Epilogue

The Hebron Massacre.

On the Friday morning of the 15th of the holy month of Ramadan, February 25th 1994, Palestinian society awoke to be engulfed by shock and to have any remaining hopes shattered as it listened to the news of the brutal killing of tens of Palestinian and the wounding of hundreds while kneeling in supplication in the sacred dawn prayer, on a sacred Friday, in one of Islam's most sacred mosques. The circumstances surrounding the massacre notwithstanding, (news reports conflicted as to the identity and motives of the killer/s) [144] the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in their entirety, as well as Palestinian communities inside Israel and Bedouin communities, went into a period of painful mourning for several days.

The peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, which Hamas had already publicly rejected, likewise went into mourning and hope died along with the victims of the massacre. The talks had to be suspended and both parties found themselves confronting not only the ramifications of the massacre on the level of local, regional and international public opinion, but also on the structural and functional level of conducting the talks. The talks almost collapsed while Hamas' position was inflated. Publicly, at least, Hamas had been criticizing the talks, not only for the fact that in their view they would lead nowhere, but because they would also allow the Israelis to exploit that phase to institute harsher measures against the very society Hamas launched its movement to serve. On every street corner and in every mosque Hamas' position grew louder and clearer; their message had to be heeded or else this society in its entirety would disappear into oblivion. The fact that Palestinian leaders went back to the talks after relative calm ensued after the massacre only gave Hamas a further instrument to underline that the current leadership is not by, for or of the people and it is only they who can represent the hopes and ambitions of a scattered society - scattered physically, psychologically and also politically.

The massacre at Ibrahimi Mosque came at a time when it could be particularly used by Hamas to benefit its cause considering that at the time of the massacre Hamas had already had two weeks to pursue its public relations and mobilization campaign. There are several factors that have some bearing on this assumption.

Firstly, the talks between Israel and the PLO had been somewhat slow, producing few if any concrete results that the general public could feel or reap the benefits of. Even Israeli and Palestinian  participants in the talks expressed frustration and dismay with the prolongation of the talis on several occasions and from both sides the message was that time was passing and with it might pass the opportunity for peace. The more frustrated the talks appeared to be the stronger the appeal of Hamas became.

Secondly, Israeli measures on the ground against Palestinians after the talks, showed no sign of abating as had been hoped, but actually became even harsher. Fewer people from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were allowed to travel to Jerusalem, killing and injuries did not stop, curfews continued and the extent of despair was getting profounder by the day.

Not surprisingly, the month of Ramadan is a time of golden opportunity for Hamas to articulate its message by reaching the widest possible Muslim audience ever, and not only in mosques. During this Muslim holy month loudspeakers in streets are also used as platforms to arouse the sentiments of the people. The purpose being to highlight the deficiencies of the PLO and more importantly to advocate the position Hamas espouses especially during and after the Friday prayers.

In spite of the blockade imposed around Jerusalem to prevent the hundreds of thousands of worshippers from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip crowding to al-Aqsa mosque, Hamas took certain risks to ensure as large an attendance as possible.

So keen was Hamas to achieve results, it shuttled West Bank and Gaza Hamas sympathizers to Jerusalem in yellow license plated cars [145] in spite of the risks involved, particularly for the evening and night prayers. As one interviewee from a Palestinian refugee camp on the West Bank revealed to the author during the first week of Ramadan:

We are fully aware of the fact that we can be easily arrested if caught travelling to Jerusalem to perform the evening and the night prayers at al-Aqsa mosque. We also know that God will accept our prayers wherever we perform them, given the extraordinary nature of the circumstances in which we live, but our goal is more far reaching and our vision goes beyond the risks we take today. The youth, the young generation especially, must know what it means to endure pain if their convictions are to become strong. Their belief in God and the practice of that belief means that they must be ready to make calculated sacrifices if our presence and influence are to be more widely felt. No time is more appropriate to raise the morale of the people than during Ramadan, even if it entails risking travel to Jerusalem in yellow license plated cars. Prayer at the al-Aqsa mosque has a special meaning, a different impact and a profounder message than anywhere else. We [Hamas] understand that and we have no qualms planning for our future, the future of all Muslims, in the complicated circumstances in which we live. The youth, the young generation are our primary target because, after upholding the word of God, they are our most sacred responsibility. [146]

The words of this man who spoke like a teacher addressing his students, represents a clear testimony to the determination Hamas was willing to expend to enhance its position during the month of Ramadan. The message from him was put in unmistakable terms and his voice was loud and clear that Hamas will continue to plan and organize despite difficult odds. No more effective results can be achieved than during Ramadan, it is the month where even non-practicing Muslims revere the solace and the holiness it brings with it.

Endless lines of people praying, preaching and gathering  all over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was a common scene during Ramadan. This was the time Hamas was anxiously awaiting to fill in any gaps as far as the transmission of its message to the public was concerned.

In essence, the massacre at Hebron and the ensuing devastating consequences came as the very event that Hamas would ordinarily use to conduct its mobilization, as was the case when the Palestinian workers in the Gaza Strip were killed which served as the catalyst for the intifada. Hamas used that event to help rally support around its cause until the intifada, the `super-event' really took hold.

Ramadan was a perfect month to engender support and the massacre was an event only to enhance it. The next super-event is yet to come when once again Hamas will attempt to transform its existence, its agenda and its message from the minimum to the maximum arena of politics. It is therefore no surprise that Hamas did not respond to the massacre with a reactive measure against the occupation. The immediate imposition of a curfew in Hebron for an extended period and the proliferation of Israeli troops and checkpoints all over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, may have been thought an effective measure to help prevent the launching of military activities by Hamas against Israelis. However, it is equally true that, if based on previous experiences, the very wide presence of Israelis in areas known to be heavily infiltrated by Hamas activists is expected to help the latter more easily target or conduct military activities. The heavy presence of Israelis, as far as Hamas's strategizing is concerned, will only make them an easier target to reach.

The fact that Hamas chose not to respond reactively certainly evokes some assumptions. Foremost among these is that Hamas chose to "reap the fruit" of the actual event of the massacre to achieve public relations objectives and support, exactly as it did at the outset of the intifada. Rather than responding with a countervailing military act to the massacre Hamas apparently chose to take its chances and await the eruption of a super-event while continuing to perform its campaign in Ramadan.

If and when the super-event occurs, which is not unlikely given the seeming intractability of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, Hamas can be expected to work diligently towards transforming its opposition to the talks from the deliberately passive and minimum arena into the intentional and active maximum arena of Palestinian politics. Hamas was patient enough to wait for 20 years after the 1967 Arab\Israeli war before launching its activities. It was content socializing its supporters, as its mentors publicly took pride in doing. Therefore, it is logical to assume that it would not necessarily meet the public expectations of a quick military strike against Israeli following the massacre. Rather it is more likely that it will continue its preparations for launching large and strategic operations at an unexpected time and place. Noteworthy here is the fact that only a few days after the massacre Hamas gave public notice that it will retaliate against several Israeli settlements.

While learning the lessons of the past of not "going along" with public expectations and demands, as was the case in the twenty year inter-war intifada period, Hamas managed to have the cake and eat it too by rallying support and issuing threats against Israeli targets.

Waiting for the super-event to come about, however, does not only represent an important pillar in Hamas' strategy, but also has potential ramifications for Palestinian society itself, in addition to its consequences for Israeli society. In order to keep its cause alive Hamas itself will have to survive. This entails among other things, further mobilization and further clashes with Israelis, whether initiated by the former or by the latter. One recent example is the car bomb suicide attack on April 6th, in the Israeli town of Afula which killed seven. [147]

Hamas will continue to be in a state of anticipation of the super-event, in essence awaiting its occurrence and capitalizing on its results. One way or another, Hamas will survive and will not feel disappointed if the gap between it and the PLO grows wider. On the contrary, more public criticism of the PLO by Hamas will be the tool used to punctuate this gap in addition to highlighting the mishaps of Palestinian leaders.

Though unlikely, if the super-event does not arise, will Hamas opt for a change in strategy or will it help a super-event to occur? Of course this question will have to remain open-ended for the time being, but the more underlying reality is that the longer it may take for the super-event to erupt, the more effective mobilization would have become. Furthermore, if the super-event does not materialize in the very near future it is possible that Hamas will intensify its disagreements with the PLO, in essence converting its position to the arena of politics. Disturbing as this may be, this question too will have to be kept open-ended, for the time being at least. The more compelling fact to be kept in mind, however, is that an exacerbation of tensions between Hamas and the PLO might serve as the precursor for a Palestinian civil war. Needless to say if this were to occur not only will Palestinian society be impacted but the Israelis too will have quite a convincing rationale for dragging their feet on the peace talks, suggesting that it is too dangerous to strike an agreement with a society broken upon itself.

Whatever path Hamas desires or aspires to walk it would undoubtedly be a delicate one with limitless effects on Palestinian society, on its Israeli counterpart, on the region and certainly on the world as a whole.

Harsh Israeli crackdowns on Hamas activists, as exemplified by the siege and destruction of houses where alleged Hamas members were operating in the towns of Abu Dis and Hebron, is bound to have its effects on Hamas' structure and functions. The systematic pursuit of Hamas operatives by Israeli soldiers can be expected to weaken the movement but it should also be expected to serve as an impetus for the movement to go deeper underground. In either case Hamas will continue to wait for the super-event and thus will prepare itself for the climax when its agenda is publicly inculcated in every facet of Palestinian life.

Whether the super-event and/or the transformation process will occur is not really the question. The question is, however, where, when, how and under what circumstances will it occur and in the absence of such a super-event what will then be the face of political life in Palestinian society?