Is the Two-State Solution Viable?
Date: March 25, 2004 PASSIA, Jerusalem Speaker: Dr. Gary Sussman, Tel Aviv University More Photos :: Caveats :: The question  :: Is the two-state solution in trouble? :: Settlements  :: The fence :: Demography  :: Palestinian dynamics  :: Unilateral actions and the legitimacy of separation  :: Is there a bi-national alternative?   :: DISCUSSION

Caveats:

• These are my own personal views and not those of the TAU.
• I am probably at the margins of the margins and maybe represent a handful of people.
• I hope that my analysis is actually wrong – not least because I favor a two-state outcome. As someone who still defines himself as a Zionist I want a volkstaat .
• I am indeed trapped between the head and the heart.
• This is not a new debate and it was a lively one before the first Intifada.
• It is very hard to debate these issues and analyze them in a fluid conflict. The challenge is not to look at short-term developments but longer term processes.
• Nothing is irreversible or inevitable – including the two-state solution.
• We need to clarify what we mean by a two-state outcome. In Israel it can range from Geneva to the Sharon (one-and-a-half-state solution).
• I have more questions than answers and I am delighted to debate this issue with a Palestinian audience as I am limited to debating it with myself and a few Israelis and Diaspora Jews that share my assessment that the two-state outcome cannot be assumed.
• For many we are on a bumpy road with detours to an end game in which two states live side by side.

The question:

• In addition to trying to explore with you whether the two-state solution is still viable, I want to ask a larger question.
• What is the equilibrium of the conflict?
• Does each conflict, like a market, have a specific (pre-ordained) outcome?
• If it is a dynamic process, then what and who determines that outcome?
• Is it the hegemonic side? Is it the weaker side? Or the international community and the perceptions of what is a legitimate and fair outcome?
• I am very interested in the discourse over what constitutes a just outcome.
• My hunch is that the outcome is not set in stone.
• The perception of what is the desirable and just outcome is can change.
• I can think of one example that I am intimately familiar with in which that did change – South Africa .
• Another example in which our understanding over conflicts changed was water.
• The water war discourse warned that the next conflicts would be about water and the water issue was (pardon the pun) considered insoluble in our context. That is no longer the case.
• What does this all mean?
• If indeed the international community (public opinion) determines what the outcome will be then I suspect that Israel and the two-state solution are in trouble – over time.
• Both are increasingly becoming discredited.
• I would add that demography might also shape what we consider to the just outcome. On this score Israeli is, again, in trouble.
• Let me add that even if we were to sign Geneva tomorrow – questions remain about the viability of that accommodation over time.
• Moreover, Israel will still have to (at some point in time) deal with the bi-national reality it finds itself in – both vis-à-vis the Arabs/ Palestinians in Israel and West of the River Jordan.
• Demography is destiny.

Is the two-state solution in trouble?

• The answer is Yes and the reason that we are debating this largely has to do with the impasse we find ourselves in.
• There are several factors which contribute to this perception that time for a deal is running out:
  1. Settlement expansion
  2. The fence.
  3. Demography.
  4. Palestinian dynamics.
  5. Unilateralism.
  6. Legitimacy for partition and Israel .

• I will briefly deal with each of them.
• My own assessment is that none of these factors on their own is enough to determine the viability of the two-state outcome.
• But taken together they form a powerful cocktail that – over time – has major implications.
• We tend to see these issues and processes as linear. But is a non-linear process that will one day see us wake up beyond a certain point.
• In hindsight historians will be able to de-construct the process, but we may be in it and unable to do so.
• Let ma also add that we will be surprised how quickly people will accommodate themselves to that new reality.
• A South African poll in 1986 suggested that 97% of whites opposed one-man-one-vote. Less than a decade later whites voted in such an election.
• I would add that the critical questions are the Palestinian commitment to the two-state model and the emergence of an effective leadership that can articulate an alternative vision that will assuage the Israeli public.
• The strongest asset that the two-state outcome has at present – and there are many – is the Palestinian leadership which clings to it.

Settlements:

• The critical question we return to over time is whether there is a point of no-return beyond which it becomes impossible to unscramble the egg.
• There is a famous debate between Lustick and Meron Benvenisti – and I will quickly simplify the positions.
• For Meron the argument was that facts on the ground set the parameters and destroy the two-state outcome.
• For Lustick was "facts in the minds." Did Israelis consider Netzarim to be the same as Tel Aviv? If so it was unlikely that they could disengage.
• Lustick – as Sharon has confirmed - was right.
• But Meron was correct, in a more fundamental way.
• Most Israelis would agree that we can role back the settlement effort, but as it expands we will be less able to go back to the starting point.
• The settlers have won in that they have altered future borders. Hence the settlements have undermined the prospects for a viable Palestinian state.
• They make the failure of partition more likely and they ensconce a bi-national reality.
• They also affect Palestinian support for partition. Certainly, when coupled with the fence, they would seem to undermine the logic of, and support for, partition.
• David Kimche in my opinion perfectly defined the point of no return in regard to the settlements – as the point where Palestinians weigh up the cost and benefits of the two state solution and decide that it is no longer in their interest.
• It also does so internationally and I will come back to this point later.

The fence:

• Most Israelis dismiss the Palestinian claims made in regard to the fence.
• They retort that it makes partition more likely (psychologically it isolates settlements to the east, it limits terror and will over time move to the green line).
• These are all ambitious assumptions.
• The fence could increase terror and the gap between the fence and the green line will again determine the viability of that entity.
• There is an Israeli assumption that we can convert the conflict into one over borders.
• It can only hold if Israeli leaves 80% of the OT's and seizes the high ground (as Olmert argues for). I cannot see the current government agreeing to this.
• The fence and the settlements serve to convince ordinary Palestinians and the international community that Israel wants a Bantustan outcome.
• In my view this will over time backfire and encourage people to support bi-nationalism (for reasons I will expand on).
• The fence (and settlements) reflects a growing Israeli tendency towards dangerous unilateralism, which I will return to.
• I want to add that Jordan in 1988 and 1994 sealed Israel 's fate.
• Israeli assumptions that it can embellish its territorial gains can only work in a Jordan is Palestine outcome.
• The fixed nature of international borders precludes an option in which Israeli gains are offset by Jordan annexing the remainder – picking up the bill as it were.
• In 50 years time this will be regarded as the seminal event – which coupled with the fence and settlement expansion dealt a fatal blow to Israel 's version of the two-state outcome.

Demography:

• Demographic trends (which favor the Palestinians) are a double edged sword.
• On the one hand, they would seem to force Israelis to make concessions.
• Israelis are certainly pre-occupied with the issues and the left and driven this hobby horse very hard.
• They understand that time is no longer on their side.
• Yossi Beilin has even gone as far as arguing that once there is no border and there is a Palestinian majority it is to late.
• I dispute this and believe that Israel can (with increasingly difficulty) impose a border.
• Whether that border holds and is deemed legitimate is a key issue.
• Sharon 's Gaza proposed withdrawal was a brilliant master-stroke in this regard. He could undermine the demographic debate inside of Israel .
• On the other hand, demographic concerns could also encourage extreme solutions – transfer and Apartheid.
• Israel is a survivalist project and it may well be that it will explore these two options after separation and long before bi-nationalism.
• The real question is what the impact of demographic trends will be on Palestinian dynamics.
• Will trends that favor the Palestinian cause them to reconsider the separation model?
• My sense is yes, and I think that Israelis underestimate the wider impact of demography.
  

Palestinian dynamics:

• This is not my forte so I am hesitant to comment here.
• In time, I believe that ordinary Palestinians will increasingly reconsider separation.
• I am not sure how long political elites can pooh-pooh Ali Jerbawi's arguments.
• As an outsider I have sense that his argument is picking up momentum – a little big like a storm and I am not sure how far away it is from reaching critical mass.
• At present the Fatah leadership seems solidly behind the two-state outcome. At least as far as the most-favored Israeli interlocutors is concerned.
• The personal and political interests (as Meron and Yossi Alpher ) have argued will probably continue keep them focused on the two-state game.
• Israeli unilateralism and the lack of the PA's domestic legitimacy – could however change this.
• As I have already argued - in Current History – Israeli efforts to impose a deal of its making may make demography and the demand for voting rights a valuable Palestinian resource.
• This thus brings us on to the critical question of Israeli unilateralism.

Unilateral actions and the legitimacy of separation:

• For a whole host of reasons, the Israeli strategic approach has become about imposing its version of the end game, unilaterally.
• Israel could succeed – certainly with a Bush Administration and the international community driven by the fear of Islamic terror and fed up with the conflict.
• Sharon has effectively lowered expectations and could impose his end game on a fatigued Palestinian and international community.
• There are two critical dangers for Israel in the unilateral path.
• One is that he will de-facto create a single (bi-) national reality by creating a Bantustan .
• What were the Bantustans ? White imposed states designed to square the South Africa demographic circle.
• In order for a Bantustan not be a Bantustan , it requires the consent of the residents.
• This is Israel 's inescapable conundrum and the folly of unilateralism.
• The support of certain warlords will not suffice over time.
• Without such consent the Israeli diktat will be in grave trouble and will come back to haunt it over time.
• Moreover, Israel is actively discrediting the notion of separation.
• The fence, the closures, the settlements, the map of control, the unilateral actions, Israeli notions of a de-militarized state, all feel like a Bantustan.
• In dong so Israel abets those who claims that separation is like Apartheid (there are important differences and I am averse to using the unhelpful and inappropriate parallel).
• In parallel, there is a process whereby people increasingly question the desirability and legitimacy of a Jewish State.
• We can ascribe this to anti-Semitism or time (young people are not really aware of the unique circumstances that made the project possible), but this variable will increasingly come into play.
• International legitimacy is a vital resource in conflicts.
• It was – in my opinion – the loss of external and internal legitimacy that forced Pretoria to make concessions.
• Israel seemingly has the support from the American political elites and, therefore, has nothing to worry about.
• But it cannot take this support for granted and could loose civil society.
• The second pitfall of unilateralism is that it could trigger a dynamic in which the Palestinian leadership is pushed to embrace bi-nationalism.
• The initial statements ( Abu Ala – Arafat to the Guardian) will be tactical alone – to scare the Israeli and the international community.
• Tactics could become strategy - the more statements are made the harder it is to back down.
• It is worth remembering that the PLO's commitment to this outcome is not that long-standing and was, at the time, a product of circumstances (the balance of power).
• Circumstances in our dynamic reality are changing.
  

Is there a bi-national alternative?

• Theoretically these processes can be reversed.
• This is the essence of Lutick's model.
• But I do not see the Israeli, Palestinian or international ( US ) leadership that can alter these bigger trends.
• Over time the legitimacy, basis and support for separation is being eroded.
• We seem to forget that the two-state idea is not a deep rooted one.
• It only become salient after 1988 and by 2008 it could be unattainable.
• 20 years is not a long time in history or in ethnic conflicts.
• In the absence a break in the stalemate and progress to a two-state outcome, I foresee a move from land-sharing to power-sharing (in the long term). It could even be a hybrid that blends land and power-sharing arrangements.
• This bi-national (by which I refer to power-sharing) could approximate consociation models.
• I am well aware of all the arguments against this model – but thy are no less damming that the arguments against other outcomes.
• There is obviously limited support for this idea in Israel .
• People in Israel are, in fact, appalled by the idea and find it laughable.
• In the same way they once found the two-state idea laughable.
• We will not get there because Meron set up a party and people voted for it.
• We will get there by default.
• There is an increasing recognition in smaller circles (young Israeli liberals) that a bi-national outcome is on the cards.
• I think that it is not unlikely that we will find ourselves in a bi-national reality and that once we are there people will assess and re-assess their positions.
• The real question we need to address is whether time will wait for the two-state solution.
• As the hegemonic power only Israel can save itself.
• Let me also add that even if we were to sign Geneva and create a viable two-state outcome, Israel will at some point in time have to accommodate the Arab community.
• I do not foresee a scenario in which Israel imposes demographic borders.
• The bi-national issue will not disappear and will, I suspect, provide for many more roundtables, perhaps in Nazareth .

Discussion

Several points were raised during the discussion following Dr Sussman’s presentation. These can be summarized as follows.

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