Dr. Rex Brynen

The Madrid Peace Process established Jordan-Israel, Syria-Israel, and Lebanon-Israel negotiating tracks - and a series of multilateral negotiations, which addressed issues of regional concern. The multilaterals, which dealt with issues such as arms control and security, water, the environment, refugees, and regional and economic development, were there for several reasons. One of the reasons was the fact that given the degree of international sympathy the Palestinians enjoyed, particularly that coming from Europe, it was felt that having more countries in the room could only improve their position. The multilaterals also, of course, reflected Israel's desire for normalization.

At the start of the multilateral component of the peace process in Moscow in January 1992, Canada was asked by the cosponsors of the peace process to assume the role of gavel holder of the Refugee Working Group (RWG). One of the reasons why Canada was chosen was because it was seen to be fair-minded, especially by America, which felt that Ottawa had what it took to deal with such a difficult and sensitive portfolio. The RWG was intended to be a kind of incentive for the Palestinians, it being clear that it dealt with an issue, namely refugees, which Israel was not at all keen to talk about. Indeed, the problems began with the initial meeting in Ottawa in May 1992 when the Likud government refused to participate, in part because of its opposition to the participation of Diaspora Palestinians. Nevertheless, the agenda was eventually set in the Israelis' absence but with the Americans doing their best to ensure that it would meet with their approval. The agenda items that were chosen were as follows: public health (Italy), human resources (US), child welfare (Sweden), social and economic infrastructure (EU), databases (Norway), and family reunification (France). Family reunification referred, of course, to the reunification of families within the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis did not like the idea because they were concerned that establishing the humanitarian principle of 'family reunification' would set the groundwork for establishing a broader human right principle of 'right of return', which could then be used to facilitate the return of vast numbers of Palestinians to the homeland. The US, meanwhile, was completely satisfied with the item's inclusion.

Having discovered the cost of not attending, Israel came to Ottawa for the second meeting in November 1992 but then threatened to boycott it due to the participation of PNC member Mohammed Halaj. They had been completely willing to ignore his membership as long as no one mentioned it, but when Halaj and his position were mentioned in the press shortly before the meeting, they felt that they had to make a fuss. By way of a compromise, Halaj announced that since the PNC was not in session, he was not technically a PNC member at that moment. The Israelis replied, "That is fine with us," only to turn around the second day of the meeting and walk out of the room.

Although the first two RWG meetings were extremely difficult, changes in the Israeli government and the Oslo agreement and so forth meant that problems of this kind more or less came to an end. The RWG held regular meetings through 1993-95, with significant changes occurring after Oslo in September 1993, and whether held in Oslo, Cairo, Turkey, or Switzerland, they continued relatively smoothly. The major problem with the RWG, which operates on a consensual basis, is that the main sessions are unwieldy due to their size; even countries that have nothing to do with the Palestinian refugees want to come, such as South Korea, Romania, and Turkey, not because they have enough money to support the projects, or anything useful to say, or any influence over the parties, but simply because they want to be seen as part of the peace process. The large numbers make achieving a consensus almost impossible, and although there are no formal decisions, if the Palestinians or Israelis do not like the direction in which the RWG is going they can simply use their implicit veto, and things come to a halt.

In addition to the RWG, Canada has also been actively involved in the meetings on water and arms control. With regard to water, Canada supported database and research activities, whilst its involvement in arms control has been mainly related to confidence building.

What, if anything, can Canadian diplomacy do, given the framework of the RWG? It is my view that the most we can do is try and encourage the parties to move in the right direction by doing several things. One is to try and hold the meetings at a smaller level; for example, we have already divided up the agenda items, each of which is shepherded by a particular country. Smaller meetings attended by only a few countries will reduce the distractions that often result from larger meetings and will allow us to deal with issues such as public health and child welfare, etc., in a more efficient manner. We could also encourage the holding of informal nonofficial meetings, as it is possible that the informality will encourage the participants to be more flexible when it comes to discussing areas of compromise and so forth. There is, however, a dilemma, inasmuch as many people are concerned that focusing on projects to improve the current living conditions of the refugees could be at the expense of dealing with the difficult political issues. Some Palestinians are concerned that normalizing the conditions of the refugees will reduce their number and weaken their political position in the negotiations; others maintain that their political rights and their human rights have nothing to do with their living conditions and should not be put in one basket. Certainly, the debate on the Palestinian side concerning the dangers inherent in focusing on the refugees' immediate humanitarian, economic and social needs and possibly weakening their political position has made that direction rather difficult to move in.

There is certainly a need for a vast amount of information concerning the refugees, not only on their number, living conditions and present needs, but also on their future needs and the socio-economic and other consequences of their possible return to Palestinian territory. The Norwegians have done a very sophisticated living conditions survey in Jordan, and started to do the same in Lebanon.

Another problem is that the Palestinian delegations simply do not have the support mechanisms that are enjoyed by other parties. When the Palestinian academics, such as Salim Tamari and Elia Zureik, were leading the negotiations, they would often only discover a day before a meeting that they were supposed to attend, which meant that they were sometimes obliged to decide upon a position in a hotel coffee shop just minutes before the meeting was due to begin, or discuss it by e-mail, knowing very well that every single word was being read by the Israelis. If the Israelis need information on something, someone from the relevant ministry will supply it, whereas the Palestinian delegation is often left totally in the dark. Now the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs oversees the negotiations, but they are still understaffed and underequipped.

Unfortunately, the PA is being extremely slow in organizing its refugee policy, having chosen in the past to concentrate on land and security issues, etc. The PLO Department of Refugees has existed for many years, but only last spring did it start moving into its offices and recruiting staff in Palestine. On a more positive note, Arafat established The Higher Council for Refugees in November, a high level inter-ministerial group. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that we have been faced with finding a solution to the refugee problem since 1992, and yet only now, in 1998, do we have the beginnings of the infrastructure to think about ways to do this. Another problem is that the Palestinians have been so busy with other matters that they have not been in a position to think about what they can gain from the multilaterals in the way of political points, funding for particular initiatives or increased donor support, etc.

There have been a couple of high-profile so-called 'international missions' to Lebanon involving the 'gavel' of the RWG and other international actors, during which the delegates talked to the Lebanese government about the situation of the refugees. Even though the missions did not change anything on the ground, they were able, I am sure, to influence the Lebanese a little. Neither the PLO nor the PA can do that, because the Lebanese will pay absolutely no attention to them, whereas if the French, the Swiss and the Japanese all show up and say, "We are concerned about the position and treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon," then the Lebanese government tends to pay a little more attention.

There are those who argue that the RWG has done very little or that it is even worse than hopeless now that the high-level multilateral track has essentially been halted by the decision of the Arab League. Some would say that there is no longer any point in playing the game, others, that certain things can still be achieved, given that almost all the countries that participate in the RWG sympathize with the Palestinian refugees.

As to Canadian involvement in the RWG, which is the single largest component of Canadian political engagement in the peace process, none of us would dispute the fact that it is extremely hard to move ahead on the refugee file under the Likud. Its coalition agreement, for example, prohibits the return of any Palestinians to west of the Jordan River, including the '67 territories, in spite of the fact that Oslo talks about the return of displaced persons to the areas in question.

Canada has been providing $8-10 million per year in development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, much of which has found its way to Rafah, partly because of the Canada refugee camp, whose name derives from the fact that the Canadian-UN peacekeeping contingent was originally in that camp. Canada has an agreement in principle concerning the return of those Palestinians trapped on the Egyptian side of the fence to their families on the Gazan side. In practice, it is taking forever to move small numbers of people across the fence, largely because of the Israelis, but also because of the Egyptian bureaucracy. Because of the engagement in Canada Camp, Canada's bilateral aid programs also involved water and waste projects in Rafah, projects on the environment, and elections support.

In addition, two inflatable boats were provided to the Palestinian Coastal Police. The only trouble was that the boats originally went faster than allowed under the rules, so the Canadian government had to slow down their engines before sending them over; even then, when the Israelis tried them out in Ashdod, one was found to go two knots too fast, and I am not sure if they have actually been delivered.

With regard to other support, the highest proportion of Canadian funding - about one quarter of all Canadian assistance to the Palestinians - has gone to the Holst Fund. Canada also gives $9 million per year to UNRWA. The problem with the Holst Fund, which has allowed the PA to continue functioning, is that no one, not even the people in the PA, know who is donating the money; from the point of view of development agencies, this is rather unfortunate as they would all prefer that their contributions be recognized. There are two major reasons for the existence of the fund:

During closure and other difficult periods, such as when the Israelis cut off the tax money to the PA, it provided a very fast mechanism for transferring money to the PA; all it took was two days to get the money to the bank and another 48 hours for the bank to get the money on the ground. It is the only 'rapid aid' mechanism of its kind.

The other reason for Holst is that it provides a rapid way to finance income-generating programs under closure.

Holst has been an important part of Canadian assistance and Canada has generally been supportive of the fund, although there are those who have seen it in a less positive light. However, it is unlikely to figure large in future Canadian assistance.

Canada has also been involved in support for NGOs and a considerable number of small projects. The Canada Fund office in Ramallah, which makes very small disbursements with a ceiling of $50,000 per grant, has been very effective due to the fact that everything is done locally with virtually no reference to headquarters. Most of the other donors do not have an equivalent mechanism for spending their budget - which in the case of the Canada Fund is approximately one million dollars - and the money is usually only available after several months following numerous letters, notes and phone calls between the local office and its headquarters.

Other Canadian funding has gone to public health and to Canadian-Palestinian NGO partnerships. A limited amount has also been used for investment cooperation projects, although it is extremely difficult to convince people who are essentially banking officials that Gaza is a great place for investment.

Canadian development assistance in general has not targeted a single area, although the Swiss, for example, tend to concentrate on one particular area in order to establish an opportunity or some kind of presence. Other donors, such as the Swedes, spread their money all over the place based on what they see as good funding opportunities. In other words, there are two models for donors, of whom the majority, including Canada, try to find a balance somewhere between the two.

Canada also serves as a member of the 'steering committee' for international assistance for Palestine. Canada is a member of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) because it is the gavel-holder of the RWG and technically the aid coordination structure flows from the steering group to the multilaterals. Canada is also involved in local aid coordination mechanisms.

When we think about Canadian political and aid policy in the coming couple of years, these are some of the issues that we should consider. What happens after 1998? None of the donors who agreed to provide for Palestine for the period 1994 to 1998 have yet committed to providing further support at the end of the five-year period, although this does not mean that no money will be available, only that until now no one has made any promises about what will happen. Between 1994 and 1998, everyone's aid budget shrunk by approximately six percent per year, which means that the aid budgets are in real terms 20 or 30 percent smaller than they were at the time of the signing of the Oslo agreement in October 1993. The CIDA budget has also decreased, the reason being that the governments are trying to reduce their deficits by cutting virtually everything, including aid budgets. Can assistance be maintained at its current level? I would not be surprised if the annual level fell a little and loans or more restrictive types of aid replaced some regular aid. When it comes to making decisions about whether to continue supporting the current levels of West Bank and Gaza assistance at the risk of cutting the aid to countries such as Egypt, Jordan or Lebanon because the CIDA Middle East budget has decreased, one has to be very careful to prepare oneself in advance for a lot of argument. Officials involved in the Egyptian program, for example, will be quick to point out that the Palestinian GNP per capita is 2.5 times higher than the Egyptian GNP per capita and they will be very upset at any suggestion that the Egyptian program should be cut in order to support the one here. Officials working on aid to Yemen will also be quick to point out that Yemeni GNP per capita is one-third of the Palestinian GNP per capita while life expectancies are ten or 12 years shorter and literacy rates are half those of Palestine, and they will bring all these statistics to bear if anyone argues that Yemen should be cut in order to allow the financing of the West Bank and Gaza to continue. I do not meant to suggest that the West Bank and Gaza will not receive funds at the current levels, only that the Palestinians will have to come up with some very good counter-arguments about why they are more important than the other places in which aid agencies operate.

With regard to donor funding for UNRWA, in Canada and many other countries this is considered ‘humanitarian assistance’ and is a tradeoff against support for the Red Cross and for the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). There is only so much money to go around, and you have to make hard choices about who gets it and who doesn't. You have to make arguments why UNRWA is so important that ultimately you should give assistance not to the refugees in Rwanda or Burundi or Somalia and various other places, but to UNRWA.

It should be noted that many of the donors do not think that UNRWA is a well-run organization from the management point of view. The question is, do you force it to reform itself at a time when it is going through a crisis? And will UNRWA eventually be obliged to increase charges for its services, or will there be a gradual decline in the services it provides due to the fact that its budget has decreased? These are the types of questions that the donors must consider. One thing is certain: UNRWA will not disappear until there is a permanent settlement. On the other hand, it cannot possibly continue to do the job it is doing without making some drastic changes. Frankly, I do not think that UNRWA is capable of carrying out effective internal planning, simply because within a few hours of its decision makers making any decision, there is bound to be a leak and half an hour later, people will be out on the streets and the organization will be back at square one, trying to think of other options. UNRWA's current problems are numerous, to say the least. It has some 20,000 Palestinian employees, but due to the fact that its accounts are not very clear the donors often complain that they do not know where the money is going. UNRWA still has its own way of doing things, and every time there is an UNRWA pledging meeting, it comes up with a different figure for its deficit, and the donors turn around and say, "Hang on! You just told us six months ago that THIS was your figure!"

From the point of view of CIDA, there are several major questions pertaining to UNRWA: What is the appropriate level of funding? How much reform is desirable, and how should that reform be facilitated, i.e., through donor meetings, quiet dialogue with UNRWA, or by paying for a Canadian consultant to help straighten up the organization? The PA, for one, would like donors to pay their full commitment.

It is true that UNRWA was asked to think about how the organization might terminate itself after 1999, i.e. after the final status agreements. In practice, nothing has changed, although there is no doubt that the donors and the PA are probably spending quite a bit of time thinking about what will happen; UNRWA provides a substantial number of services, all of which must be taken oven by the PA or else the host governments. Whether or not all this thinking is reflected in the donor's foreign policy, I would not like to say. With regard to UNRWA's ‘Peace Implementation Projects’, these were an attempt to capture some of the money that was made available as a result of the peace process. The idea was that UNRWA would be able to package up all the things it had wanted to do but not had the funds to do in an attractive parcel and present it to the donors in order to obtain adequate funding. The problem with these projects is that there are substantial operating costs involved; it stands to reason that one cannot simply build a school or youth club and then expect it to run itself, but UNRWA, unfortunately, sometimes failed to include the operating costs in the project amount. In this context, it should be noted that practically no NGOs receive money for regular operating costs; instead, they include their regular operating costs in their project budgets, and UNRWA could certainly have learned a lesson had it looked at what they were doing. UNRWA in a sense was too honest and said here are the exact costs for building a school and we want that much money; it did not take into account the amount of money that was needed over the next five years to maintain schools, hire qualified teachers, and provide other services.

As to the transferal of the UNRWA headquarters, this was a symbolic decision, made to support the PA. First of all, wages that would have been spent in Austria are now being spent in the West Bank and Gaza, which will most definitely help the current socio-economic situation. I do not think that the move will make any difference regarding how the other actors view UNRWA as an international organization; the Lebanese still mistreat the Palestinian refugees in exactly the same way that they mistreated them in the past, the Syrians and the Jordanians still treat them fairly well as they did before, and UNRWA personnel are still UN personnel. But again, it is precisely the kind of issue one must think about when considering the issue of development assistance.

Dr. Rex Brynen

Each of the participants had to represent the following personalities and was given specific instructions about the positions of their countries or their organizations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

The CIC has grown increasingly concerned that Canada is failing to address legitimate Israeli concerns. In particular, the Palestinian Authority has not taken effective security measures against extremist terrorism, and continues to violate signed agreements. There is broad support in the Canadian Jewish community for pressing the PA to live up to its commitments. Also, Canada’s involvement in the Refugee Working Group should be based on a clear understanding that it will not accept either Palestinian statehood, nor the return of refugees to any areas west of the Jordan River.

The CIC has taken these concerns to both the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA/DFAIT). It is important that these concerns be actively followed up, to assure that the taskforce report reflects Israel’s legitimate security concerns, as well as the positive nature of Canadian-Israeli relations.

You are the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (GXD) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for coordinating Canadian involvement in the multilateral working groups of the Middle East Peace Process, as well as overseeing and advising on other aspects of Canadian policy that touch upon the Arab-Israeli conflict. The largest component of your position involves your role as Gavel-Holder of the Refugee Working Group (RWG), which represents the most visible aspect of Canadian involvement in the peace process.

You have been asked to co-chair a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, in cooperation with the Director General for the Middle East and North Africa (BFM) at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Your report should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

RWG Gavel’s Speech to UNRWA Donor’s Meeting

Middle East Peace Process: Refugee Working Group

The Refugee Working Group and the Refugee Question

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations

Much Ado About Nothing? The RWG and the Perils of Multilateral Quasi- Negotiations

You are the Director of the Middle East Bureau (GMR) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for overseeing Canadian political and trade relations with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinians. You are also responsible for promoting Canadian trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East.

You have been asked to participate in a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, co-chaired by DFAIT and CIDA. In doing so, you will want to assure that any recommendations produced by the taskforce are consistent with Canada’s broader Interests in the region and do not undermine our existing friendly relations with these countries. You will also provide support to the DFAIT /GXD co-chair of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Middle East Peace Process: Refugee Working Group

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy.

You are a political advisor in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for advising the Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on the broader international and domestic ramifications of policy decisions.

The minister recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In thinking about any new Canadian policy it is important to consider the consequences for Canada’s relations with its Western allies, as well as with states in the region. Moreover, there are domestic political factors to be considered: the minister has recently been criticized by some members of the Canada-Israel Committee for what they perceive as a ‘pro-Palestinian tilt’. The CIC is particularly concerned about what they see as the failure of the Palestinian Authority to deal with terrorism and live up to its commitments under the Oslo Agreement. Your private academic advisors suggest that a more energetic Canadian approach is needed, that Canada should focus on the refugee issue, and that Canadian aid programs should play a stronger role in the area. (It should be noted, however, that CIDA is not under DFAIAT control.) While the minister often prefers bold and innovative polities, it is essential that these enjoy broad support within Canada and from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is known to favor a more cautious approach.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy.

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Israel and the Canadian Representative to the Palestinian Authority. The embassy is based in Tel Aviv and is responsible for the implementation of both diplomatic and aid policy. The CIDA officer for the West Bank and Gaza is based at the embassy; in addition, a local office of the ‘Canada Fund’ (which supports small projects) is based in Ramallah.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect our relationship with both Israel and the Palestinians. The embassy is likely to be the focal point of any new policy, so it is important that you are closely engaged with the work of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

CIDA Consultant’s Report

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Jordan.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect our relationship with Jordan. Of particular importance is the large Palestinian refugee population in Jordan and possible initiatives undertaken by Canada in the context of the Refugee Working Group. Jordan is an active member of the RWG.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Lebanon.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect our relationship with Lebanon. Of particular importance is the large Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon and possible initiatives undertaken by Canada in the context of the Refugee Working Group. Lebanon and Syria have refused to participate in the RWG or other multilateral working groups that include Israel. Moreover, there is strong suspicion in Lebanon that Canada supports the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. While untrue, this suspicion has had negative effects on Canadian-Lebanese relations.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

You are a political officer at the Canadian Embassy to the United States. You are responsible for monitoring American policy in the Middle East.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle Eat peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of how the US is likely to regard Canadian initiatives, and what potential areas of US-Canadian cooperation there might be assuming that the American initiatives do not antagonize the regional parties of further polarize the delicate political situation.

Of course, the Middle East is only a small part of our broader relations with the US. Canada is perhaps the closest ally of the US; the two economies are closely linked under the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the US accounts for fully 85 percent of Canadian trade. This aspect too should be brought to the attention of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

You are a staff member of the Privy Council Office. The PCO supports Cabinet decision-making. It also undertakes medium and long-term political intelligence assessments of international politics.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to monitor the taskforce discussions to assure that any policy recommendations are consistent with broader Canadian foreign and domestic interests.

The current PCO assessment is that the Middle East Peace Process is in a period of extended stalemate. No substantial changes are expected under the current Israeli government. Canada has been actively involved in the Refugee Working Group, but there have been no major achievements. The Middle East is not an important region to Canada in economic terms, although it is of some strategic importance. Canadian policy in the region has been closely coordinated with that of the US.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

You are a staff member of the Prime Minister’s Office. The PMO provides policy and political advice to Prime Minister Jean Chretien.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to monitor the task force discussions to assure that any policy recommendations are consistent with the political interests of the government.

It should be noted that some officials of the Canada-Israel Committee have recently complained to the Prime Minister about Canada’s perceived ‘pro-Palestinian’ tilt, as well as the Palestinian Authority’s failure to crack down on terrorist groups. The Canadian Jewish community is very well organized, is very effective at political mobilization, and closely monitors Canadian support for Israel. Arab-Canadian groups are much less well organized and have much less political influence. The Canadian press is generally even-handed in its treatment of the issue and has devoted little attention to Canadian policy. Press editorials have generally been critical of the Netanyahu government.

In a recent meeting, President Clinton thanked Canada for its continued support of the Middle East Peace Process. He also thanked Canada for its position on the current crisis with Iraq.

The Middle East is not an area of critical economic interest to Canada. While the Prime Minister supports the peace process, he sees little reason to dramatically change Canadian policy.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

You are the Director General for the Middle East and North Africa (BFM) in the Bilateral (Africa/Middle East) Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you are responsible for coordinating Canadian development assistance to the Palestinians, as well as to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries in the region. CIDA has its own minister and is not part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

You have been asked to co-chair a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The report should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, the CIDA budget has faced serious cuts. Consequently, it is unlikely that funding for the West Bank and Gaza can be expanded above its current level of $8-10 million per year, although it may be possible to find an additional $1 million for next year. Additional CIDA funds flow to non-governmental organizations and the UNRWA from CIDA’s Partnership and Multilateral Branches.

In designing an aid program, CIDA attempts to maximize the role of the private sector as an engine of economic growth and also attempts to promote the involvement of Canadian companies and technical aid. Other priorities include good governance, women, the environment, and poverty alleviation/ basic needs.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

CIDA Consultant’s Report

Other CIDA materials

You are the Director General for International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) in the Multilateral Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you provide support for the UNRWA, as well as other refugee and relief agencies around the world.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, the CIDA aid budget has faced serious reductions. As a consequence, CIDA/IHA has had to cut $1 million from its $9 million annual contribution to UNRWA. The alternative would have been to cut support to the UNHCR or the Red Cross, both of which serve much poorer and more vulnerable refugee populations in Africa and elsewhere. In addition, CIDA has concerns about UNRWA’s long-term donors’ willingness to add to its limited resources, and the Palestinian refugee population continues to grow at 4 percent per year.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

CIDA materials.

You are responsible for Middle East NGOs (NGO) in the Partnership Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you provide funds to support partnerships between Canadian and Palestinian NGOs.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, you have grown concerned about the human rights abuses by the Palestinian Authority. It is important that Canada support Palestinian NGO activities so as to promote democracy and civil society.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

CIDA materials

By Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

The political backgrounds of both the Camp David and Madrid conferences were very similar. Certain political analysts would even describe the two events as an example of history repeating itself, the only differences being in the names of the locations and parties involved.

The Camp David Accord was one of the major consequences of the October 1977 War, the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement and the psychological breakthrough represented by Sadat’s visit to Israel. The Sadat initiative, which came in the wake of the failure to hold an international conference in Geneva, struck at the logic that had governed Arab-Jewish relations for many decades. Nevertheless, the visit – although certainly a turning point in Egyptian-Israeli relations – failed to bring about a political breakthrough or mutual understanding, leading to a political settlement between Egypt and Israel, and it was the efforts of American mediator, President Carter that were ultimately responsible for direct talks taking place between the two countries under American auspices and the conclusion of a political solution.

The Madrid Conference, on the other hand, was a consequence of the Gulf War, which came against the background of the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank, as well as the Palestinian Intifada, which represented another psychological breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These events occurred in the shadow of the failure of the London talks between King Hussein, Peres, and Shamir and the option of the international conference. This time around it was American President George Bush who initiated the conference, inviting all concerned parties to enter direct talks under American auspices.

The roles of the parties involved in the Camp David and Madrid conferences may be better understood by comparing the following two triangles:

Concerning the first party, namely Israel, one could say that the stance adopted by Begin immediately prior to Camp David was very similar to that adopted by Shamir immediately prior to Madrid. Israel’s conditions for receiving Sadat in Jerusalem, according to Begin, were exactly the same, although worded differently, as its conditions for attending the Madrid Conference:

In the case of Camp David, the conditions were as follows:

Israel will not withdraw to the 1967 borders;

Israel will not deal with the PLO;

Israel will not accept the creation of a Palestinian state;

and in the case of Madrid:

there will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria [West Bank] and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the government;

Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO;

Israel opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza district, and in the area between Israel and Jordan.

Moreover, prior to both Camp David and Madrid, Israel imposed a major obstacle in the form of its stipulations regarding Palestinian representation. During the preparations for Camp David, Israel refused to accept Palestinian participation, even in a joint Arab delegation, and consequently, no Palestinian party (including PLO and OPT representatives) was allowed to participate in the conference.

The Israeli conditions for Palestinian participation at the Madrid Conference were along the same lines as those laid down at the time of Camp David:

there should be a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and not an independent Palestinian delegation;

there should be no PLO participation;

there should be no Palestinian Jerusalemite representation;

there should be no Palestinian flag and no Palestinian state.

The Israeli-proposed solutions presented at Camp David and Madrid were also practically identical. On 28 December 1977, Begin proposed his famous autonomy plan, which entailed self-rule for the Palestinian residents of ‘Judea and Samaria’ and the Gaza district, to be instituted upon the establishment of peace. Fourteen years later, on 31 October 1991, Shamir addressed the Madrid Peace Conference, saying: “Today’s gathering is a result of a sustained American effort based on our own peace plan of May 1998, which in turn was founded on the Camp David Accords. According to the American initiative, the purpose of this meeting is to launch direct peace negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, and multilateral negotiations on regional issues among all the countries of the region.”

As for the second party in the Camp David-Madrid equation, it was Egypt and Sadat at Camp David and the Palestinians and Arafat at Madrid. Sadat had come to power after the 18-year rule of President Gemal Abdel Nasser, during which Sadat had committed himself to the goals and relations of a strong Egyptian leadership, but whilst planning and eventually carrying out a white coup d’états – one of several - that would enable him to practice new policies and become a genuine leader, rather than merely one of Nasser’s comrades or deputies.

In Sadat’s first coup d’etats he laid down policies for an Egyptian economic ‘perestroika’ and in his second, he enforced a patriarchal democracy, as described in Haykal’s famous book The Autumn of Wrath. The third coup d’etats occurred when he put an end to the Soviet strategic alliance with Egypt, and the fourth, the culmination of the previous three, when he sought a political settlement with Israel. One may still remember his famous phrases “the October War is the last war,” “peace is a strategic strategy” and “we seek the peace of the brave.”

Prior to Madrid, Yasser Arafat was a leader who had remained unchallenged since 1969, working in coordination with the Arab leadership, i.e. Nasser and Sadat, with whom he shared the same goals. However, as a consequence of the 1990 Gulf War, he suddenly found himself isolated and relegated to a far away place, namely Tunisia. Arafat’s public support for Saddam Hussein had resulted in a situation whereby no one was prepared to deal with him at a political level or continue to support him financially, especially the Gulf countries and the Saudis.

At both Camp David and Madrid, the third party was the same, namely the US. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker replaced President Carter, Secretary of State Cirus Vance and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who were the American mediators in the Camp David episode, at Madrid. In both episodes, the US was the strong, active, creative and influential party, having made it abundantly clear that Washington considered Israel an important strategic ally whose security came first and at whose disposal the US was prepared to place enormous amounts of economic and financial support whilst protecting its interests in the Middle East, namely, the flow of oil, an end to terrorism, and economic and political stability for the ruling elite in the Arab states.

Although the US was the main mediator whose substantial influence led to significant results in both scenarios, several other parties also played an important mediating role. These included King Hassan of Morocco, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, and the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, in addition to the American-Jewish establishment in the US.

King Hassan, prior to Camp David, had hosted the very first encounter between official representatives from Egypt (Hassan Al-Tuhami) and Israel (Moshe Dayan). He was also responsible, prior to Madrid, for opening the door for the Israelis to enter the official Arab house by receiving Shimon Peres in Morocco.

In the seventies, Romanian leader President Causescu had facilitated communication and served as a bridge leading to the first direct dialogue between Sadat and World Zionist Organization leader, Nahom Goldman. Later, in the eighties and nineties, he played a similar role when he hosted various dialogue programs for Israelis and Palestinians. As for Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, he also contributed to the creation of awareness and to bridging the gap and promoting understanding between Arafat and his colleagues and Israeli members of the Knesset.

The majority of serious constraints that were to have a significant influence on Sadat at Camp David and Arafat at Madrid came from the local region. After the October War of 1973, which had ‘bonded’ Egypt and Syria, Sadat was aware that he could not act alone on the political front without first consulting or coordinating with Syria. In this respect, his decision to meet with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem and recognize the State of Israel, in addition to his negotiations with the Israelis at Camp David, were serious blows to Egypt’s strong and brotherly relations with Syria. So serious were these blows that they were to eventually result in a freezing of both the historical Egyptian–Syrian alliance as well as Egypt’s leading role in the Arab World.

At the time of the Madrid Conference, Arafat knew that he could neither ignore the Jordanians nor claim that the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank meant that he no longer needed their support, which is why he agreed on 28 August 1990 to Palestinian participation in the conference under the Jordanian umbrella. He stipulated, however, that continued Palestinian participation was conditional upon recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, the right of the PLO to decide upon the Palestinian delegation to Madrid, which should include Palestinians from East Jerusalem, no attempts being made to delete the Question of Jerusalem from the conference agenda, an end to Israeli settlement activity in the OPT, and international protection being afforded to the Palestinians.

On 16 September 1990, the Palestinians were given a letter from US Secretary of State George Baker, stating that the US would agree to list the Question of Jerusalem on the peace conference agenda. Then, as throughout the conference, the US mediation efforts were an essential component of the attempts to reach an agreement. Washington was more than a facilitator or partner; it was the dominant factor.

According to William Quandt in his book Camp David of 1988 (p. 29): “The role that Jimmy Carter played in the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty shows that determined presidential leadership can help to resolve complex international disputes.” The truth of this statement – not to mention the power of the American political system - was evident in Carter’s negotiating skills throughout the unfolding episode of Camp David. When Sadat ordered the Egyptian delegation to pack its bags and prepare to leave at the end of the eleventh day, Carter told him: “It will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the US and Egypt. There is no way we can ever explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have invested so much. It would probably mean the end of my presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you.” (Camp David, p.239.) Sadat, forced to face reality by Carter’s threats, completely changed his position, accepted the US assurances, agreed to stay and went on to reach a historic agreement with Israel.

The lead-up to the Madrid Conference also witnessed the same kind of US pressure, this time originating from the Bush-Baker administration, when Baker told the Palestinians in Jerusalem: “…The train is moving and you’d better not miss it, for it is not likely to come around again soon.” [Baker; The Politics of Diplomacy, p.491.] Baker added: “Once you and Israel engage, there will be no turning back.” Arafat, no doubt encouraged by what he had heard, agreed to form a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and go to Madrid.

One is left with little doubt that the US mediation role contributed to the success of both the Camp David and Madrid conferences. Equally certain is the fact that even though the efforts of Carter and Bush did not result in their reelection, the US continued to play an equally important role in the unfolding history of the Middle East conflict.

Mr. Mamdouh Nofal, Member of

the Palestinian Central Council and PLC Member

Over the past few years, the issues of the negotiating teams and political frameworks of the peace process have remained a constant source of discussion. At the moment, however, we are more concerned with the current deadlock, which has created some new reactions in the region that have the potential to do one of two things: to turn the peace process into a great success, or else to transform what we have already realized into a burden. One thing is clear: had it not been for the Gulf War and the defeat that followed, we would not have accepted the conditions imposed on us at Madrid.

Following the Gulf War, the PLO was in an extremely weak position; the Arab World and the international community considered it an outcast, and it was judged and banished accordingly. The fact that the conditions under which the PLO went to Madrid were unfair was clear from the very beginning. Abu Ammar and the Palestinian leadership were prevented from going, those Palestinians who were allowed to go were obliged to do so under a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with a Jordanian leadership, and Israel was granted the right to contest the participation of any member of the delegation. Nevertheless, the PLO accepted these conditions and gave unilateral guarantees to the Americans because it was in a state of weakness, the power that resulted from the Intifada having been frozen by the Gulf War.

There is no doubt, that without the Intifada, the peace process would not have evolved. The Intifada created an international public opinion and a movement inside Israel that insisted on moving towards a political solution, and if it had not taken place, I doubt that the Israelis would have agreed to come and negotiate. I am also fairly sure, that if the Intifada had not recurred after the 40-day curfew during the Gulf War, other unfair conditions would have been imposed on us.

There was clearly an Arab position that pressured us to accept the American conditions. I remember that a Palestinian delegation visited Syria and asked the Syrians not to reject the idea of the peace process and to put Jerusalem on the agenda, but they refused. Moreover, both Jordan and Syria declared that they would participate in Madrid even before we did, in spite of our request that they refrain from doing so. At the meeting with Hafez Al-Assad, he said to us, “Why are you dividing your country? Go to the negotiations and speak about Palestine. Do not make a difference between Jerusalem and other areas.” We told him that it was others who were differentiating, not us. And then, when we complained that the PLO had been ousted from the process, he replied, “Why do you divide your people into insiders and outsiders?” It could be, of course, that Syria did not want the PLO to participate because it did not want Jordan to get the credit for the process. When James Baker arrived he told us that we could take it or leave it, and that we were free to go to Tunis and inform the leadership that they could refuse, but that the cost would be very high and could mean an end to the PLO. It was clear to everyone that our only option was to go to Madrid, despite the unfair conditions.

With the onset of the negotiations, a Palestinian committee was formed to follow up the talks and Nabil Sha’ath, Akram Hanieh, Tayseer Arouri and I were sent by the PLO to Madrid to supervise the Palestinian delegation. We entered secretly with the help of the French and the knowledge of the Americans, and we started to help the delegation as godfathers. We were not in the negotiating room, but we met with the delegation in our hotel in Madrid. I once went in secret to the Victoria Hotel and was forced to leave after somebody saw me and the whole thing ended up as a really big story. Anyway, we helped the delegation to go to Tunis via Algeria in the plane of King Hassan II by saying that we were going to Morocco; this was our way of showing people that the PLO still had a very important role. The Americans realized this, and they used to say, “You will have a role, but behind the curtain.”

The aim of the negotiations that continued for 20 months was from the point of view of the leadership in Tunis to hinder the process as much as possible, in order to highlight the fact that the PLO had this very important role. Right at the beginning, we had succeeded in eliminating the Jordanian umbrella and the Jordanian tutelage, which put an end to Yasser Arafat’s nightmare about Jordanian control over the Palestinian territories. This is one of the ways in which we did it: When we left Amman on our way to Madrid, we, the PLO group, were requested to keep a low profile, but our delegation had already agreed that they would be a little late boarding the plane, meaning that the Jordanian delegation would get into the plane alone and it would be clear that there was actually more than one delegation. The same thing happened in Madrid when we arrived. We refused to enter the same reception hall as the Jordanian delegation, and ended up in another hall all by ourselves. Some people say that these things are just formalities, but I say that they helped us in formulating a framework for achieving our objective, which was to separate the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation into two separate delegations and bring out our independent role.

Another implicit position concerned the composition of the Palestinian delegation. Although the PLO had approved the names of the Palestinian delegation, it was not at all happy; it was afraid from the insiders, which is something that controlled the direction of the negotiations. Abu Ammar was constantly pressuring the delegation to show a firmer approach and he actually threatened anyone who showed leniency vis-ŕ-vis the Americans and the Israelis. The idea, of course, was to arrive at the point of direct negotiations with the PLO, i.e., the secret negotiations that took place in Oslo without the knowledge of the Palestinian delegation; the Israeli leadership, by then, was convinced that it was impossible to advance in the negotiations with the delegation from the inside, which appeared weak and hesitant.

Would it have been better if the delegation from the inside had reached an agreement with the Israelis? Faisal was convinced that he and the others would come to some personal harm if they continued. I told him that he was wrong; if an agreement were reached, he would be remembered not only for the role he had played in the Intifada, but also for the one he was playing then. It could be that going with the insiders option would have been better than the blockade we are currently up against, but the outside leadership was very protective concerning its role.

I would like to underline the fact that the insiders refused to take any step forward unless there was a clear agreement and a clear provision concerning the settlements. After the Israelis refused to discuss the issue of settlement in the presence of Faisal and Haidar Abdul Shafi, amongst others, they started negotiating with the PLO. They discovered, even during the very first session, that the PLO was prepared to put aside the issue of settlements, and it was then that they realized that Peres’s very positive feelings about the negotiations were justified. Rabin was against negotiating with the PLO while Peres was very enthusiastic, and Peres told Rabin: “You will not reach an agreement with Faisal Husseini concerning these issues, but you might reach an agreement with the PLO.”

The fact that the PLO yielded on fundamental issues is due, in part, to its over-confidence in its own power and abilities. I remember that when the PLO signed the agreement, I asked Abu Ammar: “What about the settlements?” He replied, “I have them both – I have Gaza and Jericho! The settlements are only details. When we are there, things will change.” He was referring, of course, to the former situation in Lebanon, where we created from a mere three or four military locations an entire Palestinian state on nearly 70 percent of the Lebanese territory. The members of the PLO negotiating team - Abu Ala’, Abu Mazen, Hassan Asfour and Yasser Abed Rabbo - had been saying that the Israelis would not agree to us taking Gaza and Jericho, and they were preparing to accept Gaza without Jericho, but Abu Ammar had insisted that because of the struggle with Jordan, there was no way we could consider taking Gaza and leaving the West Bank. For Israel, the agreement meant having a settlement concerning the borders. For the Palestinians, it meant renouncing their claim to the historical land of Palestine.

Will our people eventually be granted their rights? If we succeed in preserving what we have or maybe making it a little better, and if we do not create more bad realities, it may be possible. A lot depends not only on us, but also on the balance of powers and the situation of the Arabs. The Soviet Union represented for us a kind of a wall to lean on and when the Soviet Union was dissolved, we lost a very valuable source of support. Without Arab support in the future, it will be difficult for us to solve our problem, which requires a lot of work and a lot of peripheral cooperation. The priority now is to organize the Palestinian internal situation. Since Oslo, everything has been put aside to the benefit of the negotiations. Now, it is clear that from now until the year 2000, and perhaps until 2004, we cannot do a thing because of Netanyahu, who is not a man who looks for peace.

Our choice, therefore, it so put aside everything including our external relations to the benefit of organizing our internal situation. This means organizing and cleaning the Palestinian house. We have many problems, including the absence of the role of the Palestinian opposition; the only opposition that we have now is to be found amongst the religious trends, and this is something that worries me a great deal.

When Saddat visited Jerusalem, he changed the Israeli society. We, despite all the things that we suffered from, have also succeeded in changing the Israeli society. Now, nearly 49 percent of Israelis are with the peace process: 40 percent are Jews, while nine percent are Israeli Arabs. Making peace in the region requires raising this percentage to a minimum of 51 percent, which will take a lot of hard work. The figure of 49 percent was not reached easily nor only as a result of purely internal Israeli factors; it was also a result of certain external factors and effects including the Palestinians themselves.

What we need now is a democratic national movement - not a religious one - that stands between the religious movement and the PNA and participates in pushing the PNA towards democratic development.