The papers were presented and discussed at these workshops prior to their publication. Participants in the workshops consisted of those from educational institutions, community organizations, political activists and professionals, who will encourage practical use of the ideas raised in the local context. To conclude the programme, two of the research studies were published in book form and the other three are expected to be published at a later date.

Project Objectives

Specific objectives of the project were:

To provide a forum for open and free debate on ideas, issues and aspects of democracy in relation to Palestinians in the OPT.

To encourage greater awareness of the value and importance of using the tool of open and fair elections in a period of transition.

A long term objective was to help the development of democratic institutions of civil society.

Project Activities.

The authors and subjects chosen for the papers were as follows:

1. Author - Raja Shehadeh.

Lawyer; Co-founder of Al Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International commission of Jurists in Geneva; member of legal advisory committee for the Palestinian delegation in the Middle East Peace Process.

Subject-"The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank".

2. Author - Dr. Khalil Shikaki.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, An-Najah University, Nablus; Director of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus. Author of various studies on the Palestine Question.

Subject-"The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations".

3. Author - Ali Jarbawi.

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Bir Zeit University; political commentator and columnist.

Subject-"Mechanisms for Palestinian Elections: The Laws, Candidates and the Electorate, Parties, Funding and the Media."

4. Author - Mahdi Abdul Hadi.

Academic; member of the Palestinian delegation to the multilateral working group on Refugees in the Middle East peace process; political analyst and author of various studies on the Palestine Question.

Subject-"Democracy in Theory and Practice among Palestinian Factions in the Occupied Territories, including Islamic Political Trends.

5. Author - Ruba Hussari

Researcher; Jerusalem Media & Communications Centre (JMCC)

Journalist - Ramallah.

Topic-"The role of the Palestinian Media in a future Democratic System."

Throughout August and September 1994, all five workshops took place and details are as follows:

Workshop One

Subject: "The Role of the Palestinian Media in a Future Democratic System."

Speaker: Ruba Hussari.

Date Held: Tuesday 23rd August 1994.

Place Held: PASSIA, Jerusalem.

Participant Information:

Participants included representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; academics; professionals (particularly media professionals); and political activists. Also in attendance was the PLO representative in London, Mr. Afif Safieh, who is planning to return to Jerusalem and establish a new Palestinian daily newspaper in English.

Summary

Points raised were:

1. The position of the media as defined by the articles of the Palestinian interim by-laws.

2. National security needs of the society and the role of the media.

3. The right of the media to discuss and influence political decisions.

4. The social and political agenda of women in the transitional phase.

The case of An-Nahar was raised and it was agreed that it was a political message to Jordan from Arafat that had been sent to the wrong address. The reaction of NGOs and community leaders was very clear in it's opposition to the move and questions were raised as to what guarantees there could be that this kind of "incident" wouldn't happen again.

The situation of the Lebanese press in the 60's and 70's was raised and whether or not the Palestinians would allow the free operation of newspapers writing on behalf of other Arab states, or if the print media would be Palestinian only.

The role of the Authority and the Egyptian experience in 1974/75 was considered. At this time, the Egyptian government established a higher council for media and drafted a code of ethics for journalism. The by-laws allowed for press ownership of 49% by media organisations themselves with the remaining 51% government owned. It was asked if Palestinians would leave the decision on media guidelines to the National Authority, or if there was room for those working in the media to draft or influence the guidelines under which they will work themselves.

On the issue of censorship, it was noted that Palestinians had been crippled by Israeli censorship laws for many years. There was a general fear of the attitude of the Palestinian National Authority to the media organisations. Would they bring censorship or would they accept the challenge and have enough confidence in the media to let it function normally and without interference.

The exposure to mass media with new technology and increased television and radio time should be devoted to truth, objectivity and the building of credibility and confidence, otherwise the Palestinian media will lose a large part of it's audience.

There was a discussion on the extent to which the media can help promote elections by writing about them and having public radio and television debates. The problem of the current media was raised and it was noted that there was one major newspaper, two small bi-weekly papers and one very poor quality English newspaper. In the area of broadcast media, there was only a skeleton service operating from Jericho.

It was asked what forums were available for the mainstream and the opposition through which they could challenge the status quo and if these were not made available, would the opposition only be able to assert itself through the distribution of underground leaflets as had before.

It was asked what forums could be made available to address issues of concern to women. Cases of murder and abuse of women, as well as gross inequality of marital and divorce rights were raised and the fact that there is no media forum to address these problems.

The Islamic opposition pointed out that although they recognize "Palestinian" authority, they do not recognize it as "National" authority. A large component agreed in principle, that it must prove it is "National", therefore emphasizing the need for elections to give it legitimacy as a National Authority. They noted their disappointment at the lack of reaction to the Israeli closure of [the pro-Hamas newspaper] Al-Bayan. They maintained however, that they had a continued interest in national dialogue to maintain harmony and understanding and to develop ideas.

Independent personalities said that more tools must be made available by the media, to ensure that the whole range of political views can be aired. There were often articles which would appear representing a different point of view each week. This had recently become less common and it was urged that this particular tool for promoting ideas be adopted strongly by any current or future media concern.

The secular opposition groups criticized the way in which the Palestinian Authority had dealt with the media issue so far, pointing out that there had been contradictory statements by ministers and that there was a complete absence of forums to publicly oppose the closure of An-Nahar. The main Palestinian daily Al-Quds had not mentioned the episode and this meant that there was no `free press'.

Workshop Two

Subject: "Mechanisms for Palestinian Elections: The Laws, Candidates and the Electorate, Parties, Funding and the Media".

Speaker: Ali Jarbawi - Professor of Political Science, Bir Zeit University.

Date Held: Wednesday 31st August 1994.

Place Held: Islamic Society for Culture and Science, Al-Ram, West Bank.

Participant Information:

Participants included most Islamic leaders; secular factional leaders; Christian community leaders; members of the Palestinian Independent Group for Elections; academics; professionals; and political activists.

Summary

From the popular point of view, the importance of elections was seen as an introduction or preliminary step towards forming a democratic political system. People have suffered from being denied a say in their daily life but are very aware that the National Authority could become a military authority.

Individuals and institutions need more time to fully come to terms with the marriage between the outside and the inside and it is hoped that elections will help to consummate this relationship.

From the point of view of the National Authority, elections would grant it legitimacy. The Authority went from military struggle by an established leadership to leadership without struggle to negotiations which it shared with new leaders inside. Elections can legitimize both the old and the new.

From the opposition point of view, elections give the people the right to control the governing authority; maintain [the opposition's] political and social position and invalidate attempts to marginalize it.

It was noted that any election which takes place, be it municipal or legislative, is part of and within the control of the DOP. Whether this fact is approved of or not, any attempt to ignore it amounts to self delusion.

Palestinian strategy should be to build consensus among all parties that the eventual objective is to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 territories without jeopardizing the historic rights of the Palestinian people. The purpose of elections is to establish a representative body on the land and to establish an elected legislative council.

From the point of view of others (eg. Israel, the West, Arab States etc.), elections are an affirmation of the DOP, a dividing line between the inside and the outside and a mechanism whereby the current leadership can be changed. There is also a link between financial support and elections whereby donors call for elections as a measure of credit worthiness.

The central question is how to use the principle of elections and to create Palestinian modalities agreed by all parties in order to establish a truly representative political body. Palestinian objectives should not jeopardize the union between inside and outside nor their aggregate rights.

To establish a basis whereby Palestinians are capable of making and developing legislation on all aspects of life is of prime importance. What is proposed, is to create electoral by-laws for the transitional phase which will not jeopardize the rights expected in the final phase.

The electoral system should be temporary, used once only and should consider very carefully the societal conditions on which it must be based. Of particular relevance to this, is the fact that the society is very much orientated to group loyalty and sensibility, be it familial, tribal, geographical, factional or religious. Moreover, the gap and differences between the law and the conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should also be considered with care.

There is a need for temporary by-laws for the transitional phase and an outline of a permanent legal system. There is a need for all by-laws to be unified by an independent legal committee and there is no problem envisaged with the National Authority appointing such a committee. There is a need for a governing system or constitution which separates between various authorities and promotes balance among them.

Proposed modalities for election are on three levels:- the central level, the regional level and the local level. On the central level, it is estimated that there are six million Palestinians and based on a ratio of one seat per twenty thousand people there would be a total of three hundred seats. These three hundred elected members would form the Palestinian Parliament. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) would be responsible for affairs inside and in the diaspora.

The regional council will consist of one hundred seats for both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, all of whom will automatically become members of the PNC. Elections will not take place should Arab Jerusalem citizens refuse to participate or are denied the right to participate.

The local body shall consist of 20 members, who will form the National Authority and will be the caretaker government. This level shall be responsible for the two levels indicated above.

The Islamic groups raised the possibility of boycotting the elections. It was declared publicly on August 30th by Sa'eb Erekat, head of the appointed commission for elections, that 5 papers had been submitted to Israel for approval of general elections. The Palestinian Authority had set the date of December 15th for these to take place. As yet there has been no response and Chairman Arafat has been criticizing Rabin for delaying the election process.

In discussion it was clear that the Islamic interest in elections and reaction to the issues raised, was for their own politically partisan interests and not for national interests. It was understood, however, that if the community agreed on an electoral system and demanded and pushed for use of the system they had chosen, rather than boycott that agreed upon by the Authority and Israel, then the door for elections would be open.

The secular opposition agreed on the need to continue the national dialogue and the need to create modalities of electoral planning based on maintaining unity between inside and outside and by not necessarily legitimizing the DOP. Elections to the PNC, therefore, are possible but not to the autonomy council.

There was a heated debate on the possibility of a campaign by the Islamic and secular opposition to boycott the elections, but both are committed to continuing this kind of open discussion on the subject.

Workshop Three

Subject: "The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations".

Speaker: Dr. Khalil Shikaki - Professor of Political Science, An-Najah University, Nablus. Director of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus.

Date held: Friday September 9th 1994.

Place held: Marna House Hotel, Gaza City. Tel/Fax: 07 823322

Participant Information:

Participants included representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; academics; professionals; representatives of women's movements; political activists and media representatives.

Summary

The speaker made introductory remarks emphasizing that the geographical separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has meant that there have been two different sets of experiences and established de facto circumstances which have led to the further strengthening of the divide between the two regions and created many obstacles and distinctions between them. Despite the negative effect of Israeli occupation policies and practices for the past 27 years which exacerbated the distinctions between the two regions it did actually link them together for the first time. Since the Madrid negotiations and the following Washington/Cairo accords, the whole region is facing a new era and new conditions are present which can strengthen the current weak linkage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

There is a need for a Palestinian authority, a need for a Palestinian political system and a need to deal with local, regional and external problems. There are several options to be considered when estimating how best to address these problems.

Responses to an academic questionnaire showed deep differences in awareness of the gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What is required are new conditions for the transitional phase which can put an end to the differences and close the gaps. The scenario of developed autonomy over a semi-independent entity capable of expanding its authority to the rest of the West Bank can be considered if there is a politically functioning Palestinian authority with control over its security.

Any scenario for an independent state necessitates the withdrawal of settlers and settlements, the withdrawal of the IDF and the establishment of one political entity with one market. The choice of option for the future must rest on a careful reading of Palestinian capability and interests taking into consideration the economical, social and domestic interests of all three parties: Jordan, Israel and the PLO. There is a need to review all parties' interpretations of the current situation and how they view the future .

There is a Palestinian consensus that a political independent entity is being built but this is not the only option to unite the people and the land. There is a viewpoint which considers the transitional phase a special stage which will take the society from a revolutionary to a state condition, from an unsystematic to a democratic society where one political and administrative regime governs. The consensus is that this should be based on qualifications, scientific capabilities and loyalty to the homeland and that these are the conditions to recruit and appoint people to the seat of authority and not factional political loyalty.

One of the options to unite the people and the land is based on full assimilation ie. a central political administrative headquarters for the new Palestine.

Another option is a non-centralized administrative system which will be semi-sovereign in the transitional phase.

Another could be a federal relationship where there is no central political and administrative headquarters, but two separate geographical and political entities overseen by a higher authority.

A fourth option is a political central authority operating at the same time with a decentralized administration in which some elements of the previous options could be considered.

Whichever option or combination of options is finally decided, it is imperative that it is aware of and capable of dealing with the following factors:

1. Creation of geographic and political unity while effectively moving from a revolutionary to a state phase.

2. Closure of gaps, minimisation of current differences and finding solutions for the many different problems in each region.

3. Maintenance of a balance between the two areas despite the great proportional and strategic differences of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which also embraces the interests of other parties ie. Jordan and Israel.

4. Unification of the economic and other policies for both regions.

5. Ability to provide the necessary incentives and expenses to ensure that committed and suitable personnel are available to take charge of these two regions.

6. There is a possibility that political loyalty on both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could be directed outward. The effectiveness to prevent this shift of political loyalty should be considered and the option where this is least likely to happen should be taken.

7. Cultural and social differences between the two regions affected by the life experience of the Gaza Strip under Egypt and the life experience of the West Bank under Jordan are to be considered carefully and handled sympathetically.

8. The fact that the demographic concentration in Gaza is 10 times that of the West Bank should be given careful attention.

9. Establishment of one united educational system, one united body of law, a central authority for land and citizen registration and the fair distribution of these in the territories should be a priority.

The current political arrangements which have been imposed as an outcome of the DOP, govern the current relationship and leave all these options theoretical and hypothetical. Discussion on these two regions has revealed that we are nationally and passionately for their total assimilation and we need to translate this option to practicality. ie. by unifying the laws, having one national anthem, a central government and public promotion of the a united assimilation option. People are prepared to use their qualifications and experience into making this option work.

It is wrong to put the three parties - Israel/Jordan/the PLO - on the same level of consideration. For us Palestine is a homeland, for others it is an independent entity and they deal with it according to the needs of their financial interests and their own security.

What we need is a simple arrangement in harmony with our reality which will provide the people with legitimate government ready to use what is good in the DOP to meet their aspirations. By doing this an assimilated relationship will be created. The obstacle to this goal is the DOP which completely governs the nature of the transitional phase.

Discussion

Participant # 1

The options in the transitional phase have their impact on the final phase. When we plan for the transitional phase it should be based on an agreed national agenda for the nature of the final arrangement. We can begin with what is available in the DOP but plan as if the DOP does not exist and does not govern us. Our strategic goal should be that we work in one homeland and our plans should be concerned with how to develop this one homeland which will then make redundant all other options.

Participant #2

The strategic Palestinian goal is to reach an agreement on how better conditions to bring people together can be created. Not only by closing the gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but within each region. People are very sensitive in both regions and at present people in the West Bank see the seat of authority as existing solely in Gaza and this has had a negative impact on them.

Participant #3.

The daily life experience which reflects the differences and the gaps can be seen with those in the diaspora as well. There is a political interest and awareness created by the fact that we live in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip or Jordan, the Gulf, Europe or wherever. We have different experiences under different systems while being denied our right for self determination. What is needed is to create a mechanism in this transitional phase to centralize attention on the notion of one common single homeland.

Participant #4.

In Jordan, political decision makers are very much aware of the distinctions, gaps and differences among people in the two regions. They are expecting the Palestinian authority to face more difficulties and it seems that the Jordanian interest is to focus on these differences and gaps and use them to have an impact on the final arrangement. Should we deal with the transitional phase in accordance with the Israeli agenda and with total awareness of our differences and objectives or should we deal in accordance to our understanding of what is best for us without ignoring what the DOP is all about?

Participant #5.

Focussing or trying to build the discussion around the differences will not bring out the maturity and objective thinking that is necessary and there will be no independent Palestinian entity if we start with this negative approach. However, if you really want to deal with differences I invite you to deal with the question of refugee camps and not with the differences between cities, towns and villages. The factional headquarters abroad were the ones who started and maintain this emphasis on differences - this is a small homeland and there is no room to build it on differences. Talking of the differences will only provoke feelings that some are being discriminated against.

Participant #6.

The intifada leadership was based in Gaza and Gazans felt uneasy when it moved from there to the West Bank although there was no total consent on the West Bank. Today, all the while the seat of Palestinian authority is centralized in Gaza, the people of the West Bank feel isolated. Leaders of the PNA living in the Gaza Strip are very much aware of their authority and power but when they come to the West Bank they notice that their importance is less and consequently feel that perhaps they overestimate their position and authority in the Gaza Strip. This is a problem and the only way to solve it is to struggle to centralize our seat of government in our eternal capital of Jerusalem. I don't think refugee camps, cities or villages will disagree on centralizing our seat of government in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, until we can achieve this target, it is crucial that we centralize land and citizen registration and create one body of law to govern the one homeland. We cannot continue as things are run now.

Participant #7.

When we talk about differences and feelings of discrimination while searching for a political regime based on the current differences, we are going down the wrong track. We cannot put people face to face with these options as if they are equal options. We should present one national programme for one homeland to the people, exactly as the Zionists did. Our strategic choice should be to unite the people under one national identity. We should no longer talk about West Bankers, Gazans, Palestinians in Jordan etc. but as one Palestinian people. We should then refer to our people in accordance with geographical areas of the homeland which can be redefined into North, South, Central and Coastal regions and the diaspora.

Participant #8.

I am for the option of one homeland governed by one political system. I agree with the point mentioned earlier about Gazans feeling angry at the time when intifada political decision making was moved to Jerusalem, however, the right thing to do now is to focus on Jerusalem. Jerusalem is our capital and should become the centre of our political life. This would solve many problems.

Participant #9.

The central seat of authority for the coming two years is Gaza but transferring it to Ramallah will bring negative reactions and maybe the Gaza phase will seem like it never happened.

Participant #10.

The Gaza/Jericho phase is one station on the way to the establishment of the National Authority and we should not focus on Ramallah as if we are creating a Palestinian Bonn. The German Bonn was the substitute for Berlin, are we to forget Jerusalem for maybe twenty years as the Germans forgot Berlin? Why not begin to balance the seat of power between Gaza and the West Bank from now on and then transfer both halves to Jerusalem when the time comes. If we focus on Ramallah as an extension of the new Arab Jerusalem this will weaken the Palestinian negotiating position on Jerusalem. What is needed is to re-emphasize and re-strengthen whatever we have in Jerusalem and link it and expand it to the rest of the OPT.

Participant #11.

The feeling of discrimination that has been noted here, is not my personal opinion but is the result of many different polls and questionnaires. The question which still needs an answer is what mechanism exists to unite people in one homeland without ignoring these feelings and gaps. This could be answered by discussing the following:

a) the performance of the current Palestinian authority.

b) the relationship between the authority and the opposition and vice-versa.

c) civil liberties, including freedom of the press and human rights.

d) security.

e) elections.

f) external relationships, emphasizing the role of Jordan.

My perspective is that conditions and restraints as stated in the DOP are limiting the authority of the PNA, therefore, the PNA lacks the necessary strength and has its performance somewhat hampered. The PLO is exercising its leadership role through the current PNA and this is evident in that the individual decision making headquarters are the same, there is an absence of a system and the by-laws are not clear. Arafat is not seeking to institutionalize the PNA bodies but is centralizing all the authority in his hands. With the exception of Islamic Jihad, the opposition refuse to participate in ministerial posts but they accept lower and less important seats in the government like ministry under secretaries, general directors of departments or advisors. However, all without exception are willing to participate in serving the society in the field of health education, agriculture, municipalities etc. Though military occupation will not return to Gaza, there is a fear haunting the PNA that if conditions are to deteriorate beyond repair then it will return.

Participant #12.

There is no rationale in military action against Israel and my advice to religious opposition is that it should not be the party responsible for the failure of the DOP before the world. Israel is the one who should be responsible.

Participant #13.

The national and religious opposition are not in harmony because the national opposition is not against the political peace process particularly the PPP (Palestine People's Party: formerly the Palestine Communist Party, PCP) who have been a party to it. Our (PPP) opposition is directed at the particular results of the negotiations.

Participant #14.

The Islamic Jihad refuses to participate in any post within the PNA.

Participant #15.

The PNA lack means to deal with security issues for the following reasons:

- there is no integration between the seven various departments of security.

- there is no coordination between security institutions or officers, on the contrary there have been clashes and confrontations.

- various security forces and apparatus are functioning independently which will lead to competition developing which will worsen the situation.

-the position of the political authority today rests on a weak legitimacy (ie. absence of election) therefore, it is not going to oppose the idea of a divided security framework as this framework allows it to use each section which is less of a threat to its own position.

- opposition forces are aware that the political authority is not in a strong position to confront them.

- there is the possibility of a clash among the various security bodies and a possibility of Israeli interference.

- what will the eventual Israeli reaction be if military operations are to continue against Israel and the current PNA and authority systems remain weak.

Participant #16.

The PNA does not feel that it represents all the people and this makes it reluctant to take strong action against the opposition. The PNA is going through a continuous test phase but one major question is does the authority intend to disarm factions and activists when election time comes. We will resist disarmament. The PNA has no right to disarm the people while occupation still exists. Any one who will deny our right to resist occupation we will fight him. We don't want to become another Arab regime. If the PNA is to disarm people then there will be a confrontation, however, I don't expect there to be a total security collapse. There is no reason for this. The example of recent arrests (of opposition figures) has shown them to be a formality as if there is an unwritten arrangement between the PNA and the opposition. Our objective, from the point of view of military resistance, is to pressure the occupation to dismantle settlements. It is worthwhile noting that we take Rabin's public statements through the media as part of the negotiation game.

Participant #17.

The PNA objectives behind the recent arrests are to please Rabin.

-it is to give confidence to the Israeli public that they (the PNA) are in control

-it is an indirect testing of the water in which the future relationship with Israel will be built and a test for the capabilities of the security apparatus. The intensification of military operations (by Hamas) against Israel is to keep up the pressure for the dismantlement of settlements. We need them out as soon as possible. Our opposition platform is a responsible opposition. It is not in our interests for security to collapse or for a Palestinian civil war to arise and we are in dialogue with the PNA. In fact during the Amman talks, Hamas was offered seats in the PNA in excess of its requested numbers, but this offer was refused. What is needed now is a reform of our military actions in accordance with this transitional phase. Military action on the part of Hamas has actually been military "reaction" against a massacre or an Israeli attack. For example, the Rafah operation was a reaction to the massacre at the Erez checkpoint. The Afula and Hadera bombings were reactions to the Hebron massacre. Gush Katif was a reaction to the killing of a Palestinian youth in Jerusalem.

These operations are to meet people's aspirations and demands for justice and to seek their support. Regarding the reformation of our military operations, we will no longer announce who is conducting these operations, no longer claim responsibility for them and no longer make public the reasons behind them.

Views on Election

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

We support legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but we do not believe that such elections will take place.

PPP

We should take advantage of election and develop an assertive, determined position in which the modalities and conditions under which we will accept to participate in election are made very clear. We can then strongly apply the pressure of this position to guarantee the quality and condition of elections.

HAMAS

We are for legislative election to a parliament but the ceiling should not be the DOP.

Islamic Jihad

Participation in election under the umbrella of the DOP means that we will be giving legitimacy to the authority, therefore, we are most definitely not going to participate in legislative election. However, we will take part in election to unions and professional organisations.

What will happen in the event of Arafat's death?

PPP

The DOP will not fall apart and neither will the authority. The confusion people will face is simply because of their understanding of the DOP which is not actually ending occupation but rearranging the occupying presence. The authority will manifest its powers in Gaza but it will fade on the West Bank. Israel does not seek geographic assimilation of the territory but rather its partition. For the time being the current authority has the character of just another Arab regime.

HAMAS

There might be a chaotic situation if the head of the authority disappears for whatever reason. There will be a struggle to succeed him among those who surround him which might lead to confrontation and these circumstances might be beneficial for the opposition. The loyalty of the security forces is not for Abu Amr but for other countries.

Islamic Jihad

The security forces will take over. Certainly there will be a struggle for power but it will not be exclusive to those within the current authority. The door will also be open to those who made sacrifices during the years of occupation. At the end of the day whoever has control of military power will govern.

PFLP

In the absence of the head of the authority, the struggle will be among the PLO leadership who have been close to Abu Amr and between a new political group from the Occupied Territories. We will hear voices vying for the right to call themselves rulers and we will witness "military" Fatah against civilian Fatah. Nevertheless, at the end of the day Fatah will continue exercising the authority and the departure of its head will not have a great deal of difference.

PPP

There are three factors here:

a) The current scenario is autonomy. It will not be shaken as long as America and Israel are endorsing it.

b) Abu Amr is responsible for the deterioration in the Territories, but it will not worsen when he departs.

c) The army is not a suitable candidate for government but those who will be funding it will be able to hook it into a political framework which will then produce the decision makers.

Workshop FOUR

Subject: "The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank".

Speaker: Raja Shehadeh. - Lawyer; Co-founder of Al Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International commission of Jurists in Geneva; member of legal advisory committee for the Palestinian delegation in the Middle East Peace Process.

Date held: Saturday September 24th 1994.

Place held: Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus (Tel: 09-380383).

Participant Information:

Participants included many West Bank lawyers, judges and other legal professionals; representatives of local Palestinian chambers of commerce; educationalists; academics; representatives of women's movements; political activists and media representatives.

Summary.

The speaker began by pointing out features of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) which had become apparent since its endorsement one year ago. He said it was a framework for the final arrangement as well as being an arrangement for a self rule government in the transitional phase which will present inherent complications in moving from the latter stage to the former.

Since it is a framework agreed upon in 1993, it took the legal status quo of the time as its basis which is an important element in Israeli strategy. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion that arises out of the study of the DOP is that the interim arrangements take as their starting point and are based on the situation as it existed in the occupied territories when the negotiations began, both in terms of the state of the law and of public administration. That is to say that the Declaration of Principles comes to consolidate rather than replace the extensive legal and administrative changes which the Israeli occupation put into place during the course of its twenty-seven-year occupation of Palestinian territories. However, Palestinians could attain some of their demands and aspirations during the negotiations after transition by relying on the Geneva Convention.

The DOP was signed on September 13th 1993, the Cairo agreement on May 4th 1994 and early empowerment in the spheres of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism began on the August 29th 1994. The takeover of duties and responsibilities is however, only within the legal context of what already exists on the ground and this includes both Jordanian and British Mandate law as well as Israeli military orders.

Theoretically, the transitional phase should lead to a final arrangement based on UN security council resolution 242. However, Palestinians do not have an agenda on what they wish the final arrangement to entail. It is necessary to identify and clarify what was "legally" established and already enforced on the ground within the framework of the DOP, in order to help Palestinians to think more strategically about their final goals.

The current legal framework in existence is Jordanian, based on previous laws, Ottoman, British and French. Added to this are Israeli military orders which directed and amended previous laws. The military orders were enforced to achieve three basic objectives of control:

a) Separation between administrative and military affairs - the formation of the Israeli civil administration post-Camp David, was a tool to advance this.

b) Separation between Palestinian and Israeli affairs in the OPT as in the case of South Africa. Palestinians would be governed by military orders while settlements would continue to enjoy the citizenship of the Israeli state under the Israeli legal system.

c) Separation of the Palestinian people from their land - previously the Jordanian administration followed a policy whereby settlement of disputes over land led to a system of registration for land in the West Bank.

From the Palestinian perspective it is necessary at this point to start planning and forming an administrative system based on a Palestinian law, which will link peoples interests and land issues. In Israeli planning the question of land has been kept a very isolated issue and this has had a major impact on the position in which Palestinians found themselves at the beginning of negotiations.

The Israeli negotiating strategy has been to transfer authority over civil affairs and personal services to Palestinians without transferring any power on the major issues which are the question of land rights, settlers and settlements. Basically anything transferred is in an area that will have no real effect on the current legal status.

There have been 4,110 military orders and only four military proclamations. These have fostered the following:

a) The entry of the IDF to the area.

b) Transference of administrative and legislative authority to the Israeli military governor thereby granting him ultimate power.

c) Formation of military courts which abided by the Fourth Geneva Convention until article 35 of Proclamation no. 3 waived this requirement.

d) Ten days after the May 4th Cairo agreement, the military governor issued Proclamation no.4 in which he transferred some of his responsibilities to the PNA in accordance with the May 4th agreement.

The implementation of Gaza-Jericho is the title of Proclamation no. 4 which includes transference to Palestinians of civil administration. In Gaza, the Israeli civil administration is to be canceled but in Jericho only some of its authority will be transferred. In both cases the administration of civil and military affairs concerning Israelis in the OPT will remain as it is.

We must discover what the Palestinian strategy, planning and thinking is. It became an all too common habit to explain and decide what the official political position was according to rumors and not facts and figures. An example of this is the way Palestinians dealt with the disengagement with Jordan. King Hussein gave a speech on the 31st July 1988 in which he said that the disengagement of its administrative and legal relations with the West Bank was "according to Palestinian wishes". There are ways in which this changed the Jordanian citizenship law of 1954. What was implemented according to the Kings speech was an administrative arrangement distinguishing between the East and the West Bank. However, there was one case of a woman from Ramallah who went to the Higher Court in Jordan demanding her right to have her Jordanian passport and residency renewed. The court discussed the administrative arrangement but did not give a legal explanation, did not examine the legal power of the Kings speech and did not interfere in the constitutional aspect of the disengagement. At the end of the day it was left to the Ministry of the Interior to consider the case but constitutionally it was not tackled. The change was never confirmed by a change in the Jordanian law of citizenship.

Palestinians are now standing before a transitional phase based on a framework which exists on the ground and the need is for a Palestinian strategy to bring the full withdrawal of Israel and achieve self determination. To realize ones own identity one must begin by realizing who governs this identity, how they govern it and from where.

Discussion.

Participant #1.

We are against military orders. The Cairo agreement obligated us to keep military orders for the duration of the transitional phase but seeing as the DOP does not specify a military presence there should be no need for military orders. If we keep them then we may have to face the possibility of the Palestinian authority adopting them, applying them in the transitional phase and becoming a "police" authority which derives its legitimacy from the military orders of its occupier.

Participant #2.

Islam as read in the holy Quran addresses the case of property and I believe that this should be the basis for discussing the issue.

Participant #3.

It is the duty of professionals in the community, especially lawyers and judges, to start drafting a Palestinian legal code which will unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under one national legal system. There must be emphasis placed on the drafting of new Palestinian land registration regulations in particular. Palestinian society is in a stage of transition and the door is open for creative thinking and planning for a legitimacy which comes from the people. In the case of the disengagement with Jordan, it is hypothetically true that the Kings speech was not constitutional but political, hence Jordanian government negotiations with the PLO on issues like the economy, finance, borders and security - this is de facto implementation by the government based on consent and understanding that the disengagement was a fact. Since Madrid, the relationship has been between two people with two identities and two different territories. The question of citizenship is still to be agreed on through crucial Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations. At present there is a vacuum to be filled through joint agreements but their starting point is that Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.

Speaker.

As a civil society in the making, there is a need for regulations, laws and a constitution. We still do not have a clear idea of how to get rid of the unjust laws and replace them with just ones. The connection between politics and law is the area we need to address without fear. We need to define clearly the methodology that we are going to use. The current Palestinian decisions made do not have a legal base.

Participant #4.

The PNA regulates and makes decisions for the time being and enforcement on the ground is based not on the DOP but on peoples consent. People are accepting that the PNA is the de facto authority and therefore legitimizing it by consent. What happened in Jericho is testament to this .

Participant #5.

What steps could be taken to protect the PNA from Israeli threats to torpedo the DOP. In the field of education early empowerment has been granted to the PNA and now it is up to the Palestinian Ministry of education to decide on school fees, curriculum etc. The first step is to cancel the military orders which banned the use of 100s of books, in fact, to cancel any military orders which were imposed in the field of education. If the PNA can succeed in this without any Israeli influence then there really is an "authority" in the making.

Speaker.

There have been several attempts by other countries to guarantee the DOP. It is actually registered as a UN document but there are not any real guarantees. Talking about Israeli threats has no basis, these are empty threats. Most countries recognize the DOP and this is adequate protection against threats, the DOP is a framework and all Israel can do is to stall its implementation. Our communities succeeded in resisting military order 854 and many others. The new Palestinian reality is what will create new facts on the ground.

Participant #6.

It seems the disengagement was unconstitutional and Israeli military orders are unjust and the new reality is the DOP and the fledgling PNA. What if Jordan or even the majority of Palestinians in the OPT changed their minds?

Speaker.

This requires a political answer, not a legal one and it is wishful thinking to be considering a return to the status quo ante.

Participant #7.

What is the legal status of Jerusalem as there are already three parties directly involved?

Speaker.

Jerusalem has a very special status which is totally different from the current administrative and legal position. Israeli annexation is a violation of international law and nobody recognizes Israeli presence and practices in Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem is based on UN Security Council Resolution 181 which stipulates that it is a corpus separatum. What Israel has done is to create facts on the ground irrespective of the legal status. The Labor party follows the Likud in its policy on Jerusalem creating facts on the ground. Jordanian power in Jerusalem has only been through Islamic Waqf and some education and health services under Jordanian law but there has been a siege on Jordanian administration. Israeli policy is to have a Jewish majority in Jerusalem and there is no Palestinian strategy to cope with the ongoing deterioration in Jerusalem. This is one of the things which we should be addressing.

Participant #8.

I put the responsibility before the Palestinian bar. There should be a specialized and dedicated group focussing on the legal issues and presenting their recommendations to the leadership.

Participant #9.

There is no such thing as a centralized Palestinian bar. We have three areas in which Palestinian lawyers function - the Jerusalem "bar" on the West Bank, the Arab Federation of lawyers and the group which no longer exist as part of the Palestinian legal system since they gave up the general strike and went to work for the Israeli courts. No authority has been given to any group but we do still have a moral commitment and we are on the way to reforming a "national" Palestinian bar.

Speaker.

Our society is a forgiving society and objections to some regulations and orders by the PNC is healthy. I fully support the call for a better and more advanced role for lawyers.

Participant #10.

The DOP can be interpreted in different ways, each party in fact, has its own definition and my primary concern is that Palestinians should work towards finding a consensus on what the DOP actually means to us. Our civil society needs by-laws and a whole new legal system but we cannot begin from a vacuum. What is available has to be used as a base and then amended according to the needs of the society. We have Ottoman, Mandatory, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli laws as precedents.

Speaker.

The first thing that the PNA should do is publish a monthly Palestinian official Gazette in which proposed laws, legislation, regulations and decisions made and any appointees to PNA or other relative positions should be reported. People should not be left in the dark as to what their government is doing as this will cause not only resentment but popular speculation, which can be even more damaging. People should know immediately of all developments directly through a PNA monthly publication. It is the primary duty of the authority to issue an official Gazette and not the responsibility of the public.

Participant # 11.

Last week there was a debate on the draft labor law. I did not hear any contribution, ideas or criticisms in the local media or other public fora from lawyers and other legal professionals. I believe that the legal professionals have a duty to begin serving the public immediately and that they should take the initiative to promote equality and governmental responsibility through legal means.

Participant # 12.

There is a hypothetical possibility of forming a legislative committee. If lawyers can come up with a draft document suggesting the formation of a legal committee composed of lawyers and judges who can review the military orders, do you think the PNA will be receptive?

Speaker.

The technical committees over the last few years conducted several studies on Israeli military orders. Whether or not military orders should be used is a political and not a legal decision. What we suggest is that issues are centralized and organized in a way that will assist the community in its move towards becoming a civil society.

Participant #13.

The Cairo agreement authorized the PNA to change the by-laws and the military orders but is there any possibility that they may begin doing so prior to elections taking place?

Speaker.

The Cairo agreement speaks about stages of Palestinian legislation, all of which should be sent to an Israeli review committee within three days. At the Oslo talks there was a joint committee to revise the by-laws. The problem is the ambiguity of the wording about how far Palestinians can actually go before facing the final Israeli veto. There is a great need to go through the methodology on which the implementation of the DOP is to be based. My advice is to focus on the legal issues as a means to organize towards a primary objective of creating a fully functioning civil society.

Workshop FIVE

Subject: "Democracy in Theory and Practice among Palestinian Factions in the Occupied Territories including Islamic Political Trends.

Speaker: Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Academic; member of the Palestinian delegation to the multilateral working group on Refugees in the Middle East Peace process.

Date held: Thursday September 29th 1994.

Place held: Hebron University, Hebron.

Participant Information:

Participants included representatives of all Palestinian factional and political alignments; unions; academics; representatives of Hebron municipal council and Chamber of Commerce; legal and educational professionals; business people.

Summary.

a) The Mainstream and its alliance

The mainstream believe that the DOP and the implementation of the "Gaza-Jericho-First" agreement will lead to an independent Palestinian state. It is hoped that the return of Yasser Arafat to Gaza and Jericho will close the gap between inside and outside and unite the Palestinian political agenda which is concerned predominantly with:

1) releasing the detainees, return of deportees and diaspora;

2) dismantlement of Israeli settlements in the autonomous areas;

3) development projects and investment with the joint effort and involvement of Palestinians inside and outside;

4) democratization, starting with national dialogue and working towards elections. The Fatah movement started a process of institutionalization in preparation for elections to a congress, a central committee and a collective leadership within the movement;

5) establishing a national democratic political system on Palestinian soil, liberalization of major institutions.

This mainstream is faced with the challenges of:

1) Israeli settlement and settlers within the autonomous areas and no political mechanism or power to confront their presence, insist on their removal or even to freeze Israeli plans to expand and strengthen settlements in the OPT.

2) No power or influence to link the transitional phase with the issues of the final arrangement. Bilateral talks appear to be overshadowing multilateral talks raising fears among Palestinians that their position, interests and needs on the questions of Jerusalem, refugees, security and borders will be severely undermined prior to the final arrangement.

3) Being drawn into a sea of local, daily issues with no division of labour among members of the PNA and the beginning of a power struggle among them which is weakening their credibility, their future legitimacy and could result in the limitation of their future authority to Gaza only.

4) Close and continuous coordination with Egypt at the expense of any coordination with Jordan which has been clearly and generally negatively noted by many different and concerned parties.

5) The confusion and overlap of economic plans and agreements within the society itself and between the PNA and Israel and the PNA and Jordan.

The PLO remains the recognised leadership for Palestinians everywhere but its infrastructure and institutions are involved in a major process of being reshaped. This Palestinian authority in the making is going through a trial and error period as it adapts to its new circumstances and attempts to establish its legitimacy on the ground which will lead to its ability to provide effective government.

There are three categories of people within the Fatah movement who have returned from outside:

1) Well known names and faces who had been enjoying authority in Tunis and who returned immediately and moved to the seat of power as members of the PNA. They feel that they are the authority due to past experience and particularly because of involvement in the Oslo agreement and the conclusion that they are the ones who actually "delivered" to the Palestinin people. The problem they face, however, is legitimacy on the ground. They need to be elected by the people before they are truly the leaders.

The second issue they face is the problematic relationship between them and the de facto leaders on the ground, often intifada leaders. In some cases there is a struggle for power but in others there has been assimilation and several cases of intifada "generals' becoming part of the PNA. There has been an ongoing dialogue between the two and the formation of various institutions and organisations, particularly the security apparatus which has absorbed most of the young generation of the intifada leadership. For example the Preventive Security Force has seemingly become Fatah's military organisation for control throughout the transitional phase. The other security organisations, the Presidential security force and the General security force have absorbed those from outside. All are going through a certain degree of trial and error as they attempt to maintain law and order.

2) The second category contains businessmen, investors, intellectuals and grass roots leaders. The common ground for all of these people (whether, in fact, they are from inside or outside), is that they need the transitional phase to work out the most effective way of working and linking their interests to create a common agenda which gives them economic power and a subsequent political input in their own constituency. This group is not in a rush to govern and is very well aware that this is only the transitional phase and that many names and faces will disappear. They hope to use the transition to strengthen their roots and expand their network of connections which will leave them in a good position to succeed in the run for future power.

3) The unfortunates who came from outside, left their families and their often very successful lives, only to end up with living conditions that are mediocre at best, a serious cut in salary and with no serious attention paid to their well being. They are joined by those from inside who became affiliated with Fatah late and who have no official status. They are desperately seeking a connection with the new system to avoid losing out in the race for a future position.

Altogether, these three categories represent approximately 40% of the community. In spite of their differences their verbal loyalty is to Arafat and their interest is to become the single party of future government. Young Fatah members have succeeded in having Abu Amr (Arafat) endorse their agenda for reforms to institutionalize electoral processes to give the movement a stronger position and to avoid leaving the door open to speculation about the power, support and capabilities of the movement. They want to be visible organized and elected. In the Silwan area for example, it was claimed that there were 200 Fatah members during the intifada. Since Arafat endorsed the preparation for local elections procedures, registration to the Fatah movement has risen to 800. The transitional phase could be could be considered the Fatah reform Phase because the factions are very much more positively interested in the work of Fatah and their actions throughout this episode could encourage the factions. The general message everywhere seems to be that what is most important is what is done on the ground inside and what is visible to the population.

The process of institutionalization has resulted in a recently formed six member Higher Committee of the Fatah movement in the OPT which is headed by Faisal Hussein and contains nine departments:

1. Municipal and Villages 2. National Affairs

3. Mobilization and information 4. General Affairs

5. Student and Youth 6. General Institutions

7. Women's Department 8. Information

9. Intelligence

Each of these departments will recruit its members according to professional background, skills dedication etc. and this was the first time ever that the formation of such a committee was publicly announced in the national press. This is widely considered an indication that responsibility for organizational credibility is being taken seriously.

b) The opposition

The secular and religious opposition interpret the 1993, DOP as the "Disaster of Palestine" and "Gaza-Jericho First" as "Gaza-Jericho, First and Last", expecting the PNA to become no more than "collaborators" with limited authority over these two regions. They base their argument on the following assumptions: - UN and Security Council resolutions are becoming no more than archive documents; the world is accepting the idea that the Middle East crisis is over; Europe and the US consider the people of the Middle East to be negotiating and reshaping their own relations in the region and the role of the international community is to offer financial support only and not interfere in the deliberations and; a divided Arab world is burying the Arab nationalist cause, focussing on economic and market issues with each state defining its own separate agenda which reflects its own interests and relationships.

The secular opposition state that there is no detailed and comprehensive Palestinian strategy which can unite the people, but that it is all based on words and slogans. Concerning Jerusalem particularly examples like "Palestinian flags will be flown from the walls of Jerusalem" or "We shall all pray together in Jerusalem" are criticized as no more than hollow rhetoric. They point out the reality that Jerusalem is isolated and in a state of political and security siege. There is no movement anywhere in the OPT without Israeli permission or an Israeli granted license and Israeli military forces are still present. Therefore, they claim that the PNA will be "collaborators" with limited authority for the duration of the transitional phase.

There has however, been a serious drop in the influence of the opposition on the political process with many splits and divisions within the opposition ranks clearly evident.

Nayef Hawatmeh's DFLP, has already had a crisis situation in which one third of its central committee were dismissed for their "moderate statements" and for contacts with Fatah. The crisis goes beyond the institutional level, it is geographical, financial and ideological too. At its recent annual congress the leadership was also seen to be split and recent polls show that they do not hold more than 3-5% of factional support in the territories. There is also little opportunity for their voices to be heard, not only because of the current absence of a free media but because they have been drawn into a battle of slogans among themselves which has precluded the issuing of a cohesive statement.

The other opposition faction, the PFLP, is witnessing a similar division but is trying to overcome it with the help of some of its leaders who have returned to Gaza and the West Bank. In one of their recent conferences, they invited members of the PNA to attend and to give keynote speeches as well as other factional representatives. They want to maintain their presence and are keeping a very close eye on Fatah plans to institutionalize its movement in preparation for an elected congress. They say that its time for reform and that there is a need to join the electoral bandwagon.

The third party are Hamas. They are also having problems with division among the ranks with the clear exception of their position on elections. Statements from Hamas representatives in all areas indicate that they are interested in two kinds of elections:

a) elections on the municipal, union and charitable organisation level - to enable them to continue serving the community and to challenge Fatah at a grass roots level.

b) legislative elections - although stipulating that the ceiling of these should not be the DOP. Arafat, succeeded in having close and direct dialogue with Hamas in Gaza although in the West Bank they are divided and reluctant to join dialogue with the PNA despite the fact that they are in contact with other factions, including Fatah, in the West Bank.

The opposition, both secular and religious, criticize the DOP and the Palestinian Authority in the making, its practices and its political agenda without offering a convincing and realistic alternative Palestinian national agenda. This tactic brings neither hope nor change to the current situation and could arguably lessen their popularity in a social climate where people are weary of negativism. As noted above they are also in danger of falling into the same trap of words and slogans without making any practical effort to mobilize the community or coordinate with other factions in challenging the occupiers as was done in the intifada phase.

It is very likely that the opposition will accept to fully join in the game of "musical chairs" starting with the first notes struck by election. At the end of the day, their ultimate fear is of losing the position they do have and they cannot be sure that their "seats" are guaranteed if they are not in the game.

c) Those "rejoicing in hope".

The group "rejoicing in hope" are comprised of grass-roots organisations, professionals, business people, intellectuals, and the silent majority. They think that "Gaza-Jericho" will not fail, military occupation will not return to Gaza and the current process, with or without the current members of the PNA, will lead to a Palestinian entity more advanced than autonomy but less than an independent state. They base their argument on the fact that the DOP was signed at the White House which was a indication of wide international recognition and support for its implementation. They add that Israel is entering a new era of normalisation in the region and without a continuously developing process on the Palestinian track, Israel cannot reach the rest of the Arab world. The new era of international and regional relations is based on economic and security considerations and the DOP is one of the cornerstones on which businessmen, investors and governmental projects are to build the new Middle East. Any areas of future conflict such as finance and banking, labour and market issues or access to water and natural resources, can only be resolved by negotiation and not on a military basis.

This group is continually praying for the Palestinians to grasp the opportunities in the coming two years to rebuild their homeland with less conflict and more coordination with all internal and external parties. They see Arafat and Rabin as being in the same boat with the decision on whether this boat will sail or sink in the hands of the two peoples. This group believe that neither Palestinians or Israelis are interested in seeing the negotiation boat sink and that new definitions must be found for the relationship as they begin to use a joint vocabulary which can create new words and develop a common language for both of them. In particular they consider that the word "sovereignty" could mean "sharing authority" and the words "open city" could mean rotating responsibilities.

Issues facing the Palestinian National Authority.

One question repeatedly raised is whether or not the PNA can deal with the complex nature of Palestinian civil society which has always operated amid a plurality of political opinions. There are several immediate issues which it is necessary for the PNA to take a firm and acceptable stand on to demonstrate its capability and to maintain its support. One of the primary issues is the question of Jerusalem, regarding which the PNA need to rapidly establish a strong national consensus on their position. In order to do this, they need to continue stressing that Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian people and an inseparable part of the OPT. It must be included in all developments in the transitional phase and should begin with Israel freezing, if not reversing, the continued `Judaization' of the city and rectifying the damage already done.

Another problem concerns PNA ability and qualification to govern and obtain the necessary funding for "early empowerment" in the spheres of education, health, tourism, social welfare and taxation. Recent reports on funding, however, announced that donor country funds to the PNA would be channelled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to cover police salaries and related costs from July 1994 through to the end of October 1994 only. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has indicated that it will "bridge the funding gap" until the PNA tax system has developed to the point of covering salaries and recurrent policing costs. At present, the cost of police salaries is about $7million per month while the tax revenue collected by the PNA is running at $3million only.

There are currently 7,200 Palestinian police in Gaza and Jericho as well as three intelligence agencies - the Preventive Security Force, the Presidential Force and the General Intelligence security apparatus. There have been doubts raised about the PNA's interest in uniting and centralizing the various security organisations to become one national apparatus and doubts also about the fairness and integrity with which they will be able to maintain law and order in all of the OPT.

Other issues which the PNA must prove competent in dealing with include human rights, liberties and press freedom, formation of political parties, freedom of enterprise and investment and non-interference in the running of independent institutions.

The PNA must also face the problems associated with democracy building and running their own affairs through the mechanism of elections. This particular issue is crucial in order to legitimize the current leadership and open the door for the upcoming generation to share the responsibility of building the homeland. Further more it will demonstrate respect for the agendas of the religious and secular opposition and maintain national dialogue and harmony with them. It is also the most speedy and effective manner of divorcing Israel.

Discussion

Participant #1

We need to develop common ground between those who support and those who oppose the peace process. We realize that the opposition camp is concerned about the success of the PNA and its performance until now has indeed been unsatisfactory. It's very important that our voices are heard publicly in order to direct and correct the path before the PNA and there should be a better mechanism to develop its functioning. We need to formulate a plan based on democratic principles. We can't afford to waste time but we cannot exercise democracy in the absence of law. We need a law to protect people's rights and liberties then when the time comes for elections within the framework of the law, people will accept the results.

Participant #2

Though we don't differ much on what is happening in the Transitional Phase, we should be very much aware where it is leading us. We should now be determined to convince the Israelis that we are responsible and capable of running our own affairs. The Israelis thought that after Beirut in 1982, the Palestinian people were no more. The intifada in 1987 opened their eyes to the fact that we were still here and we now need to use this period to generate an unequivocal stand to convince them that in spite of our [internal] differences, we are ultimately one united people

Participant #3

I believe the Oslo accord did not put an end to the conflict between us and the Israelis. It just put the conflict on a different level or a different track. Some would call it a conflict between civilizations, some would call it a conflict for existence and for deepening the roots of both our presence and theirs. Whatever the actual conflict may be, my point is that we are a very long way away from meeting the people's aspirations. The question of right of return or compensation for refugees is still pending with other issues until the final arrangement. Therefore, the opposition and the supporters should work together towards the success of the Transitional Phase and this will not be achieved unless we manage to bring about a collective elected leadership. This should lay the cornerstone for the respect of human rights, human dignities and liberties. Division of labour must be based on qualifications and not factional loyalty or good connections among the elite, which can only widen the gap between rich and poor. The PNA got off to a bad start - it did not manage to professionally diagnose the "patient's" concerns and symptoms. The formation of its departments and its methods of recruitment for personnel were not started from a clean slate and demonstrated clearly that loyalty comes first and not professionalism and suitability for the job.

Participant #4

I think that Palestinians are about to lose the weight and support of UN resolutions and their enforcement in this political confrontation. If we had consistently based our confrontation on international legitimacy, UN resolutions 181, 194 and all other resolutions which condemned Israel and supported Palestinian rights, our position in Madrid would have been very different. The James Baker agenda was for less than a state and advocated only a limited autonomy and the position of the US as the sole superpower in the arena is confirmed beyond doubt after the fall of the Soviet Union. We should take into consideration the new international balance of power and the support that Israeli is gaining vis-a-vis Palestinian interests. The new reality is that we have an authority on a piece of land but it is not a progressive one - it did not institutionalize democracy. We have a people who are full of support for election to bring about a national council with legislative powers to guarantee a democratic political system. What can be done to improve and to develop this authority to build a state where the only supreme rule is the rule of law? An individual cannot hold all the authority and be above the law at the same time.

Participant #5

The overlooked factor in our current political and ideological conflict is an underestimation of the peoples will and of the gap between the leadership and its people. After the Hebron massacre there was a very important opportunity for change, political investment and rectification of the negotiations to achieve better conditions on the ground. Institutions, organisations and popular committees sent many memos and reports and requests to the PLO in Tunis explaining the new status quo in Hebron and demanding that negotiations be suspended until Israel was forced to evacuate fanatic settlers from the city of Hebron. Peres and Rabin played a classical tactical game by putting the town under siege and closing down the Hebron mosque. Many people who are opposing the current scenario of negotiations were ready to reconsider their position had the Palestinian negotiating team or the PLO leadership taken the new status quo after the Hebron massacre with the seriousness it deserved. I understand that they have been under regional and international pressure but they ignored our repeated cries to invest politically in the Hebron massacre and to create a new negotiating stance as well as to achieve immediate changes on the ground. Unfortunately, our leadership yielded again to the external pressures and ignored the voices of its own people.

Participant #6

I am not attempting to defend the actions of the PLO or the negotiating team but I can accept somebody in their position who misses 70% of attempts but scores professionally and successfully with the other 30%. (audience interruption - it should be vice versa 70% of the goals should be reached) The Palestinian factions and their democratic slogans whether they are opposed or supportive are not doing much on the ground themselves. It is the PLO who is doing it and we should support them. Furthermore, criticism of them should remain within our own house and not be put out for media consumption or political gain.

Participant #7

The question of factions is not limited to their relationship in the Territories. It also reaches out to their leadership in Damascus, Amman or elsewhere. There was a feeling among them which tended towards linkage of their political agendas, inside and outside, with Jordan. Their criticisms of today are based on the PLO ignoring Jordan and Palestinians in Jordan. I will go further on this point and say that the Hamas and Islamic leadership in Jordan will promote the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation more than they will promote a PNA functioning for the Transitional Phase in the hope of eventually having an independent state in the future.

Participant #8

In the western democratic systems there are two or more political parties. In the holy Quran there are clear phrases about the prophet defeating the parties. Here in the 20th century, I don't see any prophets but I do see parties in the making. Are we going to live in multi-party system with no prophets? The Jewish ideology is based on the Jewish people's claims to this land. Our idealogy is based on our rights to this land. Their prophets and ours are dead but their message is very much alive. We should do as they have done and make political parties based on ideology and not political slogans. What if Hamas or Islamic Jihad or other Islamic groups formed political parties based on Islamic ideology. How would the PNA or Israel react to this?

Participant #9

Legislative election delivers representatives of the people and you should consider yourselves as the peoples product and not the product of the Oslo agreement. The ceiling of elected governmental bodies may be Oslo, which actually negates its democratic merit, but the legislative elected council should not abide by such a ceiling. Since the PLO leadership did not invest politically in the Hebron massacre, they have no right to interfere in the current splits or divisions in Hebron. We had opened more than a house for condolences. Each faction had its own house and I should remind people that in a recent gathering very similar to this and in this same building Nabil Sha'ath told us "the PLO received it's return on investment in the Hebron massacre and that was the liberation of Gaza". We told him that the Israelis did not want Gaza in the first place, Rabin actually said that he didn't care if Gaza sank into the sea. The liberation of Gaza has no value for the Israelis, certainly no value for Hebronites and perhaps only has value for him.

Participant #10

I would agree that reading into factional contradictions and relations inside and outside is a complicated issue. However, were a non-partisan scholar and researcher to investigate this, his conclusions would always reveal more support than opposition to the current Transitional Phase. Can we demand a referendum by the people to make sure that his conclusions are what the people want? Legislative election we agree upon, but we are not interested in elections to the PNA.

Participant #11

On the international and regional levels, Palestinians lost politically - the conflict is considered over. The strength of the image of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands in Washington made people accept the principle that there was no longer a conflict in existence. Israelis and Palestinians don't have so much faith in this image. Occupation still exists but now we will come to see it as a new economic occupation with Japanese, German and US influence. We do not have our own national agenda.

Participant #12

The discussion of the factional relationships should be directed toward the common ground which is the question of Jerusalem, of refugees, of settlements, of security and (what people are reluctant to speak about publicly at present) the future relationship with Jordan.

Publications

The following two studies were published as the final part of the PASSIA "Education for Democracy" programme. It is hoped that the remianing three studies will be published in due course.

1. "The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank".

Raja Shehadeh.

October 1994 (Arabic and English)

Lawyer, Raja Shehadeh is co-founder of Al Haq, the West Bank affiliate of the International commission of Jurists in Geneva and member of legal advisory committee for the Palestinian delegation in the Middle East Peace Process. His paper addresses questions of legislation and the relationship between lawyers, judges, and their organizations in the current transitional phase and how the Palestinian legal structure will look throughout this time as well as the form it will take under the final arrangement. The study investigates particularly the manner in which the Palestinian judicial system is likely to evolve considering the influences of preceding legislators such as the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, the Egyptians and the Israelis. Other legal issues are also discussed and related to the process of democratization in Palestinian society.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Future Political and Administrative Relations.

Dr. Khalil Shikaki

September 1994 (Arabic)

Dr. Khalil Shikaki is a professor of Political Science at an-Najah University and the Director of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus. This study was also written as part of PASSIA's 1994 Program on Democracy. It looks at the different histories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the consequent divisions that this has caused between them. The study emphasises the need for dealing with these divisions in the transitional phase and offers several options for the future linkage of the two areas. It addresses how a federal relationship in the occupied territories can ensure their integrity and safety as a single unit and how the two areas may be represented in national bodies. Considerable attention is also given to the limitations regarding the transitional phase which are inherent in the DOP and which will hinder attempts at securing cohesion between the two areas.