Policy Imperatives for Palestine - View from the PNA
Dr. Sami Musallam

Introduction

Any policy on the Palestinian agenda is now an imperative. Palestine is still in the embryonic stage of development, and the general situation facing it is one of crisis.

Present Crisis

The peace process is in a crisis, and there is in no mutual confidence between the parties involved in the negotiations - the Palestinians and the Israelis. This lack of confidence is a result of the differences between the Israeli Labor-led government and Likud-led government.

Labor government: The general atmosphere was one of support for the peace process and for the efforts to arrive at a historic peace agreement. The government had a commitment to the peace process and to the transition to peace, despite the obstacles.

Likud government: There is no positive atmosphere regarding the peace process. The government is more intent on re-negotiating the agreements. There is a general negative attitude towards the process, the Palestinians, the Arab World and the international community. There is also a lack of governmental will to go ahead with what has been chartered in the accords.

Palestinian Position

For the first time, the Palestinian position is more readily understood and supported by the international community. We have kept our basic demand very simple, clear and to the point - to implement the signed agreements. This will lead to local, regional and international peace, which is clearly understood by countries around the world. Moreover, we have signed agreements with a state, a country, not a party or person.

The Palestinians always make the mistake, when talking about the peace process, of assuming that we have signed a peace accord. We have not signed a peace accord with Israel, we have only signed a declaration of principles. If it is implemented, we will arrive, in five years, to a stage where we - like Egypt and Jordan - will sign a peace agreement or accord with Israel. Thus, one should not criticize the PNA for its peace accords because they are not peace, but a mechanism for achieving peace.

Policy Imperatives for the Palestinians

Of highest priority to the Palestinians is the implementation of all agreements (DoP of 13 September 1993; Cairo Agreement of 4 May 1994; Paris Economic Accords of September 1994; Oslo II Agreement of 28 September, 1995; and various technical agreements).

The PNA demands concerning implementation of the agreements revolve around the following issues:

Hebron withdrawal: there has been no agreement until now because Israel is demanding to re-negotiate the agreement and is trying to expand its settlements. It wants control over one-third of the city and demands the right to carry out ‘hot pursuit’;
the economic siege/blockage;
non-implementation of the safe passage;
bypass roads: Israel is still expropriating land to build roads;
ports: the air and seaports in Gaza. We accepted to treat the ports officially like the current passages and allow for an Israeli presence;
expropriation and confiscation of land;
prisoners: the previous Israeli cabinet, justice minister and president signed for the release of 2,500 prisoners who are still in jail;
further re-deployment: this is the litmus test and the plan of action for the interim agreements. The areas were divided into A, B and C - to facilitate re-deployment - and the process should have started in September 1996. Accordingly, area B becomes A, area C becomes B then A, until eventually all of the West Bank becomes area A, i.e., under Palestinian control.

Final Status Issues

The final status issues are the most important and the most difficult issues. They are all imperatives and will comprise the cornerstone of peace in the region. They include the following:

Jerusalem: a central question for everyone;
settlements;
borders: the questions of sovereignty, statehood, etc.;
water;
refugees and displaced persons (the number is under dispute): our position on refugees is in accordance with UN Resolution 194; we will not accept any other basis. Israel does not recognize children of the original refugees. The year 1994 marked an important step towards Israeli acceptance of 194 but Israel has not attended the refugee working group meetings since then. There is currently a PLO committee in Gaza, led by Hassan Abdul Rahman, who is in charge of this issue.

Security Situation

Concerning the security of the Palestinians both in general and in regards to the Israelis, we want to establish a democratic state structure and the elections, which were to a large extent free, were a step towards this. There is extremism on both sides and we believe that the two groups of extremists are making a coordinated attempt to torpedo the peace process.

In terms of economic development, we want a normal, functioning economy, with low unemployment and a thriving private sector. Unfortunately, the PNA is faced with the following problems:

Lack of funds: There was never any money to begin with and thus no foundations for the state. We are dealing on one side with an international agreement and donors, and on the other with Israel. The aid that the donors speak about is not always forthcoming, and only one-third of what has been promised has actually been allocated.
Failed agreements: Israel is trying to block any economic agreements that do not meet the economic desires of Israel. They are allowing Israeli goods into the Palestinian market but do not allow for the free movement of Palestinian goods. The economic agreements are not in favor of the Palestinians, but they were the best we could succeed in reaching.
Closures: The economic situation is further complicated by the closure, which is preventing normal economic activity and causing unemployment. We once had a boom of direct foreign investment, especially in Nablus and Ramallah, but many investment opportunities have diminished with the situation.

There are also various issues facing the society, including the following:

Institution building versus clans: The rule of tribes has been a major factor in the social ties, and people prefer to solve social problems and political issues according to tribal (ashir) laws.
Ruled law versus tribal law: Palestinian law is based on and influenced by seven laws - Israeli, Ottoman, Jordanian, British, Egyptian, PLO and PNA. There are different laws in all areas, and the laws in Gaza are different to those in the West Bank. The PNA is trying to codify them all into a single law.
The PNA image on the streets - apathy versus support versus resistance: The PNA has been under criticism for its human rights violations and it recognizes that this is an issue. It has been trying to institutionalize the teaching of human rights values in the schools of the public security agencies and to hold seminars on human rights issues.

Relations with the Arab World

For the first time, there has been total Arab support for the PNA’s position with regards to the peace process and its demands. There is more solidarity with regard to the Palestine Question than previously, and all the Arab nations have supported the DoP and Oslo. Syria and Libya tried to abstain but they accepted the decision to support the PNA.

The region is also facing the conflict between Syria and Israel, which is quite complicated. It is a conflict of primos-inter-paris - the first among equals. There is also the question of Egypt versus Jordan and which one is the focal point of the Middle East. Israel, as part of the region, has to accept the primary role of Egypt as a social, political and cultural leader.

International Relations

The PNA’s relationship with the international community is extremely important. Over time, the PLO and the PNA have become accepted, and most countries accept the Palestinian point of view, which is the demand to implement the agreements. This relationship is reflected by the many mutual governmental visits: Chairman Arafat, in addition to other Palestinian officials, has visited many foreign countries. In return, various foreign heads of state have visited the PNA, such as Chiraq. In contrast to this relationship, Israel has been antagonizing its two main supporters, i.e., the US and the EU.


Discussion:

On the Paris Agreement:

Admittedly, the agreement has many faults, and it is not up to the Palestinians’ liking. But, it allows for renewal after three years, and the Palestinians intend to re-negotiate the agreement. We want to address various issues, such as taxation and free movement. Moreover, our economic agreement with Jordan has not been implemented because Israel is refusing to allow for the free movement of people and goods. Thus, there is no opportunity for joint economic ventures.

On the state security courts:

The state security courts, which were established by presidential decree, are a result of the two legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza. One can look at Egypt for comparison - Egyptian law allows for these courts, which it regards as part of the democratic process. In addition, the Egyptian President has both total power and control over the courts.

On security obligations:

The PNA is obliged, by the agreement, to hand over to Israel any perpetrators who are not tried and punished according to normal legal procedure. We have to either convict them or turn them over. It is a political choice, and during the recent incident we were threatened with a continuation of the siege on Ramallah. Palestine is not an independent state, but a self-governing authority restricted by agreements. Moreover, many perpetrators often hand themselves over to avoid being either caught or killed by the Israelis. There is a clear link between what we can do domestically and our agreement with Israel. Israel prefers having a Palestinian dictatorship.

On the negotiations:

The relationship between domestic policy and negotiations with Israel is very important. We had to accept many things in order to gain some sovereignty, including the idea of joint ventures. The negotiating team is a continuation of the group established by the PLO. The Madrid group had been huge and the number has decreased for various reasons. The Communist Party left the negotiations, and many others could not handle the interference from the top. In addition, there was a need for change when the issues became more topical, and there was no longer an emphasis only on security and politics. It is a mistake to put the spotlight on Hebron: issues such as safe passage are more important. Israel has no intention of giving up control over the Holy Places and it does not accept Palestinian negotiations over these or Jerusalem as a whole.

On Syria:

Our relations with Syria have been bad for reasons related to politics, idiosyncrasies, security issues, mistrust, etc. The current relations between us are basically the culmination of a negative relationship that evolved during the 70s with the Syrian intervention in PLO affairs, which led to splits within the PLO and Fatah. Until the 90s, there were over 6,200 PLO/Palestinian prisoners in Syrian prisons: at least two of them have been there since l966.

During the Gulf War, we were on two different fronts, with Syria backing the US and the PLO backing Iraq. The peace process is the bottom line in the conflict with Syria, and Syria rejects the Palestinian acceptance of the peace process. The Palestinians argue that there are two levels in the talks: the Palestinian level and the Arab level. The Palestinian side is on a lower level playing field than the Arab states, but Syria does not understand nor accept this. The Syrians felt antagonized and left out by the process, and believed that they had not been consulted in the matter. They were offended, and subsequently dropped out of the talks. Only recently has the PNA reached a similar level to the Arab states, and only in the recent Arab Summit did Syria accept the Palestinian position in the peace process.
Kaddoumi, who is second in command in the PLO, has his own interpretation of the peace process. In fact, he was a major supporter and convinced many to join him in his support in 1993. The agreement would not have passed the central council of the PLO without his intervention. He has a sound and legal position: moreover, he understands the relationship and idiosyncrasies between Arafat and Assad who share no mutual understanding. The Ba’athists will never forgive Fatah for taking away its mass support in the Arab World. Kaddoumi, Arafat and Minister of Finance Nashashibi were all Ba’athists.

The PLO objects to the Syrian aid given to PLO opposition groups. We do not expect more political support from Syria, but we support both Lebanon and Syria in their negotiations and regarding the implementation of UN Resolution 425. The PLO is trying to improve its relationship with the Lebanese regime, which is skeptical of the PLO’s role in Lebanon.

On Jordan:

Confederation with Jordan is one of the hypothetical outcomes of future negotiations. Legally we are obliged to implement the PNC decision of 1993, i.e., to establish two states. We may eventually have a confederated state, i.e., some kind of a Palestinian-Jordanian union, but we first need our own independent state. Many support the idea of a confederation, but in fact it is not practical because we have two different political systems - a monarchy and a democracy. How can we combine practically? Many issues have to be worked out and there are strong lobbies on both sides that are against the notion of confederation. Attempts at confederation have not worked out in the past, for example, the Iraqi-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, the US and the Arab nations may not allow it.

Palestinian-Jordanian relations are good, and we have even signed an economic agreement. King Hussein was the first Arab leader to be received on PNA territory. There are also extensive Palestinian-Jordanian social relations.

On the donors:

Two-thirds of the funds promised to the PNA have not been allocated. The World Bank may be squeezing the PNA politically and the EU countries have long implementation periods. European aid is more forthcoming through direct bilateral aid than through EU aid, and the EU countries prefer bilateral relations.