Lebanon’s Place in the Region
Dr. Basma Kodmani-Darwish

Lebanon, over the years, has been more of an issue than an actor. Similarly, for 30 years, Palestine was dealt with as "the Palestine issue"; only now has it become an actor. At the Madrid Peace Conference, Lebanon was a full partner, but its position as an actor is mostly a formality. There are several factors that impair Lebanon’s role as a distinct actor in foreign policy, and many of these are tied to the internal structure of the country, its history and its politics.

Background

Lebanon is an artificial construct in as much as its existence and composition are based on an historic gentlemen’s agreement. Lebanon emerged as a state in the early 1920s, when France proclaimed the creation of a "Greater Lebanon." Lebanon’s creation was a result of the problems France faced in the region. France, which was extremely hostile towards Arab nationalism, adopted a policy of ‘divide and rule’ and placed severe limitations upon legitimate representation. Thus, Lebanon was created as a combination of 27 different religious communities. After Lebanon declared its independence in 1941, a gentleman’s agreement was established to bind the country together and balance relations. It was based on an agreement between the two largest communities - the Maronite Christians, led by Bishara Al-Khoury and the Sunni Muslims, led by Riyad Salah. This bilateral agreement between the two communities had two components:

Domestic: The political system was based on dividing the major posts between the various (17) communities, with five or six having the most influence. It was a system of institutionalized confessionalism - the distribution of posts according to religion. According to the system, the Head of State was always a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Head of Parliament a Shi’ite. Every governmental post was attributed to a community and not based on any qualifications.

External: The foreign policy component was based on an oral agreement, which demanded that both communities would give up their traditional, natural alliances to the outside environment. The Sunni community had to give up their dream of creating a large, national Arab state and the Maronites had to abandon their inclination to look to outside European and Christian powers for protection.

Collapse of the System

This system, which aimed to bring the different communities together, only worked until 1976. A primary cause for its collapse was the fact that the agreement did not allow Lebanon to go through a process of nation-building and the constituencies were thus never really integrated. Because confessionalism was an organized principle of the state, the communities remained largely autonomous. Civil laws and social life were organized by the communities themselves, each based on a different heritage and there was an autonomy of functioning for each community. The state could not emerge as a strong central apparatus. Instead, it became a place where different pressures converged; it became an arbiter. The state served as the order within which community representatives interacted. A state official reached his position through his community and thus, each official was more concerned about his popularity within his community than with the state. Furthermore, influence on the state by its communities depended on how dynamic the group was.

In addition to this vertical segmentation of Lebanese society and political structure, there existed a horizontal segmentation as well. Within each community existed a ruling elite whose interest lay in maintaining the system. A sense of solidarity developed amongst this elite, with the exception of one group - the Sharifs.

Another major reason for the collapse of the agreement lay with the Shi’ite, who were a minority at the time of its collapse, and who were not integrated into the state system. The Shi’ite were the poor man in the agreement - the weak "third pillar" - even though their population equaled that of the Christians and the Sunni. They were also economically poor, uneducated and less politically conscious. As their population grew at a rate higher than that of other communities, the Shi’ite found themselves marginalized from the political system. This changed over time, especially when many of the Shi’ite who had left in the early 40s and 50s to work in West Africa returned. More conscious and educated, they returned to build their community. Moreover, many rural Shi’ite began to emigrate to Beirut for work, gradually creating a poverty belt around the city. The Shi’ite community became more unified, especially under the leadership of Imam Mousa Sader and Iran. These changes and the entire Shi’ite factor provided a major component in the collapse of the gentleman’s agreement in the mid 70s.

Lebanese Foreign Policy

Lebanon has aimed to become a neutral country like Switzerland, and it has attempted to keep away from regional politics. Yet, without a strong army, a system of defense, and even a small consensus on national identity and foreign policy, Lebanon could not develop a strong neutrality. The lack of consensus did not allow for a separation of domestic and foreign policies, and thus the state could not establish itself as a speaker on foreign policy. The lack of inter-community consensus on foreign policy prevented Lebanon from acting in any way on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neutrality proved non-viable, and Lebanon instead became an arena for the regional conflict.

The Palestinian Factor

Lebanon housed a large Palestinian refugee population, and it was concerned about the prospect of having to assimilate them. Consequently, Lebanon treated the Palestinians as a people who had to fend for themselves. When the PLO gained in strength after 1967, Lebanon was asked to allow the Palestinians in Lebanon to organize themselves and provide for their own security. Furthermore, this 1969 Cairo Agreement allowed the Palestinians to carry arms and to carry on their fight from Lebanon. They became a state within a state, and this development was seen as natural within the Lebanon context. Strong domestic parliamentary debate about the situation emerged, with a minority seeing it as a danger. Many were not conscious of the long-term meaning of the agreement and, pressured by Abdul Nasser, they agreed. The PLO moved in, and the guerrillas followed.

This situation brought the Muslim-Christian cleavage in Lebanon to the forefront, as a majority of Muslims supported the Palestinians. The Christians saw the situation as a threat to their control and, in response, they armed themselves and formed militias. Clashes erupted in 1973, and the Christian Phalangist militia came out strong in 1975. Meanwhile, an Israeli-Syrian dialogue of deterrence emerged in the late 70s and 80s.

Lebanese War

In 1978, Israel, in response to its insecurity about South Lebanon, launched an invasion into the area. It was later forced to withdraw, but it maintained, until today, control over a strip of territory - its "security zone." The invasion also resulted in UN Resolution 425, which is still the basis for Israeli-Lebanese talks. In 1982, Israel invaded again in an attempt to force out the PLO. Up until this time, the Israeli attitude was not to get involved in Lebanese domestic politics. It was primarily with the Likud government of 1977 that the idea to directly interfere in Lebanon’s domestic situation developed. The 1985-85 invasion and occupation resulted in a large number of Israeli casualties, and it brought about a huge internal debate that led to Israel’s retreat to the security zone in 1985.

At the same time, the War of the Camps erupted between the Shi’ite (Amal movement) and the Arafatists in the refugee camps. In 1985, more than 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the Lebanese Christians, and between 1983-85 more than 3,000 were killed by Amal.

As a consequence of the war, Syria was left as the major political actor in Lebanon, taking out all its rivals. Thus 1983-85 saw a new chapter in Lebanese politics, as Syria attempted to build a new political formula for Lebanon that would give Syria a stable role. In 1989, Syria, backed by other states, initiated the Ta’ife agreements in an attempt to stabilize the country.

Ta’ife Accords

The Ta’ife agreements do not change the system of confessionalism. The system remains institutionalized, but with some changes. The three-pillar government remains, with a strengthening in the role of the parliamentary president and an increased number of deputies. A significant change in the system is external - the establishment and recognition of the Syrian role in Lebanon. The agreement recognizes Lebanon’s "national and security imperative"- which is to be protected by Syria: it recognizes the Syrian role of a strategic partner, as well as its strategic concerns in Lebanon.

Yet the political system was created in a way so that it cannot function. The equal power of the three pillars of government means a continual deadlock and thus a need for an arbiter. As a result, the Lebanese have to go to Syria when making any decision.

Syria

The May 1991 Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination gives further legal strengthening to the relationship built on Syrian dominance. It gives legality to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and establishes cooperation and coordination in all fields of life. Syrian withdrawal was to have come in two years, with the organization of the Lebanese government, but instead Syrians forces re-deployed. Nonetheless, a Syrian withdrawal could easily take place at the present time because Syria has built a system of Lebanese dependence. Moreover, Syria has a well-established intelligence apparatus. It has legitimized the Lebanese dependence on Syria for security.

Current Situation

Domestically, changes have been implemented, and Lebanon has a large level of autonomy in its economic reconstruction. Socially, a strong factor in the increased integration is the growing number of inter-religious or inter-communal marriages, although they all take place in civil courts outside the country. Another consensus exists with regard to the Palestinians. All Lebanese feel that they do not want the Palestinians in Lebanon, as they believe that a Palestinian presence could threaten their attempts to build their own consensus.

Politically, Prime Minister Hariri has built for himself a strong legitimacy and a large constituency without disturbing Syria. A national consensus on Syria - that its presence in Lebanon and its influence are both unacceptable - has also emerged. To the regret of the Lebanese, their system does not allow for a strategy to combat this military and economic presence.

The Hariri government has also developed a consensus on two issues: Lebanon is not to enter any war, and Lebanon needs to devise plans for the long term regarding Syria’s heavy military presence, which has imposed a heavy economic burden on the country.

The government has attempted to establish itself as an independent actor through its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France, but many of these attempts have had limited results. For example, in the summer of 1996, after the Grapes of Wrath crisis, Lebanon called upon international countries to play a role. France was brought in to promote Lebanon as an actor, but this was only possible because it was in the Syrian interest as well. Another example is Lebanon’s rejection of the Netanyahu government’s proposed "Lebanon First" agreement: Lebanon feels it may get a better deal through Syrian instead.

Peace Process

Lebanon’s position in the peace process is a reflection of the past 20 years. Yet, the prospect of the implementation of UN Resolution 425 is not so remote anymore. Israel, which used to state that it would not withdraw without a parallel Syrian withdrawal, is now willing to withdraw with security arrangements.

Discussion:

Participant: How stable is the current situation?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: The collapse in the 70s can be blamed to a great extent on the failure of the economic system. Following the prosperity in the early 70s, a large number of people became disheartened with the system. At the same time, the elites tried to maintain their interests. This horizontal solidarity between the ruling elites is strong. At the present time, the situation is still fragile because the Christian Maronite community is not well integrated: their role has been reduced and they feel that they are the losers in the deal. Moreover, they have also isolated themselves - they called for the boycotting of elections - and these factors can only be an element of future instability. This is one area in which Syria can play a role - to help integrate the communities in a balanced way.

Participant: Does Hizballah have a vision of its own?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Hizballah was an Iranian creation, whose structure and activities were developed in cooperation with Iran, and later Syria. Yet, Hizballah has developed its own independent discourse and political strategy, independent of Iran. Hizballah has bowed out of a purely Islamic route and has evolved into a Lebanese political actor. It has become a national resistance movement whose legitimacy is based on its military role. However, it knows that it will be disarmed in the future, and it will then have to create a new role for itself. Disarming Hizballah is not part of the domestic Lebanese system, but of the regional agreement. Any agreement between Israel and Syria will have to address Hizballah and Iran. Iran will need to be involved in the discussion about how to enable Hizballah to develop into a purely political actor. While the group has acquired legitimacy, it has to find a role in the political system and must have political recognition through a representative in the parliament.

Participant: What about the Palestinian refugees?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: The Palestinians may be allowed to remain as civilians, but their legal status is still in question. The number of Palestinians in Lebanon is also unclear and UNRWA’s figures are higher than those of the government. Since the War of the Camps in 1985, almost one-half of the Palestinians in Lebanon have left. About 280,000 remain, but the Lebanese government has been pushing them to leave. Their minimum requirements for daily sustenance are not being supplied and, over the years, many have gone to Scandinavian countries. The Lebanese government also sees the peace process as an opportunity to get the refugees to leave. The refugee problem is a very sensitive issue in Lebanon.
Participant: Would refugees in Syria be pushed out?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Syrian society has accepted the Palestinians and it will most likely keep its Palestinian refugees after the negotiations.

Participant: What is the solution?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Peace in Lebanon should be a routine development. The political formula is not working because of Syria. If something positive occurs, it will most likely be in the economic sphere, in which Lebanon has a more dynamic role. Lebanon has expertise which could be of benefit in the future and it is currently assisting Syria economically by providing jobs. Peace may put Lebanon in a stronger, more independent and stable position.