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THE PEEL COMMISSION PARTITION PROPOSAL, 1937
The 1929 Hope Simpson Commission of Inquiry had explicitly
pointed to the incapacity of the economy and demography of Palestine
to be further destabilized by Zionist immigration and settlement. Its
recommendations were echoed by those of the 1930 Shaw Commission of
Inquiry, named after Sir Walter Shaw, sent to investigate incidents
of violence, which had peaked in a series of localized uprisings in
1929. The Shaw Commission stated that, “[a] continuation, or still more
an acceleration, of a process which results in the creation of a large
discontented and landless class is fraught with serious danger to the
country.” The Commission urged the British government to urgently assess
its immigration policy and to address the “meaning of the passages in
the Mandate which purported to safeguard the interests of the non-Jewish
communities.” The British ‘Passfield’ White Paper of October 1930 adopted
these findings and ordered most land transfers frozen, while limiting
immigration. However, PM McDonald, under pressure from Zionist leaders,
revoked these clauses in February 1931 with the so-called ‘Black-Letter’,
wherein he issued his personal assurances to WZO head Weizmann, going
so far as to praise “the constructive work done by the Jewish people
in Palestine [and their]... beneficial effects on the development and
well-being of the country as a whole.”
[i]
Unsurprisingly, the Palestinians were becoming increasingly
frustrated with British policy, as the likelihood of their achieving
their right to self-determination under the Mandate appeared to evaporate.
In October 1933 nationwide strikes and demonstrations against Zionism
and British collusion were met with force, leaving at least 12 Palestinians
dead and fuelling outrage at Britain’s strong-arm tactics.
By 1936, seven years after the Hope Simpson Commission, the
Jewish population had risen by more than a further 150%, an additional
62 settlements had been created and nearly 1.5 million dunums of Palestinian
land was the property of the Zionists.
[ii]
The Zionists saw the settlements as “[t]he guardians
of Zionist land,” and recognized early on that “patterns of settlement
would to a great extent determine the [future Jewish] country’s borders.”
[iii]
JA Executive Chairman, David Ben-Gurion, called the
settlers, “the army of Zionist fulfillment.”
[iv]
In mid-April 1936, a series of Arab-Jewish clashes
in the Jaffa area proved the inevitable trigger, as Palestinian National
Committees sprang up across the country in support of a call for a general
strike issued by the Palestinian representative leadership, the Arab
Higher Committee (AHC). The AHC was banned soon after by the British,
but despite the arrest of its leaders and the nationwide imposition
of curfews, the uprising surged and from April 1936 until October the
Arab Revolt swept Mandate Palestine.
[v]
The extent of the revolt and its support throughout the region
worried the British, who requisitioned additional troops in September
to put down the uprising.
[vi]
Fearing domestic instability and under pressure from
their British benefactor, regional Arab leaders eventually provided
the necessary mediation to bring about a lull in the uprising, while
Britain again dispatched an investigative commission.
Arriving in November 1936, the Palestine Royal Commission,
headed by Lord Peel, set out to assess the feasibility and future of
the Mandate. Published in July 1937, the Peel Commission’s report concluded
that, “the Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by
a Treaty System...” The proposed treaty envisioned a partition of Palestine,
with Jerusalem and Bethlehem retained under a separate Mandate, reaching
to the port at Jaffa. The part allotted the Palestinians was to be united
with Transjordan and the resulting Jewish state made to pay a subsidy
to the Arab state, to which Palestinians within the area allotted the
Jewish state would be compelled to move. The Peel Plan, with its twin
premises of partition and ‘population transfer’, was to become the point
of reference for most future schemes to solve the Palestine Question.
The Palestinians flatly rejected the notion of a Zionist state
on nearly 33% of Palestine and the dispossession of hundreds of thousands
that this would entail.
[vii]
Encouraged by the legitimization it granted their
program, but not content with the scale of conquest, the Zionist leadership
accepted ‘in principle’ but rejected ‘in detail’ the partition plan,
while Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement rejected the idea outright and
by September 1937 had commenced a violent campaign against Palestinians
and the British, marking the resumption of violence and resurgence of
the Arab Revolt.
[viii]
[ii]
Populations & settlements: McCarthy, The Population
of Palestine, p. 224 & p. 219. Land acquisition: A Survey of Palestine
Vol. 1, p. 376 & notes.
[iii]
Segev, One Palestine…, p. 249.
[iv]
Ibid. p.255. (Quoting Ben-Gurion’s memoirs.)
[v]
The Arab Higher Committee was formally established in
April 1936, with Haj Amin Al-Husseini elected its Pres. on the 25th
of that month. Its members were: Jamal Husseini, Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi,
Yaqoub Al-Ghossein, Fuad Saba, Ragheb Nashashibi, Ahmed Hilmi Abed
Baqi, Ahmed Latif Saleh, Alfred Rock and Awni Abdul Hadi - all of
whom would remain at the forefront of the Palestinian national movement
throughout the Mandate period and beyond.
[vi]
On 22 September 1936 additional troops were requisitioned.
Palestinian historian Abdelaziz Ayyad attributes a part of the urgency
of the regional leaders in exerting efforts alongside and on behalf
of the Arab Higher Committee to gain a cessation of the Revolt to
this news. Yehoshua Porath attributes lasting significance
in terms of the development of the pan-Arab movement to the support
for the Palestinian Arab Revolt throughout the region, but also notes
the economic necessity for the Palestinians to ‘deescalate’ the revolt
due to the vital citrus harvest season and the dire state of the rural
economy. Ayyad acknowledges the role though of the
many Muslim Youth and other less pan-Arab groups in mobilizing support,
finance and volunteers at the same time. In all, Porath’s assertion
that the period represented a formative moment in the development
of the Palestinian cause in the face of Zionism as a bedrock of Arab
solidarity is born out by most commentators, Ayyad included. Yoav
Gelber, among others, points out the many recurring elements of secretive
collusion and twin-channel maneuvering which characterized the political
strategies of the regional governments at the time, attributing to
the period formative patterns of betrayal and manipulation that have
persisted throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ayyad, Abdelaziz,
Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians 1850-1939, Jerusalem:
PASSIA, 1999, p. 161; Porath, Yehoshua, In Search of Arab Unity
1930-1945, London: Frank Cass, 1986, p. 162; Gelber, Yoav, Jewish-Transjordanian
Relations 1921-1948, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 83-103.
[vii]
Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora, pp. 189-193.
[viii]
PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, pp.
57-58. Ben-Gurion accepted the proposal after judging its shortcomings
vis-à-vis Zionist territorial ambitions to be outweighed by the immense
value of a non-Zionist plan which endorsed the concept of “forced
transfer.” He wrote of the Peel Plan in his diary: “This will give
us something we never had, even when we were under our own authority,
neither in the period of the First Temple nor in the period of the
Second Temple… forced transfer.” Segev, One Palestine…, p.
403.
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