The impetus behind entering negotiations governs the subsequent process and outcome of negotiations. Three circumstances face us: the U.S. agenda as revealed after the Gulf War; the as yet uncrystallised new global order following the break-up of the Soviet Union; and the domination of one superpower and its effect on international relations. During the war, the linkage demanded by Saddam Hussein, that the Palestine question is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and demands a solution, was achieved, if paradoxically. In the early days of the war, the Palestinians were placed in the position of the accused, opposed to the coalition's position in all respects. We faced, from the U.S., Europe, and Arab states, attempts to place the PLO and the Palestinian people under siege. From within our own ranks, voices called on us to acknowledge our weakness and to do penance for our wrongs. This perception of our impotence on the part of some was reflected in a newspaper article written by a member of the delegation in February, which stated that the Palestinian decision to join the negotiations was based on a weighing of the disadvantages of going against those of not going. This acknowledgement of weakness affected our work both strategically and organisationally. In terms of strategy, we are powerless. We cannot impose our solution; the basis of the negotiations is Israel's terms, not ours, and we depend on the U.S. agenda to assist us. Our conditions for negotiations, such as a halt to settlement activity, became the substance of negotiations: as if the decrease in the number of settlement housing units built were a victory. I maintain that the negotiations are leading us towards autonomy on Israeli terms. We are caught in a cycle of self-deception. The situation is this: James Baker tamed both Palestinians and Arab states. Coordination between us and Arab states is non-existent. We failed to involve the population in the peace process. Our delegation says that its strength or weakness comes from Tunis; for example, although it advised Tunis against attending the Moscow round, when Tunis ordered us to go, we went.

Comment by Ghassan al-Khatib Our achievements were ones of form not substance. We brought ourselves out of isolation, lifted popular morale, and succeeded in improving the image of Palestinians in the media. We avoided the potential losses of non-participation. Clearly, the Israelis are deliberately wasting time to prevent any substantial progress while creating new facts by continuing settlement. They put ever-increasing pressure on Palestinian society and question the credibility of the delegation and the PLO leadership. Moreover, the Israelis are trying to promote contacts through municipal councils, personalities in the education and health fields, and economists and businessmen (who have met collectively with Moshe Arens). I see Israel's interest in encouraging and reinforcing the importance of the multilaterals. In this phase our tasks are as follows: to continue participation as a matter of principle; to develop tactics to overcome Israeli delays, for example an agreement with the sponsors on timetables for discussion; to make it a condition for proceeding that Israel stop settlement activity and that continuation of multilateral talks be dependent on progress in bilaterals; to close all contacts with the occupying power, which undermine the role of the delegation; and to initiate national debate between those who participate in and endorse the peace process and those who oppose it. The negotiating programme should form a base of national unity and we should develop a national charter. The question is how to address the above in a situation of crisis in Palestinian decision-making where there are no political decision-making bodies and vital meetings go unrecorded.