The transition period has become part of any Israeli, Palestinian or Arab vision of the final resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Since the start of the negotiations, perhaps since Camp David, there has been no possibility to bypass the transitional stage. Apart from that of the Palestinians, most perspectives on the final outcome are tending towards what can be called a Palestinian "semi-state" under Jordanian auspices (the banner of confederation), under Israeli auspices, or under both. We must understand the relationship between Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and those in the diaspora against the background of their different interests and their disparate visions of the transition period and final position. I believe that the main losers in the transition period will be the diaspora leadership and people. Under any leadership, Israel is interested in reaching an agreement on the transition period, despite the diverse ideas about its form and its relation to a final resolution. Palestinians who object to the peace process are justified in the opinion that because of the conditions on which it is based, it is unlikely to lead to an independent Palestinian state. However, they are unable to provide an alternative or to interpret the hidden agenda of geopolitical considerations in the short, medium and long-term.

Labour's position Stripped of the frills of its left wing, the Israeli Labour party maintains a consensus on the following: the continuation of military occupation is too costly, morally unacceptable, and internationally embarrassing; an independent Palestinian state west of the River Jordan threatens Israeli security; annexation of the Occupied Territories is a threat to Israel's democracy and Jewish majority. A final arrangement entails more than autonomy, but less than a sovereign state (that is, a semi-independent state). It cannot happen without Jordan's participation, nor without territorial compromise, which might lead to conflict within Israeli society, even to civil war led by extremist settlers. Therefore, if it wins the election, it is highly unlikely that Labour will act according to the wishes of its left wing. On the question of Palestinian representation, the Labour party is less sensitive than Likud. This is clear from public statements regarding participation in the talks by Jerusalem Palestinians, deportees and PLO members. Labour is more flexible in its definition of the transition period, accepting a wider authority for Palestinians, similar perhaps to Egypt's vision of autonomy. If Labour comes to power, it may, if the current negotiations falter, implement autonomy unilaterally, probably starting in Gaza. Likud's position Likud's mainstream agrees on the following: sovereignty over the "Land of Israel" west of the river is exclusive to Israel; foreign sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza is a denial of the historical rights of the Israeli people; Jordan is practically a Palestinian state, and there need be no other west of the river; the continued occupation is embarrassing internationally but constitutes a domestic dispute; interim and final solutions are identical, the final one being personal autonomy under Israeli sovereignty, but with political rights in Jordan. U.S. diplomacy (and we should not be fooled into believing that it is a position of empathy with the Palestinians) seeks to shift Likud towards the Labour viewpoint on the transitional and final solutions. The strength of the U.S. stance lies in its interference in domestic Israeli debate, not by imposing a position from outside but by supporting stances already developed within Israel.

The Israeli Left and Right Better termed a peace camp than a "left", because it has little connection with left-wing ideology, this coalition supports the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, even if that means an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. However, this support comes with the following conditions: agreement on Jerusalem's status as a unified city; meeting the demands of Israeli security; assuring peace with Arab neighbours; a Palestinian compromise on the right to return; and finding an acceptable arrangement for settlements and settlers. Extreme right-wing parties demand sovereignty over the "Land of Israel" as an exclusive right of the Israeli people; formal annexation of the Occupied Territories; Palestinian residents may have religious and civil rights only, with no share in sovereignty over the land, and must accept Israeli rule and sovereignty without Jordanian participation. Those who do not accept this must leave.

The Palestinian position In short, the Palestinian position insists on establishment of an independent state in co-existence with Israel (some accept a confederation with Jordan either prior to or after independence); no separation between agreeing on a transitional stage and consideration of the final resolution; and the PLO remaining an active partner in both interim and final arrangements. We must ask, in all honesty and objectivity, what interest the PLO and diaspora Palestinians have in the transition period. Clearly, both leadership and people "inside" have an interest in the transition stage and find it attractive, under certain conditions, despite their awareness of the dangers it presents for broader national objectives. Of course, there is considerable external encouragement from the U.S., Europe, Arab states and, to an extent, Israel. On the other hand, Palestinians and their leadership in the diaspora are suspicious of the transition proposals, have no interest in them, and fear that events will proceed out of their control as soon as implementation begins. Although the leadership inside cannot proceed to the transition stage without the legitimation of PLO blessing and guidance, nor can the diaspora obstruct the process, because the consequences might be devastating for the already besieged PLO. Although the U.S. has no interest in severing the ties between inside and outside, autonomy may give the inside leadership an independent legitimacy. Unless restructured, the relationship with the diaspora leadership may enter a crisis; the PLO will require an assurance that its key role will continue, through cooperation with Jordan or a return to an effective role in Arab politics. In conclusion, there is widespread Israeli, Arab and international agreement to concentrate on the transition period. From this phase there can now be no escape, regardless of when and whether talks succeed. Apart from Likud's objections, there is consensus that the transition period will involve an end to military occupation. Jordan, Europe, the U.S., some Arab countries, and Israel all understand that a "semi-state", something less than an independent state but more than autonomy, will be effected. A sovereign state is absent from view when one looks forward through the period of negotiations and transition. Success or failure in the national project to establish an independent state on national land depends, not on the continuation of the intifada, but on the unpredictable events to come in the Arab/Islamic world. Those who believe that regional developments give cause for optimism ought therefore to oppose the current process, which makes no promise of an independent state.