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CHAPTER
TWO
THE
ARAB MOVEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
Letters
of support were sent by Palestinians to the major participants
in the conference, emphasizing the call for Arab support
to Palestinians as a way of putting an end to the Zionist
danger. Out of 387 letters, 139 came from Palestine. Despite
this fact, the conferees ignored the call for encountering
Zionism and its dangers, which could explain the Palestinian
Arabs' reservations and criticism concerning the Paris
conference.
In an editorial in Al-Karmel newspaper, the writer questions:
"Should
we allow the Zionists to revive their nationalism at the
expense of our nationalism? Have we agreed upon selling
them our land piece by piece until they expel us from
our land in groups and on an individual basis?"
In
another call by Al-Karmel to every person interested in
the fate of the country, the newspaper harshly criticized
the attitude of both the Arab conferees and the Party
of Decentralized Ottoman Administration. This call by
Al-Karmel stated that the Arab leaders were not expected
to favor the Jewish interest:
"You
must have occupied yourself with pointing out to the Ottoman
officials that the expropriation of land by Zionist agencies
and societies would weaken the Arab nationalism and consequently
trouble the Ottoman League. Observing this awkward situation
and not doing anything to change it could imply that your
ties with your Arab and Ottoman brothers in Palestine
do not exist. It could also be an indication of a lack
of awareness on your part of the fact that losing Palestine
would diminish any hope for economic prosperity in the
Arab World."
On
25 July 1913, Al-Karmel published a criticism of the leaders
of the party of the decentralized Ottoman administration.
At the time of the Arab Congress in particular, those
leaders endeavored to discuss with the Zionists the prospect
of a joint effort against the Ottomans. Al-Karmel gave
up hope in regard to those champions of reform among the
Arab leaders and those of the decentralized Ottoman administration:
"We
hoped that they would rid us of Zionist threats and dangers.
We comprised a group of people who had hoped the best
for their leaders. This team possessed tremendous power;
not to ignore that Palestine, their country, was part
of the Ottoman Empire."
Under
the title "Alummi Khiyamak Ya Israel," Issa
Al-Issa wrote in Filistin that the Arab Congress in Paris
proved, beyond any doubt, its bankruptcy. None among the
participants could be questioned by parliament except
the Lebanese delegation, because this delegation was chosen
by an elected body to represent the people in the Congress.
And no one could tell what this delegation would face,
since the results of the Congress were contrary to all
expectations. The situation of the Arab ummah, Al-Issa
added, spoke clearly in objection to those decisions adopted
by the Congress in a similar manner to the Jewish tribes
who spoke about Rahvaam, the son of King Solomon: "We
have no luck with the son of David, so pack your tents."
The
harsh criticism of both Nassar and Al-Issa and their disappointment
could be understood in terms of their assessment of the
existing relationship between Palestine and the Arab ummah.
Their high expectation of the Arab Congress in Paris and
of the Arab national leaders could have caused this disappointment.
A regular observer would have been shocked too, especially
when he tried to assess Arab nationalist Palestine and
its cause in relation to the Arab World. In other words,
it is astonishing to find Arab leaders ignoring the Palestinian
issue in a conference, when they supposedly placed the
Palestinian cause at the core of the Arab problem.
Najib
Azuri, for instance, pointed out that there existed two
groups of the same nature, which were at the same time
contradictory. On one side was the awakening of the Arab
ummah. On the other was the Jewish effort to rebuild an
old Israeli political entity. In the long run, the fate
of those two movements was to exist in a constant struggle
with each other until one would come to defeat the other.
And the fate of the whole world as it was known to them
was bound to the results of the struggle between the peoples
of two different doctrines.
Khalil
As-Sakakini, an Arab nationalist and Palestinian Christian,
also pointed to the dangers of Zionism in regard to the
Arab World in his diary on 23 February 1914. He stated
that his hatred of Zionism had not evolved from a hatred
of the Israeli people and their prosperity, but rather
from his opposition to the doctrine itself and the Zionist
attempts to built a nation at the expense of others. By
conquering Palestine, Zionism had conquered the heart
of the Arab World, since Palestine is the linking point
between the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and Africa. The Jewish
occupation of Palestine would end the Arab contact, especially
between the African and Asian Arabs.
Arabs
in general, and educated Arabs in particular, were aware
of the Zionist danger before the Paris Conference. Mustafa
Afandi, a teacher of mathematics at a Jerusalem middle
school, displayed a heightened awareness concerning Zionist
threats and colonial dangers. In an article he wrote,
he stated that Russia, which represented great oppression
and torture, presented itself as a supporter of the Jews
in the Ottoman Empire whenever the Ottoman Government
implemented its laws. The Russian Ambassador in the Empire
always attempted to present himself as a champion of Jewish
rights, whether the Jews were the aggressors or the victims.
Mustafa Afandi added that the Russians were interested
in pushing the Jews out of their own country and into
the Holy Land. Thereby, they could instigate trouble and
disturbances for the Ottomans. The Russians then could
use this situation to interfere in Ottoman domestic affairs.
The
British, according to Mustafa Afandi, wanted to see a
Greater Syria that was separated from Egypt, clearly regarding
unity as a source of strength. This separation could only
be achieved through the occupation of the Syrian country
by a foreign nation. The British, he continued, decided
to support the Jews and to help them establish a political
entity in Palestine, where the British could preserve
their interests and existence in Egypt.
Based
on the attitude of major figures in the Arab region, one
could grasp the scope of the awkwardness attached to the
attitude that was adopted by the Arab nationalists in
Paris in 1913. This obviously made the attitude of the
leaders of the Decentralization Party more strange and
surprising. However, digging deep into the ideology and
intellectual platform of the party of decentralization
of the Ottoman administration explains the apparent paradox
in their attitude.
In
1913, the head of the branches of the party on decentralization
of Ottoman administration in Syria wrote to the head courtier
of the party in Cairo. He stated that he and his colleagues
had decided to admit to the party membership only those
who adhered to Islam. On 25 August 1913, Rafiq Al-Azm,
the Secretary of the party replied, emphasizing that he
spoke for himself and indicating that Christians were
brothers of the Muslims in terms of nationality, language
and interest. He made it clear that he cared little for
those whose minds and hearts had been blinded by God and
who believed that Muslim-Christian brotherhood was a sort
of infidelity or a means to hand the region to foreign
domination. According to him, those people were either
ignorant or hypocrites. Although he did not go so far
as to accuse them of treason, he made it clear, instead,
that these people considered themselves reformers but
did not see clearly the interests of their nation, and
that their ignorance and stagnant attitude would lead
to the loss of the country. He continued to say that his
party was comprised of both Muslims and non-Muslims (Christians
and Israelis). By using the word 'motherland,' he asked
for admission to the ranks and membership of the party
Christians, Muslims and Jews; those who are known for
honesty, trustworthiness and good manners. In addition
to that, he called for the relationship between Christians,
Jews, and Muslims to be strengthened.
Based
on this ideological platform, Dr. Nasim Maltuh, a Jew
from Jaffa joined the party in 1913. Mohammed Ash-Shanti,
one of the active members of the Decentralization Party
in Palestine, wrote to the party in Cairo, informing it
that he had recruited a number of Jews as members in his
party.
The
letter sent by Rafiq Al-Azm, the Chairman of Hizb Al-Lamarkaziyyah,
to Mahmoud Al-Humusani in Beirut dated 20 June 1914 explained
the ideology of the party and the attitude adopted toward
the Zionists and the Jews. In this letter, he indicated
that when Hizb Al-Lamarkaziyyah was formed as an affiliate
body within the Arab nationalist movement, the Zionists
had taken the initiative and sent one of their leaders
to discern the state of affairs. This leader, who had
been sent earlier to Cairo, subsequently took charge of
the meeting and negotiating with the leaders of the party
in Paris on issues relating to the status of the Jews
in Palestine. In response, Al-Azm and his colleagues informed
him that
"we
are a group whose doctrine is democracy. For us, all people
in Syria are equal in terms of their rights and duties.
If the Jews were to become genuine citizens of the motherland,
they would consequently be similar to other fellow citizens
in this land, especially when the Zionist immigration
to the country is halted. None of them is allowed then
without becoming a true Ottoman citizen. They are supposed
to teach Arabic in their schools. They are also supposed
to allow children in general in this country to obtain
an education in these schools."
It
is not surprising then to find harsh criticism of the
call for the decentralization of the Ottoman administration
in Filistin on 19 April 1913 under the title "Hal
Tasluh Al-Lamarkaziyyah fi Filistin." The editor-in-chief
expressed his real surprise at the call of the people
of Beirut for a reformation through decentralizing the
Ottoman administration in various provinces of the Empire.
He did not necessarily question their intention, but rather
criticized the means of reform. For him, the decentralization
did not meet the demands of each and every province in
the Empire: for example the success of its application
in Beirut, the city of science and trade, would not necessarily
be the same as in other parts of the region. He used the
example of Palestine, seemingly to criticize the leaders
of the Decentralization Party. Palestine, according to
his argument, was an agrarian society, the wealth and
source of income of its inhabitants being based mainly
on land, the greatest portion of which was owned by a
small number of wealthy and influential families and local
leaders. The peasants, meanwhile, constituted the largest
portion of the population. Regardless of the types of
relationships in production existing in Palestine, the
country, he emphasized, had become subject to Zionist
interests, and over 100,000 different forms of adherence
and loyalty existed. He posed a rhetorical question: Who
would guarantee, upon the implementation of decentralization
in Palestine, that the Zionist leaders would not ask their
followers in Palestine to acquire Ottoman citizenship?
Were they to do this, the Zionists would be able to use
their wealth and influence to obtain the power of the
majority, going on to become members in the municipalities,
the administrations, the general council of the Mutasarrifyah.
Palestine would then become in reality a purely Jewish
country.
The
assessment by the Palestinians of decentralization in
the Ottoman Empire is essentially connected with their
generally held views concerning Palestinian citizenship
and nationality. Palestinian citizens are primarily composed
of Muslims and Christians. According to Rawhi Al-Khalidi,
both Muslims and Christians are deeply rooted in Palestine;
their history goes back to ancient times and the waves
of Semitic immigration from the Arabian Peninsula.
In
the period 1909-1914, the Palestinians were forced to
argue and pres ent their evaluation and assessment of
various matters. The assessment took into account the
Palestinians' needs and the intention to raise the efficacy
of their resistance to Zionist immigration and settlement.
Importantly enough, this period witnessed a number of
developments that could explain the Palestinians' interest
in accelerating resistance and their self-reliance in
the struggle to liberate Palestine from Zionist hegemony.
These developments were as follows:
Firstly, if the Ottoman Parliament were reinstalled, they
could use their advantage there in order to put an end
to Zionist immigration and settlement in Palestine.
Secondly,
the Unionists returned to power. Later, Hizb Al-Itilaf
Wal-Hurriyyah (the Party on Coalition and Freedom) assumed
leadership and formed the government, which shook the
Palestinians' reliance on the Ottomans in their resistance
to Zionism. These two groups opened negotiations with
the Zionist agencies, hoping, among other things, to obtain
Zionist financial support in a bid to remedy the Empire's
economic and financial ills. In return, they were ready
to accept a gradual termination of the Ottoman laws that
had been enacted earlier in order to put on hold on Zionist
immigration to Palestine.
Thirdly,
the vagueness and ambiguity characterizing the ideology
of Arab nationalism made the movement unreliable in the
struggle with Zionism. The Arab Congress in Paris in 1913
was clearly a case in point.
The
Ottoman Parliament (Majlis Al-Mab'uthan), which was installed
upon the restoration of the Constitution of 1908, was
utilized by the Palestinians as a means to resist the
Zionist immigration. In this majlis, Rawhi Al-Khalidi
- who was keen to point to the Zionist dangers and ambitions
- Said Al-Husseini and Hafiz As-Sa'ad were representatives
of the Jerusalem metropolitan area. Ash-Sheikh Ahmad Al-Khammash
represented Nablus, while As'ad Ash-Shuqeiri represented
Akka. By writing articles for newspapers and giving speeches
in the Ottoman Parliament, Al-Khalidi endeavored to present
the Palestinian issue and the expedition against Zionism.
Rawhi
Al-Khalidi, prior to 1908, was for a long time the dean
of the Ottoman diplomatic circle in Bordeaux, France.
He was also once elected, after 1908, as vice-chairman
of the Ottoman Parliament. He fully understood the objectives
and ends of Zionism, and together with Said Al-Husseini
and Ragheb An-Nashashibi, called upon the Ottoman parliamentarians
to legislate against Zionist immigration to Palestine
and the expropriation of land. The Fall of 1912 witnessed
a heated parliamentary session during which the Arab representatives
complained that the Zionists had expropriated a large
area of agricultural land in Marj Ibn Amir.
Al-Karmel
was the first Palestinian newspaper to shed light on the
danger that the Zionists posed to Palestine and the Arab
region. The editor-in-chief of this newspaper, which was
first issued in Haifa in 1909, launched a severe attack
on Zionism. He also published a book entitled As-Sahyuniyyi,
Tarikaha, Wa Garadaha, Wa Ahamiyyataha, in which he dug
deeply into the history of Zionism. He also revealed the
basis on which Zionism was structured and pointed to the
deceptive means that the Zionists used to achieve their
goals. In addition, he accused the Ottoman Empire of failing
to live up to its responsibilities toward Palestine and
the Palestinians, emphasizing that the Ottomans had not
been active in preventing the Zionist drift into Palestine.
Filistin,
meanwhile, which was issued in Jaffa in 1911, supported
Al-Karmel in its endeavor to unveil the Zionist scheme
and plans. Its owner and editor-in-chief, Issa Al-Issa,
issued several articles that were a translation of a work
by Menahem Ostshken, a historian who specialized in Zionism,
entitled The Zionist Political Program. Al-Issa should
be credited for raising, with this translation, people's
awareness concerning the dangers posed by the Zionists.
Najib
Nassar called for holding a Palestinian Congress as a
means to counter the 11th World Zionist Congress and to
resist the Zionist invasion of Palestine. The Palestinian
leaders of Nablus received this call with enthusiasm and
consequently held a Non-Zionist Congress in August 1913.
The conferees called upon the Ottomans to put an end to
selling the land by an open auction, saying that they
should have sold this land to the farmers who cultivated
it, allowing them to finance the cost of the land through
easy payments. The petition that included these demands
was signed by Abdul Fattah Tuqan, Kamil Hashim, Ibrahim
Abdul Hadi, Hasan Hammad and Nimr An-Nabulsi.
Al-Karmel
could also be credited with the call for organizing the
national effort to counter Zionism. This role must have
contributed to the formation of the Jam'iyyat Mukafahat
As-Sahyuniyyah (Zionism Resistance Society), which had
headquarters in Nablus and branches in various Palestinian
cities. The Society encouraged the use of mass demonstration
as a means to protest against the selling of land by the
government in an open auction. It also expressed its opposition
by sending telegraphs to Constantinople, in which it conveyed
suggestions that the government should give land to the
cultivators who, according the Society, would be able
to discharge themselves from their financial obligations
to the government through easy payments.
The
Society situated its headquarters and carried out its
activities in Nablus, because Nablus at that time did
not house influential Jews and Zionist figures, meaning
it did not face any counter-resistance. Some sources suggest
that by 31 August 1913, the Society began to gather strength
and accomplish victories. This date also marked the starting
point of its serious activities against Zionism.
Al-Karmel,
Filistin, and Al-Munadi newspapers in Palestine in addition
to Al-Muqtabas in Damascus and Al-Mufid in Beirut continued
their work to unveil the Zionist methods employed in Palestine.
They also criticized and resisted the call of some Arab
leaders for reaching a mutual understanding with the Zionists
which appeared in both Al-Ahram and Al-Muqatam newspapers.
The
Palestinians' strong stand on the issue of Arab independence
from the Turks was equal to their vehement opposition
to the Zionist plans in Palestine. They therefore diligently
defended Arab ambitions and interests regarding independence
and the formation of a united Arab state.
The
representatives of Palestine in Majlis Al-Mab'uthan played
an effective role in forming the 'Arab Representatives
Bloc' in March 1911. This bloc, together with the Albanians,
Armenians and some Turkish representatives formed Hizb
Al-Hurriyah Wal-I'Tilaf (The Freedom and Coalition Party),
which was known for its adoption of the idea of offering
administrative independence to various nationalities in
the Empire. It primarily exported the idea of implementing
decentralization of the Ottoman administration in the
Empire. Among the Palestinian members of this party were
Rawhi Al-Khalidi and Said Al-Husseini.
In
the light of this and other developments mentioned, one
may understand the Palestinian support of the restoration
of the Ottoman Constitution and the reinstitution of the
parliament on the anniversary of the constitutional revolution
of 1908. The correspondent of Filistin in Nablus wrote,
"On
a day like this memorable day, the Ottoman ummah regained
its constitution, which was curtailed for almost one third
of a century. During this period, it faced so many complex
obstacles, which deterred its reformation and prevented
its progress. In those days, the country was targeted
by those who had interests. God then provided it with
free men (unionists). They themselves rushed to sacrifice
the motherland."
The
Palestinian enthusiasm for the constitution and the parliament
could be understood in terms of two major themes. Firstly,
the constitution and the liberal atmosphere along with
the parliament could provide the Palestinians with the
channels needed to influence Ottoman policy, meaning it
might be possible to effectively resist the Zionist drift
into Palestine.
Secondly,
the Palestinian activists seemed to find the parliament
a reliable tool for accomplishing Arab independence from
the Turks. In other words, instead of using violent means
and struggle with the Turks to achieve independence, they
appeared to opt for peaceful means.
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