Jordanian Foreign Policy
Dr. Yezid Sayigh

For Jordan, a small actor with poor resources, foreign policy is a matter of survival. Jordanian foreign policy is characterized by strong connections between the state’s internal and external dimensions, as well as by its political economy.

Domestic Composition
Jordan, a recent and artificial creation, has been balancing two populations since 1948: the Trans-Jordanians, i.e., East Bankers or native Jordanians, and the West Bankers, a mixture of Palestinian refugees from 1948, 1967 and 1991.

Jordanian society is represented by two main divisions and by various smaller divisions within its social strata. A balance, whether real or perceived, exists and is significant, both politically and socially. The divisions affect both social facts (e.g., inter-marriages) and political alliances and attitudes, and their importance varies according to the circumstances. Apart from the two main groups there is the Hashemite ruling elite.

Resources
Jordan is a resource-poor nation that has always depended upon international subsidies, capital flow and assistance. There has been no moment in modern Jordanian history when the country did not receive or need financial aid.

Labor
The export of labor (mostly Palestinian), especially to oil-rich Gulf countries, has been crucial to the Jordanian economy. Only one-third of its labor force is domestically employed; most of the native population depends upon the state sector for employment, while the Palestinians rely on the private sector and migration. This fact is significant because when state politics or economics change, it is predominately the natives who are affected.

Economy
Jordan’s foreign policy is very closely tied to its sources of capital. In 1957, much of the foreign aid to Jordan, including loans, was from the US. In 1967, by playing the role of a confrontation state, Jordan was able to secure Gulf money, and when this was cut in 1972, the US increased its aid. Jordan began to receive up to US$1.2 billion in Arab aid when a decision was made at the Baghdad Summit of l978, which followed Camp David, to increase aid to Jordan to counter the loss of aid from the US.

Jordan’s state budget is centered around defense, development and subsidies. The labor opportunities presented through the oil boom greatly reduced the strain on the government, as the remittances helped to bolster the state economy. From 1982 onwards, and with the decline in oil revenues, the trend reversed. There was a reduction in Gulf employment, as a large number of laborers returned, a reduction in remittances and a decrease in official assistance. By the end of the 80s the Jordanian economy was overburdened with a US$6.5 billion debt. It faced several problems, including the following:

increased consumer demand;
PLO funds being channeled to the Palestinian Territories because of the Intifada;
a devaluation of the Dinar from 1987-89;
an external debt reaching over US$8 billion;
an inability to pay its debt balance or interest;
an end to Arab aid.

The crisis in the economy was evident in 1989, when a cut in subsidies led to riots and calls for parliamentary elections. The King used political liberalization as a means to diffuse the economic pressures. Needing new sources of aid - the World Bank and the IMF - the government knew that it had to make wide-ranging economic changes: privatization, liberalization, etc.

Regional Relations
Jordan’s economy is also tied to its Arab partners. Twenty percent of Jordan’s exports go to Iraq, which had originally provided oil at a cheap rate. Iraq had a trade debt in Jordan’s favor and had, until the Gulf War, re-rooted much of its trade through the Aqaba port, providing Jordan with much-needed port fees (US$300 million). Fifteen percent of Jordan’s exports (and 95% of its agricultural products) go to the Gulf states. The Gulf is vital to Jordan as a source of both employment and aid: the Gulf aid was especially important in the 70s, when it replaced that of the US. At various times, Jordan has been able to play upon its role as a "buffer state" to the Gulf: it even offered to send its troops to the Gulf to replace the US and European troops.

West Bank Factor
Since 1948, Jordan has had a special interest in the West Bank. The West Bank was perceived as an important economic unit. Jordan thus had a real interest in maintaining its claim to the area following the 1967 war. There are various other factors affecting its West Bank policy, including the following:

The internal political dimension: To control the strong Palestinian community in Jordan, it has to appear as seriously advocating their interests.
The religious dimension: Jordan wants to assert its religious legitimacy regarding the holy sites.
Political economy: The West Bank allows Jordan to play the role of peace-maker in order to enhance its regional importance.
The burden of refugees: The issue of Jordan’s Palestinian refugees gives it an additional legitimacy in its requests for international assistance.

Foreign Policy
Jordan has been playing a double role in its foreign policy. On the one hand, it is trying to be the region’s "key to peace," thus a government that needs to be stabile and strong. On the other, it has tried to be, for its Arab neighbors, a "confrontation state"- always at the center of conflict. Both these roles allow it to ask for money and assistance, whether internationally for stability, or regionally for its confrontational military role.

Jordan’s foreign policy wavers between taking the initiative and waiting for the event to die down. In 1973, Jordan did not really get involved in the war, and consequently, did not reap its benefits. Instead, the PLO was recognized as the Palestinian representative. In 1979, it followed Iraq and Syria’s lead in rejecting Camp David. In 1983, in order to seal its own legitimacy in the peace process, Jordan tried to revive a deal with the PLO and get it to accept UN Resolution 242.

After 1982, with the Likud in power in Israel, the focus of Jordan’s foreign policy was on diplomacy. Jordan was afraid that Israel would try to destabilize the country through talks of a Jordanian-Palestinian solution: diplomacy thus became a means of "forward defense."

In 1988, Jordan cuts its ties to the West Bank in order to establish that Jordan was not Palestine. It also wanted to prevent the entrance of West Bank deportees, whilst minimizing the consequences of a declining West Bank economy.

During the Gulf War, the government did not take an anti-Iraqi stance and insisted that the war was an "Arab issue."

In 1991, with the Madrid peace initiative, Jordan claimed that it was going to the talks, with or without the PLO. It created a fait accompli and joined the bilateral and multilateral talks. It wanted to regenerate its relations with the West and succeeded in securing the re-establishment of US aid (to make up for the loss of Gulf money).

In the post Gulf War era, Jordan has been able to achieve a debt write-off and re-scheduling through its peace with Israel. It now provides a "strategic depth" to Israel, through a clause in the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement that states that no foreign air force can enter over Jordanian land, thus giving Israel an extra border. Through this new relationship, Jordan has been trying to demonstrate its importance in the US strategic umbrella.

Economic Challenges
Because there is a limit to how much aid money Jordan can receive, it has been forced to reach additional agreements with the World Bank and the IMF. To meet their requirements, Jordan has to cut its state budget and restructure the economy, causing widespread social implications. Any economic restructuring, such as budget cuts and privatization, would affect the native Jordanian population, which relies on subsidies and employment. The natives would interpret these changes as undermining the pact between the Hashemites and the Hijazi family. Moreover, they fear the Palestinian presence in Jordan, and see all policies as related to the Palestinian link.