The Military and Security Establishment
Dr. Yoram Peri[1]

In the late 1940s, the American political sci­entist Harold D. Lasswell argued in what be­came known as the ‘Garrison-State Hy­pothe­sis’ that during a cold war a society cannot remain democratic, and that demo­cratic val­ues such as freedom of expression and movement will be lost as it becomes a garri­son state. In a garrison state, the vast major­ity of resources are re-allocated to the mili­tary, which consequently becomes very strong. Moreover, decision-making power moves from the parliamentary institutions to the government - particularly to the military, and society becomes increasingly closed.

Lasswell wrote this hypothesis immediately following World War II (WWII), when the Cold War between the United States and Russia began, arguing that the US would not be able to survvive as a democracy if the Cold War continued. We know now that this was not the case and that the US did not change its nature. However, strong democracies such as France and Britain were less democratic during the period of World War I (WWI).

In the 1960s, researchers began to investi­gate the military and society in Israel. They were curious as to whether Israel could con­tinue to function as a democracy, because ac­cording to Lasswell's hypothesis it could not. People were afraid that Israel would be­come a military regime in a similar fashion as other Third World countries after WWII. At that time, very few Israeli academics re­searched the impact of the military on soci­ety. However, the few who did concluded that Israel would not lose its democratic nature, and that Lass-well's theory was incorrect. Their reasoning was as follows:

1)     Israel was more developed than many of the Third World states;

2)     Israel was not a very young democracy;

3)     there was a very high level of political institutionalization;

4)     the media was independent.

These aspects of Israeli society at that time demonstrated that Israel was a strong de­mocracy, and therefore would not have the same future as the other Third World coun­tries. To a large extent, I agree with this con­clusion. For example, research has discov­ered a similarity in the value systems of western countries' military officers. In my re­search, I named this common denominator the ‘military mind.’ For example, a study done on the Ameri­can army several years ago gave high-ranking officers pictures of men's faces, and asked them who would make a good military officer. In the end, the studies found the fol­lowing four characteristics in military officers:

1)     They are nationalistic. The nation is more important to this person than any other social group.

2)     They are pessimistic about the nature of man. When asked, most agreed that the nature of man is evil. Furthermore, they believe that wars will always be a part of human existence.

3)     They are alarmists, who tend to see dan­ger as being right around the corner.

4)     They have some totalitarian characteris­tics, in that they rank people and treat those below them with force and those above them with respect and fear. These are the four basic characteristics of the military mind.

I wanted to determine whether Israeli officers had this military mind and, in 1984, I con­ducted the same research on Israeli top-ranking officers. When I began my research, I assumed Israeli officers would be the same as other officers in the world, but they differed in that the boundaries between the society and military were less distinct. In other words, the military officer is essentially not much different from the civilian Israeli. Military offi­cers rank high on the nationalism scale, but this is true for all Israelis. Very few of them said that man was born evil or that there will always be war in the world. Their perception of war was very practical: war was seen as a conflict created because of particular situa­tions. In other words, they did not believe that war is part of human nature. For these rea­sons, I concluded that Israel's officer corps - meaning professionals who go to the military as a career rather than as soldiers - should not be perceived as militaristic. Israeli society is not immune from militaristic values, but the military is not a bastion of militaristic policies, viewpoints, or philosophies.

The perception that Israel would remain a democracy like any other lasted for many years. Later, however, researchers began to notice differences, and argued that social life has to be divided into civilian and military spheres. For instance, the military had grown in strength and power, and Israeli officers were more involved in politics than officers of the Western world. However, they had no influ­ence in industrial relations. The demo­cratic civilian values moved into the security sphere. For example, during the War of Attri­tion in 1969 there was a long strike in the Ashdod Port, and people were very angry because soldiers died every day on the Suez Canal and these workers had the luxury to strike. The general secretary of the trade un­ion federation uttered a beautiful sentence in response, say­ing that, “The soldiers are fighting on the Suez Canal so the workers can strike in the Port of Ashdod.” The idea was that people are fighting not only for sur­vival, but to exer­cise their values, one of which being the right of workers to strike. Therefore, the fact that the country is at war should not prevent one from exercising these values. Unfortunately, this idea was too revolutionary for most Is­raelis to understand.

In democratic societies the military does not interfere in civilian labor strikes. In Israel, there was only one case where the army was sent in to settle a strike in Haifa Port in 1950, which created an havoc in Israel since then the army is not supposed to be involved in the resolu­tion of strikes. In 1975, during a strike in the tower of the Ben-Gurion Airport, the army was sent to replace the air control­ler. Defending this action, the minister of transportation claimed that the air control tower served not only the civilian but also the military airfield, which justified military inter­vention.

In the particular field of industrial relations, civilian values infiltrating into the military in­stitution brings about a very interesting situa­tion. Israel has a very strong military institu­tion, stronger than in other western demo­cratic societies, but its influence is limited to security matters. In all other fields, civilian values are transmitted to the military. Officers who moved into politics in Israel have political orientations ranging from the extreme left to the extreme right. Most, however, are found in the middle. Therefore, the military as such is not a source of militaristic values.

The last ten years or so have witnessed the development of ‘new historians’ and ‘new so­ci­ologists’. Ilan Pappé wrote in the Journal for Palestinian Studies (Winter 1997) a very good paper entitled, “Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Pales­tinians” in which he discusses these new his­to­rians and new sociologists. Also, my article called “Is Israeli Society Mili­ta­ris­tic?” pub­lished in the magazine, Israel Stud­ies pres­ents the research of five scholars who, for different reasons, argue that Israel is a milita­ristic society. Each scholar comes from a different background, and therefore has a different perception of Israeli militancy.

One of them is a Marxist and argues that Is­rael became militaristic before the War of 1948 because it transformed from a multi-national, multi-racial, socialist society into a capitalist society. The argument is ridiculous, because it assumes that militarism is a de­rivative of capitalism, and that one can not be simultaneously communist and militaristic. As we know, there have been some very strong militarists among the communist leaders of the world. Other scholars present additional arguments, which I will not discuss here, but the general consensus is that Israeli society at large is militaristic. I, however, think that they are mistaken, mostly with regard to the theoretical paradigm. For example, the most well-known among them, Uri Ben-Eliezer, wrote a book entitled The Origin of Israeli Mili­tarism, in which he defines militarism as the use of violence to solve political prob­lems. However, every society and every state use violence to solve political problems. If all states in the world are militaristic, the distinc­tion is not particularly useful.

This school of thought, which did not exist until about ten years ago, comprises young people who debate well, and the topic is in­teresting. However, even this school argues that the militaristic aspects of Israeli society have declined in recent years. Furthermore, the value system of Israeli society has changed, exemplified by a decline in what I call the security ethos. The security ethos used to be the major issue in Israeli society, the overarching value that impacted all other values. Security is an obsession for Israelis, which began with the origin of the Zionist movement.

Furthermore, Israeli society has moved away from collectivism and towards individualism. Because of the Zionist movement, early Is­raeli society had a strong collectivist orienta­tion. Today people do not want that anymore. In the past, Israelis who left Israel used to be called Yordim, which means deserters, a very derogative term. Israelis who went to live in the United States in order to have a better life were scorned for deserting the cause. Today, people are just as likely to say, “Who am I to tell you what to do?”

In addition, prior to the 1960s Israeli newspa­pers did not criticize the military. Because of the great success in the War of 1967, a ‘cult of the generals’ developed, which portrayed the military leaders as heroes. Every hero had two or three journalists who wrote about him and praised him to the point that he be­came a national symbol. After the War in 1973, some people questioned the role of the press concerning the military, arguing that it should be more critical towards the military in the same way that it criticizes any other in­stitution in Israeli society.

In the 1990s, 80 percent of the stories printed in Israeli newspapers concerning the military turned negative. Every day one can now find a story criticizing the military for sexual har­assment, misbehavior, bad thinking, mishaps or mistakes. Israel is moving towards what is called post-war society, and the previous val­ues are diminishing.

Following the Intifada and the Lebanon War, the Israeli public has been much more vocal about criticizing the policies of the govern­ment. Until 1982, the military was never criti­cized, and the government as well received very little criticism concerning the wars. In the later stages of the Lebanon War, however, half of the Israeli population began to oppose it. In Israeli political rhetoric, a war that is forced upon Israel is called a ‘war of no choice’, and therefore considered to be a just war. The Lebanon War was the first that the Israeli popu­lation declared to be an unjust war. Prime Minister Menachem Begin argued that al­though the war in Lebanon was a war of choice, some wars of choice are just wars, that Israel should not wait until it is attacked to defend itself, and that it had the right to start a war. The majority of Israelis did not accept Begin’s statement, however, and in­stead re-affirmed that a just war is only a war of no choice.

In the current negotiations with Syria, for ex­ample, Barak wants to show the people that he is trying his best to achieve peace. If his best proves to not be enough, than Israelis will perceive any future war with Syria as un­avoidable, and therefore a just war. Con­versely, if the Prime Minister does not try to reach peace, the next war will not be a war of no choice.

Although Israeli society was split over the 1982 Lebanon War, it criticized the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister but not the military. The first time that Israeli society criti­cized the military was during the Intifada. At first the left argued that the measures of the army were too harsh; later the right claimed that the military was being too soft on the Palestinians and not crushing the Intifada. This new widespread criticism was a dra­matic change. Furthermore, the media has helped to develop a new culture of criticism. Objec­tive developments such as the peace proc­ess, ethical changes within Israeli society con­cerning the values of collectivism and indi­vidu­alism, and changes in perceptions of the military all have resulted in what even the new historians and sociologists agree is a decline in the militaristic spirit of Israeli soci­ety.

However, as a result of the prolonged war, the military is much stronger in Israel than in other democratic societies. One expression of military power is the fact that so many generals enter politics: 20 percent of the gov­ernment is composed of ex-generals. How­ever, the fact that there are officers in the government does not make it more militaristic than a government without officers. Officers, as such, are not inherently militaristic. Milita­ristic groups, forces, and tendencies in Israeli society come from civilians, mainly from ultra-nationalist orthodox groups.

In Israel, the different schools of thought are frequently battling over the use of power, and every instance of there is an excessive use of violence provokes a reaction, of which the war in Lebanon is an excellent example. After that war, the Israeli public reaffirmed the con­cept of the just war. So, every time there is a feeling that the Israeli society is moving too far towards a militaristic position, the stronger anti-militaristic forces push it back. This battle within Israeli society is a result of the fact that we live in a prolonged war.

As my point of departure is really the demo­cratic nature of Israeli society, I am not inter­ested in other aspects of the Israeli military, even the intelligence apparatus. The conflict under which we are living is the old conflict between democratic values such as freedom and rights, and security needs. It is easier for the military to uphold the former, because it operates in the public, in the open. The secu­rity forces, on the other hand, do not work in the public, and therefore are even less demo­cratic. Indeed, because of the percep­tion that we live under prolonged war, demo­cratic val­ues are considered to be less im­portant in security spheres. When weighing democracy on one hand and security on the other, most Israelis will say that security is more impor­tant. Therefore, the Israeli public has been very lenient towards the security forces, allowing them to operate without transpar­ency or public accountability.

Among the security and the military issues, the issue of nuclear proliferation is the most sensitive, to the extent that it is not discussed at all. Revealing the extent of military censor­ship, until five years ago Israeli newspapers did not print a single word about the nuclear issue, not even questioning whether or not we have nuclear capability. The only word that could be used was ‘option’, i.e., the ‘nu­clear option’. However, even in this particular field, the values of the security people are not uniform. Some of the most pro-Palestinian sectors in Israel today are people who come from the Shabak, and some of the most do­vish come from the security services. There­fore, generalizations are not only not applica­ble, they can be dangerous.

Many visitors who came to Israel 20 years ago said it was a militaristic society because they saw soldiers everywhere in Tel Aviv. During the war in Lebanon, however, some of those soldiers returning from Lebanon to Tel Aviv demonstrated against the war. These soldiers were then accused of being anti-na­tionalist, and were even beaten by young Israelis who had not participated in the war. The soldiers returned to the war, saying that they will continue to fight because as soldiers they must obey orders, but that the war was not for a just cause.

It is a mistake to look only at the institution or the uniform and to assume that soldiers are militaristic and civilians or university intelli­gentsia are not. As mentioned before, the security services were essentially free to do whatever they wanted. The case in the mid-1980s, in which the Palestinian kidnappers of an Israeli bus were killed shocked the Israeli public, for it was revealed that the operation was an illegal murder. The public was shocked to find that the security services commit illegal acts, deceiving their superiors, the govern­ment and the court. The Israeli legal system and the attorney general fought against this case; so much so that he had to resign because the Prime Minister wanted to cover it up. This was the first time that Israelis realized that the security services are not always 100 percent clean. Furthermore, the public is still unaware of the activities of the Mossad, for they report only to a subcom­mittee of the Knesset. However, the security apparatuses have become more transparent than they were 20 years ago.

Discussion

Participant: What are the characteristics of the people involved in the intelligence agency compared to those of the military officers?

Dr. Peri: I can only give my personal impres­sions because there has been no academic research done on this issue. I believe that there is not much difference between the in­telligence services and the military officers. Some people are nasty, others are quite positive.

Participant: What is the position of the Ultra-Orthodox who do not serve in the army? How do they effect the military and how does the military effect them?

Dr. Peri: The ultra-orthodox position is very interesting because of two factors. First of all, the Ultra-Orthodox were traditionally anti-Zi­onist. They believed that the Jews should stay in Europe and wait for the Messiah to come and create a state for us. Those who lived here were extreme doves; they were against war, against conflict, and were not anti-Arab. The most extreme group among the Ultra-Orthodox is called the Neturei Karta. They would like Arafat to be the Prime Min­ister of Israel as well because Israel is sinful, as it is governed by secular Jews. They be­lieve that it is better to be governed by a Pal­estinian Arab than by a secular Jew. This is the most extreme group, but even other Ultra-Orthodox parties until the 1970s were ex­treme doves who promoted compromise and peace. It was only in the 1980s that they moved toward the hawkish position and be­came partners of the Likud Party. This move was not so much because of anti-Arab poli­cies, but because they think Likud is more Jewish, while the left, Labor, is too interna­tionalist and secular. The reason why the Ultra-Orthodox do not enter the military, how­ever, is because they believe they must de­vote all their time and energy to studying the Torah.

Participant: Are there pressures within the military to force the Ultra-Orthodox to join?

Dr. Peri: With the widening of the gap be­tween secular and religious Jews in Israel over the past 15 years, the secular elements of society have grown increasingly angry at the fact that the Ultra-Orthodox do not serve. Fur­thermore, the number of Ultra-Orthodox who do not serve in the army has grown from 0.2 percent of the population in the 1950s to five percent today. Secularists question why service is mandatory for them and not for the religious, which has caused increasing ten­sion. It was a major topic in the 1999 election campaign, and will probably continue to be a major issue that will occupy both religious and secular people. The government has es­tab­lished a committee to discuss this is­sue. The committee has put forth some ideas, but is currently suffering its own crisis, and some committee members have left. The seculars will not accept that before too long over seven percent of the Israeli population will be exempted from military service. Therefore, change is inescapable and within the next ten years Israel will most likely de­velop a new law for national service. The military today does not need every Israeli to serve as a soldier, therefore those who do not wish to serve in the army will be able to serve in civilian in­stitutions. This will solve not only the problem of the Ultra-Orthodox, but also will lessen the discrimination against Israeli Arabs. Currently, many Israelis use the fact that Is­raeli Arabs do not serve in the military to treat them as second-class citi­zens. If they serve in the na­tional service, they will have the same claim for their rights. This change will take some years to develop, but eventually it will solve the problem.

Participant: Do you see a paradox in the fact that the Ultra-Orthodox groups participate in Israeli political life, yet refuse to serve in the army?

Dr. Peri: Until 20 years ago orthodox groups did not participate in the system. For exam­ple, many of them do not vote and promote this practice. Others do vote and are mem­bers of the Knesset, but until the 1980s did not join the government. So, from a socio­logical perspective, they do not see them­selves as full partners. Those who were members of the Knesset never held positions in Knesset subcommittees, or if they did, re­fused to join the government. Only some years ago under Netanyahu did one of them became a deputy minister, but not a full min­ister. The Ultra-Orthodox call themselves marginal part­ners, and some of them do not pay taxes. They do not see themselves as full partners of Israeli society because it is secu­lar. Israeli political enfranchisement can be viewed as a circle with boundaries. Israeli Arabs are out­side the circle, and the Druze are inside the circle because the serve in the military, but are very close to the boundary. The Ultra-Orthodox lie just inside the position of the Druze, but still outside the segment of main­stream popular society. The elite lie in the very center of the circle. Therefore, from a sociological point of view the Ultra-Orthodox are neither in nor out, but are on the margin of Israeli society.

Participant: Do you think that Israeli society cannot make decisions unless it perceives that its existence is threatened, that it will act only to uphold Jewish interests? What is the role of the military institution in strengthening Israeli nationalism.

Dr. Peri: To answer the first question: there are three groups in Israel, the first of which, approximately 15 percent of the population, holds a more universalistic perception and ad­vocates Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank because the Palestinian national move­ment is legitimate. The next group, rep­resent­ing 30-40 percent of the population, are moti­vated by self-interest and are ready to negoti­ate or to give back territory only if they feel that it is good for their security and exis­tence. They continue to claim moral rectitude, but are willing to compromise and make con­ces­sions in order to achieve normalization. The third group, comprising 30 percent of the population, will not compromise. They claim that Gentiles will always want to kill Jews, and that the conflict started 4,000 years ago and will continue for the next 2,000 years.