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The
Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and Effects
Israel Confronted with the Palestinian Option This
paper represents the free expression of its author and does not necessarily
represent the judgement or opinions of PASSIA.
The presentation of these articles, originally intended as lectures
to be delivered on August 20, 1988, was banned by the authorities when
all academic and cultural meetings in East Jerusalem were forbidden
to take place. Copyright (c) PASSIA First Edition - September 1988 Second Edition - September 1995 The
Jordanian Disengagement: Causes and Effects
During
the second half of the month of Ramadan (May) 1988, King Hussein
held a series of open, popular meetings with professionals, trade
union leaders and tribesman with the aim of preparing a decisive
political move. In his public speeches, the king raised the issue
of Jordanian-Palestinian unity, and reminded his audiences of the
text of the unity accords, which state that it is a "restricted
unity," according to the Jordanian Parliament's resolution of
April 14, 1950. That resolution holds that the unity "must not
undermine a final settlement of the Palestinian cause within the
framework of Palestinian national aspirations, Arab cooperation and
international legitimacy," and that it is a "temporary
and conditional unity" in accordance with the decision of the
Arab League's council of June 12, 1950. The decision stated that
the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan declares that the annexation
of the Palestinian section to it has been necessitated by practical
needs and that Jordan will keep this territory in (custody) until
the day when it is included in a final settlement when the rest of
Palestine is liberated. Jordan will accept whatever the rest of the
Arab League states decide regarding it." The
union is, therefore, according to the King speeches and according
to the two above-mentioned resolutions, a restricted unity until
a solution to the Palestinian problem is found, or until the Palestinian
people are able to exercise their right to self-determination. It
is a restricted unity in the sense that it cannot hamper a final
settlement, and it is a temporary and not a permanent unity where "(Jordan)
would keep this territory under its custody." In
his Ramadan meetings, King Hussein recalled that he head proposed
back in March 1972 a plan to "reshape the Jordanian-Palestinian
house" in an arrangement that would include every Palestinian
all over the world in what was later known as the "United Arab
Kingdom Plan". The Palestinians in Jordan and outside, along
with the Arab countries, however, rejected that plan. At the Rabat
Summit in 1974, the Arab states, in the presence of and with the
agreement of Jordan, confirmed the Palestinian people's right to
self-determination without any outside intervention, including the
right to independence and national sovereignty under the leadership
of its sole legitimate representative the Palestine Liberation Organization.
This was also endorsed by international will in the United Nations
in November 1974 by two resolutions asserting the spirit and text
of the Rabat resolutions. All
this, according to Jordan's readings, and as outlined by the preliminary
speeches for disengagement, meant that the cards of the conditional,
restricted, and temporary unity must be returned to their owners
in compliance with Palestinian, Arab, and international demands.
Early
in August 1988, the Jordanian government, acting on directions from
King Hussein, took a series of measures which were later identified
as "severing legal, administrative, and financial links with
the West Bank. These included cancellation of the Jordanian Development
Plan for the West Bank, replacing the Ministry of the Occupied Lands
Affairs with a political department within the foreign ministry,
and terminating the services of approximately 21,000 civil servants
and employees, while "temporarily excluding" the Islamic Waqf (administration)
department and the Islamic courts from these measures. Some members
of the Jordanian Parliament's Upper House were also dismissed, and
finally, Jordanian citizenship was withdrawn from West Bank and Gaza
Strip residents. Their Jordanian passports were to become identification
documents only, while the issuing of new passports or renewing of
expired ones for West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians were suspended. According
to the advisors and advocates of the disengagement, it is a historic,
strategic, and political coup d'etat that
will not be repealed, and one that came after through discussion
and objective analysis of the political formulae in the area. They
also argue that the timing of the decision is a result of an intelligent
and daring reading of the prospects for a more dangerous future.
Jordan directly interned when it did to force the disengagement on
all parties in the political equation, not only to assure recognition
of the disengagement but also to force them to deal with it according
to its principles and rules.
Jordan's
interaction with the "national Intifada" is
not a new, coincidental, or temporary matter. "Public opinion
in Palestine and Transjordan are the same," wrote
Prince Abdullah to Sir Arthur Wauchope on
August 10, 1936 during the Palestinian revolt, warning of its impact.
He added, "I am fully alert to the continuation of peace and
stability in Transjordan to prevent the
possible explosion which I feel might occur so long as the calamity
in Palestine continues ..." Prince
Abdullah also disclosed the effects of the revolt at the time, saying, "...
only God Knows the difficulties I have to
bear for the sake of peace and stability in Transjordan,
while the cries for help from Palestine shatter the hearing of the
nation every day. The provocation letters fly out of Palestine and
enthusiastic nationalists make serious efforts to move sectarian
and racist feelings." The "Palestinian Intifada" came
to revive political schools of thought in Jordan, and to restore
them as they were back in the 1930's. Three Jordanian schools of
thought revived their ideologies and roles, and voices began exerting "pressure" towards
talking "some kind of political decision."
FIRST
SCHOOL: This was and still is the school of Arab unity. It aimed
as it still does for equality, liberty, and democracy as the basis
to formulate unity. Some of its advocates in Transjordan were Shafiq Irshaidat, Abd al-Halim al-Nimer, and Suleiman al-Nabulsi.
In Palestine, its advocates were Abdallah Rashid Amro, Abdallah Na'was, Abdallah al-Rimawi, and Kamal Nasser. Today,
this school comprises professional unions, university faculties,
and some notables including Hamad al-Farhan,
Muhammad Odeh al-Qur'an,
Suleiman al-Hadidi, and Najib Irshaidat,
as well as the Palestinian personalities Ibrahim Bakr, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyeh,
and Abd al-Majid Shouman. This
school's influence on the Jordanian monarch, however, is very limited,
and its role on the political scene fragmented; thus this school
remains captive to "romantic pan-Arabism". SECOND
SCHOOL: This was and still is the "Jordanization of
the state." It involves ridding government offices of Palestinians,
as well as removing the Palestinian Question from the country's foreign
and domestic priorities. In
the past, this school had its own advocates: Sheikh Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti in the 1950's, Hazza' al-Majali in the 1960's, Wasfi al-Tall in the 1970's, and Dr. Khalil al-Salem
in the 1980's. Today, the advocates of this school are Dr. Abd al-Salam al-Majali, Dr. Said al-Tall, Imraiwed al-Tall,
and Tareq Msarweh.
This school is also deeply rooted in the powerful Cirassian communities
in Jordan. Its
influence expanded to the Beduin tribes
after the civil war in Jordan in the early 1970's. Ideas and activities
of this school became front-page reports in the press, critical of
those "foreigners" [Palestinians] who were enjoying the
wealth of the country. They alleged that the economy, commerce, and
finance were in their hands, that land and real estate, along with
the Abdoon Palaces, were theirs, that they
possessed the keys to hotels and held festive gatherings with their
wives or mistresses. This school also criticized the rapid expansion
of those "foreigners" in the banks, companies, and courts,
alleging that a recommendation from one of them removes all obstacles,
from contractors' deals to ministerial decisions. The
complaints increased against the authority of those "foreigners" in
the country and with regard to their influence over the king. They
argued that contrary to his promises to promote the Beduin,
the monarch had been concentrating on issues pertaining to those "strangers" even
after the PLO leaders were expelled from Amman and their offices
closed in March 1986. The reading of this school added that the declining
economic conditions (falling value of the dinar,
the deteriorating economic infrastructure, etc.), the aggravating
problems of jobless graduates and the other unemployed, and the new
phenomenon of strikes by professionals and workers, as well as the
increase in the crime rate, were basically the fault of those "foreigners". In
response to this reading of the situation, the advocates of a "Jordanisation of the State" sought to pursue two related
strategies: (a) to act as a political opposition group, promoting
a policy of reform in an attempt to limit the expanding role of those "strangers";
and (b) to try to change the situation by promoting "Jordanisation" in
the social, economic, and commercial spheres. To these ends, demands
were made in public for the establishment of political parties which
would be used as formus for the establishment
of political parties which would be used as formus for recruiting and organizing followers to this school
in the hope of carrying out political reforms and implementing the
necessary changes from a position of strength. Groups of Jordanian
contractors, special clubs for Jordanians only, and banks and companies
closed to any "foreigner" emerged with the aim of establishing
a Jordanian economic, social, and financial structure capable of
standing up to those "foreigners", should confrontation
and challenges arise. THIRD
SCHOOL: This school was present within the Jordanian left, and among
opponents of the regime. The argued that within
three years the demographic future of Jordan would shift in favor
of the "foreigners". As a result, a Palestinian
majority, deprived of a homeland and self-rule, but possessng money,
education, and skills, eventually would prevail. Consequently a new
political formula was needed to take account of such a development.
They called for a Palestinian democratic state on both banks of the
river in which a Jordanian minority could participate, enjoying. The
only exception to the three schools was in the 1950's and again in
the 1980's. Two schools of thought competed during these periods.
The first one, known as the "Unity School", was led by
King Abdullah and included Suleiman Abd al-Razeq Touqan,
Ahmad al-Shaka'a, Muhammad Ali al-Ja'abari, Ragheb al-Nashashibi, Abd al-Latif Salah, Tawfiq Abu
al-Huda, Samir al-Rifa'i, Said al-Mutfi, and Rawhi Abdul Hadi. It achieved its objectives when the West Bank was annexed
to the Hashemite Kingdom. The
second school, known as "the exclusively Palestinian," was
led by the grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and included Ahmad Hilmi Abd Al-Baqi, Awni Abd al-Hadi,
Jamal al-Husseini, and Anwar Nusseibeh.
It formally achieved some of its objectives and established a legislative
council and the All Government of Palestine. Some
Palestinian individuals, foremost among them Mousa al-Alami,
stayed away from either school for personal reasons and concealed
aspirations, and instead channeled their efforts into economic, agricultural,
and educational fields (medicine engineering, and law), awaiting
solutions from outside to end the strife between the two schools.
They worked to establish the "nucleus of the future" by
keeping people on the land. The "Arab Development Project" in
Jericho was an example of such an effort. Yet,
the monarch in Amman remained informed of these movements and, then
as now, personally kept an eye on their philosophies, their men,
their relations, and even their sources of finance, as well as ways
to penetrate their ranks. And he was waiting for the right time to
make the decisive move.
By
December 1987, Amman had received three Palestinian messages from
three Palestinian locations, all of which carried the same meaning.
These messages revealed the declining and worsening relations, and
all came to the same conclusions. The
First Message was the Intifada. It stated
that if Jordan had once ruled in the West Bank, certainly there was
no future for this rule, and that it would not be possible to 'return" in
any form to the pre-1967 situation. Also, while the Intifada initially
was aimed solely against the Israeli military occupation, in the
absence of any movement towards a political solution the Intifada would
be exported beyond the boundaries of the occupied territories, west
across the "green line" and east across the Jordan river.
The effects of the Intifada were already
evident in the Arab villages inside the "green line", as
well as in the Palestinian camps, educational institutions, and mosques
and churches in Amman. The
Second Message, which came from Palestinians in Jordan, stated that
the "uprising" was a "second Arab awakening",
and while it was basically a call for liberation and national independence
on Palestinian soil, and a rejection of and resistance to repression,
injustice, and military occupation, it was also a call to liberate
Arab identity and thought from the repression and tyranny of the
ruling Arab regimes. This interpretation of the essence of the Intifada started
to spread through the Amman Arab media, the Friday sermons in the
mosques, and the church sermons on Sunday, as well as in the discussions
of the Palestinian intelligentsia. The
Third Message came from the PLO, the historic leadership of the Palestinian
people. The PLO leadership turned down several official invitations
to visit Amman, agreed to participate in a joint Palestinian-Egyptian
delegation to an international conference, and refused Baghdad's
efforts to reconcile with Amman. All this convinced Jordan that it
was impossible to restore the minimum level of relations agreed upon
in the Amman Accords of February 1985. The
three Palestinian messages were clear and straightforward. They left
the monarch in Amman with no option but to wait, hoping that the
Palestinians would change. Otherwise, his only option would be to
move ahead, contributing at least partially to this change.
King
Hussein heard and witnessed the attitudes of the Arab leaders of
the "Intifada Summit" in Algiers in June 1988. All the signs
indicated that it was not possible to abort the Intifada,
then in its eighth month; but it was also clear that the "labor
pains" of the Intifada would continue
beyond the ninth month, especially since US Secretary of State George
Shultz failed to abort it in its initial stages. Even the occupation
authorities had failed to deprive the Intifada of
its sources of survival, despite attempts to strave the
masses and despite the expulsion of its best men. The normal end
was a natural delivery of a Palestinian state, on time, in its home,
and in the presence of its legitimate father, the PLO. Rabat
was the first capital to call for and adopt the legitimate role of
the PLO in 1974. Its calls spread to Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli
in the western part of the Arab world and to Kuwait and Riyadh and
the rest of the Arab Guld capitals. Riyadh even declined to finance the 1987 Jordanian
Development Plan for the occupied territories, opting to continue
working through the Joint Committee. As for Baghdad and Cairo, and
despite their close relations with Amman, they both publicly insisted
on giving priority to dealing with the PLO when it came to Palestinian
issues. All
this left Amman with no option but to retreat from its schemes and
settle for coordination with Damascus in attempting to besiege the
PLO, where both managed briefly to curtail the PLO in Lebanon and
Jordan. However,
the general Arab message was to support the Intifada and
its historic and sole legitimate leadership, the PLO, this soberting Jordan to the reality that it is not possible to
compete with the PLO.
Amman
watched closely the scenarios of the current Israeli election campaign.
Its reading of the situation was that the Likud and
the Labor Alignment eventually would reach an understanding in order
to impose a political, military, or demographic
(transfer) solution on Amman by wooing or threats, or through American
maneuvers. Amman
has had a 20-year history of dialogue, coordination, and even cooperation
(power sharing) attempts with the Labor Party. But all that was fruitless,
and Shimon Peres failed to delivery any of his promises, thus making
the "Jordanian option" more than an illusion. Amman
was also fully aware of the danger of Jobotinsky's old
schemes and their renewal under Menachem Begin,
Sharon, and the generals of the ruling Israeli military establishment.
Amman was certain that it was impossible to communicate with this
group, hence leaving Amman with the option of exploring, and eventually
discovering the illusions of, the Labor Party. Faced with a greedy
and expansionist Likud, and in the absence of the Israeli decision, the only
option for Amman was to retreat from the Israeli arena: to withdraw
politically and leave it to the Palestinians to face the Israelis
ideologically and politically. Amman had to acknowledge the end of
the Power Sharing Scheme, the Autonomy, and the Improving the Quality
of Life Program, and finally announce the death of the Jordanian
Option. Thus Jordan had to retreat to build a political and military
defensive line to face the possible Israeli challenges of the "transfer",
the "substitute homeland", and the "imposed negotiations" following
a possible future military defeat.
After
Washington and Moscow succeeded in establishing the basis for "international denete" in
the fields of nuclear weapons and in the wake of the superpowers" agreements
regarding regional conflict - such as those in Afghanistan, Namibia,
Angola, and the Gulf - the Palestinian file is now on the agenda
of the European, European-American, and American-Soviet summitts.
This, naturally, would marginalize Jordan's role. It is thus important
for Jordan to reassess its calculations internally and externally,
and rearrange its own house alone and in its own self-interest. Likewise,
monitoring the US election campaign gives a similar assessment to
that of the international factor. The Democratic Party, for the first
time in its history, debated the Palestinian people's right to self-determination
at its national convention. Although the Democrats took no vote on
the issue, the mere discussion of the Palestinian Question, and the
increasing Arab-American calls for the establishment of an "independent
Palestinian state" alongside Israel on the historic land of
Palestine, had a special significance. It was becoming increasingly
clear theat normalization of US-Palestinian
relations is a matter of time. This could be at the expense of US-Jordanian
relations and not at the expense of US-Israeli relations, and therefore
Amman could be used as a station to reach the Palestinians. This
assessment, naturally, compelled Amman to restrate its
position and role to Washington, making clear that it continued to
be committed to a peaceful settlement in the region and to be a partner
in this settlement, but that Jordan would not be the major partner,
i.e. that it would not be a substitute for the Palestinian. Washington,
therefore, must differentiate between the role of Amman and that
of the Palestinians and must deal with the two parties separately.
All these matters, taken, together, forced the monarch in Amman not
to put off his decisive move. Effects
of the Disengagement
Article
1 of the Jordanian Constitution, published in the Jordanian official
paper No. (1093) on January 8, 1952, stated that "the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan is a sovereign Arab independent state and that
its territory is indivisible and no part of it can be given up...". This
article did not specify that the territory of the kingdom is the
West Bank and the East Bank, even after a Palestinian-Jordanian legal
committee amended the Jordanian Constitution after annexation. The
resolution of the Palestinian conferences which paved the way for
the "annexation" of the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, specifically the Jericho Conference of December 1, 1948,
stated that the "conference regards Palestine as an indivisible
unit and any solution that contradicts that does not count as a final
solution". Article
II of the Jordanian Parliament's resolution on April 24, 1950 reaffirmed "maintaining
all the Arab rights in (Palestine), defending these rights by all
legitimate means and with all rights, and without hampering a final
settlement of its just cause within the aspirations of the nation,
Arab cooperation and international justice". The
resolutions of the political committee, approved by the council of
the Arab League on June 12, 1950, also stated that "the Arab
states had announced their adherence to maintain the Arab character
of Palestine, its independence and the unity of its territory in
compliance with the aspirations of its legitimate inhabitants. Therefore,
they rejected any solution based on partitioning it, and added that
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan announces that annexing the Palestinian
section in trusteeship provided that it be part of the final settlement
of the Palestinian Question ... and that it [Jordan] accepts whatever
the rest of the Arab League states decide on ..." The Jordanian
government, the, did not reject this resolution. The "annexation" of
the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, therefore, was
temporary, restricted, and not final, and thus does not mean that
it became an inseparable part of the kingdom. In other words, the "annexation" gave
the Hashemite Kingdom not the "right to ownership" of the
territory of the West Bank, but rather the right to "political
authority" to administer and govern it as "a trust under
its supervision" to be part of a final settlement of the Palestinian
Question. Based
on this, the disengagement decision is not a violation of the Jordanian
constitution and cannot be considered as giving up parts of the property
of the kingdom, as the West Bank is not part of the kingdom's territory
but a part of the territory of Palestine. The
international community, on more than one occasion, had recognized
that the West Bank is "occupied Palestinian territories",
especially since the Intifada: UN Security
Council resolutions 605, 607, and 608, all taken in 1988, acknowledge
that the right to sovereignty on this territory is for the Palestinian
people, half of whom live on their national The
right and sovereignty is for the Palestinian people and not for the
ruling authority, whether it was a legitimate authority or that of
a military power, whether temporary, coincidental, or permanent. The
people do not possess the right to transfer or drop their soverginty on
their land, for it is part of their existence and continuity. It
is also an inherited property and people practice their sovereignty
on their land by actual existence on it and through the existence
of individuals and their institutions on it. The
`disengagement', therefore, did not leave any `vacuum', but is rather
a retreat and withdrawal of the Jordanian authority from "ruling
and administering" the West Bank which it did directly at one
point and indirectly at another. As
for the "tools" of Jordan's rule in the West Bank - the
administrative, financial, and legal institutions - announcing withdrawing
them would not impose a serious change in the daily life of the Palestinians
under occupation. a) The Jordanian Development Plan: Palestinians rejected, opposed,
and even resisted this plan not only because it fosters the "improvement
of the quality of life" scheme when they are, in fact, seeking
a "political solution", but also because it came as a result
of a unilateral Jordanian decision without consultation with the
Palestinian leadership, the PLO. Likewise, the "tools" that
the government of Zeid al-Rifa'i produced to implement
this scheme were - and continue to be - corrupted. Furthermore, the "plan" started
out by establishing groups of economic self-interest from the agricultural,
industrial, commercial, and financial sectors, and introducing them
as an advanced Palestinian social strata working under the guise
of defending the "economic interests" and protecting the
developmental gains as a prelude to accepting "partial political
settlements". "Names and titles" of this
social strata to appear on the invitation lists both of consulates
and of the occupying military administration. The
municipalities, which are the outstanding national institutions through
which most of the development plan was to be implemented, are staffed
by employees imposed by the occupation authorities in coordination
with Amman. b) The Jordanian Parliament: The dissolution of the Jordanian
House of Representatives will not affect the Palestinian society
under occupation. As the Parliament did not adopt any strategic resolutions
over the past twenty-one years of occupation which might have developed
unity between the people of the east and west banks, its existence
or absence is not materially important. In
spite of the fact that the legitimate PLO institutions, including
the Executive Committee, the Central Council, and the Palestine National
Council in its 16th, 17th, and 18th sessions adopted the "confederation" formula
to develop and promote the distinct relationship between Jordan and
Palestine, the Jordanian government, parliament, and even institutions
in Jordan did not take any steps or issue any calls to adopt the This
is in addition to the fact that Palestinian members of the Jordanian
Parliament were "employees" and not "partners" in
the Jordanian policies. Their voices had not been heard throughout
the years of occupation, a fact which further undermined their representative
role, not to mention their personal credibility. c) The Ministry of Occupied Lands Affairs: Over the past two
years, the ministry had adopted the policy of the "carrot and
the stick" in dealing with people both inside and outside the
occupied territories. On many occasions, the carrot was stolen, and
on others the ministry invented "uncivilized" and "unacceptable" methods
in applying the use of the Jordanian stick, starting with the arbitrary
measures on the bridges (considering those crossing as unwanted persons)
and ending with placing restrictions and conditions on Palestinians
intending to reside, work, or travel in Jordan. All these measures
undermined the role of this "shop" in the people's interest
both inside and outside the occupied territories. d) Employee's Salaries: The dismissal of civil servants in the
West Bank, and the cutting off of their salaries will not shake the
foundations of the lives of the majority of those employees. The
salaries were limited additions to their income and not the total
income of their households. The fact that these salaries usually
were not paid on time compelled people to take into consideration
that the money might stop one day, and thus they were prepared to
do without it. The employees, therefore, seeing their Jordanian salary
as a supplement to their income, either saved it or spent it on secondary
needs. The decision to cut these salaries now will not
turn upside down the lives of most of these employees, while the
minority who are wholly dependent upon them can manage for several
months until new "Palestinian" arrangements are made. In
responding to the Jordanian disengagement, the West Bank, therefore,
can be expected and actually required to maintain national consensus
and to announce "accepting" the Jordanian disengagement
and its administrative, legal, and financial measures. West Bank
institutions must move also to "Palestinianize" their by-laws, programs, and tools. Palestinianization of
institutions means building the "authority of the people" in
implementing the political program of the Intifada,
as stated in the leaflets of the Unified Leadership of the Uprising.
What is required now is to work, quietly and without in-fighting,
under the slogan "Let every hero stay where he is" for "cleaning
the Palestinian house", for "self-sufficiency" and
for forging harmony in the Palestinian people's aspirations and priorities. The
Palestinian institutions is for all people,
and the responsibility of administering it is a collective one that
must be conducted in a democratic, progressive, and just way. The
call now is to continue the services and activities through the will
and authority of the people, and if anyone wants to "retire", "retreat",
or "wait", he has the right to do so now, but he has not
right to hamper the march under any pretext. The Intifada is
the message of independence and there is no retreat from it.
The
disengagement as an official political event, planned
and executed by the Jordanian authorities, surprised people in Jordan.
It could take some people a long time to understand
its causes, goals, and effects. The
disengagement imposed on Palestinians in Jordan an official and direct
challenge from the authorities. The challenge, from the start, was
a social, economic, and even popular one. The
disengagement broke down all the facades and started distinguishing
between people as Jordanians or Palestinians. It invalidated the
gray theories and clarified the choice: either a Jordanian quffiyeh (headscarf)
or a Palestinian one, but not both. The
disengagement also imposed one of two options: loyalty or disloyalty
to the monarch as efforts proceed to get the "Palestinian Trojan
Horse" out of the Jordanian "house". Palestinians
in Jordan were faced with a choice of two options: - to "work" to maintain
their acquired rights in Jordan in accordance with the new formula
of disengagement, or - to cling to their accumulating
and aggregate rights in Palestine in accordance with the PLO's policies. The
Palestinian communities in Jordan are expected to intervene in the
new political, social, and economic scenario, not for the purpose
of clashing with the disengagement on its territory or "resisting" it
outside its boundaries, but rather to appease it and to buy time
to allow the crystallization of a balanced formula which does not
contradict the disengagement decisions. That formula would include
the execution of an interim and gradual program, allowing a Palestinian
withdrawal from the Jordanian political and economic life, and a "return" to
Palestine to proceed with the building of the institutions of the
state. The Jordanians must also be assured that the Palestinian withdrawal
is not intended to damage the economic structure in Jordan, but rather
is for the purpose of preparing for an equal relationship between
the two states, Palestine and Jordan, in a confederation based on
equality, justice, and democracy in accordance with PNC resolutions. One
of the exceptions to this temporary formula could arise if a part
of the Palestinian community in Jordan, seeking to maintain their
acquired rights and interests, tried to "integrate" into
the Jordanian identity and pledge allegiance to the regime instead
of betting on an unknown future in Palestine. I do not believe that
anyone will intervene to influence these groups, not only because
Palestinians cling to the absolute right of free choice and democracy,
but also because the difficulties that could arise from this integration
will limit the number of people who would want to attempt it.
It
could be said that the "disengagement" has come to put
and end to the unstable Palestinian-Jordanian relations. It is also
an acknowledgement of the futility of trying to defeat or compete
with the PLO. The disengagement provided the PLO with the following options
: 1) Accepting the disengagement. This would mean dealing with
it according to its conditions and rules, or working to deal with
it on a joint and equal basis, seeking to establish a confederation. 2) Rejecting the disengagement. This would mean confronting and
resisting it in its own territory and challenging it both within
and outside its geographic and demographic boundaries. 3) Appeasing the disengagement. The purpose of appeasing would
be to insure minimum Palestinian losses both on Jordanian territory
and outside, and, at the same time, to prevent it from stabbing the Intifada and its legitimate child, the independent Palestinian
state. The
point at which the Palestinian and Jordanian leaderships are now,
lead in two opposite directions. It is a point where neither party
can stay for long, for staying there means death and both are fighting
for survival. This
point could be called the "September Station", in which
both leaderships faced each other in military confrontation for survival
in September 1970. Today, in September 1988, they stand at the same
station in a political confrontation for "continuity". The
Jordanian leadership decided the start of disengagement by turning "eastward" and
returning to the Jordanian house to rearrange it for the sake of
its inhabitants and visitors through putting all its keys in the
hands of the monarch alone. The Jordanian leadership also openly
asked its Palestinian counterparts to give up their share in the
Jordanian house specifically since Jordan had given up its share
in the Palestinian house unconditionally. Jordan
did just that in the face of the advances of the Intifada -
the Palestinian movement for independence on the road to establishing
a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil - to keep it within its geographic
and demographic boundaries. In
addition to this, Jordan intended to place the positive or negative
effects of the Intifada in the hands of
the Palestinian leadership, the PLO, in order to keep the PLO from
exercising its efforts in more than one place outside the original
location of the Intifada. What, therefore,
are the PLO's answers to the disengagement and its effects? The
priorities on the PLO agenda are: First: To maintain Palestinian national unity, both inside and outside the
occupied territories, behind the historic and sole legitimate leadership
of the PLO.  Second: To appease the Jordanian political disengagement as a fait accompli,
and not to confront it either in its territory or outside its boundaries;
to try to coordinate to determine the geographic and demographic
boundaries of the disengagement and to agree on a "transitional
period" through which the transfer of administrative, legal,
and financial responsibilities will take place from the official
Jordanian side to the popular Palestinian side. Third: To embark immediately upon the "Palestinianization" of
the institutions in the occupied territories through drafting new
by-laws and programs, appointing new administrators, and providing
national finances without outside intervention from any Arab capital,
regardless of the amount of its contributions, and restricting finances
through Palestinian channels in order to maintain national unity. Fourth: To convene the Palestine National Council and to issue the historic
announcement, the declaration of independence of the occupied state
of Palestine, within the boundaries of the Partition Resolution,
issued by the United Nations on November 29, 1947, and to announce
willingness and readiness to start negotiations to end the occupation. Fifth: T o form a provisional Palestinian government. It could be based
temporarily in Cairo, and function as a political tool not only to
negotiate in an international conference with full powers under United
Nations auspices, but also to take up its national duties of buildings
the "Palestinian house" on the Palestinian level, and preparing
for an "Arab confederation". The government could include
the following : a) Members from the occupied territories. b) Members from the Palestinian communities in the Arab world,
Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in the diaspora. c) Leaders of the Palestinian factions within the PLO. Sixth: To adopt a political program for the provisional Palestinian government
and to distribute responsibilities among the above-mentioned three
components of the government in harmony, providing that their duties
do not overlap and provided that the government returns, within a
specific time span, to the Palestine National Council (the Parliament),
the highest body of authority. The
political program could include: a) The political program of the Intifada. b) The Palestinian document known as the Abu Sharif paper. c) A plan to keep all the PLO institutions and infrastructure
as they are, exactly like the Jewish Agency after the declaration
of the Jewish state. The PLO could become the Palestinian International
Agency to promote the Palestinian National Movement. Yet,
the challenges and responsibilities require men and women who possess
historic vision, political courage, and responsible and committed
national position to move towards crystallizing a courageous and
historic initiative, not to "compete" with or "confront" the
Jordanian political disengagement, but to go along with it to the
end. It is also necessary to develop the Intifada as
a national movement for independence and freedom in order to make
more achievements on the local, regional, and international levels,
on the road to establishing a national state led by the PLO, the historic legitimate
leadership of the people of Palestine. For
the second time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
the first since the Arab Revolt of the 1930's, the Palestinians,
the essential party in the struggle, have taken the lead in demanding
a solution to the Palestinian question. In doing so, they have addressed
the three elements of the question: their divided and occupied lands,
their dispersed people, and their suspended rights. Palestinians
have intervened, with realistic options, not against the Jewish state
of Israel - which has existed for forty years on the major part of
Palestine - but against the Israeli military occupation in the lands
which remained, namely the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The
Palestinian uprising is a normal reaction. It is a natural response
to the accumulated oppression, suppression, and deprivation. It is
not directed against the regional and international relationships
of the Jewish state, but specifically against he military occupation's repressive
practices which have persisted for the past 21 years. Regional and
international opposition has not been a deterrent for Israel. Over
the years, the occupation's practices have increased in number and
worsened in content. It overriding goal has been to eliminate Palestinian
national identity through confiscations of land and water, the establishment
of settler colonies, and many other flagrant violations of human
and national rights. The
Palestinian uprising has its own language. The word Intifada was
introduced into the lexicon of the conflict. Palestinians made it
a political reality that cannot be ignored, bypassed, or a bolished. Palestinians
have intervened with their cultural heritage. The Intifada was
endowed with symbols deeply rooted in modern Arab and Islamic cultural.
The colors of the Palestinian flag, which was drawn up in 1917, decorate
the embroidered dresses of women. The traditional quffiyeh covers
the heads of men, and the stones of resistance are in the hands of
young and old. Palestinians
intervened individually and collectively in an unarmed resistance memovement - a `white Intifada'
- that is based on the ideas of national civil disobedience for freedom
and independence. Its aim is a two-state solution on the land of
Palestine. The
uprising started in December 1987 in the refugee camps of Gaza and Nablus and spread throughout the occupied territories. Its
first stage signalled a change in Palestinian
social behavior, marked by the disappearance of fear and the reawakening
of Palestinian national identity, pride, and confidence. The
media rushed to cover the marketable action image created by the Intifada. International sympathy evoked by the uprising restored
the PLO to its leading role in the Arab world. To the Israelis, the Intifada came as political and social shock. The closer they
came to it, the more they felt it heat; but the further they retreated,
the more they worried about its development. The Intifada shattered
the fantasies of those who expected the status quo to become permanent.
It exacerbated political divisions among Israelis, and it forced
George Shultz to come running to lessen the burden on the Israelis
and to try to transfer it to the Arab capitals. But the deeply rooted Intifada stubbornly
and confidently went on. In
the second stage of the uprising, the Unified National Leadership
of the Uprising succeeded in both building national consensus and
gaining legitimacy. People adhered to its calls issued periodically
in appeals in the form of leaflets. In the past 37 weeks, 25 appeals
have been distributed. While the Palestinian house is being put in
order, popular committees were formed to rebuild the Palestinian
society on a solid national foundation. The
uprising illuminated the boundary line between Israel, the occupied
territories, and Jordan. The message to the Israelis was that the
occupation cannot continue and that there is not turning back. To
Jordan, the message was that despite its rule on the West Bank before
1967, it had no future role. Jordan
understood the message, and so withdrew from Palestine and buried
the `Jordanian option'. But Israel refused to acknowledge the international
changes, and obstinately continued its attempt to snuff out the uprising
by its traditional repressive methods. The Israeli election campaign
accelerated the oppression against Palestinians. More than 300 have
been killed, thousands arrested, and hundreds deported; bones and
limbs were broken, youths were buried alive, workers were burnt to
death, houses were destroyed, institutions were closed, and the press
was kept in the dark. The
third stage of the Intifada witnessed an
active campaign of politicization. Practical stage
were taken to promote and extend national civil disobedience.
Self-reliance was encouraged in agriculture, health, and education.
Israeli products were boycotted, and police, tax, and traffic employees
resigned as part of the process of sweeping from the Palestinian
house the remnants of the occupation. The popular committees, the
instrument of the people's authority, were broadened. The Intifada became a way of life. Even the Israeli chief of
staff said the uprising has become "deeply rooted in people's
minds and The
popular committees quickly became the target of the Israeli policy
of repression. The committees were declared illegal, Palestinian
charities were closed, academic and cultural meetings were banned,
and over thirty people were deported despite local, European, and
American opposition. Even prisoners were not immune. Some were liquidated
in the torture chambers, others were shot
in cold blood in the desert prison known as Ansar 3. The Israeli government continued deceiving its own
public that the Intifada is a war and that
a military victory is possible even "if it takes nine years",
as Prime Minister Shamir stated. The Intifada is
now going strong in its ninth month. One-and-a-half-million Palestinians,
not using weapons and not planning to kill any Israelis, have reached
the stage of independence. Shultz failed to abort the uprising in
its first trimester, the Israeli military apparatus failed in its
efforts to stop the uprising's source of energy and finance by killing
its spiritual father, Abu Kihad, on April
16 in Tunis. Israel failed politically to stop it by closing institutions
and arresting intellectuals. Israel also failed in its attempts to
force a premature cesarian birth when it leaked news of a draft Palestinian
declaration of independence and provisional government. Instead,
the historical Palestinian leadership announced that the legitimate
Palestinian home - the Palestine National Council - will house the
natural birth of the state. The birth certificate might be issued
in Strasbourg at the European Parliament or in New York at the United
Nations, where Arafat, carrying the Palestinian olive branch, will
announce the birth of the Palestinian state. The
PLO infrastructure will continue after the declaration of the provisional
government as a "Palestinian International agency" in the
same way that the Jewish agency continued in promoting the Zionist
movement after Ben Gurion announced in 1948 the creation of the provisional
government of the state of Israel. These winds of change within the
PLO have been announced by no less an authority
than Salah Khalaf, one of the senior
PLO officials. He stated that the boundaries of the Palestinian state
are not restricted to the Partition Plan of 1947, but that they will
be decided in negotiations with Israelis. In principle, he said,
the Palestinians will accept the West Bank and Gaza as the new state. The Intifada has
left the Israelis with only the Palestinian option. The facades on
all other alternatives (such as annexation, transfer, etc.) have
collapsed. What is wanted now, from friend and foe alike, especially
from every friend of Israel and the Palestinians, is intervention
locally, regionally, and internationally to save the region. Special
attention is needed in the coming decisive nine weeks that culminate
in the Israeli elections. This
intervention is need not because the conflict has proven during the
past four decades that Palestinians cannot be liquidated or defeated;
it is needed because the guarantee for Israeli security and stability
is in the hands of Palestinians. The Palestinian peace is the only
alternative to all the nightmares. And if the Palestinian peace is
killed now, the entire region will be turned into an island of violence
and chaos. Will Israelis accept the option of the Palestinian peace?
It is the option of life. He who refuses life to himself and to others
is sick and everyone must intervene to save him.
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PASSIA |
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