The Israeli Lobby and US-Israeli Relations
Colette Avital

To begin, I would like to set up the general framework of Israel's relations with the United States. There is no doubt that in terms of Israel’s existence, relations with the United States are a strategic asset. However, this was not always the case. Looking at various issues in our short history, it is clear that there has been a progressive change in America’s attitude towards Israel. In 1948, when Israel was born, the United States and Russia were the two superpowers and both immediately recognized Israel. At that time, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was under the illusion that Israel could remain neutral in the Cold War, and thus he wanted to conduct a neutral foreign policy not in alliance with either of the superpowers. However, due to the beginning of the Cold War and of the division of power between Russia and the US, Ben-Gurion's dream of neutrality was not feasible.

In the first years, Israel's relations with Russia were much closer. The aim of Russia in supporting Israel at that time was to get the British out of the area. From 1948 to 1956 Israel did not think that peace would be possible, so the main thrust of Israel’s foreign policy was defense. Israel's support came primarily from European countries. In 1955 and 1956 the big 'love affair' with France started, as a result of common interests. Relations with the Soviet Union began to cool, but in 1957 they were still important. Other countries of the Soviet Union bloc, such as Bulgaria, opened their gates and allowed immigrants to come to Israel - the only country where people were allowed to live outside of the Soviet socialist paradise. For these reasons, the US was not very favorable towards Israel in the early years.

However, a deeper understanding of US foreign policy toward Israel involves a combination of several factors. One of these is its moral commitment to the survival of the Jews and to Israel's existence as an independent country. At the same time, the US was interested in entering, permeating and gaining influence in the area. Up until events of 1955 and 1956, the US still believed that it would be possible to maintain a foothold in the area. In 1955, US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles pursued a policy of trying to establish pacts and alignments. He tried to organize what is called the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which failed. The backlash of the Baghdad Pact was that he literally threw the Arab countries into the arms of the Soviet Union. As a result, from 1955 on the US started to lose the illusion that it would have a direct influence in the Arab World.

At this time, competition between the superpowers - US and the Soviet Union - grew. Because of that competition, the United States' attitude toward Israel started changing. In a way, between 1948 and 1956 Israel was perceived as a burden, rather than as an asset. The moral obligation to ensure Israel's existence was seen as an obligation because it did not leave the US the freedom to maintain good relationships with the Arab World, collectively or individually. However, with the failure of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 the US felt free from its obligation to develop pacts with the Arab World, and gradually gave Israel increasing support. This did not happen immediately, however, as a result of the 1956 Suez Campaign. During that crisis Israel aligned itself with England and France against the weight of the superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union posed an ultimatum, demanding that Israel withdraw from the Sinai. The US threatened Israel not only with a military blockade, but also with an economic boycott. Unless Israel complied by withdrawing its forces from the Sinai, the US further threatened to expel it from the United Nations.

The United States' desire to play a role in the area and to bring the sides together was at odds with its competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The amount of aid given to Israel at different times reflects the various stages of the attitude of the US. During the War of Independence, for instance, America donated to Israel no more than $100,000. Furthermore, the US maintained an arms embargo against Israel until the end of 1968, therefore Israel received its arms supplies from the Europeans. This is an indication of how, up until 1967, Israel was a marginal factor in shaping US conceptions of the Middle East. Israel did not play a very big role in US foreign policy or in the American mind.

From 1967 on, a complete strategic change gradually brought Israel from a marginal factor to a central point in developing American conceptions of the Middle East. The Kennedy administration of the 1960s attempted to understand Israel a little bit better. However, the real policy change and the beginning of the reassessment of the role of Israel in this area occurred in 1967. After the Six-Day War, Israel suddenly seemed to be an important asset to the Americans; not only because it managed to win the war and to change its whole strategic position in the area, but because it had captured some of the Soviet Union's best equipment during the war.

However, the biggest change occurred in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War. Israel's victory in this war had two major results. It enabled the United States to have a certain amount of influence in Egypt and to end the war at will. At that time, Henry Kissinger was the US Secretary of State, and he opposed the old attitudes towards Israel as embodied by Rogers. In deciding exactly where and when the war was to end, Kissinger achieved two things. First, he established that negotiations between Israel and the Egyptians were necessary in order to initiate any disengagement. Moreover, the fact that Kissinger decided where the war ended gave the US a different role in the area, proving beyond a doubt the extent of American influence.

I would like to return to the concept of the US' 'moral obligation' to Israel. Europeans do not understand that in the US the term 'moral' has significance, and is actually one of the issues most debated among foreign policy makers. Although a dichotomy is often perceived between this 'moral' role and the strategic one, I contend that in fact these concepts should be taken as parts of a whole. Without a strategic motive the moral rationale would not stand, and at times the moral helps justify the strategic. The combination of the two produces the most significant results.

Syria's attempted invasion of Jordan in September 1970 caused the US to realize Israel's potential strategic role. Israel's strong move forward stopped the Syrians, and allowed the Jordanians to avoid a war. At that point, the United States became interested in a different kind of a partnership, and this is reflected directly in the level of foreign aid it gave to Israel. For approximately the first ten years of Israel’s existence it received only $500,000 from the US was. In the period between 1970 and 1973 it received $360 million. The perception of Israel as a strategic ally changed even more radically with the end of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, for the US began to believe that it could play a role in peace-making in the area, facilitating negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. Political leaders from both parties felt that only a strong Israel could make concessions. Furthermore, from 1967 onwards Israel's continued possession of conquered territories was intrinsically connected with the instability and lack of peace in the area. The US also perceived that only if Israel was strong and felt safe in terms of security could peace lead to land concessions, which is the basis of the American policy to strengthen the state of Israel.

From the day in 1977 when President Sadat came to Israel, the foreign policy of the United States became increasingly supportive of Israel. Since that time there has been a direct correlation between Israel's willingness to make peace and the amount of support or tension between each Israeli and American administration. When Israel had a policy of peace-making, Americabecame more and more involved. All American administrations have been very consistent in that facet of the two countries' relations. This was clearly the case with President Carter, who moved from a silent partner to an active partner from 1977 onward. If Carter had not been so eager and involved in the Camp David negotiations, Israel probably would not have been able to sign an agreement with the Egyptians. America became a full partner in peace with Israel from the moment it signed the Camp David Accords, which also meant increased American aid to Israel. Up until 1985 the US gave small packages of aid, which despite their size were very important. Beginning in 1985 when peace became tangible and Israel left the Sinai, this aid changed from a loan to a gift. After 1985 American participation gradually increased, as did the perceptions of real partnership and the notion that America had to become a guarantor for the peace in the area.

The low points in Israel’s relationship with the United States undoubtedly occurred during the Bush years, when Yitzhak Shamir was Israel’s Prime Minister. A serious crisis and extreme mistrust developed between Mr. Shamir and Mr. Bush, arising directly from the settlement issue. Mr. Shamir asked the United States for loans to support the new immigrants arriving from the ex-Soviet Union, and Bush very specifically told him that unless he agreed to stop building settlements in the West Bank, the US would not give Israel loan guarantees. Even at this low point a certain consistency marked the American policy, for when peace moved forward the Americans supported Israel. When the US perceived that Israel was stalling the peace process, relations deteriorated.

A second example, closer to the present time, is the government of Binyamin Netanyahu. At the beginning of this period I was in the United States and noticed a feeling of guilt on the part of the administration; they had been too obvious in supporting Shimon Peres during the elections. At the beginning of Mr. Netanyahu’s term the American policy makers attempted to be objective. They further sent a very clear message to the new Israeli leaders that if the peace process continued and Israel became endangered as a result, America would strongly support Israel by minimizing the dangers and increasing security. However, that support was connected to the progress of the peace process. The Netanyahu years were a succession of incidents that actually brought about confrontation between Israel and the US, even to the extent of Netanyahu's open defiance of American demands.

The fluctuation of American support at that time is once again indicative of the extent and nature of America's interest in Israel, and of the change in perceptions of that interest over time. America has over the years perceived Israel as an asset, because it thinks that Israel can do by proxy some of the things that the US itself cannot do in this area. On the other hand, there is no doubt that various Israeli administrations, beginning in 1975, have dealt differently with American demands. I mention 1975 because that was Rabin's first term as Prime Minister, and Israel did not comply with the American view of its agreement with Syria, which brought about a period of reassessment. Undoubtedly, the US attempted to pressure Israel. This gives rise to another issue: today many Israelis think that the aid we get from America limits our independence in terms of our decision-making process. For example, just yesterday the Chinese President visited Israel to discuss an arms deal in which the Chinese would purchase Israeli technology. The technology is not American, yet both the US Congress and the administration resent any kind of transfer of technology to China. This example highlights how Israel must frequently take American interests into account when dealing with other countries.

Any discussion of American policy towards Israel must also take into account the following three domestic factors: public opinion in general, the Congress and the Jewish community. Each of these has a direct impact on the American way of thinking and on US policy-making. If and when, as is the case now, the American President is a democrat and the majority of Congress is Republican, foreign policy decisions are much more difficult, especially those involving foreign aid. Israel has always understood this very important domestic balance of decision-making in America, and relations with Congress and Senate have always been considered just as important as relations with the Administration. Resultantly, in cases where the Administration has tried to put pressure on Israel, or to make decisions not considered very helpful to Israel, Congress has opposed the Administration. Thus, Israeli policy has always tried to cultivate relations with both Congress and the Administration, and since support for Israel has been bipartisan, Israel has traditionally tried to maintain equally good relations with each party.

The second important point is the Jewish community, which has always been instrumental in the interplay between Congress and Administration, i.e., the Jewish lobby. There are approximately 5.5 million Jews in America today, barely one percent of the population, yet this one percent manages to wield tremendous influence. This is one of the big riddles of the American political scene. Not every American Jew is wealthy or in a position of influence, but the Jewish community has managed to gain much more power than its percentage alone would indicate.

Early on, the Jewish community learned to be involved in the American political system. Of course, the relative power of different lobbies changes with time. During the 1970s the oil lobby was very powerful and had a lot of influence in foreign policy (1973-76). At that same time, the Jewish lobby was not very influential. Jews had to learn how to get involved in the political parties, but their main involvement has been in the campaigns of candidates; financing, fundraising and helping. This is a tremendous job of organization all over the US. The result has been that the Jewish lobby has managed to become close to most of the candidates in both parties. This is part and parcel of the whole interplay in American politics.

Interestingly, even the Egyptians have used the Jewish lobby to secure their demands and interests in American policy. It is the Jewish lobby that usually gets the aid package for the Egyptians, because it is connected with Israel. For a long time, the withholding of the first aid package to the Palestinians was 90 percent attributable to the Jewish lobby, who strongly opposed such a measure. These examples demonstrate the extent to which Israel works with the Jewish lobby, not only to secure aid for Israel but also to aid others.

The American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is par excellence the Jewish Lobby in the US. AIPAC has branches in eight major American cities, and each branch of the local Jewish leadership decides which political candidates they want to support. They usually do that by checking the voting record of a candidate who has already served, and by discussing the candidate's attitude toward different issues with those who have not. It is made clear to the candidates that the support of AIPAC is tied to these issues. Money is raised through fundraising dinners and other functions, and financial support is given. Some money is also raised for the functioning of the main AIPAC offices, but none of the money is allowed to go to Israel or to candidates in Israel.

AIPAC is trying to be supportive of every Israeli government, regardless of its orientation. However, some of AIPAC's representatives are uncomfortable with this approach, simply due to the awkward position in which this places them. If AIPAC fundraises for one Israeli government on the platform of supporting continued Israeli presence in the Golan Heights and the next Israeli government adopts a position of compromise on the Golan issue, AIPAC's credibimay be damaged. Since the policy of the current Israeli government is to try to promote the peace process, AIPAC will help convince Congress that they also have to support the peace process.

In addition to the registered Jewish lobby, another lobby coming from Israel, claiming to represent the Israeli public, is adamantly against withdrawal from the territories. A group of right-wing Israelis here in Israel are working hard in Congress, and have done a lot of damage.

Last but not least, the third factor is American public opinion at large. By every single count, American public opinion has been very supportive of Israel over the years. No American Congressman or Senator could help Israel or vote for Israel without the backing of a very strong public opinion. Because Israel is a democracy, US citizens have expressed a good deal of sympathy and support for Israelis in general and the Israeli democracy in particular, which they considered to be a “shared value”. Many Israeli may not realize the extent and importance of public opinion and lobbies in shaping American foreign policy. Yet for this reason every Israeli embassy or consulate has always had American public opinion as its main focus; particularly among the media.

The Intifada, for example, was harmful in that it tarnished the lofty Israeli image and changed perceptions of the Palestinians both in America and in Israel. The Madrid Conference was one of the results of the Intifada, as was the gradual recognition of the PLO. Around the time that the Intifada started in 1987, CNN developed the concept of broadcasting news 24 hours a day. Therefore, images from in Intifada were repeated 15, 20, 30 times a day, and those images undoubtedly had a strong impact on the public opinion.

Public opinion is also important because some US citizens point to America's own problems and question the need for foreign aid. It is very easy to convince the American public not to support any foreign aid. Lobbyists take a public opinion poll with ‘leading’ questions, bring the results to their congressman, and claim that the vast majority of the American public does not support foreign aid. The congressman will naturally agree, and will stop supporting our peace agreements with aid. This is exactly what is happening right now in America, which is why work on public opinion is so important if we want America to support the peace process.

I do not know of any relations between a superpower and a small country that can be compared to those between the US and Israel. In the whole history of diplomatic relations, the relationship between Israel and United States is totally unique. Relations usually occur in two different dimensions. The first is bilateral relations, which are multifold and include every part of the two civil societies. The second dimension is via third parties or perceived common interests. The only comparison that may approach Israel’s relations with the United States would be the relationship between the US and England, due to a common heritage and the role that England is playing in Europe. However, relations between Israel and the United States are totally outstanding by any criteria, and beyond comparison with any other relations. I would consider this one of Israel's most important strategic assets.

In the late 1980s Israel signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with America, giving it the benefits of American technology. This allows for the possibility of conducting strategic talks with America about our area, and open communications regarding policies. Thus, the Israeli and American Ministries of Defense have had certain joint programs and developed certain technologies together. I am certain that neither side has stolen information from the other. This is why the Pollard issue came as such a shock both for the Israeli government and the Americans. There are various levels of cooperation between all sorts of institutions in Israel, including secret services. Pollard was put in place by a scientific attaché by a man who did not coordinate his efforts with the Mossad. In other words, the big scandal in Israel at that time was that the Mossad had no knowledge that someone working outside of the Mossad was utilizing Pollard. You can imagine the embarrassment both of the Mossad and the Israeli government, because the way Pollard was being used was unprofessional.

The discovery of Pollard's activities had a negative impact on US-Israeli relations, because the US had been double-crossed and felt stabbed in the back, which is one of the reasons why Pollard is still in jail. Pollard did not transfer technology to an enemy, yet he has had more punishment than any man who spied for Russia. It was very difficult to explain to the United States that most of the people in charge in Israel were unaware of this situation. With the exception of Pollard, however, there is no secretive spying between Israel and America. On the contrary, there is a relationship of trust.