The peace process will create a particular political situation, regardless of the Palestininan conception of a solution. Palestinian proposals for PISGA, whether accepted in full or part, will be the basis for the interim arrangement. The final arrangement will lead to three things: normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations; legitimisation of the Jewish state on the land of Palestine; and continuation of the Israeli position as a strategic ally of the U.S. with its interests linked to U.S. interests in the region. In my opinion, the questions of normalisation and legitimation are the only cards left in the hands of the Arab and Palestinian negotiators. There is a school of thought, thus: "If Arab-Israeli normalisation is achieved inside and outside and Israel is legitimised through officially recognized dealings with the Palestinians, the West will consider the conflict over, leave it aside and turn to domestic and other international matters." Another states that Likud might offer the Palestinians a very attractive deal, which will be difficult to refuse or bargain over; Likud will continue to present itself to Israeli electorate as the party capable of retaining the whole "Land of Israel" without giving anything away in return for peace. Likud will continue to improve its chances in the 1996 election, by which time this generation of leaders will have passed. These two schools represent a path to the "dead end" option. Palestinians are aware of these ideas, therefore the multilaterals will not lead to normalisation of relations with Israel before the gaining of minimum Palestinian rights in both bilateral and multilateral talks. In a divided Arab world, can we achieve this? Some Arab states talk of revenge against the Palestinians. Others consider the PLO an enemy. If we close the door on the current process, we might succeed if not in freezing, then in delaying the normalisation of relations with, and legitimisation of, Israel.