Chapter
Four
Relationship
with other bodies
Palestinian Nationalists and Secularists.
Throughout the years of its existence,
Hamas's activities have been somewhat detrimental to the PLO. The strike
days the movement has called for as well as the use of violent acts of
resistance by its members not only deepened the rift between Palestinians
and Israelis, but also contributed to the division of Palestinian society
and to increasing the difficulty of bringing about cohesion and/or national
consensus.
The albeit skeptical opinion that
the PLO has offered them prospects for nation‑building is, for many
Palestinians, more than outweighed by Hamas's offer of individual and
thus political salvation once they return to Allah. The emphasis in Hamas's
political program on the causes and ways to get rid of despair in society,
has only made its objective more realizable. The fact, however, that the
movement has not been able to offer society more practical alternatives
has led to the waning of its support from its earlier claimed 40%.
On the other hand, the PLO leadership
being outside the Occupied Territories has given Hamas the advantage of
closer connections and arguably a more realistic perception of people's
needs. The secular left, the Palestine Communist Party (Formally PCP but
now known as the Palestine Peoples Party - PPP), the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) in particular, have fallen behind in the race for
popular support. In what is an essentially conservative society very much
rooted in Islamic teachings and in a state of despair under occupation,
there has been a perceived need for spiritual solace as well as national
liberation.
The Marxist orientation of the PFLP,
DFLP and the PPP was in principle non-religious although this element
has had to be played down. The growth in religious movements since the
1970s has caused further dilemmas for the left who have had to tread even
more carefully around the subject of religion, especially in view of the
fact that they could be accused of heresy by the Islamists. Rather than
ignore the subject altogether which was open to negative interpretation,
they too began expressing a positive attitude towards `religious beliefs'
as a "handmaiden to nationalism."
[46]
Between 1984 and 1987 the left wing
organizations within the PLO withdrew, leaving Fateh as the dominant force.
Having previously had a positive approach to Islam generally, Fateh was
in a good position to enhance this element in order to compete with Hamas.
In their leaflets they began to refer more to religious themes and in
the November convention of the Palestine National Council in 1984 a banner
was hung bearing the Koranic verse from which Fateh derives its name.
Also at this convention Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih was elected chairman.
[47]
In 1988 Hamas decided to come up
with its own covenant which was a direct challenge to the PLO. In Chapter
Four, articles 26 and 27 of the covenant, Hamas defines its attitude to
nationalist movements in the Palestinian arena including the PLO. While
careful to document understanding of the secular vision and articulate
that all are united in a common aim it nevertheless states that Hamas
will not be one with the PLO until the latter adopts Islam as its way
of life. This charter set the framework for a very unsteady relationship
and clashes between supporters of the respective movements became more
common. The attitude of the PLO towards the birth of Hamas was seen by
Jamil Hamameh as follows:
I witnessed the
behavior of Fateh and saw it adopt a very negative and unfortunate stand
vis-a-vis Hamas. In the beginning it went as far as making accusations
regarding the formation of the movement, but in the tradition of a movement
which was raised in an Islamic way, it [Hamas] did not withdraw because
of these responses but continued its work as a proof of its authenticity
and originality. Fateh, because of its hegemony and because of its belief
that it was the mother of the Palestinian people, adopted a critical stand
as it did not accept any other claims of parentage. It does not respect
others and Hamas finds this most regretful. We respect every perspective
in the Palestinian arena and we respect the Palestinian people because
we are a part of that people and we do not accept one party to be in control
of the decision process to the detriment of others. Unfortunately the
Fateh position was not a responsible position because of their fabrication
of events and their attacks on the sons of the Islamic movement and the
mosques. The unfortunate events that took place in the Gaza Strip led
to inner fighting and what then happened in Jenin and Tulkarem [further
clashes] is clear proof of that. Instead of joining hands and uniting
forces this was their public response to the formation of the movement.
[48]
The accusations
to which Hamameh initially refers are that Hamas had been essentially
unconcerned about the Palestinian struggle until it saw an opportunity
for political power during the intifada. According to Hamameh, Fateh effectively
"blacked out" the history of the movement and its links to the
Muslim Brotherhood "in order to distance Islam from the battleground
despite the fact that "since
the beginning of the occupation in 1967 the movement [Muslim Brotherhood]
had formed battalions to resist the occupation. These battalions were
known as the Sheikh's battalions or Kata'ib al-Shu'ukh". Hamameh
claimed that Fateh's "fabrication of events" had been aimed
to remove the contribution of Islamic resistance in Palestine from history
and in his words: "to un-educate, de-politicize and to make the people
unaware of the role of the Islamic movement." The emergence of Hamas
therefore revealed a strong current of sentiment which Fateh had glossed
over if not actually ignored.
This is not strictly
correct. Although Fateh did criticize Hamas for what is saw as provoking
disunity among the Palestinians and thereby undermining the Palestinian
cause, it did not see Hamas as an entirely new and historically opportunistic
movement.
When asked if
he saw the emergence of Hamas as revealing contradictions inherent in
Fateh and other movements, Hamameh replied that it was not contradiction
but merely an indication that there are differences of perspective.
I don't want
to call them contradictions - they may be differences in perspective or
differences in the understanding of the Arab - Israeli conflict. The way
I understand it as a Muslim is that it is ideological, cultural - some
might see it as a historical conflict, others as a power struggle so let
us not call it an uncovering
of contradictions but of perspectives.
[49]
This is somewhat
moderate and pragmatic response considering that counter-allegations of
promoting disunity among the Palestinian people were made by Hamas against
Fateh. Jamil Hamameh blamed Fateh entirely for all the clashes and inner
fighting that took place at that time and emphasised that nothing could
justify "what Fateh did."
I can find no
justification for what happened and for what Fateh did, regardless of
whether or not these elements were officially affiliated with Fateh or
mavericks acting independently. What is painful is that it happened at
all, no matter how many reasons there were for or behind these events
there can be no justification for inner fighting between the sons of one
people who are facing the same dangers and feeling the same pains. They
have one common enemy, what happens to any one, affects all, and nothing
will justify inner fighting. No justification can be respected or believed,
nor should be respected or believed by any rational person.
[50]
When asked about
the reaction of other political factions to the birth of Hamas, Jamil
Hamameh said that it had come as a great shock to them. He went on to
criticize the factions for their attitude to Hamas saying that they had
"accused the movement of having no concern with the Palestinian problem
and that it was a movement of dervishes whose sole interest is fasting
and praying." However,
he went on to illustrate his understanding of this attitude by saying
that:
I do not blame
anyone whose ignorance of the nature of Islam and the nature of the Islamic
movement and the stages of socialization it undergoes and the way it raises
it sons. Of course it was natural that the formation and establishment
of Hamas would come as a shock to the Palestinian factions in the arena.
Whether they be left or right leaning.
[51]
Although seeming
to find a justification for the factions attitude in a way he did not
do for Fateh, he subtly damns the factions for their "ignorance"
and therefore, for their irreligiousity, at the same time.
When asked about
the relationship between Hamas and other Islamic movements, Hamameh neither
confirmed or denied that there was co-ordination between them:
As far as I know,
and this is not necessarily 100% accurate, Hamas tries to respect all
Islamic trends and movements. I do not know if there is co-ordination
but Hamas has declared its position in its covenant.
[52]
Hamas increasingly
mounted its own operations entirely independently of the PLO. It began
to call strikes on days other than those designated by the PLO and took
violent measures to ensure that these strikes were observed. Hamas became
particularly hostile following the Algiers Declaration in 1988 which advocated
political settlement and began increasingly to attack PLO policy as a
betrayal of its own principles. Even prior to the declaration of Algiers,
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin spoke out publicly in the media and even on Israeli
television against the PLO's vision of a secular Palestinian state.
[53]
This antagonistic
relationship continued as Fateh struggled to maintain its support and
decry the actions of Hamas as breaking ranks and diluting the overall
strength of Palestinian nationalism. Hamas retaliated by insisting that
the PLO was not representative. In 1992 elections at the chambers of commerce
in Nablus and Qalqilya, Fateh issued small Korans as a reminder that their
nationalism was not entirely devoid of religious sensibilities. As a rejoinder
to this and to the increased use of Islamic slogans by Fateh, Hamas activists
in Gaza then began to use graffiti to spread the message, "Hamas
is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,"which
was the long-standing slogan of the PLO itself.
[54]
Hamas's
open competition with the PLO grew more intense leading Arafat in October
1992 to compare the movement with the separatist Inkatha Freedom Party
in South Africa which has very much complicated the work of the ANC. Arafat
went as far as threatening to fight against Hamas militarily.
[55]
Arafat's stern warnings may have been provoked by the confrontations
between hundreds of Hamas and Fateh supporters in July 1992 in the Gaza
Strip. These clashes during which knives and firearms were used leaving
three dead and many more injured, were the product of each faction's attempt
to assert itself and demonstrate its dominance in Palestinian political
life.
[56]
The expulsion
of over 400 Hamas members to Southern Lebanon in late 1992, created several
obstacles to the PLO's political line. Any policy measure the PLO undertook
had to be sensitive to the plight of the expellees. The PLO involvement
in the peace process through the Palestinian delegation was hampered,
since on more than one occasion the participants in the peace talks found
themselves compelled to announce their readiness to terminate their involvement
in the negotiating process unless the expellees were returned. Even when
the expellees declared their willingness to return on a phased basis during
the summer of 1993, the PLO position was further complicated. With the
talks leading nowhere and the PLO suffering serious economic, institutional
and administrative hardships, the popularity of the PLO was perhaps at
the lowest point in its history. Its problems were very much due to its
stand during the Gulf War which had offended a large number of those who
were supplying financial support which they subsequently withdrew. During
that period the PLO was in such financial difficulties it could not pay
families of the martyrs and/or any of its supporters.
This, combined with the events surrounding the deportation, gave
Hamas unprecedented standing. Many of those who used to get money from
the PLO now turned to Hamas for financial support. The decision by the
expellees to accept return on a phased basis gave a glimmer of hope to
the Palestinian delegation since their participation in the talks was
so often hampered by the expulsion issue. However, the difficulty of facing
the expellees whom they had promised not to rejoin the talks until their
release was considerably eased due to the unexpected breakthroughs in
secret bilateral Israeli‑PLO negotiations in late summer 1993.
[57]
For some time,
one could expect the PLO popularity to increase owing to the atmosphere
created as a result of the peace talks. However, Hamas, which considers
the autonomy scheme as a betrayal of Islamic principles, is more likely
to continue opposing and/or fighting against the peace process. In all
likelihood Hamas will continue to compete with the PLO even if it means
sitting at the negotiating table at some time. The least that Hamas can
be expected to do is to influence Palestinian public opinion by alerting
it to the "dangers" of the current political process. Undoubtedly,
Hamas members will attempt to translate the sympathy gained as a result
of the expulsions into lasting political power.
[58]
While on Marj
al Zuhour the expellees were provided with support, supplies, and an endless
stream of visitors from every political grouping in Palestinian society.
The contribution of the PLO, however, did not make much of an impression
on them:
We observed all
the honorable people from within and without the PLO, the Arab peoples
who leapt to our aid. Walid Junblatt, [Socialist and Druze leader in Lebanon]
sent bread and other necessities to us in the beginning. Supporters of
Ahmad Jibril [Head of the PFLP general Command] provided us with much
in terms of shelter, clothing and funds. Others, PFLP, Hizbullah, the
Revolutionary Guard - everyone provided for us and empathized with us.
Our brothers in Fateh, Abu Omar's [Arafat's] Fateh, I'm sure provided
us with what they could but the least giving were our brothers in the
Fateh organization. They provided something but very little. It was a
lot less than we had expected.
[59]
The actual experience
of this expulsion added further fuel to Hamas's criticism of the mainstream
or at least of secular trends. Comparing the behavior of the group deported
on this particular occasion to groups from the mainstream expelled previously,
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi had this to say:
They [secular
expellees] saw comforts in their deportation and used it as path to enjoyment.
They entrenched themselves in hotels while we entrench ourselves in trenches.
They endured the struggle from hotels while we endure from trenches. Faced
with the choice of comfort and hardship we chose hardship and stayed on
the barren land to remain a thorn in the throat of Israel and to remain
at the gates of our beloved homeland. Such hardship did not deter us as
it deterred them.
[60]
Bitawi goes on
to stress that the deportation far from breaking Hamas actually made it
stronger:
There is no doubt
that this deportation had very positive effects on our Palestinian people...people
started to have hope, our determination paid off. Imagine if we had succumbed
to circumstances and roamed around the world leaving the deportation site
in no mans land - our problem would have roamed with us as well and our
`question' would have vanished.
[61]
The PLO position
on negotiations following the deportation was viewed extremely negatively
by the expellees. As one of them stated on his return:
We valued the
step by our brothers in the PLO, to suspend the talks and one of the reasons
was no doubt that we had not returned, but after taking this step they
betrayed us. In the beginning their deed can be remembered and therefore
thanked but after this they left us hanging. They betrayed us.
[62]
In April 1993,
the expellees' spokesman, Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi reprimanded members of
the Palestinian delegation when they returned to the negotiating table,
calling them "traitors" who should not escape the punishment
of the people. To Rantisi, these delegates were not elected by the people
and as such "they represent no one but themselves." To him,
this makes "the whole [peace] process illegitimate and illegal."
While issuing
his threatening statements, Rantisi kept the door open for Hamas's further
political involvement by making statements in defence of the PLO:
The PLO is a
national Palestinian achievement. It's true that the leadership has made
mistakes and should return to the right path. This is what is needed to
save the PLO. We need a comprehensive national dialogue in which all the
factions and forces will participate from inside the territories and outside.
The structure and shape of the PLO should be redefined on a democratic
basis, to be achieved by electing a national Palestinian Parliament.
[63]
However, although
Hamas has expressed the intent to participate in municipal elections and
will continue to participate in local student councils, chambers of commerce
and other union oriented elections, it has ruled out the possibility of
involvement in elections for the self‑rule council. Despite this
assertion several Hamas members applied for admission to the newly‑formed
Palestinian police force to ensure that they would not be completely isolated
from the scene once the action began.
[64]
Given the unease
of the relationship between Hamas and the PLO, one other major worry that
needs to be addressed is the possibility of the outbreak of full scale
hostility between the two parties or in others words, the possibility
of a Palestinian civil war. This may very much depend on the position
Hamas decides to take in the future vis-a-vis elections for the autonomy
council but it cannot be ruled out. Jamil Hamameh, when questioned on
this matter, stated the following:
Hamas has declared
that it will strongly oppose inner fighting although this does not mean
that this opposition will not defend its rights. As Palestinians we reject
inner fighting among our people but I believe the Palestinian people and
the various political factions will not be at a loss when it comes to
resisting the acquiescence that is now taking place.
[65]
He was stronger
in his invocation of non-violence when asked how Hamas would react were
there to be restrictions placed upon it by a national authority established in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip:
I don't want
to get ahead of events but the movement [Hamas] will not resort to violence
and bloodshed in its resistance to a solution or authority that will came
as an alternative to occupation. We as Palestinians will respect the struggles
of our people and will continue to consider that the central enemy is
the Jewish state and not the sons of our own people.
[66]
The subject of
a civil war was more openly raised during a discussion between Sheikh
Hamad Bitawi and the Military Governor of Nablus who summoned the former
for an interrogation session after his return from Marj al-Zuhour. The
Military Governor suggested to Bitawi that there would be inner fighting
among Palestinians and Bitawi replied:
We are not going
to fight, the PLO and the Islamic movement are the sons of one people,
one homeland, one religion and one family.
[67]
Stressing that
Hamas was a legitimate opposition, Bitawi continued by asking the Military
Governor:
Don't you have
an opposition? I saw 50,000 from the Likud and others demonstrating [against
the accord] in Jerusalem....we are the same. Do you think that the Palestinian
people are a savage people? An uncultured people? We are not a savage
people, we are not an uncultured people. If we oppose, then our opposition
will be positive....I will announce and so will all the rational ones
in the country, that the party responsible for fighting is the Israeli
government which wants to feed the trouble...one more time I am saying
to you, and you can tell this to [Prime Minister] Rabin and [Foreign Minister]
Peres - we will not fight.
[68]
The assertions
made by both Hamameh and Bitawi need to be evaluated in the overall context
of Hamas relations with other Palestinian factions on the one hand and
against the backdrop of Hamas discourse and performance on the other.
While both confirm that they will not opt for inner fighting to resolve
their disagreements with other groups, Rantisi nonetheless, in commentary
on the stand taken by the PLO over the deportation issue called them "traitors
who should not escape the punishment of the people".
The way in which
the deportation was perceived and handled by various Palestinian groups
seems to have created a great degree of division in Palestinian political
attitudes. While sharply criticizing the PLO for its stand, Hamas used
the deportation to reflect its own broad political orientation based on
flexibility and pragmatism. It was not adverse to publicizing the deepening
of the rift between it and the PLO particularly when the rhetoric of suspending
the talks until all those deported were returned had proved to be just
that.
Hamas, however,
capitalised on its initial refusal and subsequent acceptance of the principle
of phased return to generate further popular support. Providing a rationale
for the apparent flexibility of Hamas policy Bitawi said:
Some asked us
- why did you refuse to have a group of 100 deportees returned before
the 2 year period while now you accept this? The answer was that there
had been changes, firstly, when the names were first announced, there
was no formal decision, we did not receive any official word from the
Israelis saying that this was just the first group. However when they
sent names and said some on the seventeenth of September and some on the
seventeenth of December - the ceiling was known, the information was clear.
There is another
thing, some of our people were getting sick and needed surgery or medical
treatment. Another thing is that it had been important to people in Palestine
in charge of institutions, that we remain here [on Marj al-Zuhour] but
there were indeed changes in those circumstances too. Therefore we had
to be flexible and could not be rigid giving the changing circumstances.
[69]
It is this calculated
flexibility that enables Hamas to accommodate various changes without
necessarily losing its support or esteem. This flexibility will be the
subject of further discussion at a later point.
Israel The relationship
between Hamas and Israel has undergone a radical change since the movement
first began. Before the intifada Hamas busied itself with political and
grass-roots activities centered mainly in universities and mosques and
designed to offer alternative ideas to the predominance of secularism
and nationalism offered by the PLO. Resistance to the Israeli occupation
was a small part of their program at that time and they were not involved
in armed resistance. Consequently, it functioned without interference
from the Israeli authorities and was able to build a strong organizational
structure with considerable influence among the people with whom it worked.
[70]
As one interviewee pointed out:
An observer of
events at the beginning of the intifada when Hamas was launched would
note that the occupation authorities did not chase or punish them. The
focus of the occupation authorities was on the Islamic Jihad therefore,
Hamas members were free to move around.
[71]
As a result of
this, the actual "intifada launch" of active military resistance
is claimed by one leading Hamas member to have been completely unexpected
by Israel:
Even the intelligence
apparatus was shocked. It is a well known fact that the intelligence services
usually monitor and gather information about all movement in Palestinian
society but even they were left wondering what had happened.
[72]
One school of
thought that tries to analyze the dynamics behind the establishment of
Hamas suggests that it is not unlikely that the Israeli Occupation was
interested in making the establishment of a balancing force possible:
Some political
analysts say that it is possible that the Israeli authorities tried to
promote an equilibrium [in the Palestinian political structure] by finding
a force to balance the PLO and effectively to weaken the PLO. The objective
was to do away with the slogan, "The PLO is the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people." The goal of the authorities [Israel]
did not spring out of love for Hamas or love for Islam, it was, their
desire, as a tactical move to establish a sort of [political] balance.
[73]
If this analysis
is to be pursued to its logical conclusion one can suggest that the Israeli
occupation calculated that a most effective way to get out of that critical
phase, the launching of the intifada, was to busy Palestinian society
with itself by internalizing the conflict between Palestinians.
Another point
often rumored is that Israel made the rise of Hamas possible by supplying
finances to areas that would have encouraged its growth. A suggestion
of this was made in 1986 by General Segev who was the former military
governor of the Gaza Strip:
We extend some
financial aid to Islamic groups via mosques and religious schools in order
to help create a force that would stand against the leftist forces which
support the PLO.
[74]
Although no hard
evidence supporting the claim of direct assistance to Hamas itself is
available, Israel can certainly be said to have contributed to the possibilities
for Hamas to receive funding. Their efforts were directed at impeding
the flow of funds to the PLO and due to their acceptance of Hamas activities
during the first phase of the intifada they did not take measures to obstruct
channels through which Hamas received its financial support thus indirectly
aiding the movement.
On the regional
level Israel sought to bring about a certain fragmentation in the Muslim
world as a whole going as far as playing a role in the arms for hostages
exchanges of the US Iran-Contra affair in which it facilitated the supply
of arms to Khomeini's Iran.
[75]
Despite publication
of the Hamas Covenant in 1988 which called for the nullification of Israel
by Islam, the relationship between Israel and Hamas was not to change
until May 1989 when Israel, recognizing that Hamas was becoming a threat,
arrested a large number of Hamas activists, among them the spiritual leader
of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The movement was declared illegal by the
Israeli authorities in September 1989.
[76]
Since then Israel
has maintained its policy of imprisonment and expulsion for those involved
with Hamas particularly at the leadership level. The culmination of this
policy came in December 1992 with the mass expulsion of 415 suspected
members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood. Among these
were apparently not only most of the leaders of the movement but also
second and third ranking officials and activists which seemed to leave
the movement in the territories leaderless.
[77]
The speed at which the expulsion took place although a shock
to many was inevitable for as one interviewee pointed out:
At the time when
Hamas started to become a threat to Israel's real security the authorities
were compelled to hit with its well known fist by deporting 400 of their
members and leaders to Marj al Zuhour in South Lebanon. Its not a secret
that the occupation authorities managed to arrest 400 Hamas members in
24 hours and no surprise because Hamas activists had been allowed to work
publicly and were, therefore, already well exposed.
[78]
In carrying out
these expulsions Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin sought to paralyze
the movement's main infrastructure by delivering it a strong retaliatory
punishment for acts of violence it had committed. His attempt to "suffocate
those in the `cellar' by "demolishing the `top floor'"
[79]
and so cripple the movement and lessen its support ironically
had the opposite effect, particularly considering the fact that many of
the deportees were not considered active or high ranking among the people
within the territories themselves and to many the act was interpreted
as no more than a show of strength by Israel. Among those deported were
doctors, engineers judges university professors and officers of the Waqf
and Zakat committees, one of whom observed:
The deportation
was undoubtedly aimed to rid Palestine of its scientific talents... furthermore
Israel and the West are worried by what they see as Islamic revivalism,
they truly believe that among those deported were over 200 imams
and that by this measure Islamic revivalism will die. Israel also wanted
to absorb or curtail the Israeli anger following the killing of Toledano
[80]
but there is no relationship between the deportees and Toledano.
[81]
The lack of justification
for the deportation was also seen as part of a history of persecution:
Deportation is
an ancient policy - the disbelievers and the unjust use it against the
prophets and the followers of the prophet.
[82]
The previous
call for the obliteration of "The Jewish State" by Hamas was
most certainly compounded by the deportation. Influenced by several psychological/motivational
assumptions one leading Islamist who was among the deportees pointed out:
The Israeli state
is not democratic, it is a state of injustice that commits this crime
without investigation as to the responsibility of the accused, without
trial before sentence and with harsh treatment. My house was besieged
and I was taken, handcuffed, feet bound and blindfolded. Myself and the
others were not given food or drink for over 40 hours and beating and
cursing against my God was continuous. This was what worried us most,
the physical pain of beating can be endured but the pain of having your
beliefs and your God cursed by your abductors does not fade easily.
[83]
Referring to
the expulsion as "the crime" and giving the equation that deportation
is equal to murder, the same deportee relayed a conversation he had with
the Israeli Military Governor in Nablus, in which he had commented that
the deportation would hurt the state of Israel. The Military Governor
asked how this could be the case and was greeted with the following reply:
During the last
45 years you have managed to establish the facade of being a democratic
state. This deportation has proved the opposite. You have deported us
without trial and this has stripped the facade of Israel's democracy -
there is no democracy - while we [the deportees] have given a portrait
of the Palestinian people as an educated people, a civilized people and
an understanding people.
[84]
He gave a further
example of the disadvantage to Israel by citing a comment from one of
the visitors to the deportation site whose perception of the deportees
integrity was concluded thus:
...were it not
for the fact that you [deportees] were honest Israel would not have deported
you.
[85]
Criticism of
Israel for it lack of justice and democratic processes is a recurrent
theme and one which been raised by many people arrested from the beginning
of the intifada until the present day. Although the above illustrates
the outrage of being sentenced without trial others have attacked the
whole Israeli process of trial and sentencing itself.
What goes on
in an Israeli court and between Israeli lawyers is not necessarily what
is recorded on the charge sheet. In my estimation there is no honest judicial
system in Israel. The general mood or character of the judge is what determines
the outcome - the nature of the interrogation and the sentence. The charges
directed against me at the court were not the charges that led to my sentencing.
[86]
Many of those
deported had been imprisoned at other times in their lives but the two
things bore no comparison according to one deportees:
The sheer fact
of uprooting a person from his land, home, family and job and to throw
him in a no-mans-land is the worst a human being can face. Imprisonment
compared to deportation can be considered a picnic.
[87]
Given the location
of the deportation site the conditions were exacerbated by the ongoing
battles between the Israeli army and Hizbullah.
In one battle,
rockets and bombs were launched over our heads. The marches we organized
would be shot at by Israeli soldiers and we used to pray the prayer of
need because we did not know if we would return or not. Machine guns and
bombs were used, not to scare but to kill and several of the deportees
were wounded.
[88]
The whole purpose
of Israel in carrying out the deportation which was to undermine the Hamas
movement most certainly backfired. Rather than cripple the movement it
added to its strength and the deportees themselves noted that despite
the period of deportation being the harshest and most painful in their
lives it could also be considered the most pleasant. The wider intention
of undermining the Islamic movement as a whole had entirely the opposite
effect giving what was used by the deportees as an uninterrupted period
of study.
When you gather
400 well educated, scientifically minded people in one place - imagine
- due to the grace of Allah we hardly missed any group prayers. Living
for 9-10 months with each prayer in a group we created a mosque from our
tent big enough to accommodate 500 worshippers. Every day I would awake
an hour before dawn to pray or meditate or remember Allah. Prayers would
be led in rotation and every day after the dawn prayer there was a religious
lesson and then a lesson to interpret the Koran. I was one who was in
charge of the interpretation. Many deportees would attend and we would
interpret entire verses. The degree of scholarship we attained during
that period we had never reached in our university studies. Some deportees
succeeded in memorizing one part, five parts or thirty parts of the Koran
and at least three succeeded in committing to memory the whole of the
holy book.
[89]
The period of
time spent on Marj al-Zuhour and the amount of aid and supplies that were
forthcoming enabled the deportees to build a fully functioning "micro-cosmic
Islamic society."
We organized
committees, for example there was a fatwa (juridical) committee
which discussed several matters like our conduct during Ramadan in which
it was decided that we would eat together before dawn and after sunset.
This provided very pleasant moments and there was so much spirituality
in these moments that I cannot describe them. We organized a disciplined
method of work responsibilities - bringing water, guard duty to protect
against wild animals, cleaning etc. In all we created 15 committees one
of which was a medical committee which treat the sick of neighboring villages
as well as those in need of medical treatment among us. There was an engineering
committee which was in charge of installing electricity and water once
the weather improved in May/June and was in charge of constructing the
mosque and laying out the tents. There was an educational committee and
a cultural and religious committee.
[90]
With the expulsion,
the popularity of Hamas received a considerable boost and the wisdom of
Israel in carrying out the expulsions was strongly challenged by international
human rights groups and dissenting camps within Israel itself. Furthermore,
coming at the stage of the peace process that it did further undermined
the position of the PLO and popular support for the process.
The December
1992 edition of the Israeli magazine, `New Outlook' was devoted
almost entirely to the question of the expulsions under the heading Against
Deportation. As one contributor pointed out, "The expulsion transformed
rather unknown Hamas ideological activists into international heroes,
victimized by Israeli oppression."
[91]
Reactions from the Israeli press included "draconian
measure"; "the Israeli government...awarded it [Hamas] a certificate
of honor which will not be easily devalued"; and "a very stupid
decision...illegal and immoral".
[92]
Following the deportations, the relationship between Israel and
Hamas went through and remains in a state of hostility. A year after the
expulsions most of the expellees were allowed to return, although to avoid
imprisonment a handful remained on Marj al-Zuhour.
The deportation
measure undoubtedly had a spillover effect, not only on Islamic groups
in the Middle East and international human rights organizations, but more
importantly on Hamas members and activists who were not themselves deported.
Many "lukewarm" supporters of the movement started to view it
with renewed respect and take it seriously as a direct consequence of
the deportation measure. Although its hierarchy was certainly affected,
if not crippled, when over 400 of its leaders were deported, the grass-roots
base of its structure was widened and solidified resulting in more attacks
on Israelis as a clear expression of distaste and anger. Hamas was also
hit on that level but was at the same time reaping the fruit of these
further attacks on its ranks.
Following the
signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13th 1993, Hamas
increased its opposition, vowing to resist the accord and continue fighting
occupation by any means necessary.
The talks which
followed the signing were also criticized and the manner in which all
negotiation had been conducted was interpreted by Hamameh thus:
Israel, only
appears to show any flexibility in order to get the PLO and Arafat out
of their troubles. In the long run the Jews will not give in to Arafat
because the mentality of Rabin is not the mentality Arafat negotiates
with. Rabin does not have the courage to deviate from the will of his
people or his government while Arafat has trampled over the will and the
struggle of his people.
[93]
Due to its declared
opposition to the occupation, to the PLO and the talks, Hamas will more
likely continue to engage Israelis in confrontation. By doing so Hamas
will firstly keep its name and cause alive. Secondly, as has so often
been the case in Palestinian society, attacks on Israelis tend to increase
a movements popularity. Thirdly, a most effective method to obliterate
or complicate the peace talks is by heightening the level of tension between
Palestinians and Israelis.
For its part,
Israel will most likely continue in its attempts to weaken Hamas organizationally
and functionally. Recent incidents of violence are a reminder of what
the future relationship between the two parties may hold.
[94]
Arab
Countries
Hamas does not
operate in a vacuum, it grew up in a region torn by conflicts and filled
with contradictions. Each and every actor in the Middle East has vested
interests that in part converge with other's and in part diverge from
them. Even those countries who at times entered into blocs or alliance
building to serve certain short or long term objectives often find themselves
confronted with a multitude of circumstances external and internal which
either enhance or disperse their schemes. Difficulties are quite abundant
as far as national actors are concerned in the region and examples are
too many to enumerate.
Sub-national
actors, as is the case with Hamas, however, operate within a regional
context that is more complex in structure and more complicated in scope.
The religious message Hamas espouses and the political characteristics
it exhibits and programs it performs, only add greater difficulties to
the already existing ones. Its scope of activities is not as formal as
a government like entity; its expectations of its performance are higher
than a formal governmental institution would place upon itself and the
demands placed upon it by its constituent supporters and activists are
by far superior to those asked of a governmental office. By definition
Hamas is a movement - a peoples movement, it evolved as a challenger to
or at least as a disturber of the status quo in the region and one impetus
behind its evolution was its rejection of what its adherents would term
as the ineptness of formal governmental institutions.
Combining characteristics
of a formal as well as an informal organizational structure Hamas' seeming
intent from the outset was to operate delicately within quite a delicate
regional environment.
Aspiring to achieve
a most difficult two faceted objective of `rallying the masses' in the
Middle East region around its cause while also convincing Middle
Eastern governments that it would be in their interests to remain silent
or at least non-adversarial to Hamas' mission the movement urged in its
covenant that:
The Arab countries
surrounding Israel are requested to open their borders for the mujahediin
of the Arab and Islamic countries so they can take their role and join
their efforts with their Muslim brothers of Palestine. As for the other
Arab and Islamic countries, they are asked to ease the movement of mujahediin
from it and to it - that is the least they could do.
[95]
In the ensuing
article of the covenant, nationalist and religious groupings,institutions,
intellectuals and the whole Arab and Islamic world are addressed with
the following:
The Islamic Resistance
movement would like each and every one of these organizations to stand
by its side, supporting it on all levels, taking up its position, pushing
forth its activities and movements and working to gain support for the
Islamic Resistance Movement so the Islamic people can be its support and
its victors - a strategic dimension on all levels: human, material, media,
historical and geographical. It works through holding supportive conferences,
producing clarifying statements, supportive articles, purposeful pamphlets
and keeping the public aware of the Palestinian situation and what is
facing it and what is being plotted against it, through educating the
Islamic people ideologically, morally and culturally in order to play
its role in the battle for liberation, just as it played its role in defeating
the Crusaders and pushing back the Tartars and saving human civilization
and that is not hard for Allah.
[96]
The theme of
the universality and unity of the Islamic nations is a recurrent theme
throughout the covenant. Article seven addresses this theme by warning
of the folly of not supporting the movement:
Muslims throughout
the world adopt the system of the Islamic Resistance Movement; they work
towards aiding it, accepting its stands and amplifying its Jihad.
Therefore, it is an international movement - it is prepared for this {task}
because of the clarity of its ideology, its lofty goal and the sanctity
of its objectives. Upon this basis it should be considered, given a fair
evaluation and admission of its role. Whoever cheats it of its right,
turns away from aiding it, or is blinded to hide its role, is a person
who argues with fate. And whoever closes his eyes from seeing reality,
unintentionally or intentionally, will one day awake to find that the
world has left him behind and the justification will wear him down trying
to defend his position. The reward is for those who are early.
The
oppression of the close relations is more painful on the soul, than the
assault of the sharp sword.
[97]
The seemingly
strong language in the Hamas covenant regarding Arab countries, however,
should be considered in light of widely held attitudes towards Arab governments
by some of Hamas leaders. To Jamil Hamameh, urging Arab governments "to
open their borders for the mujahediin of the Arab and Islamic countries
so they can take their role and join their efforts with their Muslim brothers
of Palestine" does not necessarily mean intervention in those countries
affairs.
The fact that
it [Hamas] gives a perspective about what is happening at present does
not amount to interference in the internal affairs of Arab States.
[98]
He further stresses
that:
It is not Hamas
policy to interfere with the internal affairs of any Arab state or to
enter into an alliance with any one [Arab] state against another. It respects
all and the rights of all in facing the central historical problem of
Palestine. It works towards combining all energies and uniting all efforts
to serve in the interest of Palestine. It has announced this unequivocally
in its covenant.
[99]
Hamas takes this
stance particularly bearing in mind what it sees as previous interference
in the affairs of Arab states by the PLO and which it uses as a stick
to further beat the PLO with:
When the PLO
interfered in some Arab states, we saw the results -fighting - we reap
the pains and the sufferings from this and even now we continue to suffer
from their interference.
[100]
This stance of
non-interference can quite reasonably be termed a pragmatic policy on
the part of Hamas in order to curry favor with Arab states and therefore
put itself in a position whereby the Arab states themselves will show
reciprocal understanding of Hamas. Jamil Hamameh, while denying that Arab
states reciprocate in every case alludes that they and the wider Muslim
community generally, most certainly should:
It is not the
case that all that is asked for is given. It is not within our means to
open borders, however, it is an appeal to Allah and our history implemented
through our convictions but not necessarily the case that our demands
be implemented one way or the other. We ask Allah to avert trouble for
the Palestinian people and ask that He grants wisdom. The people will
be judged and not with mercy because the Palestinian problem is not the
problem of the Palestinians only, not the problem of the Arabs only but
is a historical, international Islamic problem. It is true that Allah
has granted that we should be the tip of the spear but this does not mean
that we have to compromise and depart with soil for we alone do not own
it. It belongs to future generations - to the Islamic nation in its entirety.
[101]
The Arab states
received a much more positive endorsement from Sheikh Hamad Bitawi although
this was due entirely to the reaction of certain states to the whole issue
of the December 1992 expulsion. When talking about the conditions of living
on Marj al-Zuhour he stated that the patience and steadfastness of the
deportees had been one factor which had made conditions bearable but the
second largest factor was the support shown by numerous visitors.
"The co-operation
and help we got from the gracious people of Lebanon and Syria, from other
Arab peoples and from the Islamic world...I recall we had a delegation
representing the Nasserites. They were truly sympathetic to our plight.
They said that they had come from Egypt, not the Egypt of Sadat, the Islamic
empire or Camp David but the Egypt of the Arab people and the Egypt of
Azhar and Islam to join hands in unity. They said `We came to say that
you have raised Arab heads high and we come to kiss the ground beneath
your feet'.
[102]
Another notable
visitor from Egypt was "the son of the Imam, the son of Sheikh Hassan
al-Banna, saif al-Islam, the sword of Islam".
The Egyptian
media were very interested and sympathetic to the plight of the deportees
and this very much impressed Sheikh Bitawi:
In Palestine
I preach to 50,000 or 100,000 people at al-Aqsa mosque and to 4,000 or
5,000 in Nablus. However during my deportation I was given the opportunity
to preach to 100s of millions of Arabs and Muslims. Just imagine, the
Egyptian television, radio and print media broadcasting what we preached.
[103]
This is a very
good endorsement for Egypt considering the dilemmas regarding the Hamas
movement which the Egypt of Mubarak is currently facing. While the greatest
threat to Mubarak and the stability of Egypt is posed by the more radical
Islamic movements such as the Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya, steady gains by the
Muslim Brotherhood in professional and vocational spheres may actually
make it the more difficult movement to deal with nationally. Mubarak cannot
afford to clamp down on the Brotherhood as this will only cause greater
support for the more radical movements within Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood
is of course highly supportive of Hamas but, from the point of view of
the Egyptian regime, the interests of which tally more closely with those
of Israel, the PLO and the United States, Hamas is an obstacle to the
peace process. Because of the complexities of the Egyptian regime's relationship
with the Muslim Brotherhood, the only discouragement that it can give
Hamas is to urge contributors such as Saudi Arabia to cease or at least
lessen their support of the movement.
[104]
As well as the
Egyptians quoted above, Bitawi gives a whole list of much appreciated
visitors from the Arab world:
From Jordan there
came the media, doctors, engineers and members of the Jordanian parliament.
From the Sudan, from Northern Iraq, from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the Emirates, Tunisia, Yemen and from Libya came representatives sent
by Qaddafi asking us what we needed.
[105]
It is no surprise
that there were so many visitors from Jordan, the relationship between
Hamas and Jordan has historically always been good. It remains so at present
with Jordanian support of Hamas being mainly financial while Hamas, for
its part helps to maintain Jordanian influence in the Territories. A good
relationship with Hamas is also beneficial to the Jordanian government
in that it helps to maintain good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood
in Jordan. Millions of Jordanian dinars are given annually by the Jordanian
government to the Islamic Waqf and Zakat committees in the
occupied territories.
[106]
The Waqf
is responsible for a large part of the administrative duties in the West
Bank which maintains mosques and provides salaries for Waqf employees.
Since many employees are involved in either Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas
activism, Jordan effectively supports them.
[107]
Support for Hamas has also been forthcoming as humanitarian
aid. Jordan is cautious, however, as it does not want to be accused of
undermining the PLO and is concerned that a growth in the support of Hamas
could lead to instability in its own country owing to increased influence
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, Jordanian security services have recently
clamped down on Hamas and arrested several of its members. The main reason
behind the Jordanian authorities' decision to restrict Hamas's activities
is the latter's connection with the
Brotherhood.
In general, however,
Arab countries do remain strongly supportive of Hamas, particularly the
Sudan which is currently allowing Hamas activists to be trained there.
Some of these young trainees are from the territories but most were recruited
from Jordanian refugee camps and their time in the Sudan is approved and
given financial support from the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Khartoum.
[108]
Links remain
strong with Islamic groups in Algeria, it is there where Hamas receives
a great deal of its empowerment due to the active role by Islamists in
the Algerian political process. Hamas views the Islamists in Algeria as
role models whose work energizes the movements supporters, the clash between
the Islamists and the central government in Algeria is almost always used
by Hamas as a justificatory tool in motivating its members to unite and
to be more active. The crackdown on the Islamists by the Algerian government
and isolating them from the Algerian electorate is what enabled Hamas
to provide a rationale for its program in opposition to the status quo.
Another area
of interest in the study of Hamas' relations to the Arab world can be
found in the unfolding of the Gulf crisis in 1990. The position taken
by the PLO in the Gulf crisis which limited its access to funds and resulted
in the expulsion of many Palestinian workers from the Gulf States worked
very much to the advantage of Hamas with funds previously allocated to
the PLO being transferred to them. Its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood,
always had good relations with the Saudi Arabian monarchy and received
financial support from it, this relationship served to create an easy
channel for Hamas' receipt of funds.
In the case of
Syria however the picture is not as clear. Owing to its concern about
its national interests the Syrian regime severely crushed the Muslim brotherhood
in the city of Hama in the early 1980s. The Syrian government then believed
that the Muslim Brotherhood were organizing and acting on behalf of an
external foreign power. Its measure however, almost destroyed any bridges
that Hamas might like to have established in Syria to enhance its position.
Hamas pursues
relations that it views as advantageous either to its program or to its
wellbeing. While the relationship between Hamas and the various Arab actors
is not viewed as a strategic one by either side, both parties try to capitalise
on the benefits they can reap from such a relationship. Hamas is in need
of the support of Arab governments to help it advance its goals. Arab
governments on the other hand, invariably needed Hamas to assist in the
weakening of the PLO which did not always succumb to the dictates of Arab
leaders.
It is wrong to assume, however,
that Hamas' only preoccupation in the pursuance of its relations in the
Arab world is limited to establishing bridges of contact with Arab governments.
The Arab nation which is integral to the Islamic nation is about the most
frequently used concept in Hamas' jargon. It is through their appeal to
the Arab peoples that Hamas has been able to widen its influence on the
Arab political map. Perhaps it is the concern of Arab governments that
Hamas might attempt to penetrate the Arab conscience with its advocacies
which will motivate them to play this role with Hamas.
An interesting
component of Hamas relations with the Arab world can be found in the context
of their ties with another sub-national actor, Hizbullah in South Lebanon.
The latter is widely known to have established strong contacts with the
Islamic Jihad movement. One would expect that some kind of dialogue at
least was open between Hamas and Hizbullah particularly during the expulsion
period which saw many Hamas supporters on Marj al-Zuhour in South Lebanon.
The nature of the goals of such dialogue had it been pursued is not fully
clear as there was little reference to Hizbullah in discussions with some
of Hamas leaders.
The behavior
of the deportees proved to be a very good exercise in changing the Lebanese
attitude towards the Palestinians. Many of the deportees performed voluntary
work in the surrounding Lebanese villages, helping with the olive harvest
and one deportee who was in charge of the exercise program established
an athletic team in one of the neighboring villages. Consequently when
the time came for the deportees to return:
...old men of
70 or 80, women, children - there were many tears at our departure. They
all said that they were happy for us to be returning to our homes but
pained because of the tremendous vacuum we would leave behind us.
[109]
The attitude
of the Lebanese toward Palestinians had been negative, according to Bitawi,
because their previous experience of Palestinians in the area around Marj
Al-Zuhour was based on the presence of Hizbullah members whose behavior
was implied by Bitawi when he compared the conduct of the deportees with
Hizbullah members.
For us, to roam
around unchecked in the [local] villages, drinking, running after women
- this was something we would not do. Believe me, when people would come
to pick olives, for example, they would run away the minute they saw a
Palestinian. Fathers would assure their children `no, no darling they
are not like the commandos who were here before, Fedayeen regrettably.
[110]
There was also
a reciprocal change in attitude towards the Lebanese:
When Lebanon
used to be mentioned to me, what would come to mind would be Beirut bars
and nightclubs, but in fact we found the Lebanese people to be warm-hearted,
giving, hospitable and polite. There is now a strong trend of Islamic
revival in Lebanon and delegations from Beirut would call on us, among
them Palestinians, religious leaders and legal scholars.
[111]
The deportees
also had an effect on Palestinians living in Lebanon and one example given
by Bitawi was of a rich Palestinian who:
...did not pray,
did not fast or perform religious duties but Allah showed him the right
path. When he saw the deportees and saw that we were pleasant people he
loved us and sent cars full of fruit and vegetables. He said to us that
previously, `we [Palestinians in Lebanon] felt ashamed to call ourselves
Palestinian but now the deportees have raised our heads and we are proud
of who we are'. This man continued to contact more entrepreneurs to deliver
badly needed supplies to us.
[112]
Another change
in attitude was demonstrated by the United Arab Emirates as Bitawi takes
pains to make clear:
We had people
visiting from the United Arab Emirates and those who came would say `..before
your deportation the people of the Emirates used to hate the Palestinians.
The government and people hated the Palestinians especially after the
Gulf Crisis but after your deportation the people of the Emirates did
not hate the Palestinian people. They started to feel that there was a
segment among Palestinians who were sincere in their effort to liberate
their homeland, who were worshippers and who were solemn'.
[113]
The deportation
undoubtedly had the opposite effect from that which Israel had hoped and
was perhaps one of the strongest events in recent years that actually
went towards enhancing not only Arab unity but also the Islamic revivalist
movement as a whole. In the mind of Hamad Bitawi there was no doubt that
this had been the case:
Undoubtedly there
was a strong positive consequence of the deportation, a strong and positive
impact on Islamic revivalism.
[114]
The whole issue
served as an example to be followed by Muslims everywhere and was the
perfect platform to emphasize that the Palestinian problem was the problem
of "all Palestinians, then was the problem of all Arabs and then
was the problem of all Muslims".
[115]
Based on my experience
on Marj al-Zuhour, and the open door showed us by the Arab States, especially
the sons of Islamic revivalism and the Islamic way of life, I would say
that the voice of opposition to the Peace process and the negotiations
has not been silenced. During this deportation we addressed the Islamic
world and as a result could sense the grace of the Arab peoples.
[116]
In effect, Hamas
has been able to leave its mark on a region littered with complexities.
It has pursued at times, alliances and other relationships with national,
sub-national and trans-national actors in order to give meaning to its
existence. While difficulties were plentiful so were Hamas' means and
methods to get around them. Even the deportation, as harsh an experience
as it was, was utilized by Hamas and the benefits may have outweighed
the cost in an arena where gains tend to be a scarce commodity.
The
International Community.
Hamas views the
international theater as divided between the world of Islam and the world
of the "unbelievers" though it evolved for, or due to the intifada
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas proscribes to itself the responsibility
of guarding the word of Islam where Muslims live. Through the building
of mosques, the establishment of formal and informal contacts with individuals
and groups around the world, Hamas has expended quite an effort to publicize
its message and to portray an image of credibility and viability of its
organisation even to non-Muslims.
In the world
of "unbelievers" Hamas has tried to make quite significant inroads,
in several European countries as well as in the United States, several
Islamic organizations and mosques sprang up with alleged links to Hamas.
While the exact nature of such links could not be fully determined the
psychological dimension of the revival of Islam, even in the West deserves
some attention. When the World Trade Center bombing took place in the
United States for example, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was viewed as an Islamic
hero by Hamas even after his arrest.
Having sprung into Palestinian society,
Hamas gradually started to erect bridges of contact with other Islamic
movements in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. In Afghanistan, for example,
there are signs that Hamas leaders are trying to employ the services of
ex-fighters in the Afghanistan mujaheddiin as trainers or volunteers
for the Palestinian struggle.
Hamas did not
withhold any opportunity from advancing its agenda wherever it could and
the expulsion in December 1992 became an absolute coup for Hamas on the
public relations level. The media interest in the expulsion was the perfect
channel through which Hamas could legitimately attack Israel for the measure
and have the media friendly deportees present themselves a models of peaceful
resistance to victimization. Several points were raised in the interview
with Bitawi which are very relevant to this. Firstly, the actual area
or no-mans land to which the 415 were deported was uninhabited and extremely
inhospitable, on arrival at Marj al-Zuhour it was bitterly cold, wet and
snowing and as Bitawi pointed out:
We were all generally
employees in the middle class sector of life, we were educated employees
and not used to harsh conditions. We were accustomed to having easy access
to water which we use to cleanse before prayer but now we had to walk
very far just to bring water, we had to wash in the open and in bitterly
cold conditions. Clothing was scarce and none of us could get more than
two blankets when it was snowing. We had to walk very far to find wood
for fires.
[117]
This was the
first image that the media portrayed which engendered sympathy among the
liberal Western audience despite the fact that the group were, to all
intents and purposes, alleged by Israel to be `terrorists' or affiliated
to acts of terror.
The effects of
this image were quick to bring results:
We even had support
from the West, a delegation from Italy arrived bringing financial and
medical assistance - they organized demonstrations against the Israeli
government for taking the deportation measure. There was also some kind
of debate between our official spokesman Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi and with
an American senator on CNN. This debate gave us the opportunity to communicate
our message.
I remember that
whenever there was a conference in the United States they would ask for
a statement to be transmitted by phone. There were people from conferences
in Great Britain and students from the Soviet Union who would say that
the purpose of their trip was to interview the deportees.
[118]
As has been noted
previously, the deportees managed to build a complete community with a
very organized manner of functioning during their time on Marj al-Zuhour
despite the unreality of the situation and this was presented as a micro-cosmic
Muslim society whose ideal could be attained in a wider society. This
was an impressive sight to the stream of international visitors from whom
Hamas achieved the publicity coup:
They [visitors]
expected to find us crying and weeping but what they found were strong
spirited men facing their exile with dignity and patience.
There was a German
television team and they were stunned as we each introduced ourselves
as holders of doctorates, or engineers with some of us graduates of German
or British universities and others businessmen representing German companies
in Palestine. They were shocked and said `..but you are the terrorists?
The killers?' We replied that Israel was the terrorist and the visitors
said that our only crime was that we were people of knowledge who hold
their religious principles deeply. From the British
media came a man who was writing a report about the Islamic movement.
The first time he stayed for 20 days. He then came back, stayed for longer
and converted to Islam. He said that this had been the most beautiful
time he had lived and what he liked was not so much the fact that he was
among knowledgeable people but that the treatment each accorded the other
was compassionate and cordial.
[119]
The final part
of the above quote may actually say more about conditions in Britain than
on Marj al-Zuhour, however, it is an effective endorsement of the deportees
and hence of Hamas.
Another media
outlet which Bitawi paid particular attention to was that of Iran:
The television
crew that used to come [to Marj al-Zuhour] most often was the Iranian
television crew. They would record for half an hour and would then broadcast
in its entirety everything they had filmed. I was told that 1,000s would
cry when they heard us talk about the practices of Israeli occupation
against the Palestinian people so this was indeed a good opportunity.
[120]
Iran has recently
taken a renewed interest in Hamas and is orchestrating closer alliances
with Hizbullah in Lebanon and other Iranian backed groups. An unconfirmed
Egyptian report stated that Iran was training 3,000 Hamas fighters, had
allocated $30million to Hamas and had approved the opening of a
Hamas office in Tehran.
[121]
Whether true or not, considering the original stance of Ahmed
Yassin was critical of the Ayatollah, there has been a significant change
of attitude by the Iranian regime. Factors contributing to this are the
change in attitude of Hamas itself which has refrained from criticizing
the Iranian regime of late and the Iranian recognition of the potential
influence of Hamas.
According to
intelligence sources, the Revolutionary Guards, whose members include
exiles of the Shah who sheltered in PLO camps in Lebanon, have been allocated
the task of "nurturing" Hamas. That men who were once sheltered
by the PLO are now patronizing Hamas is an interesting point in itself.
From this source Hamas receives training and funds and is further linked
to Iran via the Iranian Foreign Ministry department dealing with Jordan
which also handles contacts with Hamas.
[122]
The deportation
while undoubtedly giving Hamas a world stage may not necessarily have
had the far reaching or long standing impact that Bitawi would hope. It
was a very newsworthy item in the International community at the time
but well before the return, media interest from the West had somewhat
declined. Bitawi claimed that the decline happened following Secretary
of State, Warren Christopher's visit to the region.
When Christopher
came the problem of the deportees already had quite a broad media dimension,
he came and then prevented the Arab media from talking about the problem.
There was a news blackout and as a result nobody mentioned the `problem',
it was marginalized.
[123]
Even if this
is not the case, the deportation may have helped the PLO and the peace
process as the extensive press coverage of the deportation sparked a general
renewal of interest in Palestinian/Israeli affairs. The sympathy for the
deportees, however, and the condemnation of Israel elicited by the deportation
has since been forgotten and the Western press has returned to its more
usual accounting of acts of `terrorism' which affect the more important
subject of Middle East peace.
However, while
the deportation was used as an effective tool to broaden the base of Hamas'
international contacts at the time it occurred, after the return Hamas
turned its attention to translating its international achievements into
domestic accomplishments among its supporters. Here again domestic, regional
and international support was consolidated to serve the objectives of
this movement which is still only a few years old.
[47]
Steinberg. Matti, Ibid. pp 42.
[48]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[49]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[50]
Jamil Hamameh, interview.
[51]
Jamil Hamameh, interview.
[52]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[53]
Taraki. Lisa, "The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian
Uprising." Middle East Report. January-February 1989. No.
156. pp 30.
[54]
Emerson. Steven, "The Palestinian Meltdown" The New
Republic. November 23rd 1992. pp 28.
[55]
Ya'ari Ehud "The Metamorphosis of Hamas." The Jerusalem
Report. Vol. III - No. 18. January 14, 1993. 24-26.
[56]
T.P. Editorial "Clashes between Hamas and Fatah." News
From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992. pp 2.
[57]
Kershner. Isabel, "The Return." The Jerusalem Report.
23 September 1993 - Vol IV. No. 10. pp 36-37.
[58]
Kershner. Isabel, Ibid.
[59]
Sheikh Ahmad Bitawi interview.
[60]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[61]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[62]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[63]
Abu Toameh. Khaled, "Watching His Words." The Jerusalem
Report. 23 September 1993 - Vol IV. No. 10. pp 38.
[64]
Interview conducted by the author with a Hamas supporter from the
Gaza Strip who asked for his name to be kept anonymous. November 15,
1993.
[65]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[66]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[67]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi, interview.
[68]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[69]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[70]
Abu-Amr. Ziad, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background."
Journal of Palestine Studies. Volume XXII. Number 4. Summer 1993.
pp 7-8.
[71]
Interview conducted by the author on October 4th with a widely
respected religious notable and national activist and one of the most
highly respected imams at al-Aqsa mosque who asked to remain
anonymous.
[72]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[73]
See footnote 2.
[74]
Usher. Graham, "The rise of political Islam in the Occupied
Territories." Middle East International. No. 453 - 25 June
1993. pp 19.
[75]
Salame. Ghassan, "Islam and the West." Foreign Policy.
No. 90 - Spring 1993. pp 36.
[76]
Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in
the territories occupied in 1967." News From Within. Vol.
VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992. pp. 8.
[77]
Abu-Amr. Ziad, Op cit. pp 14.
[78]
See footnote 2.
[79]
Ya'ari Ehud "The Metamorphosis of Hamas." The Jerusalem
Report. Vol. III - No. 18. January 14, 1993. pp 24-26.
[80]
Nissim Toledano - Israeli police officer who was kidnapped
in the second week of December 1992 and found dead several hours after
his kidnapping.
[81]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[82]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[83]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[84]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[85]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[86]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[87]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[88]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[89]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[90]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[91]
Cygielman. Victor, "The Expulsion." New Outlook.
Middle East Magazine. December 1992. pp 8.
[92]
New Outlook. Middle East Magazine. December 1992. pp 17.
[93]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[94]
Israeli crackdowns on Hamas activists are exemplified by
the siege and destruction of a house and killing of the four alleged
Hamas members operating from it, on Wednesday March 23rd 1994 in the
town of Hebron. A recent example of Hamas attacks against Israeli targets
occurred on April 6th when a suicide car bomb attack on the Israeli
town of Afula killed seven.
[95]
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement-August 1988, Article
28.
[96]
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement-August 1988 Article
29.
[97]
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement-August 1988 Article
7.
[98]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[99]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[100]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[101]
Jamil Hamameh interview.
[102]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[103]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[104]
Ramati. Yohanan, "Islamic Fundamentalism Gaining." Midstream-A
Monthly Jewish Review. Vol. 39 - No. 2 - 1993 pp 2.
[105]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[106]
Jaradat Muhammed, "Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in
the territories occupied in 1967." p. 7-11. News From Within.
Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992.
[107]
In September 1993 the author tried to conduct an interview with
Mr. Abdel Azim Salhab, deputy under-secretary of the Jordanian ministry
of Islamic Waqf affairs in Jerusalem, to get his views on Hamas. The
latter refused to be interviewed stating that "myself and my office
have absolutely nothing to do with Hamas and other Islamic movements
in Palestine". It was obvious to the author that Salwab's refusal
to be interviewed, in addition to posing a serious impediment to academic
research in Arab society, is exemplary of the attitudes of many Waqf
employees: sitting for an interview, they think, could cost them their
jobs if they were to say something not fully consistent with their superiors.
[108]
Yohanan Ramati, Op. Cit.
[109]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[110]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[111]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[112]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[113]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[114]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[115]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[116]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[117]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[118]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[119]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[120]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
[121]
Ramati. Yohanan, Op cit. pp 3.
[122]
Ya'ari. Ehud, "The Metamorphosis of Hamas." The Jerusalem
Report. Vol. III - No. 18. January 14, 1993. 24-26.
[123]
Sheikh Hamad Bitawi interview.
|