Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi:

European Union officials are currently arriving to monitor the Palestinian elections. This is an appropriate reminder of the EU's growing role in Palestine, and the importance for Palestinians to be aware of the EU and how it functions. That is the purpose of this seminar. From the Palestinian perspective, Europeans could have an important role, to balance that of the USA. However, it is worth pointing out that the monitors' report will go first to Brussels, then to the PA in Gaza; it won't be made available to the Palestinian public.

Elections
For political and practical reasons, Chairman Arafat has set the date for the elections for 20 January 1996. This is to pressure the Israelis to speed up redeployment and force the opposition's hand as to whether they will participate or not. The PA is committed to the election. There is crisis within the opposition which are having intensive meetings. Those outside are living in a different world than those inside. The inside is really divided. The PFLP in Gaza really want to run, to be part of the Palestinian house. Others can't afford to run. Opinion polls show that the left are very weak. The religious opposition, like Hamas, are also divided. Those in the West Bank are more reasonably logical, understanding that participation will lead to a role in shaping the Palestinian house.

Following the election, what will be the agenda of the Legislative Council? I have ten points on what circumstances will dictate to the council. I am not asking people not to run. I am committed to the election.

1. The Legislative Council must legitimise the Palestinian leadership, the PA, as it stands. For Hamas, this is difficult since they don't recognize the PA. Its also problematic for independents. If Haidar Abdul Shafi becomes speaker of the house, he will have to deal with the head of the PA, Chairman Arafat.

2. The Legislative Council must pass laws and regulations for our political system: a Political Party law, a Citizenship law and so on. We need a liberal, democratic political framework, not a replica of the rest of the Arab world.

3. The elected body must cooperate and consult with the opposition to reshape the Palestinian agenda. In England, for example, there is a different attitude, with the concept of a loyal opposition. We need a constructive engagement with the opposition. which must not be crushed or forced underground.

4. The elected body must amend the Palestinian National Covenant of 1965. This is a historical document from the 1960s. It does not deal with the 1990s. Since amending this document will lead to a crisis, only an elected body can do this.

5. Those who heard Arafat's speech when signing Oslo II will notice that for the first time he did not speak of our objective as a Palestinian state, but an entity. The political framework offered by Oslo I and II means that the council will be laying the foundations for a Palestinian entity not a state.

6. Since we are talking about the interim phase, and the question of Jerusalem is delayed until the final status negotiations, the council may be forced to accept Gaza or Ramallah as the de facto capital of the Palestinian entity.

7. This will lead to the need for the council to make concessions on Jerusalem in the final status talk in 1996.

8. I predict a lessening of demands for self determination, since the whole process takes place within the framework of Oslo I and II, which place a ceiling on Palestinian aspirations.

9. Similarly, the elected body will have to make a serious retreat on the right to return and refugees.

10. In view of the above, the only option for the council to maintain legitimacy is to open the door to prepare for future confederation with Jordan as the only way for the Palestinians to achieve a measure of sovereignty.