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The Making of a Palestinian Civil Society:
A Conceptual Framework
Dr. Ishaq Y. Al-Qutub[1]
The foundation of any civil
society is the provision of civil freedoms including the freedom of worship,
ideology, movement, residency, thought, conscience, organization and public
assembly, in addition to freedom of expression. Basic freedom means the
welfare of the individual and the development of his life and personality
within the context of the welfare of the community and society, and it is the
constitution of the State, in addition to religion and the prevailing culture
and values, that define the various kinds of freedoms. Democracy prevails only
when freedom exists, which is why the constitution of the State also mentions
implicitly the means of defending those same freedoms.
An important aspect of civil
freedom is the protection of the rights of individuals and groups. Such
rights, including equality before the law, should be preserved by the State,
regardless of the color, religion, race, ethnicity or language of its citizens.
As for freedom of conscience, it means the right of the individual to develop
his/her thoughts and beliefs concerning moral issues on the basis of his/her
faith and religion or from an ideological standpoint. Naturally, these same
thoughts and beliefs will usually dictate how one behaves.
The term ‘civil society’ is
used as an analytic term in social sciences. It is also used as a ‘normative
category’ that is subject to change in accordance with the changing political
and historical circumstances as well as changing theories. In this context, we
talk about liberalism, the concept of social democracy, the concept of radical
democracy and the Islamic concept. One can pose the question: Is ‘civil
society’ a synonym of ‘democracy’ or is it equivalent to political
participation, or a parliament? How do we consider the local initiatives of
citizens in organizing such institutions as neighborhood councils or groups to
protect the environment or consumers and the like? How do we view
non-governmental organizations: as a mode of life, as an alternative culture or
as pressure groups?
Philosophers, sociologists and
thinkers such as Hobbs, Montesquieu, John Stewart Mill, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and
Jean Boden, to name a few, view civil society as a form of: a) the rule of the
law, b) the separation between the State and society, and c) the balance among
authorities, or between the prevailing forces in society and the State.
Finally, a distinction should be
made between ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ or national identity. A nation can be
transformed into a civil society, and in turn, the civil society can be
transformed into a sovereign state. Ensuring that individual human needs are
compatible with the collective needs of the society and the market system is an
important way of facilitating the move toward civil society.
Throughout history, civil society
came into being in response to one-party rule in communist states, to highly
centralized decision-making in liberal states, and in response to market
economy control over social, economic and cultural life. In addition civil
society emerged in response to the presence of dictatorships in Third World
states and finally, in order to overcome stagnant organizational and
traditional structures within society.
The ultimate goal of any people
should be the establishment of a society in which equality, participation,
representation and justice prevails. I want to emphasize that democracy and
civil society are two separate concepts, with the former envisaging the means
to achieve the latter.
In a paternalistic, patriarchal
society, such as Palestinian society, it is useful to define the relationship
between the citizen and the State as follows:
· There should be a separation between the State and the
household. The two are structurally different: the household often consists of
only one family, while the State is made up of thousands of families; hence the
difference between the head of the household and that of the State.
· There should be a clear distinction between the State and
society or in essence between the State institutions and those of society.
· The individual should be viewed as a citizen, a distinct
legal entity regardless of his/her loyalties. There should be clear
distinction between the mechanisms, goals and functions of the various social
and economic institutions.
· A clear distinction should be made between societal
organizations consisting of citizens who voluntarily pool their resources to
achieve common goals and the usual organic social structures.
· Civil society will not develop in a weak state, i.e., one
where the authority is weak, but emerges when there is a strong state in order
to provide a balance of power.
· There is a need to monitor the State authority, since the
State can monitor society and has the potential and ability to exceed its
mandate and obligations.
· There is a need to define the relationship between the State
and society, since the possibility of the former suppressing the latter
exists.
· Civil society is a function of the relationship between
State and society and a source from which
the legitimacy of the State can be strengthened.
Throughout history, Palestinian
society has been affected by a succession of regimes; this is clear in the fact
that Jerusalem has been conquered and re-conquered approximately 25 times. In
modern history, Palestine witnessed the transfer from the Ottoman Turks to the
British Mandate rule, then the change from British colonialism to the
partitioning of Palestine, which resulted in the declaration of the State of
Israel, including over two thirds of Palestine. The West Bank and Gaza Strip
became two separate entities under separate administration: the former became
part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while the latter was put under the
administration of the Egyptian Government.
In 1994, following the Oslo Agreement, parts of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip were placed under the rule of the Palestinian Authority. This
succession of regimes meant there was a transition from authoritarian,
colonialist and militaristic rule and the division of society into two distinct
classes (namely the upper rich and the lower poor) to a society seeking
independence, building a civil social, political and economic order, and a
three-class society (upper, middle and lower). Any final settlement between
Israel and the Palestinians, from a Palestinian perspective, must result in
Palestinian sovereignty and self-dependence, requiring the proper utilization
of human and physical resources, sustainable institution building, and
subsequent social and economic development.
The first challenge arose with
the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which called for the establishment of national
home for the Jews in Palestine: a clear violation of the rights of the
Palestinian people. The process of strengthening
the Jewish community in Palestine involved the consolidation of Jews
mainly, from European countries with the subtle but effective cooperation of
the Western forces, mainly the British Mandate government. The formation of
the purely Israeli institutions such as the kibbutz, the moshav, and the Histadrut,
in addition to the various educational institutions, was essential to the
formation of the Jewish State later on.
The second challenge was to
restore the Palestinian
self-identity and to resist the expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine.
When the Palestinians reacted to the new situation, their attempts were marked
by a lack of good planning and other serious weaknesses pertaining to structure
and performance.
The third challenge arose
when the Arab League involved itself in making major decisions related to the
future of the Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinians felt the need to
structure their contemporary society by engaging in institution building;
consequently, a large number of political parties, labor and professional
unions, charitable organizations, clubs, and mass media institutions were
established.
The fourth challenge was the
most difficult; namely, to achieve unity after the dispersion of the
Palestinians following the War of 1948. The aim of the State of Israel, since
its declaration, was to create entities and prevent unity or direct
communication between the areas where Palestinians existed within the
cease-fire line, which separated the residents of over 90 villages from their
farms and land. Three areas were defined: the southern region encompassing
Bedouins, the collective villages of the Triangle, and the northern region
around Nazareth. The Palestinians were treated as second-class citizens and
restrictions were applied covering various aspects of their social and
economic wellbeing.
After 1948, the Gaza Strip
and what became known as the West Bank were outside the range of Palestinian
control. The two areas were physically separated, there was a vast difference
between them regarding the availability of natural resources, and both their
economic and authority systems were distinct and unconnected.
The overall status of
Palestinians between 1948-1967 can be summarized as follows:
· Jordanian (West Bank) and Egyptian (Gaza) government systems
were applied, meaning that the Palestinians gradually lost control over their
political, economic and civic affairs, whilst becoming increasingly dependent
on the Arab states, which by now were playing a significant role in attempting
to resolve the conflict with Israel and restore the rights of the Palestinian
people. Moreover, the role of the local civil organizations was marginalized by the Jordanian and Egyptian authorities.
· Palestinian performance inside Israel, the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip was inconsistent and varied from one area to the next. In Israel the
Palestinians were denied any contact with the Arab states and were obliged to
start establishing their civil societies from zero. The fact that they were
forced to accept Israeli sovereignty necessitated the adaptation to new
conditions. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians encountered diverse
conditions such as: 1) the cutting off of direct communication between the two
areas; 2) the slow revitalization of civil societies that had been established
in Palestine starting in the 1920s; 3) the necessary but difficult adaptation
to new local government systems; 4) an increase in the population density; 5) greater participation in
government administration; and 6) the emergence of an oil economy in the Gulf
region with Palestinian involvement. New political parties were formed such as
the Ba’ath, National Liberation, and Moslem Brotherhood parties, while Arab
nationalists functioned both secretly and openly until free elections were
held.
The impact of the Israeli
occupation on the development of the Palestinian civil society was minimal due
to the practices of the military authority. The following adverse conditions
prevailed:
· the uprooting of Palestinian society and the demolition of
its infrastructure due to the longest occupation in the history of the
region;
· the shift from state building to settlement expansion in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and on the Golan Heights;
· the refusal of Israel to abide by tens of UN General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions and other international human rights
conventions and treaties;
· the application of severe restrictions on Palestinian
economic, social, educational and cultural development, the aim being the
creation of high dependency on the Israeli economy and other services.
The establishment of the PLO in
the mid 1960s contributed to the success of the attempts to create and
restructure civil institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nevertheless,
the institutions were forced to function under abnormal conditions and severe
military occupation restrictions far away from the Palestinian leadership.
The
Palestinian civil system and the development of local institutions went through
various phases, characterized by adverse socioeconomic and political
conditions as follows:
· Jordan played a dynamic role in overlooking the operation of
local institutions in the West Bank. In Gaza, the National United Front was
formed but with non-civil objectives and did not play a major role in
structuring the civil societies.
· When the PLO was acclaimed in Rabat 1974 as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Front was created encompassing
various factions such as Fatah, the Communist Party, the Liberation Front, the
Democratic Front and others.
· Internal and
external structures became aware of each other and two types of institutions
emerged: formal ones, including domestic ones concerned with health, education,
welfare, etc., which were recognized by the Israeli Military Authority, and
unrecognized and unapproved grassroots movements, which were involved mainly in
voluntary work in rural and urban areas.
· In the municipal elections of 1967, Palestinian nationalist
groups managed to secure seats in main village and city councils and were able
to organize openly under their own leadership. This created a shift from the
philanthropic concept to that of development. Institutions like the Palestinian
Higher Education Council were formed and a conference that dealt with the issue
of supporting Palestinian institutions was held in 1981. The Jordanian
Palestinian Joint Committee was established in 1978 as a result of the Arab
Summit held in Baghdad.
· The Israeli Military Authority took a series of steps to
weaken the Palestinian civil organizations, which Israel often considered as
subversive institutions. Amongst these steps were attempts to have secret informants
from among the Palestinians infiltrate the local organizations.
· The role of the PLO, when it had its head offices ‘outside’,
increased in running the affairs of the Palestinians who were ‘inside’. The PLO
delegated a number of Personalities for Dialogue with the USA through Jordan,
without consulting the Palestinian ranks and file in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. This marginalized the process of making collective political and
social decisions and created a temporary gap between the ‘outside’ and the
‘inside’.
· The Intifada emerged
due to local deteriorating political and economic conditions, which led to
gradual self-management, the amalgamation of political factions under a united
leadership and linkage with the ‘outside’ leadership, the PLO. This resulted,
amongst other things, in an increase in foreign aid to local institutions.
Palestinian
society shares several features with modern societies but whilst being characterized by traditional peculiarities in
defining the political and social identity. The areas and type of environment
in which Palestinians live, i.e., village, urban area etc, and strong familial
and tribal ties all contribute to the prevailing social structure and affect
Palestinian development and policies. Neutral groups and individuals were
marginalized from the decision-making process. Today, both Moslems and
Christians share together the responsibility for building a civil society and
should be equally aware that a strong civil society entails cooperation between
the two groups in striving toward a common goal.
The influence of the upper class,
which once was prominent in Palestinian politics, has gradually diminished as a
result of various factors, most important of which is the election of the
Palestinian Legislative Council. The election of the council brought to the
forefront middle and to a lesser extent lower class individuals (who had become
powerful through joining the long national struggle of the PLO).
The
Future of Palestinian Civil Society
The development of civil
institutions has strengthened mainly as a result of international aid. However,
the PNA has taken measures in an attempt to organize the non-governmental and
philanthropic organizations both in Gaza and West Bank with a view to
regulating funding, ensuring more efficient use of human and material
resources, and dealing with the overlap in services and functions. Clearly,
there is a need to ensure better coordination between the various NGO unions
that are currently classified under various categories.
At present, non-governmental
and civil institutions have limited power and are
unable to influence the decision-making process. The PNA, in attempting
to improve the organizational structure, register these organizations and
evaluate their status and role still needs to develop a clearer concept with regard to establishing the appropriate procedures.
Grassroots organizations fear that their effectiveness, autonomy and
impact on the formation of a civil society will become further marginalized as
a result of governmental checks and controls.
The following are conditions to
be met in order for the Palestinian civil institutions to make an effective
contribution towards building a civil society:
· Regulation and legislation of NGOs to strengthen their role
and resources such as in programs for institution building, organization and
management. A national council (for the West Bank and Gaza Strip) would be
instrumental in the development of policies and strategies.
· allowing greater NGO and civil institution participation in the
political decision-making process, with relevant implementation and coordination
mechanisms;
· building a civil society requires autonomy, an understanding
of roles status, values, and norms related to the role and structure of related
institutions. This requires national training programs and further development
of the leadership;
· facilitating local, rural and urban community involvement in
the policymaking, planning, implementation and evaluation of civil
institutions: the objectives, processes, outcomes and impact on sustainable development;
· establishing links with Arab, regional and international
civil institutions through a system of exchange and joint projects and
activities.
In
conclusion, a sustainable Palestinian civil society can be achieved through concerted efforts,
the coordination of human and material resources and the application of sound
principles with the support of proper legislation. The ultimate objective is to
provide the opportunity for Palestinian citizens to enjoy their identity,
freedom, equality, and justice, all of which were denied to them for decades.
Galioun,
Burhan, et al., Around the Democratic
Option - Critical Studies. Ramallah: Muwatin, 1997. (Arabic)
Bisharah,
Azmi, A Contribution to the Critic of
Civil Society. Ramallah: Muwatin, 1996. (Arabic)
Al-Hermassi,
Abdul Baqi, “The Civil Society and the State as Implemented in Western
Politics”, in The Civil Society in the
Arab World, The Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1992. (Arabic)
Ibrahim, Hassanien
T., “The Structure of Civil Society -
Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators,” in
The Civil Society in the Arab World, The Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut,
1992. (Arabic)
Daqqaq,
Ibrahim, “Towards Building a Palestinian Civil Society” in The Civil Society in the Arab World, The Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1992.
(Arabic)
[1] Dr. Ishaq Y.
Al-Qutub is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Development Studies,
Al-Quds University, Jerusalem.