Dr. Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Fullbright Fellow, Birzeit University

When analyzing American foreign policy, there are a number of different theoretical perspectives one can employ: bureaucratic politics, rational actor or realism, corporate interest, world systems, national interest, and so on. The perspective one selects, in addition to reflecting personal values and preference, will, to a considerable extent, influence the substantive conclusions of the analysis.

Having said that, I have found it useful over my years of studying US foreign policy to focus on the continuities and consistencies of US policy from a global and historical perspective. Such an analysis diverts our attention from the specificity of any one given event, and places particular circumstances in a continuum that illuminates the patterns, principles, and objectives that underlie policy.

With regard to the question of Palestine, the most salient aspects of US policy have been its abiding constancy and its absolute negation of fundamental Palestinian rights. I am referring here to the basic right of the Palestinians to self-determination and sovereignty in some part of historic Palestine: either that portion designated in the 1947 UN resolution partitioning Palestine; or, the more commonly agreed upon area that has been accepted by the PLO itself since 1974 - the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.

I will argue in this presentation, that despite the appearance of policy shifts, new peace proposals, and initiatives from Washington over the years, the US has been consistent in its rejection of this Palestinian right. The analysis will suggest that there are three basic factors explaining such consistency:

First, structural and ideological factors in the US system that give rise to opposition to all Third World nationalist movements;

Second, a concern with Western freedom of access to Middle Eastern oil supplies that has translated into the promotion of a particularly reactionary status quo in the region;

Third, a perception about Israel’s strategic importance that conditions a favorable reaction, or at best non-interference by Washington in Israel’s objectives and policies.

Between 1948 and 1967, Palestinian nationalist aspirations were expressed through Pan-Arab nationalism rather than independently. Thus, during that period, Palestinian interests were never considered except as a problem of refugee resettlement - jobs, homes, and so forth for individual Palestinians. Not until the re-emergence of Palestinian nationalism as an autonomous phenomenon in the aftermath of the June 1967 War was there any consideration of a collective Palestinian issue in American policy. Beginning with that period it is possible to investigate American policy toward Palestine and the Palestinians. Although, it is worth noting that not even in 1948, nor at any time thereafter, did the US ever attempt to see that the UN Partition resolution, which it had so strongly backed, was fully implemented.

But, again, American consideration of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict did not really take shape until after 1967 when, on the one hand, Israel so mightily defeated its Arab neighbors and demonstrated its mammoth military strength; and on the other, the Palestinian nationalist movement re-emerged out of the defeat of the Arab states and began making itself visible on the international scene. The response of the US was immediately opposition and disregard while the problem for Israel was de-legitimizing and suppressing every manifestation of Palestinian nationalism - cultural, political and military. And that was a campaign in which Washington wholly concurred and fully participated.

Finally, while I am going to be making some comments about American policy toward revolutionary nationalist movements in general, it is worth noting that while the PLO portrayed itself and was portrayed by others as a revolutionary movement, this was not the case in the strictest sense. PLO objectives between 1964 and 1974 were first to regain all of historic Palestine, later to establish a democratic secular state, and after 1974 to accept a state in the newly occupied territories. While the PFLP and the DFLP raised slogans pertaining to structural changes in an independent Palestinian state, Fateh, the leader in the PLO, evidenced no concern about such issues. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that had an independent Palestinian state emerged in 1975, it would not have been a revolutionary state but would have become part of the status quo in the Arab state system. (Clearly, that is obvious today.) However, Washington’s perceptions, or distortions, made the nature of the Palestinian National Movement appear otherwise.

As to the original points of analysis, first, regarding opposition to Third World nationalist movements: the US has historically opposed all such revolutionary nationalist movements. Whether American policy is understood as deriving from economic determinants, or the needs of national security, or even both, the consequences are the same. Since the markets and resources required for the economic supremacy and military superiority of the US are largely to be found in the Third World, American policy makers have considered it crucial that these states remain stable, integrated into the US economy, and dependent on the US. The ‘threat’ of nationalist movements to American interests lies in their potential for indigenous leaders choosing to utilize their resources in the service of their own people rather than for the benefit of the US, and in developing autonomous economic and political structures responsive to local needs.

Second, regarding Western freedom of access: The American political-economy is grounded in corporate economic interests, which, axiomatically, involve continuous external expansion together with a stable environment in which obstacles to limitless growth will be removed or minimized as much as possible. As a result, the US is a status quo power committed to maintaining a fixed Pax-Americana over the entire globe. Any ‘disorders’ within its area of control - nationalist movements, revolutions, elected leftist governments, etc. - are automatically confronted with opposition, containment and annulment.

Now, the importance of US economic and strategic interests in the Middle East has resulted in particularly hostile reactions to nationalist movements in that region. Recall, for example, the marine landing in Lebanon in 1958. Or, the intense opposition to Nasserism, especially after co-optation failed. US tacit support for Israel’s initiation of war in June 1967 was related to American anticipation of Nasser’s demise at Israel’s hands. Ironically, as I said earlier, Palestinian nationalism re-emerged in the wake of the collapse of Nasserism. And, for a period, the Palestinian movement had charismatic influence in the Middle East as well as throughout the Third World. Thus, in the eyes of US policy makers, in addition to its potential destabilization threat in other Arab states, its plausible demonstration effect elsewhere in the Third World mandated its containment.

The indispensability or perceived indispensability of Middle Eastern oil to the Western economic system has led the US to forge de facto alliances with the most conservative regimes in the Middle East; Saudi Arabia, for example. Washington has undertaken to maintain in power the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, the most important state in the oil equation, in exchange for the monarchy’s cooperation in supplying oil, defending the value of the dollar vis-à-vis other currencies, and recycling petrodollars back to the US through investments, savings, and the purchase of goods and services. Moreover, a convergence of Saudi and American perspectives on Palestinian nationalism has been highly detrimental to Palestinian interests.

Within Saudi Arabia, and in the Arab state system generally, the normative constraints of Arabism have made it necessary for the ruling elites to appear supportive of the Palestinian cause. However, in reality the Saudi monarchy (in common with other governments) considered the Palestinian movement - especially in its youthful democratic, secularist phase - a direct threat to the rule of the royal family. This led Riyadh to pursue seemingly contradictory polices: on the one hand, publicly advocating the cause of Palestine, undertaking the brief oil embargo in 1973, and providing Fateh leaders with large sums of money, while on the other forbidding Palestinian political or military activities within Saudi Arabia, insisting that Fateh leaders reign in so-called ‘radical elements’ such as George Habash, and withholding the use of the oil weapon in a prolonged or meaningful manner as a means of support for the Palestinians. The actual Saudi opposition to Palestinian nationalism as opposed to its rhetorical support for the movement coincided with US antipathy to the Palestinian quest for self-determination. This convergence, together with the full integration of Riyadh into the US-dominated capitalist order by the mid 1970s, relieved the US of concern about a linkage between the realization of Palestinian objectives and favorable Saudi policies on petroleum, financial, and monetary matters. Moreover, after US policy makers understood the actual objectives of Saudi Arabia, American opposition to Palestinian nationalism was reinforced and further intensified.

The third factor explaining US policy toward Palestine is related to the perception of Israel as a strategic asset: Washington’s relationship with Israel is based on the institutionalization of beliefs about Israel’s strategic utility to American interests in the Middle East. Israel is considered to be promoting American interests in the following ways:

by acting as a counter to Pan-Arab nationalist movements;

by fostering and exacerbating the divisions and weakness in the Arab world;

by stabilizing the region through its absolute military superiority including its nuclear capability;

in the past, by containing the spread of Soviet expansionism;

later, by boldly fighting international terrorism;

by ensuring the survival of pro-American Arab regimes.

In my judgment, there is considerable room for debate concerning how effectively Israel contributes to the realization of these objectives. But what matters are the perceptions and beliefs within private and public policy-making circles.

In this context, it is important to consider both the concrete and the symbolic factors that have contributed to the institutionalization of the beliefs about Israel’s strategic role. The main concrete elements include the following:

First, Israel’s stunning military performance in the June 1967 War when it defeated three major Arab states in six days;

Second, the 1969 Nixon doctrine proclaimed in response to the Vietnam quagmire, which postulated reliance on certain states in crucial areas acting as substitutes for direct US intervention in the defense of American interests. This resulted in US efforts to construct a de facto tripartite alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, while Israel worked closely with Iran under the Shah, it opposed all attempts to increase Riyadh’s military capability. In the end, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, Israel was considered the sole significant surrogate.

Third, Israel’s mobilization (at the request of Henry Kissinger) for possible intervention on the side of Jordan in the September 1970 crisis between King Hussein and the Palestinians. Though Jordan, by itself, crushed the Palestinians and repulsed a Syrian tank force, the Israeli mobilization was enough to serve as a significant legitimization for the argument that Israel is protecting pro-American regimes.

Fourth, Henry Kissinger, with his immense influence and power, and with his intense commitment to Israel and to Israel’s utility as a strategic asset, contributed greatly to the legitimization of Israel’s role both symbolically and concretely through the massive transfers of technology and the military and economic assistance to Israel that he oversaw.

Fifth, pro-Israeli forces in American society, which themselves became far stronger and more important in the post-1967 period, contributed time, money, passion, and organizational and other skills to reinforcing the strategic asset thesis.

Sixth, among the concrete elements contributing to the institutionalization of Israel’s position in American political culture was a subtle transformation in the nature of policy making on Middle Eastern issues, in which Congress and the bureaucracy came to play an increasingly important role, combined with the myriad ways in which Israel and her American supporters interfaced with Congress and the bureaucracy.

And, seventh, beliefs about Israel’s role in the Cold War anti-Communist consensus, manifested in part by the campaign to free Soviet Jews, also played a critical part in the institutionalization of the strategic asset perception. Additionally, during the Reagan Administration, Israel’s contribution to the ‘anti-terrorist’ dimension of US policy (personified in the adulation heaped on Bibi Netanyahu in the wake of his brother’s death after the raid on Entebbe) became an integral part of the American ideological superstructure.

The foregoing, then, constitute what are considered the concrete factors that contributed to the strengthening of the beliefs about Israel’s strategic utility.

But, as important as any of these elements, independently or even collectively, are subjective symbolic elements and the fact that the idea of Israel as a strategic asset to US interests was repeated so often, by so many elite sources, and the attempts to legitimize this stand so manifold that the process of institutionalization was very rapid and irreversible.

‘Knowledge’, is - and I use this term in quotation marks - often mistaken for truth, but in reality, knowledge is highly subjective because it is a product of human construction. The major ‘sources’ for ‘knowledge’ about foreign affairs in American society are: official Washington - primarily the President, but in this case Congress too; mainstream journalism and the media in general; and scholars and the intelligentsia - especially those associated with the most prestigious and influential institutions. However, typically, both journalists and the media, in addition to the intelligentsia, take their information from government sources and reflect the positions and beliefs of governing circles. Indeed, for a free society, we have one of the least independent media in the Western world. Scholars too usually maintain an uncritical posture about foreign policy reflecting and confining their ‘debates’ to tactics while upholding the official consensus on objectives and interests. In the end, much that passes for independent journalism and scholarship amounts to little more than restatements of official positions. Nevertheless, what is produced by these respected institutions is accepted as ‘knowledge’.

In particular, the primary sources of ‘knowledge’ about Israel’s strategic utility were government officials such as Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Eugene Rostow and his brother Walter, Senators Henry Jackson, Jacob Javits, Abraham Ribicoff, Stuart Symington, Hugh Scott, and others.

Then, reflecting the opinions of these government officials and, in some cases reflecting personal sentiments (for example, Abe Rosenthal), a secondary source of ‘knowledge’ was the media, respected commentators, and scholars who espoused the new beliefs about Israel in every possible venue. For example, editorials in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other highly regarded newspapers consistently advocated Israel’s interests and promoted her strategic importance to the US.

Scholarly texts that became required reading at universities and graduate schools took the same track; books such as, Nadav Safran’s Israel: the Embattled Ally and Bernard Reich’s The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship were considered bibles on the subject.

The pro-Israeli lobby was also a source of ‘knowledge’ about Israel, continuously producing documents and studies to bolster American support for Israel as well generously rewarding those elected officials who adopted their line, and punishing others who did not.

Eventually, ‘knowledge’ about Israel’s strategic value to the US, as well as about its intrinsic moral worth, became part of the paramount reality, which is to say the reality of everyday life, for the majority of Americans. In other words, the nature or character of Israel, and of its significance to the US, came to be taken for granted as an objectively existing reality.

Other subjective factors that reinforced Israel’s institutional position in American political culture include a host of what sociologists call linguistic ‘typifications’.

Language, like knowledge, is a subjective form of human activity and a variety of linguistic constructions, many with extremely powerful symbolic content, have been used in the service of this institution-building process. Linguistic typifications such as America’s ‘moral commitment’ to Israel’s ‘survival’; the ‘only democracy’ in the Middle East (indeed, not just a democratic state, but ‘a light unto nations’); America’s ‘sole reliable ally’ in the region; the ‘restoration’ of the ‘chosen people’ to the ‘Promised Land’; courageous ‘pioneers’ who made ‘the desert bloom’; the ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ and Israel’s ‘Western’ society in a sea of barbaric infidels - these and other linguistic clichés were so habitually repeated, externalized, objectified, and finally internalized in the collective American social psyche that what began as one opinion about one possible policy for maximizing American interests in the Middle East, was transformed into an objectively existing institution of the social order.

One subtle but significant example may be seen in the fact that the US never merely ‘supported’ Israel or engaged in ‘relations’ with it as it does with other states. Rather, the US undertook a ‘moral commitment’ to Israel’s ‘right to exist’ and to its ‘security and survival’ (even though, in reality, the security and survival of Israel were never in danger, and never in the annals of real politics has one state undertaken such a commitment to another).

In any case, the concepts of ‘moral commitment’ and the ‘right to exist’ involve subtle ‘propositions’ about America’s ‘obligations’ to the survivors of the holocaust, and the alleged relationship between the holocaust and modern political Zionism. In addition, despite Israel’s spectacular military performance in June 1967, the ‘self evident truth’ of an embattled, mortally threatened state was sustained. And, despite the contradiction between Israel’s image as a beleaguered underdog about to be driven into the sea, and the concept of it as a surrogate power for the US, both images were upheld, and when combined with propositions I just mentioned, contributed powerfully to the institutionalization of the US-Israeli relationship and the belief that Israel indispensably serves US interests in the Middle East.

With all of these positive inducements and symbols, there still remained a few dissenting voices in the US, which necessitated the development of ‘mechanisms of control’, so to speak, to ensure that the institutional definition of Israel was maintained. Thus, those who questioned the strategic asset thesis, or worse, expressed concern for the Palestinians were immediately labeled ‘anti-Semitic’ and/or supporters of the ‘terrorist PLO’, and placed on a black list - all quite intimidating in American political culture. And, these efforts were highly effective, resulting in considerable ‘spontaneous’ self-censorship.

In any case, as a consequence of the institutionalization of the ideas about Israel’s uniqueness and its importance as a strategic asset to US foreign policy, the US has not seriously objected to any Israeli policy: the 1982 war in Lebanon, its continuous practice of state terrorism, the brutality used against Palestinians during the Intifada, its annexation and settlement of Jerusalem, the occupation of Syrian and Lebanese territory, the relentless confiscation of Palestinian land and concomitant settlement expansion, or its unshakable commitment to deny the Palestinians an independent sovereign state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

To the extent that American officials accepted Israeli arguments that a Palestinian state was a threat to Israel’s security, the US had no interest in pushing an option that differed from Israel’s - in part because it did not wish to see Israel’s security and its strategic function weakened. Moreover, since the US also opposed Palestinian self-determination, the convergence of perspectives solidly reinforced the existing American policy.

With regard to US-Palestinian relations, while I have alluded to the issue earlier, it now becomes very important to clearly distinguish tactics or policies from objectives and interests in American foreign policy. While a variety of new tactics or policies to deal with the Palestinians - peace conferences, peace talks, peace initiatives, and so on - have emerged over the years, and much has been made of so-called American efforts to broker a peace agreement, one fundamental US objective has remained constant: there is to be no sovereign, independent Palestinian state. And, that, after all, is the essential interest, and in my opinion right, of the Palestinians. Moreover, each time some new initiative pertaining to the Palestinians has emerged, it has come in response to other considerations - regional or international - rather than to Palestinian needs, rights, or interests.

In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, and in the context of Arab anger over American support for Israel, President Lyndon Johnson outlined a proposal for Middle East peace. Yet, his ‘Five Principles for Peace’ focused only on the political rights of existing states and referred to the Palestinians merely as refugees. American sponsorship of UN Resolution 242 was more of the same.

After the 1973 war, Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of US foreign policy, decided to convene an ‘international conference’ to obscure his real policy of divide and rule over the Arab states. Concerns about the oil embargo, Soviet support for Syria and Iraq, and other factors made such a conference appear useful. Yasser Arafat wrote to Kissinger at the time, asking that the PLO be included in the conference, but for Kissinger that was unthinkable - both from his own personal and political perspective and because he had just accepted a written demand from Israel that the US never recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized Israel’s right to exist.

President Jimmy Carter is remembered for being the first public official to articulate any Palestinian interest. He called for a Palestinian ‘homeland’, which I would point out, is by definition quite different than a state. In the end, however, he reneged even on this position in the context of Israeli demands (and Egyptian disinterest) during the Camp David process, which eventually led to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace that contained nothing for the Palestinians.

Ronald Reagan came to office with utter contempt for the Palestinians, a simplistic perspective of them as merely terrorists, and a declaration that the settlements were not illegal. However, after Israel’s war in Lebanon, and the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, Washington felt the need to at least give the appearance of ‘evenhandedness’. Thus, the peace initiative of the Reagan Plan and its attendant diplomacy - all of which held nothing that could further the Palestinian objective of statehood.

When in December 1988, the US opened a low-level and short-lived dialogue with the PLO, this tactic was designed, as had been others, to deal with problems other than Palestinian interests. There were two fronts:

First, at the international level, the US sought to improve its tarnished position after George Shultz’s November refusal to grant Yasser Arafat a visa to come to the UN, which resulted in the UN going to Mr. Arafat!. Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev had been working quite effectively the international scene and the US was concerned about maintaining its position as the dominant external power in the Middle East.

Second, and equally, if not more important were regional concerns: the US wanted to bring about a termination of the Intifada. It was concerned that Israel’s strategic utility was being weakened as its military became embroiled in suppressing the Palestinian uprising. The US was also concerned about the potential demonstration effect the Intifada could have in other Arab countries. And, once more, the US wanted to restore a sense of ‘evenhandedness’ in the region after its many years of overt support of Israeli interests and policies. Again, the PLO obtained nothing from the dialogue in terms of progress toward its strategic interest; indeed talking with the PLO was seen by Washington as a means of co-opting it, terminating the Intifada, and deflecting Palestinian demands for statehood. Nevertheless, as a prerequisite for its participation, the PLO had capitulated to all of Washington’s long-standing demands.

The year 1991 brought the Gulf War and in it’s aftermath, the frenetic diplomacy of James Baker culminating in the Madrid Conference. But, if we cut through the multitude of trees constructed during that period, it is possible to see the forest: as firm and unyielding as ever on the fundamental question of Palestinian sovereignty.

Next came the Oslo Accords and the supposedly historic handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the white House lawn - we have before our eyes this day the consequences of that affair.

In the US, we have a saying that diplomacy stops at the water’s edge - meaning that Democrat or Republican, Liberal or Conservative we will be of one mind in our approach to foreign policy. Tactics or policies may be changed and will often be debated loudly, but objectives, interests, or ends remain constant. I cannot think of a clearer example of this maxim than US policy on Palestine. Here we might also note that the same holds true for Israel on so-called security issues - Labor and Likud have had and continue to have the same objectives with regard to the West Bank and East Jerusalem: it is the Land of Israel and it will be so eternally. Everything else is rhetoric, or if you prefer, pomp and circumstance.

In conclusion, I think that it is necessary to be very forthright - US policy on the Palestine Question has been clear and consistent: American policy makers are unequivocally opposed to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Moreover, the Arab States have put no real pressure on the US to change that policy. And, given the strategic importance attached to Israel, indeed the institutionalization of that idea, it would be unrealistic to expect Washington to ‘pressure’ Israel in regard to Palestine. The evidence of this can be found in the fact that the US never put genuine pressure on Israel: the US$3 to US$6 billion dollars given annually to Israel - without which it could not have settled the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza and attained the high living standard that it has - has never been used, nor even threatened, as a means of altering Israel’s behavior. Note too that Israel’s annual subsidy is far more certain than that promised to retired Americans as social security.

One final thought is the importance of reflecting carefully on the meaning of the word ‘peace’. It tends to be assumed that ‘peace process’, ‘peace conference’, ‘peace initiative’, and ‘peace talks’ have a substantive meaning that includes a measure of justice for both sides. However, in American lexicology, peace is simply the absence of conflict regardless of how unbalanced the fruits are for each side. Whether it manifests as a process, a negotiation, in a conference, or as a ‘new’ initiative - it is simply a tactic to divert Palestinian attention from its fundamental objective of statehood.

HE Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO Delegation

to the UK and to the Holy See

I would like to start by saying that I am speaking in my individual capacity. If you agree with the performance, you can thank Dr. Abdul Hadi for making a wise decision regarding his choice of invitees. If you disagree, you should blame me and not the National Authority.

There are three or four books on the topic of US foreign policy in the Middle East that I wish to recommend: the first is by William Quandt, ‘Decade of Decisions’, the second by Cheryl Rubenberg, ‘Israel and the American National Interest’, the third by Camille Mansour, ‘Beyond Alliance’ and the last by J.J. Goldberg, ‘Jewish Power’. Had I written the last book, I would have been accused of anti-Semitism, but since it is Goldberg who did, at worst, he will be called narcissistic.

Now, American society is fascinating to study, and there are a variety of schools of thought concerning this fascinating society. There are those, for example, who look at American society as a result of widespread anti-colonial feeling. The American society is the result of widespread immigration from European countries. Who are those immigrants? Mainly the Catholics from predominantly Protestant countries and the Protestants from predominantly Catholic countries, and the Republicans from monarchies and the Monarchists from newly emerging republics; in other words, the doomed of the earth, all of whom sought more hospitable shores, struggled against the British Empire, obtained their independence, and in the 20th Century helped many a Third World country obtain its own. This is a very interesting approach that can be intellectually legitimized and substantiated.

You could also, however, see things in a totally reverse fashion: the US society as a colonial society that was built at the expense of the Red Indians - the Palestinians of America - who were exterminated and put into reservations preceding the emergence of the US at Mexico’s expense. One should not forget Texas, California, etc., where Mexico was gradually eaten up and annexed.

Speaking as a political scientist, I can say that the study of politics - the study of the state, the international system, the interstate relationship and the allocation of power within the international system - is still not a science, although it is moving toward scientification. There was a period of what was called ‘Quantomania’, when we attempted, by adhering to imitation scientific procedures, to quantify interactions, but it never worked. I believe that in this particular field one can present a hypothesis and its contrary with equal persuasiveness, which means that in most instances the approach one adopts depends to a great extent on one’s perception, preferences, prejudices and biases.

Now returning to the different schools of thought surrounding the American-Israeli relationship, which is a decisive relationship that has fascinated two generations of scholars, one could say that in the past there were those in America whom we used to refer to as the globalists and the regionalists. The globalists saw the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of global competition, mainly with the Soviet Union and the Communist World, etc., and in this globalist approach Israel was seen as a strategic asset and America’s regional ally. The Americans were in trouble in Vietnam; both China and Russia supported the Vietnamese, and we in the Middle East had the stronger horse and were putting them in difficulty. Opposing the globalist school of thought in Washington were the regionalists, who made up the minority and who were saying, no, please, extract the Middle East from this global picture and study it on its own merits, namely the merits of justice and injustice, and with regard to how this conflict affects us and our positions in the Middle East vis-à-vis Israel and our regional network of alliances, whilst asking ourselves if our being favorable to Israel means that we are sacrificing the network of our relationships in the Gulf, in North Africa and elsewhere.

Today, two schools of thought are engaged in a kind of intellectual battle - and by the way, intellectual battles are always necessary - in which one considers Israel a strategic asset, the other a liability vis-à-vis American national interests. I personally believe that Israel is becoming more of a liability, unlike in the ‘50s and ‘60s when it was helpful to American foreign policy in the Middle East because it helped in confronting emerging Nasserism, militant Baathism, and the possibility of Communist expansion. Today, whether one likes it or not, the entire regional state system is very pro-Western and conservative, and the Israeli Government, by its intransigence and non-flexibility is defying, destabilizing and deligitimizing the profoundly pro-Western regional system. We have all seen in recent contemporary history how the policy code of dual containment by the Americans was put in disarray. Why? The answer, according to the Arab perception, is that there was a missing link; it was never a triple containment policy because we, the Arabs and Palestinians, were more concerned with the containment of Israel. The recent failure of the Doha Conference and, a mere two weeks later, the success of the Islamic Conference in Tehran, which reinstated Iran as a major player in the region and beyond, should in my opinion cause American decision makers to open their eyes.

In summarizing all the above-mentioned debates on the American-Israeli relationship in my own words - and I know any summary is simplistic - I would say that the first school of thought speaks of an American Israel and the other of an Israeli America. Today, the US is the only remaining superpower in the world, yet when it comes to the Middle East, it has abdicated that role to its regional client, protégé or junior partner, Israel. While the first school of thought says that the US, as the senior partner, imposes upon its regional ally and junior partner its regional policy, which conforms with its global approach and interests, the other school of thought says no, because of a special relationship the Americans adopt the Israelis’ regional strategy and integrate it into their global framework. So the difference is does America impose on Israel its policy, or does America solely adopt American policy and integrate it in its approach. The reality is somewhere in the middle.

Speaking frankly, I am not insensitive to the second line of approach. There clearly exists an influential pro-Israeli lobby, which is a major player in the formulation and elaboration of American foreign policy pertaining to this region. You might have seen on CNN a recent public relations exercise, which many referred to a disaster, involving the three major spokesmen on American foreign policy, namely Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger and Cohen. The three are Jewish, and they were voicing the three key positions in the formulation of American foreign policy. I was present at the London meeting with the three Americans most directly involved in dealing with Middle Eastern mechanisms and peace processes, and I recall that after approximately ten minutes, Madeleine Albright and Arafat departed to another room. It was then that I observed that from one end of the room to the other, all those who remained were brilliant American intellectuals who were now political operatives. I remember our joking with Arafat, Abu Mazen, Sa’eb Ereikat, and Nabil Sha’ath in the hotel afterwards and telling Mr. Arafat in the presence of all the others that we, the Christians in Palestine - and I consider myself a sociological Christian, not a theological Christian, because I have doubts and doubts about my doubts - make up two percent of society, yet in our team we were two out of eight, meaning 25 percent. The Jews in America, meanwhile, make up two percent of society, yet they were eight out of eight, meaning 100 percent, so we, the Christians of Palestine, are either underrepresented - which was not the case, because we were 25 percent - or they [the American Jews] are over represented! I put it very bluntly because it is a case of perception but also content and desire.

I think that the peace process is in trouble. Let me give you my preferred formula of 25 years ago, when I was a big fan of General de Gaulle. The general, because he was both aware and a very courageous statesman, felt that the only way for conflicts to be resolved in the Middle East was through an imposed solution involving the major powers. This is why he called for a consultation between the major four; remember China was not yet in. I used to elaborate on that by saying, since both the Israelis and we believe that the entire country is ours, this enforced solution should be mutually unacceptable. Incidentally, in politics and diplomacy the concept of mutual unacceptability carries more potential than mutual acceptability: if I know that he also doesn’t like it, it makes it less unattractive to me! So since both societies considered the entire area theirs, an imposed solution by the external major powers should have been based on a two-state solution that was mutually unacceptable but imposed. Unfortunately, since that time we have become unreasonably reasonable and accepted the two-state solution, which is why our realism is now sometimes confused with resignation. Our bet concerning American foreign policy was always to wait for a new Eisenhower; remember how, in ’56, Eisenhower said to the British, the French and the Israelis, okay, now you just withdraw, and in hours the withdrawal took place?

My personal feeling when it comes to the two schools of thought and who makes whom wag in American foreign policy is that much depends on how comfortable the American President is in the Congress and in the country and how comfortable America is in the world. I believe that today, America is extremely comfortable in the world; it is the one remaining superpower, and I think, given the popularity ratings of Bill Clinton, he is comfortable in the country, although one could say that in the Congress he is not, etc. Now this is why we had the complicating factor of what happened while Arafat was in Washington. The weakening of Clinton was a devastating blow for Palestinian national interests.

At this point it is important to note that we, the Palestinians, have never put our house in order and we have a sort of dynamic approach to the American society. I believe that we should address not only American decision-making but also American public opinion, and we should have an institution, not necessarily within the Authority, with a pool of 15 or so speakers who spend their time moving between every single state in the US. We should have here in Palestine think tanks that decide upon the best Palestinian diplomatic doctrine and how we should package our message, because here again we were not always maestros in the communication of our ideas and aspirations. We should have a better Palestinian diplomatic team; we should have a foreign relations committee in our parliament to sort of cross examine nominated diplomats, involving MPs from all the different political groups, meaning we should be able to formulate our foreign policy according to the national consensus. There is no doubt whatsoever; for as long as we do not do our homework, we are destined to remain failures.

I would point out here that Arafat was deeply moved by the fact that he was given the same treatment as Netanyahu during his most recent visit to Washington. In the interest of facilitating the success of the peace process and making it correspond to the Palestinian national interest to a greater degree, we should look further into de-Americanizing the peace process itself. De-Americanizing in what sense? By introducing additional players. Now in 1991, there were three sponsors, but we knew that the Soviet Union was busy managing its decline and in occupying Chechnya. We had hoped that the European Union would be a third co-sponsor because we believed that the European Union is on the economic level of this multi-polar system a pillar of the international community, and we believed that because of the physical geographic proximity, there is an inter-dependence in our national interests, not only from the point of view of economic transactions and interactions but also with regard to security and demographic overflows, etc. However, the participation of the European Union was torpedoed by the Israelis with American assistance, although a month ago there was a document issued from Brussels by Marin, the Commissioner for Mediterranean Affairs, who claimed that Europe should be allowed to play a more active role in the peace process. I believe that the Russians should also play a larger role and that while the Americans should be invited to continue their involvement, we should also resurrect the UN role as a whole; Kofi Anan was certainly the revelation of the last crisis and we - Arabs, Palestinians, Israelis and all the others - should use more of that man and the institution he represents in conflict resolution.

The fact remains that I am pessimistic, mainly because the Israelis tend to support the idea that the Arabs have no more options, thereby confusing our realism with resignation. I am proud to say that I am a realist - I object to the use of the word moderate in this context - and I do not think that realism means resignation. I also think that we as Palestinians should agree on what the desirable negotiated outcome should be. There is already, from my point of view, a consensus in Palestinian society, and one that I am sure we can succeed in having Hamas endorse. The consensus is based on the principle that we have a conceptual difference with the Israeli political class, left right and center, which prefers to speak in terms of territorial compromise, and that we should prefer to speak of historical compromise.

But what is historical compromise for us? We believe that mandatory Palestine is the disputed area and that any compromise should be based upon the 4 June 1967 boundaries. The Israelis believe that the West Bank is a disputed area, and they offer us a compromise halfway between Jerusalem and Jericho. We, on the other hand, offer them a compromise that is based on a meeting point in Jerusalem and nowhere else. These are two different conceptual approaches with different territorial implications: territorial compromise on the one side, historical compromise on the other. For us Palestinians, this is our mini-max approach, territorially at least; the maximum we are asking for, but also the minimum we are ready, willing or capable of accepting. There is no elasticity on that issue, and I think that even those who now oppose the peace process would be prepared to join this consensus under the proper conditions.

The Israelis ask themselves what options the Palestinians have at the present time. I tell them that we have for many years attempted to play with them the winner-winner game, in the sense that we are in favor of the two-state solution, but that we were unreasonably reasonable and accepted to play that game by phases and stages. Unfortunately, they still want to play with us the winner-loser game, and I tell them very frankly, no society on earth likes to be the eternal ‘loser’ of history; a minority always emerges - and remember that it is the minorities, not the majorities who make history - and says, if we are condemned to be the eternal losers of history, then to hell with the temple, down with the pillars, let’s play loser-loser! On a more positive note, when a movement starts playing loser-loser, the rational tendency of the other side inevitably emerges and they say, let’s return to winner-winner; let’s spare ourselves all those agonistic, agonizing scenarios and continue the game on the winner-winner level. I am extremely happy that even in America with Henry Kissinger, and in Israel, with General Sharon, both have spoken of the inevitability of Palestinian statehood, and even though I recognize the fact that ‘inevitability’ is a very clinical term - you can say it is inevitable but undesirable - at least they have recognized the inevitability of Palestinian statehood.

Now a favorite Jewish author of mine, Nahum Goldman, once defined diplomacy when commenting on Henry Kissinger’s approaches in the ‘70s. Goldman said that diplomacy in the Middle East seems to be the art of delaying the inevitable as long as possible, in other words, that statehood is inevitable, and our task as political activists is to find historical shortcuts and to get it before the 20th Century rather than later. Now I personally would like to see the international community more involved, and I believe that we should reorganize the peace process by introducing other external players and rehabilitating the role of the UN. I think Kofi Anan was America’s choice to begin with; remember, Butros Butros Ghali was destabilized so that Kofi Anan could come to power, and although he wasn’t the Palestinians’ or even my personal choice, he turned out to be a person with great dignity, a great statesman and someone with enormous independence and concern for the avoidance of war, and I am sure he is as deeply committed to the achievement of peace as he was to the avoidance of war.

With regard to the question of whether there is a need to rewrite Oslo, let us review the last six years, noting that I was in favor of us going to Madrid and Oslo. The format of negotiations was clearly tailor-made to suit Israeli negotiating preferences. A person for whom I have great admiration, James Baker, often used to repeat that we have to make an offer that Israel cannot reject, in other words, an offer that corresponds to its own negotiating preference. For five or ten years prior to Madrid, articles in magazines like ‘Commentary’ in the US confirmed the belief within the Jewish intellectual community, that the Palestinian question should no longer be given centrality in America’s Middle Eastern approaches and that the Palestinian track should be disconnected from the Arab tracks.

And so, according to the tailor-made format of negotiations at Madrid, the Palestinians were invited to be half a delegation representing half the people seeking half a solution (the self-government for the interim period)! We had to go in the framework of a Palestinian-Jordanian team whose members were supposed to be recruited only from the West Bank and Gaza, and which should not include any East Jerusalem residents, nor PLO officials, nor Diaspora Palestinians. We accepted because we thought this would trigger a snowball process and improve things on the way. Oslo rectified two of those three conditions: we were no longer half a delegation, and we were now negotiating as a national movement representing the indivisible nature of our people, although we were still seeking half a solution on the way to permanent status.

Returning to the present, due to the fact that we got stuck along the road, we are now victims of an Israeli desire to optimize and take advantage of the imbalance of power. While we believe that UN resolutions and the principle of land for peace should be the guiding compass of negotiators, the Israelis would like to reflect territorially and geographically the imbalance of forces on the one side and the other. We, of course, are not comfortable with participating in the peace process whilst being at the mercy of the balance of power, and we thought that the international community would help us at the negotiating table and remedy this inferior status vis-à-vis the power equation. Their intervention up to now, however, has not been sufficiently decisive. Territorially the Israelis offer us a Sharon map or a Mordechai map; Sharon wants to give us back 35 percent, Mordechai is less ungenerous and willing to give us 50 percent, while Yossi Beilin might be even more flexible. That is the present situation. Usually, territorial rectification of a major nature is always justified under the guise of security needs and requirements. I personally believe in the intellectual battle; we should wage a serious media and information campaign, explaining to the public opinion and decision makers in Israel, America and elsewhere, that in the Middle East, it is peace that will bring security and not security that will bring peace. Only peace with the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors will bring security for Israel, whereas territorial rectification will provoke the perpetuation of the conflict.

We, the Palestinians, are the key to regional acceptance of the Israelis. When it was perceived that negotiations between the Israelis and us were moving smoothly, Israel could open doors from Morocco to Muscat, but when it was perceived that Israel was again maltreating us and not negotiating in good faith, those same doors closed in their faces. So we are the key to regional acceptance, and it is this that is the prerequisite for security, not territorial appetite. Let me tell you very frankly, that in the ‘70s an idea to which I subscribed was floated in the States, namely that there should be a formal alliance between the US and Israel, which would enable Israel to feel more secure and prevent it from constantly referring to the security pretext and territorial claims.

The reason why a military imbalance exists today is that Israel enjoys three superiorities on the military level. It has conventional weaponry superiority; its aviation establishment is numerically bigger than the French plus the British, and I suspect that on the operational level it is even better because it has had much more experience, which means that on the conventional level, Israel is stronger than any possible coalition or combination of Arab forces and you can add up Egypt, Syria, Iraq, diminished or undiminished, etc, etc, and Israel on the operational military convential level is still superior. Israel also has the nuclear monopoly - it is the only actor in the regional state system that maintains nuclear weapons. And number three, Israel has an unwritten alliance with the only remaining superpower, and I personally believe that an unwritten alliance with the only remaining superpower is even better than a written one, because an unwritten alliance allows the junior partner to behave with irresponsibility, while a junior partner within the framework of a formal alliance has to respect a certain code of conduct because he might be an embarrassment to the senior partner. So I, Afif Safieh, part of the Palestinian and Arab national movement, am not against a formal alliance ratified and codified between the US and Israel according to which the US says any threat to Israeli security and territorial integrity in the future is an attack and an offense against the American state. This means, however, that keeping this hill and that valley is not a necessity within a framework of cohabitation or within the framework of an alliance.

The Americans, in addition to the Europeans, often invoke Israeli democracy in such a way as to make Israel seem more ‘sympathique’ to the international public opinion and, for example, to Saddam the ‘dictator’; Israel is a democracy and there is no moral equivalent. By the way, I am not a fan of Saddam Hussein, nor was I a fan in 1990 and I think one of the reasons why this crisis [the recent Gulf Crisis] was better managed was because some of his assistants played a more prominent role. This argument of Israeli democracy is an interesting argument, and it is usually used as a kind of extenuating, attenuating actor. I personally believe that on the moral level, Israeli democracy is a disturbing phenomenon because there is nothing worse morally than a democratic oppression, meaning an oppression that enjoys the democratic support of the voter and the citizen. Ten years ago I was against Qaddafi’s policy towards Chad, but the Libyan people could not be held responsible for Qaddafi’s policies regarding his southern neighbor because they were never consulted. In Israel, on the other hand, because of the democracy enjoyed by the Jewish citizens of the state, what is inflicted on us - the injustice, the oppression, and the persecution - enjoys the support of public opinion, the voter, the citizen and the soldier. Democracy means responsibility of the citizen, and in this context I recall the words of a New York rabbi who said during the Vietnam War that in a democracy, if a few are guilty, all are responsible.

Now democracy also has problems making war and waging peace, and we are not unfamiliar with the coalition building policy in Israel and the impact this has had on flexibility and inflexibility at the negotiating table. This is why again, I believe there should be an external input. I was in favor of Oslo, although I admit to having had problems with the way we managed the negotiations, then the way we managed people and the economy. Oslo was a historical necessity, a lesser evil. I believe the Palestinian people and the Palestinian national movement would be in a worse condition had there not been Oslo; I think we would now be in round 62 in Washington, stagnating, with the PLO bankrupted financially and also politically, and with increasing tensions between the Palestinian legitimate, central historical leadership in Tunis and the negotiating team, which some would have perceived as an alternative leadership. But am I in favor of rewriting Oslo? No, if it is implemented the way it ought to be interpreted, it’s okay.

What should have been implemented? On the territorial level, even though there was constructive ambiguity, we reluctantly accepted for Jerusalem and the settlements to be left to the Final Status Negotiations. Territorially speaking this involves ten percent of the West Bank, meaning that in the three installments of the three redeployments, theoretically we should have gained control or be about to gain control of the other 90 percent. We didn’t get the 90 percent, and in fact, we didn’t get even the first redeployment, which is why we are speaking of one redeployment that will be two in one. Theoretically, the interim period should have been of five years’ duration, starting on 4 May 1994 and ending on 4 May 1999. It will not, of course, be ending by then if we continue at the current pace. I often say that Rabin and Netanyahu when compared to a turtle make it look like Speedy Gonzalez!

Theoretically, then, Oslo is to be implemented by 4 May 1999, by which time we should have peace, statehood, etc. We won’t, but we should have. This is why there is talk within the Palestinian political community of unilaterally proclaiming the state on 4 May 1999 in the areas we control, considering the other parts of the occupied territories as part of the state that are under occupation, etc. Who will recognize it then? We don’t know what the attitude of the Europeans and Americans will be, and there are so many question marks. So, re-write Oslo? I don’t know. But the message from us should be we are in favor of mutual recognition, and by the way, in this Israeli-Palestinian/ Jewish-Palestinian relationship, the victim hates the oppressor much less than the oppressor hates the victim. It’s intriguing: the oppressors hate us the victims much more than we have ever hated them historically, but it’s the historical truth. We have moved faster towards mutual recognition than the Israelis have; since ’73 and ’74 - the October War was the demarcation line - we have moved faster towards mutual recognition than the Israelis have. They should understand, therefore, that we are for mutual recognition. If we do not get our independent state based on the ‘67 boundaries, the recognition we extended in ‘88 or in ’91, in ‘93 or in ’94 will be subject to revision, to rewriting, according to our very pragmatic, unemotional, unsentimental approach. We are in favor of mutual, but not unilateral, recognition.