External Powers and the Arab
States: Positions on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict (I): The American Approach to the
Palestine Problem and the Middle East
HE Edward Abington
While the US involvement in the Middle East goes back to
pre-1948, it has assumed a central role since 1967. The period
between 1967-1973 was a sterile one, even though Sadat had sent
out signals that he wanted an international settlement.
Unfortunately, these signals were either ignored or misunderstood
by Israel. Israel, after the 1967 war, and until 1973, had been
intoxicated by its victory. As a result, it underestimated the
Arab capitals, not believing that they would start a war. The US
only began to receive panic signals from Israel just before the
1973 crisis. Israel was stunned by the Egyptian advances in the
Sinai and the Syrian near-success in breaking through the Israeli
lines in the Golan. The result was a high state of Israeli
insecurity.
The 1973 war also proved to be a watershed event in the region,
breaking the diplomatic deadlock between the Arab states and
Israel. Moreover, many of todays issues were prevalent in
1973 as well: for example, both the US and USSR sponsored peace
talks in Geneva between Israel, Egypt and Lebanon - the Syrians
were invited but did not attend. The first disengagement
agreement for the Golan was reached in 1974, and the US was
looking at the idea of a similar disengagement agreement, which
would include a limited withdrawal, for the West Bank. However,
such concepts were too early then.
The problem was the talks - Israel refused to negotiate with the
PLO or the Palestinians. In addition, the issues then had also
been colored by the superpower conflict. During the 1973 war,
when the Israeli army had withdrawn its troops according to the
Geneva Conference, the two superpowers had been in conflict.
American policy consequently focused on managing the Arabs and
the Israelis in a way so as not to shift the balance of power
between the US and the USSR, and not to allow any conflict to
escalate into a superpower crisis. It is US policy, which is
based on continuity and a building-block approach, that
eventually made the idea of disengagement a reality with the 1994
Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Hence, the
ideas that the US deals with today have their roots in the past.
The US has continued to build on the following:
a balance of power with a desire for peace through international
negotiations;
support for Israeli security;
a clear US position that a shift in the balance of power should
not occur to the advantage of the USSR or the Arab states.
The Current Phase
The current phase began with the Madrid Conference in 1991, with
the participation of the Soviet Union, the UN, and the EU. Madrid
represented the first time that Israel and the Arab states sat
down with an agreed format for negotiations. The conference also
launched the current peace process, which has two parts: the
bilateral negotiations and the multilateral track. The latter,
which is divided into working groups, aims to draw in a large
number of Arab states to break down barriers and develop
interaction between Arabs and Israel. The focus here is on
technical, trans-national issues and on the building of a web of
relations. The multilaterals have had only limited success, as
they have been affected by a slowdown of the peace process,
particularly on the Palestinian-Israeli track.
As the Palestinian-Israeli track matured, the US took an active
role in the following areas:
International assistance to the Palestinian Authority on an
international dimension: The donor countries convened in 1993
and made a five-year pledge to the Palestinian Authority. The
money was not intended to supplant the local economy, but rather
to supply seed-money to activate it and assist with
infrastructure and development. This is just one way in which the
US supports the peace process.
The processes of the economic summits of Casablanca, Amman and
Cairo: These encourage the establishing of relations through
business, tourism and various regional institutions.
The current US role, that of a facilitator in direct bilateral
negotiations, comes as a result of its past experience in the
region. For example, during the 1956 Suez crisis, the US had
forced a solution upon the war. This, however, proved to be
unstable and the US recognized that negotiations were the best
policy. The 1973 crisis also illustrated the crucial US role,
then as a mediator and broker of the Israeli-Egyptian
disengagement agreement. The US, in 1986, brokered the aborted
Israeli-Lebanon agreements, and more recently the Israeli-Syrian
negotiations. This was during the former Israeli Labor
government. These negotiations have since stopped with the
election of the Likud government.
The US role has been quite flexible, shifting during the past two
decades from being that of an intermediary to that of a leading
player. For example, in the 1973 conflict, the US started off as
an intermediary or go-between in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations,
and then subsequently acted as a facilitator as Israel and Egypt
began to negotiate issues directly.
The US has a road map to the peace process - the DoP, which is
aimed at bringing the Arab Israeli conflict to an end. The ideas
represented by the DoP have been on the table for the past 20
years. Thus, even with setbacks, there will always be a return to
this road map. The American aim is to pursue a balanced role
while encouraging the parties to participate in direct
negotiations. The US is aware that the Palestinian-Israeli track
requires careful monitoring and positive reinforcement during the
current process, and is thus monitoring day- to-day issues, such
as the closure. Moreover, the US role is not an exclusive one, as
it has been working closely with external parties such as the EU,
Russia and Egypt. In fact, the US welcomes international
involvement.
The US has a uniquely close relationship with Israel, which has
given the US the ability to guide the process. Progress to date
has taken place because Israel has grown to feel secure enough to
take steps towards peace. This relationship has been a central
and essential factor in moving the peace process forward.