Israel and the Middle East Peace Process
Dr. Moshe Maoz

The peace process between Israel, Syria and the Palestinians is in very bad shape. For example, the recent negotiations with Syria halted over seemingly negotiable issues such as who is going to control a strip of land in the northeast part of Lake Tiberias. I think we will need a miracle to get together again. We need creative ideas for new solutions.

The crux of the problem between Syria and Israel is mutual mistrust. When Barak came to power approximately 11 months ago, the two leaders exchanged compliments. However, while Barak continued to express goodwill, Assad stopped because he felt that Barak was trying to manipulate him as Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu had all done previously. Assad questioned what kind of game Barak was playing. Barak is not a saint, for there are no saints in the Middle East. Everyone contributes to this mess.

The two parties also misunderstood each other. Assad and Barak are somewhat similar, as they both come from tough, cold, military backgrounds, and they are both very stubborn in demanding the other's submission. Domestic issues within Israel added to the problem, for as Kissinger once said, “Israel does not have a foreign policy. Only a domestic policy”. Syria is not democratic, and therefore Assad is not as constrained by the need to appease public opinion. In any case, there is mutual mistrust between Syria and Israel and within Israel regarding domestic issues.

The Palestinian track has also not been a great success, and is currently stuck. The parties are still talking but this is not exceptional, for meaningless rhetoric abounds in Middle East politics. The crux of the matter is that Israel is not magnanimous; it is not generous. Israel makes a great mistake by being very shortsighted, especially with regard to the final status issues that are now being discussed. Perhaps, now that the Syrian track has been stalled, attention will be re-focused on the Palestinian track. In fact, several people in the government were pressing to focus on the Palestinian track rather than the Syrian because they felt it was more important. Their desire to negotiate with Palestinians does not stem from empathy towards the Palestinians; instead, Israel understands that it is in its best interest to have a happy, stable neighbor in the form of a Palestinian state. It is also in Israel’s best interest to make peace with Syria and Lebanon since otherwise the prospect of violence from the Lebanese and Palestinian sides remains.

In the 1970s, Kissinger said that in order for the Arabs to present a credible military threat to Israel, they needed Egyptian participation. However, he also felt that Syria would have to be part of any stable peace in the region. At the time, Kissinger forgot about the Palestinians, although he later said that both the Palestinians and the Syrians were very important. I believe that the Palestinians are particularly important to stability and peace in the Middle East. Peace with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians will ease Israel’s way into integrating with the Middle East and the Arab/Islamic world. I think that peace must also be built between the peoples, based on strategic and economic cooperation and cultural understanding. This is a long-term goal, however, and is a far cry from the present situation. The struggle will be long and tough, but Israel must have the motivation to accomplish it.

Can we achieve all these aims and dreams? I believe it is possible, for when there is a will, there is a way. While all sides are responsible, peace depends particularly on Israel, because it is a strong and powerful country technologically, militarily, and economically. In addition, Israel controls occupied territories, and therefore is capable of doing a lot to bring about peace.

The Arab World sees Israel as a foreign element in this region, and Israelis also perceive themselves as foreign. The main objective, therefore, is to change both this image and the reality so that we as Jews can become more integrated with our Arab neighbors. This does not require that we become Arab or Muslim, but that we learn more about the Arab culture, language, and society. This is a big challenge, however, because even Israelis who come from Arab countries and have a Judeo-Arab culture are not willing to integrate. Although we all have a lot in common, people have pushed our commonalties aside because of the conflict. We must return to these commonalties, and the risk involved in this is outweighed by the need of peoples on all sides to live and to co-exist. The majority of the people on both sides are pragmatic, moderate, and want to live peacefully.

I want to briefly outline the relations between Israel and the Arab World over the last 50 years. During the first 20 or 25 years, Arab nations, by and large, wanted to do away with Israel, owing to ideological or cultural motives. Attitudes shifted, however, and from 1967 on Arab leaders wanted to establish correct relations with Israel, provided it withdrew from the territories occupied in/since 1967. By this point, however, Israel refused, and the two sides reversed roles.

For example, on 19 June 1967, just after the Six-Day War, the Israeli Government unanimously decided to offer peace to the Arab nations by withdrawing to the international boundaries. The Arab nations rejected Israel’s proposal, and Israel abolished their decision. Israel’s offer to Jordan, however, did not include withdrawal from East Jerusalem, and they did not understand that no Arab leader could make peace without retaining a segment of Jerusalem. Even King Hussein, with all his good will and strategic relations with Israel, would not have been able to do that.

After the 1973 War, however, the Arabs began to change their attitudes and started moving towards peace. For the first time, Syria adopted UN Resolution 338. The Palestinians also changed their strategy, and in the 12^th session of the Palestinian National Council in June 1974 they decided to continue their struggle also by political means.

By this point, however, Israelis viewed this as a tactical maneuver designed to destroy Israel by stages. Israel was stubborn and did not want to change the status quo, particularly in regard to their relations with the Syrians and the Palestinians. Egypt and Jordan were a different story because Israel initiated the Kissinger step-by-step policy, which meant a progressive move towards peace starting first with Egypt, then Jordan, and finally with the Palestinians. However, both the Syrians and the Palestinians of the PLO showed a desire to come to terms with Israel - not out of love, but due to their constraints, limitations, and strategic interests. For example, by 1987 Syria came to the conclusion that a military solution would not be feasible and, instead, turned to a diplomatic solution. One reason for this was that Syria’s doctrine of strategic balance with Israel failed.

The same situation applied to the Palestinians. For instance, on 19 November 1988, Arafat appeared in Geneva and, for the first time, the PLO accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 181. This had profound implications that I am not sure even Arafat himself recognized at the time. UN Resolution 181 speaks about the division of Palestine into two states - an Arab and a Jewish state. Thus, by accepting this resolution, Arafat was indirectly recognizing the right of the Jews to a state; a significant ideological change from the PLO’s previous position. Accepting 242 was a condition for American recognition and relations with the PLO. From this point onward, both Syria and the Palestinians began making steps towards a pragmatic solution.

This was not the case in Israel however. Israel was still stubborn, perhaps because the Likud government was in power at the time. The Israeli position towards the Palestinians was structured in terms of the desire to possess territory for Greater Israel. The settlement movement spread throughout the country because the Likud wanted to avoid the possibility of a Palstate. This was done deliberately, and this attitude prevailed for many years.

The Israeli policy only began to change after the Americans applied a significant amount of pressure, and the Intifada changed the Palestinian image among the Israeli public. The public in Israel, for many years, was completely estranged from the Palestinians and looked down on them with contempt. The Intifada, however, showed the Israelis that Palestinians were fighting for their own national goals and that they were willing to sacrifice to achieve those goals. I think that a kind of admiration-hate relationship developed between the Jews and the Arabs at that time. Rabin and Peres both changed their attitudes towards the Palestinians, although it is unfortunate that it took force to accomplish this. I think that when Rabin came to power in 1992 there was a breakthrough in relations between Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians. For the first time, Rabin acknowledged that 242 also applied to the Golan Heights.

Perhaps the more important turning point, however, was the Oslo Agreement, which was a social and psychological breakthrough for both sides. For the first time, both Israelis and Palestinians expressed their desire to live in peace, reconciliation, and cooperation. Accordingly, all kinds of provisions were made. Unfortunately, Oslo did not address the major issues that have now become final status issues. Nevertheless, with all the criticism, the Oslo Agreement was implemented. Not fully or on time, but implemented. What was important at that time was the momentum. The fact that the Likud agreed to Oslo means that there was a compromise. Likud finally recognized the principle of partition.

A new era began with Barak because, for the first time, Israelis understood that Likud practices could not continue. Barak was not elected because he was leftist or liberal, but because he showed that he is tough. He was perceived as ‘Mr. Security’ who could take care of Israeli protection and defense, which is a very important issue - if not obsession - for Israelis. However, the concessions he has made since he came to power have not been very generous. He squeezed the Palestinian soul before offering any concessions. This shows, in my opinion, a lack of vision, owing partly to the position of his right-wing partners in the government.

Nevertheless, these issues must be solved, as only a final settlement will bring peace, security, and integration into this region. Most Israelis agree to a Palestinian state. In fact, recent figures show that 55 percent support it and another 20 percent believe it is going to come. The question of the nature and size of that state still remains. Hopefully we can negotiate some exchange of territories based on 1967. I cannot imagine that Israel will give up all the settlements, but perhaps we can exchange territory so that approximately 90-95 percent of the West Bank would go to the Palestinians. Thus, the Palestinians would get not only the corridor, but also some other places as well. Regarding the issue of settlements, since 70 percent of the settlers live along the ‘Green Line,’ the boundary could be moved further east to include them in Israel and we could compensate the Palestinians with other territories. As for the remaining settlements, ideally all of them should leave the Palestinian state because they are a time bomb. Many of them are militants who came to make trouble, and ideally they should go. If this does not happen, however, the second best alternative that many Palestinians agree to, would be to place these settlers under Palestinian sovereignty. They would be residents rather than citizens.

Another critical issue is Jerusalem, but I think that a solution can eventually be found. There is no problem with separate Palestinian and Israeli municipalities working under a coordinating umbrella organization. In my opinion, one undivided city is feasible. With regard to religion, the Haram Ash-Sharif would remain Muslim territory under autonomous Palestinian-Islamic jurisdiction. Everyone could benefit from this arrangement. Ideally, there should be free access to everything. This would win the good will of Muslim countries because Jerusalem is not only an Israeli-Palestinian issue but also a Muslim issue, and Israel has an interest in coming to terms with all Muslim countries.

The main issue is sovereignty. Recently, a group of Israelis and Palestinians published a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper entitled “The Future Relations Between Israelis and Palestinians,” in which we stated that Jerusalem should be undivided. Jerusalem should be a capital of two states; an Israeli capital in the west and a Palestinian capital in the east. The problem is that many Israelis are not going to accept this solution. There is a lot of work to be done in this respect, especially on the Israeli side, and Israelis must be willing to embrace creative ideas and demonstrate courage.

With regard to the issue of the Palestinian refugees, those of us who wrote this paper cannot deny the idea of the right of return. However, it was agreed that the implementation of return would apply only to the Palestinian state or whatever the Palestinian state can absorb. Israel would take only a token number - up to 100,000. The rest of the refugees would be resettled in Arab countries, whose governments would receive financial compensation from Israel, and the international community. Everyone agrees that there will be a collective compensation for the refugees. The Palestinians also demand individual compensation, which is the basis for some negotiations. I think that Palestinians know very well that even leftist Israelis would not accept masses of Palestinians coming into Israel proper.

The greatest challenge for Israel is integration. This is not easy. Israel has said that in order to achieve peace we have to be strong. However, to really attain a meaningful peace, Israelis need to change the character of their beliefs to be less patronizing towards the Palestinians. In conclusion, the issue is very difficult, but the solution can be achieved, for none of us want to continue another one hundred years of war that nobody can win.