5. Conclusions

Palestinians are in the process of developing a civil society. Palestinian social institutions - women's organizations, charitable societies, professional and labor unions - have existed for decades and are internationally recognized for their achievements in resisting Israeli colonization of their land and attempts to destroy their society and for their leadership of the grass-roots movements for independence from Israeli occupation. Still, some academics would claim that a "civil society" cannot exist in the absence of a government - i.e., one's own government, not a military occupation. This is not a popular view among Palestinians who have been in the forefront of leading what they see as legitimate civil society institutions, and indeed they must receive as much credit and respect due to non-violent fighters for independence. To the academics, Palestinians are now in a position to recreate that civil society that was developing during a previous occupation (the British Mandate) and that was destroyed with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

Of course, an independent government in a sovereign State of Palestine does not yet exist, although there is much more progress today toward achieving that goal than there has been for the previous five decades. Even if a Palestinian state does not come into being for the next few years, the character of that state is being developed now, as Palestinians - individuals and groups - begin to separate themselves (however slowly) from direct Israeli supervision and to "attach" themselves to the newly formed Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The world can learn much from the Palestinian case. Unlike South Africa, in which one group negotiated the transfer of power to another group within the same state, the gradual creation of an entirely new state is a rarity that demands watching and learning.

The PNA must walk a fine line and establish a definite balance between regulating, policing and governing Palestinian society while trying to avoid their proclivities to "control" and thus stifle that society, as has been the case in Egypt. Palestinian individuals and groups, beginning with the 1993 accords and even more so after the Taba/Oslo II Agreement, have increasingly raised their voices in opposition to what they see as a one-sided agreement, i.e., one that helps Israel but not necessarily the Palestinians. Civil society institutions - popular committees, NGOs, student organizations, opposition movements - are concerned that the PNA itself will take from them the fruits of autonomy (limited as it is), including the liberty and freedom to conduct their activities so that they, too, can participate in the recreation of Palestinian government and social development.

Before there was a second NGO draft law, the following was true of the first draft and thus again demonstrates some of the philosophy of the regime, some of the original thinking about its role and that of civil society:

"Primarily, there is only one power over NGOs, one branch of government [the Executive], even only one person [i.e., Arafat]. It is his personal vision of what NGOs should do and should be like. There is no way of appealing his [or his minister's] decisions."

Indeed, this was one of the biggest concerns of the PNGO Network. When the second draft came out with the "right of appeal" given to NGOs, the Network was very pleased to see this "check" on the authority of an otherwise powerful minister.

Even with the changes to the first draft and the initial (temporary?) success for the PNGO community with the postponement of a decision on the draft law, the struggle is far from over. In addition to what Rana Bishara of the PNGO Network sees as a clash of visions regarding how best to promote development, "state" (PNA) and "society" (NGOs, etc.) also suffer from a clash of "generations" and of "cultures". The state is solidly in the hands of an old guard generation that largely represents Palestinians living in the diaspora for decades. The old guard will remain in charge of the Executive branch as well as the Legislative after the elections - which preclude anyone under 30 years of age from running for the legislative Council. "Culturally" also, there is a clash between governors and governed. The latter are the ones who have suffered and endured occupation since 1967. Their lives are now being directed by a group made up largely of Palestinians who struggled for the liberation of Palestine from outside. While they, too, have suffered, they in no way had to live the daily misery of occupation which has socialized Palestinians in a way that the returnees cannot fully comprehend. The latter themselves have been socialized, in a different way. These new rulers have learned from the dictators of the Arab world how to govern. Their socialization has occurred in restrictive, military dictatorships, some of which have the facade of democracy, one or two of which actually have moved closer to such a liberal system. Nevertheless, the models for Arafat - the countries he's lived in and occasionally suffered from - are restrictive, military dictatorships (and/or police states) that espouse traditional, patriarchal, bureaucratic authoritarianism.

If the struggle over the NGO law in Palestine in 1995 is any indication, the prospects for the future state of Palestine look only a bit more optimistic than the existing models of Arab politics. The law was drafted in an exclusive and closed environment, despite the great efforts to be included on the part of various NGO representatives. After the drafting, the continuing debate over the draft law was marked with rancor and defensiveness.

In addition to the normal and expected friction between representatives of a state and society, there is the inevitable friction between representatives within these same entities. Political infighting and turf battles are common place in governments; so too are they within "society" and especially between representatives of sectors such as the NGO community that is looking for a way to coexist with a governing authority with whom they have had little direct, daily, and personal contact.

More significant than the inevitable internal governmental turf battles that can, ultimately, be regulated by the political "bosses" of the day, it is the battles between state and society that will determine the viability of a long-hoped for Palestinian state. The fight over the draft law of associations provides us with an excellent example of how Palestinians will come to deal with one another in that future state. Harking back to the original draft law, I present a final quotation before summing up with tentative conclusions. This is from a strong supporter of the NGO community within the PNA:

"If this PNA-draft law passes, it'll be quite difficult, if not impossible, for NGOs to build the civil society we know we can achieve. Of course, the entire situation is uncertain. We don't know for sure - who can know? - if we'll build the civil society and democracy we want."

This quote combines the pessimism and the uncertainty that the situation in Palestine in 1995-96 demands. It also suggests a hope for and faith in the NGO community as one that has tremendous potential to help the PNA establish a political community that would be the envy of the Arab World.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this initial report is one of warning - that civil society institutions and supporters must be aware (and beware) of the PNA's attempt to control society instead of simply regulating it. At the same time, the PNA must be aware (and beware) of Palestinians' determination to resist the natural tendencies of governments (in this case, its own government) to control society and not necessarily support, encourage, and liberate that society.