| Introduction | Chapters: 1  2  3  4  5 | Conclusion | Epilogue |

 

Chapter Four

 

 

Relationship with other bodies

 

Palestinian Nationalists and Secularists.

 

Throughout the years of its existence, Hamas's activities have been somewhat detrimental to the PLO. The strike days the movement has called for as well as the use of violent acts of resistance by its members not only deepened the rift between Palestinians and Israelis, but also contributed to the division of Palestinian society and to increasing the difficulty of bringing about cohesion and/or national consensus.

 

The albeit skeptical opinion that the PLO has offered them prospects for nation‑building is, for many Palestinians, more than outweighed by Hamas's offer of individual and thus political salvation once they return to Allah. The emphasis in Hamas's political program on the causes and ways to get rid of despair in society, has only made its objective more realizable. The fact, however, that the movement has not been able to offer society more practical alternatives has led to the waning of its support from its earlier claimed 40%.

 

On the other hand, the PLO leadership being outside the Occupied Territories has given Hamas the advantage of closer connections and arguably a more realistic perception of people's needs. The secular left, the Palestine Communist Party (Formally PCP but now known as the Palestine Peoples Party - PPP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in particular, have fallen behind in the race for popular support. In what is an essentially conservative society very much rooted in Islamic teachings and in a state of despair under occupation, there has been a perceived need for spiritual solace as well as national liberation.

 

The Marxist orientation of the PFLP, DFLP and the PPP was in principle non-religious although this element has had to be played down. The growth in religious movements since the 1970s has caused further dilemmas for the left who have had to tread even more carefully around the subject of religion, especially in view of the fact that they could be accused of heresy by the Islamists. Rather than ignore the subject altogether which was open to negative interpretation, they too began expressing a positive attitude towards `religious beliefs' as a "handmaiden to nationalism." [46]

 

Between 1984 and 1987 the left wing organizations within the PLO withdrew, leaving Fateh as the dominant force. Having previously had a positive approach to Islam generally, Fateh was in a good position to enhance this element in order to compete with Hamas. In their leaflets they began to refer more to religious themes and in the November convention of the Palestine National Council in 1984 a banner was hung bearing the Koranic verse from which Fateh derives its name. Also at this convention Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih was elected chairman. [47]

 

In 1988 Hamas decided to come up with its own covenant which was a direct challenge to the PLO. In Chapter Four, articles 26 and 27 of the covenant, Hamas defines its attitude to nationalist movements in the Palestinian arena including the PLO. While careful to document understanding of the secular vision and articulate that all are united in a common aim it nevertheless states that Hamas will not be one with the PLO until the latter adopts Islam as its way of life. This charter set the framework for a very unsteady relationship and clashes between supporters of the respective movements became more common. The attitude of the PLO towards the birth of Hamas was seen by Jamil Hamameh as follows:

 

I witnessed the behavior of Fateh and saw it adopt a very negative and unfortunate stand vis-a-vis Hamas. In the beginning it went as far as making accusations regarding the formation of the movement, but in the tradition of a movement which was raised in an Islamic way, it [Hamas] did not withdraw because of these responses but continued its work as a proof of its authenticity and originality. Fateh, because of its hegemony and because of its belief that it was the mother of the Palestinian people, adopted a critical stand as it did not accept any other claims of parentage. It does not respect others and Hamas finds this most regretful. We respect every perspective in the Palestinian arena and we respect the Palestinian people because we are a part of that people and we do not accept one party to be in control of the decision process to the detriment of others. Unfortunately the Fateh position was not a responsible position because of their fabrication of events and their attacks on the sons of the Islamic movement and the mosques. The unfortunate events that took place in the Gaza Strip led to inner fighting and what then happened in Jenin and Tulkarem [further clashes] is clear proof of that. Instead of joining hands and uniting forces this was their public response to the formation of the movement. [48]

 

The accusations to which Hamameh initially refers are that Hamas had been essentially unconcerned about the Palestinian struggle until it saw an opportunity for political power during the intifada. According to Hamameh, Fateh effectively "blacked out" the history of the movement and its links to the Muslim Brotherhood "in order to distance Islam from the battleground despite the fact that  "since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 the movement [Muslim Brotherhood] had formed battalions to resist the occupation. These battalions were known as the Sheikh's battalions or Kata'ib al-Shu'ukh". Hamameh claimed that Fateh's "fabrication of events" had been aimed to remove the contribution of Islamic resistance in Palestine from history and in his words: "to un-educate, de-politicize and to make the people unaware of the role of the Islamic movement." The emergence of Hamas therefore revealed a strong current of sentiment which Fateh had glossed over if not actually ignored.

 

This is not strictly correct. Although Fateh did criticize Hamas for what is saw as provoking disunity among the Palestinians and thereby undermining the Palestinian cause, it did not see Hamas as an entirely new and historically opportunistic movement.

 

 

When asked if he saw the emergence of Hamas as revealing contradictions inherent in Fateh and other movements, Hamameh replied that it was not contradiction but merely an indication that there are differences of perspective.

 

I don't want to call them contradictions - they may be differences in perspective or differences in the understanding of the Arab - Israeli conflict. The way I understand it as a Muslim is that it is ideological, cultural - some might see it as a historical conflict, others as a power struggle so let us not call it an  uncovering of contradictions but of perspectives. [49]

 

This is somewhat moderate and pragmatic response considering that counter-allegations of promoting disunity among the Palestinian people were made by Hamas against Fateh. Jamil Hamameh blamed Fateh entirely for all the clashes and inner fighting that took place at that time and emphasised that nothing could justify "what Fateh did."

 

I can find no justification for what happened and for what Fateh did, regardless of whether or not these elements were officially affiliated with Fateh or mavericks acting independently. What is painful is that it happened at all, no matter how many reasons there were for or behind these events there can be no justification for inner fighting between the sons of one people who are facing the same dangers and feeling the same pains. They have one common enemy, what happens to any one, affects all, and nothing will justify inner fighting. No justification can be respected or believed, nor should be respected or believed by any rational person. [50]

 

When asked about the reaction of other political factions to the birth of Hamas, Jamil Hamameh said that it had come as a great shock to them. He went on to criticize the factions for their attitude to Hamas saying that they had "accused the movement of having no concern with the Palestinian problem and that it was a movement of dervishes whose sole interest is fasting and praying."  However, he went on to illustrate his understanding of this attitude by saying that:

 

I do not blame anyone whose ignorance of the nature of Islam and the nature of the Islamic movement and the stages of socialization it undergoes and the way it raises it sons. Of course it was natural that the formation and establishment of Hamas would come as a shock to the Palestinian factions in the arena. Whether they be left or right leaning. [51]

 

Although seeming to find a justification for the factions attitude in a way he did not do for Fateh, he subtly damns the factions for their "ignorance" and therefore, for their irreligiousity, at the same time.

 

When asked about the relationship between Hamas and other Islamic movements, Hamameh neither confirmed or denied that there was co-ordination between them:

 

As far as I know, and this is not necessarily 100% accurate, Hamas tries to respect all Islamic trends and movements. I do not know if there is co-ordination but Hamas has declared its position in its covenant. [52]

 

Hamas increasingly mounted its own operations entirely independently of the PLO. It began to call strikes on days other than those designated by the PLO and took violent measures to ensure that these strikes were observed. Hamas became particularly hostile following the Algiers Declaration in 1988 which advocated political settlement and began increasingly to attack PLO policy as a betrayal of its own principles. Even prior to the declaration of Algiers, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin spoke out publicly in the media and even on Israeli television against the PLO's vision of a secular Palestinian state. [53]

 

This antagonistic relationship continued as Fateh struggled to maintain its support and decry the actions of Hamas as breaking ranks and diluting the overall strength of Palestinian nationalism. Hamas retaliated by insisting that the PLO was not representative. In 1992 elections at the chambers of commerce in Nablus and Qalqilya, Fateh issued small Korans as a reminder that their nationalism was not entirely devoid of religious sensibilities. As a rejoinder to this and to the increased use of Islamic slogans by Fateh, Hamas activists in Gaza then began to use graffiti to spread the message, "Hamas is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,"which was the long-standing slogan of the PLO itself. [54]

 

           Hamas's open competition with the PLO grew more intense leading Arafat in October 1992 to compare the movement with the separatist Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa which has very much complicated the work of the ANC. Arafat went as far as threatening to fight against Hamas militarily. [55] Arafat's stern warnings may have been provoked by the confrontations between hundreds of Hamas and Fateh supporters in July 1992 in the Gaza Strip. These clashes during which knives and firearms were used leaving three dead and many more injured, were the product of each faction's attempt to assert itself and demonstrate its dominance in Palestinian political life. [56]

 

The expulsion of over 400 Hamas members to Southern Lebanon in late 1992, created several obstacles to the PLO's political line. Any policy measure the PLO undertook had to be sensitive to the plight of the expellees. The PLO involvement in the peace process through the Palestinian delegation was hampered, since on more than one occasion the participants in the peace talks found themselves compelled to announce their readiness to terminate their involvement in the negotiating process unless the expellees were returned. Even when the expellees declared their willingness to return on a phased basis during the summer of 1993, the PLO position was further complicated. With the talks leading nowhere and the PLO suffering serious economic, institutional and administrative hardships, the popularity of the PLO was perhaps at the lowest point in its history. Its problems were very much due to its stand during the Gulf War which had offended a large number of those who were supplying financial support which they subsequently withdrew. During that period the PLO was in such financial difficulties it could not pay families of the martyrs and/or any of its supporters.  This, combined with the events surrounding the deportation, gave Hamas unprecedented standing. Many of those who used to get money from the PLO now turned to Hamas for financial support. The decision by the expellees to accept return on a phased basis gave a glimmer of hope to the Palestinian delegation since their participation in the talks was so often hampered by the expulsion issue. However, the difficulty of facing the expellees whom they had promised not to rejoin the talks until their release was considerably eased due to the unexpected breakthroughs in secret bilateral Israeli‑PLO negotiations in late summer 1993. [57]

For some time, one could expect the PLO popularity to increase owing to the atmosphere created as a result of the peace talks. However, Hamas, which considers the autonomy scheme as a betrayal of Islamic principles, is more likely to continue opposing and/or fighting against the peace process. In all likelihood Hamas will continue to compete with the PLO even if it means sitting at the negotiating table at some time. The least that Hamas can be expected to do is to influence Palestinian public opinion by alerting it to the "dangers" of the current political process. Undoubtedly, Hamas members will attempt to translate the sympathy gained as a result of the expulsions into lasting political power. [58]

 

While on Marj al Zuhour the expellees were provided with support, supplies, and an endless stream of visitors from every political grouping in Palestinian society. The contribution of the PLO, however, did not make much of an impression on them:

 

We observed all the honorable people from within and without the PLO, the Arab peoples who leapt to our aid. Walid Junblatt, [Socialist and Druze leader in Lebanon] sent bread and other necessities to us in the beginning. Supporters of Ahmad Jibril [Head of the PFLP general Command] provided us with much in terms of shelter, clothing and funds. Others, PFLP, Hizbullah, the Revolutionary Guard - everyone provided for us and empathized with us. Our brothers in Fateh, Abu Omar's [Arafat's] Fateh, I'm sure provided us with what they could but the least giving were our brothers in the Fateh organization. They provided something but very little. It was a lot less than we had expected. [59]

The actual experience of this expulsion added further fuel to Hamas's criticism of the mainstream or at least of secular trends. Comparing the behavior of the group deported on this particular occasion to groups from the mainstream expelled previously, Sheikh Hamad Bitawi had this to say:

 

They [secular expellees] saw comforts in their deportation and used it as path to enjoyment. They entrenched themselves in hotels while we entrench ourselves in trenches. They endured the struggle from hotels while we endure from trenches. Faced with the choice of comfort and hardship we chose hardship and stayed on the barren land to remain a thorn in the throat of Israel and to remain at the gates of our beloved homeland. Such hardship did not deter us as it deterred them. [60]

 

Bitawi goes on to stress that the deportation far from breaking Hamas actually made it stronger:

 

There is no doubt that this deportation had very positive effects on our Palestinian people...people started to have hope, our determination paid off. Imagine if we had succumbed to circumstances and roamed around the world leaving the deportation site in no mans land - our problem would have roamed with us as well and our `question' would have vanished. [61]

 

The PLO position on negotiations following the deportation was viewed extremely negatively by the expellees. As one of them stated on his return:

 

We valued the step by our brothers in the PLO, to suspend the talks and one of the reasons was no doubt that we had not returned, but after taking this step they betrayed us. In the beginning their deed can be remembered and therefore thanked but after this they left us hanging. They betrayed us. [62]

 

In April 1993, the expellees' spokesman, Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi reprimanded members of the Palestinian delegation when they returned to the negotiating table, calling them "traitors" who should not escape the punishment of the people. To Rantisi, these delegates were not elected by the people and as such "they represent no one but themselves." To him, this makes "the whole [peace] process illegitimate and illegal."

While issuing his threatening statements, Rantisi kept the door open for Hamas's further political involvement by making statements in defence of the PLO:

 

The PLO is a national Palestinian achievement. It's true that the leadership has made mistakes and should return to the right path. This is what is needed to save the PLO. We need a comprehensive national dialogue in which all the factions and forces will participate from inside the territories and outside. The structure and shape of the PLO should be redefined on a democratic basis, to be achieved by electing a national Palestinian Parliament. [63]

 

However, although Hamas has expressed the intent to participate in municipal elections and will continue to participate in local student councils, chambers of commerce and other union oriented elections, it has ruled out the possibility of involvement in elections for the self‑rule council. Despite this assertion several Hamas members applied for admission to the newly‑formed Palestinian police force to ensure that they would not be completely isolated from the scene once the action began. [64]

 

Given the unease of the relationship between Hamas and the PLO, one other major worry that needs to be addressed is the possibility of the outbreak of full scale hostility between the two parties or in others words, the possibility of a Palestinian civil war. This may very much depend on the position Hamas decides to take in the future vis-a-vis elections for the autonomy council but it cannot be ruled out. Jamil Hamameh, when questioned on this matter, stated the following:

 

Hamas has declared that it will strongly oppose inner fighting although this does not mean that this opposition will not defend its rights. As Palestinians we reject inner fighting among our people but I believe the Palestinian people and the various political factions will not be at a loss when it comes to resisting the acquiescence that is now taking place. [65]

 

He was stronger in his invocation of non-violence when asked how Hamas would react were there to be restrictions placed upon it by a national authority  established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:

 

I don't want to get ahead of events but the movement [Hamas] will not resort to violence and bloodshed in its resistance to a solution or authority that will came as an alternative to occupation. We as Palestinians will respect the struggles of our people and will continue to consider that the central enemy is the Jewish state and not the sons of our own people. [66]

 

The subject of a civil war was more openly raised during a discussion between Sheikh Hamad Bitawi and the Military Governor of Nablus who summoned the former for an interrogation session after his return from Marj al-Zuhour. The Military Governor suggested to Bitawi that there would be inner fighting among Palestinians and Bitawi replied:

 

We are not going to fight, the PLO and the Islamic movement are the sons of one people, one homeland, one religion and one family. [67]

 

Stressing that Hamas was a legitimate opposition, Bitawi continued by asking the Military Governor:

 

Don't you have an opposition? I saw 50,000 from the Likud and others demonstrating [against the accord] in Jerusalem....we are the same. Do you think that the Palestinian people are a savage people? An uncultured people? We are not a savage people, we are not an uncultured people. If we oppose, then our opposition will be positive....I will announce and so will all the rational ones in the country, that the party responsible for fighting is the Israeli government which wants to feed the trouble...one more time I am saying to you, and you can tell this to [Prime Minister] Rabin and [Foreign Minister] Peres - we will not fight. [68]

 

The assertions made by both Hamameh and Bitawi need to be evaluated in the overall context of Hamas relations with other Palestinian factions on the one hand and against the backdrop of Hamas discourse and performance on the other. While both confirm that they will not opt for inner fighting to resolve their disagreements with other groups, Rantisi nonetheless, in commentary on the stand taken by the PLO over the deportation issue called them "traitors who should not escape the punishment of the people".

 

The way in which the deportation was perceived and handled by various Palestinian groups seems to have created a great degree of division in Palestinian political attitudes. While sharply criticizing the PLO for its stand, Hamas used the deportation to reflect its own broad political orientation based on flexibility and pragmatism. It was not adverse to publicizing the deepening of the rift between it and the PLO particularly when the rhetoric of suspending the talks until all those deported were returned had proved to be just that.

 

Hamas, however, capitalised on its initial refusal and subsequent acceptance of the principle of phased return to generate further popular support. Providing a rationale for the apparent flexibility of Hamas policy Bitawi said:

 

Some asked us - why did you refuse to have a group of 100 deportees returned before the 2 year period while now you accept this? The answer was that there had been changes, firstly, when the names were first announced, there was no formal decision, we did not receive any official word from the Israelis saying that this was just the first group. However when they sent names and said some on the seventeenth of September and some on the seventeenth of December - the ceiling was known, the information was clear.

There is another thing, some of our people were getting sick and needed surgery or medical treatment. Another thing is that it had been important to people in Palestine in charge of institutions, that we remain here [on Marj al-Zuhour] but there were indeed changes in those circumstances too. Therefore we had to be flexible and could not be rigid giving the changing circumstances. [69]

 

It is this calculated flexibility that enables Hamas to accommodate various changes without necessarily losing its support or esteem. This flexibility will be the subject of further discussion at a later point.

 


Israel

The relationship between Hamas and Israel has undergone a radical change since the movement first began. Before the intifada Hamas busied itself with political and grass-roots activities centered mainly in universities and mosques and designed to offer alternative ideas to the predominance of secularism and nationalism offered by the PLO. Resistance to the Israeli occupation was a small part of their program at that time and they were not involved in armed resistance. Consequently, it functioned without interference from the Israeli authorities and was able to build a strong organizational structure with considerable influence among the people with whom it worked. [70] As one interviewee pointed out:

 

An observer of events at the beginning of the intifada when Hamas was launched would note that the occupation authorities did not chase or punish them. The focus of the occupation authorities was on the Islamic Jihad therefore, Hamas members were free to move around. [71]

 

As a result of this, the actual "intifada launch" of active military resistance is claimed by one leading Hamas member to have been completely unexpected by Israel:

 

Even the intelligence apparatus was shocked. It is a well known fact that the intelligence services usually monitor and gather information about all movement in Palestinian society but even they were left wondering what had happened. [72]

 

One school of thought that tries to analyze the dynamics behind the establishment of Hamas suggests that it is not unlikely that the Israeli Occupation was interested in making the establishment of a balancing force possible:

 

Some political analysts say that it is possible that the Israeli authorities tried to promote an equilibrium [in the Palestinian political structure] by finding a force to balance the PLO and effectively to weaken the PLO. The objective was to do away with the slogan, "The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The goal of the authorities [Israel] did not spring out of love for Hamas or love for Islam, it was, their desire, as a tactical move to establish a sort of [political] balance. [73]

 

If this analysis is to be pursued to its logical conclusion one can suggest that the Israeli occupation calculated that a most effective way to get out of that critical phase, the launching of the intifada, was to busy Palestinian society with itself by internalizing the conflict between Palestinians.

 

Another point often rumored is that Israel made the rise of Hamas possible by supplying finances to areas that would have encouraged its growth. A suggestion of this was made in 1986 by General Segev who was the former military governor of the Gaza Strip:

 

We extend some financial aid to Islamic groups via mosques and religious schools in order to help create a force that would stand against the leftist forces which support the PLO. [74]

 

Although no hard evidence supporting the claim of direct assistance to Hamas itself is available, Israel can certainly be said to have contributed to the possibilities for Hamas to receive funding. Their efforts were directed at impeding the flow of funds to the PLO and due to their acceptance of Hamas activities during the first phase of the intifada they did not take measures to obstruct channels through which Hamas received its financial support thus indirectly aiding the movement.

 

On the regional level Israel sought to bring about a certain fragmentation in the Muslim world as a whole going as far as playing a role in the arms for hostages exchanges of the US Iran-Contra affair in which it facilitated the supply of arms to Khomeini's Iran. [75]

 

Despite publication of the Hamas Covenant in 1988 which called for the nullification of Israel by Islam, the relationship between Israel and Hamas was not to change until May 1989 when Israel, recognizing that Hamas was becoming a threat, arrested a large number of Hamas activists, among them the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. The movement was declared illegal by the Israeli authorities in September 1989. [76]

Since then Israel has maintained its policy of imprisonment and expulsion for those involved with Hamas particularly at the leadership level. The culmination of this policy came in December 1992 with the mass expulsion of 415 suspected members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood. Among these were apparently not only most of the leaders of the movement but also second and third ranking officials and activists which seemed to leave the movement in the territories leaderless. [77] The speed at which the expulsion took place although a shock to many was inevitable for as one interviewee pointed out:

 

At the time when Hamas started to become a threat to Israel's real security the authorities were compelled to hit with its well known fist by deporting 400 of their members and leaders to Marj al Zuhour in South Lebanon. Its not a secret that the occupation authorities managed to arrest 400 Hamas members in 24 hours and no surprise because Hamas activists had been allowed to work publicly and were, therefore, already well exposed. [78]

 

In carrying out these expulsions Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin sought to paralyze the movement's main infrastructure by delivering it a strong retaliatory punishment for acts of violence it had committed. His attempt to "suffocate those in the `cellar' by "demolishing the `top floor'" [79] and so cripple the movement and lessen its support ironically had the opposite effect, particularly considering the fact that many of the deportees were not considered active or high ranking among the people within the territories themselves and to many the act was interpreted as no more than a show of strength by Israel. Among those deported were doctors, engineers judges university professors and officers of the Waqf and Zakat committees, one of whom observed:

 

The deportation was undoubtedly aimed to rid Palestine of its scientific talents... furthermore Israel and the West are worried by what they see as Islamic revivalism, they truly believe that among those deported were over 200 imams and that by this measure Islamic revivalism will die. Israel also wanted to absorb or curtail the Israeli anger following the killing of Toledano [80] but there is no relationship between the deportees and Toledano. [81]

 

The lack of justification for the deportation was also seen as part of a history of persecution:

 

Deportation is an ancient policy - the disbelievers and the unjust use it against the prophets and the followers of the prophet. [82]

 

The previous call for the obliteration of "The Jewish State" by Hamas was most certainly compounded by the deportation. Influenced by several psychological/motivational assumptions one leading Islamist who was among the deportees pointed out:

 

The Israeli state is not democratic, it is a state of injustice that commits this crime without investigation as to the responsibility of the accused, without trial before sentence and with harsh treatment. My house was besieged and I was taken, handcuffed, feet bound and blindfolded. Myself and the others were not given food or drink for over 40 hours and beating and cursing against my God was continuous. This was what worried us most, the physical pain of beating can be endured but the pain of having your beliefs and your God cursed by your abductors does not fade easily. [83]

 

Referring to the expulsion as "the crime" and giving the equation that deportation is equal to murder, the same deportee relayed a conversation he had with the Israeli Military Governor in Nablus, in which he had commented that the deportation would hurt the state of Israel. The Military Governor asked how this could be the case and was greeted with the following reply:

 

During the last 45 years you have managed to establish the facade of being a democratic state. This deportation has proved the opposite. You have deported us without trial and this has stripped the facade of Israel's democracy - there is no democracy - while we [the deportees] have given a portrait of the Palestinian people as an educated people, a civilized people and an understanding people. [84]

 

He gave a further example of the disadvantage to Israel by citing a comment from one of the visitors to the deportation site whose perception of the deportees integrity was concluded thus:

 

...were it not for the fact that you [deportees] were honest Israel would not have deported you. [85]

 

Criticism of Israel for it lack of justice and democratic processes is a recurrent theme and one which been raised by many people arrested from the beginning of the intifada until the present day. Although the above illustrates the outrage of being sentenced without trial others have attacked the whole Israeli process of trial and sentencing itself.

 

What goes on in an Israeli court and between Israeli lawyers is not necessarily what is recorded on the charge sheet. In my estimation there is no honest judicial system in Israel. The general mood or character of the judge is what determines the outcome - the nature of the interrogation and the sentence. The charges directed against me at the court were not the charges that led to my sentencing. [86]

 

Many of those deported had been imprisoned at other times in their lives but the two things bore no comparison according to one deportees:

 

The sheer fact of uprooting a person from his land, home, family and job and to throw him in a no-mans-land is the worst a human being can face. Imprisonment compared to deportation can be considered a picnic. [87]

 

Given the location of the deportation site the conditions were exacerbated by the ongoing battles between the Israeli army and Hizbullah.

 

In one battle, rockets and bombs were launched over our heads. The marches we organized would be shot at by Israeli soldiers and we used to pray the prayer of need because we did not know if we would return or not. Machine guns and bombs were used, not to scare but to kill and several of the deportees were wounded. [88]

 

The whole purpose of Israel in carrying out the deportation which was to undermine the Hamas movement most certainly backfired. Rather than cripple the movement it added to its strength and the deportees themselves noted that despite the period of deportation being the harshest and most painful in their lives it could also be considered the most pleasant. The wider intention of undermining the Islamic movement as a whole had entirely the opposite effect giving what was used by the deportees as an uninterrupted period of study.

 

When you gather 400 well educated, scientifically minded people in one place - imagine - due to the grace of Allah we hardly missed any group prayers. Living for 9-10 months with each prayer in a group we created a mosque from our tent big enough to accommodate 500 worshippers. Every day I would awake an hour before dawn to pray or meditate or remember Allah. Prayers would be led in rotation and every day after the dawn prayer there was a religious lesson and then a lesson to interpret the Koran. I was one who was in charge of the interpretation. Many deportees would attend and we would interpret entire verses. The degree of scholarship we attained during that period we had never reached in our university studies. Some deportees succeeded in memorizing one part, five parts or thirty parts of the Koran and at least three succeeded in committing to memory the whole of the holy book. [89]

 

The period of time spent on Marj al-Zuhour and the amount of aid and supplies that were forthcoming enabled the deportees to build a fully functioning "micro-cosmic Islamic society."

 

We organized committees, for example there was a fatwa (juridical) committee which discussed several matters like our conduct during Ramadan in which it was decided that we would eat together before dawn and after sunset. This provided very pleasant moments and there was so much spirituality in these moments that I cannot describe them. We organized a disciplined method of work responsibilities - bringing water, guard duty to protect against wild animals, cleaning etc. In all we created 15 committees one of which was a medical committee which treat the sick of neighboring villages as well as those in need of medical treatment among us. There was an engineering committee which was in charge of installing electricity and water once the weather improved in May/June and was in charge of constructing the mosque and laying out the tents. There was an educational committee and a cultural and religious committee. [90]

 

With the expulsion, the popularity of Hamas received a considerable boost and the wisdom of Israel in carrying out the expulsions was strongly challenged by international human rights groups and dissenting camps within Israel itself. Furthermore, coming at the stage of the peace process that it did further undermined the position of the PLO and popular support for the process.