SPECIAL PROJECTS

Joint Project 1995/96

BUILDING A BASE FOR COMMON SCHOLARSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING:
PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL
IN THE NEW ERA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA
Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama - Center for the Dissemination of Information, Jerusalem
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Former Spokeswoman, Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Talks

The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman

The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Head, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv
Dr. Elie Rekhess, Senior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Professor Ephraim Yaar, Head, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Tamar Hermann, Director, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research

Summary:

The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - A Palestinian Perspective
by Dr. Riad Malki

There has never been a classical opposition in Palestine, on the one hand because there were no elections, and thus no government-opposition situation, on the other, because opposition exists only regarding specific issues (e.g., the peace process), but not in general. Vis-à-vis other topics (e.g., the occupation) there is often unity among the factions. The opposition lacks the experience of being an opposition; it does not know how to play the role properly.

The Palestinian people experienced separation between factions only on certain issues but disputes always ended with a reconciliation, so no real "feeling" for opposition has developed. Furthermore, the concept of opposition found no space within the PLO system which is based on and functions by consensus. Thus, even during the last 18 months, perhaps with a few exceptions, the public never saw a serious confrontation between the PNA and the opposition. Relations are rather characterized by the development of a dialogue between the two camps.

Today, the opposition has two basic options: to find and define an entirely new role, or to continue its traditional role with some possible extensions. For the time being, the opposition has chosen the second option: not to destroy what the PNA tries to build, and to 'swallow' policies and decisions rather than actively display real opposition. The existence of such a loyal opposition is to the PNA's advantage, and there is no real threat of a civil war.

Previously, the opposition did prevent peace initiatives since they were regarded as failing to achieve justice and the recognition of Palestinian rights. After the Gulf War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, however, new realities emerged and made it impossible to talk in the old terms regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This made the opposition look at Madrid in a new way which could best be described as the concept of phases: it became more pragmatic and receptive to the idea of various stages which eventually will lead to a Palestinian state.

The opposition differs between the Jerusalem-Madrid-Washington stage and the Oslo/post-Oslo stage of the peace process. The first stage is considered the "premature" stage since the opposition was still in the making, did not materialize in terms of actions/statements and did not even seriously count with an outcome of the peace negotiations as all previous peace initiatives had failed.

With the shock of Oslo the "mature" stage began. The opposition felt it was time to respond and increased its political activity considerably: meetings and lobbying took place in order to create public opinion, and military actions were launched, although initially by the Islamic opposition rather than the PFLP or DFLP.

The position of today's opposition can be best described as "rejectionism." As things develop and the PNA sets up offices, the activity of the opposition declines, although the PNA's policy of detaining members of the opposition groups has also played a role in restricting opposition activities. Another factor is that the DFLP/PFLP were always attached to the PLO system; therefore, they have opted for "contained confrontation," i.e., confrontation, but with recognized limits in order not to reach a point of no return in regard to their relation with the PNA. In contrast, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were neither used to the PLO style and leadership (Arafat) nor bound by traditional ties, and thus went beyond certain limits, launching numerous military attacks on Israeli targets.

After Oslo, the opposition began to discuss among themselves and with the PNA the new relationship between the two sides. Initially, the opposition decided not to deal with the PNA at all but when pressure started mounting the leadership outside was forced to revise its position. Now, its members contact Arafat on certain matters. The PNA, however, has more of an interest in maintaining contact with Hamas because of its military actions which are counterproductive to the PNA's activities.

The opposition is still preoccupied with more pressing current issues such as Oslo I and II and the coming elections, so it has not yet had time to discuss the permanent status negotiations and its role regarding them. It can be assumed though that its role will be very limited, due, in part, to the existing sense of continuity as far as the negotiators are concerned which doesn't leave place for the opposition. The opposition sees its future in representation in local councils (i.e., village or municipal councils), from where it will be able to articulate its opposition. Furthermore, it sees peace as a risk which it does not want to take. Thus, Fatah decides, takes the risk and pays the price while the opposition prefers to see what happens and then to decide if it agrees or not.

Discussion: the opposition during the Intifada; the opposition's failure to present an alternative agenda; evolution of the PLO outside vs. development of the political structure inside and their de facto competition; anti-systemic vs. systemic opposition; Islamic vs. secular opposition; opposition during the state-building process; Palestinian elections; Syria and its impact on the opposition.

The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - A Jordanian Perspective
by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh

The process of political development and participation in Jordan has some unique characteristics starting with the Jordanian state being a result of territorial reconstruction in the region following World War I. Jordan has developed from without while other states are usually built from within.

1989 saw an unprecedented democratization campaign. In April 1989, it became clear, however, that the Palestinian community of Jordan was out of the game; the elections became a purely Jordanian domestic matter and therefore, Palestinians rejected participation. Today, the Palestinian vote is increasingly likely to go to Islamist groups.

In 1993, the King formally ended the Arab-Israeli conflict on his part. Being concerned about the social-demographic agenda as well as about the Islamists who increased their interference in secular life, he ordered a change to the election law. This was the first step back from democratization and the beginning of an "erosion" regarding the King's popularity. Jordan's economic opening to the West, which was soon followed by a political opening, might have strengthened the government but was not actually approved by the people.

At the beginning of the peace process with Israel, the opposition said it could understand Jordan's need for peace but stressed that it could not agree due to its own point of view. The government became increasingly authoritarian, banning the opposition almost entirely from the media and meetings under the pretext of securing the peace treaty. However, a poll conducted in August 1994 showed that two-thirds of the population supported the Washington Declaration [July 1995], mainly for the sake of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the people were very doubtful about Israel's seriousness.

In Jordanian elections, it is almost impossible to run along issues as patronage (services) and tribalism still play a major role. A constituency build on tribal structures and the state of the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship are two aspects that effect the opposition considerably. Even Palestinians who feel comfortable in Jordan are, after all, Palestinians. This self-defense mechanism traces back to the exclusion of Palestinians from the entire Jordanian bureaucracy/public sector. This discrimination has forced many Palestinians to emigrate (Gulf countries) or into business. A recent study by the Center for Strategic Studies has shown that today, 83-84% of the capital of the Jordanian private sector is Palestinian-owned. While the public sector is almost entirely occupied by Jordanians, the private sector is mostly in Palestinian hands.

Sooner or later the public sector must be reduced; this will affect mainly Jordanians. At the same time, the private sector becomes more powerful. Reforms are urgently needed and should include more innovation, new forms of property rights, and more Palestinian participation, etc., all of which would have a positive effect on the redistribution of the domestic income. Such reforms need state intervention, however, and the government does not show any movement in this direction.

Discussion: King's legitimacy (Western, Israeli, Jordanian viewpoint); Jordan's de-democratization process; Jordan-Israeli peace; ethnicity and identity in Jordan; issue of Hashemite vs. Jordanian; Jordan's plans vis-à-vis the West Bank and Iraq; King Hussein- Arafat relations; return of refugees; Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan; security issues.

The Opposition and its Role in the Peace Process - An Israeli Perspective
by Professor Ephraim Yaar

Israel's political parties and their stand towards the peace process have to be seen against the background of their historical evolution. The roots of Israel's main political parties and their characteristics go back to the formative years of the Yishuv (pre-state era). Parties were formed as soon as Jewish settlement began, i.e., in the 1920s. Israel represents a classical case of Parteienstaat, where political parties play a more important role and have greater influence than in other democracies because they and their constituencies have always been strongly ideological. Today's parties have - in their identity and ideology - emerged from those in the pre-state era.

Israel's multi-party system dates back to the beginning of Zionism. It developed due to two main reasons:

• The electoral system of "relative representation," invented in order to allow wide support and participation among the various Jewish communities in Europe. A major result of this was the need to form coalition governments ever since.
• The ideological cleavages within the Zionist movement, within which the underlying ideologies have been the same for about 100 years. This has contributed to the development of a multi-party system, since the creation of many smaller parties is very likely if political parties are formed on ideological rather than pragmatic bases.

The political spectrum during the Yishuv reflected the three ideological dimensions:

• socialist vs. capitalist vision of society;
• strategy/attitudes vis-à-vis a) England and b) the Arab world (accommodation vs. conflict);
• secular-religious issue.

After 1948, the Israeli political structure remained much the same. The change came with the War of 1967, when Israel witnessed an unprecedented revival of nationalism, particularly among the religious Jewish-Orthodox communities. Previously, the religious camp was mainly interested in annual budgets and its representation in the government. With the occupation, a "messianic spirit and vision" re-emerged. Particularly the younger members of the religious parties became the spearhead of the national forces, joined the radical secular right and laid the foundation for an ideological joint venture between the religious and secular ultra-nationalists. Since then, the political spectrum of Israel can be described along a single dimension: the left-right continuum, now expressing where someone stands towards the Arab/Palestine-Israeli conflict. (In the current Knesset, 56 members out of 120 are left while the remainder, i.e., the majority, are right.)

Today, when examining the attitudes towards the peace process in terms of the degree of religious adherence, one finds that religious observance is the main parameter. A poll of 29 October 1995 confirmed the general rule: the more religious one self-defines himself, the less likely he is to support the peace process. Most supporters come from the secular camp, but many of those would not go as far as supporting the evacuation of settlements, for example, for the sake of peace.

Discussion: Rabin assassination and effect on Israeli political system/peace process/elections; secular vs. religious vs. national forces; the implication of Rabin's assassination for the religious right; right wing settlers and their future; de-legitimization of right wing groups vs. decline of democratic values within Israel.