge amount of money to building the civilian infrastructure and Syria has accumulated ‘military dividends’ by being a confrontation state: after 1979, Syria became the sole dependent confrontation state.

If a state is preparing for war, it will eventually be dragged into war, but Syria has been able to postpone the real battle. Technologically and economically, Syria is not ready to face Israel in war. Syria’s preparation for war was not directed towards a battle but rather to strengthening the state and trying to avoid a confrontation with Israel. The Syrian force is built to defend the country and not to launch attacks. The tanks are in defense positions, and the air defense system is well-maintained when compared to the armed vehicles force. Syria’s chemical weapons capability is intended to be a deterrent.

One can see the connection between external security and the regime’s internal security. The regime’s stability is secure for as long as Syrian territory is occupied and the states territorial integrity is not respected. Syria’s economy cannot support warfare, and defense industries are weak. The majority of Syria’s finished goods come off assembly lines where machines do most of the work. The economy would collapse in the event of an embargo.

The Syrian government was convinced that the international initiatives would not be productive due to the deep mistrust between the Palestinians and Israelis. The Syrians, nonetheless, were enthusiastic about the peace conference held during the Bush Administration, and they were the first to respond to the invitation to the Madrid Conference, although they were sure it would fail because of Israel’s position. They decided to go because the alternative - war - was worse. For Syria, an indefinite continuation of the no war-no peace situation would be harmful as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lost interest in financing the country following the Gulf War.

No-War No-Peace
The no war-no peace stalemate gave legitimization to the Syrian regime. The world was interested in Syria as a major power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Full peace with Israel poses a real threat as it would lead to economic and political competition.

Regional Peace
For Syria, peace with Israel would change much of its domestic structure. Syria risks losing its importance and weight through peace. Everybody links Syria’s move towards peace with domestic reform. Once the confrontation stance has ended, the regime will have to bargain with the society. Economic reform could speed up in the absence of external threats, therefore peace with Israel could bring some economic benefits.

Post-Assad
The next leader of Syria will be weaker than Assad. He will have to rely on a coalition and he will have to bargain with his constituents. This weaker regime would have to take into consideration the different interests and demands of the society. The Syrian army has no tradition of inter-fighting, despite the fact that there have been some attempted coups by the military. Moreover, Syria’s internal factions have no interest in disrupting its stability or the slow economic development of the past 25 years.