SPECIAL PROJECTS

Joint Project 1995/96

BUILDING A BASE FOR COMMON SCHOLARSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING:
PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL
IN THE NEW ERA OF THE MIDDLE EAST


WORKSHOP EIGHT:

 

Political Trends and the New Elites

    4 November 1996, PASSIA, Jerusalem

The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem
Dr. Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem
Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Director, Islamic Cultural and Scientific Society, Jerusalem

The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman
Dr. Ibrahim Othman, Professor of Sociology, University of Jordan, Amman
Dr. Sabri Rbeihat, Sociologist, University of Philadelphia, Jordan

The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Dr. Gad Barzilai, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Yossi Shein, Chair, Political Science, Tel Aviv University

Others/Guests:

Dr. Rex Brynen, Associate Professor, Political Science, McGill University/ICAS, Montreal
Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London
Dr. Joel Peters, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Reading
Ms. Kirsty Wright, Consultant, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv

Summary:

Political Trends and the New Elites in Palestine
by Dr. Bernard Sabella

Generally, the fragmentation and cantonization of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem limit and constrain the integration of the whole society and hence the ability of the Palestinian political elite to effectively standardize and enforce its power and influence across the three territories. Historically, the Palestinian elite was based on religious affiliation with the Fath, with holy places, with religious personalities or associations. For centuries, families with such association, "notables," used their privileged status to gain advantages and powers in socioeconomic, political, and other areas. After 1948, Jordan integrated many of them into its bureaucracy but their position was weakened due to the leadership's failure in 1948, due to the shift in the center of power from the West to the East Bank, and because they were seen as self-contained and not interested in serving the society.

With the emergence of the PLO, political commitment and involvement became important aspects for influence and power. Revolutionary ideology of liberating Palestine replaced the old basis for status, privilege and elitism. The PLO sought to be the major or only center of power and was not interested in competing with forces inside the occupied territories. The inside adopted the passive strategy of "steadfastness" and non-cooperation with Israeli authorities. Any perceived threat to the PLO's role (e.g., the Autonomy Plan of the late 1970s), was answered with the establishment of bodies such as the National Guidance Committee (1978), to consolidate the center-periphery relationship. The local elite was not able to become a national leadership mainly due to the loyalty of the majority of the Palestinians inside to the PLO and due to the Israeli policies of fragmentation and cantonization of the Palestinian Territories. The local elite could deliver only at the local level, Oslo being a good example: while the "local" delegation was negotiating in Washington, the PLO decision-makers conducted secret talks.

The institutionalization of the PNA changed the role of grass-root organizations and political groups; they are no longer mobilizing the masses to confront occupation but are expected to coordinate with the PNA. The PLO has adopted the policy of co-optation of members of family elites; they mutually need each other to legitimize their privileged positions and prestige and build the foundation for an elite-based leadership. A recent poll showed that influential groups can be divided into a number of "elites" (by ranking): academic, security, government, political, industrial-financial-commercial, religious, local-municipal, tourist, real estate and traditional-family. Also, the majority of Palestinians perceive themselves as middle class. Palestinian society tends to adopt policies that encourage the development of open systems of social structure, government accountability, economic development and institutionalization of power and influence.

Discussion: Dialogue among elites; inside-outside conflict; fragmentation of the political elite in Palestine; influence of economic factors on elitism and constituencies.

Political Trends and New Elites in Israel
by Dr. Gad Barzilai

The history of Israel's party system is divided into two periods:

(1) The emergence of Mapai as the dominant socialist party (1932-1973), run by partisan leaders (e.g., David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol) and controlling most of the financial and political bodies in the Yishuv, and a military force. Since 1932 Mapai has won the Jewish Agency, Histadrut, and the National Committee elections; it could supply jobs, land and immigration licenses to its constituencies. Its main political rival, the Revisionist movement, was no real counter-elite. After 1948, Mapai established the IDF and the security services, ensuring its control over them. The successors of Ben-Gurion, who was in charge at the time, have greatly benefited from this apparatus.

(2) The evaporation of dominance in the partisan system, and the emergence of polarization (1974-1996). With Eshkol's rise to power in 1963, the party's prestige declined. He lacked the military image and was, in 1967, forced to enlarge the ruling coalition. With the joining of Begin's right wing Gahal, Mapai lost its unique partisan system and the exclusive sources of popular support, which were the main cause of the evaporation of Mapai's hegemony. Since 1974, due to the two wars and the occupation, political leaders' military/security experience became more relevant. While in earlier years Mapai enjoyed the support of the public majority and most parties, after 1974, polarization and ideological fragmentation made a national leadership almost impossible.

Extra-parliamentary bodies such as Gush Emunim (1974) and Peace Now (1978) mirrored a change in the political fabric. Both were able to mobilize the public, enjoyed the support of larger parties (Likud/Labor) and had an impact on the public agenda as well as on the media. Their activists rose to leadership positions in political parties. Dedi Zucker and Mordechai Bar'On (Peace Now) became major political figures in Ratz; Hanan Ben-Porat (Gush Emunim) in Ha'Mafdal.

The new election law (1996) weakened the effectiveness of the parliament and its elite in supervising the government; political leaders enjoy more executive power outside the legislature, bureaucracy and the military establishment. The large political parties are also weakened while religious and ethnic parties gained more electoral weight. The Haredi parties - a unique type of political elite, based on communal constituencies and religious affiliation - benefited from the new system's split-voting (e.g. vote for Netanyahu and for a religious party). Arab parties do not depend on Jewish parties and can express autonomous aspirations. Their elite was effective in gathering the various groups into two coalitions: Hadash (traditional post-communist Palestinization) and the United Arab list (cultural autonomy for Israeli-Arabs).

The Israeli society has become more Americanized; the Middle Class is stronger than ever before, the economic elite is more powerful, and individualistic traits are more important. Israel is a nationalistic society, with strong elements of racism and militarism.

Discussion: Difference between civil society, the Middle Class, elites and leaders; parties and constituencies; racial, ethnic and gender divisions in Israel; Ashkenasi vs. Sephardim elites; comparison: Palestinian and Israeli pre-state situation/Ben Gurion and Arafat.

Political Trends and New Elites in Jordan
by Dr. Ibrahim Othman

Two factors have influenced Jordan's policies since the time of Prince Abdallah, namely Jordan's geopolitically significant location, and the lack of natural resources which made Jordan dependent on foreign aid.

In its early years, Jordan's political structure and politics were determined by a society of nomads and tribes and the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Political trends are almost exclusively directed by the Hashemites and the King himself. Political parties emerged (1950-60s) but with no clear agenda. The traditional elites - loyal to the Royal family - overpowered the political parties and ruled in all aspects, including the economy. Only the Muslim Brotherhood was to some extent allowed to gain ground as a counter-force to communist groups. Now, its activities are restricted by the government. Today's political parties have no real influence and people do not trust them. The King and the Crown Prince are the only decision-makers. The elite surrounding them has no public support, does not represent any group interests or constituency, and is fully dependent on the royal family.

The Palestinian elite in Jordan is split into two groups both of which depend on the King's/army's backing: (1) those Jordanized and loyal to the Royal family, and (2) those who gained influence and certain power due to their economic status.

Discussion: "bread riots"; stratification in Jordan; role/participation of women and the academia; the marginalized South of Jordan.