Syrian Interests and Role in Lebanon
Dr. Volker Perthes

Lebanon is an important part of the Syrian policy. The Syrian hegemony in Lebanon is due, in the main, to the Arab-Israeli conflict and is a security issue.

Military-Political Relations

In 1976 Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war. (Syria introduced Al-Sa’iqa forces in 1975.) The Syrian army engaged Israeli forces in 1978, and was dragged into confrontation with them in 1982. The Syrians opposed the 17 May 1983 Lebanese-Israel agreement. Syria put pressure on the Lebanese government and was able to influence its position. In 1987 Syrian troops re-entered West Beirut at the request of different factions and managed to control the situation between the warring factions, namely Amal against Hizballah, and Amal against the Palestinians. Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia intervened in 1989. The Ta’if Accord was signed with Syria’s consent. Syria opposed Colonel Aun’s forces, and the Syrian forces managed to throw him out. The withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Beirut to the Al-Biqa’a Valley must coincide with Israel’s withdrawal from its self-proclaimed security zone.

There was a partial Syrian redeployment in August and September of 1996, which was considered by the Israelis as an offensive move. Lebanon interpreted this redeployment as part of the Ta’ef agreement. The actual strategic reason for Syria’s redeployment was to move more expensive equipment to the Syrian side of the Syrian-Lebanese borders. The Lebanese government showed that it could handle the situation as the results of the elections were pro-Syrian, since anti-Syrian members had been thrown out of the Parliament.

In April 1996 Israel attacked Lebanon in ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath.’ Syria participated in the formation of the ILMG and in monitoring the rules of the April agreement, leaving no doubt that Damascus remains the reference point of Lebanese officials. Syria is not in a process of trying to annex Lebanon as indicated in its response to ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath.’ Lebanon is vital to Syria’s security as it provides air space over Al-Biqa’a.

Syria opposed the ‘Lebanon First’ proposal because of its motto of "one people in two states." Even though there has been a declaration of cooperation and brotherhood between Lebanon and Syria, the relationship remains unequal. Syria will maintain Lebanon’s security, while Lebanon ensures that it will not become a flank of attack against Syria. Syria interferes mainly in Lebanon’s domestic policy.
Syria and Lebanon have signed several agreements such as the Free Trade Agreement. This is in the interest of Lebanon because its industry is far stronger than that of Syria, which still protects its markets from an influx of Lebanese merchandise. The special relationship continues for several reasons: some analysts overlook the fact that special relations have their dynamics and do not remain stagnant. Factors affecting the relationship include the Arab-Israeli conflict and the domestic situation, both in Lebanon and Syria.

The primary focus should be to get Syria to deliver; Lebanon is secondary. If Israel pulls out of Lebanon, pressure from the US and France will force Syria out of Lebanon for the following reasons:

Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon will decrease the need for Syrian troops as Hizballah will be disarmed. Consequently, Lebanon’s internal stability will diminish the threat to Syria.
Development in Lebanon will bring domestic stability, which will give Syria more reasons to evacuate its forces from Lebanon.
Internal developments in Syria in the post-Assad era will require the Syrian leadership to keep its elite units around Damascus rather than Beirut. Economic concerns will take precedence over the military in Syria. Consequently Syrian control over Lebanon would be reduced.

Lebanon has a vital interest in maintaining good relations with Syria. Lebanon will play a very important role in the reconstruction and liberalization of the Syrian economy, and the Lebanese banks will be at the forefront of the Arab banking sector in Syria.