SPECIAL PROJECTS

Joint Project 1995/96

BUILDING A BASE FOR COMMON SCHOLARSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING:
PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL
IN THE NEW ERA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem
Dr. Ahmad Khalidi, Chief Editor of Majallat Al-Dirasat Al-Filastiniyah (Arabic Quarterly)
HE Afif Safieh, PLO General Delegate to the UK and the Vatican

The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman

The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Senior Fellow, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University
Dr. David Vital, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Ephraim Karsh, Department of War Studies, King's College, London

Others/Guests:

Dr. Rex Brynen, McGill University/ICAS, Montreal
Ms. Ailie Saunders, RUSI, London
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI, London
Jane Armstrong, Ministry of Defense, London
Bassam Asfour, Jordanian Information Bureau, London
Douglas Davis, The Jerusalem Post, London Office
Christopher Dreyfuss, RUSI
Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Valerie Grove, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Dr. John King, BBC Arabic Service
Awad Mansour, King's College, London
Jonathan Rynhold, London School of Economics
Greg Shapland, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

Summary:

Opening Remarks (1)
by Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold

Based on the presumption that there are still many obstacles that could prevent the peace process from reaching the conclusions broadly aspired to, not least the decades of conflict which still live in the minds of the people involved, three institutes - one Palestinian, one Jordanian and one Israeli - consulted together and decided that a significant contribution can be made to resolving differences and promoting understanding by sharing their knowledge and views through a program of workshops, each addressing a particular subject in an academic manner. RUSI's role within this framework was seen as that of a facilitator.

It is clear that the goals of the project as stated in the framework document are difficult to achieve; despite international backing of the peace process, real progress has only just begun and many obstacles and considerable mistrust still exist. I would like to emphasize, however, how important it is to keep such a dialogue valid and to continue such important projects.

Opening Remarks (2)
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

The idea of the project evolved against the background that the Middle East is undergoing a transformation, based on several agreements signed by the players at the heart of the process (Palestine, Jordan and Israel), but a real process of achieving durable peace among the people is far from being reached. Mutual misunderstandings and mistrust still prevail in each of the societies involved, partly because the knowledge accumulated on each of these independently, regarding their separate identities, histories and relationship to others in the region, too often remain the exclusive preserve of each country. The basic objective was to construct a forum for dialogue and analytical approach to the issues which affect each with an emphasis on domestic political developments. This academic endeavor gathers specialists on each of the chosen issues to present their respective views on an equal footing.

State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Palestine
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

The formation of a Palestinian identity goes back to the periods of Ottomanization and Arabization. With the opposition to the British mandate and the emergence of the first anti-Zionist movements, a new chapter in Arab unity began, based on the common desire for sovereignty and independence. Palestinian-Arab unity emerged against this background for the sake of their common cause.

From today's perspective, the irony is that some decades ago autonomy for the Jews in part of Palestine was discussed, while now Oslo provides for autonomy for Palestinians in part of Palestine.

The Palestinians formed all kinds of institutions, organizations and Muslim-Christian societies in Jerusalem, Haifa, Nablus and elsewhere on Palestinian soil, many of which were devoted to working against the Zionist penetration and for Palestinian rights and aspirations. At the same time, the Palestinian national movement was divided along the line of other Arab states which were utilized as potential allies or supporters, especially with regard to the Nashashibi-Husseini rivalry. This division had a negative impact on the Palestinian national movement. While the political elite had no desire to fight and to give up their privileges and the middle class/peasants were divided along the religious dimension, it was the guerrillas that actually fought the battle.

Following recognition of Palestine as the core problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in 1964, of the PLO as the embodiment of the Palestinian national movement, marking the turning point towards "Palestinization", hundreds of grass roots organizations, clubs, women's groups and centers dealing with all kinds of issues were created, building the foundation of what today is called "civil society" as well as for a Palestinian democratic society and its future state.

The period between 1969-82 was characterized by the strategy of steadfastness. During this time, the Palestinians witnessed arrests, land confiscation, humiliation and all kinds of harassment brought about by the occupiers, but despite all obstacles, they tried to live normally and to keep their institutions functional. The main aim of this period was to maintain the status quo while waiting for the PLO leadership, on which all hope was focused, to make the next move.

With the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, things changed and the status quo was challenged; national pride replaced the fear. This change was mirrored by the civil society in the making; the inside eventually convinced the outside of a two-state solution through negotiations, endorsed by the PNC in Algiers in 1988.

With the beginning of the negotiations, another leadership crisis emerged. The inside, the people of the Intifada, convinced the PLO to overcome the humiliation and to join the Madrid conference. At the same time, the inside developed its own ideas - a nightmare for the outside, which reacted by opening several secret channels of negotiations, one of which was Oslo.

The Palestinians now face various challenges with regard to their institution-building process and statehood. Among these are: the development of a democratic system; public support for the elected PLC and national aspirations; and the need to convince Israel of the importance of real peace in the region.

At the same time, the Palestinians have to deal with outstanding issues, including: Jerusalem; the right of return; settlements; and relations with Jordan.

Discussion: minimum demands of the Palestinians; the Intifada agenda; Israeli elections; Netanyahu's scenarios; Arab summit and its meaning.

State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Israel
by Dr. David Vital

The independent State of Israel was up and running on the 15 May 1948 - precisely on schedule and in a form which it has retained to quite a remarkable extent and without interruption ever since. There was no orderly transfer of power from the imperial authority to the emerging state. Palestine, a political unit unknown before the British arrived, was simply evacuated and, upon evacuation, dissolved. The historically relevant questions of Israeli state-building are (1) how was it possible for a functioning state to promptly emerge and (2) how was it that modern Israel turned out to be from the first an enduring parliamentary democracy?

The Jewish people had no king, no prince, no established council of elders, no aristocracy, no clans and clan leadership, no bishops, and no method for agreeing on and implementing issues of common interest. The main characteristic of the Jews was that they constituted a coherent social entity, though linguistically, culturally, religiously, and historically distinct. In their communal affairs, they benefited from their experience in running their own affairs and conducting their own public business on a basis that excluded the participation of the sovereign power, enabling them to maintain their separate national cultural, religious and social identity.

Internal autonomy depended on a moral hold over the community; Jewish leadership was traditionally not aristocratic or hereditary or military but drawn from two sources: the rabbis and men of material substance. It was an oligarchy and not necessarily popular but perceived as legitimate. Traditionally, the society was accustomed to being bound by law - the Law of God - which also held it together as a coherent social body. It was therefore inherently conservative and communal leadership had to be consensual and democratic in the sense of "follow the majority/mainstream." Leaders needed to present themselves as servants of their community. The two central operative principles that led Jewish society were that social action must be free and voluntary, and that leaders were answerable to those they led and subject to public criticism.

For all these reasons, parliamentary democracy came naturally to the Jews as the sole form of government that was conceivably acceptable to them. The great deviation from it was the Zionist movement that initially formed only a small fraction of the Jewish people worldwide. A small executive committee, the elected "Smaller Actions Committee" presided over by Herzl, was authorized to handle the affairs of the movement. This "parliament," the Congress of Zionists, and an intermediate, smaller body, the Greater Actions Committee, built the skeleton of government. A range of ideological and regional parties and groups of all kinds emerged, all seeking to be elected to the Congress and to gain the support of the Jewish public at large. The major political parties in modern Israel, the Knesset and the Cabinet system have their origins in the early times of the Zionist movement and its "executive," the Jewish Agency.

Mapai - in coalition with other parties - had the dominant presence in all relevant institutions (e.g., the Histadrut, Va'ad Le'umi, Jewish Agency) and was the basis on which David Ben Gurion converted the Yishuv into a fully autonomous nation.

Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner (1938-1944) who was to implement the White Paper of 1939 judged according to what would be best for Britain in the Middle East. He did not doubt that any Jewish state in Palestine would be viable. His wisdom was very much that of the man on the spot; like the Royal Commissioners seven years earlier, he knew what he was talking about.

Discussion: 1947 Partition Plan; Jewish Agency as predecessor of the parliament; Zionist movement; Jewish immigration and the transition from pre-state to state; multi-ethnicity in Israeli society and nationalism.

State-Building, Identity, Pluralism and Participation in Jordan
by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh

The process of Jordanian state-building fits very much into the pattern of state-building in the Third World in general. Jordan lacked two important "ingredients": (1) an economic surplus; and (2) an elite other than the Hashemite dynasty stemming from the Hijaz. Both were temporarily provided by the British authorities. The state was developed from outside which had a monopoly on the government and its entire bureaucracy from the beginning.

It was people like Majali, Al-Fayez, and Arra who during the early years demanded that power be given to the "sons of the land" and were subsequently promoted. Along with this, the exclusion of non-Jordanians in relevant positions within the state bureaucracy began. The next step was the attempt to Jordanize the Palestinian population of Jordan but what was intended to be an integration process turned into a series of conflicts and clashes, not least over political positions.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the relations between Jordanians and Palestinians were satisfactory but this changed with the War of 1967. The emergence and rise of Fatah, then led from Gaza, brought a lot of unrest into the country and resulted in the exclusion of Palestinians from positions of power and heightened discrimination.

Today, we can speak to a large extent of integration. The relations between Palestinians and Jordanians could have improved during the Gulf crisis but this unique opportunity was missed. As for the future, I don't see a confederation with the Palestinians in the near future, although we will continue to have a say on the West Bank.

In the political spectrum we are currently witnessing the main party losing ground. The Islamist movement is more sound than in other Arab states; it is imbedded in the middle class and not so much a protest movement as one that promotes its Islamic ideas and believes. A major problem in Jordan is tribalism and strong communal relations. From the Jordanian point of view, the Arab-Israeli conflict has formally come to an end and no major protest has occurred. Political activism, as well as participation and mobilization is less fruitful than was the case in the 1960s, and more difficult to implement. The sense of belonging to a large community still plays a big role and elections are clearly run along tribal lines and other clan linkages that are mainly based on patterns of land distribution. Political parties exist but not as formal institutions as in the West. At some time, tribal links will become democratic in terms of voting patterns, but the long-term impact of such a change on the Jordanian civil society is unclear.

Discussion: state-building; demographic features; Palestinian-Jordanian cleavages; Abdallah and Hussein; balance of power in Jordan; Islamists; tribalism; identities; three-state scenarios (Palestine, Jordan, Israel); recent dissatisfaction and unrest; opposition.