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A reading into the vision and program of Hamas Movement in light of the current political atmosphere Open discussion
Introduction: People talk nowadays about the current political situation and not about the establishment of a state, the right of self-determination or sovereignty. The everyday talk of the people focuses on the daily social relations and the minimum requirements of coexistence in this "prison". As for the European or American role, it concentrates on improving life conditions in this "prison", and that the Palestinian movement is incapable of pulling down the wall or halting the deterioration in the security and economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to the questions about the elements of this society, especially the Islamic Movement: Is there a contradiction between the ideological or political vision and the task on the ground, which is the liberation of Palestine from the River to the Sea or the establishment of an Islamic state or independence and sovereignty on all of Palestine. Reading through the various phases that Hamas engaged in starting with the positions of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, calling for the "calm" or the participation in the ruling and elections, or accepting a Palestinian state, we can note that there is a contradiction between these positions on the one hand, and the call for armed struggle and resisting occupation and rejecting to recognize or negotiate with the Israelis, on the other hand. In this session, can one discuss the political agenda of Hamas Movement in the field that it wants to engage in?
Are we here comparing this situation with the Turkish model which combines between the attempt to become a member state in the European Union and maintaining the Islamic dimension or the way they envision the economic relations in the region as a whole in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union or the national tendencies of Turkey and the reformulation of the future of Turkey? Is there is a clear conflict in the priorities of which path to lead or is there is a possibility to combine all trends in one position? The agenda saying that Hamas is a terrorist movement is not recognized anymore and has been pushed aside. The clear position is that Hamas members are Palestinian citizens who constitute an indispensable part of the Palestinian society no matter what their ratio is in the society. Regardless of the internal conflicts between those who want to have an alliance with Hezbollah and those who want to engage in internal alliances within the Hezbollah Formula inside the Palestinian lands. What is the position of Hamas with regards to the Israeli aggression, arrests and assassination of political leaders? Does Hamas want us to pose the vision of an Islamic state and Sharia (Islamic Law) as part of the constitution or is Hamas transforming into a religious party as is the case in Israel, the religious movement formed Shas Party according to the Israeli conditions. The following questions have to be posed: Will Hamas boycott the elections because of the arrests, the assassinations and the closures? Is there momentum in Hamas leadership to go down to the streets and participate in the elections? Is there another vision on the means to have Hamas maintain its role in the society? The other question to be posed in this context: are we talking about participation and assuming responsibility for the results or are there negotiations towards consolidating the truce? In other words, there won't be attacks regardless of the position on rejecting the recognition of the state of Israel? What are the other concessions? Is Hamas looking for alliances within the Palestinian political scene for the next elections or will it work on running in the elections as an independent bloc? The question that follows: how will be the structure of the Palestinian internal front if Hamas participates and wins in the elections. Among the other questions that were posed: "What is Hamas' position regarding the security, reform and elections?" One has to read the future of Hamas taking into consideration the fact that there is still a conflict, splits and challenges that face Fatah Movement and that might lead to its disintegration if they don’t work on bridging the gap between the generations and unify the vision; the most urgent task now is to end the personal struggles, especially in the areas of Hebron, Nablus and Gaza. There are also other factors that get entangled within this web, namely the security, reform and elections, and there is also the issue of money, meaning where is the money from and who funds who? Participant: For example, let us take the elections: the question that pops up is how will Hamas react if Israel obstructs the elections and if it continues with the arrests? There is always a second party, whether it is the PNA or Israel. Thus, there are influencing factors that push the factions and movements in various directions. It is easy for some to say that it is possible to transform into a political movement and others say it is difficult. The basic question remains : Is there a convincing political track in light of continuation of occupation in the West Bank? I believe that armed resistance will return and will not be limited to Hamas only. It is possible to see Hamas reconsider the operations against civilians and try to control it if such operations become linked with terrorism at the media level. As for resistance against the army and the settlers, I believe that this is a matter of time and such resistance will return. Resisting occupation is not linked to Hamas only. One final comment: sometimes, at the political level, some insist that Hamas wants to destroy the state of Israel, but this is not true because it is clear how Hamas thinks about the two state solution and how to take this formula out of the ideological context. It is clear that it won't be within this context. They will find a semi-religious justification or a truce for ten years open for renewal. They won't say that it is reconciliation but this will be a way out, and that was clear from the statements of Sheikh Yasin when he said this matter will be left for the future generations, and this shows that he meant there would be acceptance of the facts on the ground, etc. Therefore, this is a wrong reading by some of the mass media who seek to find a linkage between Hamas and this particular position. Participant: Participant:
Participant: Follow up question: to what extent can the US exert pressure on Israel? Participant: I believe that if there is commitment to participate in elections and abide by the results of the ballot boxes, this means that there is a commitment to accept a secular state; we need to explain to what extent there is commitment to political pluralism and elections which means to trust those elected to rule the people and not the Sharia. The participant asked Sheikh Hasan Yousef about the difference between the Shura Council and democracy. Sheikh Hasan Yousef said democracy means that the people shall decide but the Shura means that the Sharia decides and we have to abide by what the Sharia states. Second: what effect it will have on Hamas in terms of its relation with Fatah or the political organization, which means that we might have two major parties and small parties that might make coalitions. Participant: If we want to read into Hamas position, we can say the following: there is a frustrating political situation which I termed as prison. There is no two state solution and there is no binational state in the foreseeable future, but the third option remains which is the resistance and the situation is ready for explosions. Another participant tackled the issue from a different perspective. It is not possible to read Hamas position away from the current regional and international developments and from its interests in the next developments. "I don’t believe that Hamas Movement is independent; Hamas is a popular movement that affects and is affected by its surroundings and the proof on that is that Hamas agreed that it might extend the truce for one more year. I believe that Hamas has an interest to keep steady relations with Iran, Hezbollah and Syria". Participant: With regards to the other influential issues, the relation between the PNA and Israel will have an impact on Hamas position meaning that the elections will be subject to Sharon's conditions and will be accepted by Hamas without making any official statement about it. As for the period after the elections, Hamas will prepare along with other forces to move military action to the West Bank. Hamas position in Gaza:
Hamas has no choice but to engage in the elections; the other factor that one needs to look into is the splits inside Fatah. Participant: 1- Hamas presence and influence in Gaza is larger than in the West Bank. 2- There are indicators that it might change its position towards the elections at the time of political deadlock while it refused any political participation when there were chances for political prospects. 3- The Palestinian political system led by Fatah is interested in holding the elections and shows strong interests in accepting the results of the elections; otherwise, they would not have insisted on holding the municipal elections and they did stress that the PLC elections will be held on January 25 regardless of the results. 4- The features of change in Hamas with regards to political participation in the current system shows that there is a realistic wing inside Hamas that feel they have to change the position because the Palestinian public started to feel dismayed by some of the practices of Hamas which wants the best without paying the price which the executive authority is paying. Therefore, we cannot avoid the fact that Hamas impression on its popularity in Palestine is an important factor that pushed it towards change. 5- Diminishing funding sources. As for the position of Abu Mazen who counted on this change in Hamas position, he is against any internal fighting. Abu Mazen counted on Hamas becoming part of the system and not against the system. Abu Mazen maintained this relation and proved it is possible to contain the internal Palestinian differences through dialogue although he opposes Hamas project. 6- If we add the regional factor, political Islam has clear options following the experiences in Algiers, Iran, al-Qaedah and Afghanistan. Therefore, I believe that there will be moves towards the one Islamic state but they will fail. We will see how mistakes will be committed just like the mistakes committed by Fatah three years ago. Their mistakes will be seen on real grounds because they are not used to offering services as part of the system but on the margins of the system to gain certain positions. I disagree with what people say that Fatah includes more than one organization inside it. I think that the problem is less serious than what is being portrayed and that Fatah will be able to contain its internal problems during the next elections. The following two conclusions can be made:
To achieve the above-mentioned results, we must encourage Hamas towards change. He explained: Hamas crisis is an ideological crisis because they want to transform from an ideological religious idea of the Islamic Brotherhood into a national project idea, but the crisis of Fatah is a crisis of figures that can be worked out at the expense of other persons. He added:
Following the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Hamas reformulated itself in a different manner; I believe that there is mobility between Hamas and Islamic Brotherhood Movement which adopted for the first time the movement of resistance which started to form its dimensions on solid ground, so it is not easy for Hamas to use the resistance card at its own discretion. It is clear that there is interim change in Hamas vision. One can note that Hamas is not very far from the political game although it clings to its goal in a different manner. Thus, and in light of the current situation, Hamas is under attack, but reality shows otherwise. There is dialogue between Hamas and the US and meetings between Hamas and Israel. Therefore, Hamas knows its position and role very well away from Hezbollah. There is what they call the all-out corruption in the PA and the talking about splits and crises, but facts on the ground show that Hamas is part of the security problem, especially in Gaza. Hamas has an interest in not having a strong authority and in joining the elections and taking its share. Hamas tries from time to time to cause splits in the security service in Gaza so as to achieve gains in this aspect. Practically speaking, Hamas enjoyed notable strength in Gaza until the explosion incident in Jabalia when it insisted that there were no internal mistakes at which point it was exposed in the internal front; Hamas then started to retreat and take its normal dimension in the political meetings. One important point to note here: will the resistance move from Gaza to the West Bank? For sure, there will be operations at a small scale against the settlers but the West Bank won't be used as launching point for rockets. Participant: The aim of course is to change the demographic ratio from an Arab majority into a Jewish majority. If these schemes are implemented, unlike the conditions during the First Land Day, Israel enjoys international legitimacy because it withdrew from Gaza, and clashes will occur. If this happens as a historical event against Israel, what will be the response of the PA and Hamas with the events, in addition to the level of response by the Islamic Brotherhood? Participant: 1- The President:
2- Hamas:
Before the First Intifada, the Islamic Movement inside homeland, in the universities, did not participate in national action. The first Intifada embarrassed them because we still disagree with Hamas when we say that Hamas existed before the Intifada, but in actuality, it existed after the Intifada on January 28, 1988, in their first statement issued during the first Intifada. This point shows the emergence of pragmatism in Hamas positions, especially when they saw the increasing influence of Islamic Jihad since 1982 as they engaged in resisting occupation while Hamas was out of the picture then. I believe that Hamas is going through the same phase nowadays because the Islamic Brotherhood is the political legitimacy reference of Hamas Movement in Palestine, same as the future of Islamists in Jordan or in Syria. I see that Hamas is facing a crisis while Hamas believes that it is part of the Islamic Movement in the region. What are the reasons that made Hamas accept to participate in the elections?
The elections and its implications on the internal situation: With regards to Israel, it will try to use the Hamas card because they are against holding the elections since the elections will grant Hamas new political legitimacy which does not serve Israel because the new parliament will include blocs that will exert pressure on Abu Mazen or any person who would reach any political settlement with Israel. Israel started a campaign of escalating acts of violence in the region targeting Hamas and striking its infrastructure through arrests under the belief that such a measure would lead Hamas to declare it does not want elections. As far as resistance and its role in the elections are concerned, I believe that Hamas would use the elections to gain political legitimacy. Another important issue is the upcoming municipal elections in the major cities in the West Bank. I would like to point out that Hamas’ problem lies in the ideas and not in the figures since Hamas gained part of its popularity based on refusing to participate, so deciding to join the elections will cause problems for Hamas which will be contradicting itself. Comment: Conclusion: 2- The civil society will benefit regardless of who participates in the elections. 3- It serves interests of both sides and the PNA and the society to expose Israel’s position against the elections through the following means, including:
4- To encourage the line which includes President Abu Mazen and to hold the elections on the set date and not accept any delay.
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