External Powers and the Arab States: Positions on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict (I):
The American Approach to the
Palestine Problem and the Middle East

HE Edward Abington


While the US involvement in the Middle East goes back to pre-1948, it has assumed a central role since 1967. The period between 1967-1973 was a sterile one, even though Sadat had sent out signals that he wanted an international settlement. Unfortunately, these signals were either ignored or misunderstood by Israel. Israel, after the 1967 war, and until 1973, had been intoxicated by its victory. As a result, it underestimated the Arab capitals, not believing that they would start a war. The US only began to receive panic signals from Israel just before the 1973 crisis. Israel was stunned by the Egyptian advances in the Sinai and the Syrian near-success in breaking through the Israeli lines in the Golan. The result was a high state of Israeli insecurity.

The 1973 war also proved to be a watershed event in the region, breaking the diplomatic deadlock between the Arab states and Israel. Moreover, many of today’s issues were prevalent in 1973 as well: for example, both the US and USSR sponsored peace talks in Geneva between Israel, Egypt and Lebanon - the Syrians were invited but did not attend. The first disengagement agreement for the Golan was reached in 1974, and the US was looking at the idea of a similar disengagement agreement, which would include a limited withdrawal, for the West Bank. However, such concepts were too early then.

The problem was the talks - Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO or the Palestinians. In addition, the issues then had also been colored by the superpower conflict. During the 1973 war, when the Israeli army had withdrawn its troops according to the Geneva Conference, the two superpowers had been in conflict. American policy consequently focused on managing the Arabs and the Israelis in a way so as not to shift the balance of power between the US and the USSR, and not to allow any conflict to escalate into a superpower crisis. It is US policy, which is based on continuity and a building-block approach, that eventually made the idea of disengagement a reality with the 1994 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Hence, the ideas that the US deals with today have their roots in the past. The US has continued to build on the following:

a balance of power with a desire for peace through international negotiations;
support for Israeli security;
a clear US position that a shift in the balance of power should not occur to the advantage of the USSR or the Arab states.

The Current Phase

The current phase began with the Madrid Conference in 1991, with the participation of the Soviet Union, the UN, and the EU. Madrid represented the first time that Israel and the Arab states sat down with an agreed format for negotiations. The conference also launched the current peace process, which has two parts: the bilateral negotiations and the multilateral track. The latter, which is divided into working groups, aims to draw in a large number of Arab states to break down barriers and develop interaction between Arabs and Israel. The focus here is on technical, trans-national issues and on the building of a web of relations. The multilaterals have had only limited success, as they have been affected by a slowdown of the peace process, particularly on the Palestinian-Israeli track.

As the Palestinian-Israeli track matured, the US took an active role in the following areas:

International assistance to the Palestinian Authority on an international dimension: The donor countries convened in 1993 and made a five-year pledge to the Palestinian Authority. The money was not intended to supplant the local economy, but rather to supply seed-money to activate it and assist with infrastructure and development. This is just one way in which the US supports the peace process.
The processes of the economic summits of Casablanca, Amman and Cairo: These encourage the establishing of relations through business, tourism and various regional institutions.

The current US role, that of a facilitator in direct bilateral negotiations, comes as a result of its past experience in the region. For example, during the 1956 Suez crisis, the US had forced a solution upon the war. This, however, proved to be unstable and the US recognized that negotiations were the best policy. The 1973 crisis also illustrated the crucial US role, then as a mediator and broker of the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement. The US, in 1986, brokered the aborted Israeli-Lebanon agreements, and more recently the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. This was during the former Israeli Labor government. These negotiations have since stopped with the election of the Likud government.

The US role has been quite flexible, shifting during the past two decades from being that of an intermediary to that of a leading player. For example, in the 1973 conflict, the US started off as an intermediary or go-between in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, and then subsequently acted as a facilitator as Israel and Egypt began to negotiate issues directly.

The US has a road map to the peace process - the DoP, which is aimed at bringing the Arab Israeli conflict to an end. The ideas represented by the DoP have been on the table for the past 20 years. Thus, even with setbacks, there will always be a return to this road map. The American aim is to pursue a balanced role while encouraging the parties to participate in direct negotiations. The US is aware that the Palestinian-Israeli track requires careful monitoring and positive reinforcement during the current process, and is thus monitoring day- to-day issues, such as the closure. Moreover, the US role is not an exclusive one, as it has been working closely with external parties such as the EU, Russia and Egypt. In fact, the US welcomes international involvement.

The US has a uniquely close relationship with Israel, which has given the US the ability to guide the process. Progress to date has taken place because Israel has grown to feel secure enough to take steps towards peace. This relationship has been a central and essential factor in moving the peace process forward.