SPECIAL PROJECTS

Joint Project 1995/96

BUILDING A BASE FOR COMMON SCHOLARSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING:
PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL
IN THE NEW ERA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The Palestinian Team:

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA
Dr. Riad Malki, Director, Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Information, Jerusalem
Professor Said Zeedani, Professor of Philosophy, Birzeit University

The Jordanian Team:

Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, Amman

The Israeli Team:

Dr. Asher Susser, Head, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv
Dr. Elie Rekhess, Senior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Professor Yohanan Peres, Sociologist, Tel Aviv University

Summary:

Internal Constraints and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process - An Israeli View
by Professor Yohanan Peres

Professor Yohanan Peres mentioned the following obstacles to peace Israel is facing:

Structural considerations: these aggravate concession-making and include: the smallness of the three territories (Jordan, Israel, Palestine), in all regards (economy, security, etc.); the deep historical cleavages and mistrust due to the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict; an Israeli leadership which thinks of peace first in terms of CVs, power and positions; a religious competition between Judaism vs. Islam and Christianity; and the internal religious conflict between secularists and religious observers.

The historical context of the peace process: Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are "second-wave" national movements. The military sphere is replaced by "unification" and "cooperation" in fields such as the economy and culture, etc. This is still new and people are confused by the picture of the enemy who has now become an "ally."

The "Masada-Complex": the fear of defeat still exists and has caused Jewish hypersensitivity to anti-Semitism. For Israelis today the question is not whether the Arabs are motivated to fight us - this is taken for granted anyway - but whether they have the opportunity to do so, and whether they would take it.

The issue of consistency: Jordan, Israel and Palestine are all incapable of surviving without external allies, which they must consistently keep interested. Today's concessions center around questions such as if the argument for Hebron to be returned to the Palestinians is that it is Arab land, then what about Jaffa? Where is the line to be drawn for concessions since the whole of Israel is built on Arab land? What is the justification for returning one place but not the other?

Constraint of the electoral balance: the Israeli electoral situation is characterized by a long-term balance with small fluctuations, between two major parties, which are often dependent on coalition with rather insignificant groups. The Rabin coalition is built on a majority of less than 0.5% over the right wing opposition! This creates a very unstable situation. Such "skin-majorities" are typical results and any organized minority - such as Russian immigrants (10%) - could claim to be the crucial coalition partner without which it would be impossible to win the next elections. Furthermore, the borders between the parties are quite blurred: there are MKs in the current Knesset who are in fact much closer to the Likud or right wing.

Public opinion: a public opinion poll (June 1995) about the peace process has shown a gradual but clear decline of support for the peace process. The response indicates also that general principles are easier to reach than specific ones: 60% agreed in general on the "Concept of Peace," while only 38% agreed on the actual "Oslo Agreement." Mistrust still proves to be strong with 71% fearing that the Arabs would destroy Israel if they could. Only 36% believe that the Oslo Accords will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and only 48% believe that peace between Arabs and Israel is possible in the near future.

Discussion: Ashkenasi vs. Sephardi Jews; Arab-Israelis and their parties; Islamic funda-mentalists in Israel and Hamas; Israeli elections 1996; peace process; Arab Druze; land confiscation and Israeli "morality"; security concerns; coexistence in the Middle East.

Domestic Constraints on Middle East Negotiations - A Jordanian Perspective
by Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh

Dr. Hamarneh listed the following main constraints to peace from Jordan's perspective:

Lack of information: e.g., Jordanians were not aware about Israel's occupation of Jordanian land until Madrid, when this issue was put on the agenda.

Public opinion: following the peace treaty with Israel, Jordanians witnessed neither a change in the Israeli attitude towards them, nor any economic benefits. For the people it is as if they contributed to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but did so while failing to settle the refugee problem and the Jerusalem question, and by selling out the Palestinian people on the West Bank.

The government's attitudes and policies: since the secret initiation of peace, a lot of censorship as well as other forms of oppression has occurred, and democratic achievements are on the wane.

Discussion: Jordanian-Palestinian relationship; Arab states and normalization with Israel; King Hussein-Arafat relations; what comes after the King?; political elite in Jordan; Palestinian Authority - performance and relation with Jordan.

Domestic Constraints on Middle East Negotiations - A Palestinian Perspective
by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Background
With the Intifada, Palestinians entered a new chapter in their struggle for freedom and independence; family/clan policies faded away and a new generation of young middle class activists emerged. After the phase of sumud (steadfastness), these new activists aimed at changing the status quo: the establishment of the state of Palestine now comprised only 22% of historical Palestine, i.e., for the first time, the West Bank and Gaza appeared as the territory for the future state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

During the Middle East peace negotiations, the Palestinians inside delivered the "PISGA" (Palestinian Interim Self Government Arrangements) Plan which consisted basically of a national authority, a transitional phase, Israeli military withdrawal and elections. The "inside" attempted to lead, while the "outside" (PLO) was far away. Therefore, the PLO opened five secret channels of negotiations, one of which was Oslo and led to the DoP, thereby putting the PLO in the driver's seat again.

Constraints Concerning the Current Process
Jerusalem (land, demography, Israeli closure policy, Palestinian institutions).

Palestinian national legitimacy: Palestinian national legitimacy is institutionalized in the PLO (PNC, Central Council, Executive Committee), but following Oslo, all of these institutions were challenged by pro- and anti-Oslo issues, the domestic vs. Diaspora leadership argument, and the question whether the PNA's performance was satisfactory or not. The leadership is witnessing a crisis: the Arafat-appointed figures are not real leaders, nor are they recognized, and only elections can deliver new faces and new thinking while legitimizing leaders. As for now, though, the elections are designed as "Fatah-elections." Another problem is the national political agenda vs. cities' agenda: Hebron and Gaza for example, are "special cases" and we can expect others under the Israeli concept of redeployment. It makes it almost impossible to unite everyone under one agenda. The problem of the special cases threatens to replace the national cause, and there is also not a single place to which everyone has access in order to meet and discuss. The Israeli agenda aims at a "Ghettoization" of Palestine. The geopolitical fragmentation leads inevitably to a national fragmentation of the people, and to division and competition of interests.

Performance of the PNA: the competence and credibility of officials are questioned, and despite a huge number of civil and security staff nothing seems to move. Regarding the negotiations agenda and the negotiators: Arafat is dealing autocratical-ly with his staff, and there are neither clear responsibilities nor continuity within the negotiation team. Other problems regard confusion regarding spending, accountabili-ty, institutions, civil servants and police.

Legal system: the current legal situation in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip is still a "jungle," a combination of Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and British (Mandate) laws and by-laws. The shape of a future Palestinian constitution is still unclear, as are future internal and external security arrangements, the status of religion, and new Palestinian laws.

The Israeli agenda: among the open questions are the settlement issue, Israeli military presence/security/redeployment/"Separation Plan", Palestinian elections, the fate of Palestinian refugees/deportees/displaced persons/prisoners and detainees.

The economy: we need a clear divorce, as we cannot continue to be dependent on Israel, but have to develop our own economic system. There must be a break away from Israeli domination; we can look for ways to cooperate.

Revival of the Jordanian option: cooperation between Jordan and Palestine will be necessary but we need to build a relationship.

Prospects: possible scenarios: (a) the existence of two de facto bi-national states: Jordan (Palestinian-Jordanian) and Israel (Israeli-Palestinian) with one nation always having less rights and opportunities than the other; (b) a clear divorce, accompanied by a leadership legitimized through elections, a Palestinian entity on Palestinian national soil, and a Palestinian state; (c) Jordan having a say on the West Bank while Palestinian issues are pending and not yet resolved.

Discussion: PLO vs. PNA; ideological and leadership crises within PLO bodies; current legitimacy and coming elections; future negotiations; Palestinian-Jordanian relations; refugee issue; PNA performance and future prospects; Palestinian opposition; Palestinian sovereignty; the amendment of the Palestinian covenant.