The Arab League and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Historical Background

After World War II, the political environment in the Arab countries was dominated by the following issues:

the notion of Arab unity, recalling the first Pan-Arab awakening, the roots of which went back to the establishment of secret societies under the Ottomans, such as Al-Ahad (1909) and the Arab Fateh (1913), and the Arab revolt of 1916;
the Palestine Question, recalling the Palestinian revolts and uprising during the British Mandate, the culmination of which was the Great Revolt of 1936 that ended with the St. James’ Conference in London and the British White Paper of 1939.

In the early 1940s, the Arab capitals witnessed a series of political consultations, followed by public statements, concerning Arab unity on the one hand and the Palestine Question on the other. Against this background, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden declared the British government’s support for the Arab countries’ desire for unity and for their right to strengthen their cultural, economic and political ties. Eden stressed that his government intended to support any agreement the Arabs would reach in this regard.

Eden’s declaration met with a mixed reaction in the Arab capitals: the Jordanians welcomed the British position as it supported Prince Abdallah’s plans for the unity of Greater Syria; the Saudis were doubtful and cautious; the Yemenis ignored it; Iraq, Syria and Lebanon expressed no enthusiasm; and Egypt called for Egyptian-Sudanese unity (the unity of the Nile Valley).

Two Arab prime ministers, Nuri Sa’id of Iraq and Mustafa Nahhas Pasha of Egypt, though for different reasons, made intensive efforts to draft the framework for a unity plan on which the various Arab governments would agree. Both men were in direct contact with London.

Nuri Sa’id’s ambition was driven by his vision of a united fertile crescent, as outlined in his Blue Book of 1943. He discussed his ideas with British government officials and introduced the term ‘Arab League’, which then related to the unity of Iraq with Greater Syria, while it left the door open for any other Arab country that wished to join. Nuri Sa’id drafted a specific plan that foresaw the formation of a permanent council of the League to be responsible for the spheres of defense, foreign policy, finance, currency, taxation, and transportation, as well as for the protection of the minorities. He also recommended that Syria and Lebanon, if reluctant to join such a body, should be forced to do so.

Nahhas Pasha invited Nuri Sa’id to Cairo in July 1943 to officially discuss the issue of Arab unity. Although the two leaders agreed, in principle, on the need for Arab unity, they differed in their priorities and on leadership issues. While Nuri Sa’id opted for Syrian-Iraqi unity first, Nahhas Pasha sought a role for Egypt in any form of unification.

In September 1943, Nahhas Pasha also invited Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda, the Prime Minister of Jordan, and discussed with him the possibility of an immediate unification between Syria and Jordan, with the option to invite, at a later stage, Lebanon and Palestine to join. As a political system for such a future unity a monarchy was envisioned. In October 1943, Sa’adallah Al-Jabari, the Prime Minister of Syria, accepted an invitation by Nahhas Pasha for the same reason, but Damascus insisted on a republican system rather than a monarchy.

The Saudis informed Nahhas Pasha about their objection to the proposed unification and expressed their concern about the Hashemite plans and intentions. They clearly limited their support to economic cooperation. In January 1944, the Lebanese President Bishara Khoury notified Nahhas Pasha that Lebanon preferred independence and secure borders for all Arab countries.

The Egyptian-Iraqi attempts to create a unity/unification plan did not succeed but rather led to a political storm in most Arab countries. It became clear that there was a dire need to deliver something in order to meet the people’s expectations and aspirations. Having realized this, Egypt called for an Arab conference, which was held in Alexandria in October 1944. The conference resulted in the Alexandria Protocol, which led to the Cairo Conference and the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945.

According to Arab historians, the Arab League was not intended to serve as a federal union but as an institution that would bring independent states together to discuss issues of common interest and possibly to agree on collective action, while recognizing their independence and guaranteeing their sovereignty. It should be mentioned that throughout all the political consultation that took place between Nahhas Pasha and Nuri Sa’id, the Palestine Question was a core issue on which an Arab consensus was easy to reach. It served as a precedent in that, during the London Conference of 1939, Arab leaders experienced for the first time how to commonly deal with a major cause. The London Conference exposed their differences in terms of ambitions and interests, and revealed how much input each was able and ready to designate in support of the Palestinians.

The Alexandria Conference of 1944 was attended by a Palestinian scholar, Musa Al-Alami, who was chosen to represent all the Palestinian parties since the Arab leaders were against the participation of the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini. Al-Alami worked closely with the Egyptians and the Iraqis, succeeded in easing the British government’s initial reservations about the participation of Palestine as a full member, and delivered a political statement about the Palestinian cause, which gained the support and sympathy of all member states.

Some historians refer to the historical background of the establishment of the Arab League as a British initiative, while others tend to give the credit to Nahhas Pasha. Nuri Sa’id is the least mentioned as the Iraqi priority was to have its own vision of Arab unity - basically confined to the Fertile Crescent - realized. I personally have reached the conclusion that because of the awareness of the public and the common call for Arab unity, as well as for the defense of Palestine, all the parties involved were able to offer varying degrees of input into what eventually led to the establishment of the Arab League.

The Alexandria Protocol placed a special emphasis on Palestine, stating that it is a major component of the Arab entity, that Arab rights should be maintained and defended, and that no peace or stability can prevail as long as Palestine is threatened.

The special resolution on Palestine in the protocol called for the ending of all Jewish immigration to Palestine and the preservation of Arab land. The independence of Palestine was considered a basic Arab right, and the resolution called for the establishment of an ‘Arab Fund’, which would be used to save Arab lands in Palestine.

The Arab League: Challenges and Achievements

As a result of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947 the Arab League held a series of meetings, which concluded with the decision to invite Arab armies to enter Palestine in order to defend its territory and people. This led to the first Arab-Jewish war of 1948, as a result of which Palestine became divided: a major part became Israel, while the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip was ruled by Egypt.

The Arab League’s political committee supported the Palestinians’ decision to establish a government in Gaza and invited its representative to attend all meetings of the League (1949/50). At the same time, the committee expressed its reservations about Jordan’s plan to annex or forcibly unite with the West Bank, stressing that Jordanian rule was only temporary, i.e., pending the ability of the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination.

In 1960, another issue the Arab League dealt with was the deterioration of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations due to the territorial claims of the former. The Arab League defended Kuwait and succeeded in forcing the Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qassem to stop all plans of annexing or invading its neighbor. However, regarding the border dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Arab League failed in achieving a settlement. At the time, the Arab League was led by Egypt, which, although having no objection to interfering in the first issue, was far less keen to interfere in the second, being constrained by the fact that its own military forces were in Yemen to support the Yemeni revolt and to fight alongside the new Republican regime against Saudi interference. These two examples show that in order to understand and judge the achievements and failures of the Arab League, one should read carefully into inter-Arab politics and disputes.

The first Arab League summit in Cairo in 1964 was called for by President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. The two challenges facing the Arab World at that time were the Israeli intention to divert the flow of the Jordan River and the fate of the Palestinians. During the deliberations, the Arab League decided to establish a military umbrella, headed by an Egyptian general (Ali Ali Amr), with the task to reorganize and enforce the Arab armies to defend Arab territories and to counter Israeli threats. Regarding the Palestine Question, the Arab League decided to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then headed by Ahmad Shuqeiri, with the goal to mobilize and unite Palestinians in the struggle for their land and rights.

Following the June War of 1967, Egypt and Jordan caused a division in the Arab League by accepting UN Resolution 242, which was strongly rejected by Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO. It took these countries more than a decade to realize the importance of utilizing UN resolutions in order to confront Israeli deception. In 1969, the Arab League held its famous summit in Khartoum where the Arab consensus was not to accept the defeat of the June War. The resolution passed at the summit stated the participants agreement ‘...to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands, which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab states abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.’

At the Rabat Summit in 1974, despite Jordan’s refusal, the PLO was recognized by the Arab League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Also during the 1970’s, inspired by Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Arab League succeeded in putting an end to the bloody military confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanians, and, at a later stage, helped in achieving a series of agreements between the PLO and Lebanon. This time, it was Saudi Arabia that took the responsibility for inviting all parties involved in the Lebanese Civil War to Ta’if in 1975 in order to conclude an agreement.

A major crisis within the Arab League occurred when Egypt went alone and signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in Camp David in 1979. As a consequence, during the course of the Arab League Summit in Baghdad it was decided to suspend Egypt’s membership and to move the League headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia. For the very first time, a non-Egyptian was appointed as the General Secretary of the League: Shazili Qulaibi of Tunisia succeeded former Egyptian Foreign Minster Mahmoud Riad (whose predecessors were Mahmoud Fawzi and Abdul Rahman Azzam, both also former Egyptian foreign ministers).

In the 1980’s, especially with regard to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the forced departure of the PLO, which sought refuge in Tunisia, neither a single Arab country nor the Arab League interfered. Although, at the most, they released political statements in solidarity with the PLO and the Lebanese people, they did nothing to defend Lebanese territory or preserve its unity.

In February 1985, the PLO and Jordan signed the famous accord that stated their intention to work together towards the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. The Arab reaction ranged between Syrian rejection, Saudi Arabian reservation, and silence on the part of the others.

In November 1987, an Arab League summit was held in Amman. It called for economic cooperation, reconciliation between Iraq and Syria, and inviting Egypt to return to the League; unexpectedly, and for the first time ever, it totally ignored the PLO and the Palestinian agenda.

A month later, however, with the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, all Arab countries with no exceptions expressed their strong support for and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The following year, Arab leaders encouraged Jordan to declare its disengagement from the West Bank. However, the position of the Arab countries with regard to the peace initiatives of the PLO and their interest to enter political negotiations with Israel was rather disapproving.

Another major Arab League crisis emerged during the Gulf War in 1990. The division among Arab counties was obvious: while some condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and joined the foreign allied forces to stop the Iraqi aggression, others called for the formation of a united Arab force to maintain security and stability and to preserve the borders of all the countries in the region. The Arab League decided to condemn the invasion and called on Iraq to withdraw its army. At a later stage, the weight of the Arab League’s position became weaker as it became obvious that each Arab country would eventually decide alone and in accordance with its own interests on what stand to take vis-à-vis the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. This was also the case with regard to the level of normalization with Israel some time later, following the commencement of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference.

The role of the Arab League was also less effective when the US invited various Arab states to participate in the Madrid Conference, which was based on negotiations (both bilateral and multilateral) and on the ‘land-for-peace’ formula. The Arab League was not invited, not even as an observer.

Between 1990 and 1995, the Arab League played more of a side role but it re-emerged to the foreground and is today as viable as it was half a century ago. With the weak process of political negotiations between Israel, Palestinians and other regional countries, the Arab League served as a necessary tool to maintain linguistic and cultural links, to preserve the common interests of its member states, and to cope with the changes in the international arena and their repercussions on the Arab World.

Today, Arab leaders are talking about the need to strengthen the Arab economy and develop a common market, as well as to reinforce inter-Arab peace, to safeguard Arab interests, and to fight security and ‘terror’ threats. The Arab League is now led by another distinguished Egyptian foreign minister, Esmat Abdul Majid, whose task, among others, is to lead it into the 21st century.