SPECIAL PROJECTS

Joint Project 1995/96

BUILDING A BASE FOR COMMON SCHOLARSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING:
PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL
IN THE NEW ERA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem
Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi, CPRS, Nablus
Dr. Ahmad Khalidi, Chief Editor of Majallat Al-Dirasat Al-Filastiniyah (Arabic Quarterly)

The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman.

The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Dr. David Vital, Tel Aviv University

Others/Guests:

Dr. Rex Brynen, McGill University/ICAS, Montreal
Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI, London
Jane Armstrong, Ministry of Defense, London
Bassam Asfour, Jordanian Information Bureau, London
Douglas Davis, The Jerusalem Post, London Office
Christopher Dreyfuss, RUSI
Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Valerie Grove, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Dr. John King, BBC Arabic Service
Awad Mansour, King's College, London
Dr. Joel Peters, Reading University
Sqn Ldr Balaam, Ministry of Defense
Ya'akov Hadas-Handelsman, Israeli Embassy, London

Summary:

Jordan in the Middle East
by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh

From the beginning, Jordan's foreign policy was determined by three factors:

• Its geopolitical significance as a buffer zone between Israel and Iraq, as well as its potential role as dumping ground for refugees from Palestine, and its status as an entity separating Syria from the Peninsula and a bridgehead from Egypt to Iraq.
• The lack of natural resources that made it always dependent on external support.
• Its establishment as a counter power regarding the search for an Arab order (since 1920, Jordan has been pro-West and anti-communist and has played a major role in Arab summits and the formulating of common Arab resolutions).

The combination of all these factors had an effect on domestic issues, alliances, politics and the critical space between state and society, including civil society and opposition.

Jordan could not afford to stay away from the Madrid Peace Conference; the people drew scenarios on possible outcomes but no one knew where it would lead to. Jordan insisted that the talks resume in Washington in order to stress the non-normalization with Israel, symbolized through the geographic distance, and to lobby the US administration and public opinion.

The news of the breakthrough in Oslo led to anxiety and fear of what might happen next. During the negotiations, Jordan did not have its own program but shared the Palestinian agenda. The peace treaty with Israel was seen as the King's own deal, designed to get rid of his headaches and to end the fear of threats from outside. Beyond this he did not care what others thought. The people expected at least economic benefits and are disappointed that nothing has significantly changed.

The King is not interested in playing a functional role on the West Bank; he compromised on Jerusalem, he accepted Egypt's leadership role, and he managed to present Jordan as the only Arab state able to deal with Labor and Likud. The Arab states somehow accepted Jordan's role as a bridgehead between Israel and the Arab world but his approaches towards the Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia could be jeopardized. Jordan is still vulnerable but not as before; it is still a small state but has gained room to maneuver.

Discussion: Leadership role of Egypt; Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty; Jordan's objectives regarding the West Bank; Palestinians in Jordan.

Palestine in the Middle East
by Dr. Khalil Shiqaqi

Since 1948, three basic elements guided Palestinian decision-making: Palestinian nationalism; the Palestinian perception of the regional balance of powers; and the sociopolitical structure in Palestine.

Palestinian priorities have changed during the past decades. The most important change occurred in the mid-1970s when the PLO accepted the notion of Palestinian independence in a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Today, Palestinian objectives are as follows: independence/and independent state; establishment of an open, stable and democratic political system embracing all segments of society; economic prosperity; and good relations with regional neighbors.

In seeking to achieve their goals, the Palestinians perceive the following threats:

• threats to Palestinian existence within a state;
• threats to the integrity of the Palestinian Territories;
• threats to the right of return to the Palestinian state;
• security-related threats;
• threats to national identity (due to geographic separation);
• the threat of outside intervention;
• internal threats (e.g., instability; polarization within the society; rivalries among security services; changing attitudes towards the peace process; discontent with the political and economic developments, and an increasingly authoritarian leadership).

Palestine could very possible contribute to the region by:

• increasing security and stability by minimizing the potential for conflict;
• contributing to political stability, mutual recognition and "normalization";
• facilitating political and sociocultural relationships and economic cooperation.

The Palestinian future role in the region will depend on three main factors:

• The nature of the future entity (a sovereign state, self-rule entity or a confederation); of the political system (democratic or authoritarian) and of the players/elite.
• The nature of regional power structures, alliances, and role of outside powers.
• The nature of regional challenges in terms of security (armament, war, terrorism), political stability (Islamic fundamentalism, political participation, liberalization, elite rivalries), and economic prosperity.

Discussion: settlements as security threat; growing radicalism; Jerusalem; national identity; citizenship; sovereignty.

Israel's Place in the Region
by Dr. Asher Susser

Historical events and the evolution of corporate identities determined the three entities Jordan, Israel and Palestine, which are all products of the struggle for Palestine. As Jordan's policy evolved so Israel was compelled to recognize Palestinian nationalism; the "Jordan option" dissipated and Israel, in coming to terms with the Palestinian national identity, had to redefine itself accordingly. From Camp David (1978) onwards Israel gravitated towards the acceptance of some form of disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza in favor of autonomy or statehood for the Palestinians.

The Oslo Accords and Israel's withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza diminished the notion of Greater Eretz Yisrael. Polls in the 1980s have already shown that a majority of Jewish Israelis prefer the preservation of their state over the Greater Eretz Yisrael concept. The Oslo process paves the way for a Palestinian state or entity of any form and changes the internal balance within the triangle of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. The less integrated the Palestinian Territories are with Israel, economically and politically, the more likely is the development of political and economic links with Jordan, also given the Palestinian population there. However, despite their cultural and social affinity both sides will do their utmost to preserve their separate identities. As Israel does not share such cultural, linguistic and religious affinity, it is unlikely that future bonds with Israel would ever be as close.

Israelis are deeply divided on policy issues and the nature/identity of the state, basically on the definition of Israel as a "Jewish State" or the "State of the Jewish People." The Arab-Israeli conflict is carried out on two fronts: between Israel and the Arab states, and intercommunally, between Israel and the Palestinians. The former is more a military one and directed by the balance of power. The latter has also a military aspect but is primarily a demographic struggle of which side has more people. Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories was not due to high military expenses but due to the realization that demographically, and politically, the occupation has become an undesirable burden.

Any "normalization" of the Arab world with Israel occurs due to pragmatism and the regional balance of power rather than due to ideological transformations. Israel is not yet accepted as part of the family of Middle East nations. The Arabs view peace with Israel as an admission of historical defeat, also regarding cultural and civilization conflicts, with Israel as an outpost of the West that has imposed itself on the region. Thus, Israel is not a "normal" state in the region, but a monument to the Arab-Muslim failure to cope with Western-style modernity.

Israel is a mixture of Western, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean influences. Decades of Arab boycott left Israel with little choice but to orient itself to Europe, the US and the Far East, which makes economic integration with the Arab world now unlikely.

Discussion: "normalization"; ideological transformation; Arab-Israeli conflict vs. European conflicts and the Cold War; Arab perception of defeat.