

PALESTINE

**FACTIONALISM IN THE NATIONAL
MOVEMENT (1919 - 1939)**

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INTRODUCTION

This study examines the internal struggle among the leading Palestinian families for the attainment of power, and leadership of the Arab national movement in Palestine. From the first years of the British mandate in Palestine, the traditional leadership of the Arabs was split between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The divisive nature of Arab leadership had its effect on the whole of the Arab national movement. In essence, that movement was never united or strong enough to confront its British and Zionist adversaries. However, part of this problem was the outcome of the existing social structure which was unproductive as well as rigid.

Nevertheless, Western influence in the form of secularism and modern development did have effect on the demography of Palestine many years before the British created it as a separate political entity. A new urban elite had come to being towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the mandate, this elite became politically influential, causing the traditional elites in the villages to feel resentful and insecure. Not until the 1930's was the urban elite able to dominate the politics of both the rural and urban populations and become in effect the national leadership of Arab Palestine.

The British, who naturally wanted to control the country, exploited almost every aspect of the demographic and social cleavages existing in Palestine. They encouraged the establishment of "peasant" type of political parties hoping such political organizations would prevent the union of rural and urban elites into what might become a viable and genuine national movement.

However, the rivalries between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis remained the British best hope for a weak and ineffective national movement. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Arabs could not escape their traditional rivalries. The Palestinian national movement fell victim to internal divisions and political fragmentation. At times, Arabs fought Arabs while their Zionist enemy confronted them with unusual stubbornness and determination to succeed in their ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

In fact, the British policy of "divide and rule", succeeded and the rivalry between the two families took a sharp turn during the first decade of British mandate. These families manipulated all the ties of kin, class and patronage to win over new supporters. Unfortunately, the traditional leadership did not realize in the 1930's that the future did not belong to it for the Arabs would lose Palestine partly in 1948. A Jewish state would be established in most of the country and the rest would go under Jordanian and Egyptian rules. Worse yet, down this pipeline the future looked gloomier. The whole of Palestine would go under Jewish rule and there would be no assurances that stability in the region of peace might one day prevail.

CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF ZIONISM AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

The awakening of Arab consciousness in modern times and the consequent rise of Arab nationalism can be attributed, *inter alia*, to the activities of the Zionists and to the impact of the First World War. The Palestinians were part of the Arab World sharing with it many of its internal developments as well as some of its external influences. Zionism was particularly influential in shaping their current politics and in determining their political destiny.

Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. For centuries, Arabs and Jews have developed deep roots and emotional attachments to it. In time, the roots and the attachments became important in the development of two separate, but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and Zionism. Both nationalisms strove to ultimately gain control of Palestine.

Historically, the Palestinian question can be related to the problem of Western intervention--cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism and political penetration in the form of colonial rule. However, while Jewish nationalism originated in the intellectual and emotional responses to the Pogroms of East Europe, the nationalism of the Arabs was a direct reaction to Ottoman (Turkish) oppression and European colonialism.

One should keep in mind that the two nationalisms appeared around the same time, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and reached the peak of their political strength later in the twentieth century. In the meantime, they were tied to the outcome of political decisions made in Europe. Although their aspirations were to be realized in Palestine, far away from Europe, their fortunes and misfortunes depended heavily on the politics of Europe, particularly those of the big powers.

The Zionist Movement

Enlightenment and secular philosophy radically changed conditions in the Jewish communities of eastern and central Europe. Ideas of nationalism and freedom had their influence on secular Jews but were not attractive among Orthodox Jews who entertained messianic hopes for salvation from persecution in

natio Christiana in the biblical promise of return to the promised land, i.e. Palestine. However, modern secular trends did affect the revival of the Hebrew language and culture. The Ideas of equality and freedom brought by the European emancipation and modern nationalism produced a number of conflicting trends : assimilation V. separatism and exclusivism, modernism V. traditionalism, and secularism V. religionism or sectarianism as represented by Jewish orthodoxy. The leaders of the traditionalists resented what appeared to be the intrusion of secular notions upon the "religious quietism" associated with the messianic beliefs of Jewish orthodoxy.

The Jewish secularists (Maskilim) labored very hard to alleviate the inhuman hardships and to improve the deplorable conditions of the Jewish ghettos in East Europe and Russia. They sought assimilation in the dominant national cultures of the countries where they lived, as a solution to the social-political discrimination and economic hardships they suffered in these gentile societies.

However, the persistence of anti-semitism contributed to the creation of the Zionist movement which argued for political separatism and against assimilation. Indeed Zionism could be seen as an inspirational movement, an alternative to the oppression and humiliation of the European ghettos to which they were confined and isolated. Yet the ideology never was a uniform creed or a monolithic movement.

The Historical Roots of Zionism : The word Zion came from its hebrew counterpart for a dry, rocky hill. Historically, it referred to one of the ridges upon which Jerusalem was built. Eventually, Zion and Jerusalem became synonymous words expressing, since the expulsion of the Jews from Jerusalem by the Romans in 73 A.D., a deep yearning for a miraculous return to the promised land.(1)

The movement which came to symbolize the meaning of the return to Zion emerged as a unique type of nationalism or as someone depicted it "a patriotism without a country." It was rooted in ideas as old as the Jewish "Dispersion," but as an organized political movement its history begins in 1897 when, under the able leadership of Theodor Hertzl, the First Zionist Congress convened in Basle to draw up a program of action and establish the foundation of what became known as the Zionist Organization.(2) Although the question of where the Jewish home should be was not finally settled until the meetings of the Sixth Congress in 1903,(3) it was in this congress that a resolution was passed creating "... in Palestine ... a home for the Jewish people [to be] secured by public law."(4) In his opening address to the First Congress, Hertzl tried to clarify the Jewish dilemma in the following words:

"Since time immemorial the world has been misinformed about us. The feeling of solidarity with which we have been so frequently and violently reproached was in the process of disintegration when we were attacked by anti-semitism. Anti-Semitism gave it new strength. We have returned home, as it were. Zionism is a return to Jewishness even before there is a return to the Jewish land . . . consequently, our movement will be embarked on a sensible cause of action only if it strives for guarantees under public law."(5)

To secure public and legal guarantees for a Jewish home in Palestine, the First Zionist Congress adopted the following program:

1. The appropriate promotion of colonization with Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and tradesmen.
2. The organization and gathering of all Jews through suitable local and general institutions, according to the laws of the various countries.
3. The promotion of Jewish national feeling and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps for the attainment of such Government consent as necessary in order to achieve the aim of Zionism.(6)

Unfortunately, the Zionist movement showed, at least in its early stages, almost total ignorance of the fact that Palestine had Arab population well-entrenched in its soil for many centuries. This was evident in the frequent use of their putative and polemical slogan "a land without a people for a people without a land."(7)

Initially, Hertzels main objective was to secure large sums of money to secure a legal guarantee, a charter to bring about the large-scale settlement of Jews as anticipated by the First Zionist Congress. Although personally, Hertzels had no specific preference to place for the Jewish home, he became convinced that if Palestine were to be the place, its "keys" were to be found in either Berlin or Constantinople. He thus, set out to secure the consent of the Turkish Sultan, and later the German Kaizer, for the initial construction of his Zionist project.

Fortunately, for the Zionists, Hertzels was known for his genius and abilities in cultivating well placed and influential men like the Baron de Rothschild.

The opportunity to make contacts with the Turkish Sultan seemed to be available at the time. The political realities of the Ottoman Empire made it vulnerable and highly susceptible to external influences offering the possibility of

financial aid. The Turkish economy was in a bad shape and the Empire was heavily in debt. Hertzl's strategy was to make a financial offer to Abdul Hamid II, the Turkish Sultan, in return for his support for the Zionist project in Palestine. In June of 1896, he came to Istanbul, the Turkish capital, and through Philip de Newlinski he sought the Sultan's consent for the issuance of a Turkish charter which would allow Jews to settle and colonize Palestine in return for the payment of twenty million British Pounds.(8)

To the surprise and dismay of Hertzl and the Zionists, the Sultan refused the offer. However, later in 1901, through intermediary, one by the name of Arminius Vambery, Hertzl was granted an audience with the Sultan.(9) At the time, Hertzl knew that the Sultan wished to gain control of the management of Turkey's public debt which had fallen under the control of the European powers.(10) In the meeting, Hertzl found the Sultan agreeable, believing the Zionist project was feasible. The Sultan thought Zionist assistance could very well free the Turkish economy of Europe's nagging influence and tormenting intervention. Unfortunately, for Hertzl and the Zionists, the Sultan balked at the idea of issuing the charter. At the time, the Ottoman state already overburdened and vexed by the Armenian dilemma and the Sultan did not wish to complicate matters further by injecting another troublesome issue into the affairs of his empire.(11) Nevertheless, in the next few years, the Zionists would be able to quietly settle thousands of Jews in Palestine. By 1908, they had acquired 156 square miles of Palestinian land in which twenty six Jewish colonies were established.(12)

Hertzl's next try was with the German Kaizer, Willhelm II. However, the German monarch, although sympathetic, thought "German patronage of the Zionist movement might in the end cost more than it was worth in difficulties with other powers, which had, or aspired to have a stake in Palestine."(13)

After several years of fruitless efforts, Hertzl despaired of ever obtaining the support of the Turks for a charter to colonize Palestine. Already, in 1900, he had turned to the British for the fulfillment of Zionist aspiration. He expressed his optimism that the British might be the government to help the Zionists in a speech of the Fourth Zionist Congress meeting in London in August of 1900:

"England, great England, free England, England looking over all the seas, will understand our aspirations. From here the Zionist idea will take its flight further and higher that we are sure."(14)

At the time, the British Colonial Secretary was Joseph Chamberlain who, according to his biographer Julian Amery, was sympathetic to the Zionist cause out of humanitarian considerations.(15) However, he later thought a "Jewish Colony in Sinai might prove a useful instrument for extending British influence in Palestine proper when the time came for the inevitable dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire."(16) Chamberlain's desire to find a territorial solution to the Jewish problem was further accentuated by Arthur Balfour Prime Minister from 1902 till 1905. In 1904, the British government proposed to settle Jews in East Africa in what was known as the "Uganda Plan." Hertzl, after failure with the Sultan and the Kaizer, seemed ready to give the plan his most serious consideration.(17) However, most Zionists were against it and professed instead the idea of colonizing Palestine.

Balfour became an ardent supporter of Zionism. One writer believes "... he was ... strongly infused, like the Evangelicals and the Puritans, with the Hebraism of the Bible."(18) His niece and biographer, Blanche Dugdale, wrote that her uncle was a deeply religious man who believed very strongly that "Christian religion and civilization owe to Judaism an unmeasurable debt, shamefully ill-repaid."(19)

In 1917, Balfour became the Foreign Minister in George Lloyd's cabinet which issued the historic document known by his name. That document, "the Balfour Declaration," promises the Jews a "national home" in Palestine.

Hertzl died in 1904. When the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917 the leader of the Zionists was Chaim Weizmann, a British citizen of Russian extraction. The new leader was a well-known scientist and a dedicated Zionist. He was instrumental in bringing about the Balfour Declaration. One writer described the events leading up to the Declaration in these words:

"The Diplomatic manoeuvres culminating in the Balfour Declaration were of crucial importance in establishing a framework in which Zionism could extend itself far beyond its own natural limits. Couched in vague language and short of any direct commitment, the Declaration implicitly recognized the existence of a special Jewish connection with Palestine and the right of the Zionists to represent the Jewish people in this regard."(20)

Some writers believe Zionist manipulation of British politics was effective because of its coincidence with a particular view of British interests :

"The British government believed that the Jews had great influence in America, upon whose financial resources it came to depend, and in Russia, where leaders of the various revolutionary were Jewish, and whose armies Britain desperately wanted to keep in the war; and the Ottoman Empire whose ruling Junta contained both Jews and those Muslim converts from Judaism known as Donmeh."(21)

Whatever the rationale behind the Declaration, the document was a great Zionist triumph. It should be remembered that Jewish presence in Palestine was, until the turn of the century, very limited, a mere five percent of the total population possessing less than one percent of the land. The opening of the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration and Jewish colonization, which were promised in the Balfour Declaration, meant that the Zionists could hope for the realization and fulfillment of their aspiration.

As we shall see later, Zionist success seemed very threatening to the Arabs of Palestine who constituted the vast majority of the then existing population and owned most of the land in the country. These Arabs were in Palestine for centuries and they felt they were indigenous to the land while the new comers of Jews were outsiders even though Jews always had kept contact with Palestine since their dispersion and historic expulsion by the Romans. No doubt the Balfour Declaration was the beginning of a tragic conflict between Arabs and Zionist Jews that would last until our time and possibly far beyond into the future.

BRITISH WARTIME PROMISES

The roots of the Arab-Zionist conflict go back to the 1880's long before the British government issued the controversial Balfour Declaration. During that period, Jews known as the Halutzim (pioneers), began to settle in parts of Palestine. According to Bernard Wasserstein, the new Yishuv were mainly refugees from the anti-semitism of Tsarist Russia, who were ardent Jewish nationalists highly influenced by Tolstoyan socialism.(22) This new Yishuv created the friction

between Arabs and Jews and in the experience of the early Jewish settlements lies the genesis of the conflict between Arabs and Zionist Jews.

British Pledges to the Arabs: The awakening interest of Arabs in their cultural heritage and traditions gave birth to Arab nationalism in the key cities of the Fertile Crescent. The nascent Arab national movement had its political organization and strength in Syria, particularly in Damascus, but its "most effective leadership arose in the Hejaz section of Arabia."(23)

During World War I, the Allied Powers were deeply interested in a quick Turkish defeat, one that would cost them less in life and money.(24) The British, in particular, thought this objective would be better served if they could bring about an Arab revolt which enhance the defeat of the Turks from within their empire. To accomplish their goal, they had to make several pledges to Sharif Hussein of the Hejaz, a descendant of the prophet Mohammed and a likely leader of the hoped for revolt. Hussein brought Arab nationalism to the forefront of regional and international politics. He was greatly assisted by his two sons, Faisal and Abdullah.(25)

Initially, the first contacts with Sharif Hussein were made by Lord Kitchener,(26) who sent him a message on October 31, 1914, pledging British support for the Arab struggle for freedom, provided the Arabs participated in the war on the side of the Allies.(27) While the British government was giving strong assurances to the Arabs that their independence from Turkey would be established as soon as the war ended, it was also assuring the Zionist Jews of its sympathy with their aspirations in Palestine.(28)

On May 23, 1915, Arab nationalist leaders issued a protocol, to be known later as the "Damascus Protocol,"(29) defining the conditions under which they would be prepared to cooperate with Great Britain against Turkey. On the basis of this Protocol, Arab national leaders pledged to fight the Turks under Hussein's leadership, and they openly declared that they would enter the War on the side of the Allied powers.

In 1915, Sir Henry McMahon the High Commissioner of Egypt, represented the British Government in the effort to reach an agreement with the Arabs.(30) The correspondence between him and Sharif Hussein covered the period between July 14, 1915 and January 30, 1916. All in all, ten letters were exchanged, of which eight related to Arab territorial questions.(31) In the correspondence with McMahon Hussein defined Arabs' aims as they stated in the "Damascus Protocol" which emphasized Arab independ-ence and unity in all regions where Arabs preponderated.(32) However, in a letter dated July 14, 1915, "Hussein had

requested independence in an area which included roughly the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden) Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Palestine."(33) Not surprisingly, McMahon was reluctant to recognize Arab independence in such vast areas, and he expressed British position in his letter of October 24, 1915, in which he specifically excluded territories "West of Damascus, Hama and Aleppo," on the grounds that they were not "purely Arab." The remaining territories were promised independence after the war.

These letters created a lot of confusion and controversy later. The biggest controversy involved Palestine. According to W.F. Abboushi's interpretation, "the Arabs ... argued that McMahon could not have intended to exclude Palestine from independence, since the area was as much 'purely Arab' as those areas he had included."(34) The British stubbornly rejected the inclusion of Palestine in the area promised independence after the end of the war. This was officially brought to the Arabs' attention by Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the colonies, in his memorandum, known to the Arabs as the 'Black Memorandum', dated June 3, 1922.(35) Later events revealed the nature of British intentions to confuse the issue when in 1916, it signed a secret agreement with France (The Sykes-Picot Agreement) promising that Palestine would be international. From an Arab point of view, British promises to the Arabs and to France were in conflict with each other.(36)

British Counterpledges: In the spring of 1916, Britain, France, and later Russia entered into an agreement for the disposition of enemy territory in the Levant. The agreement mentioned earlier, was known as the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement'. It was negotiated and ratified without the knowledge of the Sharif Hussein. According to the Arabs, it contained provisions which were clearly incompatible with the Hussein-McMahon pledges. Roughly, in the Arab areas, the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' provided for :

- (a) an independent Arab State or a federation of Arab States, in a part of what is now geographically known as Saudi Arabia and Yemen;
- (b) France in Lebanon and Syria, and Britain in Iraq and Transjordan . . .
- (c) Parts of Palestine to be placed under an international administration of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca.(37)

According to George Antonius, King Hussein came to know of the Tripartite Agreement (Sykes-Picot) after the Communists came to power in Russia in December 1917:

"The Bolshevik party had seized power in Russia a month previously, and one of their first acts had been to publish certain secret documents from the archives of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Amongst those were the texts of the Agreement of 1916, which the Turks lost no time in forwarding to Hussein with an offer for a Turco-Arab separate peace."(38)

Turkey, under the Triumvirate leadership of Enver, Tala'at and Jamal Pasha, tried to offset Allied influence in the area by persuading the Arabs to rescind their 1915 commitments to the Allied Powers. A secret emissary was dispatched to 'Aqaba carrying a letter from Jamal Pasha to Amir Faisal urging the Arabs

". . . to concert their real effort against the Allies, with the rationale that the promises given by the British were mendacious; and the only course left for the Arabs to take was to return to the Ottoman fold and secure their legitimate rights by coming to an understanding with the Turks."(39)

The letter also reminded Faisal of the grave consequences of the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' on the Arabs. However, "Hussein instructed Faisal to send Jamal a curt rejection of his peace overtures."(40) This episode of intrigue came to an end when Great Britain reassured the Arabs that it would honor its pledges and would stand by the Arabs in their struggle for independence and freedom.

The Balfour Declaration (1917): British commitments to the Zionists were not made very easily. The Zionist lobby in London played an important role in obtaining them. As mentioned earlier, Dr. Chaim Weizmann was, at the time, the leading figure among the British Zionists. His reputation as one of the most outstanding chemists in England, made him influential in British political circles. His scientific contributions helped the Allies during the war.(41) His close relations with influential men like C.P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, and Henry Wickham Steed, the editor of the London Times, made possible his contacts, with Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour.(42) Moreover, he managed to convince important Christian figures to organize the influential British Palestine Committee which urged the support of Weizmann on political, military, and humanitarian grounds. At the time, many Zionist leaders had become convinced

that a 'Legally secured home' in Palestine could be more readily obtained from Britain than Turkey or Germany. Consequently, the Zionists threw their lot openly with the British, who offered to allow the formation of a Jewish Corps to assist in the war effort. Eventually, three Jewish battalions of the "Royal Fusileers" actually served in Palestine during the war.(43)

After several months of hard and difficult negotiations, the Balfour Declaration was agreed upon. The document was "carefully produced and more consciously worded, and whatever is to be found in [it] was put into it deliberately."(44) It is rather ironic, that the Declaration was issued more than a month before the British entered Jerusalem, and almost a year before the entire country was brought under their control.(45) The Declaration stated:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."(46)

In order to understand fully the impact on the Arabs of this controversial historic document, it is important to discuss briefly the background for it and the motives behind it. The reasons which impelled the British to issue the Declaration were best elucidated by George Antonius in his classic The Arab Awakening:

"In actual fact, the British Government was moved mainly by two considerations. One was political: to win the powerful Zionist elements in Germany and Austria, who were actually in negotiation with the Control Power for the issue of a Turkish 'B.D', by providing them with a positive interest in an Entente victory; and, at the same time, to mitigate the hostility of Jews, who had been so active in overthrowing the Tsarist regime, an incentive to keep Russia in the war. The other was the imperialistic motive, first propounded by Kitchener, of securing Palestine or a portion of it as a

bulwark to the British position in Egypt and an over land link with the East."(47)

However, Weizmann gave a very different rationale for British issuance of the Balfour Declaration. In an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London delivered on June 9, 1936, Weizmann said :

"The suggestion that is often heard that the Balfour Declaration was made ... for imperialist or any other similar vulgar reason is entirely false. I think one fact may disapprove this legend. When the British Government agreed to issue the famous Balfour Declaration, it agreed on one condition: that Palestine should not be the charge of Great Britain."(48)

Basically, Leonard Stein's monumental work on the Balfour Declaration, confirmed Weizmann allegation. He stated that the Declaration was not an "impetuous or sentimental act of the British Government," it was a deliberate decision of British policy contrived at, after full consultation with the United States and the Allied Nations.(49) Consequently, it was not surprising to see the Arabs react indignantly and manifest deep frustration with the Balfour Declaration. For them the British position represented a crude policy and blatantly unfair way of rewarding their Arab ally during the war.

In order to allay Arab fears the British Government, urged the Zionists to try to be conciliatory with the Arabs. According to the American 'Special agent' in Cairo, William Yale:

"British political officers - he mentioned in particular, Colonel Symes - (later, Chief Secretary to Government of Palestine (1925-28) and Governor-General of the Sudan) - were doing their best to make the Declaration acceptable to the Syrian nationalist leaders then in Exile in Egypt."(50)

The British also tried to calm Hussein's anxieties by sending their special emissary, Commander D.G. Hogarth,(51) to Jeddah carrying a carefully formulated message to the newly self-proclaimed monarch.(52) The message reaffirmed the determination of the Allied Powers to ensure "that the Arab race

shall be given full opportunity of once forming a nation in the world."(53) The message confined, inter-alia that the protection of the Holy places of all three religions must be treated as a matter of international concern.(54)

King Hussein was receptive to Hogarth's message. However, he made some reservations which were described in John and Hadawi's Palestine Diary 1914-45 :

"The King would not accept an independent Jewish state in Palestine, nor was I, sic [Hogarth] instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain. He probably knows nothing of the actual or possible economy of Palestine, and his ready assent to Jewish settlement there is not worth very much. But I think he appreciates the financial advantage of Arab cooperation with the Jews."(55)

Hogarth's message reestablished Hussein's confidence in British pledges. Consequently, the King sent messages to Arab-leaders assuring them that the British did not think Jewish settlement and Arab independence are not incompatible in Palestine.(56) Further-more, the Zionists went further in their attempt to allay Arab fears regarding their ultimate designs. In May 1918, Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore visited Faisal in his camp near 'Aqaba to reassure him that Zionism was not striving to establish a Jewish government in Palestine. They stressed that Jewish assistance in the develop-ment of Palestine promised great benefits for both people, Arabs and Jews.(57) Faisal reaffirmed the Arab position on Palestine, that it was an 'Arab Country' and any Jewish settlement was and would be in Arab domain and under Arab suzerainty.(58)

This meeting between Weizmann and Faisal was preparatory to the famous agreement between the two men which was signed in London in early January 1919, and which "full cooperation was pledged toward joint efforts in the upbuilding of Palestine."(59)

The Zionist Commission: The Zionists had been successful in extracting from the British Government a commitment for their cherished Jewish National Home, and they set out to implement it with vigor and extreme dedication. Since Palestine was for many centuries populated by Arabs and there were in the country no more than 56,000 they knew that to accomplish their ultimate objective they had two difficult tasks : increasing the number of Jews in Palestine and the purchase of Arab lands for settlement. Without the fulfillment of these tasks there could be no Jewish national home in Palestine.

In April 1918, a 'Zionist Commission' was authorized by the British Government, to go to Palestine to determine the feasibility of the Jewish National Home.(60) The Zionist Commission was headed by Weizmann and four dedicated British Jews : Sir Leon Simon, a high civil servant and a Hebraist, Dr. David Eder, a pioneer psychiatrist and a socialist, Israel Sieff, a student of Weizmann, and Joseph Gowen, a businessman who was close friend of Hertzfel.(61)

Officially, the Commission's responsibility was :

"To carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government's declaration in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."(62)

Furthermore, two important functions of the Commission were :

1. To form a link between the British authorities and the Jewish population of Palestine; and
2. to help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.(63)

However, in Cairo (en route to Palestine) the Commission had been warned by Sir Reginald Wingate that "the Arabs were nervous and suspicious of Zionist aims;"(64) he urged the Zionist leaders to encounter Arab leaders to allay their fears and apprehensions, and if possible, to bring about union and cooperation between Jews and Arabs.

Nevertheless, one of the principle responsibilities of the Zionist Commission was the development of Jewish institutions of self- government. Those had been started during the Ottoman regime without the regime's permission, but with little interference by it. In many speeches delivered by Weizmann, the main emphasis dwelt on the Zionist's immediate objective, "a British Palestine which would act fairly and justly to all groups which inhabit the country."(65) According to a British source, Arab notables received Weizmann's statement with complete satisfaction. However, later the Commission would arouse Arabs' suspicion as to the Commission's interpretation of the Balfour Declaration.(66)

The Paris Peace Conference: On June 16, 1918, in response to a formal inquiry by seven Arab spokesmen from different parts of the Ottoman Empire, then residing in Cairo, the British Government publicly assured the Arabs that it would abide by its earlier pledges. The British reiterated their position concerning the Arab territories (including Palestine) by stating "that the future government of

those territories should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed."(67)

However, the British were silent about the conclusion drawn by the seven Arab spokesmen that Britain was "not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine."(68)

In 1918, President Wilson's Fourteen Points emphasized the principle and the right of national self-determination and this gave more hope to the Arabs that they would be able to achieve their national goals and aspirations in Palestine and elsewhere in the Arab World.(69)

Later in the 1930's reports by various British Royal Commissions admitted that all these statements and promises mentioned earlier, gave the Arabs the impression that the British were going to set up an independent Arab state that would include Palestine.(70)

In 1919, the Allied Powers sent their delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. The Zionists were invited to attend the great gathering. Their delegation included prominent personalities who were well versed in Western ways and understood Western "psychology" and culture. At the time of the Conference, the Zionists pressed their claims to Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration, as well as on the bases of historic, religious and humanitarian reasons. In particular, the Zionist delegates asked the Conference to

- (a) Include the Balfour Declaration in the peace treaty;
- (b) promote Jewish immigration to Palestine and their settlement of the land;
- (c) Provide for the establishment of a Jewish Council for Palestine to be recognized under law as representing the Jews of Palestine as well as other Jews in the Diaspora;
- (d) oppose making Palestine an exclusive Arab State or an internationalized one and set it up as a British mandate.(71)

It is important to note that the Zionists were not awarded all their requests at the Conference, but they did bolster their position later when the Palestine Mandate was established. On the other hand, the Arab point of view was completely disregarded at the Conference. Amir Faisal, their spokesman, failed to present effectively the Arab case, mainly because he did not understand Western cultural ways and big power politics. However, because of his fear regarding French imperialistic interests in the Near East, he signed (January 3, 1919) an agreement with Weizmann in which he accepted Jewish immigration to Palestine, on condition that Allied Powers' promise to the Arabs were fulfilled.

The King-Crane Commission: At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and M. Orlando of Italy agreed to send international commission of inquiry to ascertain the wishes and aspirations of the people of the Near East. However, Britain, France and Italy failed to participate in the work of the Commission:

"Britain and France backed out rather than find themselves confronted by recommendations from their own appointed delegates which might conflict with their policies."(72)

The United States went ahead and sent H.C. King, then President of Oberlin College in Ohio, and C.R. Crane, an American businessman and a prominent member of the Democratic party, to the Near East as members of the Commission of Inquiry. They submitted their report to the Paris Peace Conference on August 28, 1919, and a summary of the report was cabled to President Wilson on August 30, 1919. The cable stated:

"We are recommending for Syria first that whatever administration go in, be a true mandatory under League of Nations; second that Syria including Palestine and Lebanon be kept a unity according to desires of great majority; third that Syria be under a single mandate; fourth that Amir Faisal be King of the new Syrian State; fifth that extreme Zionist program be seriously modified; sixth that America be asked to take single mandate for Syria; seventh that if for any reason America does not take the mandate, then it be given to Great Britain."(73)

It is important to note that Palestine be kept as part of Syria, and that only part of the Zionist program be carried out.(74) The Commission's rationale for curbing the "extreme Zionist program":

". . . the erection of such a Jewish state [cannot] be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."(75)

It is to be noted also that the feeling against Zionist aspirations was not confined to the Arabs of Palestine, but was shared by people throughout Syria, as this feeling was expressed and articulated by the 'General Syrian Congress',(76)

in several of its resolutions.(77) The American Commission felt that the Peace Conference should seriously consider a reduced Zionist program. This meant a limitation on Jewish immigration and a total rejection of the Zionist dream of making Palestine a Jewish commonwealth. The Commission recommended that :

"There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a United Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the Holy Places being cared for by an International and Interreligious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this commission."(78)

The Palestine Mandate: Although the seeds of the Arab-Zionist conflict had been sown by the end of World War I, far more serious troubles were to take place in the early 1920's. All three parties, the Arabs, the Zionists and the British, were not willing to make the required effort and concessions to reconcile differences. During the Mandate, Arab and Zionist attitudes and actions became increasingly irreconcilable while British policies continued to be vague and divisive.

The Arabs believed that the British Mandate for Palestine came with the sole objective of achieving the 'Jewish National Home' by providing the Jews with the legal basis for achieving the reality of the Jewish national home. However, the British Mandate tried its utmost to isolate the Palestinians from the Arab main stream and negating the fulfillment of their national aspirations.(79)

Palestine was gradually occupied between 1917 and 1918, during the First World War by British forces under General Allenby. However,

"this occupation did not involve any annexations, because the principles which President Wilson propounded towards the end of the War, were incorporated in Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations--namely, the rejection of any territorial acquisition by conquest and the recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples."(80)

When the War was over, the Allies, in conformity with President Wilson's Fourteen points, recognized the principle of self-determination for smaller nations.(81) However, "the Mandate system was accepted by the Allied and Associated powers as the vehicle for the execution of the policy of the Balfour Declaration, and after a period of delay, the Mandate for Palestine was approved by the League of

Nations and the United States."(82) The Mandate was mainly concerned with specific obligations; the establishment of the National Home, and the safeguarding of the Arab rights. However, the Mandate involved a general obligation the primary purpose of which was expressed in the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant.(83)

However, in practice, Palestine was ruled like a crown-colony, despite the provisions of the Mandate that called for the introduction of self-governing institutions.(84) From December 1917 through June 1920, Palestine was occupied enemy territory governed by military officers who "were obliged by the Hague Convention of 1908 to maintain the status quo in the territory under their control."(85) On July 24, 1922, the Mandate for Palestine was approved by the Council of the League of Nations, and on December 22, 1923, it went into effect.(86)

It is worth mentioning that Mandates were classified A,B or C according to the particular territory's level of readiness for self-rule. However, all occupied Arab Lands were classified as "A" which meant that the tutelage period was to be relatively short.(87) The principle of the Mandate system was stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as follows :

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development when their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory, until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principle consideration in the selection of the Mandatory"(88)

The League's permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) in Geneva practiced limited supervisory powers over mandate territories and the British Government reported to it annually on conditions in the Palestine Mandate.(89)

Obviously, the inclusion in the Mandate of the Balfour Declaration was contrary to the wishes of the Palestinian Arabs While for the Jews it was the first internationally binding pledge of support. Consequently, the Zionists' political claims to Palestine were greatly strengthened, and, as for the Palestinians whose

wishes had been ascribed by the King-Crane Commission and were subsequently ignored, the Mandate proved to be disappointing.

The Arabs had always regarded the Mandate as illegal. When the Mandate was drawn up its principles did not fully conform with the League's Covenant nor with the pledges previously made to them by the Allies, nor even with the White Paper of 1922. In addition, the Mandate said nothing about the provisional independence of Palestine, while it encouraged Jewish immigration and settlement.

British official statements, including the reports of Royal Commissions, admitted that the Mandate contained conflicting obligations and irreconcilable responsibilities. This fact too was obvious to the Arabs. According to one of their spokesmen:

"On the one hand, it [the Mandate] was designed to conform to the training of the inhabitants in self-government by developing self-governing institutions; and on the other hand, it facilitated Jewish immigration by incorporating the Balfour Declaration."(90)

Moreover, according to W.F. Abboushi, "generally, the Arabs believed that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Agreement violated their right to self-determination."(91) Consequently, the Arabs were bitter, because they regarded the whole Mandatory system unjust, undemocratic and contrary to all the promises which had been made to them. According to Fred J. Khouri, the Arabs opposed the Mandate on several grounds :

"They denied the Mandate's legal validity on the grounds that, contrary to the terms of the League Covenant, Palestine was not provisionally recognized as independent and the wishes of the inhabitants were not the principle consideration in the selection of the mandatory power as required by the Covenant. The Arabs were especially aroused because, whereas numerous articles of the mandatory agreement referred to the Jewish Community by name, the Arabs, 90 percent of the population, were referred to merely as the other sections of the population."(92)

Moreover, from the beginning it was clear to the Arabs "that, if Palestine were to be turned into a Jewish national home, this would involve the indefinite denial of self-government until such time as the Jews were strong enough to take over the government."(93) Arab opposition to the Mandate and the policy of the Balfour Declaration remained obstinate and unrelenting throughout the period of

the Mandate. When appeals, protest, demonstrations and strikes failed to move the Mandatory Power to fulfill its pledges to the Arabs, they restored to outright confrontation and violence. In fact, the first violent expression of Arab feelings took place as early as 1920, when "the period of diplomacy ended and the area was sealed by the San Remo Conference." (94) Only a year later, in 1921, the second violent outburst followed. However, between 1922 and 1929, Jewish immigration was relatively limited and the country experienced a few years of relative calm. Unfortunately, a major outburst took place in 1929 which was followed by others until in 1936 the Arabs staged their major rebellion which lasted for three years, until 1939. To deal with these disturbances, riots, and rebellions, four British Commissions were organized to investigate their causes. (95) Their findings were always the same in so far as the "root" causes of the outbursts were concerned : the Arabs felt alienated by British failure to honor their promises and the injection of the Balfour Declaration into the Palestine Mandate. (96)

FOOTNOTES

- (1) Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 16, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 1032.
- (2) Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, New York, 1961, p. 3.
- (3) Walter Lehn and Sami Hadawi, Zionism and the Lands of Palestine, as cited from the proceedings of an International Symposium for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Tripoli, 1977, p. 61.
- (4) Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism, vol. I, London, 1910, p. XXIV.
- (5) Harry N. Zohn, Theodor Hertzl: Zionist Writings, Essays and Addresses, vol. I, New York, 1973, pp. 133-135.
- (6) J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. I, New Jersey, 1956, p. 209. See also Sokolow's, History of Zionism 1600-1918, vol. II, London, 1919, p. 268.
- (7) William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann M. Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, Berkeley, 1973, p. 11.
- (8) Newlinski was a polish noble and a renegade who earned his living in European capitals spying for the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid II. See N.M. Gelber, 'Philip Michael de Newlinski', Hertzl Year Book, edited by Raphael Patai, New York, 1959, pp. 113-152.
- (9) Raphael Patai, ed. The Complete Diaries of Theodore Hertzl, London, 1960, pp. 960-963.
- (10) Mim Kemal Oke, "The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Question of Palestine", International Journal of the Middle East, vol. 14, 1982, p. 330.
- (11) Ibid., p. 332.
- (12) Sokolow, History of Zionism, vol. II, pp. 228-239.
- (13) Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p. 21. For more information, see Abdel-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Al-Jzour al-Tarikhyyah Lil-Tahaluf al-Sahyuni al-Imperiali (The Historical Roots of Zionist and Imperialist Alliance), as cited from the Symposium on Zionism and Racism, Baghdad, 1976, pp. 15-16.
- (14) Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 16, pp. 1167-1168. See also, Alex Bein, Theodor Hertzl. Philadelphia, 1945, p. 346; and Regina Sherif, "Christians for Zion, 1600-1919", Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring / Summer, vol. V, 1976, p. 134.
- (15) Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. IV, London, 1951, p. 260.
- (16) Ibid., p. 261.
- (17) Israel Pocket Library, History from 1880, Israel, 1973, p. 16.
- (18) Barbara Tuchman, Bible and Sword, London, 1956, pp. 198-199.
- (19) Blanche E.C. Dugdale, Arthur Balfour: First Earl Balfour, 2 vols. New York, 1937, vol. I, p. 324.
- (20) Alan Taylor, "Zionism and Jewish History", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. I, Winter, 1972, p. 45.
- (21) William R. Polk, The Elusive Peace: The M.E. in the 20th Century, New York, 1979, p. 33. For an elaborate analysis on what impelled the British to issue the Controversial Balfour Declaration, see W.F. Abboushi's, The Unmaking of

Palestine, Cambridshire, 1985, pp. 4-6. See also, David Lloyd George, War Memories, London, 1933, vol. II, p. 50.

(22) Bernard Wasserstein, British Officials and the Arab Jewish Conflict in Palestine, London, 1971, p. 11.

(23) Fred Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 2nd ed., New York, 1976, p. 7.

(24) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 1.

(25) Alfred Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace? New York, 1978, p. 15.

(26) Lord Kitchener acted as a British Agent in Egypt and then as a Secretary of State for War.

(27) Lilienthal, Zionist Connection, p. 15.

(28) Henry Cattan, Palestine: The Road to Peace, London, 1970, p. 9.

(29) As cited by R, John and S. Hadawi's, Palestine Diary, pp. 30-31, the 'Damascus Protocol' stated: "The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers: North: The Line Mersin_Adana to parallel 37 N. and thence along the line Birejek-Urga-Mardin-Kidiat-Jazirat (Ibn 'Unear)-Amadia to the Persian frontier; East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained). West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin. The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the capitulations. The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab State. The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."

(30) See cmd. 5957, 1973.

(31) See cmd. 5957, correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein, July 1951-March 1916, Letters No. 1-10, pp. 3-18, however, George Antonious in his classic, The Arab Awakening, New York, 1946, cites only 8 letters.

(32) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 157-158.

(33) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 1, see also the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, London, 1937, p. 11.

(34) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 2. See also, Howard M. Sacher, The Course of Modern Jewish History, New York, 1958, p. 371.

(35) See cmd. 1700, 1922, see also Wasserstein, British Officials and the Arab Jewish Conflict, p. 14.

(36) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 2.

(37) John & Hadawi, Palestine Diary, p. 55. See also E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st series, vol. IV, pp. 241-251. See also J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, New York, 1950, pp. 18-19.

(38) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 253. See also, Bahjat Sabri, Filastine Khilal al-Harb al-Alamiyyeh al-Oula wa ma Ba'daha 1914-1920, (Palestine during World War I and after 1914-1920), Jerusalem, 1982, p. 97; and F. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p.8.

(39) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 256.

(40) Ibid.

- (41) Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History, p. 372.
- (42) Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, p. 13.
- (43) Ibid.
- (44) J.M.N. Jeffries, "Palestine the Reality", chapter 11, as cited in Walid Khalidi's, From Haven to Conquest, Beirut, 1971, p. 173.
- (45) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, pp. 3-4.
- (46) Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 25.
- (47) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 261; for further information see, Emile Touma, Juzour al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyah, (The Roots of the Palestine Problem), Jerusalem, 1976, pp. 82-85, see also, Akram Zu'aitir, Al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyah, (The Palestine Problem), Egypt, 1955, pp. 46-48.
- (48) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 246. See also, Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict, London, 1972, pp. 7-19.
- (49) Norman and Hellen Bentwich, Mandate Memories 1918-1948, London, 1965, p. 9.
- (50) Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p. 632.
- (51) "D.G. Hogarth was a distinguished archaeologist with special knowledge of the Near and Middle East, and served during the War as head of the Arab Bureau". As cited in John and Hadawi's, Palestine Diary.
- (52) See cmd. 5964, 1939.
- (53) Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p. 632. See also Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine is my Country: The Story of Mousa Alami, London, 1969, p. 61. And, Khayriyyeh Qasimiyyeh, "Tatawor al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyah fi 'Ahd al-Hukumah al-Arabiyyah fi Dimashk", (The Evolution of the Palestine Problem during the Arab Government's reign in Damascus), Shu'un Filastiniyah, (Palestine Affairs), vol. I, Beirut, 1977, p. 57.
- (54) John & Hadawi, Palestine Diary, p. 98. See also Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 267-270, for more detailed account of the Hogarth's message.
- (55) Ibid., p. 99.
- (56) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 269. See also Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 8.
- (57) Zu'aitir, The Palestine Problem (Arabic), pp. 96-100, see also Qasimiyyeh, "Tatawor al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyah", p. 57, and Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, p. 19.
- (58) John & Hadawi, Palestine Diary, p. 103.
- (59) Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection, p. 19.
- (60) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 7.
- (61) Norman & Hellen Bentwich, Mandate Memories, pp. 26-27.
- (62) Wassertein, British Officials and the Arab Jewish Conflict in Palestine, p. 31.
- (63) Ibid., p. 39. See also 'Issa al-Sifri, Filastin Bayn al-Intidab wa al-Sahyunieh, (Palestine between the Mandate and Zionism), Jaffa, 1937, p. 29.
- (64) Ibid., p. 36.
- (65) Minutes of the meeting at the Shepherd's Hotel in Cairo, March 27, 1918, CZA L3/285 (Central Zionist Archives).

- (66) Palestine Government, Survey of Palestine, 1948-49, vol., p. 16.
- (67) Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 434.
- (68) Cmd. 3530, 1929, p. 127. The Declaration to the Seven is quoted in Antonius, p. 433; however, the reply of the committee to the seven is quoted in Julia E. Johnson, Compiler, Palestine: Jewish Homeland, New York, 1946, p. 12.
- (69) H.W. Temperley, ed. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, 1924, p. 141.
- (70) See cmd. 3530, 1929, p. 127; and cmd. 5974, 1939, p. 45.
- (71) Lloyd George, Memories of the Peace Conference, London, 1929, pp. 747-748.
- (72) Quoted in Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922, p. 70.
- (73) Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission, Beirut, 1963, p. 218. However, for recommendations of the King-Crane Commission report, see U.S. Department of State, papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, Washington, 1947, XII, pp. 767-799.
- (74) As quoted in Woodward and Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, p. 256, and Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, pp. 66-74, and for a detailed account of the King-Crane report, see Walter Laqueur, The Israel Arab Reader, New York, 1969, pp. 23-31.
- (75) Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, p. 215; see also Qasimiyeh, "Tatawor al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyah", pp. 63-64.
- (76) The General Syrian Congress was held in Damascus between 1919 and 1920, and was attended by delegates from what later became Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. The Congress elected Faisal King of a Unified Syria which included all those territories except Iraq.
- (77) For a full text of the 'Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress' (Damascus, July 2, 1919), see Antonius, Arab Awakening, Appendix G, pp. 440-442.
- (78) Antonius, Arab Awakening, Appendix H, p. 450.
- (79) Bayan N. al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assasat al-Siasiyah Fi Filastin 1917-48 (The Leaderships and Political Organizations in Palestine, 1917-48), Beirut, 1981, pp. 127-128.
- (80) Henry Cattan, Palestine, The Arabs and Israelis: The Search for Justice, London, 1969, p. 10.
- (81) Zu'aitir, al-Watha'iq al-Filastiniyah, p. 70.
- (82) Palestine Royal Commission, Official Communique No. 9/37, 1036, p. 4.
- (83) Ibid., see also Ahmad 'Adel Al-Jader, Athr Qawanin Al-Intidab al-Baritani fi Iqamat al-Waten al-Qawmi al-Yahudi fi Filastin (The Implications of British Mandatory Laws in Creating the Jewish National Home), Baghdad, 1982, p. 57.
- (84) Ann M. Lesch, The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974, p. 74.
- (85) Ibid.
- (86) cmd. 1708, British Parliamentary Papers, 1922, pp. 3-5.

- (87) Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922, p. 94.
- (88) For a full text of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Treaty Series No. 11, cmd. 964, pp. 11-12, see also Laqueur, The Arab-Israel Reader, pp. 34-42, and M. Darwazah, al-Qadiyyah al-Falastiniyah. However, for further observations on the Mandate see Zu'aitir, Watha'iq al-Haraka, pp. 70-72.
- (89) Lesch, The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, p. 69.
- (90) Mousa Alami, The Future of Palestine, Beirut, 1970, p. 14.
- (91) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 15.
- (92) Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 17.
- (93) Alami, The Future of Palestine, pp. 15-17.
- (94) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 12.
- (95) The Palin Commission of 1929, mentioned in A Survey of Palestine, vol. I, p. 17. For the Haycraft Commission of 1921, see cmd. 1540 in A Survey of Palestine, vol. I, p. 18. For the Shaw Commission of 1930, see cmd. 3530, *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25; and for the Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937, see cmd. 5947, *Ibid.*, p. (96) Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: Palestine 1914-1967, New York, 1967, p. 60

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAJLESIYOUN'S LEADERSHIP OF ARAB PALESTINE

After World War I, political fragmentation became a very serious problem in the Arab World. In addition to the traditional socio-political divisions, which had characterized Arab society (i.e., the varieties of localism, parochialism and clannism), there was now new political entities created by the European powers. In time, these entities began to demand from the populace absolute loyalty as well as total obedience to their institutions and symbols of authority. The new colonial creations prompted the development of national liberation movements whose object was the assertion of independence through the expulsion of the colonial powers and the establishment of Arab sovereignty over Arab land.

In Palestine, the quest for independence and political freedom took a slightly different form than in the neighboring Arab states. Palestinian Arabs had to deal with a second threat to their future independence and territorial sovereignty and this threat was embodied in the goals and aspirations of Jewish Zionism. Of course, the Zionist movement had obtained, in 1917, the Balfour Declaration from the British Government promising them the creation of "a Jewish national home in Palestine." It is impossible to understand the Palestinian national movement without the constant reminder that the movement was profoundly influenced, and, to a certain degree, shaped by its long and difficult struggle with the Zionists.

One would expect that the ferocity of the struggle between the Palestinian Arabs on the one hand and the Zionists and their British ally on the other would unite the Palestinian Arab movement and would consolidate its forces to make it a more formidable force. Yet, unfortunately, the Palestinian Arabs could not escape their traditional rivalries. The Palestinian national movement fell victim to internal divisions and political fragmentations. At times, Arabs fought Arabs while their Zionist enemy confronted them with unusual stubbornness and determination to succeed in their ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Palestine Movement in its Early Stages of Development

Initially, the British governed Palestine through a military administration known as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. In 1917, this administration was headed by Field Marshal Lord Allenby assisted by his personal appointee General Clayton (Later Sir Gilbert) as Chief political officer and Sir Ronald Storrs as Governor of Jerusalem.(1) Of course, during its military occupation, Palestine continued to be governed by the laws of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor State in Palestine, in accordance with the requirements of International law.

During this period of military rule, 1917-1920, a number of political groups and associations appeared at the scene. They were the rudiments of the nascent movement which later became the official leadership of Arab Palestine. These clubs were offshoots of their Syrian prototype Nadi Filastine (The Palestine Club) which was organized in 1919 in Damascus to press upon the government of King Faisal the Palestine cause.(2) The Club was led by Shaykh Abd el-Qader Muzaffar and it included a number of young Palestinian activists like Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Izzat Darwazah, Rushdial-Shawwa and Salim Abdul Rahman al Haj Ibrahim, whose names later became well known among the leaders of Palestine.(3)

Similar political groups were organized in the towns of Palestine but only three of them had any appreciable impact upon political events in Palestine: The Muslim-Christian Association, the Arab Club (Al-Nadi al-Arabi), and the Literary Society (Al-Muntada al-Arabi).

The Muslim-Christian Association promoted the principle of political cooperation between the Muslims and Christians of Palestine for the purpose of forging unity and organizing a political front to deal with the Zionist enemy. Its membership came mainly from the ranks of the political elites of Urban Palestine, who aspired to retain the political influence they had secured under the Ottoman Empire which preceded the new British military administration. They also hoped the Arabs would obtain an appreciable measure of justice under British rule and that the new administration would honor British commitments made to the Arabs in the well-known Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915.(4)

The two other political groups, the Arab club and the Literary Society were similar to the first in that their recruits were mainly from the ranks of urban elites. But they were different in many other respects. For one thing, they rejected the creation of a British mandate in Palestine and desired instead to become part of Faisal's Syrian Kingdom.

However, the more interesting aspect of the two organizations was their being the first political manifestation of the Husseini-Nashahsibi rivalry which, later, would divide the Palestinian national movement. Until this time, the two great Jerusalem families competed by means of the traditional methods which knew very little about modern political organization. The Husseinis led the Arab club and the Nasashibis led the Literary Society. According to Zionist sources, the two groups were in contact with the more radical secret organizations known as al-Fidaj (Self-Sacrificer) and al-Ikha' Wal 'Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity). These latter groups indulged in political agitation mainly in the cities of Jaffa and Nablus and they condoned the use of terrorism as a political weapon in the last resort.(5) (No evidence was provided to prove that they did resort to terrorism).

The Palestinian Congresses

The initial period in the development of the Palestine Arab movement, from about 1919 until 1934, was marked by the convening of a number of congresses.(6) These Congresses, like the political clubs of Palestine, drew their inspiration from the General Syrian Congress of which they were initially a part. The Syrian Congress was organized in 1919 and became widely recognized as the nationalist leadership of geographic Syria, including what later became Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and the present day Syrian Republic.(7) This was the congress that elected Amir Faisal, the actual leader of the 1916 Arab Revolt, as king of a United Syrian state.

An all-Palestine Congress was held in Jerusalem between January 27 and February 10, 1919, to formulate a common policy, called "program", on Palestine to advise Faisal while attending the Paris Peace Conference on behalf of the Arabs. The Jerusalem Congress was presided over by 'Aref Pasha al-Dajani who was, at the time, the president of the Jerusalem branch of the Muslim-Christian Association mentioned earlier. (Representatives of the Association also attended the General Syrian Congress in Damascus.)(8)

The Jerusalem Congress, resolved to reject political Zionism and to accept British assistance on condition such assistance would not impinge upon Sovereignty in Palestine.(9) Basically, the Congress wanted Palestine to be part of an independent Syrian State to be governed by Faisal of the Hashemite family. It also preferred U.S. political tutelage, should this be necessary, or British tutelage, as a second choice, but under no circumstances would the Congress accept French political guardianship.

Late in 1919, the Higher Committee, al-Lajneh al-'Ulya, was formed at a special congress in Haifa. Soon, branches of this committee were organized in Jerusalem, Nablus and Haifa, and they were granted jurisdiction over other political groups such as the Arab club, the Literary Society, the Muslim-Christian Association, the Self-Sacrificers and the Greek Orthodox Club.(10) The president of the Higher Committee was Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim of the Haifa Muslim-Christian Association.

Another Congress was held in Haifa on December 14, 1920, and it consisted mainly of the then existing political clubs and associations as well as the Palestinian members of the General Syrian Congress. This Congress was the third of its kind in the sense that it was an offshoot of the first, which met in Damascus in 1919, and the second, which met in Haifa in 1919.(11)

It was at this Third Congress that the Arab Executive Committee was elected with Mousa Kazim al-Husseini as its head and 'Aref Pasha al-Dajani as his deputy.(12) The membership of the Third Congress was exclusively Palestinian, an indication that Palestine had become a separate political entity with its specific political needs and requirements.

Collectively, the Executive Committee was to become the official leadership of Arab Palestine. It consisted of nine members, who were to carry the work between the plenary meetings of the Congress, while a permanent Secretariat was organized in Jerusalem to take charge of the day-to-day aspects of Palestinian politics. Basically, members of the Executive came from the landowning families of Palestine. In addition to Musa Kazim Pasha and 'Aref Pasha, mentioned above, there were Shaykh 'Abd al-Latif al-Haj Ibrahim of Tulkarem, Shaykh Taji al-Farouqi of Ramleh, al-Haj Tawfiq Hammad of Nablus, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sa'adi of Acre, Ibrahim Shammas, and Ya'qub Bardakash. The last two were Arab Christians, one from Jerusalem and one from Jaffa.(13)

The Third Congress passed resolutions demanding self-determination for the Arabs of Palestine and the establishment of an Arab government. Obviously, the Third Congress was preoccupied solely with the problem of Palestine, Its connection with Syria was becoming more symbolic than real.

The same was true with the Fourth Arab Congress which was held in May 1921 in Jerusalem. This Congress resolved to send a Palestinian delegation to London to make a plea for the Arab Palestinian cause, The delegation did go to London where it did no more than correspond with the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill.(14) The gist of the delegation's position was not to cooperate with the British Government in drafting a constitutional document for Palestine unless the

policy of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine was altered.(15) This was probably why a meeting with Churchill never took place and the Palestinian nationalist movement was becoming more radicalized.

The Emergence of the Husseinis As the Leading Family of Palestine

To understand Palestinian Arab politics one must be familiar with the social structure of Palestinian society, and the position of influence the great families of Palestine had during the British mandate, specifically from shortly after World War I until the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948. At the outset, one must keep in mind that the politics of Palestine was largely the politics of the big families who derived their influence mostly from their ownership of vast tracks of agricultural land.

The Social Division

The Arab Muslims of Palestine, who constituted the vast majority of the country's population, were divided into three distinct social groups: the beduins, the rural people, (usually referred to as the fallahin, and the urban population.

The beduin population concentrated mostly in the southern part of the country but were found in appreciable numbers in the Jordan Valley. In 1922, according to the official census, there were about 60,000 beduins in Palestine, or about 10 percent of the total population.(16) In general, the beduins stood outside the society as a whole, not fully integrated into the mainstream of political life.(17) They usually resisted interference in their internal affairs, disliked centralized political authority, and strongly opposed any restrictions upon their freedom of movement.(18) According to one source, the traditional leadership of Arab Palestine used the beduins to obstruct Jewish efforts to colonize the southern part of the country.(19)

The fallahin were mostly poverty stricken people, illiterate, and village oriented even when they lived in urban centers.(20) At the end of 1946, less than two years before the establishment of the state of Israel, they numbered 747,970 individuals or 65.44 percent of the total Arab population. They lived in about 865 villages scattered throughout the country.(21) According to the 1922 official census of Palestine, they numbered 430,000. Probably, one percent of them were wealthy landlords, half of them were middle and small land owners and the rest, about 200,000 people, were wage earners.(22) In the rural areas, the traditional

rivalries involved the extended families, known as the hamulas, and the clans.(23) One aspect of the rivalry was historical, involving the Qaysis and the Yamanis.(24) According to R. Patai, the rivalry originated in the tribal feuds of North and South Arabia which spread into the whole of Arabia as well as the fertile Crescent.(25) In the 1920's and 1930's, the rivalry affected the Palestinians but Western sources exaggerated its strength and political implications.

The Urban population numbered much less than the rural, but it was politically the more active, playing a significant role in the national movement of Palestine.

At the bottom of the social ladder of the urban society of Palestine, there was the proletariat class, which usually contained two substrata. The first included the multitude of the unemployed and servants doing menial work at the homes of the well-to-do and in the streets as venders, porters, and helpers. The second included the impoverished unskilled workers, boatsmen and artisans.(26) They usually lived in the old part of the cities and were mostly illiterate. Politically, they provided the human element needed for agitation, demonstrations, protesting crowds, mobs and even in spontaneous riots and violent action.

Up the social ladder there was the middle class which consisted of minor government officials, teachers, shopkeepers, wholesale merchants and the more affluent artisans.(27) Most of this small middle class came to being during the mandate period of Palestinian history, when the British began to introduce European economic activities and new modes of production.(28) A large proportion of this class was the Christian Arabs and other minorities many of whom were educated in missionary schools.

The urban upper class was the center of political power and both the national and local leadership came from its ranks. Although members of this class lived in the city many of them owned a lot of land in the villages. They were absentee landlords who came from Palestine's big families. Some members of this class were high officials in the religious hierarchy who derived a great deal of influence from their role as patrons of the major religious festivals of which the Nabi Musa (the prophet Moses) was the most important.

Members of the urban upper class, usually known to Westerners as the effendi class, were usually literate and well-educated in the "outward forms of European culture."(29) The social cohesion, which characterized this class for a long time, was somewhat impaired by the political rivalries which involved the big families of Palestine whose power and influence during the twenties and the thirties of this century could not be underestimated. In Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine, the rivalry between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis was typical. The power and

influence of these two families predated the British mandate when the Ottoman state helped them extend their influence over the peasant class and the rural areas.(30)

It should be remembered that the divisions and rivalries which characterized relations among big families of Palestine were in part a by-product of a rigid social structure. According to J.C. Hurewitz, "the Muslim community was atomized by clannish separatism."(31) The clan was the social class' basic unit. Headed by a shaykh, the clan in the small village aligned itself with a particular clan in the larger village and also with a clan in the town or city where the powerful landowning families always resided as absentee landlords.

As mentioned earlier, rivalries among the big families were old going back to the Qaysi and Yamani rivalries of pre-Islamic time.(32) The latter divisions had a geographic dimension involving north Arabia, where Qaysi's power rested, and south Arabia where Yamani's influence extended. Yet Palestinian factionalism carried with it no ideological connotations, for the simple reason that big families competed for the control of existing resources and did not aim at changing the social structure.(33) In Jerusalem, as elsewhere in Palestine, ideology and politics rarely went together. In fact, the Palestinian national movement never manifested genuine ideological inclination. At any rate, prior to 1948, family feuds and factional politics were responsible for the failure of Palestinians to successfully challenge the Zionist movement in its attempt to create a Jewish state.(34)

The Hussein Family

In a sense, the history of Palestine's Arab nationalism in the 1920's and 1930's is the history of the Husseinis and Nahashibis, the two main families of Jerusalem. Although their differences were partly personal and partly related to policy,(35) there were institutional forms and terminologies involved in the competition for power and influence. The Hussein family became identified with the Supreme Moslem (SMC) and their political supporters became known as the Majlesiyoun, meaning those who supported the SMC as the focal point of Palestinian leadership. Since the 1920's, but especially during the 1930's, those who supported the SMC also supported the Husseinis, and there was a clear understanding that the Majlesiyoun were in fact pro-Hussein. The close identification of the two meant that the family must always be in control of the SMC.

There seems to be a great deal of controversy and uncertainty regarding the origin of the Husseinis. The family itself traces its origin to the prophet

Mohammed, specifically to Hussein ibin Ali Abi Talib the grandson of the prophet through his daughter Fatima. Originally from the Arabian Peninsula, the Husseinis believe they came to Jerusalem about 800 years ago.(36) Their claim is widely accepted by the Arabs of Palestine. However, one source refutes their claim and argues that the "main branch of the family was not of Palestinian origin, they were the Al Aswads (the Blacks) from the Yemen."(37) They acquired social status as a result of a marriage between one member of the family (the Aswads) and another wealthy (landowning) family from Abu Ghosh.(38) Later, one male member of the Aswad family married a female from another family called al-Husseini who claimed descent from Hussein, the son of Ali, the fourth Caliph, and Fatima, the daughter of the prophet. Contrary to Moslem custom the Aswad assumed his wife's family name so as to gain social prestige and wealth. It was Mustafa, the grand father of Haj Amin, the future leader of Palestine, who dropped the Aswad and kept the Husseinis in his family name.(39) Mustafa developed good relations with the Ottoman Turks and in the 1890's he obtained the highly prestigious post of "Mufti of Jerusalem."

The Husseinis held the position of mufti of Jerusalem since the middle of the nineteenth century. When Jerusalem became a municipality in 1877, the family had to compete with the Khalidis and Alamis for the control of the position of mayor.(40) Members of the family also held high positions in the Ottoman administration at the subdistrict, district and central (in Istanbul) levels.(41) These positions enhanced their social prestige and political influence. Of course, the post of mufti was the most prestigious because it was a religious position in a religiously significant place. Furthermore, its holder automatically became the central figure at the important Nabi Mousa celebrations.(42)

The Husseinis acquired something of a hereditary title to the office of mufti of Jerusalem. Under the Ottomans, the occupant of the office was the governor's advisor on matters involving the religious laws known as the Shari'a.(43)

Ultimately, however, the basis of Husseinis social and political prestige and influence was their wealth, especially the large tracts of land they owned in southern Palestine.(44) One source estimated that the family owned 50,000 dunums (1 dunum = 1/4 of an acre) in Jericho, Ramallah, Liddah (Iod) and Ramlah.(45)

Haj Amin Al-Husseini

In the 1920's, the Husseinis were fast becoming the most powerful family in Palestine. A member of the family by the name of Haj Amin was appointed by the British as the mufti of Jerusalem. Consequently, he became the leader of the family and ultimately the leader of the Palestine national movement. By the mid 1930's Haj Amin became the undisputed leader of Arab Palestine, and until the establishment of Israel in 1948, he was its most popular leader.

Amin was born in Jerusalem in 1896. His father was Shaykh Mohammed Tahir al-Husseini, who was also the mufti of Jerusalem during the last decade of the nineteenth century.(46) In 1912, the son, Amin, finished his high school education and went to Cairo to study religious law at the Azhar University, the best known institution of higher education for religious studies in the Moslem World. While at Azhar, he fell under the influence of the well-known Islamic reformer Rashid Rida, who at the time propagated the ideas of Afghani, another Islamic reformer of Persian origin.(47)

In 1913, Amin went to Mecca on a Pilgrimage. As in the case of all pilgrims, he acquired the honorific title of Haj which became part of his name ever since. When World War I came in 1914, he joined the Ottoman Turkish army as a lieutenant and was stationed in the Izmir province. In 1917, he returned to his native town Jerusalem and became politically active opposing and protesting the imposition of a British mandate on Palestine, particularly, because the mandate carried with it a Zionist policy which Arabs deemed detrimental to their national interest. When the Arab Revolt of 1916 became a full scale war against the Turks he joined it and he became closely associated with its leader, prince Faisal. In 1919, he became active in the General Syrian Congress, mentioned earlier, and he was the person to coordinate Congress' relation with the nationalist movement in Palestine.(48)

After he returned to Jerusalem, he taught at al-Rashidiyyah and Rawdat al-Ma'aref schools while seeking "the limelight of public life" by writing in the local newspaper Suriyah al-Janubiyah (Southern Syria) and addressing public crowds.(49) He was active in the Arab club, mentioned earlier, which had become a Hussein political strong hold. The club advocated union with Syria and agitated against British domination of Palestine. Haj Amin, as early as 1919, showed tremendous dislike for Zionist ambition and British policy. In his opposition to both, he showed considerable organizational and leadership abilities.

His political activity got him in trouble with the British authorities. On April 4, 1920, at the festival of Nabi Mousa, riots broke out and there were many Arab and

Jewish casualties for which a British military trial was held and Haj Amin, along with others, was charged for inciting the riots which caused the injuries. Amin's articles in the newspaper Southern Syria were, according to a Zionist source, inflammatory creating an atmosphere of uncontrolled excitement. He and Aref el-Aref, the editor of the same paper, were sentenced in absentia to ten years of imprisonment. Haj Amin had managed to leave the country for Damascus where he continued his political activity in the service of Prince Faisal. However, when in June 1920 the French forced Faisal out of Damascus, Haj Amin went to Transjordan where, two months later, he received a pardon from Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner of Palestine, as a result of Arab pleas on his behalf. Soon after he returned to Jerusalem, in 1921, the High Commissioner appointed him mufti of Jerusalem. At the time, he was twenty six years old.

As Mufti Of Jerusalem

The position of mufti of Jerusalem carries with it a great deal of power and prestige. There were muftis in almost every city and town, but because of the religious and political significance of Jerusalem, its mufti outranked all other muftis. This is why he was called the grand mufti, something like a head mufti.

The mufti's job is to issue a fatwa which is a ruling that a certain practice, or a certain situation, is not contrary to religious teachings or religious law. He also issues dispensations tolerating certain practices or situations, whose religious consistency or conformity is questionable. It is obvious that the position of mufti is a purely religious position. In a religious or sectarian society, like the Muslim society, the holder of the position can wield tremendous power. Under certain circumstances, a mufti can misuse his power and become the source of religious authority by validating practices which are clearly inconsistent with the religious law and by interfering in religious matters outside his traditional jurisdiction. (50)

In the 1920's and 1930's, the muftis not only possessed high prestige in the community but many of them acquired immense political influence and power. The grand mufti of Jerusalem was considered a sort of super mufti, a head mufti, who, although has no authority over muftis in other towns, exercised informal and extra-legal powers greater than his position would require.

At any rate, the way Haj Amin came to hold this position was very controversial because it involved realpolitik. At the time of British occupation of "Southern Syria" (Palestine), the Husseini family was already the most influential in the holy city. The mayor came from its ranks. He was Mousa Kazem Pasha al-Husseini, a leading figure of his time. The mufti of Jerusalem was also a Husseini. He was Kamal al-Husseini, Haj Amin's half brother. The British got along with the

mufti much better than they did with the mayor. The latter was removed from office in 1920 on account of an anti-British political speech he had made earlier and in his place Raghib Nashashibi was appointed.(51) Of course, the Nashashibis were the Husseinis main rival clan during the British mandate. Kamal, the mufti, died in March 1920 and the British had to appoint a replacement for him. As mentioned earlier, the British liked Kamal. In fact, they expanded his official duties beyond the traditional duties assigned to his office.

Under the traditional rules of international law, the British as the occupation authority, were obligated to enforce Ottoman Law in areas unrelated to military security. Consequently, they had to follow Ottoman Laws which governed the appointment of the mufti. These laws stipulated that the mufti be elected by a sort of electoral college(52) consisting of the 'Ulema (scholars in religious affairs), the imams (leaders of the Friday prayers), the Khatibs (those who deliver the Friday "Sermons"), members of the Jerusalem municipal Council, and members of the local administration council.(53)

In the election which was held on April 12, 1921, the Nashashibis threw their weight behind the candidacy of Shaykh Husam al-Din Jarallah. To the surprise of every one, especially the British themselves, Jarallah came on top of the list and Haj Amin came fourth. Since the law required the appointment of the mufti from among the top three on the list of winners, Haj Amin was out of the running.(54) (A Khalidi came second and a Budeiri came third).

Matters were further complicated by the fact Haj Amin was neither a member of the religious 'ulamas nor a true shaykh because he never completed his study at the Azhar University.(55) Yet the British preferred Haj Amin, partly because they desired to balance clan interests, a policy they believed was necessary to maintain political control. Since the mayoralty was in the hands of the Nashashibis, they wanted a Husseinis to occupy the second most prestigious job, that of mufti. Perhaps, they were encouraged by the fact that the late mufti was quite accommodating and hoped his brother Amin would be cooperative even though the latter had earlier been sentenced by a British military court. However, it seems the British did not have much difficulty persuading Jarallah to withdraw from the race leaving Haj Amin in third place, and, consequently, eligible to be selected mufti. Of course, the job went for Haj Amin.

There were other mitigating circumstances favoring Haj Amin in addition to British support. It seems he was the more popular candidate, at least many high ranking British officials thought so. The Husseinis made sure the British understood this by urging people to petition the administration, sign letters, and send

telegrams. Even non-Palestinian Arabs, including Hashemites in Jordan who were not pro-Husseinis, expressed their unqualified support of Haj-Amin. Also, Haj Amin might have gone out of his way to allay the fear of those in the British administration who were concerned about Amin's political record particularly, activities associated with the Nabi Mousa incident of April, 1920. Instrumental in his selection as mufti were Ernest Richmond, First Secretary for Arab Affairs, and Sir Ronald Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, who, together, were able to persuade Sir Herbert Samuel that Amin was the more popular choice.(56) Nevertheless, although Amin did take the job, an official letter of appointment was never sent to him and his appointment was never published in the official Gazette, as the law required.(57)

Once appointed, Haj Amin lost no time transforming the mufti position into a power house of political influence and social prestige. His real aim was to capture the more important job of President of the Supreme Moslem Council, or the SMC as it was popularly referred to in British official circles.

As President of the Supreme Moslem Council

During the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic endowment known as Waqf and the Shari'a (religious) court fell under the jurisdiction of a Turkish official holding the title of Shaykh al-Islam. The defeat of the Ottoman state in World War I left the Waqf and Shari'a courts in Palestine without their central administration and the British had to provide the substitute for it. During the military administration, 1917-1920, the courts were put under a Director General who reported to the Senior Judicial Officer,(58) and the Waqf was controlled by the officer in charge of finances. When the civil administration replaced the military administration in 1920, these arrangements were deemed insufficient in view of the fact the new administration was to be, more or less, permanent. Since the British were non-Muslims and the Muslims were the majority in Palestine, quite accustomed to an Islamic state, the arrangements were also considered as unfair. Consequently, the concept of purely Islamic Central institution to take charge of all Islamic affairs became very appealing to the British local administration. In fact, it became almost a necessity in order to avoid the appearance of being unfair to the Muslims who resented putting their religious courts under the authority of a Zionist Jew, Norman Bentwich, who headed the legal department in the British administration of Palestine.

Of course, the Muslims, themselves pushed for the idea in a series of conferences. The proposal for the creation of a Moslem Council originated in the work of a committee composed mainly of 'ulama (Islamic scholars) and set up by a country-wide conference held on November 19, 1920. The British High Commissioner, who was also a Zionist Jew, enthusiastically supported the committee's general proposal but he insisted on one amendment, that the qadis (judges) could not be removed without the government's consent.

There was some opposition, of course, but it was limited mainly to the Nashashibis whose leader Ragheb had become Haj Amin's main rival in the conduct of Palestinian politics. The High Commissioner had suggested that the proposed Islamic Council "be elected by representatives chosen by the Muslim secondary electors to the last Ottoman Parliament.(59) On January 9, 1922, the electors met to elect Rais al-'Ulama who was to become president of the Supreme Moslem Council (to be known, henceforth, as the SMC), and four other council members, two representing the Sanjak (district) of Jerusalem and one representing each of the other two Sanjaks, that of Acre and that of Nablus.(60) As was expected, Haj Amin easily won the presidency of the SMC while the opposition led by Ragheb was waging a desperate and unsuccessful campaign against him.

In order to understand the bases of Haj Amin's influence and power, one should look at the SMC's religious duties and functions. These functions were quite broad and encompassed wide range of activities. It controlled Waqf property and finances, appointed its director and staff, dismissed them as well, and supervised, in addition, all local Waqf committees. It also had general supervisory powers over the Shari'a courts, including, albeit with the approval of the government, the appointment and removal of judges. There were at the time eighteen Shari'a courts in Palestine and they employed a total of 250 individuals. (In the case of the religious endowments the SMC employed 592 people in six departments). Also, the SMC administered ten schools and institutions including the Muslim Orphanage House.(61) Finally, it had the important power of appointing Mufties outside Jerusalem, in all cities and towns except Beersheba where the mufti was elected by the local Chiefs. It was not necessary to obtain government approval for these appointments.(62)

It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the combination of mufti and President of the SMC gave Haj Amin the instruments he needed to eventually become the undisputed political leader of Arab Palestine. The SMC became the focal center of political activities around which the Husseini supporters rallied.

However, Haj Amin made sure he had complete control of this important body while building it up to be the leadership council of the people. Consequently, he secured the key positions on the council, the Awqaf bodies and the schools for members of his own family, while making sure the mu'arada (opposition) got only the minor positions.(63)

His nephew, Jamal, became the SMC's general secretary. Two other Husseinis, Tawfiq Ragheb and Ishaq Darwish, became directors of the Orphanage schools which were financed by the SMC.(64) His brother-in-law Ahmad Ragheb al-Husseini was appointed to the important position of Inspector of the Shari'a courts.(65) Ahmad also audited the SMC's accounts while his son served as a legal counsel to the SMC.(66) Fakhri, another prominent Husseinis, served until 1935, as the SMC's lawyer. Amin's cousin, Munif, became the editor of Al-Jami'a Al-Arabiyyah (the Arab league) which was the mouthpiece of the Husseinis and their political supporters (i.e. the majlesiyoun). Rawdat al-Ma'arif, an SMC school, was headed by Abdul Latif al-Husseini. This school became a Husseinis stronghold where the family agitated to drum up support for its nationalistic activities and policies.(67)

Initially, the British administration was responsible for allowing the SMC to become a powerful body. The law creating the SMC was vague on the question of the president's tenure in office, allowing Haj Amin the advantage of interpreting the law to mean that he was to be President for life. In 1926, when the four positions on the council became vacant, the British did not insist on replacing the president. In addition, the British, particularly the High Commissioner, wanted the SMC to have broad powers, perhaps not realizing the political implications of such a policy. They sincerely believed it was only fair to allow the Muslims complete control of their religious affairs and since the central Islamic institutions had disappeared with the Turkish Empire, the SMC should be allowed to replace them. Furthermore, being a Zionist Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel was very conscious of Muslim and Arab sensitivities with regard to the Balfour Declaration and the new status acquired by the Jews. Soon the Mandate agreement would recognize the Jewish Agency as a public body with important responsibilities and would leave the Arabs without a comparable agency equally recognized. Samuel became more supportive of British effort to broaden the powers of the SMC as the unofficial counterpart of the Jewish Agency.

Since Haj Amin and his family were in full control of the religious institutions of Palestine they were in a position to use these institutions to become politically the most powerful clan in the country. In a traditionally sectarian society as that of

Palestine, politics could very easily become a function of religion. In fact, since in Palestine the foreign ruler was Christian and most people living in the country were Muslims, the relationship of religion to politics was unsurprisingly intimate. Consequently, it was not too difficult for Haj Amin to become, within a short period of time, the undisputed political leader of the Palestinian Arabs.

Early Opposition to Haj Amin's Leadership

Haj Amin's ascendancy to the position of mufti and president of the SMC did not go unchallenged. The Nashashibis, under Ragheb, fought him every step of the way. Although they lost both battles, one should recall that they did win the mayoralty which was not a minor victory. The mayoralty was a very prestigious office which the Nashashibis used to gather around them the anti-Husseinis of Jerusalem and those in the country as whole. They also used it to set themselves up as the rival claimants to the country's political leadership.

Their opposition was not purely personal, or if it were, it did not hesitate to bring out to the open issues of policy and exploit the apparent weaknesses of the Husseinis, whether these weaknesses related to the public behavior of certain members or to the questionable practices of Haj Amin himself.

One such issue involved the Waqf fund which was managed by Haj Amin himself, as president of the Waqf's central committee. The fund showed revenues ranging from a low figure of 53,404,286 Palestinian pounds for the year 1926 to a high figure of 62,578,791 for 1930.(68) The opposition often charged that Haj Amin used the money to enhance his personal prestige and entrench himself in power as the country's political leader. It also complained that he used the money to reward his friends and political supporters and to keep others, particularly his opponents, away from the center of Palestinian politics.

Similar charges were made with regard to the finances of the SMC. As revenues, they were derived from three main sources: rent from its own real estate property, a tax known as "tithe", which was the tenth of the yearly proceeds arising from Waqf lands, and contributions. Income from the first source averaged around 15,000 Palestinian pounds between 1926 and 1931. On the whole, income from the second source was the largest.(69) It ranged from a high of 36,000 Palestinian pounds in 1929 to a low of 5,000 in 1931.(70) As to contributions, those usually come from Muslim or Arab governments, and never were a steady and reliable source. But in some years, they were substantial. In the year 1923-1924, the total sum of 94,952 Palestinian pounds was collected

from Hijaz, Egypt, Iraq and India to renovate the Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.(71) Most contributions were sent to maintain the holy places and to attend to the welfare of the needy Muslims. Since Haj Amin was in direct control of SMC finances, he was personally held responsible for them. Whether opposition charges against Amin were true or not, we do not know. No court of law had ever passed judgement on their validity.

It must be kept in mind that the rise of Haj Amin to position of leader did not happen without causing divisions within the Hussein family itself. The impression people had of the Husseins was that the family had a good measure of internal unity and social cohesiveness. Yet the experience was not all together positive, and some negative consequences did result from it, particularly with regard to the traditional leadership and the older generation of Husseins who felt the young Haj Amin was too obtrusive and cunning. This group was headed by Musa Kazem Pasha who had been the political and moral leader of the family for a long time. Nevertheless, one must not exaggerate the internal schism especially when viewed in the context of Arab culture. Clannish unity becomes stringer in the face of external threats or interests. In case of the Husseins, the political wounds resulting from Haj Amin's rise to eminence and power, were healed in the internal unity that followed his political victories.

One of the basic weaknesses of the Husseins was that their geographic location limited initially their influence. Very few of them lived outside the Jerusalem area. Consequently, they had to struggle in order to extend their influence over the whole country. As a strictly urban family their biggest problem was to penetrate, politically, the rural areas which were politically conservative, having traditional loyalties already well established. However, their control of the religious institutions, particularly, the SMC, helped a great deal in establishing contacts and strengthening ties with the villages and the towns. Of course, the rural population, particularly the fallahin (peasants), was strongly inclined towards religion and a religious leadership, like that of Haj Amin, had obvious advantages in politics. Although difficult, the political transformation of religious positions and symbols was not impossible at all. In fact, it became easier as the nationalists began to take issue with, and even battle with, the British occupier of their country and their allies the Zionists who soon would reveal their intention and determination to create a Jewish state in Arab Palestine. The more secularist Nashashibis were never able to penetrate deep into rural Palestine. Their political influence remained urban, among people alienated by the Husseins. The Hussein's use of patronage and money to install their political allies in position of

influence alienated families who were the local rivals of these allies. Few individuals were alienated because they found their political ambitions unfulfilled on account of Haj Amin's desire to monopolize political activities at the national level. Although very few, a number of political groups were organized around these alienated political figures. These were, for instance, the Arab National Party organized in 1924 around Shakh Suleiman Taji al-Farouqi of Ramleh,(72) the Farmer's Party or Hizb al-Zurr'a organized by Mousa Hdeib, and the Moslem National Council.(73)

Apparently, there were times when opposition to the Majlesiyoun (supporters of SMC or the Pro-Husseinis) became very desperate. Opponents of the mufti (Haj Amin) charged that the Husseinis were collaborators hiding behind nationalist slogans and nationalistic political rhetoric. The charge was based on the fact that there were many Husseinis working in the mandate (British) government of Palestine. The assumption was made that Haj Amin used his religious position to get his relatives into the government and that he was not a true nationalist. Some made an issue of the fact that Haj Amin's salary as mufti and president of the SMC was paid by the government and that when Haj Amin was appointed mufti he tried to bargain for a high salary. Before he was appointed mufti, the argument goes, Haj Amin was very friendly with the British. Few claimed that he had promised to cooperate if appointed mufti and head of the SMC.

Haj Amin might have done some of these things he was accused of, but there was no evidence that he had betrayed the nationalist movement by making improper promises to the British. Indeed his salaries were, by the standard of the time, very high,(74) but this did not mean he was bought by the British. One might have found evidence that the mufti was not yet radicalized by the events of the early 1920's, but there was ample evidence that he had become uncompromising during the riots of 1929. By the 1930's, there was no question that Haj Amin had become the most stubborn enemy the British had in Palestine. Of course, by then, Haj Amin and the Palestinian national movement were one and the same. Politically, both had crossed the point of no return.

FOOTNOTES

(1) H. Luke and E. Roach, The Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan, London, 1934, p. 31.

(2) Ann Lesch, The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973, p. 182.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid., p. 184.

(5) Zionist Intelligence Report, (henceforth ZIR), 20 March, Central Zionist Archives (henceforth CZA): Z4/16004, Zionist Intelligence Report, Fall 1919, CZA: Z4/3886/1.

(6) Palestine Government, A Survey of Palestine for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, vol. II, Jerusalem, 1946, p. 946.

(7) For a full text of the Syrian Congress resolutions, see for example George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 440-42.

(8) A Survey of Palestine, vol. II, p. 946.

(9) Lesch, Frustration, p. 188.

(10) ZIR, January 1920, CZA: Z4/3886/1.

(11) John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate, London, 1959, p. 89, see also Survey of Palestine, vol. II, p. 946.

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CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MU'ARADA IN THE 1920'S

From the first years of the British mandate in Palestine, the traditional leadership of the Arabs was split between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The divisive nature of Arab leadership had its effect on the whole of the Arab national movement. In essence, that movement was never united or strong enough to confront its British and Zionist adversaries. As mentioned earlier, part of this problem was the outcome of the existing social structure which was unproductive as well as rigid.

Nevertheless, western influence in the form of secularism and modern development did have some effect on the demography of Palestine many years before the British created it as a separate political entity. A new urban elite had come to being towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the mandate, this elite became politically influential, causing the traditional elites in the villages to feel resentful and insecure. Not until the 1930's was the urban elite able to dominate the politics of both the rural and urban populations and become in effect the national leadership of Arab Palestine.(1)

The British, who naturally wanted to control the country, exploited almost every aspect of the demographic and social cleavages existing in Palestine. They encouraged the establishment of "peasant" type of political parties hoping such political organizations would prevent the union of the rural and urban elites into what might become a viable and genuine national movement.

However, the rivalries between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis remained the British best hope for a weak and ineffective national movement. Herbert Samuel distinguished three basic movements in Palestine: Arab nationalism, Islamic unity and anti-Zionism.(2) He understood that these three movements were interrelated and that the Husseinis were trying to combine them into one single movement which would become powerful and hard for British to control. Consequently, he resorted to a policy of "divide and rule."(3) This was the policy of balancing family interests which attempted to distribute offices between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. As we have seen earlier, Haj Amin was made mufti after Ragheb al-Nashashibi was made mayor of Jerusalem.

The British policy succeeded and the rivalry between the two families took a sharp turn during the first decade of British mandate. These families manipulated all the ties of kin, class and patronage to win over new supporters.(4) As mentioned earlier, family feuds were behind the formation of some of the early political parties. It was the Nashashibis who, in 1923, encouraged the creation of the National Party which was headed by shaykh Suleiman Taji al-Farouqi of the city of Ramleh and the owner of the newspaper al-Jami'a al-Islamiyyah (Pan-Islam). Even earlier, in 1921, the opposition led by the Nashashibis established the National Muslim Association with branch offices in a number of Palestinian towns. According to one source, Samuel was encouraged by the Zionists to support opposition of the Husseinis in an effort to divide the Arab national movement.(5)

THE NASHASHIBI FAMILY

Like the Majlesiyoun (the pro-Husseinis), the Mu'arada (the opposition, the anti-Husseini) consisted of some of the big families of Palestine. Both had organizational appearances and forms, using different names at different times, but they were in the main coalitions of families clustered around Jerusalem's two great families, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. Consequently, the latter family was the political center and leadership of the opposition within the Palestine national movement.

One source traces the origin of the Nashashibi family to Egypt and states that an Egyptian by the name of Nasser al-Din al-Nashashibi had come to Jerusalem as an appointee of the Turkish Ottoman government to take up his position as director of the important Islamic place known as Haram al-Sharif(6). Another source traces the family's origin in Palestine to the fifteenth century and states that it was an extraction of Kurdish-Circassian ethnic background.(7)

Whatever their beginnings were, it seems they did not become prominent and influential until much later. According to Yeshoa Porath, "the Nashashibi family only advanced in status in later generations."(8) In 1912, one of its members, 'Uthman al-Nashashibi, a wealthy land-owner, was elected to the Ottoman Parliament shortly after the "Young Turks" had taken over the Ottoman government in Istanbul. However, the prominent figure who really gave the family its high social and political status was Ragheb whom we mentioned earlier.

A graduate of Istanbul University, Ragheb became Jerusalem's District Engineer and later in 1914 he was elected to the Turkish Ottoman Parliament. By the end of World War I, he had emerged as the recognized head of the Nashashibi family and in his new capacity he began to cultivate his political connections to set his family up as the main competitor to the Husseinis. His first victory over the Husseinis was when, in 1920, he replaced Mousa Kazem as mayor of Jerusalem. He held that important position for nearly fourteen years, until 1934, when he was defeated in the elections by Dr. Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi. Another prominent member of the Nashashibi family was Fakhri who became Ragheb's closest associate and political companion. This member of the family was very controversial figure. He was a police officer attached to Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, and he had close contacts with Zionist personalities.(9) Of course, the two great families of Jerusalem always accused each other of collaboration with the Zionist and British enemies. Since the Husseinis were undoubtedly the more popular family, particularly in the 1930's, it was the Nashashibis who suffered the consequences.

It is true that while the nationalist movement was becoming more radicalized and Haj Amin was becoming a more uncompromising leader, the mu'arada was seen as the more moderate party. Perhaps because the Nashashibis political roots were not as deep as those of the Husseinis, they were more dependent upon British favors for political advantage and social status. Consequently, they were more moderate and more eager to compromise than the Husseinis, who, by the end of the 1920's were already well entrenched in the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the mu'arada saw itself as an integral part of the Palestinian nationalist movement. One should not forget that in 1919 Ragheb was a member of the All-Syrian Congress before he returned to Jerusalem to begin his campaign against the mufti and the Majlesiyoun.(10)

Although the Nashashibis were considered prominent in the politics of the country, they did not have economic resources of the Husseinis. They were not among the big landowning families of 78 Palestine. This was another reason why they relied on British patronage to extend their political influence. It was also a reason why their allies were families and individuals who were alienated by Haj Amin and the Husseinis. Their political allies, in other words, were not traditionally loyal to them as in the case of the families which followed the Husseinis who had deeper roots in the soil of Palestine.

THE OTHER FAMILIES IN THE MU'ARADA

Several other families joined the Nashashibis in the mu'arada. One of these were the Khalidis who, it is said, were descendants of Khalid Ibn Al-Walid, the famous commander of the Arab-Muslim armies which conquered Palestine in 640.(11) This family was headed by Shaykh Khalil al-Khalidi who came second in the 1921 elections for the office of mufti of Jerusalem. We may recall that in that election Haj Amin came fourth while Jarallah had the first spot. The British, it seems, persuaded Jarallah to withdraw so they could appoint Haj Amin to the position. Khalidi never accepted the British arrangement which put Haj Amin in the illustrious position of mufti because he felt he should have been chosen. After all, when the position became vacant after the death of its last occupant, Kamil al-Husseini, Khalidi was acting mufti by virtue of being the president of the shari'a court of Appeal. Thus he was performing the duties of the office of mufti when Haj Amin received his controversial appointment.

Of course, Shaykh Jarallah was not pleased either, although he yielded to British pressure to withdraw. Jarallah's candidacy was supported by the Nashashibis and it was not surprising that the family of the former became part of the mu'arada.(12)

One of the prominent families of Jerusalem that also joined the mu'arada was the Dajanis. One theory about their name and origin, which seems to be prevalent among members of the family, is that their name used to be Dajani-Daoudi and their origin goes back to King David. Supposedly, the family had possession of the keys to King David's tomb for many generations. It is also said that the Dajanis refused to surrender the keys even after the establishment of the SMC in the 1920's. At any rate, the Jews are today in full control of King David's tomb.(13) Apparently, the Dajanis joined the mu'arada as a result of the SMC's insistence that the tomb should be under its control being the highest Islamic authority in Palestine. (It should be remembered that Muslims revered King David because they regarded him one of the important prophets, and, consequently, of religious significance).

Of course, the mu'arada was not confined to the city of Jerusalem where the Husseinis and the Nashashibis began their political quarrels and rivalry. It spread to the rest of the country, becoming strongest in the north where the urban elites had begun to alienate the rural elites. One factor in this situation had to do with the SMC's general policy of replacing many prominent individuals who held high

religious positions in the defunct Ottoman administration, men like Shaykh As'ad al-Shuqayri of Acre and Shaykh Sa'id Al-Karmi of Tulkarem.(14)

According to Porath, most of these religious personalities had opposed the nationalist movement because it was anti-Ottoman.(15) They did not go along with the launching of the historic 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman State, and they continued to deplore the consequences even after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Porath also claims that many of the personalities in the mu'arada had close ties with the Zionist movement, and that the majority of them had "benefited from financial support from the Zionists."(16) Also, it was probably true that many in the mu'arada were resentful of Haj Amin's autocratic methods and his insistence on loyalty to his person.(17)

In the city of Hebron, the SMC favored the Tamimi family by giving it monopoly over certain important religious positions. This monopoly caused other families in the city to be resentful and to join the mu'arada. The Tahboub family in particular naturally resented the change because the religious affairs of Hebron were traditionally controlled by them. Similar problems caused the alienation of other influential families like the Khatibs and the Nasser al-Din.

In the Hebron area, the old rivalry between the Qaysis and the Yamanis was also a divisive factor contributing to the political dichotomy of majlesiyoun and mu'arada. Most Villages belonged to the Qaysis and this included such villages as Doura, Halhoul, Yatta, and Bani Na'im while a minority of the villages belonged to the Yamani faction including such villages as Beit Jibrin, Ajour, Deir-Nahas. In the Qaysi villages mentioned the "Amru family was the most influential while the Azza family was dominant in the Yamani villages. When the villages dominated by the Azza family joined the majlesiyoun, the other villages of the 'Amru family joined the mu'arada almost automatically.(18)

In the city of Nablus, the situation was not too different from that of Hebron. The division was also influenced by the traditional rivalry between the Qaysis and the Yamanis. In the Yamani faction there were the 'Abd al-Hadis and the Nimrs while in the Qaysi faction there were the families of Touqan, Nabulsi, al-Masri and al-Shak'a. The Qaysis joined the mu'arada in the 1920's.

SOURCES OF STRENGTH

The mu'arada derived its power and political influence from three sources: its ability to exploit the urban-rural conflict, its appeal to the Christian minority and its relative success in municipal elections.

We have mentioned earlier, the conflict between city and village. The emergence of urban elites as a consequence of Western influence and modern developments alienated the traditional elites in rural Palestine. The mu'arada attempted to exploit this new social development with some success. Influential hamulas joined the mu'arada as early as the 1920's. Among them were such families as the Barghutis, the Abu Ghoshs and the Darwishes.(19) Although the Husseinis under the leadership of Haj Amin would politically make a sweep of rural Palestine in the 1930's, the mu'arada was able to establish there a foothold and prevent for some time the union of the two segments in one national movement. In that sense, the mu'arada may have played into the hands of the British and the Zionists whose policies were to keep the Arabs disunited in order to pursue their aim of building a national home for the Jews.

However, there was another substantial group with which the mu'arada had some appeal and this was the Christian Arabs. In general, the Christians of historic Syria were the first to espouse the ideology of Arab nationalism. Although the reasons were very complex, one of them had something to do with their level of education, which, on the whole, was higher than that of the Muslims. Of course, the missionary schools contributed greatly to this benefit and they were an important reason for the higher levels of modern developments among the Christians. Modern nationalism affected the Christians earlier and more massively than the Muslims. Consequently, the Christian Arabs of Palestine felt the impact of missionary education in terms of their strong interest in the revival of Arab heritage.(20)

The greatest assistance Christian supporters rendered to the mu'arada, was in the area of public relations and this they did through a dynamic press which they mostly controlled. During the British Mandate, the press developed into "an important vehicle of nationalist spirit, a medium of information about new political developments and an organ stressing Palestinian identity."(21)

One of the leading newspapers of Palestine was Al-Carmel which was founded in 1908 in the city of Haifa. This paper was established by Najib Nassar, an Orthodox Christian and a fiery nationalist who was among the first to warn Arabs against the dangers of Zionism. Another influential paper which later became one

of the two leading newspapers of Palestine was Filastin (Palestine). Established in 1911 by Isa and Yousif al-Isa of Haifa, this paper continued publication until 1969.(22)

The other newspapers supported the mu'arada and were, along with Al-Carmel, the official organs of the National party mentioned earlier. These were Al-Nafir which was owned by the Zaka family of Haifa and Mir'at Al-Sharq which was owned by Boulos Shihadeh.(23)

One factor attracting Arab Christians to the mu'arada was its secular tendencies and the religious connection of its rival, the majlesiyoun. Ragheb, the mu'arada leader, was known to be a worldly man, not unusually attached to religion. He held no religious position while his opponent Haj Amin was a Shaykh with all the appanages of the equivalent of a Christian high priest. Some of the Christians who followed Ragheb al-Nashashibi or became part of the mu'arada held high positions in the former Ottoman administration. They felt insecure with Haj Amin as president of the SMC. Whatever the reasons for joining the mu'arada, the Christians were a substantial group and included such influential people as Isa Al-Bandak of Bethlehem and Ya'qoub Farraj of Jerusalem. The former was a member of an influential clan, a member of the Arab Executive (AE), and a founder of the Reform party, while the latter politician was a Vice-President of the AE.(24)

Of course, not all influential Christians supported the mu'arada. Few opted for the Husseinis and their names became well-known in the national movement. They were Catholic Christians but they never defaulted on their loyalty to Haj Amin who always made sure that Christian Arabs were represented in the political Councils of the Palestinian national movement. They included such names as George Antonius, later the author of the classic The Arab Awakening, Emile Al-Ghuri who later became the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, and others like Shibli Al-Jamal, Alfred and Edmond Rock, and Izzat Tannous.

All in all the manifestations of the mu'arada's political influence was more visible at the local level than at the national level. In fact, one might come to the conclusion that had its influence at the two level been reversed it would have replaced the majlesiyoun as the official leadership of the Palestinian national movement.

In the 1927 municipal elections, the mu'arada won in all of them except in Gaza and Majdal which were won by the majlesiyoun.(25) Of course, Ragheb had been the mayor of Jerusalem since 1920. In the 1934 municipal elections, similar gains were made by the mu'arada.(26) except in Jerusalem Ragheb was replaced

by Dr, Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi whose family wavered between a pro-mu'arada position and a neutral one.

Despite its impressive showing at the local level, the mu'arada never really made it at the national level, partly because their local gains had very little influence on their political exercise at the national level. After all, under the British, municipal governments in Palestine had very limited powers. For instance, their revenues were limited primarily because they could not issue many types of permits which municipalities elsewhere usually issued, and their taxing and fee collecting powers were also curtailed. Much of their powers belonged to local commissions, which were controlled by the central government.(27)

SOURCES OF WEAKNESS

The basic weakness of the mu'arada was that it was quite fragmented and that it had no common program or goals to guide it. It consisted of diverse groups and individuals who seemed to have very little in common other than their dislike of Husseini politics and Haj Amin's political leadership.

Of course, neither the mu'arada nor the majlesiyoun had ideological commitments of any kind. True Haj Amin, as mufti of Jerusalem and head of the SMC, was able to use religious symbols to unite a majority of the Palestinian people behind him, but beyond this he had no program for the future of Palestine whether in the social area or in the political and economic areas of life. Nevertheless, after 1926 he gradually showed his resentment of the British and the Zionists, appearing to many Palestinians as someone who was fighting a common enemy, an enemy who was an outsider not a insider, one who was non-Arab, non-Middle Eastern, and non-Muslim.

Although the mu'arada did oppose British-Zionist designs for Palestine, it was very moderate in the polices, calling at times for the use of evolutionary methods rather than revolutionary ones, for diplomacy rather than violence. This approach made it appear as if it was saying that the British could be trusted and the Zionists could be persuaded to limit their program and ambition. In time, the Zionist program became more intense and the British became more forceful in supporting it. Of course, the 1930's were critical years during which time Jewish immigration increased considerably and Arab restlessness and resentment grew correspondingly. While this was happening the majlesiyoun became more credible with the people and the mu'arada lost much of its appeal. Indeed, the latter

appeared to be more interested in fighting the majlesiyoun than they were in fighting the real enemy, the British and the Zionists.

Furthermore, the mu'arada was geographically dispersed and socially fragmented. In Some places of Palestine it was very strong, in others either very weak or non-existent. Its greatest support was in the cities of Hebron and Nablus and it had some support in the Galilee region and a few coastal towns.(28) In the 1930's, its geographic base became more limited and whatever appeal it had in the rural areas it very quickly disappeared. Socially it was very diverse, It had the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, the educated and the uneducated, the Christian and the Muslim.(29) However, the social mix did not genuinely constitute a national party. One other weakness of the mu'arada was its poor finances. Of course, this problem had a lot to do with the other problem, lack of unity, fragmentation and social diversity. There was no reliable and steady sources of income and most of the revenues were private contributions. One very controversial source was Zionist financial assistance to certain personalities in the mu'arada as well as financial aid to some of its newspapers.(30) According to Zionist sources, many individuals in the mu'arada received financial help to support their political activities.(31)

The majlesiyoun made an issue of the mu'arada's Zionist connection, implying that many of its members were outright traitors. During the 1936 revolution, some of them were actually shot and killed. Zionist sources also claim that most of the wealthy Palestinian who sold land to Jews were affiliated with the mu'arada, some of them were members of the Nashashibi family.(32)

There was no evidence that Ragheb himself had accepted Zionist money. However, the majlesiyoun always accused him of accepting bribes and using the office of mayor to reward political friends and punish political enemies. Of course, this charge of misusing funds and patronage was levied by both sides against each other. Ragheb, however, did have some contacts with the Zionists but they were not to obtain financial assistance.

GROUPS AFFILIATED WITH THE MU'ARADA

The rise of the Nashashibi family to political prominence in the city of Jerusalem marked the beginning of family rivalries in the national politics of Palestine.(33) As mentioned earlier, Ragheb held important offices during the Ottoman administration. Consequently, the end of Ottoman rule meant a loss of prestige for the Nashashibis.(34)

At the beginning of the British mandate, Ragheb appeared willing to cooperate with the British at the same time he showed lack of interest in politics.(35) This was perhaps a tactical move on his part to regain lost prestige and to signal the new rulers that he would not be difficult partner should they decide to involve him in the country's politics. of course, Haj Amin was playing a similar game during the same period, around the time he was trying to get appointed to the position of mufti of Jerusalem.

What instigated the rivalry between the Nashashibis and the Husseinis was not the coming of the British to Palestine or even the end of the Ottoman rule. True the British encouraged the rivalry when they found it already existing. The real beginning of the rivalry between the two families was over the issue of representation in early congresses. As mentioned earlier, these congresses met in Palestine as an offshoot of the Syrian Congress and they were viewed as representative of the Palestinian people. The failure of the Nashashibis to obtain sufficient seats in the Arab Executive, which was elected by the congress, was the real issue upon which the politics of Arab Palestine became permanently divided.

Of course, the Husseinis wanted no opposition, and they succeeded, at the Third Congress, in December 1920, in driving the Nashahsibis completely out of the Arab Executive, so that the latter family ended up with no representation whatsoever. The issue of representation in the various congresses became more acute and by the sixth congress 1923, the mu'arada became convinced of the need for organization. Of course, opposition to Haj Amin's appointment to the position of mufti and head of the SMC accentuated the rivalry, but at the time it consisted mainly of prominent notables who were already fighting Husseinis dominance in the Arab Executive. Ragheb was the central figure among these notables. Very little organization existed then.

Of course, British and Zionist policies had encouraged the mu'arada to organize itself and become more aggressive. Once the mufti showed political inclinations to oppose the British and assert his leadership over the national movement, the British became interested in encouraging divisions within that movement and in finding a counterpart for Haj Amin, one who could effectively challenge his leadership or at least weaken it. According to Zionist sources, the High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, sought the help of Frederick Kisch, head of the Zionist organization in London, in dealing with the Arab situation.(36) Consequently, the idea of supporting the mu'arada financially and politically was part of a Zionist strategy to bring about a division within the ranks and leadership of the Arab national movement.

Already in 1920, the Zionists were soliciting Arab support for the fulfillment of their own political ambitions. They encouraged and financed the Arab-Jewish Association or Al-Jam'iyyah Al-Arabiyyah Al-Yahudiyya. The aim of the Association was to promote Arab-Jewish economic cooperation as well as to develop support for Jewish immigration.(37) The Organization's center was in the city of Haifa and it was headed by that city's Arab Mayor, Hasan Shukri. Obviously, nationalists opposed the formation of such organizations as the Association on the grounds they were supportive of the Balfour Declaration which the Arabs always considered to be sentimental to their national interest. Consequently, the Association was described as treasonable organization.(38)

1. The National Muslim Association

The establishment of the National Muslim Association was prompted by the dismal failure of the Arab delegation which in 1921, went to London to explore the possibility of obtaining British concessions on the question of Palestine and the Jewish national home. The Association's center was in Haifa and its leader was Yunis Al-Khatib.(39) Members were drawn from several prominent families, although the unofficial leadership was provided by the Nashashibi family.

The Association formally accepted the British Mandate,(40) and, in 1923, it accepted the British proposal to create a legislative council for Palestine. Such positions as these were, at the time, daring acts in view of the fact that the more popular Husseinis were formally opposed to the proposal and very silent on the question of the mandate. The Husseinis urged Palestinians to boycott elections for the council,(41) and the boycott was successful. The legislative proposal was dropped.

However, it was the Association's Zionist connection which was the more disturbing issue with the nationalists. The Association supported the Zionist program, and, according to Zionist sources, this connection was based upon the desire of the Association's leader to obtain high positions in the administration of Palestine - an objective that could be best achieved through the support of the Zionists.(42) The Association soon spread to other cities and towns. Its backbone in Nablus were the Touqan and the 'Abdul Hadi families whose 90 support was based upon their local opposition to the Hamads who were majlesiyoun in control of the mayoralty.(43) In the Jerusalem area, the Association's main support came from the ranks of the Dajani family. The

Association did not last long, primarily because the position it took did not represent the opinion of most people, and its Zionist connection was seen as damaging to the national interests of Palestinian Arabs. It was seen as a tool in the hands of the Zionists.(44) Even the British became reluctant to continue their support to it once it became clear that the Association's credibility with the Arab population was not going to get stronger. They came to the conclusion that the Association was nothing more than a Zionist creation of "doubtful political value".(45)

2. The National Party

The difficulties of the mu'arada in the first three years of the civil administration in Palestine and its apparent failure to circumvent the majlesiyoun impelled it to organize a new political party, Al-Hizb Al-Watani (the National Party). The organizers were Ragheb and Fakhri of the Nashashibi family and supporting them were As'ad Al-Shuqayri and Aref Al-Dajani. The party's first congress was held in Jerusalem on the ninth and tenth of November 1923. Along with the urban personalities there were some rural notables such as 'Omar Salih Al-Barghuti who represented some of the villages near Ramallah.(46) The party elected Shaykh Suliman Taji Al-Farouqi as its first president and a central executive and supervisory committee of twenty members.(47)

This party also had a Zionist connection, as was revealed by Zionist sources.(48) As mentioned earlier, leaders of this party 91 already had connections with the Zionist Executive with whom they shared the common goal of limiting the influence of the Arab Executive and the SMC. According to these Zionist sources, Fakhri al-Nashashibi received financial help from the Zionist office in Jerusalem presumably in return for newspaper articles denouncing the Muslim-Christian Association and supporting Jewish immigration to Palestine. A similar source claimed that Fakhri, in one particular case, asked the Zionist office for money to help open a new branch of the part in Bethlehem.(49) Fakhri according to the same source, never asked for regular subsidies from the Zionists.(50)

The party's connection with the Zionists was bitterly resented by the Husseinis, who, through Jamal Al-Husseini made their position very clear to the Zionists. According to Zionists sources, Jamal held, on one particular occasion, the Zionist organization responsible for creating the National Party and dividing the

Palestinian people.(51) He also made clear Arab opposition to the Jewish national home and Jewish "exploitation" of the country's national resources.

Arab sources reveal the party's connection with British officials. According to Izzat Darwazah, for instance, many members of the party had contacts with Sir Gilbert Clayton, the Chief Secretary in the Palestine government and an ardent supporter of the Zionist. Darwazah wrote that in 1923 the party supported the 1922 British proposal of a Legislative Council for Palestine.(52) It should be recalled that the majlesiyoun rejected the proposal on the grounds that it favored the Jews.(53) Sir Clayton seemed to have influenced the party's platform.(54)

Despite the connections which the nationalists considered either unpatriotic or treasonable, the platform of the party looked quite nationalistic and in line with the Arabs' most reflective aspirations. It advocated Arab Unity, the non-recognition of the Balfour Declaration, the rejection of the British constitutional proposals, and the establishment of a national government and an elected Parliament.(55) In addition, the party suggested various economic and social reforms.(56)

From the beginning, the party was determined to resist and oppose the majlesiyoun and their policies. Through its press, particularly Mir'at al-Sharq and Al-Carmil, its leaders "unceasingly attacked the Arab Executive for its supposed tolerance towards Zionism, while they represented their own party as the most consistent element of opposition to Zionism".(57)

The majlesiyoun, on the other hand, counter-attacked with equal force and vehemence. They circulated petitions protesting its policies, sent representatives throughout the country to expose its "treacherous" methods, and even used the pulpits in the mosques to attack its leaders.(58) The Arab executive in particular accused many of the party's leaders to have sold land the Jews and to have accepted money to promote their political program.(59)

The national party was slow in gaining new grounds, partly because its leadership was "unimpressive and politically timid" and many of its members were "ostensibly non-political."(60) In addition, the party failed to offer the people a viable political alternative: its program was not very different from that of the Arab Executive.(61) This meant that its credibility with the people depended mostly on the social prestige of its leaders and the methods they used to communicate their policies. Obviously, these were not adequate or sufficiently strong to match their political opposites in the majlesiyoun.

Moreover, the party's support depended on the nature of local rivalries. Generally, those who opposed the local notables who supported Haj Amin became

almost automatically supporters of the mu'arada. Consequently, mu'arada groups like the National party were not really a national party; rather they were local notables opposed to the supporters of Haj Amin. For instance, mu'arada member Shaykh As'ad Al-Shuqayri was a rival of Shaykh Mohammed Murad, a member of the SMC, while Sa'id Abu Khadra of Jaffa was the local rival of both mayor 'Asim Al-Said and 'Umar Al-Bitar of the Arab Executive.(62)

The failure of the National Party did not mean at all that it had no impact. It did render the national movement disunited and in a sense it did slow down its progress during the 1920's. It was in part responsible for the difficulties of the Muslim-Christian Association mentioned earlier, particularly the "temporary collapse" of the Jaffa branch.(63) It was also able to open new branches outside Jerusalem, its center, an indication that its impact was not negligible. Small branches were opened in Ramleh, Nazareth, Haifa, Acre, Hebron, Tulkarem, and Gaza.(64)

3. The Farmers' Party (Hizb Al-Zurr'a)

The year 1924 witnessed the establishment of the Farmers' party which brought with it a new phenomenon. This was to give political expression to the rural people, particularly the peasants and to make obvious the point that village elites were no longer willing to leave the urban elites in control of the country's political affairs. The party manifested the existence of deep-seated distrust of the country's urban leadership on the part of the leading families of Palestinian villages.(65) However, since the country's political leadership was in the hands of the majlesiyoun, the party's challenge to this leadership was expressed in a program similar to that of the mu'arada. Consequently, the Farmers' party from the beginning, identified with the various groups constituting the mu'arada.

Several rural families were conspicuous in the Farmers' party, among them were Abu Ghosh family,(66) the Mas'uds of Burqa, the Abu Hantashs of Tulkarm district and the Hdeibs of Dawa'imeh near Hebron.(67) One of the first branches was opened in Nablus as was followed by branches in Nazareth, Jenin, Beisan and Hebron.(68)

Contacts with the Urban opposition were made by these rural families and personalities including such urban leaders as Afif 'Abd al-Hadi of Jenin and Said Al-Shawwa of Gaza as well as urban families as the Fahumes of Nazareth. These leaders, in the cities and in the villages, were helped in their linkages and organizations by the Zionist Executive, particularly H.M. Kalvarisky. The party's

expenses were paid by the Zionists, although F. Kisch showed reluctance in supporting the new policy of Arab opposition.(69)

Basically, the doctrine around which the Farmers' party revolved manifested the traditional conflict between rural and urban interests and reflected deep-seated suspicions and dislike between fellaheen and city people.(70) The families and individuals who were affiliated with this party were primarily motivated by parochial interests. As such, that served to weaken the national movement by fragmenting its unity and altering its goals and methods.(71) Indeed, they were more interested in fighting other Arabs than they were in fighting their common enemies, the British and the Zionists.

In general, the program of the Farmers' party stressed the need to "alleviate the economic plight of the fellah by improving methods of agriculture, spreading agricultural education, and establishing agricultural banks for long-term loans."(72) Politically, this party advocated the formulation of a constitution which would reflect peoples' interests and aspirations, the formation of a national government elected by the people, and genuine cooperation with the British.(73)

Furthermore, it called for the protection of Islamic property and its management in a way that would insure equitable distribution of revenues between rural and urban people.(74) This last demand clearly reflected skepticism and distrust of the Husseinis who were seen as managing Waqf property for their own economic and political benefits.(75)

To a certain degree, the Farmers' party's program was similar to that of the National party discussed earlier. Generally, membership in the Farmers' party and the National party often overlapped. For instance, Tawfiq Fahum of Nazareth and Gaza's Said Shawwa were members of both parties. Moreover, the two parties represented a united front in the main stream of Palestinian politics.

The failure of the Farmers' party was due to many factors, one of which was its divisiveness. Its image as a group closely identifies with the mu'arada was not very appealing to the nationalists who, at the time, felt the need for a united front in their struggle against their arch enemies, Zionism and British rule. Another factor might have been the sharp decrease in Zionist financial support which had been prompted by serious crisis in Zionist finances.(76) Ironically, while this support was declining, the party's connection with the Zionists continued to discredit its leaders in the eyes of most people, particularly the nationalists.

4. Association for Village Cooperation

Following the failure of attempts in 1924 by outsiders and insiders to reconcile the various factions in the national movement and to bring together the Majlesiyoun and the mu'arada, another rural political group was formed. This was the Jam'yyat Ta'awun al-Qura (Association for Village Cooperation) which was initially founded by Al-Madi family of Ijzim in the district of Haifa, a land-owning family that controlled several villages in the north of Palestine.

The basic motivation for the formation of the Association was its distaste for the Husseinis political hegemony in Palestine. At the same time it was dissatisfied with the Nashashibi-Farouqi control of the National Party. Consequently, the Association identified with the mu'arada while it maintained a separate political existence as an organized group.

The first meeting of the Association was held in Ijzim on September 1, 1924 and it was attended by many members of the Madi family as well as Shaykh As'ad Al-Shuqayri, Najeeb Nassar, Ibrahim and Salim Najjar and others.(77) During this meeting, the Association's platform and by-Laws were formulated including a pledge to eliminate mutual suspicion and dislike between village and city people.(78) Agricultural standards were to be elevated.

Most notably, the Association had in its platform a call for Muslims to preserve their holy places and protect their religious endowments, a clear indication that these matters were not well protected by the SMC. The call was also a clear indication that the Association was to be part of the mu'arada, although, as mentioned earlier, it would maintain a separate existence.

The political objectives of the Association was to struggle for independence and Arab unity to repudiate the Balfour Declaration.(79) Furthermore, the Association made clear its disappointment with the lack of progress in the area of self-government and blamed the British government for this failure. Obviously, the Association's platform did not differ from those of the other political groups within the mu'arada i.e., the National party and the Farmers' party. Because the Association did not go as far as repudiating explicitly the British mandate, the government approved its by-Laws very quickly. Naif Madi was elected as the Association's official spokesman.(80)

5. Hizb al-Ahali (The People's Party)

The failure of efforts to bring together the various factions within the national movement prompted certain young Palestinian intellectuals from the middle class to form still another opposition party known as Hizb al-Ahali (the People's Party). These alienated intellectuals came primarily from the city of Nablus and they were dissatisfied with prevailing conditions of the national movement, particularly its traditional leadership. The party was established in April 1925, and its founders were Mohammed Salah and 'Adel Zu'a'iter.

The party's program stressed the superior qualities of democracy and the need for the use of pragmatism in pursuing national goals, especially independence. It rejected the Balfour Declaration and opposed the selling of Arab land to Jews.(81) Economically, it advocated the reduction of taxes, like the tithe, the promotion of agricultural development, trade expansion and public control of industry.

In general, the party represented still another facet of Arab factionalism and a clear manifestation of personal and parochial interests. It was an elitist party that failed to explain the deeper meaning of the current socio-economic and political problem of Arab Palestine. Indeed, it was established, according to one of its founders, M. Salah, "only . . . after the Muslim-Christian Association fell apart in Nablus."(82) It had no genuine platform and it resembled predecessors in the mu'arada splinter-groups. Consequently, it failed to attract serious followings outside the Nablus environs, and by 1928 it went out of existence.

6. The Free Party of Palestine

In December 1927, and as a result of the mu'arada's disappointment with the British decisions to give control of the Supreme Muslim Council to the Husseinis, a new anti-Husseini party, the Free Party, or Al-Hizb al-Hurr, came to existence. All the founders of the party came from Jaffa and consequently it was as parochial as the People's Party, its immediate predecessor. They included Hilmi Abu-Khadra, Issa al-Issa, Fahmi al-Husseini (no kin of Haj Amin), Suleiman Abu Ghazale, Sa'id al-Sayigh, 'Abdul-Qadir Abu Rabah al-Dajani, Hamid al-Husseini (no kin of Haj Amin), Mousa al-Kayyali, and Yousif 'Ashour.(83) In the party's administrative committee, there were Fahmi al-Husseini, 'Abdul-Qadir Abu-Rabah al-Dijani, 'Abdul-Ra'uf al-Bitar, Fawzi Abu-Khadra, Alfred Rock, Sa'id al-Sayigh, Issa al-Issa, Fa'iq Telmas, Issa Abu al-Jabin, Yousif al-Sa'id and Mousa al-Kayyali.(84) In its first meeting of December 8, 1927, the party elected 'Abdul-

Qadir Abu-Rabah al-Dajani as its Secretary-General, Hilmi Abu-Khadra as Assistant Secretary-General and Fahmi al-Husseini as the party's liaison with the government.(85)

The party's program was not too different from other splinter groups within the mu'arada. It resorted to abstract notions of political and economic reforms, and was devoid of concrete plans or a program of action. It accepted the British Mandate but only as a temporary condition, and it anticipated ultimate independence and sovereignty for Palestine. It vaguely referred to the economic and political rights of the Palestinian people and the inviolability of their public works and labor rights.(86)

Members came largely from the middle class and there was a conspicuous presence of newspaper editors, lawyers, merchants and school teachers. Nevertheless, the party should be seen as another divisive phenomenon or trend within the national movement. As such, it failed to unseat the majlesiyoun from their well established position of power and leadership.

THE MU'ARADA'S ROLE IN THE SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE 1920'S

In the 1920's, the battles between majlesiyoun and mu'aridoun were fought over specific issues. We have seen how the two groups fought their first battle over issues involving the office of mufti of Jerusalem and the SMC. The latter became the leadership council for the national movement with Haj Amin as its head, and also as the mufti.

In 1927, the municipal elections were held and they became a major issue dividing the national movement. In Jerusalem, the electoral contest was crucial because of the city's importance as the capital of Palestine and as the place where the Husseinis and the Nashashibis had their political bases. Furthermore, the city's Jewish residents played a major role in influencing the outcome of the election. They of course, supported the Nashashibi faction (i.e., the mu'arada's candidates) as the lesser of the two evils.(87) According to Porath, out of the eight seats assigned to the Arabs in the Jerusalem municipal council (five for the Muslims and three for the Christians) the Nashashibis won six while the majlesiyoun won only two. Of the six pro-Nashashibis, there were three Muslims and three Christians. Without the Jewish vote, the eight Arab seats would have been equally divided between the pro-Husseinis and the pro-Nashashibis.(88)

Even without the Jewish vote, the Nashashibis political strength would have been significant and not at all minor compared with the majlseiyoun who were

supposed to be the established leadership of Arab Palestine. Of course, Ragheb came first on the list of winners, with the Christian Ya'qub Farraj as second and Zaki Nuseibeh as third.(89)

The mu'arada also did well in the municipal elections held elsewhere in Palestine. Its candidates won majority seats almost everywhere except in Gaza and Majdal.(90) Its performance in the local elections made it clear that it was a power to reckon with and not something to be ignored. Consequently, the Husseinis were forced to - consider reconciliation with them to keep the national movement united - of course, under their leadership. But the attempt was futile producing instead another mu'arada political group, the Palestine Free Party discussed earlier.

In 1928, another major issue developed in which the two groups were involved. This one came at the end of a five year period of intense feuding between majlesiyoun and mu'aridoun. It involved the convening of the seventh Congress which had been postponed from year to year until the mu'arada's relative success in the municipal elections persuaded the pro-Husseinis that postponement could no longer be politically possible or useful. The majlesiyoun consented before hand to the allocation of a substantial number of seats to the mu'arada and the Congress was consequently convened on April 20, 1928.(91)

However, according to many scholars of Palestinian history, the Congress was the weakest of all congresses held in Palestine partly, because an effort was made "to make it an all-embracing hodge-podge of a conference comprising every shade of opinion and interest in the country."(92) Also, the Congress came close to passing a general resolution demanding from the British the formation of an independent Arab national government, under the guidance of the mandate authorities.(93) Such resolution would have been unrealistic, because the British would not have responded positively, and the resolution, as well as the Congress itself, would have simply disappeared without a trace of influence. However, many concerned members were able to persuade a majority to reiterate instead resolutions passed routinely by previous congresses.(94)

The Congress was attended by 250 delegates who mostly came from urban areas.(95) Since it was a more representative body than the previous congresses, it chose to elect a larger Executive, one that had forty-eight members, almost twice as many as in the previous Executive. The two rival groups had equal membership on the Executive with the Muslims and Christians dividing into a ratio of two to one.(96) Mousa Kazim al-Husseini, was elected President while Tawfiq al-Haj 'Abdallah, the mayor of Acre, and Ya'qoub Farraj, Jerusalem's deputy

mayor and an Orthodox Christian, were elected Vice-Presidents. The last two were members of the mu'arada and so was the Protestant Christian Lawyer Mugannam Mugannam who was one of the three secretaries of the Executive. The other two secretaries were Jamal al-Husseini, a relative of Mousa Kazim and the secretary of the previous Executive, and 'Awni Abdul-Hadi, a well known Jerusalem lawyer and later the Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party.

The seventh Congress resolved ". . . as a common right, the establishment of a democratic parliamentary government." It declared that the Palestinian people were represented in its body "which unites all the Arab parties, both Muslims and Christians . . ." and demanded that Palestine be treated like the neighboring countries which were enjoying ". . . Parliamentary constitutions of various kinds." After all, it declared the resolution, "Palestine is no more backward than any of the neighboring Arab countries." (97)

In addition to the main resolution outlined above, the seventh Congress dealt with issues and problems such as the tithe tax, agricultural loans, the establishment of an agricultural bank, and the repeal of the Hulah concession which gave the Zionists a monopoly over the Hulah area.

No doubt, the seventh Congress differed from its predecessor congresses. For one thing, it avoided the old policy of maximum demands. This was due to the influence of the more moderate mu'arada which usually found it more realistic to push for self-government (i.e., autonomy) as envisaged by the League of Nation's covenant rather than for independence which the British would agree to. (98) On the other hand, the seventh Congress reflected the composition of its membership. While it appeared united, it was in reality characterized by personal feuds and the dominance of self-interests, while it seemed to portray moderate positions, it was in reality lacking in executive power and administrative energy also due to its political heterogeneity.

Obviously, the Nashashibis and their supporters were in a position of great influence at the seventh Congress, although they failed to dominate the national movement which remained largely in the hands of the Husseinis. However, their moderate influence in the Congress had no effect outside the Congress. The country's political status quo continued to exert pressures upon its people with no hope of a noticeable change in the near future. Moreover, the Zionists would not agree to a moderate program of democratic reform because they were still a small minority in the country and they were afraid parliamentary reforms would allow the Arab majority to circumscribe their political ambitions or even destroy them altogether.

The failure of the seventh Congress to persuade either the British or the Zionists to accept a moderate platform for a Palestinian future convinced a majority of Arabs that moderation served no useful purpose. Consequently, few months later, in 1929, the country went through its worse violent episode since the British had taken charge. The so-called "wailing wall incident," which was followed by wide-spread riots, ended a long period of relative peace.

It should be remembered that some effort, although unsuccessful, was made to reconcile the mu'arada and the majlesiyoun as early as 1924, when the press espoused the idea of reconciliation in a conference which convened in June of that year. Although the conference dealt with other matters pertaining to social and economic problems of Palestine, it preoccupied itself with the problem of national unity and the presentation of a common front against Zionist incursions into the future political destiny of Arab Palestine.

The conference of Arab journalists passed resolutions imploring Arab press to be guided by the principles of public interests, to avoid involvement in private and personal feuds, and not give preference to private and sectional interests at the expense of the national and public interests. It directed the press to have due regard to professional journalistic standards to avoid polemics and sensationalism in reporting the news. Politically, the conference urged all political groups to repudiate the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration and it criticized those groups, like the Farmers' Party, that did not. Finally, it called for national unity and pointed to the hazards of sectarian strife.

Journalists' efforts to imbue the national movement with unity was greatly aided by the presence in Jerusalem of Tunisian leader 'Abdul-Aziz al-Tha'alibi. This leader was urged to bring together the leaders of the various parties and a list of names was handed to him by Najib Nassar, Boulos Shihadeh and Khalil Sakakini.(99) However, Tha'alibi did not succeed in this task mainly due to the refusal of representatives of the agricultural parties and the national Party, to attend the proposed convention for national conciliation. When the convention met two hundred out of four hundred members attended. Most of those who attended were supporters of the sixth Palestine Congress i.e., they were supporters of the Husseinis. Consequently, they used their influence to postpone indefinitely the convening of the seventh Congress.(100) As we have seen that Congress did not meet until four years later (June 1928).

However, there were few minor occasions when leaders of the various parties and political organizations showed some regard for the public interest, showing willingness to forget, at least temporarily, these personal animosities and feuds in

order to create a common front of national unity and national interest. One such occasion involved Balfour's visit to Jerusalem on March 25, 1925. The former Foreign Minister of Britain, in whose name the controversial 1917 Declaration was issued, came for the opening of the Hebrew University. In the Arab mind, his name epitomized the worst of imperialist injustice and oppression, and, therefore, it was natural for the Arabs to react negatively to his visit. The Arab Executive Committee declared the day of his arrival as a day of mourning and called for a general strike.(101)

The strike was successful. It was obeyed by the entire country. A "program of national work" was agreed upon by a temporary coalition of all the political forces, including the majlesiyoun and the mu'arada. However, although the strike was fully adhered to, the ceremonies for the opening of the Hebrew University, held April 1, 1925, were not completely boycotted as was expected. Ragheb al-Nashashibi, along with few bedouin shayks from the Beisan area and a couple of lesser known Arab personalities from Jerusalem, attended the ceremonies.(102) Their presence was a subject of heated arguments and controversy. Ragheb in particular, but also Shaykh Ali Jarallah, who was on the Islamic Court of Appeal, were made center of an emotional uproar among nationalists.

Aside from these minor instances in which a facade of unity seemed to generate some optimism in the future, the national movement continued to be sharply divided. However, by the end of 1928 "there were indications that the period of political stagnation was giving way to renewed Zionist initiative and correspondingly renewed Palestinian Arab agitation and countermeasures."(103)

In the next chapter, we shall see that, from 1929 on, Palestine was no longer merely a politically nervous place but rather a place that had become a hot bed for revolution and extreme political agitation.

FOOTNOTES

(1) W.F. Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930's", Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer, 1977, pp. 37-40.

(2) Abdul-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith (The History of Modern Palestine), Beirut, 1971, p. 214.

(3) Taysir Y. Jbara, Al-Haj M. Amin al-Husseini: Mufti of Jerusalem, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1982, p. 52.

(4) Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning, p. 19.

(5) For more information see ISA, File 158.

(6) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 60.

(7) Jacob Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, New Haven, 1956, p. 213.

(8) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 14.

(9) Ibid., see also ASS, Files 107, 105, and CZA, S25/4379.

(10) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, p. 213.

(11) Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, London, 1937, p. 154.

(12) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, p. 220.

(13) See Aref, al-Mufasssal fi Tarikh al-Quds.

(14) Shaykh As'ad al-Shuqayri held important positions in the Ottoman administration including membership in the Ottoman Parliament, Chairmanship of the "Committee for Clarification of 108 Shari'ah Affairs" in the office of Shaykh al-Islam, and "Mufti of the Fourth Army during World War II. Quoted in Porath, The Emergence, p. 212.

(15) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 224.

(16) Ibid.

(17) David Gilmore, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians 1917-1980, London, 1980, p. 50.

(18) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, pp. 222-223.

(19) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 63.

(20) Albert Hourani, Al-Fikr al-Arabi fi 'Asr al-Nahdah 1798-1939, (Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939), 3rd ed., Beirut, 1977, see chapter eleven.

(21) Aida A. Najjar, The Arabic Press and Nationalism in Palestine, 1920, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1976, p. 33.

(22) Ibid., p. 35.

(23) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 16, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379, and Kisch to Kalvarisky, August 31, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(24) Hizb al-Islah (Reform Party), was established in June 1935, by Dr. Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi, who defeated Ragheb al-Nashashibi in the Jerusalem Municipal Elections in 1934.

(25) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 65.

(26) Cmd., 5979, pp. 72-80.

(27) Ibid.

(28) The results of the "Municipal Elections" of 1927 and 1934, across the country proved that the Mu'arada's gains came from key cities in Palestine.

(29) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 63.

(30) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 16, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(31) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 14, 1923, a letter explaining the dissatisfaction of Arab collaborators (Zaki Pasha), with the Zionists for cutting down subsidy and support, CZA, S/25, 4378, Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 31, 1923, asking for more money to support Fakhri al-Nashashibi's democratic party, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(32) Gilmore, Dispossessed, p. 50.

(33) Porath, The Emergence, Vol. I, p. 209.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Lesch, Frustration, p. 202.

(36) See CZA, S/25, Files 517 and 518.

(37) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 180.

(38) M. Izzat Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka al-'Arabiyyah al-Haditha, (Concerning Recent Arab Movement), Sidon, 1951, pp. 35-38.

(39) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, document No. 6, November 16, 1921, pp. 720-721.

(40) Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning, p. 22.

(41) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, pp. 539-540.

(42) Conversation between the leading members of the "NMA" and Dr. Eder, March 30, 1922, CZA, S/25, 4380.

(43) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 217.

(44) CZA, S/25, 4380

(45) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 221.

(46) Frederick Kisch, Palestine Diary, London, 1938, pp. 50, and 53-57, see also al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O. (Zionists Organization), London, August 24, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379. (Text in French).

- (49) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O.. London August 31, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.
- (50) Ibid.
- (51) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O., London August 26, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.
- (52) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, p. 47.
- (53) Haj Amin's position on the Legislative Council and the British Blue Books was explained in two interviews with him conducted in 1974, by 'Imad Shaqqour and K, Qassimiyyeh. See Shu'un Filastiniyah (Palestine Affairs), No. 36, August 1974, pp. 12-17.
- (54) Ya'coub, Nathra Jadida (a new outlook), p. 82.
- (55) ASS, file 220, (Program of the National Arab Party), see also al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mouassassat, document No. 7, pp. 721-722.
- (56) ASS, File 220.
- (57) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 226.
- (58) Siddiq al-Tammimi to the AE, December 10, 1923, ISA, AE, 3714.
- (59) Bayan al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 182.
- (60) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.
- (61) Lesch, Frustration, p. 206.
- (62) Ibid.
- (63) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.
- (64) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 182.
- (65) Porath, The Emergence, Vol. I, p. 227.
- (66) Secret Memorandum to Dr, Eder, May 5, 1920, CZA, Z/4, 1454.
- (67) Mousa Hdeib was murdered in 1929, as a result of his close connections with the Zionist Organization, as stated in Kisch's, Palestine Diary, p. 125.
- (68) ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, New Haven, 1947, p. 484.
- (69) Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 89; see also CZA, S/25, 517 and 518.
- (70) M. Izzat Darwazah, al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyyah fi Mukhtalafi Marahiliha, vol. I (The Palestine Case at its Different Stages), Sidon, 1951, p. 47.
- (71) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, p. 241.
- (72) Lesch, Frustration, p. 113.
- (73) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mouassassat, p. 183.
- (74) ESCO, p. 485.
- (75) Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 125.
- (76) Lesch, Frustration, p. 113; see also Kisch, Palestine Diary, on the "Agricultural Parties", pp. 80-150.
- (77) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1929, p. 246.

- (78) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 132.
- (79) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-129, p. 247.
- (80) Ibid., p. 248.
- (81) The Program of the Hizb al-Ahali (People's Party), Nablus, ASS, File 718.
- (82) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al Baritani 1922-1939, p. 261, and see also ASS, File 718.
- (83) Al-Hizb al-Hurr al-Filastini: Dusturuhu wa Nizamuhu al-Dakhili (the Palestine Liberal Party: Its Constitution and Internal Structure), ASS, File 207.
- (84) ASS, File 207.
- (85) Bayan al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, pp. 184-185, and for a complete list of names, refer to document No. 8, Ibid., pp. 723-726.
- (86) See Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1929, p. 279, and ASS, File 207.
- (87) CZA, S/25, 668.
- (88) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 239.
- (89) CZA, S/25, 668.
- (90) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 239.
- (91) Palestine Zionist Executive and report by Kalvarisky, CZA, S/25,4210.
- (92) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al Hadith, p. 137.
- (93) Ibid.
- (94) Darwazah, al-Qadiyyah, p. 59.
- (95) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 195.
- (96) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, pp. 281-282.
- (97) Royal Institute of International Affairs, A Survey of International Affairs 1929, Oxford 1930, p. 258.
- (98) ESCO, p. 488.
- (99) Killah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Biritani 1922-1929, p. 246.
- (100) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 132.
- (101) Ibid., p. 134.
- (102) Two of the three Bedouin Sheiks were identified; one was Shaykh Mohammad al-Zinati and Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Hussein, as quoted in Filastin (daily Arabic newspaper edited by 'Issa al-'Issa), 966/9, April 3,4, 1925.
- (103) Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 60.

CHAPTER IV**THE MU'ARADA AND THE MAJLESIYOUN IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE (1929-32)**

During the British Mandate, Arab opposition to Zionist aspirations was never a transient phenomenon. In fact, it grew in strength with the development of Arab nationalism. Naturally, the desire for self-determination and independence also increased among the Arabs of Palestine. Ironically, after ten years of Mandate rule, the national aspirations of Arabs and Jews became so crystallized as opposite forces the success of one meant the inevitable failure of the other.

The Palestine national movement, in all of its critical stages, failed to obtain diplomatic successes to redress its grievances. Consequently, extreme alienation made it resort to violence as the only means by which it could express its frustration and anger. Undoubtedly, violence also related to the social and economic dilemma within the Palestinian Arab society. These social imbalances contributed to the ultimate failure of the national movement.

The violence of 1920, 1929, 1933 and 1936, could illustrate best Arab frustrations in achieving their goal of independence. Although each outbreak differed in intensity and duration, the constant factor remained the Arab sense of political deprivation which resulted from the growing fear of Zionist domination and the awareness that Zionist ambitions and activities were the only obstacles to the achievement of Arab independence. It was natural then that Arab nationalism in Palestine would become fiercely anti-Zionist and anti-British in form as well as in substance. There were parallels and strong opposites between Zionist achievements and Arab political omission and want of success.

At any rate, the desire to dominate the political scene as manifested in the struggle between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis was marked by the former's manipulation of the religious sentiments of the people. At the end of the 1920's, Haj Amin's position became precarious due to the successful challenge put up by the opposition in both the municipal election of 1927 and the Arab Executive elections of 1928. However, the conflict between Muslims and Jews over the Western Wall in 1928-29 presented a golden opportunity for Haj Amin to regain political influence for himself and the SMC which he headed and directed. At the time, Muslims and Christians were bound together in the struggle against Zionism.

Indeed the issue of the Wailing Wall had mobilized all Palestinians including the mu'arada to counteract Jewish claims to the Holy place.

The Wailing Wall which had religious significance to Jews was adjacent to a Muslim Holy place and the dispute involved the extent of the rights and practices of the two religious groups. It is important to note, that the mu'arada in the beginning did not actively participate in the protest and demonstration preceding the riots and the violence associated with the 1929 Wailing Wall controversy. But when the violence widespread the mu'arada's attitude changed significantly. The Wailing Wall incident became a national issue around which Muslims of all walks of life rallied. The mu'arada feared the issue was enhancing the mufti's prestige and influence and did not want the trend to continue. Its attitude was best reflected in its newspapers Mir'at al-Sharq, Sirat al-Mustaqim and Filastin, whose editorials supported the struggle for the defense of Muslim rights in the Buraq al-Sharif, the Muslim religious shrine adjacent to the Wailing Wall.

Background to the August 1929 Disturbances

There was a background for the 1929 outbreak of violence which should be mentioned here. According to Shaw Commission, in 1928, Arab fears of Zionist schemes were stirred up by the sudden and sharp increase in Jewish immigration. However, in that year the British granted to Moses Novemeysky an affluent Jew - a concession to extract salt from the Dead Sea, which Arabs thought unfairly favored the Jews. However, Arabs' objections to such concessions were rationalized along the line, that the country's natural resources were being handed to Jews and hence the Arabs would not profit from such enterprises. Yet, the Arabs wanted the Government to take over and develop such enterprises in order to benefit the entire country. Also, the Arabs were alarmed that the Jewish National Fund had succeeded in buying additional land from Arab owners. But one of the major grievances that stirred strong resentments among Arabs was the tax structure of Palestine. Arabs believed that paying high taxes especially in terms of the low standard of living among them, was serving British interests in developing the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

These reasons along with other pertinent factors led the Arab community to momentarily forget their political differences and convene in July 1928, a general congress for the purpose of formulating a common position to deal with British Zionist policy. However, the 1929 disturbances abruptly discontinued the Arab dialogue.

The 1929 Wailing Wall Incident and The Outbreak of Violence

The issues of political representation, economic grievances, and Jewish immigration were major factors in the renewed violence of 1929. However, a more specific incident, the "Wailing Wall" or the "Buraq al-Sharif" controversy, triggered the violence that engulfed Arabs and Jews in a bloody war that spread to the other cities of Palestine. No doubt, the 1929 violence left its mark on the inhabitants, both Arabs and Jews, and, for a long time, promised that the future would be even worse than the present.

The Religious Significance of the Wall

Initially, the disturbances occurred in Jerusalem and their immediate causes were the Wailing Wall which had religious significance for both Muslims and Jews.(1) According to the report of the Shaw Commission,

"This Wall forms part of the Western exterior of the Ancient Jewish Temple; being the last remaining vestige of that sacred place it is regarded with the greatest reverence by religious Jews, whose custom of praying there expended back to at least the Middle Age . . . The Wall is also part of the Haram-esh-Sherif, which is an Islamic place of great sanctity, being reckoned next to the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina as an object of veneration to Muslims."(2)

The wall is also the Western boundary of the "Haram-al-Sharif", the Muslim sacred precinct which contains "Masjid al-Aqsa" and the Dome of the Rock from which, Muslims believe, the Prophet Mohammed "tethered" his "Winged mount" al-Buraq when he ascended to Heaven.(3) Muslims consider the Haram to be the third Holiest Shrine in Islam as well as "the center of Muslim Worship in Palestine."(4) The pavement in front of the Wall and the surrounding area form part of the Abu Madian Waqf, (pious foundation), "a Muslim religious and charitable trust which is said to have been founded in the time of Saladin for the benefit of a sect of Muslims of Moroccan origin known as the Mughrabis."(5)

In 1925, Ronald Storrs, then governor of Jerusalem, authoritatively asserted the fact that the Wall and its pavement were: "Legally and juridically . . . a portion of the surface of the "Haram-al-Sharif" and as such, the absolute property of the Muslim Community."(6) Consequently, the British administration in Palestine supported the Muslim position on legal grounds but its position did not end the controversy over Jewish claims and religious practices.

Expansion of the Dispute in 1928

The British position was based on Ottoman regulations of 1840 and 1911, according to which Jews had no ownership right to the site. However, Jews did have the right to visit and worship provided they brought with them no appurtenances as chairs and benches and provided they did not erect a screen to separate men from women.(7) The rationale behind these Ottoman requirements was the fear that the pavement might become an outdoor synagogue thereby giving legitimacy to Jewish claim of ownership, a claim which would violate the rights of the Abu Madian (Muslim) endowment.(8)

However, during the British Mandate, Zionist elements renewed the Jewish challenge to the status quo of the Wall, and, during the 1920's demanded the possession of the Wall and the area adjacent to it. This, of course, became a central issue in Arab politics and another obstacle in Jewish-Arab relations.(9) According to Abboushi, "unfortunately, the British administration did not have a specific governmental agency to deal with issues relating to such matters, nor did it enact new regulations to govern such situations."(10) This was why ". . . the government relied on precedents established during the Islamic period of Palestinian history. In other words, the status quo inherited from the Turks was accepted as the law."(11)

The controversy over the Wailing Wall was made more threatening by the appearance at the scene of the extreme Zionist elements which were led by Vladimir Jabotinsky who, by 1928, had created a "sizable and politically disciplined Revisionist following in Europe and had expanded the training of his . . . Brit Trumpeldor (BETAR) units which were sent to Palestine for military and pioneer service."(12) The Wall issue gave Jabotinsky and his followers the opportunity to mobilize new support for the revisionist movement.(13) The Hebrew press in Jerusalem was supportive of Jabotinsky's position on the Wall for it had already made public demands for a revision of the status quo.(14) Such demands could

not fail to excite the Arabs and stir them to a frenzy. Haj Amin and other Muslim leaders began "an active internal campaign to raise Palestinian religious consciousness of the perceived danger to the Haram-al-Sharif."(15)

The uproar was rapidly being transformed to a war. An incident occurred in Jerusalem on September 24, 1929, the Jewish Day of Atonement that later triggered a series of violent clashes. This incident involved a group of Ashkenazi Jews who "brought a larger ark than was ordinarily used, some mats and lamps, and attached a screen to the pavement in front of the wall, all in preparation for the religious services the next morning."(16) This flagrant violation of regulations governing the Wailing Wall was reported in a "complaint . . . made to the Deputy District Commissioner of Jerusalem (Keith-Roach), by the Mutawalli (guardian) of the Abu Madian Waqf . . ." (17) However, upon the request of Haj Amin, Keith-Roach visited the area and saw the screen put up by the Jewish worshippers "to separate as in a synagogue the women worshippers from the men. This has never been done before, and was objected to by the Muslims."(18) The following day, Mr. Keith-Roach ordered the police to remove the screen. His decision caused an uproar in Palestine and overseas. Jews demanded that this decision be rescinded and recognition be extended to include the right of Jews to control the Wall.(19) However, the British government issued a White Paper in November 1928, reaffirming its previous interpretation of the Law governing the Wall. The stats quo remained unchanged.

A widespread Arab campaign of protest against Jewish threats to alter the status quo swept Palestine.(20) Haj Amin, together with other Palestinian religious leaders, started a new plan to protect Muslim Holy places. They publicized their views in Arab newspapers and sent secret messages to Muslim leaders in India. A committee for the Defense of the al-Buraq al-Sharif was founded.(21) According to Abboushi :

"The SMC saw the incident as part of a Zionist plot to usurp the Muslim's religious rights. It feared that Jews wanted to rebuild their ancient Temple, an act which could result in the total destruction of Muslim religious buildings. Jewish leaders denied such intentions, but the excitement continued, and it became obvious that during the crisis the Jews displayed obstinacy, the Arabs acrimony."(22)

The British administration justifies its status quo policy by stating that :

". . . the intervention by the police at the Wailing Wall was necessary to prevent a disturbance of the peace between Muslims, who are the legal proprietors of the site and Jewish attendants who, contrary to long-established custom and precedent, had introduced seats and benches for the use of Worshippers . . ." (23)

The British administration of Palestine asked Haj Amin to use his influence to calm people and bring the situation under control. The mufti expressed his readiness to comply with the government's request after he was assured that the Abu Madian Waqf would not be expropriated. (24) Accordingly, he announced a new strategy consisting of these elements :

"Publicizing the issue to Arabs of Palestine and to the Arab and Muslim Worlds, in order to unite them on the issue; cooperating with the Palestine and British governments while challenging them to adhere to and enforce their traditional policy of the status quo; and taking such action as would uphold Muslim rights around the Wall." (25)

Haj Amin attempted to galvanize Muslim sentiments by convening a General Muslim Conference in Jerusalem on November 1, 1928. The Assembly drew Muslims from all over the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. The resolutions which the Conference passed appeared to embody the same points already communicated by the mufti to the Palestine Government, they were also the same points which the mufti maintained throughout the conflict. (26)

Many participants in the Conference blamed British imperial policy for causing the Wall crisis and "forewarned of a Muslim rising against any European powers attempting to encroach upon the Haram-al-Sharif . . ." (27) The Conference expressed determination to hold the British government responsible for maintaining "public security and the safeguarding of the Muslim Holy Places to prevent any such intrusion on the part of the Jews." (28) Moreover, as a result of the 1928 Muslim Conference a "Society for the Defense of al-Masjid al-Aqsa and the Muslim Holy Places was established primarily to publicize the Wailing Wall controversy. Several appeals and manifestos were published in the pro-Husseini

weekly al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya in late 1928 and early 1929. The British concluded that Haj Amin and "public opinion in Palestine had definitely removed the matter from the purely religious orbit and had made it a political and social question.(29) Following the Conference, the SMC resumed with its remodelling and construction near the Wall. However, one house of the Abu Madian foundation was converted into a Zawiya (religious hospice) and to renew traditional prayer calls, a mu'azzin was authorized. Within a few weeks a British White Paper appeared which,

". . . expressed the Government's hope that Jewish and Muslim officials could agree upon a protocol regulating the conduct of the services at the Wall without prejudice to the legal rights of the Muslim owners in such a way as to satisfy normal liturgical requirements and decencies in matters of public worship."(30)

The Arabs were not satisfied with the terms of the White Paper, because it showed sympathy with the idea of extending Jewish religious practices beyond those that had been allowed by the religious authorities in past centuries. Nonetheless, the mufti informed the British that he would be satisfied with the Government's policy if it would strictly uphold ownership rights as established during the Ottoman regime. By December of 1928, the Muslims' position on the Wailing Wall issue to maintain the status quo(31) despite [British] predisposition toward a negotiated modus vivendi in which Zionist rights would be enlarged."(32)

During the first half of 1929, as the conflict over the Wall intensified, the Zionists seized the opportunity to curtail the Muslims' rights of repairing their own facilities near the Wall. In response to Zionists' initiatives, Muslim religious leaders insisted on the legal status quo as guaranteed by the British White paper of 1928. On the other hand, the Zionists were opposed to British interpretation of the status quo. Consequently, in mid-August, thousands of Jabotinsky's followers in the Betar and Maccabee organizations vowed to regain the Wall even if violence were the only method to attain their goal.(33) However, "early in 1929, the Palestine Government decided to conduct a closer examination of the principal question in the Wailing Wall dispute, namely, the rights of the Jewish worshippers to bring appurtenances to the Wall."(34) Accordingly, the British authorities asked both the SMC and the Chief Rabbinate to submit evidence supporting their

respective views on the question of the wall.(35) However, according to the British Shaw Commission, Haj Amin and the SMC

"returned an early reply to this request and in part supported their statement of the case by documents derived from the time of the Turkish regime. On the other hand, repeated reminders to the Chief Rabbinate failed to elicit any response to the request which had been made to them by the Government."(36)

The Jews organized demonstrations to support the extreme Jewish position. Joseph Klausner led these demonstrations despite efforts by Jewish moderates to stop the militants from demonstrating at the Wall. Jewish militant demonstrations, according to the Shaw Commission, were the immediate cause of the violence.(37)

On the Jewish holy day of Tisha b'Av (August 9, 1929) ceremonies at the Wall, set in motion a chain reaction of events that immensely angered the Muslim Arabs. A group of Jewish extremists raised the Zionist flag at the Wall, sang the Zionist national anthem (ha-Tiqvah) and proclaimed the Wall to be Jewish property. In retaliation, 2,000 Muslims marched to the Wall the following day, tore up a Torah Scroll, and burned some Jewish religious documents.(38) The sheikh of al-Aqsa had instigated procession while Haj Amin was negotiating with the Chief Secretary, and sheikh Hassan Abu Sa'ud, a rival of Haj Amin, delivered an inflammatory speech at the Wall.(39) This Arab counter-demonstration increased tension, however. On the following day, a Jewish boy accidentally kicked a ball into an Arab woman's tomato garden, and he was stabbed by an Arab man while in the garden trying to retrieve the ball. Jews retaliated by killing an Arab picked at random.(40) The funeral for the Jewish boy turned into a political demonstration against the British administration and the Arabs.

During the next week Jabotinsky's "defense" squads and Arab villagers clashed in a number of violent incidents.(41) The British finally quelled the riots, but not before 133 Jews and more than 116 Arabs had been killed.(42) The usual British response to violence was for the London government to send out an investigation Commission in order to recommend pacification measures. On September 14, 1929, the British government announced that a Special Commission under the chairmanship of a colonial judge 'Sir Walter Shaw' would proceed to Palestine, "to

inquire into the immediate causes which led to the recent outbreak in Palestine and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence."(43) The Commission's report remains to be the most thorough and balanced study of the disturbance.

The Reasons for the 1929 Riots

According to the Shaw Commission :

". . . racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future, was the fundamental cause of the outbreak of August last."(44)

However, the Muslims felt threatened by Zionist violation of the status quo. They felt it a matter of considerable importance that Jews "had not contented themselves with bringing benches and appurtenances of prayer as in the past . . ." (45) The Shaw Commission described the disturbances in the following terms :

"Racial antipathy, accentuated among the Arabs by a sense of religious grievance and among the Jews by a feeling of humiliation and dissatisfaction, found its outlet in a series of attacks and assaults of varying degrees of severity, which, during the week following the Muslim demonstration, were made by Arabs in the Old and New cities of Jerusalem and, to a less extent, in other parts of the country. On the 23rd of August the more serious disturbances began."(46)

Next in importance were the various activities of the Society for the Protection of the Muslim Holy Places, and, to a lesser degree, of its Jewish counterpart, the Pro-Wailing Wall Committee.(47) Inflammatory articles published in the press by both sides added another dimension to the conflict.

The Wailing Wall affair undoubtedly marked the beginning of the transformation of the Palestine Question from local problem into a pan-Arab Muslim one.(48) Yet, it is important to note the mu'arada's opposition to Haj Amin's position on the Wailing Wall crisis. It accused Haj Amin to have cooperated

with the British during the crisis.(49) Moreover, it also accused him of manipulating the crisis to enhance his position as President of the SMC despite the fact his tenure had been renewed for nine additional years. Finally, the mu'arada attacked the mufti for allegedly embezzling funds contributed by the Muslim World, particularly India, for the renovation of the Dome of the Rock.

Canning's Visit to Palestine

When the riots were over and the Arab Executive was still trying to recompose itself to pacify the situation and control the nationalist movement, a British personality by the name of Captain Robert Gordon Canning came in November 1929, to visit Palestine. Canning was known to be an ardent supporter of the Arab cause in Palestine and a critic of British Arab policy.(50) His visit was historically significant because he carried on unofficial but extensive talks with Palestine's Arab leaders, in which the possibility of introducing a quasi-parliamentary system in Palestine was explored. In these talks, Canning was reviving the 1922 issue of the legislative council. This was the British proposal for self-government which the Mandate agreement required as one of the two British responsibilities in Palestine. As mentioned earlier, the proposal was rejected by the Arabs as being insufficient fulfillment of the obligation.

While in Palestine, Canning was hosted by Fakhri Nashashibi, a relative of Ragheb Nashashibi, the leader of the mu'arada. Fakhri arranged for him several meetings with Arab leaders in both the mu'arada and the majlesiyoun. In these meetings, Canning was trying to develop a dialogue between the British government and the Arab leaders which would lay the foundation for somekind of understanding between the two parties. Several important ideas about the Arab position regarding self-government emerged. The Arabs had suggested changes in the original 1922 proposal that would make it acceptable to them.

One suggestion for changes involved the official language of Palestine. Hebrew, which was, along with Arabic, the country's two official languages, was to be dropped. The only official language to be recognized was Arabic, the language ". . . of the majority of the inhabitants." English was to be used only "under special circumstances."(51)

Also, the Arabs agreed to let the High Commissioner appoint the "President of the Government" who was to be the "President of the Executive Council." The administration of the High Commissioner "will consist purely of English

people."(52) But when (the Arab) President of the Executive Council performed his duties, he "will respect the rights of the minorities," of course, the minorities would "have representation in the council." The High Commissioner would be allowed to appoint "British advisors to all ministries."(53)

In a letter dated November 14, 1929, sent by Canning to the High Commissioner, the former stated that the head of the mu'arada would not accept a parliamentary government without the Arabs having majority control.(54) In respect, Ragheb Nashashibi was not at all different from Haj Amin.

The head of the mu'arada, reported Canning, was vehemently opposed to the veto power held by the High Commissioner over all decisions made by the council under the 1922 proposal. He thought this power was too excessive and unfair in view of the fact it had more weight than that of the majority on the council. Indeed, Ragheb proved to be "the most difficult to convince . . ." on the question of the proposed constitutional changes in the Palestine political system.(55)

The Arabs, according to Canning, expected the constitution embodying the changes they proposed should not, at any rate, be a permanent feature of the system. They implied that more progress toward self-government should be made in five or seven years when another constitutional revision would be affected.(56) The most important changes Arabs anticipated were in the area of executive power which seemed to make the Arab leaders unhappy with the political status quo.(57)

Efforts to End the Violence

As mentioned earlier, the mu'arada really had no choice but to support the 1929 riots and identify with its causes, primarily because people supported them. In doing so, it joined forces with the Grand mufti and the SMC. A great effort was made to unify the national movement. For instance, a letter was drafted on November 15, 1929, to the Times of London to be signed by Ragheb Nashashibi and the Grand mufti, the content of which undoubtedly was very important for it underscored the fact that the riots had received the support of all political factions in the national movement:

"We the undersigned, earnestly desire once again to draw the attention of the British government and the British people to the fact that the recent trouble in Palestine were a spontaneous outbreak on the part of the Arab inhabitants suffering from the effects of ten years of privileged political

Zionism . . . We desire to draw the attention of the British government to the fact that Article 2 of the Mandate is in direct contradiction to the fundamental spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and if brought before the Hague Court of International Law, would be almost certain declared illegal . . . This land which is Holy soil to nearly half of humanity and which should be in consequence the home of peace has been turned into a land of discord and bloodshed of the attempt to install a political Jewish National Home in Palestine. We think once again that no country can possibly be the national home of 2 different nations."(58)

The statement closed with a request to establish a Constitution recognizing the Arab majority as well as rights of the minorities in Palestine that would continue to be under British Mandate.

The British, however, were not responsive to the appeal by the two principle Palestinian leaders. The British Government imposed severe punishment against those Arabs who had been accused of inciting the riots. Collective punishment was characteristic of the punitive measures carried out by the British administration in Palestine. However, one particular event made things worse. Three Arabs were accused of causing the killing of many Jews in Safad and Hebron and they were sentenced to death. They were Fouad Hijazi, Ata al-Zir and Mohammed Jamjoum. Many concerned Palestinians pleaded on behalf of the three Arabs who were on death row awaiting execution. Even the Arab delegation which had departed to London in 1920, sent to the High Commissioner another urgent appeal stating that:

". . . we have lately received scores of telegrams from all parts of Palestine asking us to beg your Excellency to use your prerogative in commuting these death sentences into periods of imprisonment. Therefore, the Palestine Arab Delegation being well certain of your Excellencies honorable feelings and intentions, dare to beg your Excellency to make good use of your judicial power in changing these death sentences into sentences of imprisonment. By so doing your Excellency will contribute a great deal to public peace and prosperity and will prevent several families composed of old men, women, and children, from becoming a burden on the country and a dangerous element to public peace."(59)

The appeal was rejected and the death sentences were carried out. However, a frantic effort to prevent the Palestinian situation from deteriorating was being made in London.

The Arab Delegation in London (1930)

Before the issuance of the Shaw Commission's Report, the Arab Executive decided to send a delegation to London to try to negotiate some kind of a settlement of the Palestinian problem. The delegation consisted of the leading personalities of the Palestinian Arabs representing almost all shades of political opinion. At the head of the delegation was a Husseini, Mousa Kazim and with him as members were Haj Amin and Ragheb, in addition to three members of the Arab Executive, Awni Abdul-Hadi, Jamal al-Husseini and Alfred Rock.(60) However, there was a small minority of Palestinian Arabs who were opposed to the idea of sending a delegation to London. They believed that the future destiny of the Palestinians should not be determined by London, but by the Arabs of Palestine themselves.(61)

On March 31, 1930, Mousa Kazim delivered the opening speech in the House of Commons in the presence of Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister and Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.(62) He Stated:

"The Palestine Arab Executive which represents all the Arabs of Palestine - Moslems and Christians - have delegated me and my colleagues to submit to His Majesty's Government the following: The people of Palestine joined the Allies during the war, and many of them actually and actively joined the British in the fight against the Allies' enemies. They did it because in 1915 the British Government through their representative, then King Hussein, promised them independence. They were already promised independence of the Arab countries, including Palestine. Therefore, they request that the pledges should be executed . . . The execution of the Balfour Declaration for the purpose of making of Palestine a national home for the Jewish people, has placed the country under certain economic, administrative and political conditions and the policy pursued has curtailed all the disasters and troubles that have occurred in Palestine during the past twelve years."(63)

Concerning the particulars of the Balfour Declaration, Mousa Kazim Said:

"Owing to the dangers that are inherent in the present policy executed in Palestine, we make the following requests. We request that Laws

should be enacted in order to stop instantly Jewish immigration into the country . . . Laws should be enacted to prohibit from now on Jews from acquiring land purchased or otherwise, and to restore to their Arab owners the State Lands that have been taken by the British Government. The other Lands, from which the Arabs were evicted by Jewish Land purchase, would be returned. The present policy, based on the Balfour Declaration, should be altered . . . The present policy is detrimental to the Arab interests as well as to the British interests. Our experience during the last twelve years has shown this . . ."(64)

Mousa Kazim also stressed the need for the establishment of a National Democratic Government representing all the people of Palestine, Muslims, Christians and Jews, without discrimination against creed or race.

On April 5, 1930, the Palestine Arab Delegation sent a letter to Lord Passfield, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which the Delegation stressed three main objectives:

1. "The fulfillment of the pledges given to the Arabs by His Majesty's Government in 1915.
2. The establishment of a National democratic government in which the inhabitants of Palestine will be represented in proportion to their numbers without differentiation in race or creed.
3. The alteration of the Zionist policy founded on the Balfour Declaration."(65)
- 4.

Moreover, the Delegation put forward the following demands :

1. "That immigration into Palestine should be stopped pending the establishment of this government when this vital question will be considered from all points of view.
2. That the sale of Land to Jews would be prohibited."(66)
- 3.

It is important to note that the mu'arada was represented in the person of Ragheb Nashashibi whose speech at a meeting of a group of members from both houses of the British Parliament describes best the mu'arada's position. We mention it here because the speech embodies a position very contrary to the image of the mu'arada among many Palestinians who accused it of being soft on Zionism and British imperialism.

"Go through the pages of your glorious history and you will see there a small black spot. Is it the desire of the Great British nation that this black spot should remain there? The answer is certainly "No". Then it is within your own power you representative, of this Great Nation to eradicate this black spot and replace it by a Golden spot which would brighten the already bright and glorious pages of History of British justice . . . Will there be amongst you who would stand on the pulpit of your great Parliament and cry for Justice to us as you have already cried for Justice to other nations of the World?"(67)

This position of the mu'arada did not differ from that of the majlesiyoun and this could be substantiated by the records of the House of Commons. These records prove beyond any doubt the fact that the Arab delegation spoke the same political language regardless of the divisions and factions within it.(68)

Unfortunately, the United Front of the Arab parties in the delegation failed to persuade the British Government to adopt a more flexible policy towards the Arabs and Palestine. On April 21, 1930, the Colonial office told the Arab delegation that Britain "Would continue and administer Palestine according to the terms of the Palestine Mandate," and that the mandate "was an international obligation from which there could be no question of receding."(69)

Furthermore, on the question of Self-Governing institutions, the Colonial office blamed the Arabs for the failure of attempts to introduce it:

". . . the absence of any such measure of Self-Government in Palestine is directly due to the failure of the Arab representative leaders to take advantages of the opportunities which have been offered them in the past to co-operate with the Administration in the government of the country."(70)

At any rate, the Delegation's negotiating efforts were not that successful. However, even on the question of the possibility of a meeting between the Arab Delegation and Zionist leaders, there was unanimity of opinion that such meeting should not take place. The idea of the meeting was brought up by R.S. Reute a British mediator, in a letter wrote to Ragheb Nashashibi on April 25, 1930, in which he stated:

"On several occasions when I met the members of the Palestinian Arab Delegation - I suggested to them that an informal and not binding meeting with one of the leaders of the Zionist Organization might well serve to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations which the government will probably bring about in the near future . . . While I am under the impression that the Delegation is not disinclined to reconciliation and cooperation, provided that its fundamental claims are admitted, I feel convinced that they are firmly determined to deal exclusively

with the Govt, from which they expect the acceptance or the rejection of their well considered demands and this is in accordance with the strong anticipation of their countrymen."(71)

Reute reported that Zionist leaders gave him the idea that they were prepared "to adjust their maximum concessions as near as possible to the minimum demands of the Arabs."(72) Nashashibi never did respond to Reute's letter, and, as a matter of fact, he declined to meet with him fearing that such meeting would be contrary to the purpose of the delegation's visit to London.

However, before leaving for Palestine, the Arab Delegation issued an official statement lamenting the failure of its mission :

". . . In view of this deadlock our discussions were closed and we have decided to leave for home with the impression that the Palestine Arab case will not be justly solved by the British Government with whom the Zionists have such great influence as to hinder them from doing justice or from removing injustice in our case. Whereas we are deeply convinced by experience that continuation in usurping our rights in Palestine in favor of the Zionist policy means our extirpation as a nation and our consequent disappearance from our country . . ." (73)

The failure of the mission of the Arab Delegation had repercussions in many parts of the Muslim World. Even before the Arab Delegation left London, an All India Muslim Conference on Palestine was held in Bombay to show support for the Palestinian Arabs. It was attended by 50,000 persons who came from all parts of India.(74) And to support the purpose of the Conference about 200,000 demonstrated in the streets of Bombay.(75) The resolutions of the Conference reflected the solidarity of the Indian Muslims with the Palestinian Arabs. These resolutions insisted "that both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate must go" they also supported ". . . the efforts of the Arab Delegation in London in securing the just rights and claims of their countrymen . . ." (76)

Ironically, the British Press did report on the ALL Indian Muslim Conference and it gave it ample coverage in its newspapers. However, the overwhelming support the Arab Delegation received from various Muslim and Arab quarters did not dissuade the British Government from supporting Jewish Zionism and continuing its Balfour Declaration policy.

Upon the return of the Delegation to Palestine, it was obvious that the country had entered a new stage in its political development and orientation. This was Arab radicalism which would ultimately resort to violence as the only method available for the Arabs to stop what they considered to be the Zionist threat to their national interests and rights.(77)

The White Paper (October, 1930)

Every time conflicts develop into violence the British were in the habit of forming Commissions to investigate the violence and recommend solutions to the problems that caused it. The Shaw Commission investigated the 1929 disturbances and filed its report in April, 1930. According to the British Government, the report :

"gave rise to acute controversy, in the course of which it became evident that there is considerable misunderstanding about the past actions and future intentions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in regard to the administration of Palestine."(78)

As a matter of fact, the report of the Shaw Commission drew attention to certain aspects of the problem which promoted the Government to order another study of the problem and weigh the possibility of introducing change in its future policy towards Palestine.(79) Accordingly, it sent to Palestine an expert by the name of Sir John Hope-Simpson to confer with the High Commissioner of Palestine and report to the Government on Land settlement, immigration and development. This decision was taken by the Government on the assumption that these issues represented the crux of the matter - the Palestinian problem.

Sir John Hope-Simpson (formerly a civil servant in the Government of India) reached Jerusalem on May 20, 1930, did his investigations and left Palestine in August when he went to Athens to write his report.(80) The report was published on October 20, 1930, as cmd. paper 3686 also known as the Hope-Simpson Report. The paper also included an official 'Statement of Policy' unofficially known as the 'Passfield White Paper'. The Zionists considered this Statement of policy as a repudiation of the pledges made to the Jews and they promised to go to the League of Nations to repudiate it. Of course, the Arabs saw some hope in the Statement, although they suspected the British would not implement the policy.

In his report, Hope-Simpson stressed the fact the Palestine was a very small place, an area of only 10,435 square miles, of which more than three-quarters was uncultivable.(81) This fact had something to do with the problem of Jews and Arabs, in the sense that the Zionist project was difficult in such a small area.

Hope-Simpson, according to Abboushi, "was to test the findings of the Shaw Commission."(82) His report of October 1930, made it explicit that the economic condition of the Arab worker suffered a great deal as a result of Jewish

colonization and also as a result of the traditional economic system. The Arab worker's low-pay and chronic unemployment was partly a "by-product of Jewish settlement of Land and Jewish methods of colonization." (83) Hope-Simpson pointed out that before Zionist intervention Jewish presence in Palestine was peaceful and friendly. The policy of the P.I.C.A. (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) during the nineteenth century was useful to the Arabs: "Arabs profited largely by the installation of the Colonies, and relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbors have in the past been excellent." (84) However, "Hope-Simpson pointed out that the Zionists practiced discriminatory Labor policies [against Arabs] while proclaiming in public that they were fair labor policies." (85) The Zionists argued that if jobs were open to competition in the open market, Jewish workers would "fall to the lower standard of the Arab." (86) Hope-Simpson came to the conclusion that Zionist "colonization" was causing Palestinian land to be "extra territorialized." The land, he stated "ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future." (87)

However, Hope-Simpson's basic conclusion was that the Jewish National Home Project could not be implemented without the massive development of Arab agriculture. Moreover, he warned that with the existing poor condition of land, "the country could not absorb 'agricultural' immigration." (88)

The Zionists rejected Hope-Simpson's conclusions and recommendations regarding his assessment of Palestine's "absorptive economic capacity," Jewish immigration, land and labor policies.

At any rate, the White Paper of 1930, brought no changes to British policy in Palestine. It simply reiterated the old policy in a language less offensive to the Arabs. Even such a mild document could not fail to irritate the sensitive Zionists who were determined not to sit idle allowing the Arabs to get any concessions from the British. They used all their influence in London and threatened to move the headquarters of the Jewish Agency from London to New York and to reduce their business activities in Britain. (89) Zionist tactics worked. The Prime Minister sent a letter on February 13, 1931, to Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in which he expressed the government's good intentions in facilitating Jewish immigration and landownership :

"Further, the Statement of Policy of His Majesty's Government did not imply prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews. It contains no such prohibition nor is any such intended. What it does contemplate is such

temporary control of land disposition and transfers as may be necessary, not to impair the harmony and effectiveness of the scheme of land settlement to be undertaken . . . His Majesty's Government did not prescribe and did not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration"(90)

The MacDonald letter, known to the Arabs as the Black letter, went a long way to assuage the Zionists. Weismann, the leader of the Zionists, issued a friendly statement to which the Executive of the Jewish Agency and Dr. Nahum Goldman and Dr. I. Grunbaum, representatives of the Radical Zionists had agreed. In part, the statement said:

". . . this action [the MacDonald letter] has in my opinion reestablished a basis for that cooperation with the Mandatory on which our policy is founded. The losses which the past years severe political crisis has inflicted on our work are serious. Palestine has suffered from an economic depression which, while to a certain extent [is] connected with the worldwide economic crisis, has been rendered very much worse by the political situation. The confidence required for economic enterprise and development has been lacking. The basis for cooperation having been restored, confidence in the economic future of Palestine should revive, and with redoubled endeavour World Jewry should resume work in Palestine."(91)

Weizmann stressed that the work undertaken by the World Zionist Organization to build the Jewish National Home was bound to benefit Palestine as a whole, and that all three parties involved, the Mandatory, the Arabs and the Jews, will work together constructively for the future good and development of Palestine.(92)

Arab Reactions to MacDonald's "Black Letter"

Immediately after the content of the "Black Letter" became known, the Arabs reacted quite negatively and forcefully believing that Zionist influence in London

could change Government policy very easily. Mousa Kazim wrote a letter of protest on February 31, 1931, to the High Commissioner rejecting what he considered to be a retreat from the Passfield White Paper Policy.(93) Generally, the Arabs ruled out any possibility, of cooperation between Jews and Arabs.(94) However, the Arab Executive went even further, when it published its "Declaration to the Noble Arab Nation" stating that the British Government could not be trusted to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Arab people of Palestine because it was to resist Zionist pressure. However, many elements in the Arab National Movement were not satisfied with the Arab Executive's mild reaction. Cables and letters were sent to the Arab Executive demanding the convening of a nation-wide conference to discuss measures of non-cooperation with the government.(95) The A.E. was too divided to respond to popular demands regarding such a conference. While radical members like 'Abd al-Qadir al-Muzaffar, Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim demanded the adoption of a policy of non-cooperation with the government and even went further to advocate civil disobedience, the moderate members from the mu'arada like 'Isa al-'Isa, 'Umar al-Baytar preferred the political and economic boycott of the Jews.(96)

Although, the British Government attempted to put into effect some of the proposals of the 1930, White Paper, for example, the 'agricultural development scheme' the Arabs determined not to cooperate. Moreover, the A.E. declined the invitation extended to it by the British Government to visit London for the purpose of negotiation. However, "the H.C. did not consider as final the negative reply of the A.E. to the suggestion to send a delegation to London."(97) Before the H.C.'s departure for London, he held a meeting at the A.E. Office with Ragheb al-Nashashibi and Haj Amin al-Husseini. In the meeting, the A.E. forwarded its conditions for further talks with the London government. The main points stressed were the following: a) The Government should provide land to those Arabs who were evicted from land sold to the Zionists; b) Land should be provided by the government to those poor fellahin who did not own land; and c) Loans intended to finance the 'development project' should be allocated in proportion to the size of the communities.(98)

The news of this meeting with the H.C. leaked out and was the subject of the controversy among the Arabs and this led to the weakening of the A.E. in the eyes of the Arab public. From the summer of 1931, the A.E. was scarcely convened and its prestige and influence began to wane,(99) according to Porath. As a result, Arab politicians, in particular, the radicals, began to pursue different political paths. Some opted to establish, in the early 1930's, political parties thereby

opening a new phase, which was different from the traditional style of political moderation. The National movement had become more modern, more diversified, and more radical.

The Majlesiyoun and the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem (1931)

The British Government's retreat from its White Paper Policy prompted Haj Amin to call upon the Islamic World to help the Palestinian Arabs in their confrontation with the British and the Zionists, an idea which had strong appeal among many of the Arab leaders. The MacDonald's letter was an important factor in the adoption by the Palestinian leadership of a new strategy of closer alliance with the Arab and Muslim worlds to achieve 'Palestinian independence within the framework of Arab Unity'.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ This strategy helped Haj Amin and the radical wing of the nationalist movement to assume greater importance not only in the affairs of Palestine but also in the politics of the region as a whole. However, support for the idea of an Islamic congress had also been enhanced by the events of 1928 and 1929 which had strong religious overtones. Also, of even greater significance was the formation of the Zionist International Wailing Wall Commission in June 1931, which, from the Arab point of view, was an additional threat to their religious rights.

Haj Amin's Early Islamic Appeals

Early efforts to win political and diplomatic support from Husayn, Faysal and Mustafa Kamal Ataturk in the late 1920's were successful. They, nevertheless, proved to be inadequate to alter the course of events in Palestine.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Simultaneously, continuing efforts to secure Islamic support outside the Arab World underscored the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims as a sacred place reminding Muslims of their responsibility for maintaining al-Haram al-Sharif, in which stood Masjid al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock.⁽¹⁰²⁾ Early ties with the Muslim World went back to 1921, when the SMC was established. At the time the Haram area which had been neglected by the Ottoman authorities desperately needed reparation. Haj Amin, as the appointed President of the SMC, took upon himself the responsibility of collecting funds from the Muslim Arab and non-Arab World in order to repair part of the Haram area. He used the fund drive as a

means to heighten Muslim concern for Palestine and to enhance his position as guardian of the sanctuary. He travelled, as head of several delegations, to Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain and even to Iran in the early 1920's, and appealed for help to all Muslim sects, Shi'ites and Sunnis.(103) Good amounts of money were collected reaching the total of 95,000 (Palestinian pounds) by the summer of 1928, enough for the first stage of the repairs.(104) These delegations brought the Palestine problem to the fore of Muslim concerns securing for the Arabs of Palestine the active support of the Muslim world. And when the 1929 disturbances took place in Palestine, Muslim scholars and notables came rushing to assist the Palestinian Muslims in arguing their case before the International Commission which came to Palestine in May, 1931, to investigate the ownership of al-Buraq.(105) The thrust of their argument was that the Muslims of Palestine were merely the custodians of al-Haram al-Sharif which belonged to Muslims everywhere.(106) It seemed Haj Amin's manoeuvring proved to be successful in focusing Muslim international attention on the plight of Palestinian Arabs. According to Darwazah, the idea of convening the Islamic Congress was brought up when the Tunisian leader 'Abdul-'Aziz al-Tha'alibi was in Jerusalem. During his visit, the Tha'alibi argued that the internationalization of the Palestinian problem would give it an Islamic character. The idea was accepted by many prominent Islamic notables, and, consequently, a preliminary committee was established with Haj Amin as President and 'Abdul-'Aziz al-Tha'alibi, Amin al-Tammimi, Izzat Darwazah, Ahmad Hilmi 'Abdul-Baqi, Sheikh Mahmoud al-Daoudi, Sheikh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud and Ajaj Nuweihed as members.(107) The effort to promote the status of Jerusalem in the Islamic World was further boosted in January 1931, when the body of Mohammed Ali, the former president of the Indian Islamic Khilafat Committee, was brought to Jerusalem and buried in Haram al-Sharif.(108) This event gave Haj Amin status and prestige among the Muslims of India who subsequently came to Jerusalem in huge numbers to visit the tomb of their dead leader.(109)

However, Haj Amin did not publicly call for the convening of the Congress until after the idea was approved by the SMC on July 27, 1931. The actual invitations went out on October 20, 1931.(110) Many of the invited guests were prominent 'Ulamas who came from twenty two different countries.(111) In addition, there were representatives of the national movements in the Arab East.(112) From Iraq, for instance, several MP's scientists and men of letters like Kashif al-Ghata'i and Sa'id Thabit, Sheikh Bahjat al-Athari, Ibrahim al-Wa'ith, Majid al-Karghoul and Hasan Rida, were invited.(113) However, invitations were also sent to kings,

political leaders and notables. One king responded: he was the Imam of Yemen.(114)

The invitations set forth the intention of the Congress to discuss the protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and to discuss other Muslim affairs.(115) It was decided that the congress should be held on December 17, 1931, the date commemorating Laylat al-Isra' (according to Muslim beliefs, the date marks the occasion when the prophet Mohammed journeyed from Arabia to Jerusalem).

Opposition to the Congress

Before discussing the resolutions and recommendations of the Congress, it is worthwhile to shed some light on the background of events that prompted leading personalities like Haj Amin and Shawkat 'Ali of India, to make the entire venture of convening a World Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, possible. However, since the inception of the idea, there were many who opposed it due to various reasons; a) the opposition of the British authorities and the Zionist movement to the Congress, b) the political and religious leaders of the Islamic World, who were afraid that the Congress would deal with the Caliphate issue, c) the mu'arada in Palestine, which was scared of Haj Amin's manipulation of the Congress in bolstering his undisputed leadership in Palestine and the Islamic World.(116) However, these oppositions created obstacles as to the success of the Congress.

Although many leading Palestinian notables supported a World Islamic Congress to be held in Jerusalem, there were also many who opposed it. As mentioned earlier, the mufti saw the Congress as the means for strengthening the Arab movement in its struggle against Zionism and the Mandate. Of course, the prospect of an Islamic Congress in Jerusalem was naturally not appealing to the Zionists.(117) They, of course, opposed the Congress because they feared that the Wailing Wall controversy might be revived. Moreover, they believed that 'the mufti's position may be strengthened, and at the same time the position of the forces opposing him weakened . . ."(118) The fact that Haj Amin could obtain more power and prestige from the convening of such a congress was equally unappealing to the mu'arada.

Championed by the Nashashibis, the mu'arada printed in Mir'at al-Sharq a series of anti-congress articles in which it criticized the program of the congress for ambiguity. In particular, it attacked the idea prevalent among members of congress, of founding an Islamic University in Jerusalem similar to the al-Azhar

University of Cairo on the grounds such a University would be wasteful of resources since it duplicates the older institution.(119) The mu'arada also criticized the discursive manner in which the preliminary committee was selected i.e., without informing the Arab Executive.(120)

The mu'arada also published a statement in which it raised twenty-one questions, directed to the mufti and the majlesiyoun, regarding improprieties in the convening of the Congress.(121) In addition, petitions were signed by its leaders and made public in which Haj Amin and the Majlesiyoun were severely criticized for exploiting the Congress issue to promote their private interests. Some of these leaders went as far as contracting several members of the Congress urging them to stand up against Haj Amin and his supporters.(122)

On November 19, 1931, the mu'arada addressed a statement to the Islamic World in which it expressed its dissatisfaction with the whole idea of an Islamic Congress that did not adequately represent all the Muslims of Palestine. This statement was signed by fifty leading personalities, eight of whom were mayors, seven were Arab Executive members, two were members of the SMC in addition to the President of the High Shar'i court of Appeal and several prominent leaders of families and clans in the towns and the villages.(123)

To be constructive, the mu'arada made certain proposals which it claimed were necessary for the success of the Congress. These proposals concentrated on methods to be followed to guarantee fairness and a more representative Congress.(124) However, the principle objective of the mu'arada was to restrict Haj Amin's power and influence in the Congress, to give a chance to the opposition a public forum to articulate its position and policies and a fair opportunity to participate effectively in the forthcoming Congress.(125)

Naturally, Haj Amin had to respond to the accusations of the mu'arada in a counter-statement published in the al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya. The statement reiterated previous arguments concerning the idea of convening of the Congress.(126)

According to Zionist sources, Fakhri al-Nasashibi, a mu'arada leader and a relative of Ragheb, was sent to Egypt "to spread rumors about the object and program of the Congress, moving some of the Egyptian press to write anti-Congress."(127) During his stay in Cairo, Fakhri met Mohammed 'Ali 'Allubah Pasha and Dr. 'Abdul Hamid Sa'id, to clarify the mu'arada's position on the issue of the Islamic Congress. Consequently, the Egyptian government decided to delegate Mohammed 'Ali 'Allubah to go to Palestine and narrow the differences between the majlesiyoun and the mu'aradin. Another Egyptian, Dr. 'Abdul Hamid

Sa'id, President of the Young Muslim Associations in Egypt, went to Jerusalem before the convening of the Congress for the same purpose as that of Mohammed 'Ali's.

However, most of the effort of reconciliation was made by the Indian leader Shawkat Ali. Shwkat met with the leading figures of the mu'arada and after much debate and lengthy sessions he suggested as a solution to the problem allowing twenty members of the mu'arada to participate in the Congress. The mu'arada accepted Shawkat's proposal but Haj Amin would not. Other attempts and alternative solutions were advanced by Shawkat and the Egyptian conciliators but to no avail. Haj Amin and the majlesiyoun seemed obstinate at the same time the mu'arada was constructive and cooperative. The majlesiyoun's rationale was backed on the assumption that they were the true representatives of the Palestinian people while the mu'arada was not.

However, the controversy notwithstanding the Islamic Congress was convened on December 7, 1931, without the mu'arada participation. Ironically, Shawkat 'Ali's peaceful endeavors were not rewarded by the majlesiyoun. He was unfortunately, not elected to the Bureau of the Congress.

The General Islamic Congress (1931)

Haj Amin's strenuous efforts to elevate the status of Jerusalem in the Islamic World received its greatest achievements at the General Islamic Congress of December, 1931.(128) Presided over by Haj Amin and largely financed by the Khilafat Committee, the "Congress almost foundered on the Egyptian and Saudi rulers' rival ambitions to become the Caliph and their fear that Haj Amin was seeking that position for himself."(129) However, because the Congress cancelled this item on its agenda, Ibn Sa'ud sent an official delegation. The Congress began its sessions on December 7, 1931, and lasted till December 17, 1931. During that period of time, seventeen sessions were held(130) at Rawdat al-Ma'aref school in Jerusalem, and 150 delegates representing twenty two different Arab and Islamic countries attended.(131) On the first day, the participants staged a peaceful demonstration to dramatize Islamic unity and the centrality of Jerusalem in the Islamic World. They walked to Masjid al-Aqsa, where the opening session took place and Haj Amin delivered the opening speech. In his speech, Haj Amin made it clear that the Congress would not be used as an occasion for inciting trouble or as a forum for dissidents who wish to spread discord among Muslims. In the first

session, numerous other speeches were heard,(132) and it was not until the second session that the working days of the conference began and its administrative bureau was elected.(133) It is important to note that the largest delegate was the Palestinian, which had fifty members, most of whom were the majlesiyoun and their supporters.(134)

After two weeks of deliberations, the conferees resolved to elect an Executive Committee of twenty five members to be presided over by Haj Amin, and consisting of ten Arabs, three Egyptians, four Indians, four North Africans (in exile), one Persian, one Javanese, one Turk (in exile) and one Bosniak.(135)

The Executive Committee chose a permanent bureau consisting of seven members to implement its decisions.(136) Moreover, eight committees were formed at the Congress to study and to report on matters of concern to the Congress.(137) During discussions of the second session 'Awni-'Abdul Hadi brought the Mandate issue to the fore of the Congress and proposed its termination. However, Shawkat 'Ali, the Indian leader, repudiated the proposal which, consequently, led the members to criticize him and accuse him of being a British surrogate. Nevertheless, in the tenth session held on December 13, the Mandate question was again discussed more thoroughly and a collective anti-Mandate attitude was evidenced.

The resolutions of the Congress were numerous. They dealt with the following topics: 1) The growth of cooperation between all Muslims of the world and the spreading of Islamic culture and virtues; 2) The protection of Islamic interests and the preservation of the Islamic sanctuaries from outside control and intrusion; 3) The limitations of the Christian missionaries' efforts among the Muslims; 4) The establishment of institutions for the unification of Islamic culture and the founding of al-Aqsa University; 5) The full consideration of Islamic affairs that are pertinent to the Muslim World in general.(138)

There were resolutions condemning Zionism, the Mandatory system and colonialism, French policy in Morocco, the Soviet Government's anti-religious policies and Italian actions in Libya.(139)

The Congress of the Palestine Muslim Nation

Haj Amin's refusal to include the mu'arada in his Islamic Congress prompted the latter to call for a separate Islamic Congress to be known as the Congress of the Palestine Muslim Nation. Certain members of al-Khalidi family (specifically,

Khalil and Ahmad Samih), and also the Nashashibi family had met with few of the delegates of the Islamic Congress to protest Haj Amin's actions and policy,(140) sensing that their efforts were futile, Ragheb, Fakhri and Sheikh As'ad al-Shuqayri travelled throughout Palestine to encourage opposition to Haj Amin and to drum up support for the idea of an alternative congress to be sponsored by the mu'arada.(141)

The "Congress of the Palestine Muslim Nation", as this alternative Congress was known, was convened on December 11, 1931 at the King David Hotel on Jerusalem and was attended by 1500 people. Among the participants were mayors, village leaders, few members of the SMC, and leading Palestinian personalities.(142) However, a small number of individuals attending Haj Amin's congress chose to attend the mu'arada congress as well.

The Congress elected Administrative Board of thirty eight members which in true elected an Executive Committee of eighteen members to put into effect its resolutions. Ragheb, who was presiding over the whole congress, was elected head of the Executive Committee.(143) In addition, special committees were established to deal with various matters of interest to the mu'arada. One of them was essentially a watch dog committee organized to observe the activities of SMC and make sure there was no missing of Awqaf funds or abuse of Shari'i institutions. Moreover, this committee was empowered to prepare, if needed, legal arguments against the mufti and the SMC. The mufti was suspected of corruption and among the illegal practices for which the mu'arada accused him of were the payment of wages to the Muezzinin (individuals who call for prayers) which was prohibited by SMC regulations, charging admission fees to non-Muslim visitors of the Haram al-Sharif without the specific authorization of the SMC, and the misuse of money (the amount of 4,500) received from the Jaffa Awqaf schools.(144) Later, on January 25, 1932, the Administrative Board would send a memorandum to the special committee on corruption directing it to commence legal proceedings against the mufti and the SMC for unlawful conduct. Haj Amin was accused of violating the law for accepting two salaries one from the government and one from the Awqaf funds. Apparently, the aim of this measure was to force the mufti to give up his SMC position.(145)

The principle objections of the mu'arada against the mufti and the SMC were outlined in a letter sent by Rageb Nashashibi to the High Commissioner on December 13, 1931. The letter made certain demands which, in the opinion of the mu'arada, were necessary in order to rectify certain errors in the organizations and procedures of Islamic institutions.(146) Among these demands were the

cancellation of the laws and regulations which placed the Shari'i courts under the jurisdiction of the SMC. The mu'arada wanted these courts to be separate and independent. The letter objected to the procedure by which heads of the Shari'i courts of appeal were appointed by the High Commissioner. The mu'arada wanted these judicial officials selected by the ulamas (learned men of Islam). It also desired that the entire Islamic court system be controlled through its own internal mechanism so that the High Court of Appeal would be able to appoint and dismiss judges, formulate rules and regulations for all religious courts and control the Orphan's Fund. The High Commissioner would receive periodical reports on the judicial system from the President of the High Court of Appeal.

Obviously, the mu'arada went beyond the negativism of rejection to propose alternatives to the status quo. Nevertheless, it did consider the SMC to be a political institution rather than a religious institution. And it accused it of violating Article 9 of the Mandate Agreement, thereby objecting to some aspects of its controversial activity. Specifically, it did not approve Haj Amin's handling of SMC finances and Shafiq Abdul Hadi represented the mu'arada when he wrote a letter to Haj Amin requesting a full report on SMC finances saying such statement was overdue since the SMC did not issue one after 1923.(147)

The importance of the mu'arada congress was in providing a public forum from which it could express its political views and concerns, of course, it justified the congress on the grounds it was refused participation in the other congress, the one led by Haj Amin. Yet it was clear that the Palestine Arab National movement was haplessly divided. The two congresses made this unfortunate division very clear and obvious. Neither the majlesiyoun nor the mu'arada benefited from the outcome.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 34.
- (2) cmd. 3530, p. 27.
- (3) Holy Qoran, Sura 17.
- (4) Philip Mattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem in the Political Struggle Over the Western Wall, 1928-29", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 19, January 1983, p. 104.
- (5) cmd. 3530, p. 28.
- (6) Jbara, Al-Haj M. Amin Al-Husseini, p. 103.
- (7) See the Wailing Wall Commission Report, p. 67.
- (8) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 258; see also Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 35.
- (9) Mattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem", p. 105, and Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 258.
- (10) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 34.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Mary Ellen Lundsten, "Wall Politics: Zionist and Palestinian Strategies in Jerusalem, 1928" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 3, Autumn 1978, pp. 12-13.
- (13) Emile AL-Ghouri, Al-Mou'amarah al-Kubra (The Great Conspiracy) Beirut, 1955, p. 66.
- (14) Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 13.
- (15) Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning, p. 25.
- (16) Mattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem", p. 105.
- (17) Jbara, Al-Haj M. Amin Al-Husseini, p. 109.
- (18) Bentwich, Mandate Memories 1918-48, p. 131.
- (19) Lesch, Frustration, p. 426.
- (20) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 139.
- (21) cmd. 3530, p. 32.
- (22) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 35.
- (23) Fannie Fern Andrews, The Holy Land Under the Mandate, Boston, 1931, pp. 225-26; see also the Western Wall in Jerusalem, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies presented by the Command of His Majesty, November 1928, Cmd. 3229, p. 108.
- (24) Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 20.
- (25) Mattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem", p. 108.

(26) Ibid., see also 'Arif, Al-Mufasssal fi Tarikh al-Quds, p. 402, and Bayan al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, pp. 220-222.

(27) Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 20.

(28) Cmd. 3530, p. 32.

(29) Andrews, The Holy Land Under the Mandate, p. 243.

(30) Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 21.

(31) White Paper of 1928, cmd. 3229.

(32) Lundsten, "Wall Politics". p. 21.

(33) An eye witness account of the Zionist militancy on the Wall issue was offered by the Journalist Vincent Sheean in Personal History, N.Y., 1937, and reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed. From Haven to Conquest, Beirut, 1971, pp. 237-301, and in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: Roots of Violence in the Middle East, London, 1977, pp. 66-71.

(34) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 40.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Cmd. 3530, p. 34; see also the Stoker's Statement, published in Filastin, February 15, 1930, p. 4.

(37) Ibid., p. 155.

(38) Mattar, "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem", p. 113.

(39) Lesch, Frustration, p. 428.

(40) Issa al-Sifri, Filastin al-'Arabiyyah Bayn al-Intidab wa al-Sahyuniyya (Arab Palestine Between the Mandate and Zionism), Jaffa, 1937, pp. 124-125.

(41) Lundsten, "Wall Politics", p. 23; see also Al-Sifri, Filastin al-'Arabiyyah, pp. 125-128.

(42) A Survey of Palestine, vol. I, p. 24; see also Al-Sifri, Filastin al-'Arabiyyah, p. 127.

(43) Great Britian, Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1929, p. 4.

(44) Cmd. 3530, p. 150.

(45) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 261.

(46) Cmd. 3530, p. 155.

(47) Ibid., p. 164.

(48) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 271.

(49) Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim, August 8, 1929, as quoted in CZA, Z4/5793; see also Filastin, Stoker's Statement, March 8, 1930.

(50) Darwazah, Al-Qadiyah al-Filastiniyah, vol. I, pp. 62-63.

(51) The Mu'arada's Papers, Captain Gordon Canning's negotiations with the leaders of the Palestine National Movement: Mousa Kazim al-Husseini, Ragheb al-Nashashibi, Fakhri al-Nashashibi and Ya'coub Farraj, on the establishment of a legislative Council in Palestine, November 12, 1929, File 21. Mu'arada's Papers are cited hereafter as MP, however, these private papers are kept with Fakhri al-Nashashibi's relative, Mr. Ghaleb al-Nashashibi in East Jerusalem.

(52) MP, File 21.

(53) MP, file 21.

(54) Gordan Canning to John Chancellor (HC), November 14, 1929, MP, File 21.

(55) Same to same, Ibid.

(56) Ibid.

(57) John Chancellor to R.G. Canning, November 15, 1929, MP, File 21.

(58) Suggestions for a letter to the Times, to be signed by Ragheb al-Nashashibi and the Grand Mufti, November 15, 1929, MP, File 21.

(59) A letter sent by the Arab Delegation in London to the HC, April 4, 1930, MP, File 14. However, the context of this letter is published in Arabic too.

(60) For the complete list of the Arab Delegation's names, see Al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 870.

(61) Ibid., pp. 234-235.

(62) Deputation to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Palestine Arab Nationalists, regarding the position of the Arabs in Palestine. House of Commons -Monday, March 31, 1930. Along with Mr. Ramsay NcDonald and Lord Passfield, there were Dr, Drummond Shields-Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, -Sir John Schuckburgh, Mr. G.I. Clauson and Mr, O.G.R. Williams. MP.The Delegation's Negotiations, File 14.

(63) MP, The Delegation's Negotiations, March 31, 1930, File 14, p. 4.

(64) Ibid.

(65) The Palestine Arab Delegation's letter to Lord Passfield, April 5, 1930, MP, The Delegation's Negotiations, File 14.

(66) Ibid., p. 8.

(67) Copy of the Speech delivered by Ragheb al-Nasashibi at the meeting held in the House of Parliament on April 10, 1930, and was attended by members from the House of Commons and House of Lords. Lord Brentford was in the Chair. MP, File 14.

(68) Deputation to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Arab Palestine Interests regarding the position of Palestine-House of

Commons, March 31, 1930, May 1, 1930, May 2, 1930, Colonial Office, May 6, 1930. All these were the complete minutes of the Delegation in London, MP, File 14.

(69) O.G.R. Williams to Arab Delegation, April 21, 1930, MP, File 14.

(70) Ibid.

(71) R.S. Reute to Ragheb al-Nashashibi, April 25, 1930, MP, File 14.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Statement by the Palestine Arab Delegation, May 13, 1930, MP, File 14.

(74) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassatm p. 236.

(75) Ibid.

(76) The entire text of the All-Indian Muslim Conference was received by 'Awni 'Abdul-Hadi on April 22, 1930 in order to get published in the British press, MP, File 14, however, a copy of the text had also been published in Al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya, issue 372, May 14, 1930.

(77) See, for instance the content of the Telegram sent by the Arab Delegation in London to the Arab Executive in Jerusalem, in Al-Kayyali, Wath'iq al-Muqawamah al-Filastiniyah 1918-29, p. 72.

(78) Cmd. 3692, 1930.

(79) Ibid., p. 3.

(80) John and Hadawi, Palestine Diary, p. 218.

(81) Ibid., p. 219.

(82) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 57.

(83) Ibid., p. 58.

(84) Cmd. 3692, p. 17.

(85) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 59.

(86) Ibid., p. 60.

(87) Cmd. 3686, (The Hope-Simpson Report 1930).

(88) Abboushi, The Unmaking of Palestine, p. 66.

(89) Weizmann to Prime Minister R. MacDonald, London, February 14, 1931, published in the Palestine Bulletin, Sunday, February 15, 1931, MP, File 14.

(90) Ramsay MacDonald to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, February 13, 1931, printed for the use of the Colonial Office. Middle East No. 39 Confidential Report. MP, File 14, pp. 8-9.

(91) Weizmann to Prime Minister R. MacDonald, London, February 14, 1931, MP, File 14.

(92) Same to same, Ibid.

(93) Arab Executive President to the HC, February 16, 1931, ISA, AE, 1022.

- (94) Y. Porath, The Palestine Arab National Movement, 1929-39, London, 1977, p. 34.
- (95) Islamic Society in Haifa to the AE, March 2, 1931, ISA, AE, 1022.
- (96) Porath, The Palestine Arab National Movement, 1929-39, p. 34.
- (97) Ibid., p. 37.
- (98) Awni 'Abdul-Hadi's words in AE Session, August 16, 1931, ISA,AE,3797.
- (99) Porath, The Palestine Arab National Movement, 1929-39, p. 38.
- (100) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Biritani 1922-1939, p. 325.
- (101) Lesch, Frustration, p. 280.
- (102) Ibid.
- (103) Ibid., p. 281.
- (104) Ibid., p. 284.
- (105) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 231, however, the Muslim Scholars were Mohammed Ali 'Allubah Pasha, Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Mazahim Al-Bajahji, Fayiz al-Khoury al-Ghuneimi, and al-Taftazani.
- (106) Filastin, (English Edition), June 28, 1930, p. 2.
- (107) Darwazah, al-Qadiyah al-Filastiniyah, vol. I, p. 79.
- (108) ESCO, 1949, vol. II, p. 762.
- (109) Adel Ghneim, "Al Mu'tamar al-Islami al-'Am 1931", (The General Islamic Congress 1931), Shu'un Filastiniyah, September 1973, p. 119.
- (110) H.A.R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in December 1931", in Survey of International Affairs 1934, by A.J. Toynbee, Oxford,1935,p. 101.
- (111) For the complete list of the countries that participated in the Islamic Congress, see al-Sifri, Filastin Bayn al-Sahyuniyya wa al-Intidab, p. 178.
- (112) Neguib Sadaqa, Qadiyah Filadtin (The Palestine Case), Beriut, 1946, p.
- (113) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, p. 79.
- (114) ESCO, p. 762.
- (115) Jbara, Al-Haj M. Amin Al-Husseini, p. 151; see also, Naji 'Alush, Al-Muqawamah al-'Arabiyya fi Filastin 1917-48 (The Arab Resistance in Palestine 1917-48), Beirtu, 1967, p. 81.
- (116) 'Alush, Al-Muqawamah, pp. 81-82.
- (117) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 165.
- (118) CZA, S/25, 5689.
- (119) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 82.
- (120) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka pp. 80-81.

(121) Mir'at al-Sharq, November 20, 1931, as quoted in Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 83.

(122) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, p. 77.

(123) Some of those who signed the Statement were: 'Abdul Rahman al-Taji al-Farouqi, Muhyi al-Din 'Abdul-Sharif, members of the SMC, Khalil al-Khalidi, President of the High Shari'i Court of Appeal in Palestine, 'Omar al-Bitar, member of the Arab Executive of the Seventh Palestine Congress, Ragheb al-Nashashibi, mayor of Jerusalem, Nasser al-Din Nasser al-Din, member of the Arab Executive, As'ad al-Shuqayri, President of the Islamic Shari'i Council, Sa'id al-Karmi, formerly a judge in Transjordan, 'Assem al-Sa'id, mayor of Jaffa, Suleiman 'Abdul Razeq Touqan, mayor of Nablus, Mohammed Mass'oud al-Jarrar of Jenin, 'Aref Abdul Rahman of Jenin, and Fahmi al-Husseini, mayor of Gaza, in addition to the mayors of Ramleh, Mustafa al-Kheiri, and of Acre, 'Aref al-Soufi.

(124) Statement to the Islamic World, MP, File 23.

(125) Gheneim, "Al-Mu'tamar al-Islami", p. 125.

(126) Ibid.

(127) CZA, S/25, 5689.

(128) Gibb, "The Islamic Congress", pp. 99-109.

(129) Lesch, Frustration, p. 286.

(130) Sadaqa, Qadiyat Filastin, p. 159.

(131) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, p. 55.

(132) Many speeches were delivered by the representatives to the Congress, and here is a list of some participants: Kashif al-Ghata one of the Great Iraqi Shi'ite Mujtahideen, and Dr. 'Abdul Hamid Sa'id, president of the YMMAs in Egypt, Dia' al-Din al-Tabataba'i ex-Prime Minister of Iran, and the Indian Poet Mohammad Iqbal, the Tunisian leader 'Abdul Aziz al-Tha'alibi, 'Abdul Rahman 'Azzam, and the Prime Minister Sa'id al-Jazairi, Mustafa al-Ghalayini representing Beirut's men of letters, Riyadh Ishaq representing Russian Muslims, the Javanese 'Abdul Qahhar Mudakhar, and Bahjat al-Athari one of the leading Iraqi scientists and Sheikh nu'man al-'Athami President of the Science Center in Iraq; these names were published in the Balagh (Announcement) newspaper published in Egypt, December 12, 1931, as cited from 'Adel Ghneim, al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-'Am, p. 126.

(133) The list of names elected to the Bureau: Mohammed Amin al-Husseini as President, Dia' al-Din al-Tabataba'i, Mohammed 'Allubah Pasha, Egypt's Ex-Minister of Awqaf, Mohammed Iqbal, Sheikh Mohammed Ziyara representing the Imam Yehia Wikala of Yemen, Ra'uf Pasha delegate of Ceylon, Ibrahim Bey al-

Wa'th, Iraq's member of Parliament, Mohammad Izzat Darwazah and 'Abdul Qader Muzaffar as Secretary-Generals, Shukri al-Quwatli delegate of the National Bloc in Syria and Riyadh al-Solh of Lebanon acting both as observers with Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, President of the Arab Bank on Palestine as treasurer along with Sheikh Mahmoud al-Dajani as his assistant-manager, as cited from 'Adel Ghneim, al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-'Am, p. 127.

(134) Here is a list of the prominent leaders who represented mostly the Majlesiyoun: Mousa Kazim al-Husseini, Jamal al-Husseini, Amin al-Tammimi, Amin 'Abdul Hadi, 'Awni 'Abdul-Hadi, Izzat Darwazah, Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, Subhi al-Khadra, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, 'Abdul Qader al-Muzaffar, Ajaj Nuweihed, Mohamoud al-Dajani, Ya'coub al-Ghossein, Tawfiq Hammad, 'Adel al-Shawwa, and Is'af al-Nashashibi who was outcasted by his family, albeit, he was considered as one of the prominent poets in Palestine. See Bayan al-Hout, for a complete list of the names of the 150 delegates to the Congress, pp. 871-872.

(135) Gibb, "The Islamic Congress", pp. 99-109.

(136) These members were: Haj Amin as President, Mohammed 'Allubah as treasurer, Dia' al-Din al-Tabataba'i as General-Secretary, Nahib al-'Athma as Assistant Secretray-Genral, along woth 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Tah'alibi, Riyadh al-Solh and Sa'id Shamil as members. As quoted in Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, pp. 80-81.

(137) These matters were: 1) The status of the Congress; 2) Publicity and publications associated with the Congress; 3) Finance and Organization; 4) Moslem culture and the proposed University of the Sanctuary of al-Aqsa; 5) The Hijaz Railway; 6) The Holy Places at the Wailing Wall; 7) Islamic Information and Guidance; 8) Proposals laid before the Congress. As quoted in Gibb, "The Islamic Congress", p. 105.

(138) Ghneim, 'Al Mu'tamar al-Islami", p. 128.

(139) Lesch, Frustration, p. 286; see also Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, pp. 246-247.

(140) Alush, Al-Muqawamah, p. 82.

(141) Jbara, Al-Haj M, Amin Al-Husseini, p. 158.

(142) Statement to the Islamic World issued by the Administrative Council of the "Congress of the Palestine Muslim Nation", signed by Sa'id al-Karmi, Ex-Transjordan Chief of Justice, December 13, 1931, MP, File 25.

(143) Ragheb al-Nashashibi to Nsouhi Beydoun, District comissioner of Jerusalem, February 1, 1932, MP, File 24.

(144) Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani to Shaykh Suleiman Taji al-Farouqi, January 10, 1932, MP, File 24.

(145) Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani to a group of lawyers who were: Fahmi al-Husseini, Hassan al-Budeiri, Ibrahim Kamal, 'Omar el-Salih and Shaykh Isma'il al-Khatib, January 10, 1932, MP, File 24.

(146) Ragheb al-Nashashibi to HC, Sir Arthur Wauchope, December 13, 1931, MP, File 24.

(147) Shafi 'Abdul Hadi to Haj Amin and the SMC, January 14, 1932, MP, File 24.

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