Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, PLC member, Chair of the Political Committee

When it comes to major issues such as the issue of statehood or the issue of right of return, nothing has changed over the years as far as the official American position is concerned. The official position remains, “We will agree to whatever the two parties agree on,” which means that the US, with no real position of its own, is merely hiding behind whatever the two parties agree to do. I must add, of course, that the US still does not recognize the Palestinians’ legitimate right to self-determination, statehood, nor return, nor does it recognize the PLO, in spite of the fact that it accepted UN Resolution 194 and signed the Oslo Agreement in which the PLO is mentioned.

In short, the US is inspired more or less by what it sees on the Israeli side and tends to wait for Israel to define a policy, regardless of how it is received by the Palestinians. One must remember that the US agreed to open a dialogue with the PLO only after the PLO and President Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounced all forms of violence. From my point of view, had it not been for Israel’s acquiescence the US would never have accepted Arafat and the PLO.

As to the US mediation, the US, a primary sponsor of the peace process, describes itself as an honest broker, but Palestinian officials have always complained that this is not the case and that the US position is not neutral but is more or less consistent with the Israeli position. Had it not been for this American bias towards Israel, we would not have asked for the inclusion of other parties, which, after all, only serves to complicate the negotiations. We would much rather negotiate with the Israelis alone, but unfortunately they are not willing to negotiate in good faith and respect the concluded agreements, which is why we are obliged to go to the Americans and ask for a European role.

Today, we find ourselves – for the very first time – with two Palestinian positions vis-à-vis the US: the Palestinian official position and the position of the Palestinian street. In the past, the PLO and the people were one and the same, and generally speaking our collective position was that America is our enemy. Now, we have a political system and we have a different official position, and while people in the street and the political factions issue statements condemning America for this or for that policy or position, President Arafat sends his greetings to President Clinton and thanks him for what the US is doing: this is the way governments function, but it does not mean that Arafat is not privately unhappy or even angry with the American leadership for the way it is behaving.

As to the US Congress and the prospects of improving the US-Palestinian relations, I do not see much hope of this happening in the near future. The American public, in general, does not care much about this issue. On the other hand, there is a strong pro-Israel lobby, and I believe that we should send people like Hannan Ashrawi to present our story to the public and to Congress, at least to the people who are misinformed. In Europe, for example, many people changed their perceptions of the Palestinians once they heard our story in full, and today there is considerable sympathy for our plight at both official and unofficial levels, and I believe that if we argue our case convincingly and logically in front of Congress, we stand a good chance of winning some support, even though it might not lead to a major shift, bearing in mind the strength of the pro-Israel lobby and the fact that so many politicians depend on members of this lobby for support. There is certainly room to improve our relationship with the US government and with the US Congress, but this will require great efforts from our side.

With regard to the Palestinian leadership, we still have one man who makes all the decisions and although he listens to those around him, nobody really knows what impact this has on the decision-making process. Whenever Arafat assembles the other leaders in the PLO Executive Committee or in the PA, it is more or less to provide a cover for the kind of decisions he takes, and even the PLC members have only a very little impact on the decision-making process. We do not have a coherent decision-making process, and this is becoming a major problem, especially as the one man who does make decisions is overworked and is getting old, at the same time as his responsibilities have increased. Obviously, he cannot do everything himself, and even though he takes all the major decisions, he is incapable of following them up. As yet, we have still not created a satisfactory decision-making system.

Take, for example, the negotiations and the way in which people are selected to participate, which is totally ad hoc. How can we expect to get anywhere without improving the current system? To my regret, we at the PLC do not have the mandate to change this, and although we have often voiced our opinion that something should be done and presented what we believe to be suitable guidelines, it has been to no avail.

With regard to the question of whether such a leadership can lead our people through such a critical period, it is a difficult question. This kind of leadership is unable to mobilize the capabilities of the Palestinians. I think that political participation is a very important principle; when people participate, they are mobilized and they share the responsibilities. From my experience during the Intifada, when we work together, the outcome is usually better. But again, Arafat is obsessed with a certain vision: he wants Jerusalem and a Palestinian state and he thinks other things should wait. This is not a personal issue; Arafat is a political leader par excellence, who is very legitimate, having received 87 percent of the votes in the elections. Why did he have such support? I think the answer has a lot to do with the fact that ours is still a very parochial and partially tribal society, and a majority of people still think - remember the political elite do not represent the masses of the people - that Arafat’s leadership may not be adequate, but that without him we are going to be far worse off.

I also think that the Americans, the Israelis and the Palestinians all agree and realize that the endgame is a Palestinian state: I do not think that even a Likud government would object to a Palestinian state in Gaza. The problem is the West Bank, because we do not consider a Palestinian state in Gaza an objective. What is the position of the American administration with regard to this problem? What is it doing in order to prevent the swallowing up of the West Bank by Israel? The endgame could be a Palestinian state over ten square meters or it could be a Palestinian state covering the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

With regard to the Iraqi crisis and its effect on the Middle East peace process, I believe that the Americans are simply waiting for Saddam to make a mistake so that they can go and hit Iraq, and this time without making a phone call to anyone. But, let us assume that the Americans do strike Iraq; it is my belief that the administration would feel less compelled to play the same active role that it played after the war of 1991 when it was accused of double standards and felt it had to do something to balance the policy. Assuming America does not hit Iraq now, I believe that things will continue at more or less the same tempo with the same kind of intervention.

The trouble is that if one is serving as an honest broker and does not intervene, then, of course, the outcome is going to be in favor of the more powerful party, which is exactly what has been happening. This is why the Palestinians always end up being the party that has to make all the concessions in order to appease the other side: the balance of power prevails, with America simply stating that it will agree to whatever the two sides agree to. Unfortunately, until there is a major crisis it is unlikely that the Americans will react and then, of course, each time there is a crisis, it is the Palestinians who end up paying the higher price. We have witnessed some minor changes, but they have not been enough to force the American administration to be more creative or for us to wake up one day and hear the American leadership announce, “Okay, we recognize a Palestinian state.”

With regard to the way in which people use the external difficulties to avoid making changes internally, I think we have to ask the question, “Do external difficulties really prevent us from fighting, for example, corruption within our society?” As far as I am concerned, it is obvious that if we clean up our internal situation, we will be better prepared to face the external challenges. If we take care of all of these internal problems - inefficiency, corruption, the lack of transparency - or if we at least start taking care of these things, we will have a state of mobilization. The leadership can always hide behind the external difficulties, but I see no reason why we should not kick out all of the corrupt ministers, etc., and exercise transparency, accountability and the rule of law. On the other hand, of course, people in the street are not enthusiastic about going out to the streets to risk their lives or the lives of their children for the sake of those individuals who are enjoying the fruits of their power, which is why we are not seeing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians going out there to protest the Israeli practices or even those of certain Palestinians. I think we could say that basically, people have eaten the bait and are now more concerned with trying to preserve what little they have gained, whether it is three percent of the West Bank or restricted authority. That is why we – the people and the leadership - after almost an entire century of fighting need to reevaluate our current situation and our present and future option.

HE David Berger, Ambassador of Canada in Tel Aviv

Before I get into the specifics of the Canadian relationship with the Palestinians and the role that Canada is playing in the Middle East Peace Process, I would like to take just a moment to review the larger picture of our global foreign policy objectives and explain how our activities here are situated within that broader tableau.

Any country’s foreign policy is conditioned by several factors, the most important of which include its relative position in the world as measured by its economic and military strength, geographic location, and so on, and the nature of its society, be it democratic or authoritarian, open or closed, relatively homogeneous or multi-ethnic. In Canada’s case, the most important factors that come together to shape our foreign policy priorities include our proximity to the US and the key economic and security relationship that this has brought about, our dependence on a stable and open international trading system, and - related to this - our reliance on a rules-based international system.

But foreign policy is not only about pursuing interests; it is also about values. A country’s foreign policy is fundamentally a reflection of who you are and the values that hold your society together. For Canadians these values include tolerance, fairness, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes. These values are of course a product both of our history and our present circumstances. If Canadians value tolerance, it is because from the very outset Canada was built on an accommodation of several founding peoples, one English speaking and predominantly Protestant, another French speaking and overwhelmingly Catholic, and our indigenous peoples. From those communities, Canada has evolved to become one of the most multi-cultural countries in the world. In fact it is estimated that within a decade, fully 56% of Canada’s population will be neither of French or British origin. The art of compromise and the acceptance and respect of differences and the need to resolve disputes peacefully have been constant and necessary features of our development as a nation. It is therefore not surprising that these values should infuse our foreign policy.

The pursuit of our interests in a manner consistent with our values is the key to understanding our broad foreign policy goals and our activities here in this region.

In global terms, Canada’s three key foreign policy objectives are as follows:

promotion of prosperity by advancing our trade and commercial interests;

protecting our security by promoting a stable international environment that seeks to resolve disputes peacefully, addressing global environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration, international crime and so on;

projecting Canadian values and culture abroad by promoting respect for human rights, participatory government, the rule of law, and sustainable development.

Returning to the question of Canada’s Palestinian policy, I would simply begin by saying that while our direct economic and political interests here are modest, Canada and Canadians remain keenly interested in this region and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several reasons.

The first relates back to our belief in the need to promote international stability through the peaceful resolution of disputes. Regional conflicts that are resolved peacefully discredit the use of violence and help to build respect for international law. When violent conflict does erupt, Canada has always been in the forefront of those willing to help find a peaceful resolution to the dispute. In this regard our record in the Middle East is particularly telling. Our former Prime Minister Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in defusing the 1956 Suez Crisis and for inventing the modern-day concept of United Nations peacekeeping. Since that time Canada has participated in all UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and, in fact, in almost all peacekeeping operations worldwide.

The second reason for our continuing engagement is simply because of the highly interdependent nature of the global system today. I do not know if the former Canadian academic Marshall McCluhan realized how prophetic he was being when he coined the term ‘global village’ in the 1960s, but it has surely come to pass in ways McCluhan could not have imagined. Today no one can escape the fallout from major crises no matter where they happen. The recent confrontation with Iraq is just one example of how regional problems can engage the interests of countries around the globe.

Both historically and in modern times, Canada has almost always borne some of the consequences of regional conflict and strife because we are a preferred destination for refugees. Defusing tensions before they boil over into outright conflict helps to stem the problem of uncontrolled migration.

Finally, many domestic constituencies in Canada maintain an active interest in Canada’s Middle East policy. These include Canadian Jewish groups, Palestinian-Canadian and Arab-Canadian associations as well as human rights NGOs. Indeed, there are considerable concentrations of Palestinian-Canadians in the Greater Toronto area and in Montreal. Also of note is the fact that in Ottawa, the third most important language after English and French is Arabic.

Now that I have described the fundamentals of our foreign policy and explained some of the reasons why we continue to see a need to be active here, I would like to briefly review Canada’s position on key issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Canada recognizes that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be realized, including the right to self-determination, to be exercised through peace negotiations. Canada also supports the security, well-being and rights of Israel as a legitimate, independent state. This is consistent with, and indeed rests upon, our belief in the values of fairness, respect for human dignity and the right of all societies to freely decide their own future.

Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over the territories occupied in 1967 and opposes all unilateral actions intended to pre-determine the outcome of negotiations, including the establishment of settlements in the territories and unilateral moves to annex East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Canada considers such actions to be contrary to international law and unproductive to the peace process.

Canada believes that the status of Jerusalem can be resolved only as part of a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and we oppose, as I mentioned, Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem.

We believe that Palestinians should enjoy the rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a political system that is open, democratic, and accountable. Demonstrating our support for this principle, in 1996 Canada provided financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to help carry out the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and President. In April, we will be sponsoring the visit to Canada of a delegation from the PLC, and the program will focus on the institutions of our democracy, how they work and their relevance to the situation here. Finally, we continue to take an active interest in the evolving human rights situation for Palestinians under both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. We regularly make representations to both sides to express our concerns when we see violations of internationally accepted human rights standards. We also provide financial support to a number of Palestinian human rights NGOs to enable them to carry out the important work of human rights monitoring.

Canada fully supports the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles signed in September 1993 and the subsequent Interim Agreement. The Agreement should become a comprehensive agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the right of all countries in the region to live within secure and recognized boundaries and the requirement that Israel withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967.

Canada does not recognize the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as announced in Algiers in November 1998. Canada’s position, however, does not exclude the creation of a Palestinian state if the parties through negotiations decided upon that.

To say that the peace process is going through a difficult period would be to state the obvious. But we should not lose sight of what Palestinian have gained since the process began. Today a clear majority of Palestinians are governed by leaders whom they have democratically elected. All major urban centers in the West Bank and Gaza are under Palestinian control, except of course Hebron where there is a shared jurisdiction. And the right of Palestinians to decide their own political future with a land base in the West Bank and Gaza is almost universally recognized. Given the history of the Palestinian people since 1948, these are not insignificant accomplishments.

On the economic front however, we know that Palestinians have not realized the peace dividend that had been expected. Indeed, far from improving, all indicators suggest that the economic plight of ordinary Palestinians has substantially worsened in the last three years. This is extremely distressing to us both from a humanitarian perspective and because widespread support for the peace process cannot be sustained unless Palestinians believe that the Oslo Accords will lead to a better and more prosperous future for themselves and their children.

While our ability to help ameliorate this situation is limited, Canada has a substantial, multi-dimensional development assistance program in the West Bank and Gaza. Over a five-year period, Canada is spending more than $80 million to improve the living conditions of Palestinians. For example, we are helping to rebuild the municipal infrastructure such as water and sewerage networks and roads that were neglected during occupation, and we are funding projects to improve the conditions in refugee camps. Through the Canada Fund we support a wide range of projects, such as camps for children, health clinics, arts and recreation programs and environmental clean-ups. Through our Dialogue Fund we support people to people contact between Palestinians and Israelis. Since 1992 we have funded 66 such projects for 1.4 million Canadian Dollars. Last year we funded a summer camp called ‘Nature Has No Boundaries’ for Palestinian and Israeli young people interested in environmental issues.

Last November, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. During the course of his visit, he met with Chairman Arafat and Faisal Husseini, toured a refugee camp in Rafah and opened our Canada Fund office in Ramallah. It is fair to say that Mr. Axworthy was disturbed at what he had found both in terms of the state of the peace process and the plight of the Palestinians, particularly the refugees. He ordered a review of our programs and services to Palestinians with a view to making them more effective, more visible and of greater support to the peace process. Earlier this month a task force from Ottawa led by Mr. Andrew Robinson, the Gavel Holder or Chair of the Refugee Working Group of the Multilateral Track of the peace process, spent two weeks here meeting with Palestinians and developing proposals to implement our minister’s instructions.

Central to our efforts and the Minister’s concerns, is the question of Palestinian refugees. As Gavel Holder of the Refugee Working Group, Canada has a special responsibility to ensure that this issue remains a focus of attention for all parties. The question of refugees is, of course, one of the most difficult components of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been described as highly complex, emotional, and even explosive. And yet it must be tackled since any realistic and durable solution to this conflict requires it.

Under the DOP, the matter of refugees from 1948 has been reserved for the Final Status Negotiations. While the refugee issue itself must ultimately be resolved by the parties themselves, the Refugee Working Group has tried to complement the bilateral negotiations by defining the scope of the problem, by promoting dialogue between the parties and by mobilizing resources to improve current living conditions.

One project that Canadians are particularly proud of is in Tel Al-Sultan in Gaza. Canada has taken up one of the provisions of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty and provided funding to permit the return to Gaza from Egypt of Palestinian refugees who had been living in the former Canadian peacekeeper barracks known as Canada Camp. This project has also received important financial support from the government of Kuwait. To date, we have helped 107 extended families, involving about 1,500 people, return to their communities in Gaza.

We have a variety of other proposals in the fields of medical research, information technology, industrial innovation and university cooperation that are being developed and evaluated. On the trade front, we have committed ourselves to negotiating a memorandum of understanding between Canada and the Palestinian Authority that would lead to greater cooperation in the development of our bilateral commercial relations. In the coming months, I hope that most if not all of these projects will be realized.

On a broader level, I think Canada can offer some useful lessons for Palestinians and Israelis on institutional mechanisms for cooperation. As a very decentralized federal state composed of ten provinces, Canada has a wealth of experience in dealing with issues that cross both geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. And, like the Palestinians, we have a large, powerful neighbor to contend with. Former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau once said that living next door to the US was like a mouse sleeping with an elephant. If the elephant rolled over, the mouse was in trouble. Yet, despite our sometimes-precarious position, we have found ways to level the playing field in many areas, particularly in the all-important economic and trade field. For example, within the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement that includes our southern partner Mexico, we negotiated built-in dispute resolution mechanisms that arbitrate disagreements in a manner that is relatively fair and objective. On another front, we also have several Canada-US commissions that deal with a wide variety of transboundary issues such as water and environmental questions. The point is that there are ways in which weaker partners can negotiate arrangements with stronger neighbors that mediated the imbalance of power. There is also the case of the European Union where many of these same problems have been dealt with albeit in different ways. I think it would be useful for Palestinians and Israelis to look at the experience of countries like Canada in this regard to see what lessons can be drawn and applied here.

Finally, I just want to say once again that despite its ups and downs, despite the difficulties and setbacks, there is no real alternative to negotiation and dialogue as a means to settle this conflict. In this process both sides must understand and respect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the other or the entire process will collapse and with it the hopes for a just and lasting peace. But I am convinced that those who say that the process is doomed are wrong. I am convinced that ordinary people on both sides want the peace process to go forward and do not want their leaders to let slip the historic opportunity that exists to build a peaceful future. As Lloyd Axworthy said after his visit here, “We must keep alive the search for common ground.” In this regard Canada, in our modest way, is doing its part.

Participants are invited to consider and discuss the following:

What expectations did you have at the beginning of the seminar?

In reality, was there anything you did not anticipate or that surprised you?

What did you think of the choice of topics covered?

What did you think of the range of speakers?

Can you say anything about how you think your own opinions developed during the course of the seminar?

Here are some suggested topics:

What does the Iraq crisis of February 1998 reveal about US interests in the Middle East?

What does the Iraq crisis of February 1998 reveal about US policy in the Middle East?

What are the major components of Canadian policy in the Middle East and in what ways do you expect this policy to develop?

What is the impact of interest groups on the formulation of US or Canadian foreign policy?

In what ways does the pro-Israeli lobby influence US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process?

Compare and contrast the role of interest groups in determining US and Canadian policy toward the Middle East.

What is the US approach to the Oslo process?

What is the Canadian approach to the Oslo process?

Who are the main players in US foreign policy formulation? (Use a case study to evaluate which players were the most dominant on a particular issue.)

What advice would you give to the Palestinian Authority about influencing US or Canadian policy in the region and why?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Realist approach for analyzing the US position in the Middle East?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Liberalism approach for analyzing the Canadian position in the Middle East?

During the last session of the seminar, the participants were asked to evaluate the information they had been given, its practical use with regard to their professional activities, and the overall style of the seminar. The following points were mentioned:

The seminar has achieved its goal as a seminar aimed at civil society empowerment. I think I can apply the information we received to my work very easily. I believe that encouraging citizens to take action in the field of politics can be beneficial to society as a whole.

From my point of view, the most important aspect of the seminar was that it helped us to understand the concept of civil society, its major actors, and the role it can play in a political system.

I learned a lot, not only from the lecturers, but also from the other participants. I think it was very useful to relate what we learned to our places of work, as by doing this we were able to learn how to apply what we learned to our daily life.

The seminar helped me to think in a different way, to analyze problems more systematically, to share my opinions with others, and to express myself with confidence. During similar events, this has not been possible.

It was a good idea to discuss current issues in the seminar.

The seminar gave us a good insight into our community’s problems and the role of NGOs in society.

The seminar provided me with my first opportunity to practice brainstorming as a method of dealing with certain issues. I think this is a very effective method, particularly when it involves a relatively large group.

We were given a lot of very useful information from some excellent lecturers. We have learned to analyze, and I hope to be able to use my new skills in order to contribute to the decision-making process that relates to my field of work. I was surprised but encouraged to find that there were more women than men taking part in this particular course.

I am very happy about the fact that many of the lecturers were Arabs; this should give us more confidence as Arabs and Palestinians.

When asked if they had any criticisms regarding the seminar, the participants focused on the following points: