We must consider the factors affecting the local Palestinian leadership, and the leadership's relation to the people; from these we can assess the overall role of the local leadership. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was fundamental to the weakening of the mainstream Fatah, its military role and its presence in Lebanon and elsewhere; in addition, the split led by Abu Mousa in 1983 weakened Fatah, its internal and external relations. Other organisations, particularly the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) suffered as a result of the invasion of Lebanon and the absence of effective military response. The main beneficiary was the Communist Party, the leadership of which was based in the Occupied Territories, close to the people. In the early 1980s, the Islamic movement, notably Hamas, began to organise in the Occupied Territories, particularly in institutions of higher education, but not, apart from a limited role in Jordan, in the diaspora. Its emerging presence in the community weakened other groups, especially Fatah. Another destructive influence was the split within the DFLP during the intifada. Its internal strife, Israel's arrest of many members, and the divided groups' lack of direction have reduced their weight and credibility within the leadership, with detrimental consequences for leadership itself. A major blow to the Communist Party was the decline of the left and Communist parties worldwide, especially the fall of the Soviet bloc. The Communists were the first Palestinian left-wing group to face the crisis, having addressed the problem in a conference four years ago, and froze mass organising while preoccupied with internal matters and ideological differences. This brought them to the same crippled state as the DFLP. Although affected by the crisis, the PFLP did not witness the same degree of conflict in its leadership and remained relatively coherent. However, Israel's arrest of PFLP activists damaged its standing on the streets. Certainly, the ideological crisis which has engulfed others on the left will reach the PFLP sooner or later, but with less effect. Organisational structure varies between factions, and the factors affecting inside-outside relations vary accordingly. Concerning the relationship between factions in decisionmaking within the PLO, before 1982-83 there was an agreed fixed quota arrangement which assigned the majority of votes to Fatah, with the rest distributed between other factions and independents. In some places, such as Kuwait, a faction with only four or five members would still receive its set quota. Change to this quota formula came with the formation of the Unified National Leadership, an innovation which succeeded simply because of peoples' zeal and unity in facing occupation and entering a new chapter of struggle, the intifada. Nevertheless, the new model, which gave each faction equal representation and financial support, faced difficulties. Was it fair for each faction to have equal financial backing, regardless of its weight in the community? Fatah, the faction most affected, opposed equal representation and demanded a return to the old quota system. Another difficulty arose on the question of consensus: some said that the new system was undemocratic. A third problem was the geographic centralisation of the local leadership. Although at the beginning of the intifada, the young leadership were spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza, in 1988-89 Israel deported and arrested many of this network of activists. In addition, resistance to occupation took a new form, with less concentration on the grassroots and more on Jerusalem-based diplomacy and media activity and the work of independent groups of professionals. Independents outside the Jerusalem area became active and influential partly in response to this centralisation. Evidence of this was the result of the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce elections. A general state of disillusionment reinforced the position of independents and of Hamas, while weakening that of the leadership. The coming period will witness rivalry between factions and dissatisfaction among members, especially in Fatah, of the way their respective leaderships take decisions. Faisal Husseini's role in this phase is similar to that of Yasser Arafat: simulaneously leading a revolution, and a PLO institution, and Fatah. We should also note the issue of relations between inside and outside, and their differences on the question of leadership.