CHAPTER TWO

THE ARABS AND WORLD WAR I

The Arabs in Syria seemed to have lost faith in the call on the Turks to grant the Arab region independence from the Empire. Consequently, they began to search for external support for the endeavor. According to British documents, a group of Druze from Lebanon and Damascus contacted the British Consul in Beirut in 1913 and asked for British aid to the Arabs in the struggle with the Turks. In the same year, a Muslim delegation visited Kitchener in Cairo and proposed that Greater Syria be annexed to Egypt, suggesting that Syria be offered its own self-rule and administration. Kitchener, in response, handled the proposal. By late 1913, the participants in the Arab Congress in Paris had sent delegations composed of active participants in the Congress to the French Foreign Ministry and to the embassies of the great powers, where they were supposed to hand copies of the congressional decision to the European officials.

On 24 February 1914, the British Ambassador in Constantinople wrote to the British Foreign Minister and indicated that a number of Arab officers had visited the embassy and inquired what the British attitude toward the Arabs would be in case a state of emergency occurred. At the time, Aziz Ali Al-Masri was in prison, waiting for judicial delivery of a verdict, and the Arabs petitioned the foreign ministers in Constantinople presenting his case and calling for support.

Based on the British documents, the Arab leaders seemed to have initiated the establishment of an alliance between the Arabs and the British. Their move made the British pay great attention to the possibility of having an alliance with the Arab nationalist movement in the region. This move possibly had an impact on the eventual results of the Arab region by the end of World War I, as it exposed the Arabs' limited alternative for an alliance in the war.

The British Government favored an alliance with the Arab movement. They attempted to prevent the Ottoman Sultan from declaring a holy war against the allies. The Arabs could also contribute to the British world effort through their internal work against the Ottomans. Furthermore, the alliance could provide the British with a guarantee concerning their interests in the region, at least during the war. Moreover, the Arab leaders showed great enthusiasm for fighting the Ottomans, which would add to the British war effort and the allies' vested interests in winning the global war.

Immediately after the breakout of World War I, Al-Jam'iyyah Ath-Thawriyyah Al-Arabiyyah, (The Arab Revolutionary Society), issued a call to all Arabs, descendants from Qahtan. In its call, it emphasized that Muslims, Christians and Jewish Arabs were related in Arabism and nationalism, demanding that the Arabs take care of their brothers in Yemen, Asir, Najd and Iraq and defend them from the threats of the enemy. Arabs in Greater Syria and Iraq were supposed to work together along with their fellow nationalists. In this call, the Arab Revolutionary Society asserted "The Muslims, Christians and Jews among you must work hand in hand for the interest of the motherland and the ummah. You all inhabit and invest in the same land, you speak a single language. Therefore, you must be a united ummah and a single hand. You must aid each other, unite and support each other." The Society again called on the Muslims not to discriminate against Christians and Jews since they all worshipped the one God and asked Christian and Jewish Arabs to work hand in hand with the Muslims.

This liberal tone in the Arabs' calls during World War I could also be seen in the letter written by Abdul Ghani Al-Arisi after he was arrested in late July 1915. In this letter, he pointed out that religious and racial prejudice had never been contemplated by Arab nationalists. He demanded that the Arabs not be divided into denominational and ethnic groups. According to Al-Arisi, Christians, Muslims, Jews, Druze and atheists were all Arabs and should act in accordance with Arab interests. Sharif Al-Hussein of Mecca wholly supported Al-Arisi's premise and called upon the Arabs to consider the Jews who resided in the Arab World to be Arabs.

This liberal and tolerant stand adopted by the Arab nationalist movement could not be seen as an unusual development. Its roots go back to the ideological stand to which the Arab nationalist movement committed itself back in 1913 at the time of the Arab Congress in Paris. This liberalist ideal could have brought about a concerted Arab effort in dealing with the issue of Arab independence and unity. However, it did not take into account the fact that Palestine at that time was the target of Zionist plans and schemes. However, this Arab liberal show probably strengthened the alliance with the British, since Britain would have favored liberalism over Ottoman Islamism during World War I, the time of polarization and alliances in the world.

The British, in their attempts to create an alliance with the Arab movement, continued to contact the Arab leadership. The Arab nationalist movement, however, was divided on the issue of alliance. The first faction, which was led by Prince Abdullah, the son of Sharif Al-Hussein of Mecca, was enthusiastic concerning an alliance with the British. The second one led by his brother Faisal, showed reluctance. The meeting held in Damascus upon Prince Faisal's visit to Syria in 1915 resolved the problem by issuing the Damascus Protocol as the basis for any alliance negotiations with the British. This protocol underlined the demand for Arab independence and unity under the leadership of the Caliphate and determined the boundaries of the Arab World. Moreover, it called for the substitution of the capitulation granted to the Europeans according to the Ottoman calls for the treaty of mutual defense with the British, where Arab and Britain would be equal partners.

This protocol constituted the main basis for the Al-Hussein-MacMahon correspondence. In Al-Hussein's letter to MacMahon, dated 10 July 1915, the writer asserted that Britain should recognize Arab independence within these boundaries: Marcin and Adana in the north, from East Birsha up to the Gulf of Al-Basrah and the Indian Ocean in the south, and in the east the Red Sea and the Mediterranean with the exception of Aden on the southern front boundaries, which could maintain its status. England, Al-Hussein added, should recognize an Arab Caliphate.

On 25 October, the British Ambassador in Cairo, in response to Al-Hussein's letter, accepted the Arab demands, mentioning one reservation with regard to the French interests in Lebanon. This acceptance must have been obligatory to the British Government. It was presented very clearly through correspondence between the British Ambassador in Cairo, who was granted total authority over decision making on behalf of the British Government and Sharif Al-Hussein, who was looked upon as an official spokesman of the whole Arab people.

This correspondence could have been an impetus behind Arab participation in the war in accordance with the Arab alliance with the British. The policy of Jamal Pasha greatly elevated the tension between the Arabs and Turks, which must have easily provoked the Arab leadership to start an Arab revolt.

Jamal Pasha repeatedly sentenced Arabs, including many Palestinians, to death. On one occasion, he hanged 12 young men in Jerusalem, in addition to the Mufti of Gaza, Ahmad Arif Al-Husseini, and his son from the well-known Al-Husseini family.

On 6 May 1916, Jamal Pasha hanged a new group of Arab leaders after Prince Faisal made an unsuccessful attempt to get him to grant them a pardon. Upon his return to Damascus from Beirut, Faisal informed his colleagues of his assessment of the Turks' intentions as exposed in Jamal Pasha's acts. They all agreed upon the necessity of Prince Faisal departing immediately for Mecca in preparation for the breakout of an Arab revolt. The Al-Hussein correspondence was not yet completed; in fact, Sharif Al-Hussein and the Arab leaders were under the impression that the British would live up to their promises to the Arabs.

The Arab Revolt started as planned by Arab leaders on 10 June 1916. The Palestinian participation in the secret stages of the Arab Revolt came through the activities of the enrolled Palestinian members of Al-Fateh and Al-Ahd. In the midst of World War I, and in spite of the difficulties and miserable conditions that existed in the country, great numbers of Palestinians volunteered in the army, signing their names with the volunteer registration office that the British established in 1917. The number of Palestinian volunteers was estimated at several thousand, which could seem high in terms of the condition of the country and the divided allegiances of young Palestinians between the two struggling camps. Al-Haj Amin Al-Husseini, who was still a young man at the time, played an active role in recruiting volunteers, for which purpose he was obliged to travel to various parts of the country.

The Palestinians' enthusiasm in regard to participation in the Arab Revolt of 1916 stemmed from the way in which they perceived themselves as part of the Arab ummah and the hope that the revolt would result in resolving the Palestinian issue and putting an end to Zionist immigration to Palestine. Contrary to these and the fellow Arab brothers' expectations, the British signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, according to which the Arab region was to be divided into French and British spheres of influence. More importantly, the British issued the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, in which the British Government granted the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine.

The British moves of 1916 and 1917 contradicted the British promises to the Arabs. According to Jeffries, Palestine, in the British agreement with the Arabs, was to be granted independence and self-rule, similar to Al-Hijaz and any other Arab province included in the agreed Arab independence. He added that the British denial of Palestine's independence was a manifestation of the British commitment to political Zionism. He went on to say that the British officials, back in October 1915, had nothing in mind with respect to Palestine and Zionism except for including Palestine within the Arab independent commonwealth. It was never said at that time that Palestine would be totally or partially Jewish, and Palestine had not yet been subjected to political ends for the British and the Zionists. The map drawn for the Arab independence back then also included Palestine as part of the Arab commonwealth.

The promises and agreements that the British offered various parties during World War I could be understood as part of Britain's endeavor to accomplish its vested interest in winning the war. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 seemed to be grounded by two sets of objectives. On the one hand, the British were highly concerned with securing an alliance with Zionism as a means of bringing new parties to the Western alliance - mainly the United States - and improving their chances of winning the war. In addition to that, they tried to make Eastern European Jews support Zionism instead of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Furthermore, this declaration might be viewed as a natural outcome of the formation of the war cabinet of 1916 in which three active Zionists were major figures, namely, Prime Minister Lloyd George, the Minister of the Interior Herbert Samuel, and the person in charge of the Colonial Office, Arthur Balfour.

The British on the other hand could have considered highly the strategic importance of this declaration. In accordance with this theme, the Balfour Declaration could be viewed as the outcome of the British attempts to make use of the Jewish problem dating back to 1841 when the British moved to convince the Ottomans to open Palestine for Jewish immigration. The Jewish homeland in Palestine might have been looked upon by the British as a strategic asset and a reliable ally that could aid them in preserving and enhancing their interests in the Middle East.

While the Zionists' options varied, the Arab nationalist movement had limited choices. The Arabs could hardly participate in the war independently and had no other option than to ally themselves with England and France. Although the British might offer the Arabs promises of independence and freedom, they could easily back away from their commitments.

According to Jeffries, Sharif Al-Hussein of Mecca, through the negotiations with the British representative in Cairo and through his clever use of political language, proved to be a stubborn and shrewd politician and negotiator. His orthodoxy was at the same time evident. Jeffries asserts that "we find him greatly interested in allying himself with us along with his great confidence of our promises."

The above suggested a paradox in the British commitments to implement these promises, which is evident in Jeffries' argument. The British signed the agreement in 1916 and then issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917 while committing themselves to their promises to the Arabs, promises that were specified and clear in letter and spirit. Jeffries stated that "Great Britain was ready to recognize Arab independence within the areas included in the boundaries suggested by Sharif Al-Hussein of Mecca and will support this independence." Palestine was included within these boundaries. The Arabs were free on their land to choose whatever suited their ambitions and needs. Jeffries added that importantly, the British agreed with Sharif Al-Hussein on Arab independence. According to that agreement, the British did not treat him as Sharif of Mecca but rather the sole representative of the entire Arab ummah, including the Palestinians. He also spoke on behalf of the Arab secret societies in which the Palestinians were active.

In the final analysis, the period under discussion can be considered a highly critical era in the history of Arabism and Palestinian national resistance, not least of all because it witnessed the birth of both an Arab nationalist and Palestinian national movement. The rise of the two movements was grounded on objective factors. The emergence of Arabism and the Arab nationalist movement, influenced by the Ottoman reformation effort, entailed depriving the old social classes in the Arab East of their influence. Therefore, Arab nationalists were instrumental in the formation of the Palestinian National Resistance, which came as a result of the peculiar status of Palestine in the late nineteenth and early 20th Century, dictated by the Zionist invasion of Palestine.

The Arab nationalist movement passed through some stages. In the first place, it emerged as a literary movement whose major concern was the revival of Arab literature and the Arabic language and culture. In the late 19th Century, this movement could be viewed as part of the Ottoman constitutional movement. In response to Sultan Abdul Hamid II, it stood for the restoration of the Constitution and the reinstallation of the parliament. After 1909, the Arab movement became more active against the Turks. Now with its own societies and organizations, its main concern became the materialization of Arab independence.

It could be said that the Arab nationalist movement lacked organizational or ideological cohesiveness and that it suffered from the absence of clear and well-defined programs and schemes to bring about the desired change. The Arab vanguard raised vague and ambiguous slogans, which did not necessarily serve the movement well during World War I, especially at the time of negotiating the prospect for an alliance with the British in the war.

The Palestinian National Resistance found itself in an awkward situation. Since it was originally born within the Arab nationalist movement, the Palestinians were to play a significant role within the movement, while at the same time having to single-handedly resist Zionism within Palestine. This is not to neglect the fact that the Arab leaders were mainly concerned with the issue of Arab independence and unity. Although Palestine for them was an important part of the Arab World, it received minimal consideration.

This period could be regarded as highly significant in the history of both the Arab and Palestinian struggle, since it carried with it the basis for both the Arab nationalist movement and Palestinian National Resistance. The foundations and the character of each of these two movements, in addition to their interdependence on each other, would have serious ramifications for both, beginning at the time of the war and more clearly in the post-World War I period, up to 1939 and 1948, the period under study in this work.