| Introduction | Chapters: 1  2  3  4  5 | Conclusion | Epilogue |

 


Chapter Two

 

 

Growth of the Movement

 

Domestic Determinants

 

To say that the occupation has been largely responsible for the development of any phenomenon in Palestinian society has become a cliche. This belief has some merits, however, as far as the evolution of Islamic movements in the society are concerned, particularly the formation of Hamas at the critical juncture in Palestinian history that was the Intifada. The Muslim Brothers, as much as nationalist groups, tried to manipulate the consequences of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to their advantage in Palestinian society but the secularists undoubtedly enjoyed greater success in the first few years after occupation in 1967 than did the Islamists. That success seemed to have been short-lived, however, for while the secularists were publicly mobilizing Palestinian masses against the occupation in the 1970s, the religious groups, particularly the Brothers, were setting the necessary groundwork for their programs and activities for the 1980s. In the words of a widely respected religious notable and Palestinian national activist:

 

Since 1967 the Muslim Brotherhood movement had been leaning toward peaceful means and methods and their activities concentrated on the issuance of publications, educational meetings and the celebration of religious occasions. Their situation remained as such until the year 1967. Between 1967 and 1987, some discussion and debates took place between the Muslim brotherhood group and other resistance groups regarding resistance activities and concrete acts against the occupation. The response of the Muslim Brotherhood youth was that the time had not yet arrived for that. Concentration, therefore, was on the socialization of the youth in religious Islamic terms and in moral and educational terms. [20]

 

The Islamists therefore, worked quietly on organizing their ranks at university campuses and in other institutions where, during the 1970s, they established the solid foundations needed to penetrate Palestinian society. While the widespread popularity the secularists achieved in the 1970s did not help the Islamist cause, in the 1980s the trend gradually started to reverse. The tremendous decline in the PLO standing following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was accompanied by a gradual waning of the strength of secularist groups in the Occupied Territories. The increasing repression by Israeli authorities throughout the period preceding the intifada only helped weaken the secularists, in effect making it more possible for the religious groups to organize and further enhance their ability to spread their teachings. The worsening economic conditions in Palestinian society during that period also made the work of the religious groups easier. More people started turning to religion as a means of personal security. [21]

 

Even more instrumental in the formation of Hamas and the consolidation of its position in Palestinian society was the fact that the Israeli occupation in its attempt at the beginning of the Palestinian uprising to weaken the resolve of the secularist movement, had remained relatively quiet as far as the activities of Hamas were concerned. The occupation authorities acted on the premise that allowing Hamas to grow might lead to internalizing the conflict within Palestinian society, hence their relaxed attitude towards Hamas's role.

 

Indeed, Israeli strategy to weaken the secular forces by remaining somewhat silent on Hamas's activities bore fruit. Over the years, PLO institutions got weaker and weaker as did other secular forces in the Occupied Territories. The weaker the secularists got the stronger the Islamic movements, especially Hamas, became. Constant shifts in PLO positions also enabled Islamic movements to grow by capitalizing on what they called the `unprincipled representative of the Palestinian people'. Ironically, through its attempts at times to weaken the leftists on university campuses and in other unions, the mainstream movement in the PLO, Fatah, often entered into coalitions with the Islamists. This type of politicking, however, only assisted in the growth of such movements.

 

Any analysis of the domestic determinants shouldn't neglect the fact that the cultural orientation of Palestinian society in Islamic teachings provided the Islamists with a fertile ground from which to operate. The fact that most Palestinians are born Muslims made it easier for the Islamists, and henceforth, for Hamas to cultivate the benefits of such a social environment. Of course, cultural upbringing has its impact on the educational system of any society and in this regard, Islamic teachings become an integral part in the socialization process of many Palestinians.

 

The continuation of the intifada and the participation of a vast number of Palestinians in its activities helped resolve some disagreements within the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas's involvement in the Uprising provided it with a successful way out of the isolation in Palestinian society which had afflicted the Brotherhood in earlier years. When asked about the link between the intifada and Hamas, Jamil Hamameh replied:

 

After the intifada proliferated and had completed a great part of its journey and made a great many sacrifices and after Hamas had contributed to these sacrifices all were convinced that Hamas was an authentic and original movement. I say with tremendous pride and with all due respect to all political trends who participated in the intifada that I am utterly convinced that the Hamas movement was the new blood which gave magnitude to the intifada. Hamas was the dynamism for the activation of the intifada with Allah's help. [22]

 

When asked whether the Hamas movement had been formed before the beginning of the intifada and had been preparing for it or whether they were simply simultaneous developments, he replied:

 

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has had a program of preparation and guidance. The Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine is part of the international Islamic movement. It has many interests but its central preoccupation in Palestine is the Palestinian problem. The sons of the Islamic movement were undergoing a process of socialization and preparation and being brought up for the moment when they would have to exercise their legitimate rights over the soil of Palestine in resisting and ridding it of the occupier. We are not afraid to say that in spite of arrest and imprisonment we will not be deterred from resisting the occupation as much as our means permit. As I told you from the beginning, the Hamas movement was not an accidental event, not a marginal occurrence, not the result of a mere hour of work, spur of the moment result of a whim. It is an extension of roots buried deep in the belly of the earth and was always undergoing its preparation in universities, mosques, unions...all of this was the infrastructure of the Islamic resistance movement. [23]

 

As can be seen from the above the already existing structure of the Brotherhood organization was a tremendous asset to Hamas. Instead of expending much effort and considerable time on organizational matters, they found in the Brotherhood a convenient base, a benefit not enjoyed by other movements. In the same interview, in answer to a question about the particular determinants which assisted in the birth of Hamas, Hamameh said the following:

 

As I said, the Islamic Resistance Movement came naturally and a variety of factors helped facilitate this. These objective factors served as a preparation for the intifada. There are also factors accompanying the intifada - suppression practised by the occupation authorities, injustice and oppression and loss of hope and despair as far as the political solutions that were proposed were concerned. The beginning of the weakness of the PLO and the surrender and betrayal made by the leading forces within the PLO and their departure from Beirut - all of this caused profound frustration for the people in the Occupied Territories. There was a phase for preparation, for guidance and socialization of the sons of the Islamic movement and when the right time arrived there was the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] with its magnitude and strength, its existence in the arena, the evolution of its activities and its sound perspective all of which, I believe, were behind its formation. [24]

 

That the occupying power tolerated Hamas's activities until about May 1989 for the reasons discussed earlier, only made it easier for the new movement to solidify its standing both functionally and organizationally. It was in May of 1989 that the Israeli authorities began to arrest top leaders in Hamas such as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and it was only in September of the same year that they declared the movement to be illegal.

 

In the first two years of the intifada, in particular, Hamas also worked diligently on building its financial standing in the occupied territories from mosques and other religious and social institutions. In addition, they made good use of the weak organizational structure of the secularist movements, particularly Fateh, by offering their newly-joined members concrete incentives, financially and spiritually. The prevalent traditionalism and poverty, especially in the Gaza Strip, made it easier for Hamas to rally a sizeable number of Palestinians around its program. Those who were previously uninvolved began to see in Hamas an outlet for expressing their religious-political views. [25]

 

There are, however, particular determinants behind the popularization of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Firstly, Gazans generally tend to be more conservative and traditionalistic in their outlook on life. Secondly, socio-economic hardship tends to be greater in the Gaza Strip than in other Palestinian locations. Muslim activists confirm that the defeat in 1967 brought the movement to life and indeed from then until the present day the number of mosques has doubled. Among the world's most densely populated areas, Gaza is basically a city surrounded on all sides by sprawling refugee camps. 40% of the land area of the Gaza Strip has been seized by Israel and the unemployment rate, which has always been high, has increased even further since March 1993 when Israel effectively sealed off the Strip and in doing so, the livelihood of many Palestinians working as laborers in Israel.

 

Thirdly, Gaza is closer geographically to Egypt than any other Palestinian region and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt assigned a special status to Gaza as far as their activities were concerned, due to this geographic proximity. In the 1950s the Brotherhood made their presence in Gaza noticeable. After 1967, they used the defeat of the Arab nation in their attempt to transform Palestinian society, beginning with Gaza. Following the Iranian revolution, the Brotherhood made headway in Gaza through organizing and preaching and founded the Gaza branch of al-Azhar, the only functioning university in Gaza, as their base of operations. In the 1980s Muslim Brothers clashed with secularist groups, particularly leftists, on more than one occasion. The resulting violent and tense atmosphere helped the Brotherhood assert itself. In 1985, following the release of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, supporters were mobilized around his cause through the largest Islamic organization in Gaza, al-Mujamma, with a membership of over 2,000. Yassin publicly called for transforming the society to make it more in line with Islamic teachings. Before the intifada, the focus had been on reforming Palestinian society from within, in effect, by marginalizing secularist activities and presence. [26]

 

Also of particular relevance to the Gaza Strip was the noticeable increase in resistance activities by the Islamic Jihad movement in the late 1970s. Such activities, while directed at Israeli occupation forces, sent worrisome signals among Hamas's ranks when it was later formed. Those individuals who originally belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood felt that Islamic Jihad was pulling the rug from under their feet, since a group's popularity in Palestinian society, particularly then, was principally determined by the size and volume of resistance activities against the occupation.

 

When the intifada started, the Islamic Jihad movement were the first muntafideen [uprisers] in practical terms along with the Fateh movement. The Islamic Jihad movement contained few individuals but their work was strong, violent [powerful] and effective against the Israeli occupation. The Islamic Jihad was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood which split from the movement in Egypt and in Gaza. They had several reservations and criticisms of the Brotherhood leadership and their methods, thus they pursued a different path. Therefore, when the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood saw the Islamic Jihad movement performing this effective role they woke up and reacted by forming a new organization and called themselves the Islamic Resistance movement, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, the acronym of which is Hamas. [27]

 

 So the increased activities of Islamic Jihad most certainly made Muslim Brotherhood activists feel that they had to do something about the situation; the founding of Hamas was an effective way to achieve this objective. It is certainly no surprise that the movement was formed and launched in the Gaza Strip and it is indeed unlikely that any other location would have contributed even half as much to its success. However, when asked about the actual launch of the movement Jamil Hamameh would give no more than the following guarded comment:

 

The movement emerged in the Gaza Strip and was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, may Allah protect him and undo his troubles. The emergence and establishment of the movement was a sudden event, unexpected by anyone, therefore it caused shock and disbelief. I do not have the exact details of the formation in specific terms but know it was launched in Gaza and then moved to the West Bank where I had the honor to be selected to bridge the gap between Hamas and Fateh through the leaflets. Among the founders known are Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Abdul Aziz Ali Rantisi - this is all the information I have. [28]

 

Since this launch the popularity of the movement has obviously increased quite dramatically. Jamil Hamameh was asked to assess the reasons behind the distinct popularity which Hamas had acquired. His initial comment was the launch itself had come from the beliefs of the people rather than the leadership and that it was launched in an Islamic manner. He further said that:

 

The Hamas movement clarified for the Palestinian people the real nature of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The [military] operations by the sons of the movement then bore testimony to its effectiveness. [29]

 

When asked if the popularity was perhaps due to the waning of belief in the nationalist movement Hamameh replied:

 

The movement becoming great [mighty] was not affected by the strength/weakness of the other movements. This movement has become strong because of its originality. However, when people lose hope in an ideology they would tend to seek one that is better. [30]

 

Hamameh's view of the strength of Hamas is not shared by Sheikh Khalil al-Alami, [31] who although very critical of, and dissatisfied with PLO political maneuvers, views the formation and subsequent launching of Hamas with great skepticism. Hamas' role he suggested had been blown out of proportion by observers which has given a mistaken impression of its effectiveness.

 

The methods that Hamas used to promote itself were questioned and Hamameh was asked if Hamas had provided systematic services and activities or had undertaken any particular measures during the intifada to mobilize the population. He was further asked if there were particular institutions which facilitated this. Hamameh would not answer this question directly but instead gave a general answer incorporating all movements.

 

Every movement has its policy as much as it needs to enable it to achieve its goals. What is important is that the beliefs and the convictions of the people serve the movement. In my estimation all movements in the Palestinian arena would try to establish their own institutions and Hamas is no exception. I could not say which particular institutions are directed by those who would serve Hamas. [32]

 

Another factor adding to the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip came in the form of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 when many Palestinians forced out of the Gulf region ended up in the Gaza Strip. With them they brought back not only harsh memories, but also the lifestyle and exposure to Islamic thought they had acquired in the Gulf over many years. In them, Hamas found a rich environment for espousing its teachings and for increasing its base of support. Following the Gulf crisis were two other events which helped define Hamas as a political voice in opposition to the PLO. Firstly, the Palestine National Council's Algiers declaration in 1988 recognizing Israel as a state and placing it within its 1967 borders, which as far as Hamas was concerned was an act of treason against the Palestinian people as, "the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [holy trust] upon all Muslims generations till the day of Resurrection." Secondly, the PLO's acceptance of the Baker Peace Plan was seen by Hamas as another departure from the Palestinian people's birthright as it was built on the premise of autonomy and not liberation and retrieval. Added to the Hamas criticism of these two events, which tapped a strong vein of common sentiment among the people, is the fact that Israel chose this time to arrest hundreds of Hamas supporters and sentence Ahmad Yassin to life imprisonment. [33]

 

The Gulf War itself was instrumental in the further political development of the Hamas movement in several ways as were many other regional events which both preceded it and came about as a result of the crisis. These regional factors will now be discussed.


Regional Determinants

 

The political, social and economic atmosphere in the Arab region following World War II was fertile ground for extremist tendencies. The Arab defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was viewed by Islamic movements as a natural result of the society's discarding of religion in its political life. The popularization of Nasserism in Egypt in the 1950s and Nasser's concerted crackdown on the Muslim Brothers led many Islamists to conclude that his proclaimed attempt at bringing modernization to Egypt in particular, and to the Arab region in general, was no more than a veiled effort to introduce westernization and/or socialism, both of which were considered contributors to the spread of corruption.

 

The catalyst for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood was the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. To the Muslim Brothers, that fiasco was inevitable given the wide gap between society and Islam and given the leaders' inability to mobilize the people on bases other than Islamic teachings. Of particular importance to the Brothers was the demise of Nasser's role as a result of the war, especially after he had captured the hearts and minds of the people with his slogans. His poor planning and unpreparedness could not have been avoided, they argued, since his guiding principles were not Islamic. [34]

 

Following the '67 war the technological gap between the Arab World and the West widened. In some parts of the Arab region, many people were stricken with poverty. This, combined with the absence of political measures to protect the civil liberties of the Arab citizen, led many Arabs to turn to Islam as a refuge. The greater the state of political and economic despair in the Arab World, the more likely it was for a social shift towards religion. Certainly the main beneficiary was the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Being the oldest and most organized religious structure, it was relatively easy for it to appeal to Arab public opinion through its teachings.

 

The death of Nasser, the fear of a return of Nasserism and the release of many Muslim Brothers from Egyptian prisons by the new leadership gave a tremendous boost to the Movement. Those released influenced students at university campus's with their teachings, including many Palestinians studying in Egypt. Certainly, Palestinian students graduating from Egyptian universities transmitted the teachings they had acquired to Palestinian society, in effect serving as the leaders of various Islamic movements. [35]

 

The Arab region also affected the growth of Muslim movements in Palestinian society in several other ways. Palestinians working in the conservative Gulf countries undoubtedly were influenced by the religious lifestyle dominant in those countries. They too carried what they had learned to Palestinian society, either during annual visits or upon permanent return. Governments of some Gulf countries played a pivotal role in supporting the growth of Islamic movements in Palestinian society, including the growth of Hamas, through their financial assistance to the Islamic Waqf or through the Zakat (charitable fund) committee for the purpose of establishing and/or preserving mosques. [36]

 

Another factor contributing to the strength of Islamic movements in Palestinian society was the success of the Iranian Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini against the Shah in 1979. The removal of the Shah from power in spite of Western support for his regime, combined with the institution of Islamic law in Iran, boosted the morale of Islamist groups and gave them a strong impetus to replicate the Iranian experience. Furthermore it has since become an Iranian cliche that Israel's success is due to the fact that it is a religious state and Arab defeat is therefore because they are insufficiently devoted to Islam. This argument is now used by Hamas against the secularism of the PLO. [37]

 

In Southern Lebanon, as Islamic resistance fighters carried out attacks against Israeli forces, Islamic movements in Palestinian society capitalized on such acts to enhance their popularity and to further widen the scope of their mission.

 

The impact of the region on the growth of Hamas in Palestinian society can also be seen in the Jordanian regime's attempt to keep its influence in the area through its support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan's control of the Islamic Waqf institutions and the consequent funds necessary for its operations certainly helped to enhance the Islamic trend.

 

The Gulf War gave a tremendous boost to the fortunes of Hamas which was very careful about its stance at the time. They took great care with their pronouncements in an effort to remain in favor with all countries that were important to their finances and support. Kuwait was a country that had good ties with Hamas and it was therefore very much in Hamas's interests to criticize Iraq for the takeover. This they did, but in subtle pronouncements which they ensured were overshadowed by their criticism of Western, namely US, intervention. The criticism of Iraq satisfied the Gulf governments while criticism of the US who, after all was the "real" enemy satisfied the demands of their own public and of the Iranian regime. This ensured that they maintained close contact with their supporters and funders in both the Gulf and Iran. This stance was very different from that taken by the PLO which expressed support of the takeover of Kuwait and support for the regime of Saddam Hussein. This worked even further in Hamas's favor as the Gulf countries began to see Hamas as an alternative force to the PLO in the region. The consequence of this was the realization that to weaken the PLO one must strengthen Hamas and following the Gulf war much of the funding which had been earmarked for the PLO was then transferred to the coffers of Hamas.

 

The loss of faith in Arab nationalism generally after '67 and the death of Nasser was compounded by the Gulf War. Iraq's ill-fated attempt to assert Arab Nationalist dominance and Arafat's ill-fated decision to support it did Arab nationalism generally, but in Palestinian society in particular, no favors whatsoever. Indeed, the PLO stance in the Gulf and Iraq's consequent defeat came to be seen by many Palestinians as symptomatic of the inability of the whole nationalist ethos to truly address any of their grievances.

 

In light of the above, it is obvious that several circumstantial, cultural and regional factors were brought to bear upon the evolution of Hamas. The movement worked diligently to capitalise on regional events and to reap the fruit of several developments, particularly conflicts. The fact that Hamas was in its infancy, did not sway it from widening its base and attracting supporters. Without a regional context which would make its local presence and effectiveness possible, Hamas would, with all certainty, have had greater difficulties. International events also assisted the movement as the ensuing pages will demonstrate.

 

 


International Determinants

 

The gradual collapse of the Socialist bloc in the mid - to late 1980s provided Islamic movements in general, and those in Palestinian society in particular, with a strong weapon in their march towards public recognition. The death of Communism not only meant the removal of the Soviet empire from the political map of the world, but was also interpreted by Islamists as signifying an exclusive viability of Islam as way of life. To them the Soviet Union was dissolved not because of a countervailing military power but because of its disavowal of Islam as the only "correct" way of life. [38] Before the mid-1980s the main power struggle was seen as that between communism and capitalism or Soviet Union and United States. The attention of the media and therefore the public generally was devoted to the configuration of power exemplified by the cold war. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States never came into direct confrontation, the closest being in the 1960s with the Cuban missile crisis, there are various examples where they fought through "client regimes".

 

            In Afghanistan the power that eventually forced the Soviet Union out, and in a military manner, was the Islamist movement. Although the mujaheddiin, were not weapons manufacturers and their military action against the Soviet Union was heavily reliant on the United States for its equipment, the perception of this action and the power struggle involved that forced the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was that it had been entirely a victory for the mujaheddiin, vanguards of Islam, and, therefore, Islam itself. The United States could not defeat the Soviets directly but under the rubric of the Islamic movement which it supplied, its national interest was served. Islam therefore came to be seen as an effective tool for bringing change.

 

The  eventual Soviet withdrawal was therefore perceived as a great triumph for Islam and a sign of its potential, especially given the sheer size and might of the Soviet Union at the time. This served as an incredibly strong mobilizing impetus to other Islamic movements such as Hamas. The former government of Najibullah Khan had to ensure close links with its religious leadership in order to maintain and broaden its support. [39]

 

Since the Soviet Union has collapsed the Islamic movement has, almost by default, become more of a threat to the United States than the former Soviet Union. This perception and the psychological boost it gives to the Hamas movement cannot be underestimated.

 

As the Soviet Union was dissolving there was another power at work which would serve as a challenge to Western power: Iraq. In attempting to assert the vitality of Arab nationalism, Iraq took over Kuwait in August 1990. With the sanction of the Soviet Union via the UN security council the United States and the USSR were effectively united against a third party for the first time. The failure of Saddam Hussein's enterprise was interpreted by Hamas as a defeat for nationalism, leaving Palestine with Islam (and Hamas) as the only alternative.

 

Islamists generally do not differ too much between East and West insofar as the attitude of both to Islam is unfavorable. They consider there to be an inherent enmity between Islam and the way of life it entails and both the Western and Eastern ways of life, capitalism as is and Communism as was. The belief that the victory of the mujaheddiin in Afghanistan was a sign that if Islam can defeat one of these powers, there is no reason why it cannot defeat the other, undoubtedly gave a huge boost to the ability of Hamas to rally the Palestinian people around its cause. The collapse of the Soviet Union was taken as the collapse and diminution if not disappearance of the credibility of Marxism, leaving a huge vacuum in the political influence of the leftist groups in Palestinian society. Hamas capitalized on this vacuum, being able not only to cite the victory of Islam against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but also to belittle the beliefs of the secular Palestinian left for adhering to what had become an ideology without credibility. This dual attack deeply affected the support of the secular left trend in Palestinian society which became even less able to meet the demands of the Palestinian people and Hamas took the stage like a long awaited Messiah.

 

Other international influences on or inspirations for Islamic movements are obviously Iran's Islamic revolution and subsequent financial support for Hamas, particularly after the start of the intifada. Other sources of material support for Hamas are various, notably, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Sudan and Algeria. The subtle stand taken by Hamas over the Gulf crisis resulted in increased support from the Gulf and Iranian contributions also increased as did their provision of military training. [40]

 

An indirect consequence of any successful Islamic movement, and this was particularly the case following Afghanistan, is an increased incentive to give funds to other movements. Donations from individuals are received through Islamic organizations, and Hamas has been a direct beneficiary of the Afghan success. "Muslims throughout the world, including in Europe and the United States are now offering support to the mujaheddiin of Palestine." [41]

 

The sudden focus on Islam of the world media has been criticized as no more than the West finding a new enemy now that communism has surrendered. [42] The portrayal of Islamic trends or actions throughout the world though generally negative have nevertheless resulted in high international visibility which serves the aims of movements like Hamas. An event such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center can be seen as a success on the international stage as far as showing power is concerned and is a reminder not only of the seriousness with which Islamic movements demand to be taken but also of their increasing international spread. Such an incident dispels any notion that may have been held that they are localized and do not come close enough to the West to seriously affect its societies.

 

Based on the above it can be seen that Hamas has capitalized on events in several parts of the world, it has tried to benefit from triumphs and losses. The influences brought to bear upon it are too many to enumerate here, in every corner of the globe, however, one incident here and another there, helped shape the meaning of the movement, the definition of its goals and the articulation of its message. Even where Hamas played no role it did not shy away from attempting to claim partnership and/or responsibility and further used events to emphasize the universality of the Islamic mission.

| Introduction | Chapters: 1  2  3  4  5 | Conclusion | Epilogue |





[20] Interview conducted by the author on October 4th 1993, with a widely respected religious notable and national activist and one of the most highly respected imams at al-Aqsa mosque who asked to remain anonymous.

[21] Rekhess. Elie, "The Iranian impact on the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip." The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 1988. pp 4.

[22] Jamil Hamameh interview. (See Historico-Political background, footnote 7.)

[23] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[24] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[25] Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967." p. 7-11. News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992.

[26] Rekhess. Elie, Op. cit. p. 5.

[27] Interview conducted by the author on October 4th 1993, with a widely respected religious notable and national activist and one of the most highly respected imams at al-Aqsa mosque who asked to remain anonymous.

[28] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[29] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[30] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[31] Sheikh Khalil al-Alami, an imam at the al-Aqsa mosque, was interviewed at his office in Jerusalem in September 1993.

[32] Jamil Hamameh interview.

[33] Usher. Graham, "The rise of political Islam in the Occupied Territories." Middle East International. No. 453 - 25 June 1993. p 20.

[34] Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967." News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992. pp 7. (See also Rekhess. Elie, "The Iranian impact on the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip." Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University. Jan. 1988.)

[35] Jaradat. Muhammed, Ibid  pp 7.

[36] See Shadid. Mohammed K. "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza." Third World Quarterly. Vol. 10. No. 2.  April 1988. pp 667.

[37] Salame. Ghassan, "Islam and the West." Foreign Policy. No. 90 - Spring 1993. pp 29.

[38] Jaradat. Muhammed, "Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the territories occupied in 1967." p. 7-11. News From Within. Vol. VIII - No. 8. August 5th 1992.

[39] Abu-Amr. Ziad, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background." Journal of Palestine Studies. Volume XXII. Number 4. Summer 1993. pp 16-17.

[40] Ramati. Yohanan, "Islamic Fundamentalism Gaining." Midstream-A Monthly Jewish Review. Vol. 39 - No. 2 - 1993 pp 3.

[41] Abu-Amr. Ziad, Op cit. pp 17.

[42] Salame. Ghassan, "Islam and the West." Foreign Policy. No. 90 - Spring 1993. pp 23.