Dr. George Giacaman

Dire Forebodings

By the end of the second week of the Gulf crisis and as the Palestinian position began to crystallize, Palestinians found themselves the object of a campaign of threats, scorn, and vituperation. The opening salvos came from the Israeli left whose political career even before the onset of the Intifada owed much to an on-going dialogue with Palestinians. In the midst of the war-mongering mood and the frenzy of hostility to Iraq that gripped Israel, the Israeli left needed to distance itself very quickly from the position of its Palestinian interlocutors. The emerging national consensus within Israel did not leave much room for dissent, and if the Israeli left were to survive the Gulf crisis, it seemed prudent that it go on the attack.

An assortment of well-known figures led the campaign. The writer A.B.Yehoshua, Knesset members for the Citizen's Rights Movement Yossi Sarid and Dedi Zucker, and Mapam's M.K. Eliezer Granot, expressed shock and deep disappointment. Some threatened the Palestinians with the cessation of dialogue, others fulminated with dire forebodings. In an interview with the New York Times in mid-August Yossi Sarid declared that he no longer felt any need to meet with Palestinians. In the same interview, Dedi Zucker affirmed that the Palestinians had committed a grave error, perhaps even a historic one.

By the end of August a virtual chorus of Arab, Western, and Israeli politicians, analysts, observers, and journalists were predicting the worst for Palestinians at the end of the crisis. Several Israeli commentators saw this as one more historic mistake to the repetition of which Palestinians appear to be addicted. Latent in this view is the assumption that the Palestinians ought to have joined the war effort against Iraq by dispatching a symbolic contingent to Saudi Arabia for instance, in the manner of Morocco. Whether it was politically feasible for the PLO to align itself with the United States and Israel against Iraq was never discussed. Nevertheless, the foreign minister of Egypt spoke for several Arab regimes and for Israel's government when he alluded to the possibility of withdrawal of recognition of the PLO as the Palestinians' representative as one long-term result of the Gulf crisis.

By the middle of September some among those on the left in the Israeli political spectrum had an opportunity to reassess their position. It must have become clear to them that in the heat of the fray they had uttered words not expressive of their true interests. This is especially relevant in the case of organized groups such as Peace Now. For if dialogue with Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories were to be irrevocably severed, it was not clear that such groups would be able to survive the outcome. Peace Now in particular is especially susceptible in view of the fact that its existence and cohesion as a movement is predicated on the pursuit of peace with Palestinians through dialogue and joint action. As a result, Peace Now published several advertisements in the Arabic press in East Jerusalem distancing itself from some of the more extreme pronouncements by some of its members. Their official view now recognizes the disparity of positions on the Gulf crisis, affirming at the same time the need not to have this preclude the continuation of dialogue and joint work. Spoils of War

Meanwhile, the scramble for the political spoils of the crisis started in Israel. The Bush administration went to great lengths to keep Israel out of direct military involvement in the interest of securing Arab legitimacy for its imperial effort. Unconfirmed Press reports suggested that an international conference to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the end of the crisis was an early casualty, having been sacrificed by the Bush administration to appease the Shamir government. After the start of the war in mid-January Israel was commended on its "restraint" by one visiting Congressional delegation after the other. It transpired that Israel had shown commendable restraint twice, once in not attacking Iraq before the beginning of the air war, and once again after Iraqi Scuds fell on Tel Aviv and other locations. On this score, Iraq can be seen as having been even more restrained than Israel, with a record of almost ten years of restraint before firing its first missile, and doubly so for not attempting a pre-emptive strike before Israel bombed its nuclear reactor in 1981.

There is more than one reason why Israel's government agreed to stay out of the war even after Israel was hit be Iraqi missiles. For one thing, the attacks on Israel proved to be a veritable PR windfall enabling it to pose again as the victimized underdog after three years of not very favorable coverage due to the uprising in the occupied territories. Every visiting delegation from the United
States and Europe was issued gas masks immediately upon arrival Fat the airport and some even got to use them during their stay, thus sharing in Israel's moment of danger and drama. And all before the peering eye of the T.V. camera.

Israel's government was also hoping to cash in on the crisis. Finance minister Yitzhak Moda'i prepared a list of "expenses" totaling 13 billion dollars. Among the smallest itemized sums was that of damages due to missiles as of date of preparation of list. The list included one billion dollars for lost income from tourism, Band ten billion dollars for the settlement of Soviet immigrants. How the latter sum was related to the war was never made clear. The U.S. government was only partially obliging. This confirmed earlier fears that the U.S. was planning to use economic assistance as a bargaining chip to exact political concessions from Israel after the war. Still, Israel was able to raise more private funds than it does at normal times thanks to the effort of various Zionist groups in the U.S.

The main reason for the celebrated restraint of the government of Israel is political and not military or economic. As the war progressed it became demonstrably clear that the war aimed at destroying the military power of Iraq and the power base of the regime, as well as the toppling of Saddam Hussein if possible. Thus the United States was in the process of accomplishing what Israel wished to accomplish but could not on its own. Indeed, Israel's military involvement would have been counter-productive not only because of the strain it would have imposed on the Arab side of the alliance, but because it was not at all clear that Israel could do better than the U.S. forces were doing.

Thus Israel found itself in the enviable position of having someone else do the dirty work it wished to do while it went busily about collecting political credit to be used after the war. As early as mid-September it was clear to many politicians and commentators in Israel that the U.S. may owe its Arab allies a political quid pro quo at the end of the conflict, and that Israel might have to assume part of that bill. Linkage, that is, in all but name.

Linkage

In spite of the fact that in his broadcast towards the end of February in which he announced the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait Saddam Hussein agreed to separate the issues he had conjoined, the confluence of the Gulf war and the Palestine question was already established. Before the war had ended, various American officials including the President and the Secretary of State emphasized the need to address the Israeli-Palestinian question. Soon after the cessation of battle and before the conclusion of a formal cease-fire, the President of the United States again emphasized the need to work towards the solution of the Palestinian problem as well as the Arab Israeli conflict in his speech before the joint session of Congress on March, 1991, as did several Arab regimes allied with the United States.

The Secretary of State of the United States also raised this point during his visit to Israel a week later. But if statements by politicians invariably prove ephemeral especially if made in the heat of battle, let me adduce three reasons why the U.S. might need to pursue the beginning of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

First, one should keep in mind that the vast majority of Arabs (as well as the vast majority of Muslims) are strongly opposed to the American aggression against Iraq and view it as a latter-day imperialistic venture, in spite of the fact that they may not necessarily support Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The issues are separate and separable. It is too early to discern the long- term implications of this for the regimes that allied themselves with the United States, but it is clear that they will need to continue to justify this alliance especially when the scale of death and destruction comes to be known. Cancellation of loans (as in the case of Egypt) and infusion of cash(as in the case of Syria) will not be enough. Nor will it be perceived as a gain that the ruling families in the Gulf sheikhdoms have been preserved. Only concrete gain on an Arab issue of central concern, such as the Palestine question, can possibly do the job. Indeed, several members of the ruling families of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have shown sensitivity to this question and have continued to pledge support to the Palestinian cause even while criticizing the Palestinian leadership. One should therefore expect that these ruling families, with the backing of Egypt, will press their patron for movement on the Palestine question. Their self-interest and that of the United States requires this.

Second, the uncommon and unusual zeal with which the United States pursued the application of Security Council resolutions is bound to be remembered in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The United States and Israel can endlessly deny the viability of comparison between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Gulf War, but in the minds of the vast majority of Arabs the comparison is eminently viable because of the starkness of the contrast. The issue of double standards is bound to be raised, and the disparity in the treatment of the two conflicts is bound to be noted. This can evoke powerful emotions in a world where the vast majority who are poor will now have to behold the spectacle of the rich and profligate re-enthroned. Saddam Hussein may have been extremely cynical in raising the issue of Palestine and of poverty and wealth. But he has raised very real issues. Hence, in view of the fact that the United States will have to depend on local regimes for the protection of its interests, propping them up will have to include a political initiative that addresses some of the concerns of the people they rule.

Finally, much has been made of the need to assure the "security and stability" of the Gulf. Indeed, Bush's "new order" requires that American interests in the Gulf remain secure, that the United States not have to fight a war every few years to protect those interests, and that the local regimes assisting in securing those interests be themselves stable. Syria and Egypt are supposed to play ca direct military role in ensuring the stability of some of those regimes, and ultimately, Israel is expected to be a part of this "security alliance." Needless to say, this longer view assumes the settlement of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. As the present war has shown, Israel has been a strategic liability to the United States.

Still, even shorter-term arrangements will require the initiation of a political process that addresses the Palestinian question. It is difficult to see how the Gulf can be made secure in its stability with a festering problem in the front yard of all Arab regimes, especially if the Intifada continues. And there is no reason to believe that the Intifada will wither away or stop. Doubts

There is nonetheless ample room for skepticism. The relevant question is not so much whether it is in the long-term interest of the U.S. to work seriously for a solution of the Palestinian problem, but whether the present administration has the political will to bring pressure to bear on the government of Israel to make such a solution possible. Indeed, the history of American policy towards the Middle East at least since 1967 affords a list of declarations forgotten, initiatives thwarted, plans abandoned, and promises not kept. A distinction can be made between the long-term interest of the U.S. in the Middle East, and the ability and hence the willingness of any one administration to pursue those interests in a determined fashion. One important constraining factor on politicians occupying the highest office in the U.S. is the considerable pressure that can be brought to bear upon them by the Israel lobby, which includes a substantial number of United States senators. But what makes such pressure unduly effective is the lack of any credible threat to U.S. interests in the region despite its de facto sponsorship of the cause of Greater Israel. Arab client regimes subservient to the United States have been unable or unwilling to take the practical steps needed to counter the pressure placed on any one administration. Indeed, Arab regimes subservient to one power or another have been the Palestinians' heel of Achilles for more than half a century.

The only pressure that the United States was willing to exercise on the government of Israel by the end of the first year of the Intifada was to have Israel submit its own proposal for a solution to the Palestinian problem. The result was the Shamir plan of May 1989. After failing to have the government of Israel take its plan seriously shortly before the Gulf crises started, Secretary Baker has now renewed his efforts with the difference the he is taking the whole of the Shamir plan seriously, partly perhaps in the hope that Shamir himself will do the same. For, as the Prime Minister of Israel never tires of repeating, the main items in his plan deal with peace with Arab states rather than the Palestinians. Hence the two-track" approach of Mr. Baker.

How far this new approach will succeed remains to be seen. What is new in the present situation in the aftermath of the war is that the United States has more of an interest in working for a solution to the Palestinian problem than it had before the Gulf crises, for reasons outlined above. It also has an interest in working towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict so that Israel may play a more vigorous and direct role in securing the stability of the regimes entrusted with the task of securing U.S. interests in the region. Again it remains to be seen if the present Administration has the political will to see such a project through, in so far as it involves exchanging land for peace. It will require of the United States to be much more than a "catalyst," the role assigned in public to it by Secretary Baker.

The position of the government of Israel regarding the "two-track" approach has so far been positive but cautious. The Prime Minister claims that the matter of exchanging land for peace has not been raised by the Secretary of State in their private meetings. Shamir in any case continues to emphasize the importance of progress in achieving peace with Arab governments, relegating the need to make peace with the Palestinians to a less important category.

While it might be difficult for the government of Israel to reject its own peace plan now that it has been sponsored by the United States, at least two options are open to the government, each consistent with its radical ideology. The first is stalling, an old tactic now to be pressed into the service of rejectionism. This option envisions Shamir giving a positive response, in principle, to the American initiative, while stalling at every turn over every conceivable issue of procedure or substance. The purpose would be to gain time and delay for a year or so until the U.S. Administration turns its attention to the election campaign.

The second envisions the government of Israel amenable to some accommodation of the regional interests of the United States, albeit at a high price to be exacted from the Arab countries, from the United States, and from the Palestinians. The virtual surrender of the Arab countries will be required, and Israel's economic, political, and military hegemony formally enshrined in "peace" treaties arrived at in one or more stages. Under the most optimistic version of this option, Israel will accept to cede portions of the West Bank and Gaza in return for settling the Palestinian problem on its own terms. Relinquishing portions of the occupied territories will be made out to be a most dramatic and momentous occasion threatening to rend Israel apart, a trauma that will haunt Israel for years to come. This sacrifice will no doubt require adequate compensation, even though it may be difficult to conceive of a compensation commensurate with it.

Winners and Losers

In spite of the dire forebodings and the expectations of some that Palestinians will be among the main losers, Palestinians remain in the aftermath of the war a major political factor. It is true they have incurred losses. Their political leadership is being ostracized, at least temporarily. Their image has been tarnished, and at least 150 thousand have lost a haven and a place of work. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that these losses will not be more than temporary, in spite of Israel's attempt to make some of them permanent. For to the present government of Israel the essence of the Palestinian problem, as a political problem it is willing to deal with, is demographic: What is it to do about nearly two million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Large scale immigration from the Soviet Union will no doubt strengthen Israel in more than one way. But it will not solve the "demographic problem," it will only postpone it. It is recognized in Israel that every million immigrants will delay the demographic parity between Arab and Jew in "Eretz Yisrael" by a decade. If two million immigrants arrive from the Soviet Union in the next three years, twenty-three years hence we will be where we are now demographically, all else being equal.

To the government of Israel there is no Palestinian problem other than this one. Hence the focus of its vision on a segment of the Palestinian population, that under occupation, and not on land. This is how we can explain its attempts to find a "local leadership" to talk to, a leadership not in any way affiliated with the PLO, since the PLO stands for the land and for the whole of the Palestinian people. And to the extent that the United States attempts to exclude the PLO from its "peace process," it would be supporting Israel's vision of the Palestinian problem, notwithstanding United Nations and Security Council resolutions.

The relevant question then in the present context is whether the present government of Israel with possible support from the United States will be able to impose its vision of what constitutes the Palestinian problem on Palestinians, on Arabs, and on the world community.

There is no reason to believe that Israel will be able to achieve this objective even with the support of the United States. To the extent that Israeli-Arab negotiations require Palestinian consent and Israeli-Palestinian peace requires Palestinian presence in the negotiations, the problem for Israel, the Bush administration, and some Arab regimes attracted by the idea of punishing the PLO is how to proceed without PLO support but with a Palestinian dispensation.

There is no solution to this problem. The nearest thing to a credible alternative in the occupied territories is the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Even if its leadership accepted to replace the PLO, in an Arab delegation for instance, the popular base of Hamas would find it difficult to accept such a prospect. The political program upon which Hamas's constituency has been mobilized does not allow for an easy transition to the negotiating table.

The PLO and the Palestinians might not have enough strength to realize their vision of peace, but they have enough strength to prevent the relegation of the Palestinian cause to the status of a demographic problem. In the event the Bush administration proves to be serious in its determination to work towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as its long-term interest demands, Palestinian political leverage would have been ironically enhanced as a result of the war. The United States has more of a stake now in the resolution of this conflict than it used to before the war, and it cannot dispense with Palestinian approval. If on the other hand the Bush administration finds that it is not willing to pressure Israel to accept a role for the PLO in the negotiations that is acceptable to the Palestinian organization, it might decide to forsake the pursuit of a settlement in the Middle East.

From a Palestinian perspective this need not be the worst possible outcome. Shamir's autonomy plan as a final solution to the Palestinian problem is the continuation of occupation under a different guise. If in return for this the government of Israel hopes to have Arab States affix their seal of approval to peace arrangements ensuring Israel's hegemony in the region, an indefinite continuation of occupation might well be a more attractive option.