Dr. Bernard Sabella

Introduction

An examination of post-war prospects for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is in fact an assessment of the Palestinian position and its possibilities and constraints. In order to engage in such an assessment there is a need to consider the positions and interests of the various members of the American-led coalition as well as the positions of other key actors in the Middle East. Such consideration is essential in order to evaluate how these positions affect the Palestinian position.

It is expected that, in the post-Gulf war era, the Palestinians will continue to adhere to the constants, which have shaped their politics since 1967, and more specifically since December 1987 with the outbreak of the Intifada. These constants, based among other things, on various UN resolutions, call for an end to Israeli occupation, the right to self-determination and a two-state solution. The Palestinian constants have been best formulated by the decisions of the Palestine National Council which convened in Algiers in November 1988.

Palestinian constants are not likely to change as a result of the Gulf conflict. But the Gulf conflict has had its repercussions on the practical preoccupations of Palestinians as well as on the means and methods of realizing their political constants in a changing Middle East.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the various positions, it is appropriate to note two points on the possible impact of the Gulf conflict on the Palestinian problem and the Arab world, in general.

First, the Gulf conflict has confirmed that the Palestinian problem is one of the problems in the Middle East and not the major one. The crisis and the war in the Gulf prove that for oil-rich Arab regimes, as well as for Egypt and Syria, there are immediate and vital interests that supersede their traditional involvement in the Palestinian issue. Not that the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer on the political agenda of these states, in particular of that of Egypt and Syria, but that self-interest of the oil-rich regimes and the Realpolitik of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes have taken precedence over their long standing role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second, the Gulf crisis has led to the division of the Arab world between those who took active part in the American-led coalition and those who have opposed it or adopted a neutral stand. While this rift will eventually be healed; in the short run, the Arab world will suffer the consequences of this division. While Arab governments may learn to quickly close ranks, Arab masses will need longer time to accommodate themselves to the outcome of the Gulf war. Accordingly, internal and inter-Arab politics may continue to be affected by the aftershocks of the Gulf conflict for some time to come. If this state of affairs holds, it will certainly not serve the urgency with which the Palestinians view their cause and its advancement.

While these two general points tend to the pessimistic, the overall post-Gulf war outlook may indeed prove more optimistic, from a Palestinian perspective, in the long run. The American-led coalition received legitimation for its actions from UN Security Council resolutions on Kuwait. This is the same international forum that has repeatedly passed resolutions in favor of the Palestinian people and their rights, for the past forty-three years. Besides, the positions of the various coalition partners, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, are not likely to be as uniform as their position on the Gulf issue. This divergence of positions while it may complicate matters, could help guarantee that Palestinian rights and aspirations remain high on the agenda of the international community.

The positions of the various actors in the Middle East, post-Gulf conflict, serve as a context within which the Palestinian position can be freshly assessed and evaluated. Following, then, are assessments of positions likely to affect the Palestinian position and its future prospects.

The American Position

US involvement in the Gulf is geo-political and strategic and not simply based on the desire to safeguard international legitimacy by implementing Security Council resolutions on Kuwait. The liberation of Kuwait is apparently a primary motive but as important is US determination to destroy Iraqi military capabilities and the threats that these pose to the oil-rich Arab regimes, to Israel and consequently to American interests.

The US military involvement in the Gulf will only partially Gachieve its goals if it is not supplemented by a political program to ensure vital American interests. This political program or "new order", as the Americans call it, would aim at maintaining the stability of the oil-rich Arab countries, and at the reconstruction of Kuwait and Iraq, post Saddam Hussein. James Baker, the US Secretary of State, has volunteered the funds of the oil-rich countries for the purpose of reconstructing the war-torn region. The American "new order" would also act, or so the Americans hope, to absorb anti-American sentiments among Arab and Moslem masses by proving that the US has no sinister intentions against the peoples of the region and that it acted on principles of international legitimacy.

While some segments of the Gulf masses, especially in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, may respond positively to American reconstruction over- tures, it is hard to envision that the majority of Arab masses will easily forget and forgive the US military role in the Gulf.

The Arab masses, throughout the region, will, for long, see US involvement in the Gulf as a war waged against Iraq in order to maintain the Arab clientele of Washington in power, on the one hand, and to protect Israel and maintain its strategic edge in the region, on the other. The Arab masses will not easily forgive the for adopting a double standard: one, for Iraq and Arabs and Moslems, in which immediate implementation of UN Security Council resolutions is pursued through garnering international support to wage a merciless war on an Arab country. The second standard is that with which Israel is favored. Israel has not implemented even one of the numerous UN Security Council resolutions on the Palestinian problem. It continues to occupy Arab land without the US raising serious objections against it. In fact, the US has been rewarding Israel, over the years, with substantial economic and military aid amounting to billions of dollars.

Official US policy on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is likely to be constrained by counteracting currents, post the Gulf conflict. In the short and medium range, the Americans will be preoccupied to see that the political settlement in the Gulf region will proceed according to their designs. Thus, in the short run, American policy makers' efforts will be taken up by the political consequences of the post-war situation in the Gulf. The American policy makers, however, know well that, in the long run, maintaining the new political arrangements in the Gulf will have to be supplemented by parallel arrangements of a comprehensive nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. One approach likely to be followed by the American policy makers is to involve their Arab clientele, in particular Egypt and Syria, in the search for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But such search does not depend solely on the will of Arab states to make peace, it involves as well the will of Israel to offer concessions, territorial and political, to make such search for peace feasible.

American policy makers, however, may not be able to put the required political pressure on Israel to come up with the desired political stand needed to start a serious peace process. This, on account of American internal political considerations and of Israel's shown restraint on retaliating the Iraqi missile attacks on it. Because of Israel's strong support in Congress and the lobbying activities of pro-Israel supporters on Capitol Hill, the American Administration will likely be constrained in the extent of pressure it is likely to apply on Israel. On the other hand, the US Administration can argue that the war waged in the Gulf has saved Israel from worse consequences than the destruction inflicted by the Iraqi Scud missiles. This should be appreciated by Israeli policy makers who should use the opportunity presented, post-Gulf war, to show flexibility on starting a peace process with their Arab neighbors. It is doubtful, however, that the Israelis will be in a hurry to oblige the US Administration and they may resort to delaying tactics, as they have done in the past to torpedo their own political plan on the Palestinian question. The US Administration, given the expected rise in President Bush's popularity, post-Gulf war, could respond to these tactics by convincing Congress of the need to apply more pressure on Israel in order to push for a viable peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The US Administration is determined, at least for the foreseeable future, not to engage in direct dialogue with the PLO. American policy makers, with the help of their Arab coalition partners, may start looking for acceptable Palestinians to groom for the eventuality of peace talks. At the same time, the Americans would continue to maintain links with Palestinians and their institutions in the Occupied Territories even with those known to be pro-PLO. American policy makers know well that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and elsewhere consider the PLO as their sole legitimate representative. No peace initiative, therefore, is likely to succeed without the involvement of the PLO and Palestinians affiliated with it.

The US may consider involving Jordan in the peace process, inspite of its anti-coalition stand in the Gulf conflict. Jordan, because of its past administrative and other links with the Occupied Territories could prove to be essential for the success of intermediate arrangements agreed upon in negotiations. In addition, King Hussein has taken a stand in the Gulf war that is in conformity with that of the Palestinians and other Arab masses. The US thus would attempt to cash on the political credit that the King has earned with the Palestinians. The American policy makers, however, know that any involvement of Jordan in the peace process would have to involve the Palestinians, and in specific the PLO, as well. Jordan cannot act alone in matters that touch on the Palestinians and their future, regardless of the kind of pressure that Washington may bring to bear on the King and on Jordan.

The Soviet Position

While the US posits itself as the key player, for good or for bad, in the Middle East, the Soviet Union is not altogether out of the political game following the failure of the Gorbachev cease fire and peace initiative in the Gulf. Inspite of the disappointment in the overall Soviet stand in the Gulf crisis, the Arab countries can still look for the Soviet Union to support Arab causes and, in particular, the Palestinian cause. The internal political debate in the Soviet Union is likely to lead to increased Soviet interest and involvement in the Middle East region, if for no other reason then for the containment of conservative politicians and the military establishment by President Gorbachev. Soviet policy, post the Gulf war, is likely to stress the Soviet position on comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement and the implementation of UN resolutions on the question of Palestine and the Occupied Territories. The demand for holding an international peace conference could be renewed by the Soviet Union which has, for long, advocated such a step.

The Soviet position is closer to the positions held by some Western European countries, such as France and Italy, and diverges from the position held by Washington. Because of the need in Washington to bolster Gorbachev's position in the Soviet Union, the US Administration is likely to take the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in serious consideration when planning the peace process. If no peace process takes place between Israel and the Arabs and if the Soviet Union is not involved, the likelihood that the Soviet Union would go back to its patron-client relationships with Arab states will increase. Soviet influence can thus be expected to be direct and indirect on the political developments in the Middle East, post the Gulf war. For these reasons, the Soviet Union should not be discounted as an important factor in the new Middle East emerging after the settlement of the Gulf conflict.

The Position of the Arab Oil-Rich Countries:

The oil-rich countries and, in particular Saudi Arabia, would like to prove that their stand on the Gulf crisis and war was directed neither at the Iraqi nor at the Palestinian people. Their stand stems from self-interest and from the need to see legitimacy restored in Kuwait. The Saudis, like the Kuwaitis and other oil-rich countries, will not easily forget what they perceive to be the totally pro-Iraqi stance of the PLO. They are, therefore, predisposed to make any future financial support to the Palestinians contingent on changes in the Palestinian leadership or a dramatic turnaround in the policies of the PLO to suit Saudi interests and those of the oil-rich countries. They would certainly insist on atonement by the Palestinians for their stand on the Gulf conflict. But atonement, by itself, will not be satisfactory as they will adopt punitive measures against the Palestinians residing in their countries. These may include massive deportations, imprisonment and stiff restrictions on the social and economic activities of Palestinians. The Gulf countries will also cease their unconditional financial support to Palestinians. But the Saudis and other Gulf states understand well that in order to bolster their positions, both internally and in the region, they need to contiune and show apparent interest in the Palestinian problem. This interest may not amount, post-Gulf war, to more than lip-service but the Saudis, as long as Israel occupies the al-Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem, cannot altogether drop the Palestinian cause or openly engage in peace talks with Israel. This is because the Saudis are the guardians of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina. Their credibility as the guardians of Islam's holiest shrines may be questioned if they undertake political steps that would implicitly or explicitly condone the continued Israeli occupation of Islam's third holiest shrine. The Saudi policy on the occupation of Jerusalem and the rest of the Arab territories has been strongly tied to the religious factor as is well illustrated in King Fahd's peace plan of 1982. Accepting to end the state of belligerency with Israel without a comprehensive settlement is likely to create problems for the Saudi Dynasty as well as for other reigning dynasties in the Gulf region.

Given, however, that Israel was on the side of the American-led coalition and that it did not embarrass the Arab coalition partners by attacking Iraq, the Arab oil-rich regimes would be disposed to adopt a favorable stand towards Israel if not publicly then in private. The Saudis, and the other oil-rich Arabs may be reinforced in this favorable disposition towards Israel by the fact that the Palestinians had sided with Iraq during the Gulf conflict. If it were not for the religious factor and for internal political factors, the oil-rich states would not need much convincing to openly normalize their relations with Israel.

At present, the oil-rich Arab regimes are not overly concerned with the Palestinian problem. Even if a formal negotiation process is started, it is unlikely that they will themselves sit on the table of negotiations with Israel. They may, however, offer incentives to the Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanians to make a negotiated solution possible. These incentives will be given with strings attached and will be made selectively to encourage those elements which are openly supportive of Saudi policies in the Gulf region and elsewhere in the Arab world.

The Palestinians, therefore, must not rely, in any futuristic solution or political process, on the regimes of the oil-rich countries. While financially, Palestinians may continue to need the help of the oil-rich Arab countries, it must be remembered that these countries themselves need the political and religious support provided by their backing of the Palestinian cause. But, clearly, the oil-rich countries need such support to a lesser extent now than was the case in the distant and immediate past.

The Israeli Position

The Gulf crisis brought to a halt the efforts of the Israeli Left at working out a political dialogue with the Palestinians. These efforts were intensified after the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987 and the adoption by the PNC of its decisions of November 1988 favoring a two-state solution. The disappointment of the Israeli Left, with the Palestinian position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and with the Palestinian sympathies in the Gulf war, cannot explain, by itself, the failure of the Israeli Left in producing tangible results for its dialogue with the Palestinians. The failure of the Israeli Left stems from a number of reasons: First, the limited support it has within Israel, which translates into minimal influence on decision-making processes in the Israeli body politic. Second, the Israeli Left believed in dialogue with the Palestinians in order to:

a) Draw the Palestinians into accepting Israeli's existence and encourage them to adopt a political platform in line with such an acceptance;

b) Signal to the Palestinians the willingness of the Israeli Left to acknowledge Palestinian rights within the framework of a peaceful settlement acceptable to the two peoples;

c) Use their dialogue with the Palestinians for internal political purposes as well as for enhancing their relations with West European and North American peace movements, given the Israeli government harsh policies in the Occupied Territories, and

d) Attempt and influence the Israeli public, and consequently the decision-making process, into accepting the idea of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.

But the Israeli Left, similarly to Palestinians engaged in "small talk", overestimated dialogue as a tool to advance the peace process or to score political and other gains. Some Israeli leftists mistakenly thought that the fact that dialogue was going on would bring Palestinians to a, more or less, similar political outlook as that of the Israeli Left. These Israelis were naive to assume that the mere act of dialogue would erase the effects of decades of hostility between Israelis and Palestinians or that it would lead the Palestinians to dramatically reorient their political identifications with the Arab world.

The Gulf crisis and war proved that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot be solved without considering its regional and international contexts. It would, however, be unfortunate if the Israeli Left now adopts the position that a regional settlement, between Israel and neighboring Arab states, can, by itself, solve the Palestinian problem or necessarily advance Palestinian-Israeli peaceful co-existence.

An important component of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the Palestinian predicament that is a direct product of Israeli occupation and policies. Electing to neglect the Palestinians and advising them not to call, as some Israeli leftists have done, can best be understood as an emotional reaction, not so much different from the emotional reactions of the Palestinians during the Gulf War. While emotions, both on the personal and societal levels, can be the basis for adopting and examining political stands, they can never provide solid grounds for formulating policies that could withstand the challenge of transient developments or events.

The Israeli Left is likely to reevaluate its stand once the Gulf episode is settled. But this reevaluation would probably focus on internal Israeli factors and on new regional developments rather than on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, as such. The Palestinian component of the conflict will be considered, but it is doubtful that this consideration would lead to a serious renewal of dialogue between the Israeli Left and the Palestinians.

In the broader Israeli political and military context, there was acknowledgement, by numerous Israeli public figures, that the American-led coalition has taken on the job that Israel may have had to undertake by itself in some years to come. In addition, there was the grim realization that Israel's future wars would be quite different from past wars due primarily to the technology of missiles and other sophisticated weaponry. The conclusion, in this regard, is that future wars would not spare the home front and that the civilian population would be directly exposed to the brunets of war. Besides, the fact that Jews, who have gone through the harrowing experience of the holocaust, had to be exposed once again to the threat of possible chemical attacks in Israel itself has had socio-psychological effects on the Israeli public. While these developments could lead to the strengthening of a pragmatic political position, which Israel could adopt, they could also lead to intensification of war-related preparations to absorb and develop ever more sophisticated weaponry. In this latter case, the hard-line politicians would feel comfortable in continuing with their unyielding policies knowing that adequate preparations are being made for Israel's future wars.

The initial conclusions drawn from the Gulf war by Labour and Likud politicians differ substantially from each other. In fact, leading personalities in both parties find that the Gulf conflict had reinforced their previous positions on the peace process. Shimon Peres and Itzhak Rabin of Labour expressed views that stressed the need for the initiation of a peace process with the Arab countries and with the Palestinians after the Gulf war. Peres, on his part, mentioned the role that Jordan could play in a peace process and the arrangements accompanying it in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Peres went as far as expressing the view that some Israeli territorial concessions are called for and that Palestinians and Arabs would have to reciprocate by offering concessions, on their part. The Gulf crisis and war thus seems to reinforce the assumptions upon which the Labour leadership has based its political view, especially since the mid-eighties, on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although no specific mention was made of involving the PLO in the peace process, one can assume that the Labour Party will be ready to include Palestinians, acceptable to the PLO, in future negotiations. In adopting this stand, Labour shows political realism since there is no alternative leadership to the PLO in the Occupied Territories. But it is too much to presume that Labour is in a position, now, to agree to direct talks with the PLO or that it would go out of its way to accommodate the PLO, as an equal partner, in future peace talks.

The position of the Likud can be deduced from statements made by Itzhak Shamir, the Prime Minister. He has reiterated that Israel is willing to enter into negotiations with Arab states without prior conditions. However, Shamir expressed strong hard-line position on the issue of the territories when he voiced rejection of any territorial compromise and vowed not to allow the opposition Labour party to be in a position to run Israel's foreign policy, post Gulf conflict. Shamir's vision for a peaceful settlement involves signing peace agreements with the Arab states while at the same time offering administrative arrangements in the Occupied Territories that will not acknowledge Palestinian political rights. This vision is shared by the dominant faction of the Likud with possible dissent by some members close to the political center and with strong opposition by the more right-wing members of both the Likud party and the government coalition.

The Foreign Minister, David Levy, seems to stick to the Israeli government election proposal of May 14, 1989. Like Shamir, he is willing to hold peace talks with all Arab states together with a delegation of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, unaffiliated with the PLO. Levy even entertained the idea that if Palestinian delegates are found who do not favor holding elections in the Occupied Territories then Israel would be willing to oblige them. This is one way in which Levy thinks of disposing of the election proposal since he knows well that elections in the Occupied Territories will result in the success of pro-PLO Palestinians. Levy, surprisingly, took on Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Housing, who had argued for the outright annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in response to Palestinian identification with Iraq. The more right-wing members of the Likud and government coalition have criticized Levy for wanting to renew the government's election proposal of 1989. They consider Levy's position as given the Palestinians another chance that they do not deserve.

Moshe Arens, the Defense Minister, identifies with Shamir's vision of future peace talks and, like Levy, he would like to see local acceptable Palestinians in these peace talks. It seems that the Likud leadership believes that post-Gulf war, peace with the Arab states may be more possible. But the political position adopted by key Likud personalities indicates that they will not come up with pragmatic inducements to Arab states for these to seriously consider getting engaged in peace talks. Likud bases its future vision on ideological grounds that are not likely to be compromised especially if the prospects for a real peace rest primarily on some territorial concessions. The inclusion of Rehavam Zeevi of the transferist Moledet party in the Israeli cabinet in February 1991 can thus be seen as a reinforcement of Shamir's position on possible peace talks with the Arabs. While the Israeli government will not adopt Zeevi's transferist policy, his presence in the cabinet will ensure that Shamir has enough votes in the Knesset to block any eventual peace plan that would require some sort of territorial compromise.

The Israeli government and the military authorities in the Occupied Territories are likely to use the harsh economic realities of 1991 to try and stop the Intifada and to find and groom acceptable Palestinians with whom to negotiate. Both Intifada-related incidents within Israel and Soviet Jewish immigration, in 1990, have started the process of limiting the numbers of Palestinians employed in Israel. With the start of the Gulf war, the Israeli authorities deemed it opportune to initiate new measures such as total curfew on the Occupied Territories and the apparently permanent checkposts on the northern and southern entrances of East Jerusalem, in addition to the Erez check post in Gaza, to restrict the movement of the Palestinian population into Israel. The Israeli authorities, aware of the negative consequences that the absence of Palestinian workers had had on Israeli economic sectors, especially construction, adopted a new policy of granting work permits to Palestinians whose Israeli employer asks for them and provides their transportation back and forth to their workplace. This is, at best, a selective process which aims at restricting the number of Palestinians employed in Israel, at limiting their movement inside Israel and at giving an upper hand to the Israeli authorities in the Occupied Territories to issue work permits. It is expected that less than one-third of the Palestinian labour force of close to 120,000 that used to work in Israel will eventually be given work permits. The Israeli authorities have also granted licenses for a number of new Palestinian factories with the hope that these could absorb some of the workers not permitted to work in Israel. But the granting of licenses to factories has also a political dimension: preparing the ground, through economic "carrot and stick" measures, for the hoped for change in political orientation of some segments of the Palestinian population. The new Israeli economic policy in the Occupied Territories will, however, not succeed in quickly overcoming or erasing the obstacles with which the Israeli authorities have checked the development of the Palestinian economic infrastructure since June 1967. The Israelis may be too optimistic to think that their change of mind on economic matters would readily produce political results in line with their designs for the future of the Occupied Territories.

The Gulf war has confirmed both the Labour and Likud leaderships in their pre-war positions. What has changed, however, is the regional and international contexts within which both Israel and the Palestinians find themselves after the Gulf war. American-led coalition partners, or some of them at least, may now want to introduce new rules to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the peaceful implementation of UN resolutions pertinent to this ongoing conflict. US pressure on Israel may occur given that the US had practically saved Israel from the hazards of waging its own war against Iraq and a potential coalition of other Arab countries. On the other hand, the "good behavior" of Israel in not getting involved in the Gulf war is a point of leverage in favor of Israeli hardliners who would argue that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict should be based primarily on Israel's security and territorial integrity; i.e., no withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. The US will certainly not use force, or form a war coalition, in order to force Israel to comply with UN Security Council resolutions on the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is unlikely, therefore, that a solution to the Arab Israeli conflict would be addressed by the Americans with the same immediacy and urgency that they have shown towards the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict. Israel, for the time being, will not come under immediate pressure from the US to move towards a comprehensive political settlement with its Arab neighbors and with the Palestinians. There will be a period of few months; at least, before serious efforts towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be started. This is enough to provide Israel with valuable time to formalize its harsh and calculated policies against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This time of waiting will be used by Israel to try and lay the ground for the emergence of an acceptable local leadership that would be willing to sit with the Israelis at the negotiations table.

Egypt's Position

The Egyptian regime has adopted a strong anti-Saddam stand during the whole of the Gulf crisis and war. The public pronouncements of Egyptian officials were often harsh and in fact harsher, at times, than pronouncements made by Saudi and other Arab officials in the Gulf. These public stands while specifically directed against Saddam reflect the economic dependency in which Egypt finds itself on the Gulf states, on the one hand and the political (and economic) dependency on the US, on the other. And yet the Egyptians tried to rationalize their stand on the Gulf crisis as one based on principles that apply equally to other conflicts in the region and in specific to the Palestinian problem. The Egyptians, however, while sticking to principles and, given their dependency relationships, are not likely to dramatically differ from the Saudis and the Americans with respect to the PLO. The Egyptians are in a position to keep channels of communication open with the Palestinians but they are likely to view favorably changes in the leadership of the PLO and if not, a dramatic turnaround in PLO politics to suit the post Gulf war era as atonement to the Palestinian stand during the war. But this Egyptian position towards the PLO may be affected by internal developments in Egypt itself: If internal protest movements spread then one of the steps to contain them would be to quickly normalize relations with the PLO by showing that, inspite of the Palestinian stand on the Gulf, the Egyptian government is indeed sticking to principles in all regional conflicts and is not simply motivated by its relationships with the US and the Gulf states.

Inspite of the fact that Egypt has diplomatic relations with Israel, it remains powerless to engineer, by itself, a solution to the Palestinian problem because of its dependency relationship on the US and on Saudi Arabia. Egypt, however, can play the role of the intermediary between Palestinians and Israel as it has done in the past. Post the Gulf war, however, Egypt may like to groom its own men among the Palestinians in order to increase its political leverage as intermediary. The expectation, then, is that while Egypt continues to maintain contact with the PLO it would want to create its own sphere of influence among the Palestinians whether within the PLO itself or in the Occupied Territories.

Jordan's Position

Jordan's stand on the Gulf crisis and war was based, from the beginning, on seeking an Arab solution that would ensure Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait through peaceful means. Together with this stand, it was clear that Jordan, its king, government and people, identified with Iraq and perceived US intentions as centered more on a military rather a political solution to the problem. The Jordanian stand was not received favorably neither by the US nor by some Arab members of the coalition, particularly Saudi Arabia. As a result, Jordan suffered from aid cuts and other direct economic sanctions applied to it both by the US and by the oil-rich Arab countries. In addition, the Jordanian economy suffered in its trade relations and oil imports as a result of UN sanctions applied on Iraq. Besides, the Gulf crisis denied Jordan vital remittances by Jordanian expatriates who used to work in Kuwait and other countries of the Gulf region.

Secretary of State Baker signaled in a statement to Congress that there was no alternative in Jordan to King Hussein inspite of US strong displeasure with Jordan's stand in the Gulf crisis. In Israel, concern was repeatedly expressed by leading government officials on developments in Jordan. At the same time, however, voices from within the Israeli government and the opposition Labour party have not excluded Jordan as a potential partner in any future peace settlement.

Given Jordan's difficult economic conditions and its relative political isolation in a post-Gulf war Middle East, it is likely that the Jordanian government would adopt a pragmatic and reconciliatory approach in the new politics of the region. This approach, however, would not be without its cost particularly in political terms. The Jordanian government, therefore, would be willing to play a more active role in the search for a peace process but it will do this through coordination with other Arab countries, especially Syria and Egypt, and with the PLO, as well. It may not be far-fetched to suggest that, given the present realities of the region, the Jordanian government may renew its 1985 agreement with the PLO to take into consideration the developments of recent months. While the Jordanians will come under pressure to get involved, on their own, in the peace process, the political acumen of King Hussein would tend to favor a coordinated Jordanian-Palestinian stand, and if possible a pan-Arab stand, on the issue of peace talks with Israel.

The Position of Syria

Syria, for once, may be in a position to consider, in a serious manner, the prospects of getting engaged in Arab-Israeli peace talks. But Syria, for internal political and ideological reasons would want strong inducements, such as the return of the Golan Heights, in order to justify its willingness to engage in peace talks with Israel. Unless the Israelis are willing to consider offering such inducements, the Syrians are unlikely to engage in a peace process, inspite of American and Saudi enticements for them to do so. With respect to Syrian-Palestinian relations, the Syrians continue to have influence among certain Palestinian groups. Inviting Syria, as some Israelis have suggested, to be one of the Arab Charges d' Affaires of the Palestinians will advance the efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, however, in preparation for a peace conference, could coordinate its position with Jordan, other Arab states and the PLO in order to come up with a joint political stand. It is doubtful that Syria, by itself, will be able, at present, to formulate a Syrian-Palestinian position that will enjoy
wide support among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and elsewhere. It is, therefore, possible that the Syrians may want to normalize their relations with the PLO, both in preparation for possible talks with Israel and for internal and ideological political considerations. But the Syrian leadership, given regional and international developments at present, may not be pressed for a rapprochement with the Palestinians.

The French and European Positions

France has traditionally adopted an independent political position with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The French position, with its acceptance of the international peace conference Hand with its highest level consultations with Palestinian leaders, has provided in the past an important base of support for the Palestinians in European and international circles. France's active involvement in the Gulf conflict should be seen, in part, as a justification for the continuity of this independent French position, including the possible call for the implementation of UN resolutions on the question of Palestine. France is expected to emphasize the need for Palestinian participation in any peace process. The problem for the French, however, is how to overcome American censure of outright PLO participation and American opposition, as well, to the idea of Israel's implementation of UN resolutions on the question of Palestine. The French are expected to continue their support to the Palestinians and their cause but, in return, they would like to see the Palestinians adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach in light of the developments following the Gulf war.

The countries of the European Community are likely to offer economic help to the Palestinians. The political positions, however, will fluctuate between those that will identify with the American position on the Arab-Israeli conflict as in the case of Britain and Germany and those that will stick to their own position as is the case of France and Italy. The role of the EC countries, however, will center on their continuing policy of offering financial and other help to the Palestinians. This help is politically motivated and it is likely, therefore, that it will be used to press the Palestinians into adopting positions that would help to advance peace talks with Israel. As a result of the Gulf crisis and the perceived pro-Iraqi position of the Palestinians, some European countries may be more susceptible to channeling funds, through the Israeli authorities, to specific Palestinian institutions and groups in the Occupied Territories. Israel will certainly manipulate such a situation to ensure the advancement of its political designs and measures in these territories.

The Palestinian Position

The Gulf war necessitates a reassessment of the Palestinian position both in the Occupied Territories and in the regional and international contexts. But such a reassessment should rely on how to realize the Palestinian Political Constants and not on compromising them. These political constants include:

1.A speedy end to Israeli occupation with all the oppressive and repressive measures affecting the whole of Palestinian society.

2. The exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, including the right to establish a state along the guidelines stipulated by the various UN resolutions since 1947.

3.The November 1988 decisions of the Palestine National Council which accept a two-state solution and UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

4.The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In reassessing the Palestinian position, priority should be given to ordering the Palestinian house. This ordering should be done by Palestinians themselves without interference by Arab and other states. The reassessment should aim at answering the following questions:

a) What are the pressing Palestinian preoccupations, in terms of society and economy, after the Gulf war?
b) Where does the Intifada stand, both internally and internationally? How would the Intifada continue and what are the most effective means to realize Palestinian objectives, given the present realities?
c) How would Palestinians respond to pressures and attempts to divide them politically? How should Palestinians address the Arab masses and peace movements in Western Europe and North America, post-Gulf war? What are the political options open to the Palestinian leadership and how can it use these to safeguard the historical rights of the Palestinian people?

As to the practical preoccupations of the Palestinian people, these should top the Palestinian agenda, post-Gulf war. Addressing the practical preoccupations of Palestinians, as they relate to society and economy, is a necessary step to ordering the Palestinian house. Ordering the Palestinian house could involve establishing or renewing political contacts with other states but the stress should be first and foremost on meeting the practical concerns and needs of the people. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate how the Gulf crisis has affected the needs of the Palestinian people whether those who were forced to leave Kuwait and other Gulf states or those who continue to be exposed to Israeli practices and oppressive measures in the Occupied Territories.

One possible approach to meeting the needs and preoccupations of Palestinians is to work out a socio-economic plan for the Occupied Territories. Such a plan would aim at centralizing public services, especially those provided in education, health and welfare. While the health sector may have witnessed, in the last three years, more coordination among its various organizations, this coordination should be furthered and advanced even to a higher level. All public sectors, serviced by Palestinian institutions, need to develop a common strategy and vision for the future. This cannot be accomplished if factionalism and other narrow criteria are left to determine the priorities of the various Palestinian institutions.

As important in such a socio-economic plan should be the development of the economic infrastructure in order to create new jobs for the thousands of unemployed Palestinians. These new jobs should center in industry and agriculture as well as in construction. We should not be satisfied with beefing up existing industries but should strive to develop our own industrial infrastructure capable of meeting most of our internal needs together with some export demand. Without agree in, among ourselves, on minimal guidelines to direct our economic efforts in the coming few years, we would likely get to a situation of chaos whereby all individual or small efforts will not add up to substantial development of our economy.

In the final analysis, attention paid to the practical concerns and needs of Palestinians is a political act: Without a solid socio-economic base, political and economic pressures on the Palestinians are likely to have negative effects that may include the emergence of various centers of influence that are in competition and contradiction with each other. A solid socio-economic base will, therefore, counteract such possible negative effects and will keep intact the political will of the Palestinian people.

As long as Israeli occupation continues so will the Intifada. This is simply because the Intifada is the antithesis of military occupation. Palestinians, however, should evaluate their Intifada and its tactics, given the new regional and international developments. This evaluation should be done internally and for strictly internal purposes and not as a means to compromise with Arab and foreign powers. The Palestinians need to weigh the effectiveness of Intifada tactics, used since December 1987, on achieving their political goals as well as the effects of such tactics on the concerns and needs of the population. A formula should be found whereby Palestinians would safeguard and advance their economic, educational, health and other accomplishments while adopting tactics that will keep the political objectives clear to the population at large.

Some may argue that the best way for the Intifada to proceed is for mass-based participation to be renewed. There is, however, a problem with this argument since it may tend to neglect that the factors affecting the Intifada in its 39th month are definitely different from the factors that were present in the first few months of the Intifada. But it is correct that the highest consideration in any evaluation or assessment of the Intifada should be on how to keep it a mass-based movement. This consideration, however, should be addressed keeping in mind the economic and other pressures that are being applied on the Palestinians. Assessing the Intifada, in its 39th month, should be a calculated and objective undertaking which, while considering the different internal political and ideological stands, should also touch base with Palestinian masses and with their pressing concerns and realities. If this is not done in the process of Intifada-evaluation and assessment, we are likely to find ourselves operating in disharmony and with serious gaps in communication between the different segments of society.

The Palestinians should be aware that they are heading towards a period of intense political pressure that aims at discrediting them, dividing them and assigning them a peripheral role in any future political process in the region. This kind of political pressure constitutes a form of psychological warfare to get the Palestinians to feel that there is no alternative for them but to play according to the wishes and rules of the US, Israel and some Arab countries. The American Secretary of State, in his upcoming trip to the Middle East, does not have free time to meet with Palestinians; the British Foreign Minister, while expressing his willingness to bring in the Palestinians from out of the cold, does not specify the price of his doing so. The Israelis do not want to talk except with "acceptable" Palestinians and some Arab coalition partners introduce "distinctions" between the Palestinian leadership and its people. All these attempts are pressure tools to emphasize the "powerlessness" of the Palestinians.

Palestinians should not be quick to respond to this psychological warfare: they should keep their cool on account of three reasons:

First, ever since 1948, Palestinians were treated peripherally by many powers whether in the region or outside of it. This treatment never succeeded in obliterating the fact that there could be no real peace if Palestinians were not included in the peace-making or if their rights, as a people, were not secured. A convincing illustration of the failure of this treatment are the seven wars in which Israel was involved since 1948, the Gulf war being the latest.

Second, if a serious peace process is started to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians will be invited; otherwise, the peace process cannot conclude successfully. Because there is a consensus among the Palestinians that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Palestinian representatives in any future peace talks need to have PLO blessing and approval, if not be PLO members themselves. Thus, inspite of what Washington, Tel-Aviv and some Arab capitals would like to see with respect to Palestinian representation, the Palestinians will continue to speak with one tongue based on the political constants to which they adhere.

Third, the West-European voices, and in particular those of French President and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had emphasized the need to implement UN resolutions on the question of Palestine, provide comfort to the Palestinian people. These French pronouncements prove that what applies to one conflict should apply to another, as a matter of principle. France is not alone in adopting this position, other voices have expressed the same principle and declared the need for convening an international peace conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whatever the procedure adopted, if and when peace talks begin, the Palestinians will be represented not by quislings but by genuine representatives of the Palestinians people and its will.

Keeping cool, however, does not mean that the Palestinians have to sit still and let the ball rest in the court of others. The Palestinians need to resume their contacts with Arab, European, Asian and African countries in order to explain their position based on their political constants and in order to alert the governments of these countries to continuing infractions against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. These contacts should also mend fences with Arab and other states in order to contribute to the efforts of reconstruction and reintegration of both the Gulf region and the Arab world.

More specifically, Palestinians should study the options available to them in terms of political coordination with other Arab states, and in particular Jordan. This coordination should be the nucleus for the adoption of a common Arab stand in preparation for the eventuality of Arab-Israeli peace talks.

Conclusion

While the Palestinian people has suffered, since 1948, affliction after affliction, this state of affairs is not due to "Palestinian betting on the wrong horse, every time". The problem lies in the historic fact that the creation of Israel was at the expense of the Palestinian people, their society and rights. The Palestinians, time and again, have sought justice but others wanted them to show moderation, realism and pragmatism in order to achieve their goal. Even when the Palestinians adopted a pragmatic and realistic political position as reflected in the PNC decisions of November 1988 in Algiers, the response was disappointing particularly from the US.

The option left for the Palestinians is to hold on to their political position of Algiers, 1988. Based on this, they should actively pursue a peace solution in the region and they should express willingness and act to open and renew dialogue with governments, peace forces and others who are ready to acknowledge Palestinian rights.

Palestinians should stress that they seek a peaceful Middle East and that they are open to ideas that would guarantee that a future Middle East will be one of stability and prosperity for all of its peoples, including the Palestinian people. This message of peace should be at the center of the Palestinian political position and it should highlight Palestinian rights and aspirations. Flexibility, by the Palestinians, should be shown with respect to intermediate territorial arrangements that should, in the long run, guarantee their rights and aspirations.

A new Middle East cannot emerge without the active involvement and participation of the Palestinians, irrespective of plans by big or regional powers. This fact should reinforce the Palestinian in their position and yearning to have a just and lasting comprehensive settlement that would, hopefully, usher the region into a new era of peace, justice and stability.