

## CHAPTER III

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MU'ARADA IN THE 1920'S

From the first years of the British mandate in Palestine, the traditional leadership of the Arabs was split between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The divisive nature of Arab leadership had its effect on the whole of the Arab national movement. In essence, that movement was never united or strong enough to confront its British and Zionist adversaries. As mentioned earlier, part of this problem was the outcome of the existing social structure which was unproductive as well as rigid.

Nevertheless, western influence in the form of secularism and modern development did have some effect on the demography of Palestine many years before the British created it as a separate political entity. A new urban elite had come to being towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the mandate, this elite became politically influential, causing the traditional elites in the villages to feel resentful and insecure. Not until the 1930's was the urban elite able to dominate the politics of both the rural and urban populations and become in effect the national leadership of Arab Palestine.(1)

The British, who naturally wanted to control the country, exploited almost every aspect of the demographic and social cleavages existing in Palestine. They encouraged the establishment of "peasant" type of political parties hoping such political organizations would prevent the union of the rural and urban elites into what might become a viable and genuine national movement.

However, the rivalries between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis remained the British best hope for a weak and ineffective national movement. Herbert Samuel distinguished three basic movements in Palestine: Arab nationalism, Islamic unity and anti-Zionism.(2) He understood that these three movements were interrelated and that the Husseinis were trying to combine them into one single movement which would become powerful and hard for British to control. Consequently, he resorted to a policy of "divide and rule."(3) This was the policy of balancing family interests which attempted to distribute offices between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. As we have seen earlier, Haj Amin was made mufti after Ragheb al-Nashashibi was made mayor of Jerusalem.

The British policy succeeded and the rivalry between the two families took a sharp turn during the first decade of British mandate. These families manipulated all the ties of kin, class and patronage to win over new supporters.(4) As mentioned earlier, family feuds were behind the formation of some of the early political parties. It was the Nashashibis who, in 1923, encouraged the creation of the National Party which was headed by shaykh Suleiman Taji al-Farouqi of the city of Ramleh and the owner of the newspaper al-Jami'a al-Islamiyyah (Pan-Islam). Even earlier, in 1921, the opposition led by the Nashashibis established the National Muslim Association with branch offices in a number of Palestinian towns. According to one source, Samuel was encouraged by the Zionists to support opposition of the Husseinis in an effort to divide the Arab national movement.(5)

### THE NASHASHIBI FAMILY

Like the Majlesiyoun (the pro-Husseinis), the Mu'arada (the opposition, the anti-Husseini) consisted of some of the big families of Palestine. Both had organizational appearances and forms, using different names at different times, but they were in the main coalitions of families clustered around Jerusalem's two great families, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. Consequently, the latter family was the political center and leadership of the opposition within the Palestine national movement.

One source traces the origin of the Nashashibi family to Egypt and states that an Egyptian by the name of Nasser al-Din al-Nashashibi had come to Jerusalem as an appointee of the Turkish Ottoman government to take up his position as director of the important Islamic place known as Haram al-Sharif(6). Another source traces the family's origin in Palestine to the fifteenth century and states that it was an extraction of Kurdish-Circassian ethnic background.(7)

Whatever their beginnings were, it seems they did not become prominent and influential until much later. According to Yeshoa Porath, "the Nashashibi family only advanced in status in later generations."(8) In 1912, one of its members, 'Uthman al-Nashashibi, a wealthy land-owner, was elected to the Ottoman Parliament shortly after the "Young Turks" had taken over the Ottoman government in Istanbul. However, the prominent figure who really gave the family its high social and political status was Ragheb whom we mentioned earlier.

A graduate of Istanbul University, Ragheb became Jerusalem's District Engineer and later in 1914 he was elected to the Turkish Ottoman Parliament. By the end of World War I, he had emerged as the recognized head of the Nashashibi family and in his new capacity he began to cultivate his political connections to set his family up as the main competitor to the Husseinis. His first victory over the Husseinis was when, in 1920, he replaced Mousa Kazem as mayor of Jerusalem. He held that important position for nearly fourteen years, until 1934, when he was defeated in the elections by Dr. Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi. Another prominent member of the Nashashibi family was Fakhri who became Ragheb's closest associate and political companion. This member of the family was very controversial figure. He was a police officer attached to Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, and he had close contacts with Zionist personalities.(9) Of course, the two great families of Jerusalem always accused each other of collaboration with the Zionist and British enemies. Since the Husseinis were undoubtedly the more popular family, particularly in the 1930's, it was the Nashashibis who suffered the consequences.

It is true that while the nationalist movement was becoming more radicalized and Haj Amin was becoming a more uncompromising leader, the mu'arada was seen as the more moderate party. Perhaps because the Nashashibis political roots were not as deep as those of the Husseinis, they were more dependent upon British favors for political advantage and social status. Consequently, they were more moderate and more eager to compromise than the Husseinis, who, by the end of the 1920's were already well entrenched in the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the mu'arada saw itself as an integral part of the Palestinian nationalist movement. One should not forget that in 1919 Ragheb was a member of the All-Syrian Congress before he returned to Jerusalem to begin his campaign against the mufti and the Majlesiyoun.(10)

Although the Nashashibis were considered prominent in the politics of the country, they did not have economic resources of the Husseinis. They were not among the big landowning families of 78 Palestine. This was another reason why they relied on British patronage to extend their political influence. It was also a reason why their allies were families and individuals who were alienated by Haj Amin and the Husseinis. Their political allies, in other words, were not traditionally loyal to them as in the case of the families which followed the Husseinis who had deeper roots in the soil of Palestine.

## THE OTHER FAMILIES IN THE MU'ARADA

Several other families joined the Nashashibis in the mu'arada. One of these were the Khalidis who, it is said, were descendants of Khalid Ibn Al-Walid, the famous commander of the Arab-Muslim armies which conquered Palestine in 640.(11) This family was headed by Shaykh Khalil al-Khalidi who came second in the 1921 elections for the office of mufti of Jerusalem. We may recall that in that election Haj Amin came fourth while Jarallah had the first spot. The British, it seems, persuaded Jarallah to withdraw so they could appoint Haj Amin to the position. Khalidi never accepted the British arrangement which put Haj Amin in the illustrious position of mufti because he felt he should have been chosen. After all, when the position became vacant after the death of its last occupant, Kamil al-Husseini, Khalidi was acting mufti by virtue of being the president of the shari'a court of Appeal. Thus he was performing the duties of the office of mufti when Haj Amin received his controversial appointment.

Of course, Shaykh Jarallah was not pleased either, although he yielded to British pressure to withdraw. Jarallah's candidacy was supported by the Nashashibis and it was not surprising that the family of the former became part of the mu'arada.(12)

One of the prominent families of Jerusalem that also joined the mu'arada was the Djanis. One theory about their name and origin, which seems to be prevalent among members of the family, is that their name used to be Dajani-Daoudi and their origin goes back to King David. Supposedly, the family had possession of the keys to King David's tomb for many generations. It is also said that the Djanis refused to surrender the keys even after the establishment of the SMC in the 1920's. At any rate, the Jews are today in full control of King David's tomb.(13) Apparently, the Djanis joined the mu'arada as a result of the SMC's insistence that the tomb should be under its control being the highest Islamic authority in Palestine. (It should be remembered that Muslims revered King David because they regarded him one of the important prophets, and, consequently, of religious significance).

Of course, the mu'arada was not confined to the city of Jerusalem where the Husseinis and the Nashashibis began their political quarrels and rivalry. It spread to the rest of the country, becoming strongest in the north where the urban elites had begun to alienate the rural elites. One factor in this situation had to do with the SMC's general policy of replacing many prominent individuals who held high

religious positions in the defunct Ottoman administration, men like Shaykh As'ad al-Shuqayri of Acre and Shaykh Sa'id Al-Karmi of Tulkarem.(14)

According to Porath, most of these religious personalities had opposed the nationalist movement because it was anti-Ottoman.(15) They did not go along with the launching of the historic 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman State, and they continued to deplore the consequences even after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Porath also claims that many of the personalities in the mu'arada had close ties with the Zionist movement, and that the majority of them had "benefited from financial support from the Zionists."(16) Also, it was probably true that many in the mu'arada were resentful of Haj Amin's autocratic methods and his insistence on loyalty to his person.(17)

In the city of Hebron, the SMC favored the Tamimi family by giving it monopoly over certain important religious positions. This monopoly caused other families in the city to be resentful and to join the mu'arada. The Tahboub family in particular naturally resented the change because the religious affairs of Hebron were traditionally controlled by them. Similar problems caused the alienation of other influential families like the Khatibs and the Nasser al-Din.

In the Hebron area, the old rivalry between the Qaysis and the Yamanis was also a divisive factor contributing to the political dichotomy of majlesiyoun and mu'arada. Most Villages belonged to the Qaysis and this included such villages as Doura, Halhoul, Yatta, and Bani Na'im while a minority of the villages belonged to the Yamani faction including such villages as Beit Jibrin, Ajour, Deir-Nahas. In the Qaysi villages mentioned the "Amru family was the most influential while the Azza family was dominant in the Yamani villages. When the villages dominated by the Azza family joined the majlesiyoun, the other villages of the 'Amru family joined the mu'arada almost automatically.(18)

In the city of Nablus, the situation was not too different from that of Hebron. The division was also influenced by the traditional rivalry between the Qaysis and the Yamanis. In the Yamani faction there were the 'Abd al-Hadis and the Nimrs while in the Qaysi faction there were the families of Touqan, Nabulsi, al-Masri and al-Shak'a. The Qaysis joined the mu'arada in the 1920's.

## SOURCES OF STRENGTH

The mu'arada derived its power and political influence from three sources: its ability to exploit the urban-rural conflict, its appeal to the Christian minority and its relative success in municipal elections.

We have mentioned earlier, the conflict between city and village. The emergence of urban elites as a consequence of Western influence and modern developments alienated the traditional elites in rural Palestine. The mu'arada attempted to exploit this new social development with some success. Influential hamulas joined the mu'arada as early as the 1920's. Among them were such families as the Barghutis, the Abu Ghoshes and the Darwishs.(19) Although the Husseinis under the leadership of Haj Amin would politically make a sweep of rural Palestine in the 1930's, the mu'arada was able to establish there a foothold and prevent for some time the union of the two segments in one national movement. In that sense, the mu'arada may have played into the hands of the British and the Zionists whose policies were to keep the Arabs disunited in order to pursue their aim of building a national home for the Jews.

However, there was another substantial group with which the mu'arada had some appeal and this was the Christian Arabs. In general, the Christians of historic Syria were the first to espouse the ideology of Arab nationalism. Although the reasons were very complex, one of them had something to do with their level of education, which, on the whole, was higher than that of the Muslims. Of course, the missionary schools contributed greatly to this benefit and they were an important reason for the higher levels of modern developments among the Christians. Modern nationalism affected the Christians earlier and more massively than the Muslims. Consequently, the Christian Arabs of Palestine felt the impact of missionary education in terms of their strong interest in the revival of Arab heritage.(20)

The greatest assistance Christian supporters rendered to the mu'arada, was in the area of public relations and this they did through a dynamic press which they mostly controlled. During the British Mandate, the press developed into "an important vehicle of nationalist spirit, a medium of information about new political developments and an organ stressing Palestinian identity."(21)

One of the leading newspapers of Palestine was Al-Carmel which was founded in 1908 in the city of Haifa. This paper was established by Najib Nassar, an Orthodox Christian and a fiery nationalist who was among the first to warn Arabs against the dangers of Zionism. Another influential paper which later became one

of the two leading newspapers of Palestine was Filastin (Palestine). Established in 1911 by Isa and Yousif al-Isa of Haifa, this paper continued publication until 1969.(22)

The other newspapers supported the mu'arada and were, along with Al-Carmel, the official organs of the National party mentioned earlier. These were Al-Nafir which was owned by the Zaka family of Haifa and Mir'at Al-Sharq which was owned by Boulos Shihadeh.(23)

One factor attracting Arab Christians to the mu'arada was its secular tendencies and the religious connection of its rival, the majlesiyoun. Ragheb, the mu'arada leader, was known to be a worldly man, not unusually attached to religion. He held no religious position while his opponent Haj Amin was a Shaykh with all the apparitions of the equivalent of a Christian high priest. Some of the Christians who followed Ragheb al-Nashashibi or became part of the mu'arada held high positions in the former Ottoman administration. They felt insecure with Haj Amin as president of the SMC. Whatever the reasons for joining the mu'arada, the Christians were a substantial group and included such influential people as Isa Al-Bandak of Bethlehem and Ya'qoub Farraj of Jerusalem. The former was a member of an influential clan, a member of the Arab Executive (AE), and a founder of the Reform party, while the latter politician was a Vice-President of the AE.(24)

Of course, not all influential Christians supported the mu'arada. Few opted for the Husseinis and their names became well-known in the national movement. They were Catholic Christians but they never defaulted on their loyalty to Haj Amin who always made sure that Christian Arabs were represented in the political Councils of the Palestinian national movement. They included such names as George Antonius, later the author of the classic The Arab Awakening, Emile Al-Ghuri who later became the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, and others like Shibli Al-Jamal, Alfred and Edmond Rock, and Izzat Tannous.

All in all the manifestations of the mu'arada's political influence was more visible at the local level than at the national level. In fact, one might come to the conclusion that had its influence at the two level been reversed it would have replaced the majlesiyoun as the official leadership of the Palestinian national movement.

In the 1927 municipal elections, the mu'arada won in all of them except in Gaza and Majdal which were won by the majlesiyoun.(25) Of course, Ragheb had been the mayor of Jerusalem since 1920. In the 1934 municipal elections, similar gains were made by the mu'arada.(26) except in Jerusalem Ragheb was replaced

by Dr, Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi whose family wavered between a pro-mu'arada position and a neutral one.

Despite its impressive showing at the local level, the mu'arada never really made it at the national level, partly because their local gains had very little influence on their political exercise at the national level. After all, under the British, municipal governments in Palestine had very limited powers. For instance, their revenues were limited primarily because they could not issue many types of permits which municipalities elsewhere usually issued, and their taxing and fee collecting powers were also curtailed. Much of their powers belonged to local commissions, which were controlled by the central government.(27)

### **SOURCES OF WEAKNESS**

The basic weakness of the mu'arada was that it was quite fragmented and that it had no common program or goals to guide it. It consisted of diverse groups and individuals who seemed to have very little in common other than their dislike of Hussein's politics and Haj Amin's political leadership.

Of course, neither the mu'arada nor the majlesiyoun had ideological commitments of any kind. True Haj Amin, as mufti of Jerusalem and head of the SMC, was able to use religious symbols to unite a majority of the Palestinian people behind him, but beyond this he had no program for the future of Palestine whether in the social area or in the political and economic areas of life. Nevertheless, after 1926 he gradually showed his resentment of the British and the Zionists, appearing to many Palestinians as someone who was fighting a common enemy, an enemy who was an outsider not an insider, one who was non-Arab, non-Middle Eastern, and non-Muslim.

Although the mu'arada did oppose British-Zionist designs for Palestine, it was very moderate in its policies, calling at times for the use of evolutionary methods rather than revolutionary ones, for diplomacy rather than violence. This approach made it appear as if it was saying that the British could be trusted and the Zionists could be persuaded to limit their program and ambition. In time, the Zionist program became more intense and the British became more forceful in supporting it. Of course, the 1930's were critical years during which time Jewish immigration increased considerably and Arab restlessness and resentment grew correspondingly. While this was happening the majlesiyoun became more credible with the people and the mu'arada lost much of its appeal. Indeed, the latter

appeared to be more interested in fighting the majlesiyoun than they were in fighting the real enemy, the British and the Zionists.

Furthermore, the mu'arada was geographically dispersed and socially fragmented. In Some places of Palestine it was very strong, in others either very weak or non-existent. Its greatest support was in the cities of Hebron and Nablus and it had some support in the Galilee region and a few coastal towns.(28) In the 1930's, its geographic base became more limited and whatever appeal it had in the rural areas it very quickly disappeared. Socially it was very diverse, It had the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, the educated and the uneducated, the Christian and the Muslim.(29) However, the social mix did not genuinely constitute a national party. One other weakness of the mu'arada was its poor finances. Of course, this problem had a lot to do with the other problem, lack of unity, fragmentation and social diversity. There was no reliable and steady sources of income and most of the revenues were private contributions. One very controversial source was Zionist financial assistance to certain personalities in the mu'arada as well as financial aid to some of its newspapers.(30) According to Zionist sources, many individuals in the mu'arada received financial help to support their political activities.(31)

The majlesiyoun made an issue of the mu'arada's Zionist connection, implying that many of its members were outright traitors. During the 1936 revolution, some of them were actually shot and killed. Zionist sources also claim that most of the wealthy Palestinian who sold land to Jews were affiliated with the mu'arada, some of them were members of the Nashashibi family.(32)

There was no evidence that Ragheb himself had accepted Zionist money. However, the majlesiyoun always accused him of accepting bribes and using the office of mayor to reward political friends and punish political enemies. Of course, this charge of misusing funds and patronage was levied by both sides against each other. Ragheb, however, did have some contacts with the Zionists but they were not to obtain financial assistance.

### **GROUPS AFFILIATED WITH THE MU'ARADA**

The rise of the Nashashibi family to political prominence in the city of Jerusalem marked the beginning of family rivalries in the national politics of Palestine.(33) As mentioned earlier, Ragheb held important offices during the Ottoman administration. Consequently, the end of Ottoman rule meant a loss of prestige for the Nashashibis.(34)

At the beginning of the British mandate, Ragheb appeared willing to cooperate with the British at the same time he showed lack of interest in politics.(35) This was perhaps a tactical move on his part to regain lost prestige and to signal the new rulers that he would not be difficult partner should they decide to involve him in the country's politics. of course, Haj Amin was playing a similar game during the same period, around the time he was trying to get appointed to the position of mufti of Jerusalem.

What instigated the rivalry between the Nahashibis and the Husseinis was not the coming of the British to Palestine or even the end of the Ottoman rule. True the British encouraged the rivalry when they found it already existing. The real beginning of the rivalry between the two families was over the issue of representation in early congresses. As mentioned earlier, these congresses met in Palestine as an offshoot of the Syrian Congress and they were viewed as representative of the Palestinian people. The failure of the Nashashibis to obtain sufficient seats in the Arab Executive, which was elected by the congress, was the real issue upon which the politics of Arab Palestine became permanently divided.

Of course, the Husseinis wanted no opposition, and they succeeded, at the Third Congress, in December 1920, in driving the Nashahsibis completely out of the Arab Executive, so that the latter family ended up with no representation whatsoever. The issue of representation in the various congresses became more acute and by the sixth congress 1923, the mu'arada became convinced of the need for organization. Of course, opposition to Haj Amin's appointment to the position of mufti and head of the SMC accentuated the rivalry, but at the time it consisted mainly of prominent notables who were already fighting Husseinis dominance in the Arab Executive. Ragheb was the central figure among these notables. Very little organization existed then.

Of course, British and Zionist policies had encouraged the mu'arada to organize itself and become more aggressive. Once the mufti showed political inclinations to oppose the British and assert his leadership over the national movement, the British became interested in encouraging divisions within that movement and in finding a counterpart for Haj Amin, one who could effectively challenge his leadership or at least weaken it. According to Zionist sources, the High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, sought the help of Frederick Kisch, head of the Zionist organization in London, in dealing with the Arab situation.(36) Consequently, the idea of supporting the mu'arada financially and politically was part of a Zionist strategy to bring about a division within the ranks and leadership of the Arab national movement.

Already in 1920, the Zionists were soliciting Arab support for the fulfillment of their own political ambitions. They encouraged and financed the Arab-Jewish Association or Al-Jam'iyyah Al-Arabiyyah Al-Yahudiyya. The aim of the Association was to promote Arab-Jewish economic cooperation as well as to develop support for Jewish immigration.(37) The Organization's center was in the city of Haifa and it was headed by that city's Arab Mayor, Hasan Shukri. Obviously, nationalists opposed the formation of such organizations as the Association on the grounds they were supportive of the Balfour Declaration which the Arabs always considered to be sentimental to their national interest. Consequently, the Association was described as treasonable organization.(38)

### **1. The National Muslim Association**

The establishment of the National Muslim Association was prompted by the dismal failure of the Arab delegation which in 1921, went to London to explore the possibility of obtaining British concessions on the question of Palestine and the Jewish national home. The Association's center was in Haifa and its leader was Yunis Al-Khatib.(39) Members were drawn from several prominent families, although the unofficial leadership was provided by the Nashashibi family.

The Association formally accepted the British Mandate,(40) and, in 1923, it accepted the British proposal to create a legislative council for Palestine. Such positions as these were, at the time, daring acts in view of the fact that the more popular Husseinis were formally opposed to the proposal and very silent on the question of the mandate. The Husseinis urged Palestinians to boycott elections for the council,(41) and the boycott was successful. The legislative proposal was dropped.

However, it was the Association's Zionist connection which was the more disturbing issue with the nationalists. The Association supported the Zionist program, and, according to Zionist sources, this connection was based upon the desire of the Association's leader to obtain high positions in the administration of Palestine - an objective that could be best achieved through the support of the Zionists.(42) The Association soon spread to other cities and towns. Its backbone in Nablus were the Touqan and the 'Abdul Hadi families whose 90 support was based upon their local opposition to the Hamads who were majlesiyoun in control of the mayoralty.(43) In the Jerusalem area, the Association's main support came from the ranks of the Dajani family. The

Association did not last long, primarily because the position it took did not represent the opinion of most people, and its Zionist connection was seen as damaging to the national interests of Palestinian Arabs. It was seen as a tool in the hands of the Zionists.(44) Even the British became reluctant to continue their support to it once it became clear that the Association's credibility with the Arab population was not going to get stronger. They came to the conclusion that the Association was nothing more than a Zionist creation of "doubtful political value".(45)

## 2. The National Party

The difficulties of the mu'arada in the first three years of the civil administration in Palestine and its apparent failure to circumvent the majlesiyoun impelled it to organize a new political party, Al-Hizb Al-Watani (the National Party). The organizers were Ragheb and Fakhri of the Nashashibi family and supporting them were As'ad Al-Shuqayri and Aref Al-Dajani. The party's first congress was held in Jerusalem on the ninth and tenth of November 1923. Along with the urban personalities there were some rural notables such as 'Omar Salih Al-Barghuti who represented some of the villages near Ramallah.(46) The party elected Shaykh Suliman Taji Al-Farouqi as its first president and a central executive and supervisory committee of twenty members.(47)

This party also had a Zionist connection, as was revealed by Zionist sources.(48) As mentioned earlier, leaders of this party 91 already had connections with the Zionist Executive with whom they shared the common goal of limiting the influence of the Arab Executive and the SMC. According to these Zionist sources, Fakhri al-Nashashibi received financial help from the Zionist office in Jerusalem presumably in return for newspaper articles denouncing the Muslim-Christian Association and supporting Jewish immigration to Palestine. A similar source claimed that Fakhri, in one particular case, asked the Zionist office for money to help open a new branch of the part in Bethlehem.(49) Fakhri according to the same source, never asked for regular subsidies from the Zionists.(50)

The party's connection with the Zionists was bitterly resented by the Husseinis, who, through Jamal Al-Husseini made their position very clear to the Zionists. According to Zionists sources, Jamal held, on one particular occasion, the Zionist organization responsible for creating the National Party and dividing the

Palestinian people.(51) He also made clear Arab opposition to the Jewish national home and Jewish "exploitation" of the country's national resources.

Arab sources reveal the party's connection with British officials. According to Izzat Darwazah, for instance, many members of the party had contacts with Sir Gilbert Clayton, the Chief Secretary in the Palestine government and an ardent supporter of the Zionist. Darwazah wrote that in 1923 the party supported the 1922 British proposal of a Legislative Council for Palestine.(52) It should be recalled that the majlesiyoun rejected the proposal on the grounds that it favored the Jews.(53) Sir Clayton seemed to have influenced the party's platform.(54)

Despite the connections which the nationalists considered either unpatriotic or treasonable, the platform of the party looked quite nationalistic and in line with the Arabs' most reflective aspirations. It advocated Arab Unity, the non-recognition of the Balfour Declaration, the rejection of the British constitutional proposals, and the establishment of a national government and an elected Parliament.(55) In addition, the party suggested various economic and social reforms.(56)

From the beginning, the party was determined to resist and oppose the majlesiyoun and their policies. Through its press, particularly Mir'at al-Sharq and Al-Carmil, its leaders "unceasingly attacked the Arab Executive for its supposed tolerance towards Zionism, while they represented their own party as the most consistent element of opposition to Zionism".(57)

The majlesiyoun, on the other hand, counter-attacked with equal force and vehemence. They circulated petitions protesting its policies, sent representatives throughout the country to expose its "treacherous" methods, and even used the pulpits in the mosques to attack its leaders.(58) The Arab executive in particular accused many of the party's leaders to have sold land the Jews and to have accepted money to promote their political program.(59)

The national party was slow in gaining new grounds, partly because its leadership was "unimpressive and politically timid" and many of its members were "ostensibly non-political."(60) In addition, the party failed to offer the people a viable political alternative: its program was not very different from that of the Arab Executive.(61) This meant that its credibility with the people depended mostly on the social prestige of its leaders and the methods they used to communicate their policies. Obviously, these were not adequate or sufficiently strong to match their political opposites in the majlesiyoun.

Moreover, the party's support depended on the nature of local rivalries. Generally, those who opposed the local notables who supported Haj Amin became

almost automatically supporters of the mu'arada. Consequently, mu'arada groups like the National party were not really a national party; rather they were local notables opposed to the supporters of Haj Amin. For instance, mu'arada member Shaykh As'ad Al-Shuqayri was a rival of Shaykh Mohammed Murad, a member of the SMC, while Sa'id Abu Khadra of Jaffa was the local rival of both mayor 'Asim Al-Said and 'Umar Al-Bitar of the Arab Executive.(62)

The failure of the National Party did not mean at all that it had no impact. It did render the national movement disunited and in a sense it did slow down its progress during the 1920's. It was in part responsible for the difficulties of the Muslim-Christian Association mentioned earlier, particularly the "temporary collapse" of the Jaffa branch.(63) It was also able to open new branches outside Jerusalem, its center, an indication that its impact was not negligible. Small branches were opened in Ramleh, Nazareth, Haifa, Acre, Hebron, Tulkarem, and Gaza.(64)

### **3. The Farmers' Party (Hizb Al-Zurr'a)**

The year 1924 witnessed the establishment of the Farmers' party which brought with it a new phenomenon. This was to give political expression to the rural people, particularly the peasants and to make obvious the point that village elites were no longer willing to leave the urban elites in control of the country's political affairs. The party manifested the existence of deep-seated distrust of the country's urban leadership on the part of the leading families of Palestinian villages.(65) However, since the country's political leadership was in the hands of the majlesiyoun, the party's challenge to this leadership was expressed in a program similar to that of the mu'arada. Consequently, the Farmers' party from the beginning, identified with the various groups constituting the mu'arada.

Several rural families were conspicuous in the Farmers' party, among them were Abu Ghosh family,(66) the Mas'uds of Burqa, the Abu Hantashs of Tulkarm district and the Hdeibs of Dawa'imeh near Hebron.(67) One of the first branches was opened in Nablus as was followed by branches in Nazareth, Jenin, Beisan and Hebron.(68)

Contacts with the Urban opposition were made by these rural families and personalities including such urban leaders as Afif 'Abd al-Hadi of Jenin and Said Al-Shawwa of Gaza as well as urban families as the Fahumes of Nazareth. These leaders, in the cities and in the villages, were helped in their linkages and organizations by the Zionist Executive, particularly H.M. Kalvarisky. The party's

expenses were paid by the Zionists, although F. Kisch showed reluctance in supporting the new policy of Arab opposition.(69)

Basically, the doctrine around which the Farmers' party revolved manifested the traditional conflict between rural and urban interests and reflected deep-seated suspicions and dislike between fellaheen and city people.(70) The families and individuals who were affiliated with this party were primarily motivated by parochial interests. As such, that served to weaken the national movement by fragmenting its unity and altering its goals and methods.(71) Indeed, they were more interested in fighting other Arabs than they were in fighting their common enemies, the British and the Zionists.

In general, the program of the Farmers' party stressed the need to "alleviate the economic plight of the fellah by improving methods of agriculture, spreading agricultural education, and establishing agricultural banks for long-term loans."(72) Politically, this party advocated the formulation of a constitution which would reflect peoples' interests and aspirations, the formation of a national government elected by the people, and genuine cooperation with the British.(73)

Furthermore, it called for the protection of Islamic property and its management in a way that would insure equitable distribution of revenues between rural and urban people.(74) This last demand clearly reflected skepticism and distrust of the Husseinis who were seen as managing Waqf property for their own economic and political benefits.(75)

To a certain degree, the Farmers' party's program was similar to that of the National party discussed earlier. Generally, membership in the Farmers' party and the National party often overlapped. For instance, Tawfiq Fahum of Nazareth and Gaza's Said Shawwa were members of both parties. Moreover, the two parties represented a united front in the main stream of Palestinian politics.

The failure of the Farmers' party was due to many factors, one of which was its divisiveness. Its image as a group closely identifies with the mu'arada was not very appealing to the nationalists who, at the time, felt the need for a united front in their struggle against their arch enemies, Zionism and British rule. Another factor might have been the sharp decrease in Zionist financial support which had been prompted by serious crisis in Zionist finances.(76) Ironically, while this support was declining, the party's connection with the Zionists continued to discredit its leaders in the eyes of most people, particularly the nationalists.

#### 4. Association for Village Cooperation

Following the failure of attempts in 1924 by outsiders and insiders to reconcile the various factions in the national movement and to bring together the Majlesiyoun and the mu'arada, another rural political group was formed. This was the Jam'yyat Ta'awun al-Qura (Association for Village Cooperation) which was initially founded by Al-Madi family of Ijzim in the district of Haifa, a land-owning family that controlled several villages in the north of Palestine.

The basic motivation for the formation of the Association was its distaste for the Husseinis political hegemony in Palestine. At the same time it was dissatisfied with the Nashashibi-Farouqi control of the National Party. Consequently, the Association identified with the mu'arada while it maintained a separate political existence as an organized group.

The first meeting of the Association was held in Ijzim on September 1, 1924 and it was attended by many members of the Madi family as well as Shaykh As'ad Al-Shuqayri, Najeeb Nassar, Ibrahim and Salim Najjar and others.(77) During this meeting, the Association's platform and by-Laws were formulated including a pledge to eliminate mutual suspicion and dislike between village and city people.(78) Agricultural standards were to be elevated.

Most notably, the Association had in its platform a call for Muslims to preserve their holy places and protect their religious endowments, a clear indication that these matters were not well protected by the SMC. The call was also a clear indication that the Association was to be part of the mu'arada, although, as mentioned earlier, it would maintain a separate existence.

The political objectives of the Association was to struggle for independence and Arab unity to repudiate the Balfour Declaration.(79) Furthermore, the Association made clear its disappointment with the lack of progress in the area of self-government and blamed the British government for this failure. Obviously, the Association's platform did not differ from those of the other political groups within the mu'arada i.e., the National party and the Farmers' party. Because the Association did not go as far as repudiating explicitly the British mandate, the government approved its by-Laws very quickly. Naif Madi was elected as the Association's official spokesman.(80)

## 5. Hizb al-Ahali (The People's Party)

The failure of efforts to bring together the various factions within the national movement prompted certain young Palestinian intellectuals from the middle class to form still another opposition party known as Hizb al-Ahali (the People's Party). These alienated intellectuals came primarily from the city of Nablus and they were dissatisfied with prevailing conditions of the national movement, particularly its traditional leadership. The party was established in April 1925, and its founders were Mohammed Salah and 'Adel Zu'aiter.

The party's program stressed the superior qualities of democracy and the need for the use of pragmatism in pursuing national goals, especially independence. It rejected the Balfour Declaration and opposed the selling of Arab land to Jews.(81) Economically, it advocated the reduction of taxes, like the tithe, the promotion of agricultural development, trade expansion and public control of industry.

In general, the party represented still another facet of Arab factionalism and a clear manifestation of personal and parochial interests. It was an elitist party that failed to explain the deeper meaning of the current socio-economic and political problem of Arab Palestine. Indeed, it was established, according to one of its founders, M. Salah, "only . . . after the Muslim-Christian Association fell apart in Nablus."(82) It had no genuine platform and it resembled predecessors in the mu'arada splinter-groups. Consequently, it failed to attract serious followings outside the Nablus environs, and by 1928 it went out of existence.

## 6. The Free Party of Palestine

In December 1927, and as a result of the mu'arada's disappointment with the British decisions to give control of the Supreme Muslim Council to the Husseinis, a new anti-Husseini party, the Free Party, or Al-Hizb al-Hurr, came to existence. All the founders of the party came from Jaffa and consequently it was as parochial as the People's Party, its immediate predecessor. They included Hilmi Abu-Khadra, Issa al-Issa, Fahmi al-Husseini (no kin of Haj Amin), Suleiman Abu Ghazale, Sa'id al-Sayigh, 'Abdul-Qadir Abu Rabah al-Dajani, Hamid al-Husseini (no kin of Haj Amin), Mousa al-Kayyali, and Yousif 'Ashour.(83) In the party's administrative committee, there were Fahmi al-Husseini, 'Abdul-Qadir Abu-Rabah al-Dijani, 'Abdul-Ra'uf al-Bitar, Fawzi Abu-Khadra, Alfred Rock, Sa'id al-Sayigh, Issa al-Issa, Fa'iq Telmas, Issa Abu al-Jabin, Yousif al-Sa'id and Mousa al-Kayyali.(84) In its first meeting of December 8, 1927, the party elected 'Abdul-

Qadir Abu-Rabah al-Dajani as its Secretary-General, Hilmi Abu-Khadra as Assistant Secretary-General and Fahmi al-Husseini as the party's liaison with the government.(85)

The party's program was not too different from other splinter groups within the mu'arada. It resorted to abstract notions of political and economic reforms, and was devoid of concrete plans or a program of action. It accepted the British Mandate but only as a temporary condition, and it anticipated ultimate independence and sovereignty for Palestine. It vaguely referred to the economic and political rights of the Palestinian people and the inviolability of their public works and labor rights.(86)

Members came largely from the middle class and there was a conspicuous presence of newspaper editors, lawyers, merchants and school teachers. Nevertheless, the party should be seen as another divisive phenomenon or trend within the national movement. As such, it failed to unseat the majlesiyoun from their well established position of power and leadership.

### **THE MU'ARADA'S ROLE IN THE SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE 1920'S**

In the 1920's, the battles between majlesiyoun and mu'aridoun were fought over specific issues. We have seen how the two groups fought their first battle over issues involving the office of mufti of Jerusalem and the SMC. The latter became the leadership council for the national movement with Haj Amin as its head, and also as the mufti.

In 1927, the municipal elections were held and they became a major issue dividing the national movement. In Jerusalem, the electoral contest was crucial because of the city's importance as the capital of Palestine and as the place where the Husseinis and the Nashashibis had their political bases. Furthermore, the city's Jewish residents played a major role in influencing the outcome of the election. They of course, supported the Nashashibi faction (i.e., the mu'arada's candidates) as the lesser of the two evils.(87) According to Porath, out of the eight seats assigned to the Arabs in the Jerusalem municipal council (five for the Muslims and three for the Christians) the Nashashibis won six while the majlesiyoun won only two. Of the six pro-Nashashibis, there were three Muslims and three Christians. Without the Jewish vote, the eight Arab seats would have been equally divided between the pro-Husseinis and the pro-Nashashibis.(88)

Even without the Jewish vote, the Nashashibis political strength would have been significant and not at all minor compared with the majlseiyoun who were

supposed to be the established leadership of Arab Palestine. Of course, Ragheb came first on the list of winners, with the Christian Ya'qub Farraj as second and Zaki Nuseibeh as third.(89)

The mu'arada also did well in the municipal elections held elsewhere in Palestine. Its candidates won majority seats almost everywhere except in Gaza and Majdal.(90) Its performance in the local elections made it clear that it was a power to reckon with and not something to be ignored. Consequently, the Husseinis were forced to - consider reconciliation with them to keep the national movement united - of course, under their leadership. But the attempt was futile producing instead another mu'arada political group, the Palestine Free Party discussed earlier.

In 1928, another major issue developed in which the two groups were involved. This one came at the end of a five year period of intense feuding between majlesiyoun and mu'aradoun. It involved the convening of the seventh Congress which had been postponed from year to year until the mu'arada's relative success in the municipal elections persuaded the pro-Husseinis that postponement could no longer be politically possible or useful. The majlesiyoun consented before hand to the allocation of a substantial number of seats to the mu'arada and the Congress was consequently convened on April 20, 1928.(91)

However, according to many scholars of Palestinian history, the Congress was the weakest of all congresses held in Palestine partly, because an effort was made "to make it an all-embracing hodge-podge of a conference comprising every shade of opinion and interest in the country."(92) Also, the Congress came close to passing a general resolution demanding from the British the formation of an independent Arab national government, under the guidance of the mandate authorities.(93) Such resolution would have been unrealistic, because the British would not have responded positively, and the resolution, as well as the Congress itself, would have simply disappeared without a trace of influence. However, many concerned members were able to persuade a majority to reiterate instead resolutions passed routinely by previous congresses.(94)

The Congress was attended by 250 delegates who mostly came from urban areas.(95) Since it was a more representative body than the previous congresses, it chose to elect a larger Executive, one that had forty-eight members, almost twice as many as in the previous Executive. The two rival groups had equal membership on the Executive with the Muslims and Christians dividing into a ratio of two to one.(96) Mousa Kazim al-Husseini, was elected President while Tawfiq al-Haj 'Abdallah, the mayor of Acre, and Ya'qoub Farraj, Jerusalem's deputy

mayor and an Orthodox Christian, were elected Vice-Presidents. The last two were members of the mu'arada and so was the Protestant Christian Lawyer Mugannam Mugannam who was one of the three secretaries of the Executive. The other two secretaries were Jamal al-Husseini, a relative of Mousa Kazim and the secretary of the previous Executive, and 'Awni Abdul-Hadi, a well known Jerusalem lawyer and later the Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party.

The seventh Congress resolved ". . . as a common right, the establishment of a democratic parliamentary government." It declared that the Palestinian people were represented in its body "which unites all the Arab parties, both Muslims and Christians . . ." and demanded that Palestine be treated like the neighboring countries which were enjoying ". . . Parliamentary constitutions of various kinds." After all, it declared the resolution, "Palestine is no more backward than any of the neighboring Arab countries."(97)

In addition to the main resolution outlined above, the seventh Congress dealt with issues and problems such as the tithe tax, agricultural loans, the establishment of an agricultural bank, and the repeal of the Hulah concession which gave the Zionists a monopoly over the Hulah area.

No doubt, the seventh Congress differed from its predecessor congresses. For one thing, it avoided the old policy of maximum demands. This was due to the influence of the more moderate mu'arada which usually found it more realistic to push for self-government (i.e., autonomy) as envisaged by the League of Nation's covenant rather than for independence which the British would agree to.(98) On the other hand, the seventh Congress reflected the composition of its membership. While it appeared united, it was in reality characterized by personal feuds and the dominance of self-interests, while it seemed to portray moderate positions, it was in reality lacking in executive power and administrative energy also due to its political heterogeneity.

Obviously, the Nashashibis and their supporters were in a position of great influence at the seventh Congress, although they failed to dominate the national movement which remained largely in the hands of the Husseinis. However, their moderate influence in the Congress had no effect outside the Congress. The country's political status quo continued to exert pressures upon its people with no hope of a noticeable change in the near future. Moreover, the Zionists would not agree to a moderate program of democratic reform because they were still a small minority in the country and they were afraid parliamentary reforms would allow the Arab majority to circumscribe their political ambitions or even destroy them altogether.

The failure of the seventh Congress to persuade either the British or the Zionists to accept a moderate platform for a Palestinian future convinced a majority of Arabs that moderation served no useful purpose. Consequently, few months later, in 1929, the country went through its worse violent episode since the British had taken charge. The so-called "wailing wall incident," which was followed by wide-spread riots, ended a long period of relative peace.

It should be remembered that some effort, although unsuccessful, was made to reconcile the mu'arada and the majlesiyoun as early as 1924, when the press espoused the idea of reconciliation in a conference which convened in June of that year. Although the conference dealt with other matters pertaining to social and economic problems of Palestine, it preoccupied itself with the problem of national unity and the presentation of a common front against Zionist incursions into the future political destiny of Arab Palestine.

The conference of Arab journalists passed resolutions imploring Arab press to be guided by the principles of public interests, to avoid involvement in private and personal feuds, and not give preference to private and sectional interests at the expense of the national and public interests. It directed the press to have due regard to professional journalistic standards to avoid polemics and sensationalism in reporting the news. Politically, the conference urged all political groups to repudiate the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration and it criticized those groups, like the Farmers' Party, that did not. Finally, it called for national unity and pointed to the hazards of sectarian strife.

Journalists' efforts to imbue the national movement with unity was greatly aided by the presence in Jerusalem of Tunisian leader 'Abdul-Aziz al-Tha'alibi. This leader was urged to bring together the leaders of the various parties and a list of names was handed to him by Najib Nassar, Boulos Shihadeh and Khalil Sakakini.(99) However, Tha'alibi did not succeed in this task mainly due to the refusal of representatives of the agricultural parties and the national Party, to attend the proposed convention for national conciliation. When the convention met two hundred out of four hundred members attended. Most of those who attended were supporters of the sixth Palestine Congress i.e., they were supporters of the Husseinis. Consequently, they used their influence to postpone indefinitely the convening of the seventh Congress.(100) As we have seen that Congress did not meet until four years later (June 1928).

However, there were few minor occasions when leaders of the various parties and political organizations showed some regard for the public interest, showing willingness to forget, at least temporarily, these personal animosities and feuds in

order to create a common front of national unity and national interest. One such occasion involved Balfour's visit to Jerusalem on March 25, 1925. The former Foreign Minister of Britain, in whose name the controversial 1917 Declaration was issued, came for the opening of the Hebrew University. In the Arab mind, his name epitomized the worst of imperialist injustice and oppression, and, therefore, it was natural for the Arabs to react negatively to his visit. The Arab Executive Committee declared the day of his arrival as a day of mourning and called for a general strike.(101)

The strike was successful. It was obeyed by the entire country. A "program of national work" was agreed upon by a temporary coalition of all the political forces, including the majlesiyoun and the mu'arada. However, although the strike was fully adhered to, the ceremonies for the opening of the Hebrew University, held April 1, 1925, were not completely boycotted as was expected. Ragheb al-Nashashibi, along with few bedouin shayks from the Beisan area and a couple of lesser known Arab personalities from Jerusalem, attended the ceremonies.(102) Their presence was a subject of heated arguments and controversy. Ragheb in particular, but also Shaykh Ali Jarallah, who was on the Islamic Court of Appeal, were made center of an emotional uproar among nationalists.

Aside from these minor instances in which a facade of unity seemed to generate some optimism in the future, the national movement continued to be sharply divided. However, by the end of 1928 "there were indications that the period of political stagnation was giving way to renewed Zionist initiative and correspondingly renewed Palestinian Arab agitation and countermeasures."(103)

In the next chapter, we shall see that, from 1929 on, Palestine was no longer merely a politically nervous place but rather a place that had become a hot bed for revolution and extreme political agitation.

**FOOTNOTES**

- (1) W.F. Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930's", Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer, 1977, pp. 37-40.
- (2) Abdul-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith (The History of Modern Palestine), Beirut, 1971, p. 214.
- (3) Taysir Y. Jbara, Al-Haj M. Amin al-Husseini: Mufti of Jerusalem, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1982, p. 52.
- (4) Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning, p. 19.
- (5) For more information see ISA, File 158.
- (6) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 60.
- (7) Jacob Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, New Haven, 1956, p. 213.
- (8) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 14.
- (9) Ibid., see also ASS, Files 107, 105, and CZA, S25/4379.
- (10) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, p. 213.
- (11) Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, London, 1937, p. 154.
- (12) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, p. 220.
- (13) See Aref, al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Ouds.
- (14) Shaykh As'ad al-Shuqayri held important positions in the Ottoman administration including membership in the Ottoman Parliament, Chairmanship of the "Committee for Clarification of 108 Shari'ah Affairs" in the office of Shaykh al-Islam, and "Mufti of the Fourth Army during World War II. Quoted in Porath, The Emergence, p. 212.
- (15) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 224.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) David Gilmore, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians 1917-1980, London, 1980, p. 50.
- (18) Shimoni, The Arabs of Palestine, pp. 222-223.
- (19) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 63.
- (20) Albert Hourani, Al-Fikr al-Arabi fi 'Asr al-Nahdah 1798-1939, (Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939), 3rd ed., Beirut, 1977, see chapter eleven.
- (21) Aida A. Najjar, The Arabic Press and Nationalism in Palestine, 1920, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1976, p. 33.
- (22) Ibid., p. 35.
- (23) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 16, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379, and Kisch to Kalvarisky, August 31, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(24) Hizb al-Islah (Reform Party), was established in June 1935, by Dr. Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi, who defeated Ragheb al-Nashashibi in the Jerusalem Municipal Elections in 1934.

(25) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 65.

(26) Cmd., 5979, pp. 72-80.

(27) Ibid.

(28) The results of the "Municipal Elections" of 1927 and 1934, across the country proved that the Mu'arada's gains came from key cities in Palestine.

(29) Ohanna, The Internal Struggle, p. 63.

(30) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 16, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(31) Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 14, 1923, a letter explaining the dissatisfaction of Arab collaborators (Zaki Pasha), with the Zionists for cutting down subsidy and support, CZA, S/25, 4378, Kalvarisky to Kisch, August 31, 1923, asking for more money to support Fakhri al-Nashashibi's democratic party, CZA, S/25, 4379.

(32) Gilmore, Dispossessed, p. 50.

(33) Porath, The Emergence, Vol. I, p. 209.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Lesch, Frustration, p. 202.

(36) See CZA, S/25, Files 517 and 518.

(37) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 180.

(38) M. Izzat Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka al-'Arabiyyah al-Haditha, (Concerning Recent Arab Movement), Sidon, 1951, pp. 35-38.

(39) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, document No. 6, November 16, 1921, pp. 720-721.

(40) Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning, p. 22.

(41) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, pp. 539-540.

(42) Conversation between the leading members of the "NMA" and Dr. Eder, March 30, 1922, CZA, S/25, 4380.

(43) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 217.

(44) CZA, S/25, 4380

(45) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 221.

(46) Frederick Kisch, Palestine Diary, London, 1938, pp. 50, and 53-57, see also al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O. (Zionists Organization), London, August 24, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379. (Text in French).

- (49) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O.. London August 31, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.
- (50) Ibid.
- (51) Kalvarisky's letter to Z.O., London August 26, 1923, CZA, S/25, 4379.
- (52) Darwazah, Hawla al-Haraka, p. 47.
- (53) Haj Amin's position on the Legislative Council and the British Blue Books was explained in two interviews with him conducted in 1974, by 'Imad Shaqqour and K, Qassimiyyeh. See Shu'un Filastiniyah (Palestine Affairs), No. 36, August 1974, pp. 12-17.
- (54) Ya'coub, Nathra Jadida ( a new outlook), p. 82.
- (55) ASS, file 220, (Program of the National Arab Party), see also al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mouassassat, document No. 7, pp. 721-722.
- (56) ASS, File 220.
- (57) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 226.
- (58) Siddiq al-Tammimi to the AE, December 10, 1923, ISA, AE, 3714.
- (59) Bayan al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 182.
- (60) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.
- (61) Lesch, Frustration, p. 206.
- (62) Ibid.
- (63) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 131.
- (64) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 182.
- (65) Porath, The Emergence, Vol. I, p. 227.
- (66) Secret Memorandum to Dr, Eder, May 5, 1920, CZA, Z/4, 1454.
- (67) Mousa Hdeib was murdered in 1929, as a result of his close connections with the Zionist Organization, as stated in Kisch's, Palestine Diary, p. 125.
- (68) ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, New Haven, 1947, p. 484.
- (69) Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 89; see also CZA, S/25, 517 and 518.
- (70) M. Izzat Darwazah, al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyyah fi Mukhtalafi Marahiliha, vol. I (The Palestine Case at its Different Stages), Sidon, 1951, p. 47.
- (71) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, p. 241.
- (72) Lesch, Frustration, p. 113.
- (73) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mouassassat, p. 183.
- (74) ESCO, p. 485.
- (75) Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 125.
- (76) Lesch, Frustration, p. 113; see also Kisch, Palestine Diary, on the "Agricultural Parties", pp. 80-150.
- (77) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1929, p. 246.

- (78) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 132.
- (79) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-129, p. 247.
- (80) Ibid., p. 248.
- (81) The Program of the Hizb al-Ahali (People's Party), Nablus, ASS, File 718.
- (82) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al Baritani 1922-1939, p. 261, and see also ASS, File 718.
- (83) Al-Hizb al-Hurr al-Filastini: Dusturuhu wa Nizamuhu al-Dakhili (the Palestine Liberal Party: Its Constitution and Internal Structure), ASS, File 207.
- (84) ASS, File 207.
- (85) Bayan al-Hout, Al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, pp. 184-185, and for a complete list of names, refer to document No. 8, Ibid., pp. 723-726.
- (86) See Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1929, p. 279, and ASS, File 207.
- (87) CZA, S/25, 668.
- (88) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 239.
- (89) CZA, S/25, 668.
- (90) Porath, The Emergence, vol. I, p. 239.
- (91) Palestine Zionist Executive and report by Kalvarisky, CZA, S/25,4210.
- (92) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al Hadith, p. 137.
- (93) Ibid.
- (94) Darwazah, al-Qadiyyah, p. 59.
- (95) Bayan al-Hout, al-Qiyadat wa al-Mou'assassat, p. 195.
- (96) Khillah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Baritani 1922-1939, pp. 281-282.
- (97) Royal Institute of International Affairs, A Survey of International Affairs 1929, Oxford 1930, p. 258.
- (98) ESCO, p. 488.
- (99) Killah, Filastin wa al-Intidab al-Biritani 1922-1929, p. 246.
- (100) Al-Kayyali, Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith, p. 132.
- (101) Ibid., p. 134.
- (102) Two of the three Bedouin Sheiks were identified; one was Shaykh Mohammad al-Zinati and Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Hussein, as quoted in Filastin (daily Arabic newspaper edited by 'Issa al-'Issa), 966/9, April 3,4, 1925.
- (103) Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 60.