2. State Building & Law Making in Palestine

The summer and fall of 1995 was a crucial period in setting the stage for future state-society relations in Palestine. After negotiating and finalizing the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the Taba or "Oslo 2" Agreement), the PNA set out to draft and nearly institute a law that would govern NGOs broadly defined (charitable and relief groups, both local and international; foundations; and private institutions). This also was a time that the NGO community itself was organizing and lobbying against this particular law. Having a law to govern and regulate the NGO sector was not, in and of itself, an issue of contention for the Palestinian NGO community. It was the specific law and the general spirit of its drafting that most concerned and mobilized this community.

In a series of interviews conducted between October and November, 1995, this issue continuously rose to the top of the agenda for any meeting held with either the PNA (PECDAR, Ministry of Social Welfare, and Ministry of Justice) or with the Palestinian NGOs and other non-profit organizations (such as Cooperative Societies, not technically governed by NGO laws). Given that a significant part of the law concerns the rights and responsibilities of NGOs regarding the acceptance of international aid, the draft law also was very much on the minds of international donors, such as the World Bank, International NGOs (INGOs), and the European Union, representatives of which also were interviewed for this research.

Attitudes of Palestinian Authority officials and NGO representatives, largely reflecting a political "class" as well as the politically and socially active "elite", are important to understand, especially given the still-to-develop traditions and routines of Palestinian state-society relations. As governors and governed begin to work together, or often at cross purposes, it is useful to see how they develop the methods of governing, obeying authority, protesting against each other. An excellent example of how the PNA and Palestinian society are dealing with one another, negotiating future relationships, lobbying for current interests, and complaining about one another's actions is the case of the proposed NGO law, written in 1995. Palestinians can use this case to learn how to "negotiate" state-society issues specifically and perhaps more generally, e.g., in terms of creating the necessary "social contract" between this new state and this old society. Others (outside observers, students of Palestinian and comparative politics) may use this case to get a better understanding of a variety of theoretical and policy issues, including:

n civil society

n democratization (if this can be considered as separate from civil society)

n self-reliant development

n role of international donors in promoting socio-economic development

n role of international donors in promoting or prohibiting political development

n relations between INGOs and local NGOs and the role of "government" in restricting those relations

What is clear from the Palestinian case is that issues of democratization, development, and foreign assistance cannot be separated, especially given the massive amounts of money the donor community is pouring into the Palestinian Authority's coffers and the fact that much of that money is being diverted from the NGOs. Under Israeli occupation since 1967, Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were the only significant "entity" that could and would promote development projects for Palestinians suffering from the occupation. Thus, PNGOs would receive tens of millions of dollars each year from international donors - U.N. and other multilateral agencies, governments and INGOs - to help them in their tasks. But,

"donors told us 2 months after Oslo [i.e., the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993] that no more money would be coming to NGOs directly. We must go to the PNA!"

Now, there's the rub. What will the PNA do with that money? Will it turn it directly back into the NGOs that must come looking to it for the money that used to come directly to them? Or, will the PNA use that money for vastly different purposes from what it was originally intended and offered? Some NGO officials complain that "90% of foreign aid to the PNA [is spent on] policing, security, and surveillance." Others worry that whatever aid does get to NGOs will be directed to those who support the government and money will be refused to any NGO considered "opposition".

The idea of "pro-government NGOs" and "opposition NGOs" stems from the historical development of Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after Israeli occupation began in June 1967. The internal divisions within the Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the general nationalist movement were replicated in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, often to the point that if a pro-Democratic Front NGO were established in a given village or town, Fateh would establish a similar NGO, but one dependent on it. This tended to promote a plethora of NGOs in many communities in the occupied Palestinian territories. An Israeli-PLO peace process has not ended these divisions; rather, it has allowed these divisions to continue, perhaps even to become more stark. As Barghouti states, with the signing of the Gaza-Jericho agreement in 1993,

"it is inevitable that there will be some polarization and differentiations in this broad-based sector [NGOs], especially in that some of the activists in this movement perceive their role as temporary and are waiting for the establishment of a Palestinian authority ... Consequently, a proportion of what are considered NGOs today will be transformed into government organizations or will become part of the authority's structure."

A great many others will remain outside, in the non-profit, charitable, developmental, voluntary sector. Whether they will remain as vital to the support and sustenance of Palestinian society as they have been under Israeli occupation remains to be seen. The potential to retain their significance in socio-economic development depends to a great extent on the legal and regulatory environment within which they operate.

The legal framework to which NGOs must adhere is an important place to start when discussing the role and potential of NGOs in providing services (health care, job training, literacy programs, day care centers, agricultural extension, legal advice, credit programs, and so on). It is important to know whether NGOs are given considerable latitude in planning and executing their activities or are instead restricted, controlled, and confined in those activities. Such legal frameworks also indicate the way in which a government will exercise its authority over various other aspects of society - e.g., elections, freedom of expression and assembly, human rights, trade and investment, and so on.

What is occurring in Palestine in the mid-1990s is a rare case of state building. New states are not created much any more. As the PNA develops the institutions and the legal frameworks to govern, inevitably there will be a clash with those who are to be governed. Palestinians have been without a representative government (i.e., in close and daily contact) for decades; now they have a chance to create one. But, in the past, in the absence of a government and in the face of Israeli military occupation and usurpation of rights and confiscation of lands and deportations and demolition of homes and inhumane treatment in prisons and elsewhere, it has been the NGOs and grass-roots organizations and popular committees that have sustained the movement of a society to resist such an occupation. And these NGOs were supported, funded, often created by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

With the creation of the PNA, led by the PLO, many of the NGOs that were established to act on behalf of the PLO in the occupied Palestinian territories "joined" the PNA structure and no longer can be considered "non-governmental." Still, there are a great many NGOs in Palestine that are either in opposition tothe PLO and PNA and the current "peace process" or are neutral on these matters or maybe even supportive of the PLO but do not want to be part of the PNA. The latter two groups remain committed to working outside the government, in the non-profit, grass-roots, and/or charitable sectors. Given the chaotic situation developing in Palestine with the piece-meal transfer of records and of authority from the Israeli occupation administration to the PNA, it is all but impossible to develop a concise picture of the NGO community in Palestine. What is clear is that the number of NGOs in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip is at least 700 (and as many as 1500). Fully half of this minimum figure of 700 (377) are found in a single bloc, the General Union of Palestinian Charitable Associations. Palestine is replete with a variety of blocs (unions, networks, federations); often there are a few different blocs within the same sector (e.g., there are at least four in health). The latter are a vestige of the divisions within Palestinian society during the occupation. Still, not all blocs should be seen merely as a vestige of internal divisions; many exist in fact to bring a unity long denied to Palestinian society. See Table 2.1 to get an initial idea of the extent of both the networking and the divisions within the Palestinian NGO community.

Into this fractious situation, the PNA has come. And it has not come with the full support of the Palestinian people. In addition to a general disappointment with the terms of Palestinian "autonomy", there is an added dimension of resistance to joining the peace process coming from the military wing of Hamas. This segment of an otherwise socially activist Islamic Resistance Movement, along with the Islamic Jihad, have insisted on using any means necessary (i.e., including violence) to resist the "peace process" that they see as continuing Israel's occupation of Palestine with the complicity of the PLO. (The PLO/PNA continues to hold discussions with Hamas leaders in order to bring them into the process and especially to participate in the legislative elections in January 1996.) Indeed, much of the terms of the autonomy agreements give the PNA a huge police apparatus that will be used more to protect Israelis than fellow Palestinians. With at least seven different police units totalling 25,000 to 30,000 in the Gaza Strip alone, this force is used to root out the Islamic opposition against Israel more than to "protect" Palestinians from each other, especially considering that Palestine has a very low crime rate as compared with Western industrial societies.

With the vestiges of a "police-state" as well as with the approach to policy making within the PNA, the latter is already being compared to numerous other authoritarian Arab regimes. Part of this "presumption of authoritarianism" is Arafat's own tendency toward total control and concentration of power (including an unwillingness to delegate responsibilities), due to nearly 30 years as leader of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Part of it is the recognition on the part of Palestinians that since other Arab regimes are almost universally dictatorial (albeit with degrees of dictatorship), this regime likewise will assume such a method of rule. It is also certainly true that the "twenty-seven year occupation has naturally made Palestinians distrustful of authority."

Even more to the point is the practice of the PNA while in power and especially of its various subunits - ministries and police units, including the mukhabaraat (secret police). As these entities attempt to impose their will, their "authority" on the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, they have consistently offended and often outraged the people who actually carried on the resistance to Israeli occupation for 28 years. Many of these new governors are "returnees" from PLO headquarters in Tunis and from other offices around the Arab World - Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and so on. Those who have remained to carry out the struggle for independence or just to survive the occupation and all its horrors are skeptical, at least, of these returnees; often they are dismissive of those who have come in to reap the benefits of someone else's daily struggle against oppression and subjugation.

New laws or proposed laws on governing NGOs, on political parties, on freedom of expression and association, have been received with a chorus of rejection by interested groups who feel that their years of struggle are being scorned as a new authority imposes its will and drafts legislation without consulting with the people most affected by such legislation. And when there is "consultation", it is often in the form of Mukhabaraat (secret police) seeking information from and about individuals and groups, information that is to be used to monitor, control, and/or subvert grass-roots, charitable, and developmental activities, not encourage and support them.

The competition within the PNA between various ministries has put the NGO community in the middle of a bureaucratic and political turf war. NGOs are uncertain which ministry is going to win out in this struggle and which is the one they must "report to" and register with. The turf battle has spilled over, outside the walls of the PNA offices in Gaza, Ramallah and Jericho. For instance, while many NGOs assumed they had to deal with the Ministry of Social Affairs in terms of registering their organizations, these groups also were being "monitored" by al-mukhabarat al-'aama (general intelligence). Two "questionnaires" were distributed by the secret police/general intelligence in 1995. The first was a fairly bland questionnaire asking general information about the NGO and its board members. The second, however, was especially intrusive into the personal affairs of individual members of an NGO. For instance, the second questionnaire asked the following questions (among others):

name of mother; her profession, social status and address

? individual's passport number, profession, height, color of skin, eyes, hair, blood group, distinguishing marks

? name of wife (before and after marriage); name of second wife; third wife; their mothers' names

? name of father, his occupation, other family income

? names of brothers, their professions and addresses

? names of sons and their professions

? other relatives' names

? names of three important friends (professions and addresses)

? "Have you ever belonged to any Palestinian organization? mention date and reason for leaving."

? "Have you ever been a member in a political party? Name and Date."

? "Has any of your family been charged of spying? Name and Date."

? "Does any of your family members belong to a political party? Name of family member and name of party."

? "Have you ever been imprisoned for political reasons or others?"

? "Write a personal report about events in your life."

? Signature

Of course, the mukhabaraat threatened any organization that "leaked" this questionnaire outside their offices. Yet, I was able to obtain copies of it from several different sources - none of which was directly from an NGO.

This type of heavy handed approach to "governing" NGOs in Palestine is one of many reasons why the PNGO community is so concerned. In addition to the mukhabaraat, Palestinian NGOs are being asked to report to the Ministry of Social Affairs (Welfare). To formalize this, a draft law was prepared and nearly approved by President Arafat and his Council of Ministers, but not by an elected legislative council (the elections for which had yet to occur). How that draft was prepared, distributed within the PNA (but not outside), discussed by the NGO community (despite not being informed), and later revised and suspended from further governmental approval is the subject of the next section.