Israeli Politics: From the Intifada to the Peace Process
Prof. Asher Susser[1]

The Regional Context

In the last decade or so a series of regional changes have created a window of opportu­nity for comprehensive Middle East peace­making. The regional balance of power has generally shifted in the last 10 or 15 years in Israel’s favor. The fact that Israel has, gener­ally speaking, become more powerful has given rise to a new Israeli willingness to ne­gotiate and to concede in negotiations with its Arab neighbors.

The changes that have brought about this shift in the balance of power are multifold. First of all, the peace established between Egypt and Israel has lasted for over 20 years.

Second, the end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on the Middle East. With the Soviet Union out of the picture as a major superpower, waging the conflict with Israel has become far more difficult for players like Syria and the PLO, which historically have been very dependent on the Soviet Union. The United States, Israel's closest ally, re­mains the world's sole superpower.

Third, there has been massive Jewish immi­gration from the former Soviet Union to Israel. The Jewish population in Israel has increased by about 20 percent in the last ten years, which has had an impact on the way Israelis see themselves, tending to reassure them about their future. Similarly it has also had an impact on the way the Arab World tends to view Israel. It has undermined the traditional radical Arab position that time and history are essentially on the Arab side. The massive Soviet immigration to Israel has given Arabs cause to recognize that Israel is not a declin­ing con­cern, but rather a thriving state that has increased in population and augmented its economic and technological power advan­tage.

Fourth, the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War and its consequent decline as a military power has further altered the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor.

Finally, the Intifada had a significant, al­beit mixed, effect on the balance of power in the region. On the one hand, it forced Israel to recognize the limitations of its in­creasing power. Israel gradually began to accept that it could not control a large and disaffected Palestinian population indefinitely. The Intifa­da, however, also forced the Pales­tinians to conclude that if they wanted to transform the Intifada into a real and tangible political gain, they would have to negotiate with Israel.

The combination of all these factors revealed two main points to the Israeli body politic: the extent of Israel’s power and regional domi­nance, and the limitations thereof. Thus, Is­rael may very well be the most powerful state in the region, but at the same time the Israelis can not change the fact that they are only minority, and a small one at that, in the Mid­dle East. Although Israel is a regional power, its use of force is severely constrained. Is­raelis would probably be amazed by the of­ten-mentioned Arab and Palestinian belief in the almost unlimited power of Israel to do as it pleased in the region. The manipulative prowess attributed to Israel and the Jews contrasts in the  extreme with the much more modest conception the Israelis themselves have of their actual capabilities.

Israelis are acutely aware of the fundamental lack of symmetry between Israel and the Arab states. There is, after all, only one Is­rael, but there are many Arab states. The relationship of the Arab states and the Pales­tinians to Israel is mainly bilateral. Con­versely, Israel’s relations with each one of its Arab neighbors are almost always part of a multi-lateral equation. Relations with Egypt are linked to Israel’s views and concerns about other Arab states. Palestine is inti­mately connected to relations with Jordan. Ties with Jordan are connected to Iraq. Syria and Lebanon are obviously inter-related issues, and so on. Israel’s relations with its neighbors are hardly ever strictly bilateral. Consequently, in the Israeli frame of mind it is never simply an Israeli-Palestinian equation, but one in which it is incumbent upon Israel to relate to Palestine within a context that in­cludes other regional players, above and be­yond the Palestinians.

In conclusion, therefore, the peace process is not the product of an ideological metamor­phosis in the sense that the Arab World has fundamentally changed its attitudes towards Israel. Nor have most Israelis dramatically altered their ideological perceptions. Instead, the peace process is a ‘window of opportu­nity’ based on a pragmatic recognition of both sides of their respective limitations.

Why is this only a window of opportunity? It is but a window because there are certain ele­ments on the regional horizon that might alter this balance of power and make the Middle East less conducive to the pursuit of peaceful negotiations. The reemergence of Iraq as a great regional power and/or the dissemina­tion of weapons of mass destruction may shift the balance of power in the Arabs’ favor. As a result, they might perceive negotiation with Israel as a less attractive proposition.

In facing this window of opportunity, Israel is geo-politically situated at the core of two con­centric circles. The inner circle surrounding Israel contains those countries that are en­gaged in the peace process. The outer circle contains countries like Iran and Iraq (or the less important states of Libya and Sudan), that are not involved in these negotiations and still maintain positions of extreme hostil­ity towards Israel. Israel, therefore, seeks to create a zone of peace with the inner circle of states, in the form of peace treaties with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. This inner circle of countries would thus serve as an area of peace and security, separating Israel from the outer circle of states, with which relations are potentially hostile, and thereby significantly reducing the chances of Iraqi or Iranian involvement or intervention in matters that impinge upon Israeli security.

The Domestic Israeli Debate

The crux of the Israeli domestic political de­bate is how to actually go about accomplish­ing this zone of peace. Basically, there are two schools of thought in Israeli society, broadly categorized as the right and the left. The supreme historical principle and objec­tive of the right was the redemption of the territory of Eretz Yisrael. They consequently refused to accept the land for peace formula and did not believe that Israel should con­cede territory for the sake of peace. This, they argued, was not only ideologically unac­ceptable but also ex­tremely dangerous for Israel in the present circumstances. After all, since there is still a danger that the radical elements in the region might regain power, they feel that conceding territory would prove to be too big a risk for the future of Israel. The country, the right fears, might find itself inde­fensible after major with­drawals from territo­ries taken in the War of 1967, whether in the West Bank or the Golan Heights.

The ideological point of departure of the left has always tended to emphasize the principle of the redemption of the people rather than the redemption of the land. For the left, terri­tory was an essential means to achieve the end, but it was never the ultimate objective in and of itself. Territory was an essential pre­requisite for the creation of a state for the Jewish people, but it did not have to include all of Eretz Yisrael. From the left-wing point of view, therefore, the parti­tion of Palestine was a legitimate option from very early on.

The argument made by the left was, and is, that there was no choice but to concede land if Israel wished to create this inner circle of peace with its immediate neighbors. Moreo­ver, peace in and of itself was a form of re­assurance against radicalization of the region in the future and thus a key component of Israel’s security.

In the past, Israeli society was deeply divided between right and left on this issue of parti­tion. Today, however, the real material differ­ences between left and right in Israeli politics are much narrower than they used to be. Much of the ideological right, which consis­tently believed in the inviolable principle of ‘Greater Eretz Yisrael,’ has accepted, how­ever grudgingly, the Oslo process. The de­bate in Israel now is no longer on the princi­ple of with­drawal from the West Bank and Gaza, but rather its extent. That is, it has be­come a matter of degree rather than one of principle. This is a most significant historical shift, whereby the majority in Israel, including much of the right, has accepted the logic of parti­tion. The question is no longer whether Israel accepts the idea of a Palestinian state, but rather its extent and future relationship with Israel.

Israel’s current policy towards the occupied territories is an attempt to balance the demo­graphic and territorial requirements of Israeli security. Most Israelis have arrived at the con­clusion that making concessions to the Pal­estinians is important for Israel’s long-term existence and that coercing millions of disaf­fected Palestinians to live under Israeli rule does not serve Israel’s own self-interest. The notion of ‘separation’ has to do with Is­raeli reluctance to construct its socioeco­nomic future based on Palestinian labor and the subjugation of the Palestinian economy to that of Israel. According to this frame of mind, Israel has an interest in the development of the Palestinian economy to allow for the Pal­estinians to have a viable state of their own, reducing the Israeli economy’s dependence on Palestinian workers. The solution, there­fore, lies in the creation of a Palestinian state, narrowing the economic gap between Pales­tine and Israel, reducing Israeli and Pal­estinian mutual dependence and hopefully at­taining security in terms of economic justice, social equilibrium and lack of friction, all of which will be essential for a lasting peace.

Yet matters do not end here. There are two critical historical phases in the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the War of 1948 and its consequences, and the War of 1967 and its aftermath. The first relates to Is­rael’s creation, the second to its expansion. It is much easier for Israel to negotiate 1967 questions, such as the future of the West Bank and Gaza, the future of Jerusalem, the settlements, and the 1967 refugees, which only touch upon Israel’s size. Israel can ne­gotiate the 1967 issues without compromising its existence as a state as de­fined in the Is­raeli Declaration of Independ­ence in 1948. However, Israel cannot negoti­ate the 1948 questions with the same ease. There are two 1948 questions which impinge upon the exis­tence of the Israeli state as presently defined: 1) the status of the 1948 refugees, and 2) the status of the one million Palestinian citizens of Israel whose key spokespersons are cam­paigning for an alter­native to the current defi­nition of the Israeli state as the state of the Jewish people.

Israeli politics are therefore being redefined as a result of the peace process. The cleav­ages are no longer primarily between the Zi­onist left and the Zionist right. Today, the key differences are between secular and religious, and between Zionists and non-Zionists, sym­bolized so clearly by the emergence of Shas as the main ultra-Orthodox non-Zionist party. New battle lines are being drawn in the do­mestic Israeli debate. The new divisions are between the Zionists, who wish to maintain Israel as a secular Zionist liberal democratic state, and the non-Zionists, who contest the status quo and would like to see it replaced either by a de-Zionized secular state or a less secular and more theocratic Jewish state.

There are two major constituencies of non-Zionists in Israel. The ultra-Orthodox Jews and the Palestinians. They share a common ethos of dissent towards Israel as a secular Zionist state. The Orthodox object to the secular nature of the state, whereas the Pal­estinians are increasingly critical of Israel’s exclusive designation as the state of the Jewish people. These are the issues that are rising to the top of the Israeli domestic agenda. As the Arab-Israeli conflict winds down and Israel approaches the creation of the two-state solution, the question of its own identity is becoming ever more acute. As long as Israel defines itself as the state of the Jewish people (and one may assume that most Israelis will continue to regard this des­ignation as the authentic expression of their national aspirations), the complete resolution of all the historical bones of contention be­tween Israel and Palestine might prove to be an elusive goal. Israelis may be willing to concede considerable amounts of territory. They should not be expected to concede their identity as well.