Assymetric Negotiations (I):
The Middle East Peace Process
Moderated by Dr. Joel Peters

This session took the form of a roundtable discussion dealing with the issue of asymmetric negotiations in general and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in particular. As an introduction to the discussion, Dr. Joel Peters explained some fundamental concepts of power relations and negotiations:

When we look at the Arab-Israeli conflict, we have to distinguish two levels: the interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states and the intra-communal conflict, i.e., the conflict between the two peoples. In terms of the negotiated processes in Madrid, the second level, the Palestinian dimension, was absent; there were only negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The Oslo process, then, brought the conflict back to the intra-communal level of the 1920’s, to the question of how two peoples can live together. The War of 1967 had been an interstate conflict; for example, Security Council Resolution 242 mentions the Palestinian people only as a refugee problem, and otherwise focuses on states, borders, etc. - which actually was the reason for its rejection by the Palestinians at that time. In the Oslo process, the major issue was the communal problem, the search for a solution to the problem of how Israelis and Palestinians can live together.

The question we want to look at now, is whether you can have negotiations in a situation of unequal power like the one between the Palestinians and the Israelis. We have learned that in diplomacy, there is a need for the acceptance of fundamental norms and of the ‘other’ as an equal partner. These norms are generally observed because they are useful to all the states; they exist because states have a common interest in a well-functioning diplomatic system. In negotiations, the condition is the rational desire of both parties to reach an outcome together. The question is if the system can function in an unequal power relationship. How will parties then get to the table? Why should the stronger power negotiate at all?

This question was discussed most vigorously by participants, most of whom doubted that negotiations in such a situation could be successful. They felt that the stronger power would impose its rules and dominate the negotiations. They accepted the idea that in order for parties to get to the negotiation table, there is a need for common interests, such as peace. They remarked, however, that in order for negotiations to be successful, there is a need for equality, or at least the genuine acceptance of a peaceful approach to conflict resolution and recognition of the other side.

One participant mentioned the example of the Camp David Accords. He said it was clear that there had not been equality in power between Israel and Egypt: the Egyptian army had been defeated, and its economy was crippled; the Israeli army, meanwhile, had been newly equipped, and Israel could count on US backing. However, power is also a matter of perceptions: after 1973, both Israel and Egypt felt strong and victorious, and both were supported by a superpower. Only because of this feeling of strength were they ready to embark on negotiations.

This example led to a discussion about the question as to whether the Palestinians, in 1993, felt that they had won the ‘war’, the Intifada, and consequently engaged in negotiations whilst in a strong position. It was mentioned that to the vast majority of the Palestinians, it seemed that although they had won the war, they were still in a very weak position due to the serious problems inside the PLO following the Gulf War, the strength of Hamas, and the dominance of Jordan. They had, however, achieved some success inasmuch as their negotiators were acknowledged as Palestinians, while the Palestinian problem was once again on the global agenda. It was also mentioned that Israel had a strong interest in coming to the negotiation table: it was eager to gain Arab recognition and to reach peace settlements with its neighbors.

It can be concluded that in order to come to the negotiation table, an interest in a negotiated settlement, unlike equality, is a basic necessity: reality shows that negotiations often take place between the victor and the vanquished and that outcomes are often imposed. The opposite side of the coin is that the weaker side is not powerless; it also has assets to bring into the negotiations. In the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, for example, it is amazing how much the Palestinians, as a group without support or a functioning bureaucracy, have managed to get out of Israel; also remarkable is the extent to which they have succeeded in filling the holes not mentioned in the accords, e.g., by having their own stamps, driving licenses, etc. Power is much more than just military force; it should be seen as something that you have and that the other side needs.

Equality in power is not an objective fact, but a matter of perceptions. Interesting in this respect is Netanyahu’s election campaign in which he sought support from the Israelis, using the slogan that "we want to negotiate from a position of strength." His attempts to gain support were successful because the general perception at the time was that Labor was negotiating from a position of weakness. There was a mirror of perceptions in both societies; the Palestinian opponents to the peace process also rejected the process because they considered the Palestinians to be in a position of weakness.

The second round of discussion centered around the figure of Netanyahu and the strength or weakness of the Palestinians. Most participants still felt that the Israelis effectively had the power and, therefore, Netanyahu was talking from a position of strength and would always be talking from a position of strength: even under Peres and Labor, no real effort to achieve peace had been made. On the other hand, it was mentioned that only two months after his election victory, Netanyahu had been obliged to meet Arafat, whom he had never previously acknowledged. This shows the force of reality.

Again, the effects of the Intifada on the position of the Palestinians were discussed. It was said that the Intifada had not strengthened the PLO, but only Hamas. It was remarked that through the negotiations, the Palestinians had become stronger: they had been globally recognized, while their identity had been acknowledged. Israel, on its part, had been forced to admit that the occupation could not continue. Moreover, the PLO had gained recognition as the official representative of the Palestinian people.

The discussion was interrupted to re-think the basic notions of strength and weakness, about which, it appeared, nobody was clear. It was decided that one of the major problems is that power is not clearly defined, being a social phenomenon that involves much more than military might. The peace process itself was described as a king of "social power," from which people cannot escape. As mentioned earlier, Oslo closed the circle of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing the problem back to the communal relationship and the question of coexistence. It was perceived by the Palestinians the same way as by the Israeli right-wing, i.e., as the starting point of a Palestinian state. What has been achieved through the Oslo process is that the Palestinians have been acknowledged as partners. Oslo is the reason why, now, three to four years later, there is an Israeli debate about a Palestinian state. These are social processes that evolved as a result of the negotiations. For the same reasons, Netanyahu had to talk to Arafat; he had to meet him. We are now in a phase of re-defining the relationship. It is these social dynamics that negotiations are all about.

Asymmetric Negotiations (II):
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in the Gulf
Ailie Saunders, Head of the Middle East Program, RUSI, London

Looking at the two main fields of international conflict in the Middle East during the last two decades, the Iran-Iraq and the Arab-Israeli problem, we can find important parallels. Both conflicts are to some degree about the definition of borders and the repercussions of the projection of power; they both involve major asymmetries between the conflicting parties. As Joel Peters has covered this aspect for the Arab-Israeli conflict, I now want to speak about the asymmetries in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

One can say that in the Gulf region, an inversion in the balance of power between the major adversaries took place in the period from the first to the second Gulf War. Iran and Iraq have been, over the past 17 years, inherently asymmetric in terms of their regional standing and power. Iran started off, at least on paper, as the stronger of the two countries; it later became the weaker, mainly because of its isolation. At the beginning of the first Gulf War, Iran had a population of 50 million and was heavily equipped with US military machinery, whereas Iraq had only a much smaller population of 15 million and little arms. This was because the Iranian revolution had spread fear throughout the Gulf, which had a negative impact on the traditional cultural conflict between the Sunni and Shiite communities; the Iraqis were able to use this fact in their propaganda, which enabled them to gather support in the form of arms supplies, financial, technical, and logistical assistance via, and from, the smaller Gulf states and members of the international community. The balance of power, therefore, shifted in its favor. Iran was not totally isolated, but its supporters, for example, Syria and arms suppliers such as China and North Korea, were neither neighbors nor the kind of allies that would easily extend the sort of economic assistance Iran needed (and which Iraq already received). But Iran also had a policy of maintaining its economic independence, by strictly limiting its borrowing from abroad.

Iran was later defeated as a result of its economic isolation and attacks on its oil infrastructure, which made it difficult to export its oil. Ayatollah Khomeini, as a charismatic, uniting figure, was able to draw wide support from among the Iranian population, as well as from among the masses abroad, in declaring the Iran-Iraq war a war against the US and capitalism and imperialism as such. At the same time, Iran was able to manage its affairs in a way that decreased its dependence on any external partner. It did this, for example, by adapting budget costs to the level of oil revenues and by exchanging oil for military goods from Syria, the Soviet Union and China. But in the end, this could not compensate for the effects of the devastation to its oil industry.

The problem that led to the Iran-Iraq War was essentially a territorial dispute over the Shat Al-Arab, the waterway that lies on the border between the two countries. A temporary resolution of the dispute was found in the Algiers Agreement of 1975. But this was abrogated by Saddam Hussein, which prompted a prolonged period of tension between Iraq and the new revolutionary regime in Iran, until Hussein launched a major attack across the border into Iran itself. After Iraq’s initial attack, the war developed - in the years 1982-4 - into Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil platforms and a stalemated trench warfare. This escalated into the use of Scud missiles by both sides in what became known as the war of the cities; meanwhile the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was cut off. In 1986, the war was deadlocked and Iran decided to invest many more lives in human wave attacks against Iraq. The same year, the drop in oil prices, which resulted from the Saudis’ expansion of their oil production and exports, had a devastating effect on Iran, which could not expand its oil exports because of Iraqi attacks and the destruction of much of its oil industry.

Iran, which was becoming increasingly weak, tried to minimize some of its asymmetry with Iraq by developing its relations with the superpowers and playing one off against the other, though not always consistently or successfully. For the US, Iran’s strategic location between Russia and the Gulf gave it an important geopolitical significance. With the revolution, however, the US lost its ally in the Middle East. In 1984/85, as a result of Iranian policies, the relationship between the two countries took on a new twist, with the US becoming more actively involved in its support for Iraq. The American hostage crisis, Iranian involvement in terrorism, the Lebanese Civil War and the Iran-Contra affair all contributed to Iran being seen as an aggressive force by the US, which as a result started to support Iraq more actively. By contrast, at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s ideological stance was against the Soviet Union and Communism. Iran supported the Afghan rebels in their struggle, but meanwhile accepted Russian army supplies. So it compromised on its ideological stance in order to gain access to military equipment that would help it in the war. But Soviet concern regarding the repercussions of the Iranian revolution for its own people led it to supply Scud missiles to the Iraqis from 1982. When the war was deadlocked, Iran approached the Russians for military equipment, but was unable to secure the kind of contracts it wanted and received little economic support. In 1987, with its position in the war worsening, Iran made a more conciliatory approach towards the Soviet Union, decreasing both its aid to the Afghan rebels and its rhetoric. As a result, it was able to achieve greater Soviet support of its case in the UN Security Council.

Iran effectively adopted a policy of successfully playing off one superpower against the other. Besides the ideological differences between Iran and both powers, it has been able to secure US as well as Soviet Union support by avoiding direct confrontation with either one and by generating power from their rivalry in the region.

Today, the US and Russia are no longer the main rivals in the region. Instead, Iran and Iraq have managed to play a similar game in their policies towards the US and the Europeans in the Gulf in reaction to the policies of containment. Yet to resolve their differences with each other, they will continue to play off the US against the Europeans in order to gain support for their respective causes, as a way of dealing with the asymmetry, which is less, now, with each other, than with the US and the international community.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Since Oslo
Roundtable Discussion Moderated by Dr. Joel Peters

This session was a roundtable discussion centering around the subject of negotiations in general, the problem of secret negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian context, and the current state of the peace process.

After applying the theoretic concepts of pre-negotiations and ripeness to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the discussion quickly developed around topics of day-to-day politics, such as King Hussein’s letter to Netanyahu concerning Israel’s settlement policy, and its intentions and importance for the Palestinians and the larger Arab public. Another subject was the ambiguity of the US policy towards settlement activity, as indicated by the veto against the Security Council resolution on this issue, on the one hand, and the American will to participate in the meeting in Gaza on the other. [The meeting was called for by Arafat in mid-March to enable him to explain his position on the Israeli settlement policy and to search for a common stand with representatives of the EU and other states.]

Some of the participants felt that the recent situation in the region had nothing to with what they had learned about conflict resolution. They were encouraged, however, to look at the processes, not the results: the day-to-day events on the Palestinian-Israeli scene were viewed as a living database that exemplified all the different concepts of conflict resolution and diplomacy.

The discussion then came back to the question of secret negotiations. To the participants, it seemed obvious that another Oslo channel was needed to allow progress to be made in the negotiations, but it was also mentioned that if the Oslo accords had been arrived at openly, they could have been discussed much more in public; moreover, grave mistakes might have been prevented. It was doubted that it would now be acceptable, during such secret negotiations, for the academics involved to hide their activities from the government and for government officials to hide their activities from the public.

Dr. Joel Peters elaborated on the notion of secrecy: After World War I, Wilson proclaimed in his ‘Fourteen Points’ that agreements between states should be "open agreements arrived at openly." His belief resulted from the bad image that secret diplomacy had at that time - think of the consequences of the Balfour Declaration or the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He later realized, however, that the important fact was that the agreements - and not so much the process of arriving at them - be open ("open agreements arrived at secretly"). His realization corresponded with the idea, published by de Tocqueville in the 17th century, that "democracies do not do diplomacy well."

Thus, today, we are back to secret negotiations and open results. The problem with this is that we do not know what might be going on at this moment in talks between Israel and the Arab states. The example was given of Nixon’s breakthrough with China, which was only possible without the prior knowledge of the US Congress. Likewise, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process at the end of the 70’s, including Sadat’s famous speech during which he said that he would go even to Jerusalem in the search for peace, had been preceded by a series of secret meetings between the two sides in Romania and other places.

Somebody asked about the pre-negotiation period. In respect to the Oslo Accords, what had been known all the time was that there were meetings between Israelis and Palestinians on an academic level where ideas were exchanged. Contacts had been going on for years on an unofficial, but open level. In summer 1993, there were five back-channels functioning. The interesting question is the one as to why this back-channel delivered whilst the others did not. One factor was the role, or rather the absence, of the media. Due to the absence of the media, Oslo provided the teams with space to work problems out. The negotiations did not become just another theater providing good pictures and dramatic scenes for the media, as was the case in Washington. Such ‘track II’ diplomacy provides an enormous advantage in allowing negotiators to use this space to speak to each other frankly without regard to publicity and political statements to the public.

Another point that I want to make here about diplomacy concerns the perceptual environment of international relations. Diplomacy involves communication between states, which means speaking to each other, but it also means non-verbal communication. The problem Jordan has at the moment, for example, is one of perception. Dore Gold had gone to Jordan two days before the tunnel in Jerusalem was opened, which made it seem as if Jordan knew about the opening in advance. When Netanyahu came back from Amman, he ordered that the building at Jabal Abu Ghneim should commence. The Jordanians were furious because again, it looked as if they had known in advance. Thus, in the letter that King Hussein sent to Netanyahu he was actually not talking to the Israeli Prime Minister; it was a message to the Israeli public and to the US, in addition to the Arabs, that he was not involved in Netanyahu’s game.

The following discussion first centered around the question of who makes diplomacy, and the topic of ‘timing’. The participants did not believe that the opening of the tunnel and the commencement of building in Har Homa happened by accident after the visits to Jordan. These acts were considered part of Israel’s policy to rule and divide. It was recalled, however, that Netanyahu did not have an interest in undermining King Hussein’s position, as the Jordanian monarch was Israel’s only regional ally at the time. The timing had not been intended, but was a stupid mistake by Netanyahu.

Dr. Joel Peters again stressed the fundamental difference between Oslo and other examples of secret diplomacy: The importance of the meeting between Abu Ala’ and Uri Savir was that it was the first officially sanctioned meeting between the PLO and an Israeli official. There had been contacts before the aforementioned meeting, but the gap between the positions of the two sides was too wide. Therefore, there was a need for space to allow creativity to bridge these gaps. It is important to stress that academics and track II meetings do not, alone, lead to peace agreements, but this channel was accepted because it provided the necessary space for the politicians to find solutions.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Since Oslo:
New Approaches to Conflict – Multilaterals and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East
Dr. Joel Peters

Talking about the peace process, the multilateral negotiations are often forgotten because the media and the public concentrate on the much more spectacular bilateral talks involving high-ranking officials and heads of states. The multilateral talks involve five working groups, which deal with the following:

arms control;
the environment;
water;
refugees;
economic development.

They involve Israel, the Arab states, and the wider community, but not Libya, Iran, and Iraq. They have been boycotted by Syria and Lebanon, whose leaders have stressed that first, bilateral problems have to be settled and peace has to be made, and only then can normalization take place and the fruits of peace be harvested. In November 1996, the Palestinians boycotted the talks, excluding the group on refugees, to put pressure on the bilateral talks.

What is the concept of the multilateral talks? The idea is that, in a post Cold War environment, security and economic development have become new notions; they are beyond the capacity of the single state. The state is not an island: the idea of sovereignty has changed, and it is clear that security can be enhanced by regional cooperation. The idea of the multilaterals is one of ‘functional cooperation’: peace in the region will be maintained through the intertwining of the states. By creating regional structures from which all states profit, the stakes in upholding these structures become very high. The economic integration of the EU is a perfect example.

What has been achieved after five years of multilateral talks? First of all, it needs to be stressed that the situation is fundamentally different today to what it was five years ago: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is no longer the main moving factor of politics in the region. This does not mean, however, that the conflict is solved or that there might not be rising tension and violence in the transition period.

Secondly, the multilaterals have created a diplomatic space in which problems can be dealt with over a relatively long period of time. (One of the problems faced by the parties involved in this process is that everybody expects it to collapse soon, and therefore, they are under pressure to achieve results as quickly as possible.) The multilaterals offer a space for diplomatic debates and constructive, regional, long-term thinking, for agenda setting, for small steps towards a common decision-making process on a regional basis, and for the building of ‘patterns of dialogue’ through constant communication that can help to bridge contrary positions in crisis situations. The dialogue serves as a measure of confidence building.

An example of the success of the multilaterals was the proposal for the Middle East Development Bank in Summer 1995. This was a ‘regional idea’ coming out of the multilaterals that was presented by a joint delegation of Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians, and Jordanians in Europe. The multilaterals serve as an environment from which ideas such as this one can be fed back into the wider process.

In functional meetings, shared problems can be solved. Often this is done by bringing in experts. In many cases, politics disappear in the face of ‘technical’ problems, e.g., the oil spill in the Gulf of Aqaba that does not stop at the borders and can only be resolved jointly, or various water desalination projects. In these cases, a mechanism of communication and a broader regional framework can be established to solve such problems. Does this mean normalization? To a certain point, yes, because it involves the interaction of the Israelis with the other teams; it creates an atmosphere of continued interaction, and it brings the participants in such talks closer together. Hence, there is the possibility for new regional dynamics; this does not necessarily mean the implementation of the ‘New Middle East’ à la Peres, but there is an opportunity for a different, more peaceful, more integrated Middle East.

Question: What are the different roles of academics and government representatives in the multilaterals?

Answer: The multilaterals serve as a framework, a context to bring together technical experts. The multilateral talks on arms control, for example, have not been taking place on an official level for a long time, but they have been going on as academic conferences. It is hoped that some of the results will spill over to the governmental level. Another example is a conference that was held in London on Middle Eastern financial markets with the participation of experts and business people that have an impact on official thinking

Question: But what are the actual results of the multilaterals; what are their tangible outcomes?

Answer: The answer depends very much on your definition of ‘tangible outcomes’. I think the most important outcome has been the creation of a space for on-going consultations and long-term perspectives for shared problems in the region. The first material outcomes have included, among others, the agreement on an environmental code of conduct, the establishment of the REDWG secretariat in Amman, and a joint desalination project. Other projects just need more time to become implemented. One of the main problems is that you cannot push the outcomes of the multilaterals too far forward; they have to be feasible according to the current state of the bilateral relations. And then there are problems that have to be resolved in the multilaterals, the most obvious example being the refugee talks.

Question: The Palestinians froze their participation in the multilaterals. Israel does not seek a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. As long as this is so, normalization through the multilaterals should not proceed.

Answer: I think it was wrong to break up the multilaterals. I understand all the reasons for the Palestinian boycott of the talks - and the reason for it has to be sought in the Hebron context - but the result was not productive; the Palestinians were not even able to influence the Hebron negotiations through it. Yes, the core problem is political, but conflict resolution and the notion of security have been redefined in the post Cold War period. Security for a single state only can no longer be reached. The existence of forums for discussion, giving room to talk and think together, is important.

Question: I want to make a few comments: I think the Arab boycott was the Palestinians’ last available tool to exert pressure against Israel. Now, they are left alone while the conflict continues. The comparison with the relation between France and Germany does not make much sense because the starting positions of Israel and the Palestinians were so unequal. I think economics and politics cannot be separated, thus, we will not profit from these talks. First, the political problems have to be solved, and the nations that have been ignored for such a long time, like Palestine and Jordan, have to be developed. Last but not least, I want to ask you: where is the Middle East in the New World Order?

Negotiating Intractable Issues: Jerusalem
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Talking about Jerusalem, I want to focus on the following three points: the importance of the question of Jerusalem and its various dimensions, the different phases of negotiations concerning Jerusalem, and the question of where we are today in terms of negotiations.

Let me begin by summarizing the main issues that make the question of Jerusalem so important. The first issue is that the question of Jerusalem is a national one, embracing a land that is the homeland of a people whose basic national rights - namely freedom and self-determination - are being denied. For Palestinians, Jerusalem is the people’s capital, the people’s national address. So many Palestinians died in its defense in the face of so many conquerors, yet its protection remains their greatest national cause.

The second issue involves the question of sovereignty. There are many new interpretations of sovereignty, but in this instance, the actual state of sovereignty is related to the philosophy, context and outcomes of the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab sovereignty in the remainder of the Palestinian homeland must include the right to govern, to reside and to move freely in Jerusalem.

The third issue is the centrality of Jerusalem. The largest Palestinian city, Jerusalem is the center of all the important components of Palestinian daily life: culture, education, health-care, business and tourism. All cities, towns and villages are connected through the activities that take place in Jerusalem, the place in which both the geographic and demographic integrity of the Palestinian homeland are centralized; this, despite all Israeli attempts to ensure its isolation from the rest of the Palestinian Territories.

The fourth issue is that Jerusalem is an Arab Christian-Islamic city. It has a Christian identity embodied in the Christian faith, in Jesus and his life and in the Christian Holy Places. It also has an Islamic identity, embodied in Islamic ideology, in the fact that Jerusalem was the first qibla, the point to which Muslims direct themselves when in prayer, and the site of the famous nocturnal journey of the Prophet Mohammed, mentioned in the Holy Quran. Its Arab identity, meanwhile, is embodied in the Arab culture, heritage, buildings, Christian and Islamic Holy Places and the harmonious co-existence of Muslims and Christians, which goes back to the seventh century.

The fifth issue is the question of different intertwined symbolic dimensions. As a historical city, Jerusalem has many holy, political, central, national and geographical dimensions, and many different demographic constituencies with their different institutions. It belongs to all believers, all of whom need free access and the right to reside as citizens under a fair and just administration and democratic rule. And finally, it is a central issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One cannot simply separate these issues from each other.

Let us now look at the different phases of negotiations on Jerusalem. In order to understand the first phase, that lasted from 1967 to the early 1980’s, one should study carefully the minutes of the early meetings between the then Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan and Palestinian notables and mayors. The following is taken from a conversation that took place between Dayan and Palestinian advocate Aziz Shahadeh and Mayor of Nablus Hamdi Kana’an on April 16 1968:

In one of his questions, Dayan asked: "Do you, the Palestinians, with or without Jordan, want to conclude a separate peace with Israel, without committing yourselves to Egypt or Syria?" The second question was: "There will be no change in the status of Jerusalem. It is possible to solve the question of the Holy Places and religious institutions?"

The Palestinians replied: "We must not extend a hand to the Israelis unless we are willing to extend the other hand to the Arab states. If we became secessionists and separated from King Hussein with the Arab agreement, there would be no settlement and we would not gain anything." Other Palestinians added: "Without solving the Jerusalem issue in all its dimensions, instead of limiting it to the Holy Places or institutions, there will be no settlement."

During that phase, people in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the Jerusalemites, were waiting for a solution to come from outside. The ‘inside’ leadership that had emerged, made up of notables, members of the large and wealthy families, and the elected mayors, were reluctant to accept any responsibility for negotiations. This was not only because of their weak constituencies or because they represented only one third of the Palestinian people, or even because the PLO, the ‘outside’ leadership, would not allow them to hold independent meetings and negotiations with the Israelis; it was because, in this phase, the conflict was an Arab-Israeli one that was still in the very early stages of becoming Palestinized. No Palestinian leader, whether from the inside or outside, was prepared to consider separate negotiations with Israel without an Arab umbrella, nor to separate the question of Jerusalem from its context and limit it to the Holy Places and institutions.

The Israeli strategy from day one of the occupation was annexation, assimilation and the Judaization of Jerusalem. Israel’s strategy soon became clear in the official statements of the Israeli leaders, the Israeli Knesset’s decision to annex East Jerusalem and the Israeli policies and practices of confiscating land, building settlements, and moving Israeli people and institutions to the eastern part of the city that was occupied in 1967. The Western part had already been Judaized between 1948 and 1967, despite Palestinian property rights and the non-acceptance and non-recognition by all countries, including the US, of changes to the status of Jerusalem or Israeli attempts to have it as accepted as the capital of Israel.

During the Intifada, the status quo was changed, and a new civil society began to develop under a new generation of Palestinians, represented by local activists, professionals, and the unified leadership of the Intifada. The seat of authority of the Intifada evolved in Gaza, moved to Nablus, and then settled in Jerusalem - only after this last move was it finally recognized and approved of by all Palestinians.

It should be noted that although the Israelis had made several attempts to invite the outside leaders to enter a dialogue since as early as 1986, there had been little progress. The Intifada, however, brought a revolution in Palestinian minds: we realized that we had to fight for and negotiate on what remained, i.e., about 22% of Palestine. We realized that we had to accept a two-state solution arrived at through negotiations. Therefore, during the Intifada negotiations with Israelis were continuous.

For example, a Palestinian-Israeli meeting was scheduled to take place on 2 August 1990 at the Notre Dame Palace Hotel, with a view to signing a declaration that accepted the use of negotiations as a tool to reach coexistence. But on the same day, Iraq entered Kuwait and the two delegations went to the meeting place, not to sign the declaration, but to declare their new positions. The Israelis, on their part, went to declare ‘divorce’ as expressed clearly in an article in Ha’aretz by Yossi Sarid from Meretz: "I am going back to my sealed room. I don’t want to see, to hear, to talk. I am afraid." The Palestinians, meanwhile, went to tell everybody, "Yes, we are part of the Arab World, which is divided, and which reflects its division on us. Some of us are against the invasion, others would like to see Arab conciliation and interference in this conflict, while a third group supports Saddam, as is clear in the streets of Nablus and Gaza."

When the opportunity to go to Madrid arose, the local leadership convinced the PLO to send a delegation enveloping Haidar Abdul Shafi and Faisal Husseini. The negotiations revealed a new Palestinian face to the world and led to global acceptance of the PLO as a reliable partner. The local leadership, meanwhile, presented the plan for PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority). Then, the negotiations in Washington began. They were a nightmare for the PLO, because it was unable to control them directly. Thus, it opened five secret channels in different locations and with different intermediaries to conduct negotiations with the Israelis, accepting among others the setting offered by Terje Larson. The position of the Palestinians at that time was to demand a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital, but the Israelis convinced them to talk about things that both parties could actually deliver. In spite of the ongoing conflict, we were able to reach a stage of mutual recognition and to finally accept each other as a partner in the peace process.

Now, what about Jerusalem in the negotiations? What can, and what cannot, be sacrificed? On which issues is it possible to compromise? In 1948, Jerusalem was divided and West Jerusalem became under Israeli control. In 1967, East Jerusalem also found itself under Israeli rule when it was occupied by Israel. It is clear, today, that by postponing the issue of Jerusalem to the end of the current negotiations, there will remain nothing to discuss. But I now want to present the different scenarios for Jerusalem, envisioned by the various sides, and the different dimensions involved.

At the moment, there are three main scenarios for Jerusalem: a closed, a divided or an open city. Among both Palestinians and Israelis, there exists a preference for an open city, a physically undivided city for two peoples and three faiths. But I want to stress that there is still no agreement on anything, and the road between the discussion of ideas and scenarios and reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable solution promises to be a long and laborious one.

Peres, for example, envisioned a Jerusalem with the three major dimensions of religion, politics and civil affairs, with the first providing for the governing of the holy sites by the religious leaders, the second for Jerusalem being the Israeli capital, and the third for having two separate municipalities in the city. The Abu Mazen-Beilin document, as a second example, provides for the expansion, renaming and sharing of the city.

What are the dimensions that have to be taken into consideration when talking about a solution for Jerusalem? What kind of goods are on the table, waiting to be negotiated upon?

The geographic and demographic component: Before the War of 1967, West Jerusalem covered an area of 53 km² and had 195,000 inhabitants, while East Jerusalem covered 6 km² and had 75,000 inhabitants. When Israel seized all of Jerusalem in 1967, and subsequently announced the ‘unification’ of the city, a modern myth was born; in fact, Jerusalem has been forcibly turned into a Jewish city through the illegal Judaization of Arab East Jerusalem. As of today, 28 settlements and neighborhoods have been added to the city. There are 330,000 Israelis in West Jerusalem and 150,000 Jewish settlers in the eastern side. Some 160,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem, with an additional 50,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites residing in the suburbs of Jerusalem, having been driven outside the city’s boundaries.

The Israeli authorities have proceeded with their de-population policy in a series of waves. The 1968 Master Plan for Jerusalem envisioned expansion in three phases: the first phase was the construction of buildings on former no-man’s-land, to eliminate the physical barriers that marked the two parts of the city; the second phase was to divide and encircle the immediate periphery, mainly neighboring Arab villages, with Jewish settlements; while the third phase was the building of a belt of outlying settlements in order to secure control over ‘Greater Jerusalem’. Over the years, 34% of East Jerusalem has been expropriated, while 56% has been designated ‘green land’, which is effectively the same as confiscation, meaning that all that is left today for the Palestinians is 14%. Israeli policies succeeded in bringing the population ratio to the level of 72% Jews to 28% Palestinians.

The national and political component: Historically, Jerusalem has been part of Palestine, and Palestinian heritage is deeply rooted in the city. Jerusalem is related to the land and people of Palestine, and to their Muslim-Christian beliefs and holy places. Jerusalem is of great importance to all Palestinians, not only as a holy city but also as the political, geographic, economic and cultural center of Palestine. It is the capital of the Palestinian people; it is the symbol of Palestinian national identity and of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Its Arab roots go back 5,000 years to the time when the city of Arab Yabous (Jerusalem) was founded. Jerusalem is thus identified with Arab culture, heritage, architecture and significant monuments, and there is an agreement on the urgent need and duty to preserve these sites, as well as Jerusalem as a historic city. Against the background of centuries of Muslim rule and the uninterrupted Arab presence in the city, no one can justify the policies and practices of 27 years of Israeli occupation and ignore almost 1,400 years of Arab Muslim-Christian rule.

The religious component: The religious claims of the three monotheistic religions to Jerusalem are each unique, with their own special attributes and form of attachment to different places in the city. Jerusalem’s holiness complicates any attempt to solve the Jerusalem question and is often used or manipulated to attain non-religious goals. Yet, the meaning of religious attachment to the city was and remains a major concern. As well as its Jewish heritage, Jerusalem is a city of Arab, Islamic and Christian heritage. Its Islamic identity derives from the fact that it was the site of Prophet Mohammed’s nocturnal journey, Isra’ and Mi’raj, the original qibla for Muslims, and the site of Islam’s third holiest shrine, Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Ummayad Caliph Mu’awiyah linked his own personal identity with Jerusalem, calling himself Caliph of Beit Al-Maqdis. Thus, it is part of the Islamic faith. It is also the site of the Holy Sepulcher, other important churches, and the Mount of Olives.

Limiting the problem to the holy sites is not appropriate; the right to live and to practice one’s religion in the city must be guaranteed. This is what an open city must provide for. We have all learned from the experience of sharing religious sites, such as the Abraham Mosque in Hebron; exclusivity, however, is also not an answer. We need to understand the other’s religion in order to be able to reach an agreement. Religion has to be seen in the context of the land, the people and their rights.

The Legal Component: Since the implementation of the article contained in the 1948 Partition Plan (UN Resolution 181) on the question of Jerusalem was suspended, the nature, limits and scope of international, regional and local legislation and administrative by-laws that govern the city have been determined by the creation of facts on the grounds by the occupier. Today, the struggle over Jerusalem is still basically a struggle over property and who controls it.

There is no legitimacy or license under international law or international resolutions passed since the beginning of the century, including UN Resolutions 242 and 338, that allows Israel to take over Arab land in Occupied Arab East Jerusalem. International law prohibits the annexation of territory by force. East Jerusalem is regarded as occupied territory and Israel’s activities in this part of the city (such as settlement construction, Israeli population transfer and annexation) are considered illegal and null and void. Moreover, certain articles of UN Resolution 194 relating to compensation and the right of return are still being twisted by Israel in regard to Arab properties in West Jerusalem that were confiscated by Israel in 1948. In the course of the War of 1948, some 64,000-80,000 Palestinians were forcibly driven out of West Jerusalem and its immediate vicinity and all the property left behind was declared ‘absentee property’. It should be noted that immediately prior to the war, 40% of property in West Jerusalem belonged to Palestinians and 34% to the Waqf, churches and government of Palestine, while a mere 26% belonged to Jews.

Security and equality: The security concerns of both sides must be recognized. This does not just mean military security. I am talking about the need for mutual recognition and the sharing of responsibilities. There should not be exclusive access for one people at the expense of the other. But, the question of equality should be seen as a general principle rather than in every detail; equality can, in many cases, be reached through reconciliation and by widespread acceptance of the principle that people are equal under one law. Welfare and social services have to be supplied according to equal principles. And, most importantly, there should be equal residence and citizen rights.

Institutions: When, in the course of the June War of 1967, Jerusalem was occupied in its entirety by Israeli forces, many of its Arab inhabitants were evicted and their property seized or demolished. When East Jerusalem was annexed and subjected to Israeli law, Palestinians refused to accept Israeli sovereignty over the city, choosing instead to resist by means such as stressing the illegitimacy of the occupation, refusing to join the West Jerusalem municipality and trying to preserve the Arab character of the city. The chapters of Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem can be traced back to the very beginning of its occupation in June 1967 when Sheikh Abdul Hamid Al-Sayeh, the Chief Judge of the Sharia Court of Appeal (Jerusalem), issued an Islamic fatwa that clearly supported the refusal of the Moslem community to be governed by Jewish/Israeli law.

This resulted in the preservation of Palestinian commercial and other major institutions, including the Arab Electricity Company. Although the Arab municipality in Arab Jerusalem had been dissolved and closed, its premises having been forcibly seized by the Israelis, while the control of public services had been taken over by the Israeli municipality in West Jerusalem, Arab neighborhoods continued to exist as separate communities and the Palestinians refused to become Israeli citizens, thereby boycotting municipal elections. The Palestinians succeeded in maintaining key institutions such as medical centers and hospitals, the Sharia courts, societies, tourist offices, intra-city transportation networks, as well as centers and forums providing scientific, cultural and educational research, information and services.

Jerusalem is not united, it is occupied, and the borders between both parts of the city have not disappeared; the physical borders of the past have merely been replaced by the psychological, invisible borders of the present. Meanwhile, the presence of settlers who seek to de-stabilize existing Palestinian society from within has introduced an insidious new threat. Palestinian security needs can only be met by putting an end to the Israeli occupation and by recognizing and guaranteeing Palestinian self-determination and the right to self-defense against external aggression or internal subversion.

Settlements: There is a need for an immediate end to all settlement activity and confiscation of land in Jerusalem. The question of settlement is not limited to Jerusalem; it covers all the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Nowadays, 13 settlements surround Jerusalem and isolate it from the rest of the of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. When the final status talks deal with the question of settlements, they should include those 13 settlements as well as they are undoubtedly illegal and a major obstacle in the path of peace.

Economy: The economic damage inflicted upon the Palestinians under occupation needs to be rectified. Jerusalem’s economy is part of the economy of Palestinian society; it enjoys, however, special advantages due to the city’s status as a center of tourism and pilgrimage. Jerusalem could become the economic center of Palestine once the closure is lifted.

The problem of Jerusalem will not be solved unless the rights of both peoples, Israeli and Palestinian, are recognized, and the occupation of East Jerusalem comes to an end. The collective rights of only one population, the Israelis, are illegitimate. The authority that currently rules the entire city is also illegitimate. This has to be acknowledged by replacing the current system with a new one, based on sharing the city: what is needed is the establishment of two capitals, two sovereignties, and two municipalities, allowing both peoples to live independently next to each other in an open and free city: ‘Separate and share!’ Both Israelis and Palestinians must be allowed to run their own affairs independently, to function independently, to make their decisions independently, and to take responsibility for their respective societies’ daily life and concerns. This is the key to coexistence. On this basis, we then can cooperate and coordinate on issues with which we are both concerned, such as water and electricity. It must be possible for me, as a Palestinian, to address my own authority on any matter and turn to my own elected Palestinian leadership. I am a Palestinian citizen in Palestinian Jerusalem governed and guided by Palestinian policies, laws and by-laws. To achieve this aim and to end hostilities, military occupation and confrontation in the Holy City, peace has to be given a chance, starting with mutual recognition of each other and the rights of both peoples. We should not postpone this crucial issue any longer. Let us start living together, separate but equal, in our city of Jerusalem; let us, together, share its goods, preserve its holy places and historical monuments, and develop the city’s economy. Let us work together for a better future!

Arab-Israeli Negotiations (I): Israel and Egypt (Camp David)
HE Ahmad Kamal, Diplomat, Egyptian Embassy, Tel Aviv

In talking about the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and the Camp David Agreement, I want to begin with the question of why and how it all begun. I then want to talk about the following points: the nature of the peace between Egypt and Israel, the peace treaty and the Palestinians, the Syrian position and the fruits of peace for Egypt.

When analyzing the peace negotiations and the treaty between Egypt and Israel, we should start by discussing the motives that the Egyptians had in launching the negotiations with the Israelis. These motives were mainly of an economic nature: the Egyptian economy was going through a very difficult period, especially in the late 1970’s. The Egyptian people, at that time, had to struggle very hard to make ends meet, and even bread was in short supply. This triggered the search for peace, at a time when the Israelis were ready to discuss a peace treaty. Camp David has been widely criticized but there is one fact - and this is my own personal opinion - that we should not forget: with Camp David, we gained our land back. All the rest is just ink on paper.

After Camp David, Egypt initiated a long-term national project to develop the Sinai Peninsula in all its aspects, from agriculture and water resources management to irrigation and sewage systems. In the frame of this project, that is supposed to come to completion in the year 2017, about 300,000 acres of land should be made available for farming, while about five million Egyptians will hopefully be relocated to the Sinai peninsula. This project will lead to the development of a totally autarkic area in the Northern Sinai that exports its products to other parts of Egypt and possibly to the world. The Southern Sinai, on the other hand, has a high tourist potential. At the moment, studies are being carried in regard to mining projects in this area. What I want to say is that we came out of Camp David with a new wheat basket for Egypt. The development plans for the Sinai Peninsula are in total accordance with Egyptian traditions. The Egyptians like to live and work in their own country. They went to work in the Gulf countries, but decided to come back to work in Egypt, even for lower wages. With Camp David, the whole Sinai came back under Egyptian control, even though it had to stay demilitarized.

As I said, the economic motives were the main reasons for the Egyptians to engage in the Camp David negotiations. Egypt, at that time, had to struggle with a high debt burden, and its infrastructure was very weak. Until 1981, only about 2% of the national income was spent on infrastructure. (From 1981 until today, about 180 million Egyptian Pounds have been spent on infrastructure.) The confrontation with Israel was costly: the military budget used up a large proportion of the national income, especially as relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating and the US could dictate arms prices. Peace seemed the only way to get rid of this burden - which does not mean that we did not seek a real peace.

We were able to reach the stage of negotiating a peace agreement following mediation efforts from various regional players, e.g., Morocco. Some of the preliminary negotiations were taking place in secret under the patronage of King Hassan of Morocco. But the breakthrough occurred after American mediation; former US President Carter was the first American president to launch a peace initiative in the Middle East. The real breaking point was Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.

By the way, I want to tell you that the Camp David negotiations really complicated the position of the Syrians and the Palestinians in their subsequent negotiations with the Israelis, due to the fact that the Israelis were able to profit from their negotiation experience with the Egyptians. When speaking of Areas A, B and C under Camp David, we speak of areas that are completely different, in many respects, to Areas A, B and C under Oslo. Area C in the Sinai, for example, is under the complete sovereignty of the Egyptians, but demilitarized; Area C in the Palestinian Territories, in contrast, is under Israel’s complete control.

What, now, is the content of the peace treaty? [Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, 26 March 1979].

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, [...]. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

[...]

Now, what has been achieved and what has not? It is obvious that normalization has not taken place. We signed the peace treaty in 1979, but we were not as keen on normalization as other Arab states are today. Israeli politicians say that there is no real peace with Egypt, and that the Egyptians took back their land while laughing at the Israelis, because they got what they wanted whereas the latter did not. We Egyptians have our own point of view about normalization at this time. Some people support the dialogue with Israeli intellectuals and academics. Others say that until the Palestinian people secure at least their basic rights, we cannot start a normalization process with Israel. There is no living peace: for example, there is almost no trade between Israel and Egypt. There was an Israeli project to import gas from Qatar, but the project was stopped when Ariel Sharon became minister of infrastructure. Economically speaking, it would make far more sense for Israel to import gas from Egypt, and I think that we will, eventually, be approached again in relation to this project. We have the gas, but we are not selling it. We could, however, sell it to another country, for example, Turkey.

Question: Was Israel’s desire to guarantee its share, in the form of a joint project, the reason why Egypt was not able to sell the gas to the PNA?

Answer: No, we make a clear distinction between our relations with the PNA and those with Israel. It is a matter of identity. We can sell our gas to the Palestinians as we please. We do not interfere with Israeli trade relations with other countries; it is, therefore, quite logical that Israel cannot dictate how and what we sell to the PNA or the shape of our relations.

Now, let me come back to the peace treaty. Egypt regained the Sinai, and I have already talked about the development project that followed. The fourth article of the treaty provides for the Sinai being divided into three areas, A, B, and C, with different arrangements concerning security and a military presence, as well as for a demilitarized strip inside Israel.

Question: But this is not control over the Sinai!

Answer: Yes, it is; Egypt has sovereignty over the Sinai. It is not military control that defines sovereignty. Look, for example, at Japan, at how it has prospered and its current standing in the world, even though it was demilitarized after World War II.

Egypt, now, is going through a process of transformation. This has only been possible on the basis of peace. Everything is being reconstructed in the most up-to-date manner: the telephone system, the sewage system, etc. Currently there is an underground system being built in Cairo for the six million people that commute to the city each day. New cities have been built, and Egypt is one of the world’s leading tourist destinations. Moreover, according to the statistics of the World Bank and the IMF, it has a high economic potential. Some 70 billion Egyptian Pounds are being spent on development projects all over Egypt.

Question: But it seems that the Egyptian citizens have not really profited from all this.

Answer: We are talking about 60 million people, so I think it will take a while for the benefits to trickle down. We depend on peace to further reduce our military spending. If we are able to redirect these funds to other areas, it will make things much better for the Egyptian people.

In the peace negotiations, we have not neglected the Palestinian cause. Have a look at what is mentioned in the Camp David Agreement: total autonomy for the Palestinians in the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem as an integrated part of the Arab occupied territories, thus being subject to all forthcoming agreements on the Palestinian Territories. If Egypt had been supported by the other Arab states during the negotiations at Camp David, the results, of course, would have been much better. But the division in the Arab World at that time was as bad as the one after the Second Gulf War. If we had not gone to Camp David in the 70’s, we would now be discussing the terms of withdrawal from the Sinai. If the Arab World had joined Camp David, then the whole story, including the present situation on the Golan Heights, would have been much different.

Question: But I think that at that time the Palestinian people were not ready for peace with Israel. We all had this belief in Pan-Arabism and armed struggle was a part of the Arab mentality. Superpower support, meanwhile, was divided between the Arabs and Israel. There was no shift towards peace with Israel.

Answer: The real question, therefore, is not whether Egypt should or should not have gone to the peace talks, rather if it could have coordinated with the rest of the Arab World in order to strengthen its position.

Let me compare the situation of the Golan and the Sinai. The Sinai covers an area of approximately 61,000 km², whereas the territory of the Golan is only about 1,800 km². The Sinai can be seen as a buffer zone: it has a strategic depth that is further underlined by the water barrier of the Suez Canal. The Sinai Peninsula has only three passages. The Southern Sinai is mountainous terrain, which does not allow for the passage of freight carriers or armored personnel carriers. Consequently, by merely controlling the three narrow passages of the Sinai, one can, in effect, assert control over the whole Sinai region. According to this point of view, the Sinai effectively serves as a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt.

The Golan Heights are a totally different issue. From the Heights, it is easy to control the Israeli terrain below. Any short-range artillery stationed on the Golan can easily hit Israeli targets, which is what most worries the Israelis. If you intended to threaten Israel with artillery from the Sinai, you would need long-range missiles in order to reach Israeli targets.

The second point is that it is much easier to reach the Golan Heights from the Syrian side than from the Israeli side. On the Golan, you also find the main water channels that flow into Lake Tiberias, which provide a crucial source of water for Israel. These are the points that dominate the Israeli view of the Golan issue. The Heights are perceived as ‘ruling’ the north of Israel and being easy to reach from the Syrian side; they are, after all, only 60 kilometers away from Damascus. In the Sinai, it would take a minimum of two days to mobilize and dispatch Egyptian forces to the peninsula. Therefore, the Sinai can function as a buffer zone, but the Golan Heights cannot.

Of course, the Syrians have their own point of view regarding this issue. Security arrangements, as were allowed for in the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, are not applicable on the Golan Heights. If the Syrian forces were to be stationed at a distance of 50 km from the Golan, they would find themselves right on the outskirts of Damascus! I am convinced that the Israelis will withdraw from the Golan Heights at some point, but Prime Minister Netanyahu cannot negotiate on all tracks at the same time. One Israeli told me: "If you want to know from where Israel is ready to withdraw and from where it is not, you should look at where the Israelis bury their dead." There is not a single person buried on the Golan Heights.

Question: What is your opinion about the differences between the methods employed by Israel to put pressure on Egypt and the Palestinian Authority during negotiations? You said that Israel learned a lot from the negotiations with the Egyptians. What can we, the Palestinians, learn from the Egyptians’ experience?

Answer: The Palestinian-Egyptian coordination is not just a shallow affair; it is really much more than that, and it has reached something like a real partnership. The reason for this is the fact that the relationship is not just based on agreements, but on an identity, as I have already explained. The Palestinians have suffered from the beginning of this century, therefore, the kind of pressure exerted upon them is incomparable to that exerted upon Egypt. The extent of the Israeli measures against the Palestinians is exemplified by the Israeli decision to start building a new settlement in Arab East Jerusalem (Jabal Abu Ghneim). Thus, you cannot compare the situation of the Palestinians with that of the Egyptians. We were always in a position whereby we could have stopped a process whenever we felt it to be necessary. The position of the Palestinian people is much weaker.

Question: Do you think that Sadat committed a big mistake when going for a separate peace without the Palestinians. Was he too self-assured?

Answer: This has not been a separate peace. And you have to see that the decision-making process in Egypt had passed through a lot of changes from the era of Abdul Nasser to that of Sadat. Abdul Nasser had a charismatic personality that can hardly be assessed according to today’s standards. Sadat had a vision, and he wanted to implement it, but he was not in a position to do so alone. The president nowadays is no longer a decision maker, but a ‘decision chooser’. He makes a choice among the different possibilities presented to him by his support system. So, Sadat did not take the decision on his own. But, in answer to your question, yes, he was too self-assured when it came to his opinion about Egypt’s standing in the Arab World.

Question: Was it this failure to assess the situation properly that led to his assassination? And, if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations had already begun at that time, do you think Sadat would be alive today?

Answer: I do not think that Camp David was the main cause of Sadat’s assassination. The era witnessed the rise of fundamentalist Islamic movements that interpreted Islam according to their needs. They were strongly opposed to the idea of peace with Israel, and they based their opposition on religious grounds. This psychological or religious barrier to peace with Israel remains until today amongst a large portion of the people.

Question: What is your evaluation of Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations? Do you negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians?

Answer: We do not negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians; we acknowledge that there is a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian negotiating team, and we negotiate on behalf of ourselves. During the early stages of the negotiations, there was a need for the Palestinians to consult with us to learn from our experience of negotiating with Israel. We are totally in support of Palestinian rights; we are against settlements, against the Judaization of Jerusalem, and against anything that might hinder the attainment of Palestinian rights. But our main interest is not in this region: it is, at the moment, in security and our border arrangements with Sudan and Libya, not to mention our domestic situation.

Question: It sometimes appears as if Egypt is governed by chaos. What were the tools used by the Egyptians in their negotiations with Israel?

Answer: It was simple for us because we were the largest Arab country confronting Israel. Egypt had participated in all the wars that had taken place in the region. Ours is a stable country that enjoys a high degree of homogeneity, with 90% of the population being Sunni Muslims and the remaining 10% Coptic Christians. The people are able to bear a lot. Egypt is a respected country with good relations with other Muslim countries. We are a state with many strong points, but, of course, there are weak points, too.

Question: What do we, the Palestinians, really have to give to the Israelis? What do we have to offer in a peace agreement?

Answer: I think we all over-estimate the Israelis; they need peace too, but they want it according to their design. The price of confrontation is very high, and they are no longer able to carry this economic burden. Israel wishes to become the Hong Kong of the region, but it realizes that economic development is dependent on the existence of peace.

Question: Can we say that Israel was looking for an ally in the region to be used as a key to economic access to the region? Were there any secret arrangements concerning this in the treaty?

Answer: There were no secret articles in the treaty. And, supposing that there were, I do not think that they would have remained secret for 17 years. No, there are no secret arrangements, but there are a lot of problems and different opinions.

Question: Egypt lost its leadership position in the Arab World as a result of Camp David, but it received compensation in the form of economic progress. What was Israel’s strategic goal in the negotiations with Egypt?

Answer: Israel’s main goal was to minimize security pressures. Israel had a real interest in peace and stability in the region, partly because it wanted to go ahead with its policy of internal economic reforms, which required both stability and resources.

Question: What can Egypt do to exert pressure upon Israel? Is there something that Egypt can use but has not used until now?

Answer: There is no doubt that Egypt has the means to assert pressure on Israel. A simple evaluation of the Israeli-Egyptian relations would show the Israelis that there is discontent on the Egyptian side. The Egyptians, as a result of this discontent, are reluctant to establish further relations with the Israelis.

Question: Why were the Palestinians not invited to Camp David?

Answer: I understand that the feelings of the Palestinians were hurt. The PLO, at that time, was considered a terrorist organization. Perhaps Sadat also feared that including the PLO in the talks would lead to difficulties. Therefore, the PLO was not officially invited to take part in the negotiations, but Edward Sa’id and Ibrahim Abu Lughod, who were members of the PNC at the time, served as advisors.

The ideological self-image of Syria has evolved over time. Twenty-five years ago, Syria’s approach to politics was much more nationalist than it is today. Now, the notion of a Greater Syria, which was the underlying objective shaping Syria’s politics, is weaker but not totally absent. It affects the relations with the Palestinians, not least of all because it is contradictory to the Palestinian nationalism represented by the PLO. In the Syrian view, the PLO should be under Syrian control and Palestinian nationalism should merely be a part of regional nationalism. This attitude does not simply spring out of a romantic Pan-Arab vision; it is also a consequence of the real effects of Palestinian and regional politics on the Syrian situation and on Syrian politics. Syria perceives itself as the patron of Arab nationalism, its only true proponent since Abdul Nasser - the core nationalist country. This self-image as the leader of the Pan-Arab movement is recognized by most other Arab states.

Internationally, Syria is keen on not being singled out as the region’s saboteur state. It plays a role as a host for opposition groups and maintains control over the situation in South Lebanon, but engages, on the other hand, in negotiations and even joint actions with the US (as in the Second Gulf War). Due to its strategic importance and stand in the Arab World, Syria has a considerable margin of maneuverability. It can get away with behavior that other states dislike and is even treated with respect by the US and the EU, despite being regarded as a state that promotes terrorism.

Regionally, Syria has good relations with many countries, including Iran. It is able to use these relations to its advantage, for example, in order to consolidate its own standing vis-à-vis Israel or Iraq, or with regard to its domestic Islamic opposition, because such relations are depicted as proof of the government being a good Arab, Muslim regime. But the regional balance is delicate.

The internal Syrian situation is the most important determinant of its foreign policies; it is also the most delicate subject, and it is not easy to determine the extent to which it affects foreign policy decisions. President Asad is part of a minority group, the Alawites; they enjoy a privileged position, but this is likely to decline with the end of Asad’s reign. The most acute problem at the moment is the question of succession. Connected with the privileges enjoyed by the Alawites is the unfair division of resources among the country’s population segments. There has been a change in the demographic structure with a rise in the Alawite presence in Damascus, but its impact is not yet clear. With regard to the economy, there is a careful and limited process of privatization, but this is revealing many difficulties related to corruption and its effect on the centers of power.

Let me now come to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. How do the aforementioned factors influence the relations with Israel? Is it true that the Golan is the last of Syria’s concerns as some Israeli circles say? Does Syria need to fix its problems of succession and the internal political situation first, before being able to embark on further negotiations with Israel?

What are the critical outstanding issues that the two countries need to resolve, and which side has the greater interest in finding solutions?

Syria has a strong interest in Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights - which has become an even more complicated issue since Netanyahu assumed power. Under Labor, an agreement on the Golan had been negotiated and was almost ready for signing, but the new government wants to negotiate all over again. This issue also involves the scope of the envisioned withdrawal. The Golan, for Syria, is a matter of pride and nationalism. Asad, as the self-proclaimed leader of Pan-Arabism and as the one who always attacked Sadat for surrendering cannot compromise on the basic issue of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, although he might be able to compromise on certain details. What are the other issues related to this? First of all, there is a need for security arrangements for the post-withdrawal period. Israel has an interest in arrangements that are not dependent on the continuation of the current Syrian regime; it wishes to protect its interests, even in the event of a new government and the civil strife that could result from the succession process. Thus, there is a need for demilitarized zones beyond the Golan Heights themselves; the question to be negotiated is if they should be designated equally or proportionally. This also involves the question of the quantity and quality of armament allowed in the area.

Other important topics for the Israelis are the Syrian-Iranian alliance entailing the support for ‘terrorist’ groups in Lebanon, as well as the Israeli interest in maintaining its nuclear monopoly in the region; the arrangements in Lebanon concerning the nature and the size of the Syrian presence and its future role in the country; and the Syrian attitude towards Palestinian opposition groups in Syria - such as the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

For both countries, the water question is a critical one that needs to be discussed.

The normalization of relations that Israel insists should follow a peace agreement will be difficult for Asad to accept, but in the event of an Israeli withdrawal and a fair agreement, gradual normalization will be possible. Even if the government does not control or block the normalization process, there is no reason for the Syrian regime to fear that it will proceed too quickly, as they believe it did with regard to Egypt and Jordan.

Syria up until now refuses to participate in multilateral negotiations or regional conferences concerning issues relating to the refugees, the environment, etc., because it first wants to settle the basic issues through bilateral negotiations. The multilaterals, however, are not meaningful without Syria’s participation.

Another issue Israel is interested in is the situation and future of the Jews left in Syria.

It is clear that neither of the two parties is in a hurry to continue with negotiations. Israel is far more interested in preserving the status quo concerning the Golan Heights or in changing the balance of power in its favor. This is clearly apparent in the Israeli proposals of a one-sided withdrawal or a ‘Lebanon first’ option, which cannot be taken seriously. Time will work in favor of Israel as Syria’s power appears destined to decline.

There is, however, a relation between the different ‘tracks’. When the Syrian track deteriorates, it has a negative influence on the Jordanian and Palestinian track. Hence, Syria’s power is in its ability to cause problems in Lebanon and to disrupt the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian relations. Syria has a ‘power to sabotage’. Israel is much stronger in everything concerning weaponry, but Syria has been able, through Asad’s careful brinkmanship, to create a kind of parity and deterrent by its power of sabotage and by securing Arab support of its position. None of the sides today really thinks of attacking the other, despite all the talk about war or preparations for war.

Question: You said that Syria has become less nationalist; now, who has become more nationalist in comparison?

Answer: No, you misunderstood. Syria has become less nationalist compared to its own stand earlier. The position it took, for example, during the Second Gulf War, was not a nationalist position.

Question: Why does Syria host Palestinian opposition groups?

Answer: They serve as a playing card for Syria in its relations with Israel. There is the possibility that these groups would have to leave the country if Syria signed a peace treaty with Israel; at the very least, they would not be able to continue with their political activities.

Question: What are Syria’s interests in the region?

Answer: Syria’s main interest at the moment is not to be forgotten or become isolated as this would weaken the Syrian position.

Question: How do you see the situation in Lebanon at the moment?

Answer: There exists a trade-off in Lebanon. The Lebanese, at the moment, accept an oppressive regime that provides them with security. The Syrians have not taken permission from the Lebanese; however, in Lebanon, there is no consensus that Syria should leave. Some people are interested in seeing a continued Syrian presence.

Question: What are the Syrian interests in Lebanon?

Answer: Syria has a strategic interest in Lebanon because of its problematic relations with Israel, and it considers Lebanon its backyard. It also has economic interests in Lebanon such as the work opportunities provided there for Syrian migrant workers.

Question: You said that Syria is seeking Arab unity. Is this so because Syria is weak?

Answer: No. Arab unity is not high on the Syrian agenda. Such talk is part of the political culture, of the flying discourse, of the propaganda to legitimize the system.

Question: What about the talk of war between Syria and Israel?

Answer: Such a war could be a tactical war to foster negotiations. But the situation is too sensitive; no one has an interest in a war at this time, as it could easily get out of control.

Question: How does Syria manage to have good relations with many countries, and even with countries that are enemies with one another?

Answer: This is because Syria has a central role in the region as it is strategically important to so many countries: Iran, the US, Palestinian groups, etc. Another reason for its good relations is the expertise of the Syrian leadership.

Question: How do you see the US role in the Syrian-Israeli peace process?

Answer: The US is pressuring Syria at the moment to return to the negotiation table, but Syria does not have to yield to American pressure.

Question: Is there hope for a quick Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation?

Answer: I would say, no. A rapprochement in this adverse situation can only be temporary, a tactical move.

Question: In this seminar, we have talked a lot about ripeness and the hurting stalemate that is needed to overcome deadlocks in negotiations. Where is the hurting stalemate on the Syrian-Israeli track or, how could it be induced?

Answer: A feeling of urgency would be needed, but neither side feels this at the present time. The Gulf War induced a US peace initiative, but the fact remains, that for the last 25 years, the status quo - a situation of stability - has continued to exist. There is no urgent necessity to move away from it. Maybe this will only change in the face of a disaster.

Question: What would be a scenario for future negotiations?

Answer: As I said, negotiations will only resume if there is a drastic deterioration in a certain field. An unexpected event could trigger a new situation conducive to negotiations. This could be in Palestine or in South Lebanon, for example.

Question: What about the domestic political situation in Syria - the assassination of Asad’s son a few years ago and the bus bombing last year? Isn’t it very tense at the moment and is this not going to reflect on the negotiations?

Answer: It has never been verified that Basil Asad was assassinated, but it is likely. And this, of course, weakens the Alawite dynasty in Syria. Concerning the bus bombing last year, nobody knows for sure who or what was responsible. There are three possibilities: Israel and its friends in Southern Lebanon as a reaction by proxy to guerrilla activities; Syrian Islamists, which I consider rather unlikely; or an internal power struggle. But it can be seen as a sign of a deteriorating internal situation. How this situation will affect the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, however, is not easy to determine.

Arab-Israeli Negotiations (III): Israel and Palestine
Oslo - the Conflict, the Mediators and the Breakthrough
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

During the last ten decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict went through various interconnected and interdependent phases. They may be classified according to three major eras: the international, the Arab and the Palestinian era. Although they each represent a certain period, they overlap in terms of dates, places, proposed solution (political and military) and respective outcomes. The evolution of the conflict throughout these three eras shows that each left its mark and influenced the other in terms of players, mediators and issues of concern. None can be studied independently or separated from the others since each stage of the conflict evolved over time and led, eventually, to some kind of result, which influenced the development of stages yet to come. Moreover, what may be viewed as a breakthrough at any one stage in any of the eras has to be seen as a product of preceding events. Thus, although the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the success or failure of its main players and mediators must be read against the background of the respective circumstances, it can ultimately only be understood in its overall context.

In order to understand the full meaning of what is widely chronicled as the "breakthrough" at Oslo in October 1992, there is a need to trace and study certain events as they occurred during the three eras. Particular consideration must be given to the political environment, the mediators, the proposed solutions and the outcomes.

The political environment of the time included the re-awakening or "renaissance" of the Arab national movement and the birth of the Zionist movement, both of which faced three major, contradicting political documents: the first was the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence of 1915, in which the British invited the Arabs to become allies against the Turks and offered in return to help them establish their sovereign independent Arab states; the second was the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, which outlined the new colonial map of the Middle East as drawn up jointly by the British and the French; and the third was the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British government declared its support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

At the doorsteps of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 we saw the British officer Thomas Edward Lawrence adopt the role of a mediator and attempt to satisfy both sides’ aspirations by drafting the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, which related to certain aspects of Arab-Jewish cooperation. The Arabs, including the Palestinians, did not rec-ognize nor accept the concept or the content of the document. The Palestinians argued that since Faisal spoke no English and Weizmann no Arabic, the document reflected Lawrence’s "interpretation" in accordance with British "wishful thinking," and was merely an attempt to close the gap between the three contradicting political documents.

The Versailles Peace Conference was an international forum for both the Arab and Jewish leaders to present their cases, while the 14 points the US president had called for - including the right to self-determination - were not applied. As the British and French governments held the mandates in the Arab territories for several decades, the international era was dominated by third party involvement.

As an outcome of World War II the geopolitical map of the Middle East was redefined. The Palestinians emphasized their Arab roots and their status as an integral part of the Arab nation with all its aspirations. The creation of a central Arab political address was realized with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. At the same time, the central Jewish-Zionist political decision-making apparatus moved from London to Washington, and thus, the center of influence and alliances was shifted. Soon after, a series of events - the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the subsequent first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and the establishment of the Israeli state - led to the uprooting and expulsion of the Palestinian people and their search for refuge in the neighboring Arab countries.

The mediators, their proposals and ideas for resolving the conflict, and the manner in which they were introduced during this era were not very different from those of the previous period, although they had been somewhat adjusted to the new balance of power in terms of intervention, interpretation and reasoning.

The binational state thesis, for example, which had previously been discussed between Jewish, British and Palestinian intellectuals, was now (July 1947) presented by King Abdallah to the UN Commission as a collective Arab position. Similarly, the plan to partition Palestine, originally proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937 and developed by the Woodhead Commission in 1938, was now presented in the Partition Plan of Resolution 181, passed by the UN General Assembly. Thirdly, the proposed annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to the Jordanian state, which had been discussed most intensively between King Abdallah and Zionist leaders in August 1946, was now brought up by the Swedish UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Finally, the question of Jerusalem was continuously addressed as a key component of any future political settlement, with many proposals that essentially promoted a special status for the city. The real novelty in this era was the shift in priorities, which put the issues of borders, refugees and direct negotiations towards mutual recognition at the top of the agenda.

The outcome was the emergence of the phenomenon of political assassination that became characteristic of the first phase of the Arab era.

The Palestinization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was accelerated by the Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine in the course of the 1967 June War. The Palestinian era reached is peak with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington DC on 13 September 1993.

This era witnessed many political phases with numerous attempts to build a bridge between and by the two peoples immediately concerned: Palestinians and Israelis. More than 30 years have left a long record of contacts, dialogue, confrontation and, more recently, numerous meetings between individuals and groups from both sides, sometimes with the presence of a third party.

The first phase (1967-1970) was determined by the shock of the Arab defeat, the fear of the unknown future, the absence of leadership and the total military occupation. The Palestinians ‘inside’ responded with a policy of non-cooperation with the occupiers, while waiting for a solution to come from outside, either internationally (UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967), regionally (Arab Summit, Khartoum, August 1962) or PLO (Al-Muqawamah Al-Filestiniyah).

However, none of the outside players delivered a solution, while inside, the Palestinian society was crippled by the lack of an economy, health, welfare or education services and institutional development. The Israeli policy, from as early as 1967, had three main aims as described by Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister. The aims were as follows:

to maintain daily contact between the Palestinians and the Arab World to divert the Palestinian focus from Israel to outside;

to use the Palestinians to pass political messages to Cairo and Amman;

to initiate direct contact with the Palestinians, hoping that they will accept to accommodate themselves to the Israeli reality.

However, the Palestinian position was that they "must not extend a hand to the Israelis unless ‘we’ are willing to extend another hand to the Arab states. If ‘we’ became secessionists and separated from the Arabs there would be no settlement, and ‘we’ would not gain anything."

In the second phase (1970-1982), the Palestinians ‘inside’ adopted a new policy: steadfastness (summud), i.e., keeping their civil society functioning and developing institutions and their leadership. This phase was characterized by the loss of power and status of local notables and old families, the rise of a national front, the formation of the National Guidance Committee, and acceptance of the challenges of confrontation but with a willingness to negotiate and to exercise the right to govern. The ‘outside’ leaders voiced their desire for a peaceful solution based on coexistence and mutual recognition. But this new development in Palestinian thinking and planning was faced with many sacrifices and the assassination of PLO leaders, which brought the Palestinians to a phase of isolation.

The third phase (1982-87) witnessed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, followed by the Palestinian resistance movement’s exodus. The Israelis hoped that these two events had cleared the way to reach a political settlement with ‘moderate’ Palestinians inside the territories. The Israeli plan was "an autonomy" based on the Jordan Option. The Jordanians called for the exchange of "land for peace" to be negotiated within the context of an international conference with PLO participation (11 February 1985). A series of contact, dialogue, drafted joint statements, documents and declarations occurred during this phase. Examples are Shimon Peres’ meetings with ‘inside’ activists, the encounters of Uri Avineri and Mattiyahu Peled with ‘outside’ leaders, including Chairman Arafat, and the academic dialogue between Abba Eban and Walid Khalidi.

The major results of these meetings were:

At the time of the fourth phase (1987-90), the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories had reached a stage of desperation and anger, which made them feel they had nothing to lose. They decided (a) to change the status quo, i.e., to end Israeli occupation, and (b) to build a new society in the OPT, based on self-reliance, and to direct it towards freedom, independence and statehood. This new phase of resistance was introduced with what became known as the Intifada.

The three main characteristics of the Intifada were as follows:

no fear of direct confrontation with the military occupiers;

the Palestinization of the OPT;

the elaboration of a political settlement based on a two-state solution.

Several mediators rushed to the scene with many ideas on how to bring the two sides - the occupier and the occupied - together in a peace conference:

An Egyptian initiative in January 1988 called for a six-month truce and a freeze on settlement activities;

US Secretary of State George Shultz added to the Egyptian idea in March 1988 by suggesting that negotiations be held along the provisions laid down in the Camp David Accords, and that Palestinian self-rule be achieved by February 1989;

Mikhail Gorbatchov encouraged PLO leader Yasser Arafat to recognize Israel’s right to exist;

The ‘inside’ Palestinian leadership favored two initiatives: a) issuing a declaration of independence and b) forming a provisional government-in-exile; meanwhile, the ‘outside’ PLO leadership expressed its readiness to sit down with Israel if Israel, in turn, agreed to withdraw from the OPT.

On 2 August 1990 delegations from the Palestinian and Israeli mainstream met in Jerusalem to sign a joint statement, which included mutual recognition and a call for direct negotiations towards a settlement of the conflict. However, the Gulf Crisis halted their work. At the same time, the world witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arab World dividing over the issue of the Gulf War, and Israel remaining the strongest military arsenal in the Middle East while the PLO had no military power, or Arab financial or political support.

The Palestinians ‘inside’ faced land confiscation, settlement building and, from the beginning of the Intifada, four years of social and economic suffering. Their options were limited when "they were called upon to accept a reality that was not yet legally in force." This reality, the commencement of negotiations, was introduced by US President George Bush on 6 March 1991. The US formula to the Madrid Conference was based on the implementation of a) UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; b) the principle of land for peace; c) the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and d) security and peace for the state of Israel.

The Israelis made it clear that their participation in Madrid was conditional on the following elements regarding the Palestinian participation: no to Jerusalemites, no to PLO members, no to an independent Palestinian delegation, no to the Palestinian flag and no to a Palestinian state.

The Palestinians realized that they could not deter those who were invited to go, nor change or amend the terms of reference; nor could they afford to stay outside the negotiation tunnel. Thus, they accepted the challenge to enter the dark tunnel, confident that they would be able to change the conditions and influence other parties based on the mechanism of the Intifada, "changing the status quo in the process and establishing new realities." In Madrid, they were acknowledged and perhaps for the first time, the world showed concern for what they had to say. "Look at Hanan Ashrawi - the moment they saw this messenger, they began to listen to the message."

The Palestinian delegation to Madrid was not elected but nominated by the PLO ‘outside’ leadership in Tunis. Some classified the delegates as representatives of regional affiliations, e.g., a village, a tribe, a political faction or a profession. Others maintained that their selection was the result of PLO recognition of their long years of suffering under occupation.

In Washington, the talks were of the nature of a diplomatic game, which in itself created special problems for a ‘people’ acting in the role of a ‘nation-state’. After 22 months of Washington negotiations, the Israelis presented their version of a transitional phase: the old autonomy plan, starting with the gradual transfer of 12 technical civil departments from Israeli to Palestinian hands, but without any mention of authority transfer, military withdrawal, or recognition of Palestinian rights to the land, water, Jerusalem, and nothing on the question of sovereignty. In addition, the Israeli plan limited Palestinian rule to only one third of the OPT, meaning all authority would remain in Israeli hands, including borders, continued settlement activities, etc. The Palestinians developed and presented a "political document," later known as PISGA (Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority), confirming the Palestinian demand to freeze all settlements, guarantee the geographic integrity of the OPT, and to hold democratic elections. These two documents - the Israeli Autonomy Plan and PISGA - were the only ones trying to close the gap between the two sides that emerged without the interference of a third party, or the influence of a mediator.

Following nine months of negotiations in Madrid, five rounds of talks at the US State Department and the exchange of numerous documents outlining the totally different positions of both the Palestinian and Israeli side, and after it became obvious that neither the mediators nor the US could successfully influence the talks in one way or another, the negotiations had seemingly reached a deadlock. Throughout this period, both the Israeli government and the PLO were very much concerned with the role, performance and future of the Palestinian delegation, though for different reasons.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was extremely worried that the PLO would infiltrate its members into the Palestinian delegation, as he had constantly opposed any attempt of the PLO to become even partly involved and had gone so far as to outlaw any contact between members of the Palestinian delegation with the outside PLO. The gravity of this attitude became clear when Shamir dismissed Minister of Science Eizer Weizmann from his cabinet after the latter established contact with the PLO representative to Switzerland, Mr. Nabil Rimlawi. Shamir was interested in maintaining the umbrella of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. He sent verbal messages to Amman suggesting joint economic and tourist projects in the Red Sea area (Aqaba-Eilat), anticipating the implementation of the old Likud plan for a Jordanian role on the West Bank that leaves the "Jordanian option" open to interpretation. Amman listened but took neither the emissaries nor their messages seriously.

Meanwhile, PLO chairman Arafat tried to balance the Likud’s plans by opening various back-channels with the Labor Party. Among these attempts was his encouraging Faisal Husseini to meet with Peres, Ephraim Sneh and others. After the fall of Shamir, newly-elected Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took office, formed a new government, and resumed negotiations with the Palestinian delegation in Washington. Throughout nine rounds of talks in Washington, the Palestinian delegation remained loyal to Arafat and the PLO leadership and refused to bypass them. Arafat saw the delegation as a ‘Trojan horse’ and encouraged Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi to convince Washington of the need for the PLO to take part in direct talks. However, Washington’s advice was not to rush things, nor to jump to later phases, as, according to the US, the PLO’s role was yet to come.

On day one of the Washington negotiations, Arafat had sent two emissaries to establish direct contact with the Palestinian delegation (Akram Haniyyeh and Dr. Nabil Sha’ath), since it was his nightmare that the Palestinian delegation (Al-Wafd) would turn into a substitute leadership. His famous quotation, "They want Yasser Arafat to be a male bee, i.e., deliver once and die," speaks for itself. Arafat’s ongoing fear was that the negotiation process would not be governed by desires but by results and, despite the loyalty of the delegates to the PLO and to his leadership, he realized that those who delivered were likely to become future leaders. There were several indications of such an unwelcome development. For example, it was the Jerusalemite leader Faisal Husseini, who, in his capacity as the head of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, exchanged official correspondence with US Secretary of State James Baker, who was officially received at the US State Department, and who, before the end of the eighth round of talks, was received by President George Bush at the White House.

The situation Arafat faced at this time resembles the episode of Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the world Zionist movement, and Ben Gurion, then leader of the Jewish Agency ‘inside’ Palestine, in 1948: following Israel’s declaration of independence and the establishment of the Jewish state, the ‘outside’ leader Weizmann became the symbol of the state and its head, but it was Ben Gurion who formed the government and ruled as Prime Minister.

With this background in mind, Chairman Arafat and the PLO leadership in Tunis saw that the official negotiations taking place between 20 people in Washington would lead to nowhere. Recalling the experience of Vietnam, Algiers and Camp David, Arafat and his inner cabinet were convinced that other channels must be opened. The PLO badly needed the peace talks to progress in order to maintain its legitimacy as the official representative and leadership of the Palestinian people, especially in view of an increasing opposition steered by the radicals in Damascus and the Islamic trends of Hamas and Jihad Islami, and in order to face King Hussein whose popularity was rapidly growing. To take any further step forward in the peace process was furthermore crucial in order to contain the already recognized ‘inside’ Palestinian leaders, and to grab the possibility of establishing direct secret contacts with Israel. The opening of new channels besides the official talks in Washington was encouraged by the Israeli Knesset decision to lift the ban on contact with the PLO, although Arafat was left wondering why the lifting of the ban coincided with the deportation of 400 Islamic leaders from the OPT.

On the other hand, Rabin and his inner cabinet thought along similar lines and gradually realized that the Palestinian delegation itself was not capable of signing an agreement with Israel nor of governing any interim regime, and that it lacked legitimacy as it was not elected by the community but chosen by Israel in back-door coordination with the US and the PLO. Furthermore, the Israeli side comprehended two other crucial aspects: a) that any agreement would require a strong and highly legitimate Palestinian authority in order to gain acceptance and in order for its security and police forces to be able to control the OPT; and b) that Israel’s only alternative to dealing with the PLO as a legitimate political representative was the Islamic movement and its leadership. This, however, would imply the transformation of the political conflict into a religious one - something the Rabin-Peres government could not afford.

Thus, at this stage, numerous other channels of contact between the Palestinians and the Israelis were opened besides the official talks in Washington. Indeed, at least two of them contributed major elements to the final text of the accords, as did the ten rounds of formal negotiations at the State Department in Washington, held between November 1991 and June 1993. One of these channels was, again, the ‘inside’, i.e., Faisal Husseini’s and Hanan Ashrawi’s contacts with and through Washington, ordered by and directly reported to Arafat, but without the knowledge of any other member of the delegation or of any other PLO leader in Tunis. Another channel was the indirect contact with and through Cairo of Arafat himself and members of his inner cabinet. A third channel was proposed by PLO Executive Committee member and head of the Palestinian negotiation committee, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who suggested to open a back-channel contact with and through the Russians in Moscow in order to balance the Washington track. The Russians made a great effort to convince the Israelis of the need for their intervention, but Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ answer was, "What is already available is enough."

At a time when the talks had seemingly come to a deadlock and the two parties urgently needed to break out of their domestic constraints and to deliver some kind of an interim arrangement, an intermediary appeared who introduced an issue that addressed a major concern of both sides, despite their different motivations. Terje Larson, founder of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Sciences, who at the time was working on a project to alleviate Gaza’s chronic social problems, suggested to focus on "Gaza first" as an initial step towards a comprehensive agreement. Gaza was of particular interest to the Israelis and Palestinians. Peres’ thinking had centered for years on the notion of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and Rabin had repeatedly expressed in public speeches the wish that Gaza would disappear from the map and "sink in the sea." On the other hand, Chairman Arafat and most PLO leaders were very much aware of and seriously concerned with Gaza’s daily cry for freedom and the need to rid the area rid of the Israeli occupation. As far back as in 1974, at the Rabat Arab Summit where the PLO was recognized by the Arab leaders as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat and Arafat had mentioned Jericho as a possible base for PLO authority and talked about the need to have a strong PLO presence in Gaza as well.

Terje Larson, the Norwegian intermediary, suggested that Israeli Labor politician Yossi Beilin, who considered Gaza one of Israel’s biggest political and military problems in need of an immediate solution, should meet Faisal Husseini and discuss the issue. The meeting between the two took place shortly before the June 1992 Israeli elections, but a second meeting did not materialize after Beilin became Peres’ Deputy Minister in the Rabin government and Faisal Husseini received too much public and media attention. The fact that Arafat would not welcome such a contact with the ‘inside’ leaders was clear to the Israelis, who were aware of the conflict and mutual fear defining the Palestinian inside-outside leadership relations at that time.

Yossi Beilin took the initiative to overcome this situation by giving the green light to one of his academic colleagues, Professor Yair Hirschfeld of Haifa University, to contact Ahmad Qrei’a (Abu Ala’), the PLO’s financial expert, at the multilateral meetings on 3-4 December 1992, in London. Palestinian delegation members Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, together with the PLO representative in London, Afif Safieh, encouraged Qrei’a to meet Hirschfeld and arranged the first encounter. Meanwhile, Terje Larsen persuaded Hirschfeld to attend the meeting. PLO leaders in Tunis viewed this meeting as a watershed, marking the beginning of direct and secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel. The ‘outside’ leadership was extremely concerned that the Palestinian ‘inside’ delegation, i.e., Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Haidar Abdul Shafi and others would not learn more about the development of this channel. Abu Ala’ later revealed that whenever Hirschfeld, during the various stages of the talks, made attempts to approach Husseini, Ashrawi or any other Palestinian activist from inside the territories to pass a message or to comment on an issue, the PLO threatened to freeze the contacts or halt the talks. The PLO inner cabinet that supervised this back-channel consisted of Chairman Arafat, Abu Mazen and Abu Ala’, while Peres, with his close advisors, and Beilin, with his academic team, negotiated on the Israeli side. Both parties were keen to maintain the high level of secrecy of this channel and the Norwegian mediator committed himself to take full responsibility for facilitating the meetings but without intervening in the substance of the talks.

The two leaderships both faced domestic constraints and feared a political storm that would shake their foundations. In this regard, the Palestinians faced two crises. The first arose when the Palestinian delegation’s leading figures, namely Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi and Sa’eb Erekat, resigned due to differences with Arafat in terms of tactics and strategies and because of the absence of a centralized body to coordinate and govern the negotiation process. Additionally, they suspected the existence of another negotiation channel undermining their own efforts behind their backs. The second crisis emerged when three PLO leaders (Abu Mazen, Yasser Abed Rabbo and Mahmoud Darwish) resigned due to differences with Chairman Arafat regarding the handling of the PLO’s financial affairs and the possible bankruptcy of its institutions. Chairman Arafat contained the first storm by accepting the establishment of a higher coordinating body to supervise the negotiations and allowing the participation of leaders from the inside. With regard to the second storm, he managed to abort this by disclosing the news of the successful developments on the Oslo track to the resigning PLO leaders. They withdrew their resignations with the exception of Mahmoud Darwish, whose move was followed by others such as PLO Executive Committee member Shafiq Al-Hout, the PLO representative in Beirut.

On the Israeli side, there was the case of Mr. Dare’i of the Shas Party who was - after being convicted of bribery by the Israeli High Court - asked to resign, or otherwise be dismissed from office by the Prime Minister. This episode resulted in the Shas Party’s withdrawal from the government, which in turn shook and weakened the coalition government, leaving it dependent on the Arab vote in the Knesset. At the same time, rumors of alleged secret negotiations taking place between Israel and Jordan stirred more dissension within Israeli ranks. Moreover, the rumors served as an invitation to Hamas, Jihad Islami and other Islamic organizations on both banks of the Jordan River to coordinate positions and prepare strategies to face any outcome of the alleged Jordanian-Israeli talks.

The Israeli agenda for the breakthrough was made up of three components, as Foreign Minister Peres put it:

1. a partial staged Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories, beginning with Gaza as an opening gambit;

2. postponing difficult and complicated issues to the future, i.e., a later round of talks, when the final status of the OPT would be decided upon - thus, leaving the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for the time being, enveloped in fog; and

3. building a strong foundation of economic cooperation.

This concept allowed Israel to make the future of Palestinian autonomy with ‘Gaza-Jericho first’ dependent on the future balance of power and on the ability of the Palestinians to develop towards an independent Palestinian state - or otherwise to face transformation into a scattered ‘bantustan’ with Israeli de facto - if not de jure - sovereignty. By postponing the most difficult issues - including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, security, relations and cooperation with other neighbors - to the final status talks, the Israelis made it clear that they considered Oslo a test, i.e., an interim phase, during each stage of which they would insist on the fulfillment of certain guarantees before moving any further.

The Palestinian agenda, on the other hand, was determined by a) the notion that reaching an agreement would mean a historical breakthrough in terms of mutual recognition. This recognition could take the form of a declaration of principles or of a framework agreement similar to the Camp David accords; b) the importance of the ‘Gaza-Jericho first’ formula as an incentive to market the proposed declaration of principles by establishing an official, recognized PLO authority on Palestinian soil; c) the realization that separating the difficult issues from those that could be agreed upon more easily would make way for needed compromises; and d) the realization that a Palestinian-Israeli agreement would open the door for other agreements with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. For the Palestinians, Oslo was thus a means to establish an official and recognized PLO authority in part of their homeland. Another incentive for the acceptance of the historic reconciliation with the Israelis was the recognition of the OPT "as a single territorial unit whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period."

The Norwegian intermediaries contributed a great deal to what the world witnessed as the first ever historic handshake between top Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the lawn of the White House on 13 September 1993. The substance of the DoP was the exchange of land for peace and limited Palestinian self-rule during a transitional phase, until the final status talks on the remaining major issues would provide for a permanent settlement. In fact, this understanding was consistent with the basic principles of the initial Madrid Peace Conference, the invitation to which - dated 18 October 1991 - read as follows:

The Oslo ‘breakthrough’ provided one of many opportunities to build a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but it seems that too many people are prisoners of past ideologies, principles and positions and do not realize the importance of looking forward to the future. Furthermore, they tend to underestimate the power and options of the other side. The major lesson to be learnt from the Oslo experience is that it needs more than the will and courage and more than pressure and constraints to force legitimate leaders to reach political agreements to put an end to deep-rooted historical conflicts.

The Oslo accords were signed between the PLO, the sole, legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people and the embodiment of Palestinian aspirations, and the elected Israeli government, headed by the Labor Party. The Oslo blueprint delivered mutual recognition and conformed to the common interest in minimizing the role of Islamic groups and extremist bodies on both sides. However, the agreement to build a relationship on the principle of land for peace, reiterated in the subsequent Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement signed 4 May 1994 in Cairo, was designed according to Rabin’s and Peres’ plan to leave the OPT in stages or throughout testing periods.

Today, three years after Oslo, there is a Palestinian Authority with an elected legislative council governing the autonomous areas of the Zone A category, coordinating with Israeli security forces in the territory falling in the Zone B category, while most of the OPT - Zone C - remains under Israel’s full control. The Palestinians, after accepting the transitional phase as an opportunity to establish their civil society and institutions and to build bridges of trust, understanding and cooperation with the other side, are now facing a new dilemma. It took them two decades of steadfastness under occupation, five years of challenging the occupiers, during the Intifada, and three years of long and painful negotiations in Madrid, Washington and Moscow to bring about the historic signing of the DoP, the reconciliation document signed with the Israeli Labor Party, representing half of the Israeli society.

Following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 by a Jewish extremist, and, six months later, with the defeat of the Labor Party, the rise of the right-wing Likud Party and the direct election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister, the Palestinians realized that not even half of the Israeli society accepts a political settlement on the basis of the land-for-peace formula. It took Mr. Netanyahu 100 days in office to evoke a storm in both societies as well as in the region as a whole. The angry Palestinian outburst in September 1996 - in response to the Likud government’s policies and practices - brought the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to yet another crossroads, with no clear indication of what lay ahead.

Against the background of the formula of Mr. Netanyahu to contain the problems in the Gaza Strip through economic scenarios while sharing, not leaving, the West Bank - rejected by the Palestinians as unacceptable - it was again the Norwegians who mediated. On the recommendation of his advisor Dore Gold, Netanyahu had invited Terje Larson, UN Special Coordinator for the Occupied Territories to his office on 14 August 1996, and asked him and his wife, Muna Juul, to host a series of quiet top-level Palestinian-Israeli meetings in a bid to reach an agreement with Arafat. Arafat welcomed the idea as it meant he would have his personal direct channel for a new chapter of PLO-Likud relations.

The Norwegian mediation led to the first official public meeting between Chairman Arafat and the Likud Party’s leader and Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in Beit Hanoun/Gaza, where we witnessed the second historic handshake on 4 September 1996 - almost three years after Oslo. The main goal of the meeting at Beit Hanoun was to resume the halted bilateral talks and to arrange for the implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement, signed with the previous government.

The confidential note for the records of the Palestinian-Israeli meeting of 4 September, put together by the Norwegian intermediaries at their residency in Tel Aviv, states the following:

The nature, scope and results of the meetings from 1967 until 1990 can be summed up as follows: they helped in exploring opinions and ideas in the search for short and long-term solutions and illustrated the various reactions of the local communities to the respective suggestions and outcomes of these meetings. They also helped to shape the Palestinian leadership and to coordinate among various figures and schools of thought, and they contributed to the promotion of a national leadership, although, on the other hand, they divided the people into moderates, independents, extremists and loyalists, into mainstream and opposition, inside and outside, thus preventing the emergence of a real national alliance. Finally, they paved the way for others to enter new rounds of negotiations by exposing preconditions and offering starting points for future meetings, based on the achievements and failures of all the procedures and attempts to resolve the conflict that occurred previous to Oslo.

The role of the external parties involved in the Oslo phase has been that of assisting the two sides directly involved in the conflict in taking up their new positions and in reshaping their relationship, while, at the same time, scoring points and striking alliances on their own behalves.

It is true that the role of leaders is to lead, to bring about agreements, and to gain and maintain the consent of their people, but leaders with the required commitment and vision are not always available; and if they are, they may not have enough time to fulfill their dreams.

Arab-Israeli Negotiations (IV): Israel and Jordan
HE Dr. Jawad Anani, Director, Anani Center for Studies, Amman,
and Member of the Senate Council, Jordan

This is the first time that I have been to Jerusalem since 1967 and I have to admit that I was scared to come here. But let me explain why I am here: I will be speaking about the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations and I can do this with an inside view as I was a member of the Jordanian delegation to Madrid, to the first nine rounds of negotiations in Washington and to the multilaterals dealing with refugee questions, and last but not least I was the minister responsible for the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. For me, the most important experience in all these negotiations was the human dimension involved in such meetings. I learned that you cannot overestimate the importance of human feelings and the chemistry between persons and teams in such negotiations.

In the Madrid and Washington negotiations, there was a dichotomy in the approach of the Israelis: they dealt with the Jordanian delegation, although they were negotiating over Palestinian issues. This was the consequence of the conditions they had imposed on the Palestinian representatives; the Israelis would not accept an autonomous Palestinian delegation, nor one that included PLO members, Jerusalemites, or Diaspora Palestinians. They robbed the Palestinians of any legal representation in the negotiations. Haidar Abdul Shafi, for example, did not sign the agreements as a legal representative. On the other hand, the Israelis realized that there was a need to find a legally empowered and responsible representative.

Thus, the first part of the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations centered on the question of how to cope with the Palestinian dimension. One of the problems was that the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation comprised the same number of representatives as the Israeli team, even though the Jordanian delegation, on its own, should have equaled the Israeli one. ‘Diplomatic arithmetic’ led to the agreement that negotiations would take place on two tracks according to the issues concerned: in the case of a ‘Palestinian issue’, the joint delegation would consist of nine Palestinians and two Jordanians, whereas in the case of a ‘Jordanian issue’, it would be the other way around. A substantial amount of ‘corridor diplomacy’ was employed to allow this decision to be reached.

For the Palestinian delegates, it was most important to be treated as equal by the Israeli side and to assert their independence from Jordan, to show that there were two different entities represented in the delegation. Thus, symbolism became especially important.

The negotiations themselves were rather amusing: there was no chairman for the sessions, no agreed upon minutes, and all we produced were non-papers. This was the result of an American approach, which tries to circumvent some of the inherent problems of negotiations that can block them in an early stage - such as choosing the chair. Flexibility was meant to allow the dynamics of the process to become a self-runner.

In the beginning, the two sides would talk to each other only in the negotiation room; outside, there was no communication at all as both sides considered the other to be the enemy. This mood prevailed throughout the first two rounds, and the ice was only broken as a result of an(other) American idea to set up two different coffee tables outside the conference room, with basic ingredients missing on one table but available on the other, so that the two sides were forced to talk to each other. Hence, a slow rapprochement between the sides began, and this later involved contacts on a more personal level.

What were the major issues involved in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations?

Territory: Israel captured 360 km² of Jordanian territory (which is about the size of the Gaza Strip) in a creeping occupation from 1970 onwards. The question was whether UN Resolution 242 would apply to this territory as the occupation took place after the resolution was passed. But, as the text of the resolution reads ‘withdrawal from occupied territories’ (as opposed to ‘withdrawal from the occupied territories’), it can be assumed that Resolution 242 refers to any territory occupied by Israel, notwithstanding the fact that there have been no acknowledged boundaries between Jordan and Israel, only cease-fire lines. Israel agreed to return land to Jordan.

Water: The most difficult issue was the water question. The 1953 Johnson Plan that provided for the division of the Yarmuk waters between Jordan (300 million m³), Syria (40 million m³) and Israel (25) was at that time rejected by the Arab states. A division of the Yarmuk waters was agreed upon at the 1964 Arab Summit, but this became baseless with the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Jordan River Valley. Today, Syria gets a share of about 90 million m³ of the Yarmuk water, and Israel about 25 million m³ (after the peace treaty). The main problem is that Israel is not willing to share the water of the Jordan River as it considers Lake Tiberias its only supply of drinking water.

Refugees: The total number of Palestinian refugees is not easy to determine. If all who left what is now called ‘Israel proper’ were included, there would be about five million refugees. But it is also a matter of subjective perception and self-definition. According to UNRWA statistics, there are about 1.2 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan. What distinguishes these refugees from refugees in other countries of the region is that 95% of them have become Jordanian citizens.

Jordan thinks that the refugee question should be solved according to the rules of international law, but Israel rejects the application of UN Resolution 194. The refugee question is a complicated matter, partly because 80-90% of the refugees in Jordan do not even want to return. Thus, it becomes a matter of compensation involving questions relating to who will compensate and how much will be paid. In the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, no special arrangements were made concerning the refugee issue because the subject had already been postponed to the final status talks by the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Jordan, hence, could not proceed with the solving of the refugee issues; it could not take over the responsibility, but Jordan and Egypt will join in the discussion in the context of the final status negotiations.

The Israeli condition for the talks with the Jordanians was that they take place in the frame of negotiations leading to a peace treaty. Jordan agreed to this due to its desire to solve the burning issues first. Now, we are at a stage in the negotiations where we need to agree on an approach to solving the pending issues with the Palestinians. Looking at the future of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, it is most important to understand that the strengthening of both parties vis-à-vis Israel will only succeed when the relations between Jordan and the Palestinians are strengthened.

The final status negotiations will center around the following questions affecting Jordan: water, borders (and especially the rectifying of the borders between Jordan and the Palestinians), and Jerusalem. You might wonder why Jordanians interfere in the Jerusalem issue. There are several reasons for this. Jerusalem is a symbol and a sign on the road of history. It has been lost and annexed under Jordanian rule. We want to make sure that it will be taken care of by the Palestinians and not by the Israelis. At least 60% of the Jordanians are of Palestinian origin, and about 20% of the remainder also have Palestinian blood in their veins - and they are proud of it! Why are we fighting each other? What we need are proper arrangements that will enable us to deal with one another.

There is also a need for cooperation in the economic field. Our economies have always developed in a parallel manner, although, during the last two years, there has been a slight improvement in the Jordanian economy while the Palestinian economy has gone into a sharp decline. Today, the Palestinian economy is totally controlled by Israel; Israel dominates Palestinian trade, territory and labor. A political disengagement is worth very little without an economic disengagement.

Question: You have already spoken about the question of Jerusalem. But what is the detailed Jordanian position on its status? Can you elaborate on this, please?

Answer: The Jordanian position on Jerusalem is very clear. King Hussein wants all the land occupied by Israel to be returned to the Palestinians and for it to be under Palestinian sovereignty. Concerning the Holy Sites, sovereignty should be for God, i.e., there should be a kind of joint administration consisting of the religious leaders or an international regime. At exactly the same moment that Jerusalem is returned to the Palestinians, Jordan’s role will end.

Question: Don’t you think that the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty weakens the position of the Palestinians?

Answer: I think we should accept that we, as Arabs, are not united. It is impossible that a united Arab delegation would ever sign a peace treaty with Israel because each Arab country has a different agenda and different interests. There would always be states such as Syria blocking the negotiations. There is no perfect solution. But, in the end, you are right. We should have cooperated much better with the Palestinians.

Question: Why should the Palestinians trust Jordan’s claim that it will return Jerusalem to the Palestinians, taking into account everything that has happened between the two peoples?

Answer: There are no guarantees. But what would be the use for Jordan to rule over the Holy Sites? What leverage would Jordan have over them?

Comment: The Jordanian religious custody over the Holy Sites has not weakened Palestinian claims to the whole city of East Jerusalem.

Answer: But the fact of the matter is that since 1967, Jordan has maintained custody of the Holy Places, and if we had left our positions, e.g., in the administration or in the courts, these places would have been lost to the Israelis. It has to be ensured that they are returned to the Palestinians.

Question: I have two questions. After the signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, there was a crisis in the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. How can we improve this relation? Also, concerning Har Homa, what is the Jordanian position on this issue, and what action is being taken in Jordan with regard to Israeli settlement activity?

Answer: First, concerning the question on Israeli settlements, three times now Israeli officials have visited Jordan and, the very next day, announced a decision. This made it look as if there had been an agreement or coordination between Jordan and Israel. Jordan has to make its position very clear: we have nothing to do with this, and we are against all Israeli settlement activity, including that at Jabal Abu Ghneim.

Concerning your question on the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, we need confidence building measures. Trust has to be built between the leaders, and in order to achieve this, they need to talk to each other. King Hussein is not completely free in what he does. He is a strong leader, but he has to listen to the different factions in his society. The Jordanian ‘Likud’, for example, which has a strong lobby, seeks complete disentanglement from Palestinian issues.

Question: I want to come back to the Jerusalem question. Why is Jerusalem mentioned at all in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty?

Answer: The peace treaty acknowledges the Jordanian custody of the Islamic Holy Sites in Jerusalem. This is partly the result of a misunderstanding between Palestinians and Jordanians who did not talk to each other, for example, at the 1995 Casablanca Summit. We should not engage in petty disputes, but work together to salvage Jerusalem!

First and Second Track Diplomacy: From Madrid to Oslo
Dr. Ron Pundik, Executive Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation, Tel Aviv

I want to give you a historian’s perspective on the negotiations leading to the Oslo agreements enriched with some personal ingredients that I can provide having been a part of the Oslo team.

The Oslo process did not start in Oslo, but a long time before that. It was mainly Yair Hirschfeld who, from the beginning of the 1980’s, established contacts with Palestinian political figures and the business community. Hirschfeld was acting as a private individual, and he never had an official status in these contacts. He had quite a close relationship with members of the Palestinian leadership, on the one hand, and members of the Labor Party, especially Yossi Beilin, on the other, and at the end of the 80’s, he acted as a catalyst for the first meetings between the Labor doves and the local Palestinian leadership. What I am underlining here is that ‘Oslo’ was not planned from the academic ivory tower, but has always been connected to the political and diplomatic track.

The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference brought an important result: the peace process was back on the agenda (even though there were only face-saving efforts on the Israeli side), and two official channels for negotiations were created: the bilateral and the multilateral talks. On all sides, great expectations arose, but nothing moved in the first few months of negotiations in Washington. The Israeli government at that time was only interested in dragging its feet and in creating a new situation on the ground through its settlement policies. Shamir had been forced into the process by Baker. The situation in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, with the ongoing and increasingly violent Intifada involving attacks against Israeli civilians, finally led to the vote against the Shamir government.

In June/July 1992, the new Labor government under Yizhak Rabin was formed. It was not an easy time, with Rabin and Peres fighting a ‘political knife struggle’ against each other and being on non-speaking terms. Nevertheless, Peres was appointed foreign minister and Yossi Beilin his deputy. Rabin considered the bilateral tracks to be of equal importance as Israel’s relations with the US, and they were therefore conducted by the prime minister’s office. The multilaterals were left to Peres; he was, so-to-speak, left with the less important track and the cocktail parties. Beilin, meanwhile, became the head of the Israeli steering committee in the multilateral negotiations.

Hirschfeld and I were in a strange situation. In spite of the change in government, we were not nominated for any official position. Yet, we maintained our good relationship with the Palestinian leadership, which was something that the government lacked. On the official track, Rabin kept Eliakim Rubinstein as the head of the Israeli negotiation team in Washington. With the two ‘icebergs’, Rubinstein and Abdul Shafi in Washington, nothing was likely to progress. Rabin had promised in the elections to come up with an agreement with the Palestinians within six to nine months, but he insisted that the restrictive conditions placed on the Palestinian delegates were enforced, and he did not make any substantial policy changes with regard to the different issues discussed by the two sides.

At the same time, as a kind of ‘track two’ negotiations, Hirschfeld and I had frequent meetings with the Jerusalemite leadership: Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Sari Nusseibeh, and Ziad Abu Zayyad. Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin were on our weekly meeting list, together with other Israeli politicians and officials. Through these sets of contacts, we arranged for the two secret direct meetings between Husseini and Peres in December ‘92 and January ‘93, as a first step to solving the Marj a-Zuhur deportees problem, which had caused the freezing of all bi- or multilateral negotiations.

The clear message that we received from Ashrawi and Husseini was that they felt crippled, that the official team could not deliver, and that the PLO should be, directly or indirectly, part of the negotiations. The Israeli position on this was a clear ‘no’ to a meeting, and ‘no’ to any further discussion of the issue of negotiations with the PLO. The PLO was considered a terrorist organization, and therefore, contacts with its members were prohibited by law.

We were much more effective in dealing with the multilaterals, where we were able to arrange secret and productive meetings between the two sides, for example, in order to pave the way for an understanding on certain water issues. The most important thing for us was to foster the official negotiations and to maintain our level of credibility with both sides. It seems that we succeeded in this.

On 30 November 30 1992, we had another meeting with Hanan Ashrawi at her home in Ramallah, where she pointed out that there was an immediate need for involving the PLO in the official negotiations. She also suggested that we, being very active in the field of Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation and other multilateral issues, should go and meet Abu Ala, the PLO minister of economy and de facto team leader in the multilaterals. Our decision at this point was not to report on this to Beilin. Our goal was to talk to a PLO official to see whether there was a chance for an agreement in case the Israelis were ready to talk to the PLO. Thus, there was a need for an opportunity for Hirschfeld, or the two of us, to visit Europe at the same time as Abu Ala. The opportunity soon came with the invitation to a forum on water issues in Zurich. Hirschfeld flew to London, where Abu Ala arrived to lead, behind the scenes, the Palestinian team for the multilateral steering committee. This historic yet unnoticed meeting took place in the lobby of a hotel on 3 December 1992. Abu Ala arrived together with Afif Safieh, the PLO representative to Britain.

This was a long shot in the dark! In order not to force him into accepting responsibility, Beilin, who was by chance also in London at the same time, was not informed that the meeting was going to take place. He was, however, informed by Hirschfeld right afterwards about the encouraging results. He was very enthusiastic and did not rule out further meetings. A second meeting with Abu Ala and Afif Safieh took place later the same day, and the results were conveyed by me to Beilin. Hirschfeld used the twilight zone in the Israeli law that left the possibility for journalists and academics to meet with PLO officials.

Why Oslo? In London, Hirschfeld had met Terje Larsen, the head of FAFO, our Norwegian partner for a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Norwegian project proposal on the Palestinian labor market in Israel, and we were supposed to present him with our proposal for Norwegian funding. At that time, Larsen’s organization was active in the West Bank and Gaza where it was executing a socio-economic survey within the Palestinian community. He was visiting the area frequently and maintained good relations with Palestinian leaders as well as with PLO officials including Abu Ala. Similar to Hirschfeld and myself, he was involved in political activities, well connected with his country’s leadership, but not an active politician. During his visits to Israel, and while meeting with us and with Beilin, he offered - with the blessing of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry - to act as a facilitator by conveying messages and creating a secret channel between Israel and the Palestinians. At that time, in mid-1992, other Europeans also approached us and proposed to help in a similar manner.

Hirschfeld knew that if we wanted to continue meeting with Abu Ala, we would have to be assisted by a facilitator, and the Norwegians were perfectly suited for this task. Beyond the fact that we felt very comfortable with Larsen, something which should not be underestimated, we knew that the Norwegians are unbiased, independent, honest brokers, wealthy, and that they have no self interest in the conflict. Although we had a plan to use our foreign passports and travel directly to Tunis, we wanted to secure the option of a facilitator. One should take into consideration the fact that we knew that if the creation of a secret channel was to materialize, we were in need of financial resources. As our organization is independent and refuses to accept any funding from Israeli governmental sources, and other resources were not available at the time, we had practically no choice but to approach somebody like Larsen.

Hirschfeld informed Larsen about the possibility of creating a channel, and Larsen reacted immediately and offered his assistance. A few weeks later he informed us that he had arranged the first meeting of what would later become known as the Oslo secret channel. We accepted the Norwegian invitation for a so-called ‘FAFO seminar’ with the participation of a Norwegian team, a Palestinian team led by Abu Ala, and an Israeli team consisting of Hirschfeld and myself.

In the early hours of 20 January 1993, the Knesset passed the law revoking the former ban on contacts with the PLO. We learned the news at the airport on the way to Norway. Only Beilin knew of our plan to meet PLO officials. To be honest, we were not at all sure whether the Palestinians would come to Oslo. After violent Islamic Jihad and Hamas activities at the end of 1992, some 400 Hamas and Islamic Jihad leading figures had been deported to South Lebanon, and there had been a clear-cut decision by the PLO to freeze all contacts with Israel and stop its participation in all official tracks, which included both the multi- and bi-lateral negotiations. But the Palestinians came to Oslo. On the morning of 21 January 1993, at a villa south of Oslo, the ‘seminar’ was opened. It was then that we met for the first time the PLO delegation nominated by Arafat, which included Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour, and Dr. Maher Al-Kurd. After lunch, the Norwegian ‘disappeared’ and we, Israelis and Palestinians, were left together to try and find the way to solve 100 years of conflict. The Norwegians played an important role as facilitators; they did not intervene with mediation efforts or proposals, but were committed to the process, not only in their capacity as financiers but also in spirit.

The first meeting was both successful and encouraging. We saw it as a clear PLO message that there was a desire for peace, co-existence and future cooperation with Israel. Among other things, Abu Ala said in this meeting that the official channel in Washington in its current configuration was a dead-end. He suggested that we study together the option of the ‘Gaza first’ plan, as a basis for the beginning of a settlement. He emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, proposing that we studied the idea of joint free zones and other joint infrastructure projects, and he mentioned the necessity of jointly combating terrorism. Our task was to carry this message to the Israeli government, and to convince it of the advantages that could be gained by dealing directly with the PLO.

The following month we had our second meeting. As the situation was now becoming very serious, Beilin informed Peres of the channel and the meetings; Peres waited before going to inform Rabin and allowed the contacts to proceed at an unofficial and deniable level. The Palestinians, on the other hand, did not know who was informed on the Israeli side. But Abu Ala and Abu Mazen realized the importance of these contacts and decided, after only a very short period of time, to focus the Palestinian efforts on this track.

The goal of the meetings was to arrive at a first draft of a declaration of principles. The approach used during the first five months of intensive meetings with PLO representatives was completely different from the approach in Washington. In Oslo, we agreed upon having a dialogue about reality, not about dreams; a dialogue in which each side tried to understand the other, putting aside the traditional zero-sum game attitude. We started to draft a paper that was already trying to take into account the red lines of the two sides, rather than anachronistic opening positions. We started with a common draft embracing all the points agreed upon. As this was a channel that, for both sides, was deniable and without obligations, we had the opportunity to discuss everything. With time, a chemistry developed that built on the idea: ‘Let’s put the past aside; we cannot make a better past, but we can, perhaps, make a better future.’ The so called ‘Oslo spirit’ started to emerge and we were all looking for a win-win solution.

In Washington, the situation was impossible. There, everything was loaded with symbolism; big delegations were having public fights, records were open, and the Palestinian side was bound by instructions from Tunis and by local pressure from the West Bank and Gaza. The asymmetry of the two parties did not allow substantial negotiations. In Oslo, it was just the opposite. We would sit by the fireside, have long chats in the woods and drink and eat together. There was definitely no feeling of ‘occupier’ and ‘occupied’.

The first draft of the DoP was ready in May 1993. At that time, Rabin was already on board. In April, upon being informed of the progress that had been made by Peres, he said that we could go on with Oslo, but only on condition that we would have to convince the PLO to allow the Palestinian team to come back to the official negotiations in Washington. Peres and Rabin, as a result of the dialogue between them, which at that time was mainly related to Oslo, were able to develop a good professional working relationship, and they began to talk about other matters of state. They both understood that there was a chance to bring peace to the Middle East, and that they were able to complement each other: Peres was the one with the vision, and Rabin provided the pragmatic, systematic, practical, and technical approach that could make the vision come true. Before long, they began to jointly develop orders for the negotiation team in Oslo.

At this time, the PLO demanded an elevation of the Israeli team up to an official level. Rabin and Peres decided to send Uri Savir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry with us to the next meeting in order to evaluate the situation. Savir was totally surprised about the channel. There had been no leaks on either side - the thing that we feared most because a single leak could have ruined everything. The May meeting was dramatic. It was the first meeting between PLO representatives and an Israeli official sent by the prime minister to discuss a political agreement. Savir was not only a professional diplomat but also a very talented negotiator, and it was not long before he acknowledged that the Oslo channel could be the track for a historic breakthrough. In the next meeting, Joel Singer, who later became the legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry, took part. We were now a team of four led by Savir. The idea was to involve Israeli officials, but no members of government in order to keep open a door for retreat. Up to this point, more than four months of negotiations had taken place with their ups and downs, but always without outside pressure, journalists or the public. We knew that we had to proceed fast as leaks were becoming more and more probable.

On 20 August 20 1993, the DoP was signed in Oslo. On 30 September, the same paper was signed in Washington in front of the world. One dramatic change had been made; the treaty was no longer signed by the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations, but by the Government of Israel and the PLO. Recognition of the PLO, which would be responsible for implementing the agreement, became important. Hence, new negotiations about mutual recognition took place and letters of recognition were exchanged immediately prior to the signing of the DoP in Washington. The Oslo Agreement was a watershed; it was the first step towards reconciliation and co-existence.

Question: I would like to know more about the setup and support for the Israeli team in the Oslo channel. What motivated you to take part in the secret channel, how much freedom to negotiate did you have, who paid your costs and to what extent was the Israeli secret service involved?

Answer: As to our motives, we, as academics with long established contacts on both sides, found ourselves at a junction between the two societies, which provided us with an opportunity to offer ideas and serve as a catalyst for Israeli and Palestinian relations. The input of the Israeli government was minimal at the beginning, when only Yossi Beilin knew about the contacts, but it increased when Peres became involved in March/April. It finally reached a peak when Peres and Rabin were both on board; in fact, the two men actually dictated parts of the agreement. Concerning financing, all expenses were paid by FAFO. Neither Mossad nor Shabak were involved until the very last stage.

Question: What is your outlook on the peace process?

Answer: This might surprise you, but I think that the situation is very good. By and large, we have a sound process, and it is getting stronger on the ground. It will, undoubtedly, have to pass through far more difficult times. Of course, we have serious problems, but we have to keep things in perspective: remember, it is the Likud that is now leaving Area C! Even if we are only talking about 2% of the total area, Likud is leaving and this goes against all Likud ideology.

Question: Does the failure of Labor in the last elections mean that the peace process has failed?

Answer: No, on the contrary; the electorate voted in favor of the peace process! Of course, security and peace are better than peace with less security.

Question: What has been the role of the US in the secret talks?

Answer: The Americans were kept in the picture from the very first meeting, and they always received status reports. But they did not take these meetings seriously.

Question: Was it really by accident that the law forbidding contacts with the PLO was abolished the night before you flew to Oslo?

Answer: Of course, we had worked towards that goal. But we did not know it would happen. We read about it on the plane!

Question: Are you willing to play a similar role in the negotiations with Syria?

Answer: We do not want to impose ourselves. It makes only sense, when we can contribute something, then, we may get involved. We had a dominant role, for example, in the drafting of the Beilin-Abu Mazen document.

Negotiating Economic Agreements: A Palestinian Perspective
Samir Huleileh, Ministry of Trade, PNA

I have been part of the Palestinian team to the multilateral talks on economic development since 1991 and to the bilateral talks with the EU and the EFTA since October 1993. In this presentation, I want to focus on the Paris Agreements, which were negotiated for about six months and later upgraded and amended by the Oslo Agreements, the Taba Agreement and the Joint Economic Protocol. There was (and is) a need to restructure all economic and trade relations between the Palestinians and Israel and between the Palestinians and the whole region because the Palestinian economy, including most Palestinian trade, has been totally dominated by Israel.

The first major problem that we encountered in the negotiations was the lack of technical capacity. The Palestinian representatives all came from the academic field and had very little practical experience. For example, we were not able to find a single individual who was specialized in customs. We had no knowledge about all the important details, no database and no reliable statistics. Hence, during the first two to three months, we simply came to the negotiation table and asked hundreds of questions in order to fully understand the issues and to be able to develop our own agenda for the upcoming negotiations.

The second problem was that we lacked knowledge of the overall situation, of the comprehensive nature of all the matters involved. We did not have negotiation experience, and we had to learn all our negotiation skills in the multilaterals. The Israeli team, on the other side, consisted of representatives of the different ministries, all of whom were very knowledgeable with regard to the details and technical aspects of the negotiations.

Another problem was that of the mandate or authorization. In the beginning, we were not authorized to negotiate; we were only allowed to ask and learn. Later, we faced the problem of not being able to alter agreements that had been initialed by a higher authority at a previous stage. This relates directly to the question of the leadership’s trust and confidence in the technical team. If there is no trust, the negotiating team becomes a group of mere messengers. We did not enjoy the full confidence of the Authority, and every two weeks or so, we were obliged to go to Tunis to report on the progress of the negotiations and to receive instructions.

Following the negotiations, the next major hurdle was the implementation of agreements. In many instances, Israeli ministries that had not been involved in the negotiations were not willing to accept or to implement certain agreements. Take the case of the agreement on the free movement of goods and labor: security personnel had not been involved in the negotiation process and, consequently, refused to work together in implementing the deal. On the Palestinian side, members of the negotiation team were later appointed to various ministries to provide them with the manpower able to understand, explain and implement the agreements.

Israeli attitudes in the negotiations changed dramatically after the bombing attacks. Due to security pressures, the wording of an agreement was changed again and again. There was one paragraph in the Paris Agreement that was changed 80 times!

The economic protocol between Israel and the Palestinians was signed on 29 April 1994. The preamble of the Paris Protocol states that this agreement is meant to be the groundwork for the development of a Palestinian economy and that the Palestinians ought to have the right to develop a decision-making process on their own. It was to cover the whole interim period but in two different phases. Thus, there was no need to re-negotiate and in Taba, only minor amendments to the original text were made. This was the reason why the agreement was not included in ‘Gaza-Jericho first’ and why it was signed separately. The Joint Economic Council is to update the agreement every six months within the given frame to adapt it to the new situation. This dynamic aspect is an important ingredient that is missing in the other Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

In the beginning, the main negotiator for the Israeli side was the IDF, but the Palestinians were successful in their attempts to bring the concerned civilian officials to the negotiation table. The Israeli team consisted mainly of ‘technocrats’. Still, some of them had serious problems with accepting Palestinians as equal partners, although six months into the negotiations there were relatively good relations between the two sides. We learned to respect each other and even became friends. The climate is very important in such negotiations.

Question: What fields does the Paris Agreement cover?

Answer: Every economic matter in which both parties are involved had to be settled in the protocol.

Question: Why did the Israelis accept your approach? Why did they have the patience to sit and listen and answer your questions for over two months?

Answer: The Israelis found this learning process acceptable because it was necessary. We were very fair and straightforward in this. It was a genuine approach, and that was respected by the Israelis.

Question: What was your priority in these negotiations, the political or the technical issues?

Answer: Although our starting point was always related to highly political questions, we soon realized that we were only able to solve the technical questions at that stage. Thus, we resolved the technical questions, which represented real progress.

Question: Would you negotiate with the Israelis again?

Answer: Yes, but only with a clear mandate.

Question: You said earlier that the spirit of the Israeli side in these negotiations made it much easier. Isn’t the lack of spirit the major impediment towards a political agreement?

Answer: Yes, this is the problem when you negotiate with an occupier. Many Israelis cried after signing the agreement because they felt they had lost something. Other Israelis, for example businessmen from Tel Aviv, did not feel this way; they did not have any experience with Palestinians, they did not care about the occupation, but they had an interest in the business opportunities they expected from the agreement. This will be a major problem in further negotiations with the Israelis.

Negotiations in such a context also act as ‘rehabilitation programs’. They involve a human dimension, the need to listen to the other side and to understand its problems and sorrows. Now, it appears that we have to enter new negotiations with a new government.

Question: You said that it was hard to find Palestinians with practical experience. I find this hard to believe.

Answer: Yes, it is true. The problem was to find Palestinians that had practical experience and a good knowledge of the current economic system.

Question: What is your judgment of the agreement? Does it fulfill the wish for an independent Palestinian economy?

Answer: The agreement, indeed, opens the way for an economic breakthrough with Israel. But of course, the framework is given: the interim agreements, the economic imbalance, etc.

Question: Have there been many violations of the agreement?

Answer: The agreement has not been fully implemented, particularly with regard to the free movement of goods. Violations have also occurred under the pretext of security considerations.

Question: I have heard that experts judge the agreements to be bad. What did you really achieve in Paris?

Answer: I think that we achieved the best possible compromise. The only viable alternatives were the full separation of the two economies or a free trade agreement (as agreed upon in Paris). You have to be careful not to confuse the problems related to implementation or that result from the closure with the basic idea and concept of the agreement.

Question: Why did the European leadership not get involved in the details of the negotiations? I think that the Palestinian team could have used their help.

Answer: There were consultations with the political leadership on the framework of the negotiations and the agreement, and I think this was useful. But their mandate did not allow them to interfere in detailed questions

Question: What were the major problems in the multilateral talks?

Answer: Actually, the bulk of the problems were personal: who is leading the team, and who dominates decision-making, etc.

Negotiating Economic Agreements:  A European Perspective
Geoffrey Haley, Representative Office of the European Commission, Jerusalem

Let me just start with a couple of remarks before I open the discussion. I think it will be most useful if I answer the questions that you have instead of me thinking about what might be interesting to you. Although I have not participated in the Barcelona negotiations, I have been a very close observer, and I have some experience from multilateral talks within the EU.

In the EU, we have a lot of practice in multilateral talks. Our experience is that agreements are not static, neither in the negotiation phase nor in their implementation. Agreements, in most cases, serve as a framework that will be filled and influenced by the new political context. An important issue in negotiations is the question of ‘ownership’: you have to convince the other side that, actually, they have been the owner of the idea or, at least, that they can become the owner of the idea because they can benefit from its results. This involves publicity; the people concerned must feel that they are the owners of the decision. We have also discovered that the production of papers and agendas becomes very important in such negotiations, and in this, the Europeans are very good.

The Barcelona process and the rewards that are expected have motivated the Israelis to continue economic negotiations. We have to see that negotiating an agreement is not only an end, but also a journey. The important fact is that it always offers a possibility to come back to the process and to talk to each other. But of course, these negotiations are also limited by set boundaries: they take place inside an ‘envelope’ decided upon by the political context. The issues that the Palestinians are allowed to negotiate on, for example, are very restrained: for example, Article 9 of the Oslo II Agreement states that the PLO can negotiate on behalf of the Legislative Council in the fields of economic agreements, regional development and education.

The Brussels approach to the multilaterals that Samir Huleileh talked about was that we, as Europeans, should act very carefully and concentrate mainly on attempting to influence the atmosphere and allow a process of confidence building. We have been invited in as technical advisors and have done a study on the Palestinian economic situation to provide some background for the negotiations, but we have not interfered directly in the process. In the Barcelona negotiations, it is different; here, the EU is involved directly and committed to finding solutions to the problems on a bilateral level.

The problem of the process within the EU is that, first, an issue has to be discussed among 15 states, who then have to give the mandates for signing before ratifying the agreement according to different procedures. This often leads to the dilemma of not being able to meet deadlines. But, all in all, I think, the Barcelona agreements are quite a success. The effectiveness of the Europeans has been surprising in these negotiations, especially when one considers that it has been the first real opportunity for the EU to arrive at a joint foreign policy.

Question: What are the rewards for the EU as opposed to the ones for the Palestinians in these agreements?

Answer: This is not a zero-sum question. Freer trade allows more gains for every side involved because of the possibility for specialization. Thus, mutual gains are to be expected from the agreement.

Question: Yes, but what, in effect, is offered to the Palestinians?

Answer: In general, the Palestinians now have free access to European markets. There are, however, certain barriers, particularly with regard to agricultural goods. These will be reviewed later. Today, Palestinian products are sold in Europe under Israeli names, but the Palestinians have already been designated their own quotas in relation to the export of potatoes, strawberries, flowers, etc., to the EU, and they have completely free access for their industrial goods, e.g., garments.

Question: What is your experience with the Palestinian negotiation team?

Answer: I think there was a major improvement in the economic knowledge and expertise of the Palestinian team between Paris and Brussels. Their main problem is not a matter of skill, but the lack of trust put in them. They have been only messengers, not negotiators. This has been true for the Israeli side as well, by the way, and it made it very difficult to negotiate.

Question: When I look at what is happening now, I see that Palestinian products cannot compete, even here in Palestine. They are so expensive due to all the costs resulting from the hardships of occupation. Do you think that we should protect our goods in our market?

Answer: No, I am against a protectionist policy and closed markets. A national economy has to learn how to survive in an open world economy. Of course, we need to help the Palestinian entrepreneurs to compete on the global market, but this cannot be achieved through protectionism. The Palestinian market is much too small for a closed economy to survive.

Question: Were the Palestinians involved at all in the drafting of the protocol? Why has there not been a ratification process, as has been the case in the other countries?

Answer: The zero draft of the protocol, that was essentially the same for all our Mediterranean partners, although there were some special regulations relating to the specific problems of the Palestinians, went to Abu Ala and was amended by the Palestinian side. As I said in the beginning, according to the DoP, it is the PLO, not the PNA, that has the power to negotiate economic agreements for the Palestinians. Therefore, PNA or PLC ratification of the Paris or the Barcelona protocols was not necessary.

Looking at the actual setting here, we see that negotiations take place in a situation of unequal power. Israel, as a strong power, has an interest in bilateral negotiations; it uses ‘Salami-tactics’ to divide the negotiation partners. The Palestinians, on the other hand, have an interest in bilateral negotiations. They need the multilaterals to enhance their power with the help of allies and by packaging different issues together.

The conflict to be dealt with in the Security Council simulation is fictional, but very close to reality. It is about friction between different tribes in Yemen that lead to violent incidents at the Yemeni-Saudi border. We, as the Security Council, will try to negotiate a resolution concerning the issue. Each participant will represent one state in the Security Council, and we will start with polarized positions. I want to remind you that in negotiating it is not which positions are being taken that is important, but why they are being taken, that is, what the real interests of the other side are. Motives should not always be laid open. We will try to confront theory and practice: what we have learned about negotiations versus the outcome of the simulation. In this first session, however, we will start with some preparatory exercises and learn about negotiation approaches, techniques, strategies and procedures. You can find a lot of the exercises, additional reading material and graphics in the two booklets that have been distributed.

Exercise 1: Negotiation Process

What you have done right now is an example of a negotiation process. Some of you used the following approach: first, everybody presented his point of view, then, you looked for common points, and in the end, you drafted a common statement. This approach is called a synergetic approach. In order to come to a joint text, it is best to first leave problematic aspects open and put them into brackets, not finalizing everything at once. In a second round of negotiations, there might be the opportunity for compromises or win-win solutions by packaging these disputed aspects.

Other groups used a different approach, trying to get to a synthesis of all the view points proposed by embracing all the points mentioned in a ‘brain-storming’ session. In this case, usually, you will reach a rather vague declaration. Or you can try and go for compromises - a lose-win solution, but often not a bad solution and preferable to lose-lose solutions.

Another important point in negotiations is the procedures of decision-making. The technique used has a direct impact on the substance and on the strength of the agreement or its prevention. Possible decision-making procedures are consensus, majority vote, minority protection (veto).

As you might have already noticed during this exercise, in reality, one of the major problems in negotiations is the restriction of time in trying to solve a problem. Another problem is that of the negotiation management: who will take the initiative, the chair, etc.? The chair is always in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, he cannot defend extreme interests, on the other hand, he can take the initiative and influence the agenda, and therefore compensate for a lack of power. Before starting negotiations, a chair and a rapporteur have to be designated.

In his book Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher stresses that in negotiations, you should try to concentrate on the real needs or interests of the other side. Its positions might shift quickly, but its interests will basically stay the same. It is assumed, that during the course of the negotiations, trust will build up between the parties. Often, however, the opposite is the case as hidden agendas become obvious, people feel insulted, etc. When the process comes to a crisis, it might fail, but the crisis might also provide an opportunity to solve the problem. Often such a crisis is needed to enter the ‘real’ negotiations. By avoiding crises, solutions may be prevented, too. In different cultures, the phenomenon of crisis is perceived in different ways. While the Germans, for example, tend to avoid crises, in the US they are seen as useful and fruitful.

Exercise 2: Perceptions and Reality

An overhead depicting a long and complicated sentence was shown for a few seconds. The exercise asked participants to determine how many F’s could be found in the sentence. Answers varied from three to six F’s. The exercise showed that people see the world differently, depending on what it is that they concentrate upon. In most cases, there is not only one truth to an issue; you have to work with uncertainty, ambiguity and relativity.

Let us come back to negotiations. The main elements of negotiations are: the actors, (be it people or states), having common or opposing interests and using different tactics and strategies, the process and its procedures, and, possibly, a solution.

Concerning the parties in negotiations, their approach can be distributive bargaining, which correlates with a zero-sum or non-cooperative win-lose approach. Or they can go for integrative bargaining, correlating with a variable-sum approach allowing a range of behavior from cooperation to distribution.

Most important are the interests of the parties involved in negotiations as well as the interest in negotiations as such. In this respect, the question as to whether there is an alternative to negotiations, also called BATNA (‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’), is decisive. In a situation where two parties have complementary interests, there is no need for negotiations; they just have to search for a coordination strategy. More problematic, however, is a case in which two parties have identical, but mutually exclusive interests. Here, negotiations will be difficult. Alternatives to negotiations can be ‘fight’ or ‘flight’.

The parties can use different strategies and tactics in the negotiation process, ranging from avoidance, over accommodation, compromise, and competition to collaboration (or cooperation). Their behavior will depend on the stakes, their relative power, interest interdependence and the quality of the relationship.

Exercise 3: Conflict Situations and Handling Modes

The strategy chosen varies according to the situation. It depends, as stated above, on the relative power position of the parties, the stakes involved in the outcome, the competitiveness of the interests of the parties and the communications practice between the parties.

Exercise 4: Thomas-Kilmann Exercise

Consider situations in which you find your wishes differing from those of another person. How do you usually respond to such situations? Given were pairs of statements relating to possible behavioral responses (ranging also from competing to accommodating) in conflict situations. The participants had to choose the statement that they considered most appropriate in the situations described.

The aggregated scores acquired by the group (and for the female and the male members of the group) were as follows:

It is striking that the whole group scored highest on compromise, avoidance and collaboration and lowest on accommodation - which can be seen as progressing on a win-win line. The female group members scored highest on compromise and collaboration, whereas the males scored highest on compromise and avoidance. Compared with other groups doing this exercise, it is interesting to note that Israelis and Jordanians scored much higher on competition. In Germany, a gap was remarkable in Eastern and Western male and female approaches: whereas Western females and Eastern males scored highest on accommodation, Western males and Eastern females scored highest on competition. Thus, it can be concluded that cultural and societal background is very important in the approach towards negotiations.

Before starting the negotiation process itself, a chair has to be selected and an agenda has to be put up. The agenda is very important as it determines the content of the meeting and ranks and groups the different issues. The agenda setting involves a serious problem inasmuch as the most important issues are often scheduled for the beginning of the session, and as they involve the biggest controversies, they are likely not to be resolved easily. This might lead to the result of not reaching any agreement at all. Thus, the opposite approach is sometimes more promising: start with the smaller questions and attempt to find common ground before proceeding to the tough questions. It is useful to link different issues together in order to get to win-win solutions.

During the first negotiation phase, it is important to gather information and to explore the other side’s stands and interests. During the negotiations, a bargaining process takes place; the most successful approach is to create common zones by packaging deals. The power of a party in this process, that is, its capacity to determine or substantially influence the outcome of the process is based on two factors. The first is its structural power stemming from its position of (in)dependence, its resources, and ‘management’ of its own society, i.e., the fact of being backed by the state’s society. The second important factor relates to the question of whether or not this structural power can be projected in the negotiation process. After the bargaining process, decisions have to be taken down, implemented and verified.

Simulation Exercise: UN Security Council
on the Crisis in Southern Arabia
Dr. Paul W. Meerts

The participants were provided with material on the following fictional case. Each of the participants had to represent one of the current members of the Security Council (with the exception of Guinea-Bissau). Participants were then given specific instructions about the positions of their countries as well as general information about the countries involved in the conflict. The aim of the simulation was to negotiate a resolution concerning the following crisis in a given time frame (two half days):

The Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia face a new crisis at their shared border. This happens against the background of long ongoing animosities between the two states. The 1995 Memorandum of Understanding provided for an end to the fighting at the border (in connection with ending the Yemenite Civil War in which Saudi Arabia had been engaged in an effort to destabilize the central government), but still did not define the border between the two countries. The Taif Agreement, that provides for the leasing of three Yemeni provinces to Saudi Arabia, has to be re-negotiated every 20 years. It has not been re-negotiated since 1994.

In the latest (fictional!) developments, several tribes supported by Saudi Arabia have revolted against the central government in Sanaa, aiming at establishing an independent state in the North-Eastern part of Yemen. The Yemenite government has sent troops to the region to prevent the Saudis from continuing their support for the rebellious tribes. Near the Western border of the Sultanate of Oman, a Saudi Army unit and a Yemenite Army unit exchanged fire and consequently, heavy fighting broke out. Several soldiers on both sides were killed. At the same time, Yemenite Army units cracked down on the rebels, causing a flood of refugees to enter Oman.

Saudi Arabia and Yemen accuse each other of violating human rights and of trying to occupy foreign territory, which is suspected of having large oil deposits. Yemen accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting Yemeni rebels in order to break up Yemen. Furthermore, it is well-known that Saudi Arabia seeks to build an oil terminal at the Hadramaut capital of Mukalla in order to diminish the vulnerability of Saudi oil exports at the entrance to the Gulf and the Red Sea.

The permanent representative of Egypt, being worried about a possible distortion of the delicate balance of power in the Arab Peninsula, convenes the Security Council with the support of the chair (Japan). He calls upon the Council to adopt a resolution to condemn the violation of human rights and to convince the parties involved to stop the fighting. At the request of Egypt, international agencies should send humanitarian aid to the region, while a peacekeeping force should be formed to maintain the peace. The Security Council meets in order to try to adopt a resolution on the crisis.

The Council consists of five permanent members - the veto powers China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US - and ten non-permanent members, currently comprising Chile, Costa Rica, Kenya, South Korea, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Japan, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. A Council resolution can be adopted when 9 out of 15 votes are in favor of the resolution and there is no veto (of a permanent member) against it. In procedural matters, the veto cannot be used.

The first task for the participants was to become acquainted with their country’s position and, after 90 minutes, to come up with a first statement, of no more than three minutes length, on their stand concerning the crisis on the basis of their mandate. They should also find out about possible coalition partners for the following negotiations, first becoming aware of their own priorities and then tracking down the other delegations’ stands on these issues.

Before getting into the first session of the Security Council, the role of the chair was explained to the participants. The chair’s tasks are to:

Another hint given to the participants was to avoid getting into voting at an early stage and instead to try to first create a joint draft, by putting issues that were still unclear into brackets and leaving them for a second round of negotiations. The resolution, or parts of it, should only be voted upon at the end.

After the first round of interventions made by the participants on behalf of their countries, the basic issues relating to the conflict as well as proposed solutions were drawn together and grouped under headings, in order to allow a more focused discussion later. They were grouped as follows:

(3) Humanitarian affairs	(4) Diplomatic problems
humanitarian aid	bilateral talks
refugees	· mediation (where, who, when, agenda)
human rights violations	condemnation
individual versus minority rights	territorial integrity/sovereignty/autonomy
evacuation

A draft resolution should have been reached within about two hours. The first decision taken by the chair was to go into recession for 15 minutes. After the break, negotiations started. The participants adopted the above list, without any changes, as an agenda for the Council session in order not to waste time discussing ranking or grouping. The participants then proceeded by discussing each point separately and voting on it to get an idea of the general disposition prevailing in the Council.

The discussion centered on topics relating to the field of security. It was finally agreed that there should be a call for an immediate cease-fire; peace troops, observers and a fact-finding mission should be sent to the region; and, after considering the fact-finding mission’s appraisal of the situation, the sides should withdraw their troops and demilitarized zones should be established. There was no agreement about whether the Yemeni tribes should be disarmed.

Closing the session, the participants were reminded of the tactic of ‘packaging deals’; they were encouraged to look for integrated win-win solutions instead of bargaining about each topic separately. The rapporteur was encouraged to prepare a preliminary resolution as a tangible basis from which to go on with the discussion.

In the next session, the task for the participants was to finalize the resolution by re-reading it, commenting on it, clarifying the points on which no agreement had been reached and negotiating them and, in the end, taking down the final version.

Resolution X

Dr. Meerts evaluated the resolution as being a quite good and rather substantial document. The negotiation process revealed the difficulties in getting to a joint version, even in a technically simple situation such as the one given. It showed the importance of exploring the other sides’ interests and of not proceeding too fast in the beginning. It also became clear that when the text of a draft resolution was at hand, the process was much smoother. The fact that the participants immediately started to vote on the resolution point by point prevented them from looking for more integrative solutions by making package deals. The process also exposed the problem of time restriction and the need to take breaks in order to allow for informal conversations and to enable the participants to recover.

Concerning the resolution itself, it should be noticed that in the preamble, the scenario should be laid out. This is also the place to reaffirm former resolutions relating to the subject. Then, in the operative paragraphs, a standpoint should be formulated and, possibly, solutions to the problem proposed. The resolution negotiated here is a very substantial one, and in this, it is actually not very realistic. Usually, resolutions are much more vague.

Afterwards, research findings relating to the effectiveness of a negotiator were discussed. A good negotiator should be hard rather than lenient. Concerning the power balance, he should try to dominate the discussion rather than become subdued; he should, however, be able to uphold a jovial, personal climate rather than a formal or hostile one. Concerning flexibility, he should explore rather than repeat. Unskilled negotiators tend to be either tough all along the line or very soft all along the line.

Exercise 5: Profile of the Negotiator

The participants were asked to honestly evaluate their own negotiation behavior in the Security Council session and then to present their own negotiation profile to a group of three to comment on it. Thus, they had the opportunity not only to get to a more substantial self-evaluation, but also to a mirror image, the evaluation through others.

Research results show that skilled negotiators avoid irritations and use little of their time for counter proposals, defense or attack of the other’s position; they avoid behavioral labeling and are able to tell people in a diplomatic way when they feel insulted. They listen actively and frequently test for understanding. They ask questions in order to check assumptions, to summarize the other party’s position, and to uphold the atmosphere. They only use few arguments to back each case they advance, which means that they set priorities and only present the best arguments.

Negotiations between representatives of different countries are naturally influenced by cultural differences and their reflection in negotiation behavior. In research conducted in the 60’s and 70’s in IBM branches all over the world (except the socialist countries), countries were ranked in five dimensions of culture. The dimensions in which cultural differences were measured were: power distance, that is the extent to which the less powerful members of society accept that power is distributed unequally; individualism, that is whether people look after themselves and their immediate family only or rather belong to in-groups (families, clans or organizations) who look after them in exchange for loyalty; Confucian dynamism, that is the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historic or short term point of view; masculinity, that is the fact that the dominant values in society are achievement and success rather than caring for others and quality of life; and, finally, uncertainty avoidance, that is the extent to which people feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations. Examples of negotiation styles resulting from different cultural backgrounds and possible cross-cultural misunderstandings were discussed.

Exercise 6: Individual Negotiation Styles

The participants had to choose between different statements, each relating to different styles of problem solving. According to their choices, they were graded according to their dominant value orientation: action, which means that they are rather result-oriented, productive, efficient, responsible, pragmatic, impatient, quick, and energetic; process, which means that they are fact-oriented, care about procedures, planning, organizing, testing and details, and that they are systematic, logical, patient, and cautious; idea, which means that they care about concepts, innovation, opportunities, designs, potentials and that they are imaginative, charismatic, difficult to understand and provocative; or people, which means that they care about people, needs, motivations, cooperation, sensitivity and that they are spontaneous, empathetic, warm, and sensitive. Usually, people score high on two styles, and low on two others. People that score evenly in all four dimensions, are good, flexible partners in a team.

Exercise 7: Problem Solution

To wrap up the workshop, a final exercise was conducted. The group was split in two and each half was sent to a different room. The two groups were given seemingly contradictory instructions: each person had to choose a partner belonging to the other group and convince him to come with him to his room. The exercise exemplified that in order to resolve the problem, there was need for a creative result. Only in a fully integrative solution would everybody be able to fulfill his task; only when the partners trusted each other, so that one of them would first go with the other and rely on the other coming with him later, would they all be able to succeed.