Ms. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, Department of International

Relations, London School of Economics, London.

When looking at the foreign policy of a state, two dimensions need to be considered. First, one needs to look at who makes and enacts a state’s policies, that is, the government and its bureaucracy. Second, one needs to consider the environment in which decision-makers operate and the constraints that act on their decision-making process. But before looking how Canadian foreign policy is made, let us briefly consider the historical context from which it emerged.

The French colonized Canada in the 16th Century. In 1759, British forces attacked Quebec City and defeated the French. Following their victory, the British ruled and further settled the conquered territory and Canada became a British colony. “To a great extent, the history of Canada's external relations is the history of the development of a British colony into an independent nation within the Commonwealth.”

Canada’s birth as an independent nation-state is generally traced back to 1867, when the British North America Act united the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada into one confederation. Although self-governing in internal affairs, the new Confederation’s external relations – boundary disputes, trade negotiations and the ratification of treaties - continued to be carried out by Britain. To some extent, therefore, Canada was not entirely sovereign since it was not, as such, recognized by other states. The signing of the Washington Treaty in 1871 was a first step towards Canada achieving international status. Not only was Canada’s Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, sent as member of the British delegation but it was also the first document in which the US acknowledged the existence of its northern neighbor. In 1909, a small Department of External Affairs was instituted. Its tasks were nevertheless limited and it remained bound to the British Colonial Office. In 1912, the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs was created and given to the Prime Minister of Canada. Canada’s Prime ministers would hold this dual function until 1946.

World War I was a turning point in Canada’s relations to Britain and in its quest for international sovereignty. Since 1867, Canada had regularly pressed London to give it greater control over foreign policy matters, a struggle that was more forcibly pursued by Prime Minister Borden (1911-1921). His efforts came to fruition in 1917, when Britain finally accepted to grant Canada, along the other Dominions, increased autonomy and more substantial powers in external affairs. British Prime Minister Lloyd George realized that the Dominions could not be expected to continue to contribute troops and incur losses in the name of the Empire without their respective governments participating in the decision-making process. The Imperial War Conference passed a resolution which recognized the Dominions as ‘autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth’, and gave the Dominions and India ‘an adequate voice in foreign policy’. The word Commonwealth was used to describe the self-governing (later independent) part of the British Empire. In 1919, largely as a result of Prime Minister Borden’s insistence, the Dominions were given what amounted to dual representation at the Paris Peace Conference both as nations in their own right and as units of the British Empire. It was in both capacities that Canada signed the Treaty of Versailles and became a member of the League of Nations.

In 1921, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was elected to power after the Liberal Party won all of the seats in the province of Quebec. The Conscription Crisis of 1917 dramatically highlighted French Canadian reluctance to support the British Empire. Taking into account Quebec’s sensitivities in external affairs, which were seen has having contributed to Borden’s conservatives downfall, Mackenzie King sought to further distance the country from the British Empire. He adopted an essentially isolationist policy so as to avoid jeopardizing Canada’s national unity. At the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Commonwealth abandoned the practice of unified diplomacy and, with Britain’s assent, Canada introduced a separate external policy.

As has been illustrated, Canada achieved control over its own external affairs very gradually. Full independence only came in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster gave the Dominions complete legislative independence so far as they desired it, although in Canada’s case this stopped short of the right to amend its own constitution. In fact, it was only in 1982 that the Canadian government finally asked the British Parliament to give it the means and right to amend its own constitution domestically. And it could therefore be said that Canada formally severed its colonial ties to Britain when the Constitution was ‘patriated’ 16 years ago.

Canada is a constitutional monarchy, a federal state and parliamentary democracy. Its constitution includes a number of documents; together they are referred to as Canada’s Constitution Acts. The most important of these documents is the British North America Act of 1867, or as it has been called since 1982, the Constitution Act. This document includes a section that spells out the division of powers. Power in Canada is distributed vertically, between the executive, legislative and judiciary, and horizontally between the central government, usually referred to as the federal government, and the provinces. “The responsibilities of the central, or federal, Parliament include national defense, inter-provincial and international trade, the banking and monetary system, criminal law. The courts have also awarded to the federal Parliament such powers as aeronautics, shipping, railways, telecommunications and atomic energy. The regional or provincial legislatures are responsible for education, property and civil rights, the administration of justice, the hospital system, natural resources within their borders, social security, health and municipal institutions.” Because of Canada’s historical ties to Britain and to the British Crown, the division of powers, contrary to what prevails in the US, is not always explicitly or clearly defined, and this is particularly the case in relation to international affairs. The existence of ‘gray areas’ in Canada’s constitution is a potential source of conflict between contending actors. However, as will be discussed shortly, foreign policy decision-making has tended to be concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and a few key Cabinet ministers.

The executive branch is composed of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Legislative or Parliament includes the House of Commons, the Senate and the Governor General. While the House of Commons is composed of elected representatives, the Senate, by contrast, is non-elective. The third and final branch is the judiciary, that is the Supreme Court of Canada.

If the Prime Minister is the head of government, Canada’s head of State and sovereign is the Crown, that is the Queen or King of Great Britain, represented in Canada by the Governor General. The Crown has the legal authority to conduct foreign policy. “Canada’s head of state - Queen Elizabeth II - is thus vested with the formal constitutional authority to make all those decisions that shape the country’s role in world politics. As in Britain, the powers to negotiate and ratify treaties with other sovereign powers, to conduct diplomatic relations, and to wage war are all part of the royal prerogative.” Although formal authority may rest in the Crown, the Queen’s role remains essentially symbolic, both in Canada and Britain. It is often said that ‘the Queen rules but does not govern’; that in essence is the meaning of a constitutional monarchy. Although the monarch’s role may be symbolic, it is nevertheless important to bear this legal framework in mind for it explains why foreign policy in Canada is the responsibility of the political executive, and more specifically that of a central core of ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Thus, while Parliament and the provinces may at times influence the shaping and conduct of foreign policy, their role remains somewhat constrained by this constitutional legacy.

The Cabinet formulates government policies and priorities; it is responsible for the introduction and passage of government legislation, the execution and administration of government policies and the finances of the government. Although substantial, the Cabinet’s powers do not have any formal constitutional basis but are derived from the Cabinet’s legal status as the Crown’s representative.

The Cabinet is formed and led by the Prime Minister, who chooses members from the legislature and gives them ministerial and departmental responsibilities. Although Cabinet ministers tend to be elected representatives of the House of Commons, it is not infrequent for the Prime Minister to recruit from the Senate. Until 1993, all ministers were included in the Cabinet. With the expansion of government activity throughout the years, the number of ministers sitting in Cabinet progressively rose and reached 40 under Mulroney in 1987. In order to keep the numbers in the Cabinet more manageable, Jean Chrétien decided in 1993 to reorganize the Cabinet and create a distinction between Ministry and Cabinet. The Ministry now comprises 30 ministers, of whom 22 are members of the Cabinet. The remaining eight are called Secretaries of State and can be compared to what in Britain are called ‘Junior Ministers’.

The political capacity of the Cabinet to govern depends on its ability to secure and maintain majority support in the House of Commons. When a political party wins the elections with a strong margin, party discipline will insure that Cabinet decisions are not challenged in the House of Commons. Difficulties may arise when the winning political party has not secured a sufficiently strong majority and if when opposition is well organized. Party politics has seldom influenced Canadian foreign policy in the past. Two parties have traditionally dominated Canadian politics: the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party. Both parties shared similar views with regards to Canada’s foreign policy objectives and military alliances. Although the Liberal Party opposed the Conservative government’s decision to implement the Canada-US free trade agreement in the late 1980s, their ‘anti-American’ position was considerably softened once they were elected to power. After the 1993 elections, and even more so since 1997, the Conservative Party loss considerable support and the balance of power is now held by two regionally based parties: the Bloc Quebecois and the Western-based Reform Party. Although both parties have on several occasions expressed their opposition to particular issues, such as the decision to get Canadian troops involved in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton accords, it is still too early to evaluate what their impact on Canada’s foreign policy more broadly might be.

In theory, Cabinet decides on foreign policy. But while it is clear that most major foreign policy decisions are taken after consultation with the Cabinet, this is not always the case. Cabinet decisions are not necessarily taken by majority vote and while the Prime Minister may consult his Cabinet he is not bound to follow its advice. There have been attempts to further ensure greater Cabinet participation in foreign policy matters so as to avoid decisions being taken solely by the Prime Minister. Although theoretically laudable, broad Cabinet participation is deemed to be impractical in foreign policy matters. The reason for this is that most foreign policy decisions are seen to fall in either two categories. Either they are taken in crisis situations and therefore need an immediate response, thus precluding the possibility for consultation, or they are seen to require such technical expertise of a level not expected from Cabinet ministers. Whether these reasons are deemed valid or not, the fact is that most foreign policy decisions tend to be made by the Prime Minister and those ministers whose portfolios are more obviously related to foreign affairs.

The Prime Minister is the chief minister and effective head of the executive in a parliamentary system. He generally is the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons. If there is no majority, the Prime Minister is the leader of the party most likely to win support from other parties in the House. The position and responsibilities of office are not created and defined by any statute or constitutional document but are recognized by law. Throughout the years the Prime Minister has become the most important person in Canadian politics. As Chair of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister controls the agenda at meetings and selects the members of Cabinet committees. Because of this and party solidarity, he has also great influence over the Parliament. He can ask a minister to resign and advise the Governor General to dissolve parliament and call elections.

Since 1867, Canada has had 20 Prime Ministers, some of whom were re-elected several times and have thus left a lasting imprint on Canadian foreign policy. The distinct eras identified in the country’s foreign policy tend to correspond to these Prime Ministers’ tenures. Although the Prime Minister ceased to be in 1946 the sole person responsible for the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, his impact on the country’s external relations remains nevertheless considerable. One of the Prime Minister’s first responsibilities is to create the government; he not only appoints the Cabinet ministers, but also selects the Clerk of the Privy Council, the most senior civil servant and bureaucratic head. In deciding who will occupy foreign policy making positions, both at the governmental and bureaucratic levels, the Prime Minister influences the kind of advice on foreign affairs the government will receive.

The increased popularity of Summit diplomacy since the end of World War II has provided the Prime Minister with an additional forum in which to exert his influence on international matters. Some summits are one-off events and deal with a particular issue or crisis. Others are more institutionalized, such as the G-7 meetings, the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, and the Summit of Heads of Sate having the use of French in common (La Francophonie). Last but not least are the frequent summit meetings held between the American President and the Canadian Prime Minister. A clear indicator of the increased importance of Summit diplomacy is the record number of visits abroad undertaken by Prime Minister Chrétien in his first year in office.

Given the Prime Minister’s pre-eminence as a foreign policy actor, his personality and beliefs will strongly influence the country’s orientations. Pearson’s internationalism and vision of Canada as a middle-power account for the country’s active involvement in multilateral organizations during his premiership in the 1960s. Trudeau’s more nationalist inclinations led him to adopt policies such as the National Energy Policy (NEP) and the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) which, as he saw it, would guarantee greater national control over the country’s economy and further insure Canada’s independence. Mulroney, on the other hand, was strongly impressed by the American system. He sought, through the establishment of the Canada-US free-trade agreement and a closer partnership on security matters (increased Canadian participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative), to reverse the previous Liberal government’s anti-American tendencies. But while the Prime Minister plays a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of Canada’s foreign policy, he is assisted by a number of Cabinet ministers and more specifically, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The minister who has the statutory authority to conduct Canada’s foreign policy is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or, before Prime Minister Chrétien changed the name of the portfolio in 1993, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Until 1946, the Prime Minister also occupied the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Both Prime Minister St Laurent (1948-57) and Prime Minister Pearson (1963-68) previously occupied the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs before being elected Prime Minister. This testifies to the perceived importance of the position of Secretary of state for External Affairs at the time. The most famous Secretary of State for External affairs in Canada is Lester B. Pearson. Pearson held this position from 1948 to 1957; his involvement in international affairs and more notably his role in the establishment of United Nations Peacekeeping operations won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. After 1968, the Secretary of State for External Affairs came to assume a less pre-eminent status. Because the Prime Minister plays such an important role in international affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has tended to remain in the Prime Minister’s shadow. The extent to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs is susceptible to influence Canada’s foreign policy not only depends on his/her relationship to the Prime Minister but also on what issues acquire saliency.

Appointed in January 1996, Lloyd Axworthy quickly made it known that under his leadership, Canada could be expected to play a greater role in issues such as human rights, democratization and development assistance. As a member of the Opposition he frequently expressed anti-American views, but it may well be that now that he is in government he will have to alter his stance to a certain degree. Of course, his appointment could also be interpreted as an attempt by Ottawa to signal its desire to distance itself from the previous Conservative government’s strong pro-Americanism.

As mentioned earlier, the Department of External Affairs was first instituted in 1909. It then progressively grew as Canada’s international status and needs steadily increased. Throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, economic issues acquired increased importance. Canada's traditional reliance on foreign trade made it particularly sensitive to growing international economic interdependence. Several departments or ministries (such as Agriculture, Industry, Communications or Fisheries) began to develop their own international divisions. It was then perceived that the Department for External Affairs needed to be restructured so as to integrate these new international economic dimensions. The Department of External Affairs underwent a succession of bureaucratic reorganizations and in 1982, international trade and export promotion was brought under its umbrella. Under Mulroney, the Department of External Affairs was formally renamed the Department of External Affairs and International Trade. In 1993, under Prime Minister Chrétien, the investment development division of Investment Canada was integrated into the department now renamed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Three ministers now head the Department: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International Trade and the Minister for International Co-operation who is also responsible for La Francophonie.

It is often said that civil servants are very influential in formulating a country’s policy; this is seen as being particularly the case in foreign policy matters. Civil servants have several advantages, the most important of which is a virtual monopoly over information and analysis of that information. In foreign policy this is all the more significant, for most of the intelligence that is used in formulating bureaucratic recommendations is shrouded under the veil of secrecy. Moreover, if the Prime Minister has the prerogative of defining long-term policy goals in the white papers, the implementation of such policies requires the appropriate knowledge and expertise, which is where the bureaucracy often comes in. In addition, because foreign policy covers such a vast array of issues, it is difficult for the ministerial representative to keep abreast of new developments, which means that given their expertise and access to information, the bureaucracy cannot be easily bypassed.

The extent to which civil servants are able to influence the foreign policy agenda should nevertheless not be overrated. This depends on a series of factors, namely the confidence or strength of the responsible ministers and the degree of competition between the different bureaucracies. “The play of bureaucratic politics is muted to some extent also by the nature of the Canadian Cabinet system. For between the bureaucrats and the constituency they serve are the ministers of the Crown, who collectively (not individually) are responsible to Parliament for the full range of governmental behavior, and by whom serious conflicts among sometimes competing departments are ultimately settled.” It may perhaps be safe to say that while civil servants can try to influence or persuade ministers, the latter are ultimately responsible for formulating the policies. An illustration of how things operate on the ground is provided by the case of the Canada-United States Free Trade talks. Civil servants in the Department of External Affairs were strongly opposed to the establishment of such close bilateral ties with the US, as they feared this might compromise Canada’s independence and trade relations at the multilateral plane. Yet in spite of their opposition, negotiations went ahead and the bureaucracy was left with the task of implementing the wishes and polices of their ministers.

The Legislative is composed of two Houses: the Senate, or Upper House, and the House of Commons frequently referred to as the Parliament. Whereas the Senate’s 104 members are appointed, the House of Commons’ 301 members are elected. There are therefore as many members to the House of Commons as there are electoral districts or constituencies. Elections in Canada are conducted every five years, as defined by the Constitution. The candidate that obtains the majority of votes, irrespective of whether or not this represents more than 50 percent, is then elected to the House of Commons. Although some candidates run as independents, most belong to one of the recognized political parties. The party that obtains the majority of seats in Parliament will generally form the government and its leader will become the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is therefore himself an elected Member of Parliament although there have been exceptions to this rule in the past.

While Parliament’s main function is to provide legitimacy to the Cabinet’s decisions it is generally agreed that its role in foreign policy making is minimal. Thus, “while every government naturally seeks to avoid embarrassment in the House, and while this doubtless has an ‘anticipated reaction’ effect on policy deliberations at the executive level, there appear to be relatively few cases in which parliamentary debate in the formal sense can be said to have had a decisive impact on government behavior in the foreign policy field.” Apart from a number of bills on economic or environmental matters, including the one that instituted the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, most foreign policies are taken outside the legislative realm of Parliament. Canada’s decision to commit troops to the Gulf War coalition, for instance, was made by Mulroney after a dinner with President Bush at the White House. The decision was therefore taken without consulting Parliament, although it should be noted that Parliament was then in recess, as is generally the case in August, and it would have been impossible to wait until all the ministers were brought back to Ottawa. The executive branch has tended to keep Parliament out of the foreign policy decision-making process unless of course a delicate situation arose in which case they would consult Parliament as a means of deflecting responsibility.

Although its powers are limited, Parliament does nevertheless play a role in the foreign policy process. Members of Parliament may probe or challenge government policy on the floors of the House of Commons and the Senate. Because the question period in the Parliament is so well-covered by the media, it allows the Opposition to force certain foreign policy issues on the agenda, which in turn will serve to inform public opinion on such matters. Such was for instance the case in 1968 when Trudeau’s government was forced to soften its anti-secessionist stance and provide humanitarian assistance to Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. The government was similarly pressured by Parliament to alter its policy towards the US when the Nixon administration decided to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972. “The government in Ottawa, like many other allies of the US, dispatched diplomatic notes expressing concern over what was seen as an excessive use of force. The new Democratic Party (NDP), however, wanted a stronger and more public expression of Canadian sentiment, and announced its intention to introduce a motion ‘condemning’ the US when Parliament opened on 5 January 1973. Even though the bombing had by then terminated, the Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, moved a government motion ‘deploring’ the American action. It was a preemptive measure, for the NDP held the balance of power in this minority parliament, but it shifted the government’s position considerably.’

Parliamentarians may also voice their opinion on particular issues and try to influence government policy in Party caucuses. Such was the case in August 1982 when a group of parliamentarians challenged the Liberal Party’s policy over its Middle East policy. “A group of MPs who opposed Israeli action in Lebanon strongly urged the government to apply sanctions against Israel and extend recognition in some form to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. According to reports, there was heated debate and only the intervention of influential ministers prevented a fuller and more forceful expression of dissent. Although the Cabinet rejected a change in policy, a comprehensive re-evaluation of Canada’s Middle East relations was undertaken.” In addition to the above, Parliamentarians may exert some influence on the foreign policy process in committees, such as the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs or the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and in international parliamentary associations. On foreign policy issues, the main activity of the Senate does not take place on the floor itself. Rather, senators with international interests participate in the work of the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Although the Committees do not necessarily influence or challenge existing policies, they nevertheless perform an important investigative function which may affect future decisions.

The number of foreign policy issues debated at the House of Commons has steadily increased over the last decade. Emergency debates were held for example on the Beijing massacre in June 1989, on the Gulf War crisis in the autumn of 1990 and on the Canada-US free-trade legislation in July 1988. Because of Mulroney’s failure to consult with Parliament on issues that involved the lives of Canadians, such as his decision to commit troops to the Gulf War coalition and to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, Chrétien promised to further include the House of Commons in the decision-making process. The government’s 1995 foreign policy statement thus highlighted the need for increased parliamentary debate and input on foreign policy matters and asked that the government “turn to the House of commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and international Trade and to the Senate Committee on foreign Affairs to involve Canadians in providing the government with advice on updating the directions of [the country’s] foreign policy.” Although more time has indeed been spent on foreign policy discussions in Parliament since Chretien’s election, it is still too early to judge whether or not Parliament has indeed been given greater powers in foreign policy matters.

Canada’s federal structure was established in 1905. Over the years, and more so since the 1960s, the role of the provinces in the foreign policy-making process has gradually increased. Canada is composed of ten provinces and two territories and has two official languages: English and French. Ontario and Quebec are the two oldest and more populous provinces; Ontario is home to 37 percent of the Canadian population and a quarter of Canadians live in Quebec. British Columbia and Alberta are the westernmost provinces and main producers of oil and gas, while Saskatchewan and Manitoba lay in the prairies, and are often regarded as the granary of Canada. In the East are the maritime provinces: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, the last province to join the federation in 1937.

Even in the most decentralized federal states, external relations are traditionally considered to be the preserve of the central government. The constituent units are not to engage in foreign relations unless authorized by the central government. But as mentioned earlier, Canada's Constitution does not always clearly spell out and define the division of powers. “The provisions of the BNA Act (since 1982, called the Constitution Act, 1867) that specify the division of powers - sections 91 and 92 - did not explicitly assign competence in foreign affairs to either the federal level or the provincial levels. Nor, notably did the BNA Act deny the provinces the possibility of an international role as other constitutions do.” Since no amendment was made to Canada's constitution, any attempts made by the provincial governments to acquire further leverage on the country's external relations could therefore not be formally prohibited. In the early days of the Confederation, when classical patterns of diplomatic intercourse characterized inter-state activities and when Britain was still responsible for the Dominion's external relations, no need was felt to further clarify the matter. But over the last three decades, international relations have become increasingly complex and dominated by economic issues. Highlighting their economic international dependency, provinces have expressed their desire to participate more actively in international affairs appealing to their own interests and developmental needs.

Provinces have at their disposal two means of influencing the conduct of their state's foreign policy. More traditionally, they may exert pressures on the central government so as to insure that their interests be taken into account during international negotiations. More recently, some provinces have established their own diplomatic or para-diplomatic channels which are essentially economic in nature and whose goal is to favor financial investments and commercial trade. “After Mulroney began the free trade process in 1985, the provinces moved to make their positions known, not only through ministers’ conferences but also at the official level through representatives to the Committee on Trade Negotiations. The richer provinces hired high-profile consultants to represent their free trade views in Ottawa, while the smaller provinces sent officials drawn from their own bureaucracies.” Smaller provinces such as Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland have not created large bureaucracies to manage their international activities. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba and British Columbia have become somewhat more institutionalized in this sphere, but their governments are nonetheless content to conduct their international relations in an ad hoc fashion. Ontario and Alberta have for their part increased their provincial representation abroad through modest intergovernmental affairs agencies. Finally, Quebec has sought to institutionalize the support system for its foreign relations in a way that its foreign office is practically a fully developed foreign ministry. Created in 1965, Quebec’s foreign office expanded to such an extent that by the early 1990s, it was given the name of Ministère des Affaires Internationales, a micro version of the External Affairs Department in Ottawa. Quebec, whose diplomatic activities are not confined to economic issues but also include cultural and educational treaties with France, is considered to be one of the most active sub-national actors in terms of foreign policy.

This phenomenon is by no means confined to Canada. Indeed, sub-national actors worldwide, whether they be provinces regions or cities, have progressively become more active on the international scene. Whereas only four American states were represented abroad in the 1970s, in 1985, 29 states held 55 permanent legations in 17 different countries. This phenomenon of segmentation, more frequent among federal states but also present among unitary ones, is the natural extension of sub-national traditional spheres of competence onto the international scene. It stems not only from the growing complexity of world affairs but also from the central states growing inability to adequately manage national politics. Although a potential source of conflict with the central government, sub-national actors para-diplomatic activities tend to be increasingly seen as part of a process of rationalization and cooperation between the two levels of government established in response to the demands of increased interdependence.

While it is important to examine the political structure of a country in order to determine which actors are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, it is nevertheless necessary to consider the broader context in which they operate. Since Canada’s foreign policy does not change drastically every time a new Prime Minister comes into office, there must be factors that underpin the state’s general policy orientations and constrain the range of options available to policy-makers. Among those factors that are generally singled out as having an influence on foreign policy making are geography, economy, culture, military capability and the international context. These, in turn, will affect the choice of allies and membership to regional and international organizations. Another factor that is frequently considered in the foreign policy analysis literature is public opinion. One would indeed be inclined to believe this to be an important factor in country like Canada where there is such a strong democratic tradition. And although foreign policy is often seen as the policy area least influenced by domestic constraints, evidence of the contrary forces us to consider how domestic concerns and public opinion may in fact influence the decision-making process.

Canada is the second largest country in the world. With almost ten million square kilometers, it is 18 times larger than France is. Although the Canadian territory is vast, its population is relatively small with only 30 million inhabitants. Partly because of the climate, the great majority of Canadians live in the southernmost parts of the country, within a 300-kilometer band along the US border. This physical proximity to the US has greatly affected Canada both domestically and in its foreign policy orientation, and the fact that most Canadians are either native English speakers or at least understand the English language has also made them particularly receptive to American culture. While Canada’s remoteness from Europe may have allowed for a more isolationist foreign policy prior to World War II, its geographical location made it particularly vulnerable during the Cold War. Indeed, when looking at a polar projection, one realizes that Canada is positioned directly between what were the two rival superpowers. Because of its relatively moderate military capability, Canada was therefore obliged to find alternative means of fending off any threat to its territory. It did so by actively participating in the establishment of multilateral institutions designed to maintain international order: the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition to these, Canada also entered security agreements with the US, which were formalized in 1958 by the North American Air Defense Command or NORAD. With the end of the Cold War, Canada’s geographic location has lost some of its strategic significance and direct threats to the country’s security are no longer imminent.

One way of finding out what objectives a new government has set itself and what its priorities are, is to take a look at a government’s official policy statements. While these may not necessarily offer an entirely accurate and detailed picture of a government’s future activities, they nevertheless constitute a valid indication of its overall orientations. Canada in the World, which is the government’s 1995 foreign policy official statement, identifies three key objectives, the first of which is the promotion of prosperity and employment. This, it states, is at the heart of the government’s foreign policy agenda. It is interesting here to note that ever since Trudeau’s statement in 1970, concern for Canada’s national economic prosperity has figured in Canada’s foreign policy priorities.

To ensure that Canada be competitive and prosper in the world economy, the 1995 white paper identifies four strategies:

a supportive domestic economic policy framework;

access for its goods and services abroad (through bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states);

an open, fair and predictable set of rules governing trade and investment; and

the means to ensure that Canadian firms are able to take advantage of promising foreign market opportunities.

The second and third stated objectives, the promotion of global peace as the key to promoting Canada’s security, and the projection of Canadian values and culture, also both emphasize the importance of economic concerns. Indeed, stability and security are listed as prerequisites for economic growth and development, whereas the vitality of Canadian culture is seen as an essential component to Canada’s economic success. What therefore transpires from this foreign policy statement is how the current government not only sees Canada’s foreign and domestic concerns as interconnected but also the extent to which the country’s national interest is defined in economic terms.

Canada is first and foremost a trading nation. In fact, one of the most important features of Canada’s economy is its dependency on foreign trade. Canada has never been self-sufficient and is increasingly relying on international trade for its economic prosperity. For most of the 1990s, 40 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) has been generated by exports of goods and services, the great majority of which coming in fact from sales in merchandise rather than services. Canada is a country rich in raw resources, and products based on Canada’s natural resource industries (agriculture, fishing, energy, forestry and mining) make up 54 percent of its exports. Because of its reliance on international trade for its well being and prosperity, Canada’s diplomacy is to a remarkable extent driven by economic considerations. One could in fact almost argue, that Canadian foreign policy is in major part, trade relations policy. The fact that since the 1980s, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Trade have been merged into what is now known as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade testifies this. Canada’s reliance on foreign trade means that the country is particularly vulnerable to economic pressure. This was illustrated in 1979 when the combined pressures of the Arab states and the Canadian business community forced Prime Minister Joe Clark to back away from his policy of moving the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Canada’s dependence on foreign trade therefore acts as a major constraint on decision-makers and greatly determines the orientations of Canada’s foreign policy and this, more than any other factor, explains why the US constitutes one of the main sources of influence on Canadian foreign policy.

The greatest feature of Canada’s economy is its overwhelming vulnerability and dependence on the American economy. The US, which purchases about 80 percent of Canadian exports and which supplies nearly 76 percent of its imports, is Canada’s most important trading partner. Until World War II the US and the UK frequently exchanged positions as the first and second most important destinations for Canadian exports. However the US now imports only 1.5 percent of all Canadian shipments abroad and only 2.6 percent of Canadian imports come from the UK. Japan has in fact supplanted the UK as Canada’s second trading partner, although its share remains largely below that of the US, with four percent of exports and three percent of imports. The Europe Union, including the UK, accounts for only 5.5 percent of Canadian exports. Not only has the US become an increasingly important destination for Canadian exports, but it also has become one of the major sources of foreign investment to Canada. In 1995, 40 percent of American investment was direct. By contrast only 16 percent of non-American investment in Canada was direct, reflecting the lesser role in the Canadian economy of non-American business firms. As these figures indicate, Canada’s economy is intrinsically bound to and dependent upon that of the US. But while access to US markets, investment and technology have benefited Canadians, the resulting arrangements, along with the great disparity in population between the two countries, have created serious problems for Canada and led to fears for loss of its sovereignty. Canada’s relations to the US have thus periodically oscillated between the need for greater economic co-operation and the desire to maintain its independence.

As was mentioned earlier, the Americans were the first to grant Canada some form of international recognition with the signing of the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Trade negotiations came to characterize the nature of the two countries’ relationship almost immediately. In 1911, President William Taft and Prime Minister Laurier reached an agreement providing for a limited free-trade pact. But public opinion was then already fearful that further economic integration would eventually lead to Canada’s loss of sovereignty to the US. Conservative opposition blocked the free-trade legislation in Parliament and Laurier went on to loose his elections because of this. In the early decades of the 20th century, the US began to invest in Canada’s industry thus increasing Canada’s dependency on American capital. After the Great Depression, Canada made various attempts to ‘de-link’ its economy from that of the US, but these were short-lived. In 1934 trade relations between the two countries resumed. In order to shield its economy from any future American protectionist policies, Canada began once more to negotiate with the US an agreement on tariff reductions and increased trade that was signed in 1938.

In the late 1940s and ‘50s, US corporations increased further their penetration and control of Canada’s economy by massively investing in the country’s natural resources. In 1948, Canada once more began negotiations with the US on a free-trade agreement but decided ultimately to back down from it. “In an attempt to avoid a return to bilateral negotiations with the US, which exposed Canada to the possibility of having to make concessions in one area to obtain US concessions in another, Canadian leaders turned to multilateral arrangements, such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in international economic relations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in military relations, believing they offered greater opportunity, through alliances with other countries, to curb the unilateral exercise of power by the US and to reduce the danger of direct Canada-US confrontation.” In spite of these attempts, the process of economic integration continued inexorably and in 1965, Canada and the US signed the Autopact Agreement, which created for manufacturers a conditional free-trade zone in motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts production in Canada. The period that followed was marked by conflict, as Canadian governments adopted protectionist measures that angered Americans. One such clash occurred after the OPEC crisis of 1973-74, when Canada raised the price of its oil exports. Tensions rose once more in the 1980s, following the introduction by Trudeau’s government of the National Energy Program and the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency. Both measures were adopted as means of guaranteeing Canadian control of its own economy and therefore reducing American encroachment.

With the election of Mulroney in 1984, Canada began a new round of negotiations with the US that led to the signing of a comprehensive free-trade agreement in 1987. The trade agreement quickly came into effect in January 1989, and Canadian-American economic relations were fundamentally changed. In 1994, the agreement was extended to Mexico and became known as the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although opposed to the Canada-US trade agreement while in Opposition, the Liberal Party has not sought to cancel it. Instead, it has attempted to bring into the agreement several other South American countries. Their presence, it is hoped, would help to further diffuse American preponderance.

As we have seen, Canada’s economy, history, culture and security are intrinsically bound to the US. This vulnerability to American policy and economic cycles explains why it is vital for the country to maintain good relations with its neighbor and why “ever since Mackenzie King’s first meeting with President Coolidge in Washington in 1927, Prime Ministers have sought to establish a personal relationship with their American counterpart.” It follows therefore that most Canadian foreign policy decisions tend to be based on a calculation of the degree to which the issue may affect its relationship with the US. “On numerous occasions, Canadian policy has been determined not directly by the American government, but by Canadian officials’ assessment of how their stance on an issue risked damaging Canadian-American relations.” Thus, when the Canadian government decided in 1949 to recognize the Kuomintang (KMT) rather than the Peoples Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, they were motivated not so much by ideological or other concerns - in fact it would appear that most Canadian officials would have preferred to recognize the PRC - but by the realization that this matter did not warrant crossing the US on an issue that the Americans perceived as important for them. The advantages of recognizing the KMT did not counterweigh the potential disadvantages that would have followed from American discontent, had Canada decided instead to recognize the PRC. The US bombing of Libya provides another example where Canada decided to back American decisions because not doing so may have jeopardized the Free-Trade Agreement, which was then being considered for ratification by the US senate.

In spite of these constraints on Canada’s foreign policy, there have nevertheless been some instances when the Canadian government opposed or challenged American actions on international matters. Although he committed Canada to the Plan for Joint Defense (NORAD) in 1958, and his rapport with Eisenhower was good, Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s personal relations with President J.F. Kennedy were poor. When the Cuban missile crisis began on 22 October 1962, the Canadian government, informed only one and a half hours in advance of Kennedy’s intentions hesitated to back the American government. The issue of the Canadian government was whether to comply with an American request to move Canadian forces to an alert status knows as ‘Defcon 3’. With the approval of the Minister of National Defense, Douglas Harkness, Canadian units did quietly so, but formal authorization was delayed while the Cabinet debated. Fearing a Canadian alert would provoke the USSR and believing the American Cuban policy to be generally unbalanced, angered by the lack of advance consultation and concerned about the implications for Canadian policy on nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green were reluctant to acquiesce to Kennedy’s demands. Approximately half of Canada’s ministers remained undecided, but as Soviet ships approached the quarantine zone later in the week, Harkeness’ position gained support and on 24 October, the government authorized the Defcon alert. Canada’s hesitation reflected in part the desire of the Prime Minister and others to preserve the independence of Canadian foreign policy and to maintain a balanced posture in crisis conditions. The delay, however, was widely criticized and exacerbated already difficult relations with the Kennedy administration, which accused Diefenbaker of failing to carry out his country’s commitments.

In 1965, relations between the two countries did not improve in spite of a change in government. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson not only failed to give the US the support it demanded during the Vietnam War but in 1967, the Canadian government openly expressed its disagreement with American policies in Southeast Asia. Public opinion in Canada was strongly critical of the US policy in Vietnam and as the years went by this developed into a general anti-American feeling. It was in this period that Prime Minister Trudeau risked American opprobrium on a number of issues ranging from Nixon’s decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, to the energy and foreign investment policies of the 1980s mentioned earlier. One of the pledges of the Mulroney government, overwhelmingly elected to power in September 1989, was to refurbish the relationship with the US, bruised by the many disputes of Trudeau’s last term. Mulroney cultivated his relationship with Reagan, abandoned the National Energy Program, weakened the Foreign Investment Review Agency and signed the comprehensive free trade agreement. But even Mulroney sought to distance himself from his American counterpart on a number of issues such as that of the support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, or on South African Policy. Prime Minister Chretien has more recently also opposed American policy in some instances such as in Bosnia, the refusal of the US to pay its debts at the UN, and Cuba.

What all these example serve to illustrate is that while Canada’s foreign policy may be to a great extent constrained by its dependence on the US, it must nevertheless not be assumed that Canada will automatically align itself with the US. If geographical proximity, cultural affinities and economic necessity account for the two countries historical ties, other factors will affect foreign policy making; these may be the personality of Canada’s Prime Minister, the ideological stance of the government in power, public opinion and the international context.

Canada belongs to numerous formal international organizations. Some are universal while others have restricted membership. Among those that play a greater part in Canadian foreign policy are of course the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the G-7 (8), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and to some extent the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. Canada’s membership in such diverse multilateral institutions not only illustrates what has been coined Canada’s ‘liberal-internationalist’ inclinations but also the variety of its allegiances, interests and commitments. Whereas membership in NATO was dictated by Cold War security concerns, Canada’s involvement in the Commonwealth and in La Francophonie is a reflection of the country’s colonial legacies and linguistic makeup. The extent to which membership to such organizations exerts an influence on Canadian foreign policy varies according to the international context. It should moreover be born in mind that such membership does not only act as a constraint but is also an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s participation in these multilateral organizations should therefore also be understood as being dictated by the need to preserve international order propitious for its trade and as a means to curb Great Power influence.

Canada played an active role during the San Francisco Conference that led to the creation of the UN in 1945. It saw the new organization as a forum in which it would be able to voice its needs more forcibly. Canadian officials hoped that the new organization would enable greater participation in world affairs from those ‘lesser’ powers. Their doctrine included two components: the functional principle and the concept of middle power. “In concrete terms, this meant that a state would have a particularly strong case for gaining access to a UN institution or decision-making process when it had either a substantial stake in the problem at hand, or a significant store of the resources relevant to its management or resolution.” As the Cold War unfolded, it became evident that the UN’s capability was constrained by the Great Powers veto in the Security Council. Although the original optimism waned, Canada nevertheless continued to participate actively in the organization.

Among its best-publicized achievements is Canada’s role in the creation of UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has certainly helped Canada to develop an independent role and identity in the international scene that distinguishes it from the Americans. In addition, Canadians are acutely aware of the fact that their national security is linked to international security. Canada has never fought in a unilateral war, and the five wars in which it was involved were all fought in concert with other powers. Canadian public opinion is very favorable to peacekeeping and although support sometimes declines, the majority of Canadians have this idea that peacekeeping is one of their main international assets or characteristics. Considering the limited defense budget and capability, the Canadian contribution to peacekeeping compares very well with other countries. Tens of thousands of Canadians have served in UN peacekeeping forces since the early ‘50s in 40 separate missions; this includes not only members of the Canadian forces, but also about members of the Royal Police, the Canadian Red Cross and governmental and non-governmental agencies. Peacekeeping, of course, is not merely based on idealism; the need to protect world peace is a prerequisite for the economic prosperity of Canada.

Canada’s promotion of NATO was dictated by the realization that the UN could not by itself adequately guarantee world security, particularly with the advent of the Cold War. “In fact, the creation of NATO was largely an Anglo-Canadian initiative, in alliance with the U.S. state department, to design a multilateral organization that would give France in particular and Europe in general the political stability needed to ward off Soviet encroachments. Canada’s main objective was to use the combined associations of the UN to create a fully multilateral framework for NATO, rather than a merely European-North American base, and to set up reciprocal guarantees among all NATO members that would make the NATO arrangements directly relevant and complementary to Canada’s growing bilateral defense cooperation with the United States”’ Given that the US is a powerful member of the organization, NATO has at times been perceived to be to the detriment of Canadian independence in foreign policy and some commentators have suggested that Canada withdraw from the Alliance. Although NATO’s importance as a military alliance has somewhat declined since the end of the Cold War, Canada continues to play an active part in it. NATO is still important in securing a more stable world order and Canada’s presence in the organization allows it to maintain friendly relations with Europe.

Canada’s membership to the Commonwealth and to La Francophonie emerged out of the country’s historical ties to Britain and France. On the whole, membership to such organizations as the Commonwealth or La Francophonie does not impose any generalized set of obligations on Canadian governments, and rather than acting as constraints they could be viewed more as instruments at the disposal of Canada to forward its interests and views. “The Commonwealth framework enables Canadians to pursue certain economic interests while reflecting a broad social democratic interest in international cooperation and a domestic value consensus. The Commonwealth is outside the US orbit, it embodies cooperation, and it does not cost a great deal either in financial or political terms. (…) This structure provides an opportunity for meeting economic goals and for asserting sovereign independence while fulfilling an important part of the national self image.”

Domestic concerns may be expressed directly, via elections, polls, representatives, the media or pressure groups, or indirectly, in the perception policy makers may have of it. It is often said that public opinion plays little role in the shaping and conduct of foreign policy even among the more democratic states. The assumption is that international affairs are of no real interest to the population in general and that when the public does express itself on such matters, its opinion is fickle and dictated by the moment. Moreover, even in those instances where international affairs may directly affect the interests and daily lives of the population, as in the case of national conscription or free-trade agreement, it is frequently said that opinion will be fragmented to such an extent as to allow policy-makers to ignore it altogether. Although it is difficult to measure the impact that public opinion may have on the conduct of foreign policy, it would nevertheless seem hasty to dismiss it as irrelevant.

Canada’s size and bilingual heritage has had an impact on its foreign policy orientations as the country’s history has been marred by fears for the country’s unity. These fears have been particularly heightened since the 1960s when part of Quebec’s predominantly French speaking population began to express separatist feelings. More recently Canada’s unity has been further threatened by the emergence on the federal scene of two political parties whose platforms are dictated by regional concerns - the Bloc Quebecois and the Western based Reform Party - and the quasi-total demise of two cross-national parties, the Progressive Conservative and the New Democratic parties. Although the influence of the Western provinces discontent on Canada’s future integrity is considerable, greater attention has traditionally been granted to the issue of Quebec. As mentioned before, Quebec’s reluctance to engage its troops during World War II greatly influenced the government’s decision to sever its ties with Britain. Ever since that time Canada’s successive governments have had to pay particular attention to this province’s requests, bearing in mind that it includes a quarter of the country’s total population. Canada’s attendance to the biennial of the Summit of Heads of States having the Use of French in Common, or La Francophonie, illustrates the impact the francophone population has on the country’s international relations. And when Chretien’s Liberal Party was elected to power in 1993, due attention had to be paid to the forthcoming referendum in Quebec on separation when nominating the Cabinet ministers. LLoyd Axworthy, who had been external affairs critic when the party was still in opposition, should have normally been given the External Affairs portfolio. Instead Chretien decided to appoint Andre Ouellet, a francophone from Quebec, to the position. By thus doing, the government hoped to show its commitment to the province and rally as many Quebecois to its cause. After the referendum, in which the population of Quebec voted by a very slight margin against further moves towards secession, Ouellet was thanked for his services while Axworthy became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Although Quebec’s role is felt in various foreign policy areas, one issue that is generally perceived as being overwhelming determined by Quebec’s separatist threat is Canada’s opposition to secessionist movements worldwide. This issue could in fact be used to illustrate the way conflicting domestic demands are filtered by the policy-making apparatus. In addition to the English and French communities, there are a large number of other ethnic groups in Canada, reflecting the country’s multicultural heritage and successive immigration waves. Ethnic groups tend to give priority to the welfare of their members in Canada and to Canada’s relations with their respective countries of origin. The Jewish community in Canada is particularly well organized and represented in foreign policy matters by the Canada-Israel Committee. Founded in 1967, the Canada-Israel Committee employs several full-time staff members in three offices - the national office in Ottawa, a Quebec regional office in Montreal, and a communications and research department in Toronto. Frequent and persistent contact is made with the civil service and elected representatives in Ottawa, to ensure a high level of awareness on Middle East issues. Contact with the political community is spread across all political parties. Other well-organized ethnic interest groups include the Canadian Arab Association, the Arab Palestine Association, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian Polish Congress. Many members of the Armenian, Baltic, Palestinian, Sikh, Tamil and Ukrainian communities in Canada have been active in pressing the government in Ottawa to incorporate their concerns in Canada’s relations with the ‘occupying’ state. But when Canada’s ethnic communities have attempted to influence the government into supporting separatist causes, they have generally failed. The Canadian government’s reluctance to include these minorities demands is interpreted as being the result of its reluctance to give Quebec separatists any additional grounds to justify their cause. But while the menace of Quebec’s separation may indeed have an impact Canada’s anti-secessionist stance, this dimension should nevertheless no be overstated.

As the case of the government’s response to the Nigerian civil war of 1968-69 illustrates a number of factors need to be considered. When Biafra’s separatist claims led to the Nigerian government’s violent military retaliation and the suffering of millions of Nigerians, the government’s initial stance on the advice of the Department of External Affairs was to ignore the issue by invoking the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. This traditional statist position was further reinforced by Canada’s concerns over its own domestic situation as Quebec separatists were gaining momentum. Yet in spite of this dual constraint, international law and domestic situation, the government was forced to reconsider its position because of Canada’s mounting public indignation. Trudeau’s offhand remarks on Biafra and the government’s reluctance to provide assistance to the starving Biafran population generated a scandal in the media which in turn prevented the Opposition in Parliament from challenging the policy. While the case of Nigeria may have been somewhat exceptional, it nevertheless highlights the importance of public opinion on an issue which first hand may not have been deemed of public interest. If Canadian public opinion might to some extent be driven by events and media coverage, it nevertheless appears to display a certain consistency in its response to external events notably in its belief that Canada should play an active role in peacekeeping. It was indeed because of public pressure that the Canadian government, against the advice of its own military officials, decided to contribute troops to the 1960 Congo operation.

Given the paramount importance of the economic dimension in Canada’s foreign policy it is therefore not surprising that groups organized to promote business, labor, agricultural, professional and consumer interests actively seek to influence governmental policy on these matters. A wide variety of business groups participate in the foreign policy-making process. These groups deploy considerable efforts and resources in order to have their interest represented at the different levels of government: the Cabinet, the Parliament (notably its standing committees, and the bureaucracy. It is indeed important to remember that today’s Member of Parliament may be tomorrow’s cabinet minister. The foreign policy interests of most of these groups revolve around trade and tariffs issues, although there is a significant divergence of opinions within and among groups. “Of considerable importance are the umbrella groups that promote the interests of business as a whole. These include the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Business and Industry International Advisory Committee (CBIIAC). (…) These associations are well-endowed by their members, highly institutionalized, and permanently embedded in the policy-making scene in Ottawa.” Although individually powerful, economic interest groups may not necessarily alter the government’s policy on such given issues for their interests might not necessarily converge into one coherent and unified policy. Thus while some members of the business community approved the Free-Trade agreement, others vehemently opposed it.

In addition to these economically oriented interest groups, there is also a wide array of non-economic or societal interest groups. Because of their enormous diversity, their abilities to exert influence in the foreign policy-making process vary considerably. Moreover, the work of many non-economic groups suffers from insufficient financial resources and fluctuations in membership. Among the various societal groups that try to influence the government on foreign policy matters are the National Committee on the Status of Women, various religious organizations (such as the Quakers who push for disarmament), and the military organizations. Although the Canadian veteran and military interest groups are a well-organized lobby that makes representations to the government on matters pertaining to national defense and the health of the military establishment in Canada, they had had relatively little success in influencing governmental policies. Nevertheless, the recognition by the US of Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, an important goal of the association in the 1980s, can be attributed to their relentless efforts. Finally, there are several other groups who attempt to influence governmental policies on specific international issues; these include groups such as OXFAM Canada, the Canadian section of Amnesty International, the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian University Overseas Service, the Middle East Discussion Group, the Canadian Peace Congress and Pollution Probe.

When trying to determine how a given country’s foreign policy is made, it is important to consider not only who among the policy makers yields the greatest influence but also what other factors affect the final outcome. If Canada’s foremost priority is to secure the more propitious environment for its economic wellbeing, decision-makers may have divergent opinions as to how Canada’s national interest may best be served. Some have emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the US; others have focused on the establishment of multilateral institutions destined to secure a more stable and predictable international order. While such decisions may be the result of a Prime Minister’s personal beliefs and inclinations, the existing international climate and balance of power also affect them. Finally, at a time when international forces and growing economic interdependence increasingly impinge on the population’s daily life, it only fair to expect that domestic concerns will more frequently permeate the foreign policy decision-making process.

With Joel Greenberg from The New York Times

and Paul Adams from the BBC

Dr. Rosemary Hollis:

This session is intended to give participants the opportunity to talk to international correspondents who cover this part of the world in order to provide news to their respective publics. These publics include people who do not know very much, who do not care very much, and who have specific agendas. This serves to complicate the life of a correspondent, which is already affected by various constraints and restrictions.

Paul Adams, BBC:

As most people know, the BBC is a very large and multifaceted organization. We do not have what I perceive to be the luxury of working for a single media. We are radio and television, and we are not just one radio and one television; we are world service radio and domestic radio, which has about three or four networks, world service television, and domestic television. In addition, we have recently started a new domestic 24-hour cable channel, which we have to provide material for.

I think it fair to say that the BBC has become an increasingly demanding organization in terms of quantity. I am pretty sure that my bosses in London are very aware of the fact that the more programs we have to work for and the more times we have to go live, the less we are able to think about what we are doing and talk to people.

Due to the fact that there are only three BBC correspondents here in Jerusalem, it is often extremely difficult to talk to people in order to learn more about the reactions, etc., and we are sometimes forced to rely on what London provides us with, which is usually obtained from Reuters or AFP or one of the other big news agencies. Relying on others, obviously, has its dangers. We often find ourselves having to rely on three or four international news picture agencies for material, which can be a real problem as they often make mistakes; they say that somebody is talking when it is actually somebody else and they say this is a picture of one place when it is actually a picture of somewhere else. They once, for example, mistakenly showed a shot of downtown Ramallah in the middle of a story on Tel Aviv! This is the kind of thing that happens, and it happens more and more.

Joel Greenberg – The New York Times:

I want to talk a little bit about the dilemmas that we face here in the Middle East by giving you a recent example. Two days ago I did a story on the meeting in Ramallah to commemorate the passing of 50 years since the Naqbe, which coincidentally came just one day after Israel inaugurated its 50 years of independence celebrations. When I proposed the story and sent it to New York, one of the questions I was asked was, “Why are we writing about this when we did not write nearly enough about Israel’s 50^th anniversary?” The complaints centered around the fact that the anniversary of the Naqbe had to do with history, while coverage of the Israeli celebration focused exclusively on the controversies involving the planning committee, which had been forced to deal with one crisis after another. Of course, maybe the people making the complaints were not aware that The New York Times, like any other news organization, is planning a big special edition on Israeli independence day, but it just goes to show the kind of sensitivity that exists. Here was a chance to look at what Israel’s 50^th anniversary means for the Palestinians, and that is why it was so interesting and why I wrote the article. It was not – at least as far as I was concerned - a matter of scorekeeping. For me, the idea is really not so much to balance for one side or for the other, but to present an interesting story that tells us something about the society, politics and origins of the people involved.

The problem is that we are talking about a country where there is a major conflict, which is why the parties to the conflict each try to pull you to their side and ask questions such as: “Why did you write about this, and why did you write about that, and how come you did not mention this or that, etc.?” I think that one must always ask oneself the question, “Does the story tell us something new about the politics and the social reality of this society or country?”

There are two very good examples of stories that I felt were very interesting, both of which are connected with time. One concerns the Palestinians, the other the Israelis. The first story was about the ‘premature’ end of summertime in Israel. It was decided in Israel well before the summer ended to go back from summertime to wintertime. This decision angered many circles in Israel: it was all to do with religious considerations and the fact that the Minister of Interior in Israel is from the Shas Party, which is an ultra-Orthodox party. So, this was a story that told us a lot about the cultural clash in Israel between religious and non-religious Jews, between the secular culture and the religious culture, and that was very interesting.

The other story involves the Ramadan canon in East Jerusalem, which goes off during Ramadan to mark the end of the fast. Here the issue was security constraints, because the man responsible for the canon has problems with the police because of security considerations regarding the explosive charges. The police, apparently, are constantly watching him to make sure that he uses all the explosives for the canon and does not use them for anything else, which means that the story tells us quite a bit about Palestinian society, its customs, and religion under occupation, as well as the existing political situation. In this case, the criteria are does the story tell us something new and interesting about the society and about the people and does it do it in a fair and honest manner? This, I believe, should be the guideline when one reads the foreign press.

Participant:

What sort of problems do you have with the Israeli censor?

Joel Greenberg:

As a rule, we usually do not submit our material to the censor, although we are always careful to display tact and common sense when dealing with an issue that might be problematic from the censorship point of view. Let me give you an example. When Katyusha rockets were fired at a certain Israeli kibbutz in Northern Israel, I went to the kibbutz and interviewed several people. The Israeli military told me to submit the finished article to the censor to make sure that it could not be used by Hizbollah to determine the actual location of the spot where the rockets fell. I did not, however, submit the article, the reason being that I did not specify the name of the kibbutz, partly because it was not necessary to do so. The article was about what people in the North are going through and their anxiety, not about specific locations. This means that we always keep in mind potential problems and are careful to constantly check ourselves.

Now, what happens if there is a really important story about a Palestinian who has been tortured to death and it is clear that the Israeli censor will not release any information. This is where the issue of journalistic integrity becomes very important. We would probably bend the rules a little in order to get the story out, which is more or less common practice amongst foreign correspondents, although I personally have never really come up against that kind of problem. I can say, that as a rule, we do not submit to censorship.

Paul Adams:

I think people have exaggerated how vigilant the censors actually are and how often we are obliged to deal with them. For example, when the Israeli soldiers were killed in Southern Lebanon, there were reports coming out from Beirut quoting Lebanese security sources, but in the majority of instances, it was London that gathered the information and took responsibility for broadcasting the reports.

There are times when the censor is very busy indeed. During the Gulf War in 1991, it reached the point where censors were in hotels in Tel Aviv and we really were under some pressure to play by the rules. I remember talking to my editors in London on the phone in my home in Abu Dis; I wasn’t broadcasting, but simply confirming that another Scud missile had landed in Ramat Gan. Suddenly, the censor came on the line and told me that the conversation had gone far enough and had to come to an end. I explained to him that I was not broadcasting but simply discussing the situation and he said to me, “Okay. I just want to remind you that these are the rules.”

Joel Greenberg:

The reality is, that censorship exists, but it only applies to immediate and extreme security circumstances. I once discovered there were Syrian Jews in Israel whilst walking down the street and hearing some people talking Arabic in West Jerusalem: upon asking them some questions, I discovered that they were Jews who had come from Syria secretly after Syria had agreed to let Jews out through a third country such as America. Public understanding was that the Syrian government was allowing them to leave and giving them visas on the condition that their final destination should not be discovered, published or discussed. I felt I had an interesting story, but I called the censor about it because it was clear that there were human lives involved: I was concerned that if it was published that ‘X’ from Damascus is in Israel, it could have very bad implications for his family inasmuch as it could harm their wellbeing and hamper their chances of leaving. Indeed, the Israelis said that I could not publish the story. It was a very worrying sense of responsibility, and to be honest, I did not have much of a problem with the censor’s decision, in spite of the fact that the story was so interesting.

The real problem arises when censorship is misused. One good example concerns the training accident that occurred two or three years ago. At the time, Ehud Barak was heading the army command, but the fact that he was there was censored. Why should it not be known that he was there at the exercise? Censorship is understandable to some degree, but there are certainly times when it is misused.

Paul Adams:

There are actually times when foreign journalists can help Israeli journalists by breaking censorship rules for them; for example, by naming a member of the Mossad who is currently under investigation. The man was first named abroad, and that put pressure on the authorities here. There is also another kind of pressure, but this time it is put on the journalists; it is not really censorship as such, but it is still a problem. It happens when you interview, for example, a government official, and then he reminds you of something you said yesterday or last week, something the official clearly disagrees with. Some journalists might feel intimidated by that, particularly if they are keen to have a good relationship with the interviewee. Unfortunately, it is something we all have to go along with.

Participant:

Why has so little been done to reflect the reality of Palestinian daily life in other countries?

Paul Adams:

You have raised a very good point. As journalists, we tend to tell the big political stories. Sometimes these stories concern only the politicians, but we often want to describe to our readers the human consequences of policies. A good example is the closure. ‘Closure’ is a very dry sounding term that does not really mean anything to people abroad. It sounds administrative, but it has enormous human personal consequences, so as journalists we try and illustrate those. Palestinian propaganda is used very badly, and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from the Israelis, who provide enormous quantities of information, great access to officials, including home telephone numbers, documents, invitations to film female army units training, and press conferences with military officials, etc., all of which is pure propaganda. This is where the Palestinians have several disadvantages in terms of organizing such things, but they would do well to try a bit harder.

Joel Greenberg:

The problem, I believe, is the nature of the explosive political situation and the military and security situation on which we naturally focus. No, we do not do enough about ordinary life, whether in relation to the economic difficulties of Israelis in a development town in Southern Israel or the life of a Palestinian student at Birzeit University. Look at life in Ramallah, for example, and how that has changed: the nightlife, the shows, the music, the bars. Under occupation there was nothing, but today, Ramallah is becoming an alternative Palestinian capital due to the fact that people are unable to reach Jerusalem. That is an interesting story, but as it is not political, we tend not to do enough about it.

Participant:

Do you not agree that journalists sometimes provide incorrect or inadequate information? The Israeli news, for example, covered a story about how Palestinians steal cars. The story concentrated on the fact that it was Palestinian thieves who were stealing the cars and failed to mention certain important details, such as the way in which the cars arrived in the Palestinian territories. What about the checkpoints? How did the cars get through those? And what about the cooperation between the ‘mafias’ on both sides?

Paul Adams:

Not every story is going to be accurate or told the way you want it to be told. Now, if you are suggesting that the cars story is not a story then you are wrong, because the statistics alone tell you that it is a story, that huge numbers of cars - for whatever reasons - are stolen, and that the ‘skeletons’ of those cars are frequently discovered in the wadis of the West Bank. Now, there are reasons why this happens: there are political reasons and there are reasons to do with the prevailing social and economic situation. If I had done that story, I would have found it important to state that there are several reasons why this is happening. It would, after all, be very idiotic to suggest that you had a nation of thieves, and I do not think that London would allow me to do that; those in charge would say that this is nothing but crude and racist nonsense.

There is something that you did not mention, which is the question of pressure. Palestinian journalists are now under two kinds of pressure: pressure from Israel and pressure from their own authority. Just yesterday or the day before, Ghazi Al-Jabali, who has no legal authority in terms of the media, announced that all 30 or so Palestinian independent TV and radio stations had to apply to the Interior Ministry for a permit within 48 hours. Neither the man nor the ministry has the right to do that, which led to a great deal of confusion. I was at a Palestinian TV station in Bethlehem while the staff were discussing the order and they were genuinely surprised, asking questions such as: Why is Ghazi Al-Jabali coming up with an order like this? What is the motive? Is it because of the Gulf crisis? Is it because they want to prevent us from broadcasting demonstrations in the street? This is a new kind of pressure that is coming from your own leadership.

Participant:

Of course, this is one case, but do not forget that the Israelis have arrested a huge number of journalists and closed 20 or so media offices; this is only one case. With regard to the Authority, we need more training, and we need more truth, etc.

Participant:

But no one can deny that journalists are over-highlighting the mistakes being made by the PA whilst ignoring those being made by the Israeli government. For example, if the PA arrests a journalist, practically every single journalist will cover the story, but hundreds of Palestinian journalists are in Israeli jails and nobody cares about them.

Joel Greenberg:

I have to disagree with you. Prior to Oslo, we covered many steps taken by the Israelis against the press. In fact, we still do, but what is different today is that there is now a Palestinian government and for the first time Palestinians are in charge of their own press. This is something that is interesting to the readers because it tells us something about the society and about the politics of the society. Our readers and we ourselves are interested in the new situation whereby there is a Palestinian government for the first time and for the first time Palestinian newspapers have to answer to a Palestinian authority. Again, you are getting back into the scorekeeping and the game of ten points here, ten points there.

Participant:

But you often exaggerate.

Paul Adams:

Are you saying that we should somehow be more generous to the PA? Look, there is a difficult moral dilemma here. I mean you have a new Palestinian government operating under extreme difficulties. Does that mean that I should somehow say, “Oh, well, if that journalist disappears or that guy is tortured to death in a Palestinian jail, it is because the Arafat is having difficulties with the Israelis and therefore, it means he has more reasons to be tough”? We have to apply the same standards, and I do not think that you are right. Take the question of torture. Torture is now being conducted in Palestinian and Israeli jails; there is much much more debate about torture in Israeli jails because there are legal cases in the Israeli courts involving Israeli lawyers and Palestinian human rights lawyers, whereas no such debate exists concerning what is going on in Palestinian jails. Whether you like it or not this kind of debate can go on in Israel because there is a relatively free press and a relatively lively judicial system as well.

Participant:

Suppose for example that there is a bomb in West Jerusalem and another one in East Jerusalem at the same time. Which one will you cover? What are the considerations: the preference of the organization you work for, your personal preference or the audience that you cater for?

Paul Adams:

I hate to admit it, but it would be the number of people killed that would determine which bombing we covered. I’m sorry, but it is rather a pointless question because you want me to say that we will go to one or the other, which isn’t the case: there is no political reason, there is no journalistic reason, and there is no editorial reason why we would choose one over the other. We are going to get the pictures anyway. If we do not take them ourselves, we get them from Reuters, or from the Associated Press, or from elsewhere. Our decision to go to one scene and not the other does not mean that we have taken a kind of decision to be more sympathetic to a particular side. It means that one site was closer than the other was, or that for other reasons it was more practical to go there.

It is true that whenever there is a tragedy involving Israeli civilians, we see more of the aftermath, the funerals, etc., and this is something I often wonder about. If five people are killed on one side and five people are killed at the other side, you are going to see more of the Israeli side. I do not think that there is a deliberate attempt to sympathize with one side more than the other; it is just that we have more material around. Nevertheless, this is something that troubles me from time to time.

Joel Greenberg:

I remember one particular funeral in Bethlehem. We had a picture of the mother of the boy in the paper, but because of the current situation, the funeral became - as Palestinian funerals often become - a political demonstration with flags and slogans, and this is what we ended up seeing on TV. The Israelis are much quieter, and all we usually see is a string of shots of women and men crying, which is something that Western audiences can relate to. The Palestinian men, on the other hand, are not crying, but shouting, “Bilroh, bildam, nafdik ya shahid” (with our soul and our blood, we sacrifice ourselves for you the martyr). So you see, we have two totally different images.

We also have a problem with access. Following the Hebron massacre, for example, the Israeli army shut the area, whereas following the bombings in Ben Yehuda street, anybody could walk in there and take as many pictures as they wanted. Hebron was under occupation at the time of the massacre and I remember that when I went there, it was very quiet and nobody had any pictures. It all happened very early in the morning, at around 5.30, and because the wounded were taken away so quickly, there were only a few pictures of the wounded on stretchers that some locals managed to get from the roofs. The problem was that the Israeli military made it impossible to get any decent pictures by closing the area.

Another good example concerns the events at Al-Aqsa the day after the tunnel was opened. Three people were killed, and I managed to get into the mosque area - I am not a Moslem, and I shouldn’t have been there, but I managed - and I wrote about everything I had seen, but again, it was extremely hard to get pictures because both the Israelis and the Waqf do not allow non-Moslems to enter the area. On the other hand, anybody can go to the market in West Jerusalem.

Participant:

Many Palestinian women cry and we do not see this on the Israeli TV, whereas we often see Israelis crying over the ‘slaughter’ of their people.

Joel Greenberg:

When the boy Ali Al-Jawarish from Bethlehem was killed, they showed his mother in the hospital crying. During the Intifada, the Israelis never got to see the grief of Palestinians, but this changed to a considerable extent with the Oslo Accords. I am not saying that Israeli television is perfect, but it is certainly improving. Today, we see interviews with mothers and fathers who have lost children, which is something that we never saw during the Intifada because at that time, the Israelis thought they were in a war, and during a war, you do not show the other side.

Paul Adams:

It’s a cultural thing too. The Israeli funeral is much closer to what Westerners know, what they recognize as a funeral. When you get right down to the core of it, people in the West have an easier time identifying with Israelis because they feel they are more or less the same kind of people. Many Israelis are from Britain and America, which makes it easier for Westerners to identify with them. When Westerners see a funeral where the overwhelming flavor is loud and nationalistic, they tend to pull away and to think, this is not for me, I do not understand this, I want to keep it at a distance. It is a very deep-seated cultural reaction that is actually to your disadvantage.

Participant:

Do you agree with me that for a long time, say from 1967 until the Intifada, the Western media was more sympathetic to the Israeli line, especially in the US, and that this sympathy continues to influence media practices and organizations in the West?

Joel Greenberg:

I would like you to come to a synagogue in New York or to any Jewish gathering in New York and listen to the questions we get. People will say that we write much more sympathetically about the Palestinians. All sorts of camps think that we favor the other side, but the reality is that the mechanisms of reaction are more organized in a Jewish community; in other words, you will get more letters, you will get more telephone calls, you will get more of a response from the Israeli Consulate, from Jewish organizations, and from pro-Israel advocacy groups that are well-organized to defend Israel’s interests. I once received a letter from the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee when I quoted a Palestinian who said that the Palestinians ‘fled’ in 1948; the letter said, we did not flee in 1948, we were expelled by the Israelis. What I mean is that these pressures are coming from different directions and the reality is that the pressure is coming more - I would say - from the Israeli-Jewish side, and as a reporter you have to resist this; you have to believe in what you write. I am not saying that we are perfect, but we try to be fair. A good reporter should be able to resist pressure and to think of himself not as serving any one side, but as representing what is fair and honest.

Paul Adams:

I will just echo that. I mean the Israelis are convinced that the BBC is and always has been anti-Israeli; they are convinced. Just as you assume the opposite, they assume that that is the truth.

Dr. Rosemary Hollis:

There are a lot of stories in Britain about journalists being quietly eased out of posts in Jerusalem because of Israeli pressure.

Joel Greenberg:

Unfortunately, the Palestinian media is chaperoned by President Arafat. There are newspapers in Israel, on the other hand, which you could say are heavily influenced by the military establishment and the defense establishment. As to the international journalism, such as the Herald Tribune and the BBC, it strives to be independent of interest groups, pressure groups and governments. I think good media serves no master.

Paul Adams:

Sometimes, the media becomes a pressure group for a particular issue. Bosnia is a very good example. The Western media in its reporting of what was happening convinced the general public that there should be Western intervention in Bosnia. Again, independent newspapers started a campaign, calling for our involvement in Bosnia. Is that what newspapers should be doing? I am not sure, but I am sure that it is different from representing the interests of governments or other groups.

Participant:

I do not think that the world understands the Palestinians. For example on the question of settlements, Nethanyahu talks about them using terms such as ‘the natural growth’ of Israel, etc., which can often mislead Western audiences.

Paul Adams:

You know, that is a phrase that has been used, but it is a term that is used mostly by the Israeli government and whenever one quotes someone using that term, one must be careful to say, “what the Israeli government describes as national growth” and to remind people that as far as International Law is concerned settlements are illegal. You might choose to repeat the British government’s view, which is that they are illegal and are not good for peace, or you might choose to use the American formula, which is that they are an obstacle in the way of achieving peace, or you might choose to recall UN resolutions on the subject or to quote the Palestinians who say that they have torpedoed the peace process; there are many ways in which you can balance the phrase ‘natural growth’.

Joel Greenberg:

I was at Bet El a month or two ago when they dedicated a new neighborhood and Mordechai said that the neighborhood was necessary because of the needs of the people in that area and the fact that the next generation has to get married and find homes, etc. At the same gathering, they handed out flyers, advertising new houses in the neighborhood. Why are they advertising if it is natural growth? If it is only the children of Bet El who need houses, why is there a need to advertise? Obviously, that advertisement should be mentioned in any story and there should be a real effort on the part of the reporter to take the myth and see if it bears any relation to the reality. Today, for example, the Americans said we have to attack Iraq because there are weapons of mass destruction, there are biological weapons, and so forth; you have to check this as a journalist and to consider the evidence. A good journalist always checks the statement.

Dr. Rosemary Hollis:

Is there anything that you would like us to think about?

Paul Adams:

One thing that this conversation has demonstrated is that you are all under the impression that the pressures on us from Israel, from our own editors, and from our own governments are enormous. That is just not the case. I agree that there was a time when it was not fashionable to criticize Israel, but the 1980s really changed that; the press relationship with Israel changed dramatically and besides, today’s journalists usually have an instinctive sympathy for the underdog, the person who the journalist thinks is the one in the most difficult situation. It is a natural sympathy and it sometimes leads you down the wrong path, but most journalists probably share it. The result of the Intifada was that amongst journalists and in the West in general, Palestinians were regarded for the first time more as victims than persecutors, and we should not underestimate the effects of this.

Concerning Iraq, we think that it is actually quite important to explain to foreign people what is happening here, but because there are so many correspondents in the Gulf producing all this material on planes landing and so on, it is difficult for us to get our material to the audience. I admit freely without reservation that that is a weakness. I personally am constantly telling my people in London if you do not have a piece from us here in Jerusalem explaining the whole issue of why the Palestinians react the way they do, then we have failed to do our job.