Assymetric Negotiations (I):
The Middle East Peace Process
Moderated by Dr. Joel Peters

This session took the form of a roundtable discussion dealing with the issue of asymmetric negotiations in general and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in particular. As an introduction to the discussion, Dr. Joel Peters explained some fundamental concepts of power relations and negotiations:

When we look at the Arab-Israeli conflict, we have to distinguish two levels: the interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states and the intra-communal conflict, i.e., the conflict between the two peoples. In terms of the negotiated processes in Madrid, the second level, the Palestinian dimension, was absent; there were only negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The Oslo process, then, brought the conflict back to the intra-communal level of the 1920’s, to the question of how two peoples can live together. The War of 1967 had been an interstate conflict; for example, Security Council Resolution 242 mentions the Palestinian people only as a refugee problem, and otherwise focuses on states, borders, etc. - which actually was the reason for its rejection by the Palestinians at that time. In the Oslo process, the major issue was the communal problem, the search for a solution to the problem of how Israelis and Palestinians can live together.

The question we want to look at now, is whether you can have negotiations in a situation of unequal power like the one between the Palestinians and the Israelis. We have learned that in diplomacy, there is a need for the acceptance of fundamental norms and of the ‘other’ as an equal partner. These norms are generally observed because they are useful to all the states; they exist because states have a common interest in a well-functioning diplomatic system. In negotiations, the condition is the rational desire of both parties to reach an outcome together. The question is if the system can function in an unequal power relationship. How will parties then get to the table? Why should the stronger power negotiate at all?

This question was discussed most vigorously by participants, most of whom doubted that negotiations in such a situation could be successful. They felt that the stronger power would impose its rules and dominate the negotiations. They accepted the idea that in order for parties to get to the negotiation table, there is a need for common interests, such as peace. They remarked, however, that in order for negotiations to be successful, there is a need for equality, or at least the genuine acceptance of a peaceful approach to conflict resolution and recognition of the other side.

One participant mentioned the example of the Camp David Accords. He said it was clear that there had not been equality in power between Israel and Egypt: the Egyptian army had been defeated, and its economy was crippled; the Israeli army, meanwhile, had been newly equipped, and Israel could count on US backing. However, power is also a matter of perceptions: after 1973, both Israel and Egypt felt strong and victorious, and both were supported by a superpower. Only because of this feeling of strength were they ready to embark on negotiations.

This example led to a discussion about the question as to whether the Palestinians, in 1993, felt that they had won the ‘war’, the Intifada, and consequently engaged in negotiations whilst in a strong position. It was mentioned that to the vast majority of the Palestinians, it seemed that although they had won the war, they were still in a very weak position due to the serious problems inside the PLO following the Gulf War, the strength of Hamas, and the dominance of Jordan. They had, however, achieved some success inasmuch as their negotiators were acknowledged as Palestinians, while the Palestinian problem was once again on the global agenda. It was also mentioned that Israel had a strong interest in coming to the negotiation table: it was eager to gain Arab recognition and to reach peace settlements with its neighbors.

It can be concluded that in order to come to the negotiation table, an interest in a negotiated settlement, unlike equality, is a basic necessity: reality shows that negotiations often take place between the victor and the vanquished and that outcomes are often imposed. The opposite side of the coin is that the weaker side is not powerless; it also has assets to bring into the negotiations. In the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, for example, it is amazing how much the Palestinians, as a group without support or a functioning bureaucracy, have managed to get out of Israel; also remarkable is the extent to which they have succeeded in filling the holes not mentioned in the accords, e.g., by having their own stamps, driving licenses, etc. Power is much more than just military force; it should be seen as something that you have and that the other side needs.

Equality in power is not an objective fact, but a matter of perceptions. Interesting in this respect is Netanyahu’s election campaign in which he sought support from the Israelis, using the slogan that "we want to negotiate from a position of strength." His attempts to gain support were successful because the general perception at the time was that Labor was negotiating from a position of weakness. There was a mirror of perceptions in both societies; the Palestinian opponents to the peace process also rejected the process because they considered the Palestinians to be in a position of weakness.

The second round of discussion centered around the figure of Netanyahu and the strength or weakness of the Palestinians. Most participants still felt that the Israelis effectively had the power and, therefore, Netanyahu was talking from a position of strength and would always be talking from a position of strength: even under Peres and Labor, no real effort to achieve peace had been made. On the other hand, it was mentioned that only two months after his election victory, Netanyahu had been obliged to meet Arafat, whom he had never previously acknowledged. This shows the force of reality.

Again, the effects of the Intifada on the position of the Palestinians were discussed. It was said that the Intifada had not strengthened the PLO, but only Hamas. It was remarked that through the negotiations, the Palestinians had become stronger: they had been globally recognized, while their identity had been acknowledged. Israel, on its part, had been forced to admit that the occupation could not continue. Moreover, the PLO had gained recognition as the official representative of the Palestinian people.

The discussion was interrupted to re-think the basic notions of strength and weakness, about which, it appeared, nobody was clear. It was decided that one of the major problems is that power is not clearly defined, being a social phenomenon that involves much more than military might. The peace process itself was described as a king of "social power," from which people cannot escape. As mentioned earlier, Oslo closed the circle of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing the problem back to the communal relationship and the question of coexistence. It was perceived by the Palestinians the same way as by the Israeli right-wing, i.e., as the starting point of a Palestinian state. What has been achieved through the Oslo process is that the Palestinians have been acknowledged as partners. Oslo is the reason why, now, three to four years later, there is an Israeli debate about a Palestinian state. These are social processes that evolved as a result of the negotiations. For the same reasons, Netanyahu had to talk to Arafat; he had to meet him. We are now in a phase of re-defining the relationship. It is these social dynamics that negotiations are all about.

Asymmetric Negotiations (II):
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in the Gulf
Ailie Saunders, Head of the Middle East Program, RUSI, London

Looking at the two main fields of international conflict in the Middle East during the last two decades, the Iran-Iraq and the Arab-Israeli problem, we can find important parallels. Both conflicts are to some degree about the definition of borders and the repercussions of the projection of power; they both involve major asymmetries between the conflicting parties. As Joel Peters has covered this aspect for the Arab-Israeli conflict, I now want to speak about the asymmetries in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

One can say that in the Gulf region, an inversion in the balance of power between the major adversaries took place in the period from the first to the second Gulf War. Iran and Iraq have been, over the past 17 years, inherently asymmetric in terms of their regional standing and power. Iran started off, at least on paper, as the stronger of the two countries; it later became the weaker, mainly because of its isolation. At the beginning of the first Gulf War, Iran had a population of 50 million and was heavily equipped with US military machinery, whereas Iraq had only a much smaller population of 15 million and little arms. This was because the Iranian revolution had spread fear throughout the Gulf, which had a negative impact on the traditional cultural conflict between the Sunni and Shiite communities; the Iraqis were able to use this fact in their propaganda, which enabled them to gather support in the form of arms supplies, financial, technical, and logistical assistance via, and from, the smaller Gulf states and members of the international community. The balance of power, therefore, shifted in its favor. Iran was not totally isolated, but its supporters, for example, Syria and arms suppliers such as China and North Korea, were neither neighbors nor the kind of allies that would easily extend the sort of economic assistance Iran needed (and which Iraq already received). But Iran also had a policy of maintaining its economic independence, by strictly limiting its borrowing from abroad.

Iran was later defeated as a result of its economic isolation and attacks on its oil infrastructure, which made it difficult to export its oil. Ayatollah Khomeini, as a charismatic, uniting figure, was able to draw wide support from among the Iranian population, as well as from among the masses abroad, in declaring the Iran-Iraq war a war against the US and capitalism and imperialism as such. At the same time, Iran was able to manage its affairs in a way that decreased its dependence on any external partner. It did this, for example, by adapting budget costs to the level of oil revenues and by exchanging oil for military goods from Syria, the Soviet Union and China. But in the end, this could not compensate for the effects of the devastation to its oil industry.

The problem that led to the Iran-Iraq War was essentially a territorial dispute over the Shat Al-Arab, the waterway that lies on the border between the two countries. A temporary resolution of the dispute was found in the Algiers Agreement of 1975. But this was abrogated by Saddam Hussein, which prompted a prolonged period of tension between Iraq and the new revolutionary regime in Iran, until Hussein launched a major attack across the border into Iran itself. After Iraq’s initial attack, the war developed - in the years 1982-4 - into Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil platforms and a stalemated trench warfare. This escalated into the use of Scud missiles by both sides in what became known as the war of the cities; meanwhile the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was cut off. In 1986, the war was deadlocked and Iran decided to invest many more lives in human wave attacks against Iraq. The same year, the drop in oil prices, which resulted from the Saudis’ expansion of their oil production and exports, had a devastating effect on Iran, which could not expand its oil exports because of Iraqi attacks and the destruction of much of its oil industry.

Iran, which was becoming increasingly weak, tried to minimize some of its asymmetry with Iraq by developing its relations with the superpowers and playing one off against the other, though not always consistently or successfully. For the US, Iran’s strategic location between Russia and the Gulf gave it an important geopolitical significance. With the revolution, however, the US lost its ally in the Middle East. In 1984/85, as a result of Iranian policies, the relationship between the two countries took on a new twist, with the US becoming more actively involved in its support for Iraq. The American hostage crisis, Iranian involvement in terrorism, the Lebanese Civil War and the Iran-Contra affair all contributed to Iran being seen as an aggressive force by the US, which as a result started to support Iraq more actively. By contrast, at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s ideological stance was against the Soviet Union and Communism. Iran supported the Afghan rebels in their struggle, but meanwhile accepted Russian army supplies. So it compromised on its ideological stance in order to gain access to military equipment that would help it in the war. But Soviet concern regarding the repercussions of the Iranian revolution for its own people led it to supply Scud missiles to the Iraqis from 1982. When the war was deadlocked, Iran approached the Russians for military equipment, but was unable to secure the kind of contracts it wanted and received little economic support. In 1987, with its position in the war worsening, Iran made a more conciliatory approach towards the Soviet Union, decreasing both its aid to the Afghan rebels and its rhetoric. As a result, it was able to achieve greater Soviet support of its case in the UN Security Council.

Iran effectively adopted a policy of successfully playing off one superpower against the other. Besides the ideological differences between Iran and both powers, it has been able to secure US as well as Soviet Union support by avoiding direct confrontation with either one and by generating power from their rivalry in the region.

Today, the US and Russia are no longer the main rivals in the region. Instead, Iran and Iraq have managed to play a similar game in their policies towards the US and the Europeans in the Gulf in reaction to the policies of containment. Yet to resolve their differences with each other, they will continue to play off the US against the Europeans in order to gain support for their respective causes, as a way of dealing with the asymmetry, which is less, now, with each other, than with the US and the international community.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Since Oslo
Roundtable Discussion Moderated by Dr. Joel Peters

This session was a roundtable discussion centering around the subject of negotiations in general, the problem of secret negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian context, and the current state of the peace process.

After applying the theoretic concepts of pre-negotiations and ripeness to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the discussion quickly developed around topics of day-to-day politics, such as King Hussein’s letter to Netanyahu concerning Israel’s settlement policy, and its intentions and importance for the Palestinians and the larger Arab public. Another subject was the ambiguity of the US policy towards settlement activity, as indicated by the veto against the Security Council resolution on this issue, on the one hand, and the American will to participate in the meeting in Gaza on the other. [The meeting was called for by Arafat in mid-March to enable him to explain his position on the Israeli settlement policy and to search for a common stand with representatives of the EU and other states.]

Some of the participants felt that the recent situation in the region had nothing to with what they had learned about conflict resolution. They were encouraged, however, to look at the processes, not the results: the day-to-day events on the Palestinian-Israeli scene were viewed as a living database that exemplified all the different concepts of conflict resolution and diplomacy.

The discussion then came back to the question of secret negotiations. To the participants, it seemed obvious that another Oslo channel was needed to allow progress to be made in the negotiations, but it was also mentioned that if the Oslo accords had been arrived at openly, they could have been discussed much more in public; moreover, grave mistakes might have been prevented. It was doubted that it would now be acceptable, during such secret negotiations, for the academics involved to hide their activities from the government and for government officials to hide their activities from the public.

Dr. Joel Peters elaborated on the notion of secrecy: After World War I, Wilson proclaimed in his ‘Fourteen Points’ that agreements between states should be "open agreements arrived at openly." His belief resulted from the bad image that secret diplomacy had at that time - think of the consequences of the Balfour Declaration or the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He later realized, however, that the important fact was that the agreements - and not so much the process of arriving at them - be open ("open agreements arrived at secretly"). His realization corresponded with the idea, published by de Tocqueville in the 17th century, that "democracies do not do diplomacy well."

Thus, today, we are back to secret negotiations and open results. The problem with this is that we do not know what might be going on at this moment in talks between Israel and the Arab states. The example was given of Nixon’s breakthrough with China, which was only possible without the prior knowledge of the US Congress. Likewise, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process at the end of the 70’s, including Sadat’s famous speech during which he said that he would go even to Jerusalem in the search for peace, had been preceded by a series of secret meetings between the two sides in Romania and other places.

Somebody asked about the pre-negotiation period. In respect to the Oslo Accords, what had been known all the time was that there were meetings between Israelis and Palestinians on an academic level where ideas were exchanged. Contacts had been going on for years on an unofficial, but open level. In summer 1993, there were five back-channels functioning. The interesting question is the one as to why this back-channel delivered whilst the others did not. One factor was the role, or rather the absence, of the media. Due to the absence of the media, Oslo provided the teams with space to work problems out. The negotiations did not become just another theater providing good pictures and dramatic scenes for the media, as was the case in Washington. Such ‘track II’ diplomacy provides an enormous advantage in allowing negotiators to use this space to speak to each other frankly without regard to publicity and political statements to the public.

Another point that I want to make here about diplomacy concerns the perceptual environment of international relations. Diplomacy involves communication between states, which means speaking to each other, but it also means non-verbal communication. The problem Jordan has at the moment, for example, is one of perception. Dore Gold had gone to Jordan two days before the tunnel in Jerusalem was opened, which made it seem as if Jordan knew about the opening in advance. When Netanyahu came back from Amman, he ordered that the building at Jabal Abu Ghneim should commence. The Jordanians were furious because again, it looked as if they had known in advance. Thus, in the letter that King Hussein sent to Netanyahu he was actually not talking to the Israeli Prime Minister; it was a message to the Israeli public and to the US, in addition to the Arabs, that he was not involved in Netanyahu’s game.

The following discussion first centered around the question of who makes diplomacy, and the topic of ‘timing’. The participants did not believe that the opening of the tunnel and the commencement of building in Har Homa happened by accident after the visits to Jordan. These acts were considered part of Israel’s policy to rule and divide. It was recalled, however, that Netanyahu did not have an interest in undermining King Hussein’s position, as the Jordanian monarch was Israel’s only regional ally at the time. The timing had not been intended, but was a stupid mistake by Netanyahu.

Dr. Joel Peters again stressed the fundamental difference between Oslo and other examples of secret diplomacy: The importance of the meeting between Abu Ala’ and Uri Savir was that it was the first officially sanctioned meeting between the PLO and an Israeli official. There had been contacts before the aforementioned meeting, but the gap between the positions of the two sides was too wide. Therefore, there was a need for space to allow creativity to bridge these gaps. It is important to stress that academics and track II meetings do not, alone, lead to peace agreements, but this channel was accepted because it provided the necessary space for the politicians to find solutions.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Since Oslo:
New Approaches to Conflict – Multilaterals and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East
Dr. Joel Peters

Talking about the peace process, the multilateral negotiations are often forgotten because the media and the public concentrate on the much more spectacular bilateral talks involving high-ranking officials and heads of states. The multilateral talks involve five working groups, which deal with the following:

arms control;
the environment;
water;
refugees;
economic development.

They involve Israel, the Arab states, and the wider community, but not Libya, Iran, and Iraq. They have been boycotted by Syria and Lebanon, whose leaders have stressed that first, bilateral problems have to be settled and peace has to be made, and only then can normalization take place and the fruits of peace be harvested. In November 1996, the Palestinians boycotted the talks, excluding the group on refugees, to put pressure on the bilateral talks.

What is the concept of the multilateral talks? The idea is that, in a post Cold War environment, security and economic development have become new notions; they are beyond the capacity of the single state. The state is not an island: the idea of sovereignty has changed, and it is clear that security can be enhanced by regional cooperation. The idea of the multilaterals is one of ‘functional cooperation’: peace in the region will be maintained through the intertwining of the states. By creating regional structures from which all states profit, the stakes in upholding these structures become very high. The economic integration of the EU is a perfect example.

What has been achieved after five years of multilateral talks? First of all, it needs to be stressed that the situation is fundamentally different today to what it was five years ago: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is no longer the main moving factor of politics in the region. This does not mean, however, that the conflict is solved or that there might not be rising tension and violence in the transition period.

Secondly, the multilaterals have created a diplomatic space in which problems can be dealt with over a relatively long period of time. (One of the problems faced by the parties involved in this process is that everybody expects it to collapse soon, and therefore, they are under pressure to achieve results as quickly as possible.) The multilaterals offer a space for diplomatic debates and constructive, regional, long-term thinking, for agenda setting, for small steps towards a common decision-making process on a regional basis, and for the building of ‘patterns of dialogue’ through constant communication that can help to bridge contrary positions in crisis situations. The dialogue serves as a measure of confidence building.

An example of the success of the multilaterals was the proposal for the Middle East Development Bank in Summer 1995. This was a ‘regional idea’ coming out of the multilaterals that was presented by a joint delegation of Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians, and Jordanians in Europe. The multilaterals serve as an environment from which ideas such as this one can be fed back into the wider process.

In functional meetings, shared problems can be solved. Often this is done by bringing in experts. In many cases, politics disappear in the face of ‘technical’ problems, e.g., the oil spill in the Gulf of Aqaba that does not stop at the borders and can only be resolved jointly, or various water desalination projects. In these cases, a mechanism of communication and a broader regional framework can be established to solve such problems. Does this mean normalization? To a certain point, yes, because it involves the interaction of the Israelis with the other teams; it creates an atmosphere of continued interaction, and it brings the participants in such talks closer together. Hence, there is the possibility for new regional dynamics; this does not necessarily mean the implementation of the ‘New Middle East’ à la Peres, but there is an opportunity for a different, more peaceful, more integrated Middle East.

Question: What are the different roles of academics and government representatives in the multilaterals?

Answer: The multilaterals serve as a framework, a context to bring together technical experts. The multilateral talks on arms control, for example, have not been taking place on an official level for a long time, but they have been going on as academic conferences. It is hoped that some of the results will spill over to the governmental level. Another example is a conference that was held in London on Middle Eastern financial markets with the participation of experts and business people that have an impact on official thinking

Question: But what are the actual results of the multilaterals; what are their tangible outcomes?

Answer: The answer depends very much on your definition of ‘tangible outcomes’. I think the most important outcome has been the creation of a space for on-going consultations and long-term perspectives for shared problems in the region. The first material outcomes have included, among others, the agreement on an environmental code of conduct, the establishment of the REDWG secretariat in Amman, and a joint desalination project. Other projects just need more time to become implemented. One of the main problems is that you cannot push the outcomes of the multilaterals too far forward; they have to be feasible according to the current state of the bilateral relations. And then there are problems that have to be resolved in the multilaterals, the most obvious example being the refugee talks.

Question: The Palestinians froze their participation in the multilaterals. Israel does not seek a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. As long as this is so, normalization through the multilaterals should not proceed.

Answer: I think it was wrong to break up the multilaterals. I understand all the reasons for the Palestinian boycott of the talks - and the reason for it has to be sought in the Hebron context - but the result was not productive; the Palestinians were not even able to influence the Hebron negotiations through it. Yes, the core problem is political, but conflict resolution and the notion of security have been redefined in the post Cold War period. Security for a single state only can no longer be reached. The existence of forums for discussion, giving room to talk and think together, is important.

Question: I want to make a few comments: I think the Arab boycott was the Palestinians’ last available tool to exert pressure against Israel. Now, they are left alone while the conflict continues. The comparison with the relation between France and Germany does not make much sense because the starting positions of Israel and the Palestinians were so unequal. I think economics and politics cannot be separated, thus, we will not profit from these talks. First, the political problems have to be solved, and the nations that have been ignored for such a long time, like Palestine and Jordan, have to be developed. Last but not least, I want to ask you: where is the Middle East in the New World Order?

Negotiating Intractable Issues: Jerusalem
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Talking about Jerusalem, I want to focus on the following three points: the importance of the question of Jerusalem and its various dimensions, the different phases of negotiations concerning Jerusalem, and the question of where we are today in terms of negotiations.

Let me begin by summarizing the main issues that make the question of Jerusalem so important. The first issue is that the question of Jerusalem is a national one, embracing a land that is the homeland of a people whose basic national rights - namely freedom and self-determination - are being denied. For Palestinians, Jerusalem is the people’s capital, the people’s national address. So many Palestinians died in its defense in the face of so many conquerors, yet its protection remains their greatest national cause.

The second issue involves the question of sovereignty. There are many new interpretations of sovereignty, but in this instance, the actual state of sovereignty is related to the philosophy, context and outcomes of the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab sovereignty in the remainder of the Palestinian homeland must include the right to govern, to reside and to move freely in Jerusalem.

The third issue is the centrality of Jerusalem. The largest Palestinian city, Jerusalem is the center of all the important components of Palestinian daily life: culture, education, health-care, business and tourism. All cities, towns and villages are connected through the activities that take place in Jerusalem, the place in which both the geographic and demographic integrity of the Palestinian homeland are centralized; this, despite all Israeli attempts to ensure its isolation from the rest of the Palestinian Territories.

The fourth issue is that Jerusalem is an Arab Christian-Islamic city. It has a Christian identity embodied in the Christian faith, in Jesus and his life and in the Christian Holy Places. It also has an Islamic identity, embodied in Islamic ideology, in the fact that Jerusalem was the first qibla, the point to which Muslims direct themselves when in prayer, and the site of the famous nocturnal journey of the Prophet Mohammed, mentioned in the Holy Quran. Its Arab identity, meanwhile, is embodied in the Arab culture, heritage, buildings, Christian and Islamic Holy Places and the harmonious co-existence of Muslims and Christians, which goes back to the seventh century.

The fifth issue is the question of different intertwined symbolic dimensions. As a historical city, Jerusalem has many holy, political, central, national and geographical dimensions, and many different demographic constituencies with their different institutions. It belongs to all believers, all of whom need free access and the right to reside as citizens under a fair and just administration and democratic rule. And finally, it is a central issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One cannot simply separate these issues from each other.

Let us now look at the different phases of negotiations on Jerusalem. In order to understand the first phase, that lasted from 1967 to the early 1980’s, one should study carefully the minutes of the early meetings between the then Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan and Palestinian notables and mayors. The following is taken from a conversation that took place between Dayan and Palestinian advocate Aziz Shahadeh and Mayor of Nablus Hamdi Kana’an on April 16 1968:

In one of his questions, Dayan asked: "Do you, the Palestinians, with or without Jordan, want to conclude a separate peace with Israel, without committing yourselves to Egypt or Syria?" The second question was: "There will be no change in the status of Jerusalem. It is possible to solve the question of the Holy Places and religious institutions?"

The Palestinians replied: "We must not extend a hand to the Israelis unless we are willing to extend the other hand to the Arab states. If we became secessionists and separated from King Hussein with the Arab agreement, there would be no settlement and we would not gain anything." Other Palestinians added: "Without solving the Jerusalem issue in all its dimensions, instead of limiting it to the Holy Places or institutions, there will be no settlement."

During that phase, people in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the Jerusalemites, were waiting for a solution to come from outside. The ‘inside’ leadership that had emerged, made up of notables, members of the large and wealthy families, and the elected mayors, were reluctant to accept any responsibility for negotiations. This was not only because of their weak constituencies or because they represented only one third of the Palestinian people, or even because the PLO, the ‘outside’ leadership, would not allow them to hold independent meetings and negotiations with the Israelis; it was because, in this phase, the conflict was an Arab-Israeli one that was still in the very early stages of becoming Palestinized. No Palestinian leader, whether from the inside or outside, was prepared to consider separate negotiations with Israel without an Arab umbrella, nor to separate the question of Jerusalem from its context and limit it to the Holy Places and institutions.

The Israeli strategy from day one of the occupation was annexation, assimilation and the Judaization of Jerusalem. Israel’s strategy soon became clear in the official statements of the Israeli leaders, the Israeli Knesset’s decision to annex East Jerusalem and the Israeli policies and practices of confiscating land, building settlements, and moving Israeli people and institutions to the eastern part of the city that was occupied in 1967. The Western part had already been Judaized between 1948 and 1967, despite Palestinian property rights and the non-acceptance and non-recognition by all countries, including the US, of changes to the status of Jerusalem or Israeli attempts to have it as accepted as the capital of Israel.

During the Intifada, the status quo was changed, and a new civil society began to develop under a new generation of Palestinians, represented by local activists, professionals, and the unified leadership of the Intifada. The seat of authority of the Intifada evolved in Gaza, moved to Nablus, and then settled in Jerusalem - only after this last move was it finally recognized and approved of by all Palestinians.

It should be noted that although the Israelis had made several attempts to invite the outside leaders to enter a dialogue since as early as 1986, there had been little progress. The Intifada, however, brought a revolution in Palestinian minds: we realized that we had to fight for and negotiate on what remained, i.e., about 22% of Palestine. We realized that we had to accept a two-state solution arrived at through negotiations. Therefore, during the Intifada negotiations with Israelis were continuous.

For example, a Palestinian-Israeli meeting was scheduled to take place on 2 August 1990 at the Notre Dame Palace Hotel, with a view to signing a declaration that accepted the use of negotiations as a tool to reach coexistence. But on the same day, Iraq entered Kuwait and the two delegations went to the meeting place, not to sign the declaration, but to declare their new positions. The Israelis, on their part, went to declare ‘divorce’ as expressed clearly in an article in Ha’aretz by Yossi Sarid from Meretz: "I am going back to my sealed room. I don’t want to see, to hear, to talk. I am afraid." The Palestinians, meanwhile, went to tell everybody, "Yes, we are part of the Arab World, which is divided, and which reflects its division on us. Some of us are against the invasion, others would like to see Arab conciliation and interference in this conflict, while a third group supports Saddam, as is clear in the streets of Nablus and Gaza."

When the opportunity to go to Madrid arose, the local leadership convinced the PLO to send a delegation enveloping Haidar Abdul Shafi and Faisal Husseini. The negotiations revealed a new Palestinian face to the world and led to global acceptance of the PLO as a reliable partner. The local leadership, meanwhile, presented the plan for PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority). Then, the negotiations in Washington began. They were a nightmare for the PLO, because it was unable to control them directly. Thus, it opened five secret channels in different locations and with different intermediaries to conduct negotiations with the Israelis, accepting among others the setting offered by Terje Larson. The position of the Palestinians at that time was to demand a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital, but the Israelis convinced them to talk about things that both parties could actually deliver. In spite of the ongoing conflict, we were able to reach a stage of mutual recognition and to finally accept each other as a partner in the peace process.

Now, what about Jerusalem in the negotiations? What can, and what cannot, be sacrificed? On which issues is it possible to compromise? In 1948, Jerusalem was divided and West Jerusalem became under Israeli control. In 1967, East Jerusalem also found itself under Israeli rule when it was occupied by Israel. It is clear, today, that by postponing the issue of Jerusalem to the end of the current negotiations, there will remain nothing to discuss. But I now want to present the different scenarios for Jerusalem, envisioned by the various sides, and the different dimensions involved.

At the moment, there are three main scenarios for Jerusalem: a closed, a divided or an open city. Among both Palestinians and Israelis, there exists a preference for an open city, a physically undivided city for two peoples and three faiths. But I want to stress that there is still no agreement on anything, and the road between the discussion of ideas and scenarios and reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable solution promises to be a long and laborious one.

Peres, for example, envisioned a Jerusalem with the three major dimensions of religion, politics and civil affairs, with the first providing for the governing of the holy sites by the religious leaders, the second for Jerusalem being the Israeli capital, and the third for having two separate municipalities in the city. The Abu Mazen-Beilin document, as a second example, provides for the expansion, renaming and sharing of the city.

What are the dimensions that have to be taken into consideration when talking about a solution for Jerusalem? What kind of goods are on the table, waiting to be negotiated upon?

The geographic and demographic component: Before the War of 1967, West Jerusalem covered an area of 53 km² and had 195,000 inhabitants, while East Jerusalem covered 6 km² and had 75,000 inhabitants. When Israel seized all of Jerusalem in 1967, and subsequently announced the ‘unification’ of the city, a modern myth was born; in fact, Jerusalem has been forcibly turned into a Jewish city through the illegal Judaization of Arab East Jerusalem. As of today, 28 settlements and neighborhoods have been added to the city. There are 330,000 Israelis in West Jerusalem and 150,000 Jewish settlers in the eastern side. Some 160,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem, with an additional 50,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites residing in the suburbs of Jerusalem, having been driven outside the city’s boundaries.

The Israeli authorities have proceeded with their de-population policy in a series of waves. The 1968 Master Plan for Jerusalem envisioned expansion in three phases: the first phase was the construction of buildings on former no-man’s-land, to eliminate the physical barriers that marked the two parts of the city; the second phase was to divide and encircle the immediate periphery, mainly neighboring Arab villages, with Jewish settlements; while the third phase was the building of a belt of outlying settlements in order to secure control over ‘Greater Jerusalem’. Over the years, 34% of East Jerusalem has been expropriated, while 56% has been designated ‘green land’, which is effectively the same as confiscation, meaning that all that is left today for the Palestinians is 14%. Israeli policies succeeded in bringing the population ratio to the level of 72% Jews to 28% Palestinians.

The national and political component: Historically, Jerusalem has been part of Palestine, and Palestinian heritage is deeply rooted in the city. Jerusalem is related to the land and people of Palestine, and to their Muslim-Christian beliefs and holy places. Jerusalem is of great importance to all Palestinians, not only as a holy city but also as the political, geographic, economic and cultural center of Palestine. It is the capital of the Palestinian people; it is the symbol of Palestinian national identity and of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Its Arab roots go back 5,000 years to the time when the city of Arab Yabous (Jerusalem) was founded. Jerusalem is thus identified with Arab culture, heritage, architecture and significant monuments, and there is an agreement on the urgent need and duty to preserve these sites, as well as Jerusalem as a historic city. Against the background of centuries of Muslim rule and the uninterrupted Arab presence in the city, no one can justify the policies and practices of 27 years of Israeli occupation and ignore almost 1,400 years of Arab Muslim-Christian rule.

The religious component: The religious claims of the three monotheistic religions to Jerusalem are each unique, with their own special attributes and form of attachment to different places in the city. Jerusalem’s holiness complicates any attempt to solve the Jerusalem question and is often used or manipulated to attain non-religious goals. Yet, the meaning of religious attachment to the city was and remains a major concern. As well as its Jewish heritage, Jerusalem is a city of Arab, Islamic and Christian heritage. Its Islamic identity derives from the fact that it was the site of Prophet Mohammed’s nocturnal journey, Isra’ and Mi’raj, the original qibla for Muslims, and the site of Islam’s third holiest shrine, Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Ummayad Caliph Mu’awiyah linked his own personal identity with Jerusalem, calling himself Caliph of Beit Al-Maqdis. Thus, it is part of the Islamic faith. It is also the site of the Holy Sepulcher, other important churches, and the Mount of Olives.

Limiting the problem to the holy sites is not appropriate; the right to live and to practice one’s religion in the city must be guaranteed. This is what an open city must provide for. We have all learned from the experience of sharing religious sites, such as the Abraham Mosque in Hebron; exclusivity, however, is also not an answer. We need to understand the other’s religion in order to be able to reach an agreement. Religion has to be seen in the context of the land, the people and their rights.

The Legal Component: Since the implementation of the article contained in the 1948 Partition Plan (UN Resolution 181) on the question of Jerusalem was suspended, the nature, limits and scope of international, regional and local legislation and administrative by-laws that govern the city have been determined by the creation of facts on the grounds by the occupier. Today, the struggle over Jerusalem is still basically a struggle over property and who controls it.

There is no legitimacy or license under international law or international resolutions passed since the beginning of the century, including UN Resolutions 242 and 338, that allows Israel to take over Arab land in Occupied Arab East Jerusalem. International law prohibits the annexation of territory by force. East Jerusalem is regarded as occupied territory and Israel’s activities in this part of the city (such as settlement construction, Israeli population transfer and annexation) are considered illegal and null and void. Moreover, certain articles of UN Resolution 194 relating to compensation and the right of return are still being twisted by Israel in regard to Arab properties in West Jerusalem that were confiscated by Israel in 1948. In the course of the War of 1948, some 64,000-80,000 Palestinians were forcibly driven out of West Jerusalem and its immediate vicinity and all the property left behind was declared ‘absentee property’. It should be noted that immediately prior to the war, 40% of property in West Jerusalem belonged to Palestinians and 34% to the Waqf, churches and government of Palestine, while a mere 26% belonged to Jews.

Security and equality: The security concerns of both sides must be recognized. This does not just mean military security. I am talking about the need for mutual recognition and the sharing of responsibilities. There should not be exclusive access for one people at the expense of the other. But, the question of equality should be seen as a general principle rather than in every detail; equality can, in many cases, be reached through reconciliation and by widespread acceptance of the principle that people are equal under one law. Welfare and social services have to be supplied according to equal principles. And, most importantly, there should be equal residence and citizen rights.

Institutions: When, in the course of the June War of 1967, Jerusalem was occupied in its entirety by Israeli forces, many of its Arab inhabitants were evicted and their property seized or demolished. When East Jerusalem was annexed and subjected to Israeli law, Palestinians refused to accept Israeli sovereignty over the city, choosing instead to resist by means such as stressing the illegitimacy of the occupation, refusing to join the West Jerusalem municipality and trying to preserve the Arab character of the city. The chapters of Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem can be traced back to the very beginning of its occupation in June 1967 when Sheikh Abdul Hamid Al-Sayeh, the Chief Judge of the Sharia Court of Appeal (Jerusalem), issued an Islamic fatwa that clearly supported the refusal of the Moslem community to be governed by Jewish/Israeli law.

This resulted in the preservation of Palestinian commercial and other major institutions, including the Arab Electricity Company. Although the Arab municipality in Arab Jerusalem had been dissolved and closed, its premises having been forcibly seized by the Israelis, while the control of public services had been taken over by the Israeli municipality in West Jerusalem, Arab neighborhoods continued to exist as separate communities and the Palestinians refused to become Israeli citizens, thereby boycotting municipal elections. The Palestinians succeeded in maintaining key institutions such as medical centers and hospitals, the Sharia courts, societies, tourist offices, intra-city transportation networks, as well as centers and forums providing scientific, cultural and educational research, information and services.

Jerusalem is not united, it is occupied, and the borders between both parts of the city have not disappeared; the physical borders of the past have merely been replaced by the psychological, invisible borders of the present. Meanwhile, the presence of settlers who seek to de-stabilize existing Palestinian society from within has introduced an insidious new threat. Palestinian security needs can only be met by putting an end to the Israeli occupation and by recognizing and guaranteeing Palestinian self-determination and the right to self-defense against external aggression or internal subversion.

Settlements: There is a need for an immediate end to all settlement activity and confiscation of land in Jerusalem. The question of settlement is not limited to Jerusalem; it covers all the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Nowadays, 13 settlements surround Jerusalem and isolate it from the rest of the of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. When the final status talks deal with the question of settlements, they should include those 13 settlements as well as they are undoubtedly illegal and a major obstacle in the path of peace.

Economy: The economic damage inflicted upon the Palestinians under occupation needs to be rectified. Jerusalem’s economy is part of the economy of Palestinian society; it enjoys, however, special advantages due to the city’s status as a center of tourism and pilgrimage. Jerusalem could become the economic center of Palestine once the closure is lifted.

The problem of Jerusalem will not be solved unless the rights of both peoples, Israeli and Palestinian, are recognized, and the occupation of East Jerusalem comes to an end. The collective rights of only one population, the Israelis, are illegitimate. The authority that currently rules the entire city is also illegitimate. This has to be acknowledged by replacing the current system with a new one, based on sharing the city: what is needed is the establishment of two capitals, two sovereignties, and two municipalities, allowing both peoples to live independently next to each other in an open and free city: ‘Separate and share!’ Both Israelis and Palestinians must be allowed to run their own affairs independently, to function independently, to make their decisions independently, and to take responsibility for their respective societies’ daily life and concerns. This is the key to coexistence. On this basis, we then can cooperate and coordinate on issues with which we are both concerned, such as water and electricity. It must be possible for me, as a Palestinian, to address my own authority on any matter and turn to my own elected Palestinian leadership. I am a Palestinian citizen in Palestinian Jerusalem governed and guided by Palestinian policies, laws and by-laws. To achieve this aim and to end hostilities, military occupation and confrontation in the Holy City, peace has to be given a chance, starting with mutual recognition of each other and the rights of both peoples. We should not postpone this crucial issue any longer. Let us start living together, separate but equal, in our city of Jerusalem; let us, together, share its goods, preserve its holy places and historical monuments, and develop the city’s economy. Let us work together for a better future!

Arab-Israeli Negotiations (I): Israel and Egypt (Camp David)
HE Ahmad Kamal, Diplomat, Egyptian Embassy, Tel Aviv

In talking about the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and the Camp David Agreement, I want to begin with the question of why and how it all begun. I then want to talk about the following points: the nature of the peace between Egypt and Israel, the peace treaty and the Palestinians, the Syrian position and the fruits of peace for Egypt.

When analyzing the peace negotiations and the treaty between Egypt and Israel, we should start by discussing the motives that the Egyptians had in launching the negotiations with the Israelis. These motives were mainly of an economic nature: the Egyptian economy was going through a very difficult period, especially in the late 1970’s. The Egyptian people, at that time, had to struggle very hard to make ends meet, and even bread was in short supply. This triggered the search for peace, at a time when the Israelis were ready to discuss a peace treaty. Camp David has been widely criticized but there is one fact - and this is my own personal opinion - that we should not forget: with Camp David, we gained our land back. All the rest is just ink on paper.

After Camp David, Egypt initiated a long-term national project to develop the Sinai Peninsula in all its aspects, from agriculture and water resources management to irrigation and sewage systems. In the frame of this project, that is supposed to come to completion in the year 2017, about 300,000 acres of land should be made available for farming, while about five million Egyptians will hopefully be relocated to the Sinai peninsula. This project will lead to the development of a totally autarkic area in the Northern Sinai that exports its products to other parts of Egypt and possibly to the world. The Southern Sinai, on the other hand, has a high tourist potential. At the moment, studies are being carried in regard to mining projects in this area. What I want to say is that we came out of Camp David with a new wheat basket for Egypt. The development plans for the Sinai Peninsula are in total accordance with Egyptian traditions. The Egyptians like to live and work in their own country. They went to work in the Gulf countries, but decided to come back to work in Egypt, even for lower wages. With Camp David, the whole Sinai came back under Egyptian control, even though it had to stay demilitarized.

As I said, the economic motives were the main reasons for the Egyptians to engage in the Camp David negotiations. Egypt, at that time, had to struggle with a high debt burden, and its infrastructure was very weak. Until 1981, only about 2% of the national income was spent on infrastructure. (From 1981 until today, about 180 million Egyptian Pounds have been spent on infrastructure.) The confrontation with Israel was costly: the military budget used up a large proportion of the national income, especially as relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating and the US could dictate arms prices. Peace seemed the only way to get rid of this burden - which does not mean that we did not seek a real peace.

We were able to reach the stage of negotiating a peace agreement following mediation efforts from various regional players, e.g., Morocco. Some of the preliminary negotiations were taking place in secret under the patronage of King Hassan of Morocco. But the breakthrough occurred after American mediation; former US President Carter was the first American president to launch a peace initiative in the Middle East. The real breaking point was Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.

By the way, I want to tell you that the Camp David negotiations really complicated the position of the Syrians and the Palestinians in their subsequent negotiations with the Israelis, due to the fact that the Israelis were able to profit from their negotiation experience with the Egyptians. When speaking of Areas A, B and C under Camp David, we speak of areas that are completely different, in many respects, to Areas A, B and C under Oslo. Area C in the Sinai, for example, is under the complete sovereignty of the Egyptians, but demilitarized; Area C in the Palestinian Territories, in contrast, is under Israel’s complete control.

What, now, is the content of the peace treaty? [Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, 26 March 1979].

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, [...]. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

[...]

Now, what has been achieved and what has not? It is obvious that normalization has not taken place. We signed the peace treaty in 1979, but we were not as keen on normalization as other Arab states are today. Israeli politicians say that there is no real peace with Egypt, and that the Egyptians took back their land while laughing at the Israelis, because they got what they wanted whereas the latter did not. We Egyptians have our own point of view about normalization at this time. Some people support the dialogue with Israeli intellectuals and academics. Others say that until the Palestinian people secure at least their basic rights, we cannot start a normalization process with Israel. There is no living peace: for example, there is almost no trade between Israel and Egypt. There was an Israeli project to import gas from Qatar, but the project was stopped when Ariel Sharon became minister of infrastructure. Economically speaking, it would make far more sense for Israel to import gas from Egypt, and I think that we will, eventually, be approached again in relation to this project. We have the gas, but we are not selling it. We could, however, sell it to another country, for example, Turkey.

Question: Was Israel’s desire to guarantee its share, in the form of a joint project, the reason why Egypt was not able to sell the gas to the PNA?

Answer: No, we make a clear distinction between our relations with the PNA and those with Israel. It is a matter of identity. We can sell our gas to the Palestinians as we please. We do not interfere with Israeli trade relations with other countries; it is, therefore, quite logical that Israel cannot dictate how and what we sell to the PNA or the shape of our relations.

Now, let me come back to the peace treaty. Egypt regained the Sinai, and I have already talked about the development project that followed. The fourth article of the treaty provides for the Sinai being divided into three areas, A, B, and C, with different arrangements concerning security and a military presence, as well as for a demilitarized strip inside Israel.

Question: But this is not control over the Sinai!

Answer: Yes, it is; Egypt has sovereignty over the Sinai. It is not military control that defines sovereignty. Look, for example, at Japan, at how it has prospered and its current standing in the world, even though it was demilitarized after World War II.

Egypt, now, is going through a process of transformation. This has only been possible on the basis of peace. Everything is being reconstructed in the most up-to-date manner: the telephone system, the sewage system, etc. Currently there is an underground system being built in Cairo for the six million people that commute to the city each day. New cities have been built, and Egypt is one of the world’s leading tourist destinations. Moreover, according to the statistics of the World Bank and the IMF, it has a high economic potential. Some 70 billion Egyptian Pounds are being spent on development projects all over Egypt.

Question: But it seems that the Egyptian citizens have not really profited from all this.

Answer: We are talking about 60 million people, so I think it will take a while for the benefits to trickle down. We depend on peace to further reduce our military spending. If we are able to redirect these funds to other areas, it will make things much better for the Egyptian people.

In the peace negotiations, we have not neglected the Palestinian cause. Have a look at what is mentioned in the Camp David Agreement: total autonomy for the Palestinians in the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem as an integrated part of the Arab occupied territories, thus being subject to all forthcoming agreements on the Palestinian Territories. If Egypt had been supported by the other Arab states during the negotiations at Camp David, the results, of course, would have been much better. But the division in the Arab World at that time was as bad as the one after the Second Gulf War. If we had not gone to Camp David in the 70’s, we would now be discussing the terms of withdrawal from the Sinai. If the Arab World had joined Camp David, then the whole story, including the present situation on the Golan Heights, would have been much different.

Question: But I think that at that time the Palestinian people were not ready for peace with Israel. We all had this belief in Pan-Arabism and armed struggle was a part of the Arab mentality. Superpower support, meanwhile, was divided between the Arabs and Israel. There was no shift towards peace with Israel.

Answer: The real question, therefore, is not whether Egypt should or should not have gone to the peace talks, rather if it could have coordinated with the rest of the Arab World in order to strengthen its position.

Let me compare the situation of the Golan and the Sinai. The Sinai covers an area of approximately 61,000 km², whereas the territory of the Golan is only about 1,800 km². The Sinai can be seen as a buffer zone: it has a strategic depth that is further underlined by the water barrier of the Suez Canal. The Sinai Peninsula has only three passages. The Southern Sinai is mountainous terrain, which does not allow for the passage of freight carriers or armored personnel carriers. Consequently, by merely controlling the three narrow passages of the Sinai, one can, in effect, assert control over the whole Sinai region. According to this point of view, the Sinai effectively serves as a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt.

The Golan Heights are a totally different issue. From the Heights, it is easy to control the Israeli terrain below. Any short-range artillery stationed on the Golan can easily hit Israeli targets, which is what most worries the Israelis. If you intended to threaten Israel with artillery from the Sinai, you would need long-range missiles in order to reach Israeli targets.

The second point is that it is much easier to reach the Golan Heights from the Syrian side than from the Israeli side. On the Golan, you also find the main water channels that flow into Lake Tiberias, which provide a crucial source of water for Israel. These are the points that dominate the Israeli view of the Golan issue. The Heights are perceived as ‘ruling’ the north of Israel and being easy to reach from the Syrian side; they are, after all, only 60 kilometers away from Damascus. In the Sinai, it would take a minimum of two days to mobilize and dispatch Egyptian forces to the peninsula. Therefore, the Sinai can function as a buffer zone, but the Golan Heights cannot.

Of course, the Syrians have their own point of view regarding this issue. Security arrangements, as were allowed for in the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, are not applicable on the Golan Heights. If the Syrian forces were to be stationed at a distance of 50 km from the Golan, they would find themselves right on the outskirts of Damascus! I am convinced that the Israelis will withdraw from the Golan Heights at some point, but Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot negotiate on all tracks at the same time. One Israeli told me: "If you want to know from where Israel is ready to withdraw and from where it is not, you should look at where the Israelis bury their dead." There is not a single person buried on the Golan Heights.

Question: What is your opinion about the differences between the methods employed by Israel to put pressure on Egypt and the Palestinian Authority during negotiations? You said that Israel learned a lot from the negotiations with the Egyptians. What can we, the Palestinians, learn from the Egyptians’ experience?

Answer: The Palestinian-Egyptian coordination is not just a shallow affair; it is really much more than that, and it has reached something like a real partnership. The reason for this is the fact that the relationship is not just based on agreements, but on an identity, as I have already explained. The Palestinians have suffered from the beginning of this century, therefore, the kind of pressure exerted upon them is incomparable to that exerted upon Egypt. The extent of the Israeli measures against the Palestinians is exemplified by the Israeli decision to start building a new settlement in Arab East Jerusalem (Jabal Abu Ghneim). Thus, you cannot compare the situation of the Palestinians with that of the Egyptians. We were always in a position whereby we could have stopped a process whenever we felt it to be necessary. The position of the Palestinian people is much weaker.

Question: Do you think that Sadat committed a big mistake when going for a separate peace without the Palestinians. Was he too self-assured?

Answer: This has not been a separate peace. And you have to see that the decision-making process in Egypt had passed through a lot of changes from the era of Abdul Nasser to that of Sadat. Abdul Nasser had a charismatic personality that can hardly be assessed according to today’s standards. Sadat had a vision, and he wanted to implement it, but he was not in a position to do so alone. The president nowadays is no longer a decision maker, but a ‘decision chooser’. He makes a choice among the different possibilities presented to him by his support system. So, Sadat did not take the decision on his own. But, in answer to your question, yes, he was too self-assured when it came to his opinion about Egypt’s standing in the Arab World.

Question: Was it this failure to assess the situation properly that led to his assassination? And, if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations had already begun at that time, do you think Sadat would be alive today?

Answer: I do not think that Camp David was the main cause of Sadat’s assassination. The era witnessed the rise of fundamentalist Islamic movements that interpreted Islam according to their needs. They were strongly opposed to the idea of peace with Israel, and they based their opposition on religious grounds. This psychological or religious barrier to peace with Israel remains until today amongst a large portion of the people.

Question: What is your evaluation of Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations? Do you negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians?

Answer: We do not negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians; we acknowledge that there is a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian negotiating team, and we negotiate on behalf of ourselves. During the early stages of the negotiations, there was a need for the Palestinians to consult with us to learn from our experience of negotiating with Israel. We are totally in support of Palestinian rights; we are against settlements, against the Judaization of Jerusalem, and against anything that might hinder the attainment of Palestinian rights. But our main interest is not in this region: it is, at the moment, in security and our border arrangements with Sudan and Libya, not to mention our domestic situation.

Question: It sometimes appears as if Egypt is governed by chaos. What were the tools used by the Egyptians in their negotiations with Israel?

Answer: It was simple for us because we were the largest Arab country confronting Israel. Egypt had participated in all the wars that had taken place in the region. Ours is a stable country that enjoys a high degree of homogeneity, with 90% of the population being Sunni Muslims and the remaining 10% Coptic Christians. The people are able to bear a lot. Egypt is a respected country with good relations with other Muslim countries. We are a state with many strong points, but, of course, there are weak points, too.

Question: What do we, the Palestinians, really have to give to the Israelis? What do we have to offer in a peace agreement?

Answer: I think we all over-estimate the Israelis; they need peace too, but they want it according to their design. The price of confrontation is very high, and they are no longer able to carry this economic burden. Israel wishes to become the Hong Kong of the region, but it realizes that economic development is dependent on the existence of peace.

Question: Can we say that Israel was looking for an ally in the region to be used as a key to economic access to the region? Were there any secret arrangements concerning this in the treaty?

Answer: There were no secret articles in the treaty. And, supposing that there were, I do not think that they would have remained secret for 17 years. No, there are no secret arrangements, but there are a lot of problems and different opinions.

Question: Egypt lost its leadership position in the Arab World as a result of Camp David, but it received compensation in the form of economic progress. What was Israel’s strategic goal in the negotiations with Egypt?

Answer: Israel’s main goal was to minimize security pressures. Israel had a real interest in peace and stability in the region, partly because it wanted to go ahead with its policy of internal economic reforms, which required both stability and resources.

Question: What can Egypt do to exert pressure upon Israel? Is there something that Egypt can use but has not used until now?

Answer: There is no doubt that Egypt has the means to assert pressure on Israel. A simple evaluation of the Israeli-Egyptian relations would show the Israelis that there is discontent on the Egyptian side. The Egyptians, as a result of this discontent, are reluctant to establish further relations with the Israelis.

Question: Why were the Palestinians not invited to Camp David?

Answer: I understand that the feelings of the Palestinians were hurt. The PLO, at that time, was considered a terrorist organization. Perhaps Sadat also feared that including the PLO in the talks would lead to difficulties. Therefore, the PLO was not officially invited to take part in the negotiations, but Edward Sa’id and Ibrahim Abu Lughod, who were members of the PNC at the time, served as advisors.

The ideological self-image of Syria has evolved over time. Twenty-five years ago, Syria’s approach to politics was much more nationalist than it is today. Now, the notion of a Greater Syria, which was the underlying objective shaping Syria’s politics, is weaker but not totally absent. It affects the relations with the Palestinians, not least of all because it is contradictory to the Palestinian nationalism represented by the PLO. In the Syrian view, the PLO should be under Syrian control and Palestinian nationalism should merely be a part of regional nationalism. This attitude does not simply spring out of a romantic Pan-Arab vision; it is also a consequence of the real effects of Palestinian and regional politics on the Syrian situation and on Syrian politics. Syria perceives itself as the patron of Arab nationalism, its only true proponent since Abdul Nasser - the core nationalist country. This self-image as the leader of the Pan-Arab movement is recognized by most other Arab states.

Internationally, Syria is keen on not being singled out as the region’s saboteur state. It plays a role as a host for opposition groups and maintains control over the situation in South Lebanon, but engages, on the other hand, in negotiations and even joint actions with the US (as in the Second Gulf War). Due to its strategic importance and stand in the Arab World, Syria has a considerable margin of maneuverability. It can get away with behavior that other states dislike and is even treated with respect by the US and the EU, despite being regarded as a state that promotes terrorism.

Regionally, Syria has good relations with many countries, including Iran. It is able to use these relations to its advantage, for example, in order to consolidate its own standing vis-à-vis Israel or Iraq, or with regard to its domestic Islamic opposition, because such relations are depicted as proof of the government being a good Arab, Muslim regime. But the regional balance is delicate.

The internal Syrian situation is the most important determinant of its foreign policies; it is also the most delicate subject, and it is not easy to determine the extent to which it affects foreign policy decisions. President Asad is part of a minority group, the Alawites; they enjoy a privileged position, but this is likely to decline with the end of Asad’s reign. The most acute problem at the moment is the question of succession. Connected with the privileges enjoyed by the Alawites is the unfair division of resources among the country’s population segments. There has been a change in the demographic structure with a rise in the Alawite presence in Damascus, but its impact is not yet clear. With regard to the economy, there is a careful and limited process of privatization, but this is revealing many difficulties related to corruption and its effect on the centers of power.

Let me now come to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. How do the aforementioned factors influence the relations with Israel? Is it true that the Golan is the last of Syria’s concerns as some Israeli circles say? Does Syria need to fix its problems of succession and the internal political situation first, before being able to embark on further negotiations with Israel?

What are the critical outstanding issues that the two countries need to resolve, and which side has the greater interest in finding solutions?

Syria has a strong interest in Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights - which has become an even more complicated issue since Netanyahu assumed power. Under Labor, an agreement on the Golan had been negotiated and was almost ready for signing, but the new government wants to negotiate all over again. This issue also involves the scope of the envisioned withdrawal. The Golan, for Syria, is a matter of pride and nationalism. Asad, as the self-proclaimed leader of Pan-Arabism and as the one who always attacked Sadat for surrendering cannot compromise on the basic issue of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, although he might be able to compromise on certain details. What are the other issues related to this? First of all, there is a need for security arrangements for the post-withdrawal period. Israel has an interest in arrangements that are not dependent on the continuation of the current Syrian regime; it wishes to protect its interests, even in the event of a new government and the civil strife that could result from the succession process. Thus, there is a need for demilitarized zones beyond the Golan Heights themselves; the question to be negotiated is if they should be designated equally or proportionally. This also involves the question of the quantity and quality of armament allowed in the area.

Other important topics for the Israelis are the Syrian-Iranian alliance entailing the support for ‘terrorist’ groups in Lebanon, as well as the Israeli interest in maintaining its nuclear monopoly in the region; the arrangements in Lebanon concerning the nature and the size of the Syrian presence and its future role in the country; and the Syrian attitude towards Palestinian opposition groups in Syria - such as the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

For both countries, the water question is a critical one that needs to be discussed.

The normalization of relations that Israel insists should follow a peace agreement will be difficult for Asad to accept, but in the event of an Israeli withdrawal and a fair agreement, gradual normalization will be possible. Even if the government does not control or block the normalization process, there is no reason for the Syrian regime to fear that it will proceed too quickly, as they believe it did with regard to Egypt and Jordan.

Syria up until now refuses to participate in multilateral negotiations or regional conferences concerning issues relating to the refugees, the environment, etc., because it first wants to settle the basic issues through bilateral negotiations. The multilaterals, however, are not meaningful without Syria’s participation.

Another issue Israel is interested in is the situation and future of the Jews left in Syria.

It is clear that neither of the two parties is in a hurry to continue with negotiations. Israel is far more interested in preserving the status quo concerning the Golan Heights or in changing the balance of power in its favor. This is clearly apparent in the Israeli proposals of a one-sided withdrawal or a ‘Lebanon first’ option, which cannot be taken seriously. Time will work in favor of Israel as Syria’s power appears destined to decline.

There is, however, a relation between the different ‘tracks’. When the Syrian track deteriorates, it has a negative influence on the Jordanian and Palestinian track. Hence, Syria’s power is in its ability to cause problems in Lebanon and to disrupt the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian relations. Syria has a ‘power to sabotage’. Israel is much stronger in everything concerning weaponry, but Syria has been able, through Asad’s careful brinkmanship, to create a kind of parity and deterrent by its power of sabotage and by securing Arab support of its position. None of the sides today really thinks of attacking the other, despite all the talk about war or preparations for war.

Question: You said that Syria has become less nationalist; now, who has become more nationalist in comparison?

Answer: No, you misunderstood. Syria has become less nationalist compared to its own stand earlier. The position it took, for example, during the Second Gulf War, was not a nationalist position.

Question: Why does Syria host Palestinian opposition groups?

Answer: They serve as a playing card for Syria in its relations with Israel. There is the possibility that these groups would have to leave the country if Syria signed a peace treaty with Israel; at the very least, they would not be able to continue with their political activities.

Question: What are Syria’s interests in the region?

Answer: Syria’s main interest at the moment is not to be forgotten or become isolated as this would weaken the Syrian position.

Question: How do you see the situation in Lebanon at the moment?

Answer: There exists a trade-off in Lebanon. The Lebanese, at the moment, accept an oppressive regime that provides them with security. The Syrians have not taken permission from the Lebanese; however, in Lebanon, there is no consensus that Syria should leave. Some people are interested in seeing a continued Syrian presence.

Question: What are the Syrian interests in Lebanon?

Answer: Syria has a strategic interest in Lebanon because of its problematic relations with Israel, and it considers Lebanon its backyard. It also has economic interests in Lebanon such as the work opportunities provided there for Syrian migrant workers.

Question: You said that Syria is seeking Arab unity. Is this so because Syria is weak?

Answer: No. Arab unity is not high on the Syrian agenda. Such talk is part of the political culture, of the flying discourse, of the propaganda to legitimize the system.

Question: What about the talk of war between Syria and Israel?

Answer: Such a war could be a tactical war to foster negotiations. But the situation is too sensitive; no one has an interest in a war at this time, as it could easily get out of control.

Question: How does Syria manage to have good relations with many countries, and even with countries that are enemies with one another?

Answer: This is because Syria has a central role in the region as it is strategically important to so many countries: Iran, the US, Palestinian groups, etc. Another reason for its good relations is the expertise of the Syrian leadership.

Question: How do you see the US role in the Syrian-Israeli peace process?

Answer: The US is pressuring Syria at the moment to return to the negotiation table, but Syria does not have to yield to American pressure.

Question: Is there hope for a quick Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation?

Answer: I would say, no. A rapprochement in this adverse situation can only be temporary, a tactical move.

Question: In this seminar, we have talked a lot about ripeness and the hurting stalemate that is needed to overcome deadlocks in negotiations. Where is the hurting stalemate on the Syrian-Israeli track or, how could it be induced?

Answer: A feeling of urgency would be needed, but neither side feels this at the present time. The Gulf War induced a US peace initiative, but the fact remains, that for the last 25 years, the status quo - a situation of stability - has continued to exist. There is no urgent necessity to move away from it. Maybe this will only change in the face of a disaster.

Question: What would be a scenario for future negotiations?

Answer: As I said, negotiations will only resume if there is a drastic deterioration in a certain field. An unexpected event could trigger a new situation conducive to negotiations. This could be in Palestine or in South Lebanon, for example.

Question: What about the domestic political situation in Syria - the assassination of Asad’s son a few years ago and the bus bombing last year? Isn’t it very tense at the moment and is this not going to reflect on the negotiations?

Answer: It has never been verified that Basil Asad was assassinated, but it is likely. And this, of course, weakens the Alawite dynasty in Syria. Concerning the bus bombing last year, nobody knows for sure who or what was responsible. There are three possibilities: Israel and its friends in Southern Lebanon as a reaction by proxy to guerrilla activities; Syrian Islamists, which I consider rather unlikely; or an internal power struggle. But it can be seen as a sign of a deteriorating internal situation. How this situation will affect the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, however, is not easy to determine.

Arab-Israeli Negotiations (III): Israel and Palestine
Oslo - the Conflict, the Mediators and the Breakthrough
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

During the last ten decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict went through various interconnected and interdependent phases. They may be classified according to three major eras: the international, the Arab and the Palestinian era. Although they each represent a certain period, they overlap in terms of dates, places, proposed solution (political and military) and respective outcomes. The evolution of the conflict throughout these three eras shows that each left its mark and influenced the other in terms of players, mediators and issues of concern. None can be studied independently or separated from the others since each stage of the conflict evolved over time and led, eventually, to some kind of result, which influenced the development of stages yet to come. Moreover, what may be viewed as a breakthrough at any one stage in any of the eras has to be seen as a product of preceding events. Thus, although the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the success or failure of its main players and mediators must be read against the background of the respective circumstances, it can ultimately only be understood in its overall context.

In order to understand the full meaning of what is widely chronicled as the "breakthrough" at Oslo in October 1992, there is a need to trace and study certain events as they occurred during the three eras. Particular consideration must be given to the political environment, the mediators, the proposed solutions and the outcomes.

The political environment of the time included the re-awakening or "renaissance" of the Arab national movement and the birth of the Zionist movement, both of which faced three major, contradicting political documents: the first was the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence of 1915, in which the British invited the Arabs to become allies against the Turks and offered in return to help them establish their sovereign independent Arab states; the second was the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, which outlined the new colonial map of the Middle East as drawn up jointly by the British and the French; and the third was the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British government declared its support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

At the doorsteps of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 we saw the British officer Thomas Edward Lawrence adopt the role of a mediator and attempt to satisfy both sides’ aspirations by drafting the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, which related to certain aspects of Arab-Jewish cooperation. The Arabs, including the Palestinians, did not rec-ognize nor accept the concept or the content of the document. The Palestinians argued that since Faisal spoke no English and Weizmann no Arabic, the document reflected Lawrence’s "interpretation" in accordance with British "wishful thinking," and was merely an attempt to close the gap between the three contradicting political documents.

The Versailles Peace Conference was an international forum for both the Arab and Jewish leaders to present their cases, while the 14 points the US president had called for - including the right to self-determination - were not applied. As the British and French governments held the mandates in the Arab territories for several decades, the international era was dominated by third party involvement.

As an outcome of World War II the geopolitical map of the Middle East was redefined. The Palestinians emphasized their Arab roots and their status as an integral part of the Arab nation with all its aspirations. The creation of a central Arab political address was realized with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. At the same time, the central Jewish-Zionist political decision-making apparatus moved from London to Washington, and thus, the center of influence and alliances was shifted. Soon after, a series of events - the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the subsequent first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and the establishment of the Israeli state - led to the uprooting and expulsion of the Palestinian people and their search for refuge in the neighboring Arab countries.

The mediators, their proposals and ideas for resolving the conflict, and the manner in which they were introduced during this era were not very different from those of the previous period, although they had been somewhat adjusted to the new balance of power in terms of intervention, interpretation and reasoning.

The binational state thesis, for example, which had previously been discussed between Jewish, British and Palestinian intellectuals, was now (July 1947) presented by King Abdallah to the UN Commission as a collective Arab position. Similarly, the plan to partition Palestine, originally proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937 and developed by the Woodhead Commission in 1938, was now presented in the Partition Plan of Resolution 181, passed by the UN General Assembly. Thirdly, the proposed annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to the Jordanian state, which had been discussed most intensively between King Abdallah and Zionist leaders in August 1946, was now brought up by the Swedish UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Finally, the question of Jerusalem was continuously addressed as a key component of any future political settlement, with many proposals that essentially promoted a special status for the city. The real novelty in this era was the shift in priorities, which put the issues of borders, refugees and direct negotiations towards mutual recognition at the top of the agenda.

The outcome was the emergence of the phenomenon of political assassination that became characteristic of the first phase of the Arab era.

The Palestinization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was accelerated by the Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine in the course of the 1967 June War. The Palestinian era reached is peak with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington DC on 13 September 1993.

This era witnessed many political phases with numerous attempts to build a bridge between and by the two peoples immediately concerned: Palestinians and Israelis. More than 30 years have left a long record of contacts, dialogue, confrontation and, more recently, numerous meetings between individuals and groups from both sides, sometimes with the presence of a third party.

The first phase (1967-1970) was determined by the shock of the Arab defeat, the fear of the unknown future, the absence of leadership and the total military occupation. The Palestinians ‘inside’ responded with a policy of non-cooperation with the occupiers, while waiting for a solution to come from outside, either internationally (UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967), regionally (Arab Summit, Khartoum, August 1962) or PLO (Al-Muqawamah Al-Filestiniyah).

However, none of the outside players delivered a solution, while inside, the Palestinian society was crippled by the lack of an economy, health, welfare or education services and institutional development. The Israeli policy, from as early as 1967, had three main aims as described by Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister. The aims were as follows:

to maintain daily contact between the Palestinians and the Arab World to divert the Palestinian focus from Israel to outside;

to use the Palestinians to pass political messages to Cairo and Amman;

to initiate direct contact with the Palestinians, hoping that they will accept to accommodate themselves to the Israeli reality.

However, the Palestinian position was that they "must not extend a hand to the Israelis unless ‘we’ are willing to extend another hand to the Arab states. If ‘we’ became secessionists and separated from the Arabs there would be no settlement, and ‘we’ would not gain anything."

In the second phase (1970-1982), the Palestinians ‘inside’ adopted a new policy: steadfastness (summud), i.e., keeping their civil society functioning and developing institutions and their leadership. This phase was characterized by the loss of power and status of local notables and old families, the rise of a national front, the formation of the National Guidance Committee, and acceptance of the challenges of confrontation but with a willingness to negotiate and to exercise the right to govern. The ‘outside’ leaders voiced their desire for a peaceful solution based on coexistence and mutual recognition. But this new development in Palestinian thinking and planning was faced with many sacrifices and the assassination of PLO leaders, which brought the Palestinians to a phase of isolation.

The third phase (1982-87) witnessed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, followed by the Palestinian resistance movement’s exodus. The Israelis hoped that these two events had cleared the way to reach a political settlement with ‘moderate’ Palestinians inside the territories. The Israeli plan was "an autonomy" based on the Jordan Option. The Jordanians called for the exchange of "land for peace" to be negotiated within the context of an international conference with PLO participation (11 February 1985). A series of contact, dialogue, drafted joint statements, documents and declarations occurred during this phase. Examples are Shimon Peres’ meetings with ‘inside’ activists, the encounters of Uri Avineri and Mattiyahu Peled with ‘outside’ leaders, including Chairman Arafat, and the academic dialogue between Abba Eban and Walid Khalidi.

The major results of these meetings were:

At the time of the fourth phase (1987-90), the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories had reached a stage of desperation and anger, which made them feel they had nothing to lose. They decided (a) to change the status quo, i.e., to end Israeli occupation, and (b) to build a new society in the OPT, based on self-reliance, and to direct it towards freedom, independence and statehood. This new phase of resistance was introduced with what became known as the Intifada.

The three main characteristics of the Intifada were as follows:

no fear of direct confrontation with the military occupiers;

the Palestinization of the OPT;

the elaboration of a political settlement based on a two-state solution.

Several mediators rushed to the scene with many ideas on how to bring the two sides - the occupier and the occupied - together in a peace conference:

An Egyptian initiative in January 1988 called for a six-month truce and a freeze on settlement activities;

US Secretary of State George Shultz added to the Egyptian idea in March 1988 by suggesting that negotiations be held along the provisions laid down in the Camp David Accords, and that Palestinian self-rule be achieved by February 1989;

Mikhail Gorbatchov encouraged PLO leader Yasser Arafat to recognize Israel’s right to exist;

The ‘inside’ Palestinian leadership favored two initiatives: a) issuing a declaration of independence and b) forming a provisional government-in-exile; meanwhile, the ‘outside’ PLO leadership expressed its readiness to sit down with Israel if Israel, in turn, agreed to withdraw from the OPT.

On 2 August 1990 delegations from the Palestinian and Israeli mainstream met in Jerusalem to sign a joint statement, which included mutual recognition and a call for direct negotiations towards a settlement of the conflict. However, the Gulf Crisis halted their work. At the same time, the world witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arab World dividing over the issue of the Gulf War, and Israel remaining the strongest military arsenal in the Middle East while the PLO had no military power, or Arab financial or political support.

The Palestinians ‘inside’ faced land confiscation, settlement building and, from the beginning of the Intifada, four years of social and economic suffering. Their options were limited when "they were called upon to accept a reality that was not yet legally in force." This reality, the commencement of negotiations, was introduced by US President George Bush on 6 March 1991. The US formula to the Madrid Conference was based on the implementation of a) UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; b) the principle of land for peace; c) the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and d) security and peace for the state of Israel.

The Israelis made it clear that their participation in Madrid was conditional on the following elements regarding the Palestinian participation: no to Jerusalemites, no to PLO members, no to an independent Palestinian delegation, no to the Palestinian flag and no to a Palestinian state.

The Palestinians realized that they could not deter those who were invited to go, nor change or amend the terms of reference; nor could they afford to stay outside the negotiation tunnel. Thus, they accepted the challenge to enter the dark tunnel, confident that they would be able to change the conditions and influence other parties based on the mechanism of the Intifada, "changing the status quo in the process and establishing new realities." In Madrid, they were acknowledged and perhaps for the first time, the world showed concern for what they had to say. "Look at Hanan Ashrawi - the moment they saw this messenger, they began to listen to the message."

The Palestinian delegation to Madrid was not elected but nominated by the PLO ‘outside’ leadership in Tunis. Some classified the delegates as representatives of regional affiliations, e.g., a village, a tribe, a political faction or a profession. Others maintained that their selection was the result of PLO recognition of their long years of suffering under occupation.

In Washington, the talks were of the nature of a diplomatic game, which in itself created special problems for a ‘people’ acting in the role of a ‘nation-state’. After 22 months of Washington negotiations, the Israelis presented their version of a transitional phase: the old autonomy plan, starting with the gradual transfer of 12 technical civil departments from Israeli to Palestinian hands, but without any mention of authority transfer, military withdrawal, or recognition of Palestinian rights to the land, water, Jerusalem, and nothing on the question of sovereignty. In addition, the Israeli plan limited Palestinian rule to only one third of the OPT, meaning all authority would remain in Israeli hands, including borders, continued settlement activities, etc. The Palestinians developed and presented a "political document," later known as PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority), confirming the Palestinian demand to freeze all settlements, guarantee the geographic integrity of the OPT, and to hold democratic elections. These two documents - the Israeli Autonomy Plan and PISGA - were the only ones trying to close the gap between the two sides that emerged without the interference of a third party, or the influence of a mediator.

Following nine months of negotiations in Madrid, five rounds of talks at the US State Department and the exchange of numerous documents outlining the totally different positions of both the Palestinian and Israeli side, and after it became obvious that neither the mediators nor the US could successfully influence the talks in one way or another, the negotiations had seemingly reached a deadlock. Throughout this period, both the Israeli government and the PLO were very much concerned with the role, performance and future of the Palestinian delegation, though for different reasons.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was extremely worried that the PLO would infiltrate its members into the Palestinian delegation, as he had constantly opposed any attempt of the PLO to become even partly involved and had gone so far as to outlaw any contact between members of the Palestinian delegation with the outside PLO. The gravity of this attitude became clear when Shamir dismissed Minister of Science Eizer Weizmann from his cabinet after the latter established contact with the PLO representative to Switzerland, Mr. Nabil Rimlawi. Shamir was interested in maintaining the umbrella of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. He sent verbal messages to Amman suggesting joint economic and tourist projects in the Red Sea area (Aqaba-Eilat), anticipating the implementation of the old Likud plan for a Jordanian role on the West Bank that leaves the "Jordanian option" open to interpretation. Amman listened but took neither the emissaries nor their messages seriously.

Meanwhile, PLO chairman Arafat tried to balance the Likud’s plans by opening various back-channels with the Labor Party. Among these attempts was his encouraging Faisal Husseini to meet with Peres, Ephraim Sneh and others. After the fall of Shamir, newly-elected Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took office, formed a new government, and resumed negotiations with the Palestinian delegation in Washington. Throughout nine rounds of talks in Washington, the Palestinian delegation remained loyal to Arafat and the PLO leadership and refused to bypass them. Arafat saw the delegation as a ‘Trojan horse’ and encouraged Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi to convince Washington of the need for the PLO to take part in direct talks. However, Washington’s advice was not to rush things, nor to jump to later phases, as, according to the US, the PLO’s role was yet to come.

On day one of the Washington negotiations, Arafat had sent two emissaries to establish direct contact with the Palestinian delegation (Akram Haniyyeh and Dr. Nabil Sha’ath), since it was his nightmare that the Palestinian delegation (Al-Wafd) would turn into a substitute leadership. His famous quotation, "They want Yasser Arafat to be a male bee, i.e., deliver once and die," speaks for itself. Arafat’s ongoing fear was that the negotiation process would not be governed by desires but by results and, despite the loyalty of the delegates to the PLO and to his leadership, he realized that those who delivered were likely to become future leaders. There were several indications of such an unwelcome development. For example, it was the Jerusalemite leader Faisal Husseini, who, in his capacity as the head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, exchanged official correspondence with US Secretary of State James Baker, who was officially received at the US State Department, and who, before the end of the eighth round of talks, was received by President George Bush at the White House.

The situation Arafat faced at this time resembles the episode of Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the world Zionist movement, and Ben Gurion, then leader of the Jewish Agency ‘inside’ Palestine, in 1948: following Israel’s declaration of independence and the establishment of the Jewish state, the ‘outside’ leader Weizmann became the symbol of the state and its head, but it was Ben Gurion who formed the government and ruled as Prime Minister.

With this background in mind, Chairman Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis saw that the official negotiations taking place between 20 people in Washington would lead to nowhere. Recalling the experience of Vietnam, Algiers and Camp David, Arafat and his inner cabinet were convinced that other channels must be opened. The PLO badly needed the peace talks to progress in order to maintain its legitimacy as the official representative and leadership of the Palestinian people, especially in view of an increasing opposition steered by the radicals in Damascus and the Islamic trends of Hamas and Jihad Islami, and in order to face King Hussein whose popularity was rapidly growing. To take any further step forward in the peace process was furthermore crucial in order to contain the already recognized ‘inside’ Palestinian leaders, and to grab the possibility of establishing direct secret contacts with Israel. The opening of new channels besides the official talks in Washington was encouraged by the Israeli Knesset decision to lift the ban on contact with the PLO, although Arafat was left wondering why the lifting of the ban coincided with the deportation of 400 Islamic leaders from the OPT.

On the other hand, Rabin and his inner cabinet thought along similar lines and gradually realized that the Palestinian delegation itself was not capable of signing an agreement with Israel nor of governing any interim regime, and that it lacked legitimacy as it was not elected by the community but chosen by Israel in back-door coordination with the US and the PLO. Furthermore, the Israeli side comprehended two other crucial aspects: a) that any agreement would require a strong and highly legitimate Palestinian authority in order to gain acceptance and in order for its security and police forces to be able to control the OPT; and b) that Israel’s only alternative to dealing with the PLO as a legitimate political representative was the Islamic movement and its leadership. This, however, would imply the transformation of the political conflict into a religious one - something the Rabin-Peres government could not afford.

Thus, at this stage, numerous other channels of contact between the Palestinians and the Israelis were opened besides the official talks in Washington. Indeed, at least two of them contributed major elements to the final text of the accords, as did the ten rounds of formal negotiations at the State Department in Washington, held between November 1991 and June 1993. One of these channels was, again, the ‘inside’, i.e., Faisal Husseini’s and Hanan Ashrawi’s contacts with and through Washington, ordered by and directly reported to Arafat, but without the knowledge of any other member of the delegation or of any other PLO leader in Tunis. Another channel was the indirect contact with and through Cairo of Arafat himself and members of his inner cabinet. A third channel was proposed by PLO Executive Committee member and head of the Palestinian negotiation committee, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who suggested to open a back-channel contact with and through the Russians in Moscow in order to balance the Washington track. The Russians made a great effort to convince the Israelis of the need for their intervention, but Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ answer was, "What is already available is enough."

At a time when the talks had seemingly come to a deadlock and the two parties urgently needed to break out of their domestic constraints and to deliver some kind of an interim arrangement, an intermediary appeared who introduced an issue that addressed a major concern of both sides, despite their different motivations. Terje Larson, founder of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Sciences, who at the time was working on a project to alleviate Gaza’s chronic social problems, suggested to focus on "Gaza first" as an initial step towards a comprehensive agreement. Gaza was of particular interest to the Israelis and Palestinians. Peres’ thinking had centered for years on the notion of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and Rabin had repeatedly expressed in public speeches the wish that Gaza would disappear from the map and "sink in the sea." On the other hand, Chairman Arafat and most PLO leaders were very much aware of and seriously concerned with Gaza’s daily cry for freedom and the need to rid the area rid of the Israeli occupation. As far back as in 1974, at the Rabat Arab Summit where the PLO was recognized by the Arab leaders as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat and Arafat had mentioned Jericho as a possible base for PLO authority and talked about the need to have a strong PLO presence in Gaza as well.

Terje Larson, the Norwegian intermediary, suggested that Israeli Labor politician Yossi Beilin, who considered Gaza one of Israel’s biggest political and military problems in need of an immediate solution, should meet Faisal Husseini and discuss the issue. The meeting between the two took place shortly before the June 1992 Israeli elections, but a second meeting did not materialize after Beilin became Peres’ Deputy Minister in the Rabin government and Faisal Husseini received too much public and media attention. The fact that Arafat would not welcome such a contact with the ‘inside’ leaders was clear to the Israelis, who were aware of the conflict and mutual fear defining the Palestinian inside-outside leadership relations at that time.

Yossi Beilin took the initi