Dialogue Program 2002 Home
Home > Dialogue Program >

24 July 2002

PASSIA ROUND TABLE

THE LAND QUESTION after 1948

Dr. Michal Oren

Speaker: Dr. Michal Oren, Historical Geographer
Dr. Michal Oren

The State of Israel emerged through a process of 'nation building'. Among the structural foundations of this process, lies the concept of 'formation of territory' that serves a double function: 1) strengthening the inner identity of the nation; and 2) securing external recognition. Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, this process was initiated by the Jewish nation through the purchase of lands from the Palestinian-Arab nation, and then, the 1948 war. With the declaration of the State of Israel, the 'formation of territory' by the Jewish nation was secured through sovereignty and ownership of the land.

When the State of Israel was declared, there were two primary national groups, the Jewish nation which was the majority and the Arab nation which was the minority. As the majority group within the State of Israel, the Jewish nation dictated its beliefs, principles, culture and laws to the Arab nation and was able to maintain policies of non-equal allocations of land as well as other natural resources. The justification for all of this was the concept of 'historical truth' claimed by the Jewish nation and supported by political, financial, cultural and even academic tools.

It is typical in any country for the ruling party to insist that the 'individual' forego certain rights in the interest of the 'general public.' However, in the State of Israel where there exists a national conflict beween the majority and minority gorups, the minorities interpret acts for the interest of the 'general public' as a calculated way of dispossessing them further from their land. In the State of Israel, as in other bi-national or multi-national countries, the athorities indeed preferred the interests of the majority nation, in this case the Jewish people, and while using the term 'national project' they did not mean the 'public need' or the interests of all citizens. Rather, the term 'national project' related solely to 'Jewish needs.' Thus, in the case of the State of Israel, the term 'national' carries a double meaning: 'general public' and 'Jewish nation.'

In recognition of this duality, I have developed two distinct measuring rods to classify the land policies of the State of Israel after 1948: 'Land Policy of State,' and , 'Land Policy of Nation.' The confusion and blur between these two concepts and their implementation to achieve specific agendas can be seen in their application as described in the following examples.

STATE LANDS
No one disagrees with the fact that it is the interest of any country to save and guard its land - its most precious resource. Public land is used for both social and economic development. Therefore, State authorities have a keen interest in acquiring additional property and retain the power to activate a long list of measures enabling them to take possession of private land, including the use of expropriation with or without compensation. These measures belong under the category of 'State Land Policy' through which the 'individual' is required to give up his individual rights for the 'good of the society.'

Today, in the State of Israel, 93% of the 20 million dunam comprising the country are public. This is an extraordinary rate, unequaled except in the former Soviet states.

In the State of Israel, the land is divided as follows:

  • 3.5% is owned by private individual Arabs.
  • 3.5% is owned by private individual Jews.
  • Some 12% is Jewish National Fund land, which it acquired prior to and after the establishment of the State. About 7% of this were abandoned Arab lands, that were acquired from the Development Authority.
  • Some 12% is what was remained from Arab abandoned land and wasn't sold to the Jewish National Fund, but left in the ownership of the Development Authority.
  • And some 69% is State land that it received as a legacy from the Ottoman Empire and from the British Mandatory government, most of this land is non-cultivable lands like deserts, wadies, seashores, former Mewat lands or Metruka etc.


The Land Registry
Immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel, the Government launched an extensive operation of identifying State land, listing them, registering them and evicting 'invaders.' The British Government had initiated this project in 1928, importing the 'Thorens method' from Australia. However, they only completed 20% of the territories in Palestine during the British Mandate. In the eyes of the British, this operation, which I have classified under the 'Land Policy of State,' was an appropriate management activity. The British were not biased towards any particular side. Their goal was to prepare a land inventory for the eventual use of a future state. This explains why they were neither in a hurry, nor insistent that every single dunam be accounted for.

This was not the case with the State of Israel. From 1948 onward, the State of Israel used the same method, but turned this registration into a national goal: caching as much State land as possible that had been cultivated by Arab 'invaders.' This land was essential for establishing new Jewish settlements. As a result, there was a constant battle in the vicinity of the Arab villages and the process of identifying State land became a source of ceaseless conflict.

The State of Israel refused to ignore or waive even small, scattered pieces of land in the middle of dense Arab populations. There were thousands of trials over tiny parcels. Essentially, this was a race against 'Article 78 of the Land Law of 1858' that stated that after a 10 year period of cultivation, the land became 'private.' The Arabs brought aerial photographs and documents to the court trials as proof to substantiate their claim of having cultivated and paid taxes over a 10-year period. Furthermore, the Arabs worked enthusiastically to cultivate additional land before the land officers arrived to the villages. Although the Arabs were able to win many of the cases that were brought to court, the State of Israel gained hundreds of thousands of dunam.

In 1958, before this registration was completed, the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) enacted a new law that extended the required period of cultivation from 10 years to 15 years, and in actuality 20 years. This is how the seemingly innocent will of a country, as in all countries, to protect its lands from 'invaders,' became a 'national' war in which the State of Israel converted the 'Land Policy of State' into a 'Land Policy of Nation.'

Much of that we should ascribe to the fact that there almost weren't Jewish 'invaders' at that time. The Jews were dedicated to the Zionist idea of concentrating lands in the hands of the Jewish Government and that only she could develop the country and maintain the territorial boundaries for the Jewish state's safety and security, and for this reason, every piece of land was essential. And, this is why the Arabs rejected the plan and rallied to prevent it.

Expropriation for 'Public Good'
Another way of achieving State Land that belongs to the category of 'Land Policy of State' is the law of expropriation for public need. Again, this law exists in all countries. The British, during the Mandate period, had enacted such an order in 1943. Although it is always difficult to persuade people to relinquish their private property for the public good, it was seven times harder to persuade the Arab population who interpreted this as a 'Land Policy of Nation' and was in disagreement with the cultural bias of the regime.

A clear example is the case of 2,000 dunam that were expropriated in 1961 from Arabs living in Sachnin and Arabe for the 'national project' of a water conduit. The Arabs claimed that every time that the conduit ran through Jewish-owned land, the engineers found technical reasons why they should dig a tunnel under ground, while on Arab-owned land, the conduit always stayed open requiring the Arab landowners to forfeit property and/or having their land divided into unmanageable pieces. The Government of the State of Israel claimed that the water conduit was to benefit all citizens. However, being singled out to bear the cost of this 'national project' and seeing the ownership of Arab land diminish, it was difficult for the Arabs to accept the Government's explanation.

It was even more difficult for the Arabs to grasp the expropriation of 1,200 dunam for the establishment of the city of Upper Nazareth, or 5,500 dunam for the city of Carmiel, since this land was taken not for the use of all citizens but for one sector exclusively - the Jewish one.

In cases involving land expropriation, the law does not require reasons beyond the claim 'that the Minister of Finance demanded it.' Here again, we can see that the blur between 'National' and 'Public' is outstanding.

The State of Israel used a technique of expropriating land en masse without using them immediately. Rather than locating owners that would have required a long and exhausting process, the State of Israel created a pattern of expropriating large quantities of land without using them immediately. The implication was that it would be up to each individual Arab landowner to protest by filing a law suit against the Government. Yosef Weitz of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) described this strategy in his diary:

"We explored the Upper Galilee lands that the State is claiming as her property. Later those lands will be used as settlements for new immigrants and in that way we shall Judaizise a little bit of these enclaves, in the surroundings of Sachnin and Arabe… [Some of the lands], the Arabs claim they are theirs, and the State has proof that they are hers. Other parcels that the Arabs demand and cultivate, the State doesn't have counter proof. The Jurist officers… demand undoubted proof from our side. In case of any doubt, they will tend to the Arab side. I checked a parcel of 10,000 dunams in Sachnin, where there are all those kinds of juristic situations. I came to the conclusion that if the judges accept my claims there wouldn't be enough room for a settlement of 100 families… not to mention the case of losing the case if the judges accept the Arab claim…"

Thus, with the goal to populate the Galilee with Jews, Yosef Weitz decided at this point to implement a new procedure: first expropriating many parcels of land, using the law of expropriating for the need of the public. Then placing the responsibility on the Arabs to prove their ownership. However even if they proved it, they would only be entitled to compensation - in other land, or mone.

It should be mentioned that the State of Israel's first recourse was usually not expropriation. The official guideland in these affairs was to first try to buy the land through negotiation, and only when the Government was unable to succeed, was the use of the 'law of expropriation for public good' exercized. This was because the cost of compensation incurred by expropriation for 'the public good' was so high that the Government needed to be cautious.

Bedouin Land in the Negev
Another case involving State Land is the property of the Bedouin in the Negev:

Prior to 1948 there was almost no land registration in the Negev. According to Ottoman law, 'right of possession' was only approved for cultivated land, again according to the aforementioned 'Article 78.' During the Mandate period, the British continued the status-quo and recognized the Bedouin's right of possession of 2 million dunam out of a total of 12.5 million dunum in the Negev. It is important to note that during the Mandate period, whenever Bedouin sold land to Jews, the British recognized the transaction as real ownership and gave it legal validity.

After 1948, only 25% of the Bedouin of the Negev remained within the borders of the State of Israel. They were relocated by the authorities to the dry northern Beersheva region where the Government leased 'bad' land to them, tax free and at a low price. The land leased to them was in small parcels and carried an annual contract. This was done to prevent the Beduoin from being able to make a claim according to the aforementioned 'Article 78.'

Many Bedouin did not agree to this plan. They refused to accept 'abandoned land' that belonged to other Bedouin. They continuously asked for their land to be registered in their names. Their arguments were historic - the Ottoman and the British had recognized their rights and culture in respect to the land - Bedouin looked at the whole Negev as their 'Dira.'

The Government refused to accept these arguments, claiming that she was improving the conditions of the Bedouin in comparison to their former nomadic way of life. This argument was good only for softening any guilt feelings on the side of the Jews. Ultimately, 700,000 cultivated dunams claimed by the Bedouin, who had remained within the borders of the State of Israel, were given to new Jewish settlements.

Due to an objection raised by Emil Habibi, a member of the Knesset, the 'Beduin Land Affair,' did not pass quietly. In response to the uproar, the Government appointed a committee to discuss the matter. This committee pointed out that the State of Israel could not ignore the historic evidence, provided by the Bedouin, that proved that during the Mandate period the JNF actually purchased land from the Bedouin which thereby secured recognition of their rights to land.

Ultimately, the committee recommended that cultivation for 10 years would establish claim of ownership, and that this should be proved through tax documents or Tabu registers. However, in most cases, this proof was not available since the records were in Gaza under the jurisdiction of Egypt and therefore not accessible. Furthermore, when the Bedouin were moved to the Beersheva district, all the old marking signs in the original fields were destroyed by the new Jewish settlements. The Bedouin were only able to offer proof for the land in their new location near Beersheva, where they did possess the required documents and evidence from before 1948. And, in these cases, the Government had to recognize the Bedouin claims and register their ownership.

LAND POLICY OF NATION
Following are some clear examples of 'Land Policy of Nation:'

Abandoned Properites
The State of Israel's victory in the 1948 war presented an opportunity for a very significant expansion of land. This expansion was based on some 4 million dunam of 'abandoned land' - land belonging to Arabs who were evacuated from their homes during the crisis and were unable to return. Most of this land was cultivated. This land was placed under the auspices of the 'Custodian for Abandoned Property'. The idea to allocate this land for new Jewish settlements, in order to accommodate the thousands of immigrants that were arriving to the country. The Government conferred this land to a fictive external non-governmental body called the 'Development Authority,' who served as a legal cover for the exploitation of this land. Besides, the Government initially intended to sell all 4 million dunam to the JNF. However, the JNF only had funds to purchase 1.3 million dunams. The remainder were left in the hands of the 'Development Authority'. The money of any sale from this land to the JNF was to be held for future compensation to refugees. The excuse of this maneuver was that only the JNF could collect contributions from the Jewish Diaspora for future compensation.

Present Absentee Properties
Included among the abandoned properties from the 1948 War, were those properties of 'present absentees' (Arabs who were evacuated from their homes during and after the war but remained within the borders of the State of Israel, for example the villagers of Ikrit and Biram.) These 'internal refugees,' estimated at approximately 20,000 people, found themselves living in very bad conditions at the edge of cities and villages. Their aspirations to return to their land and homes were considered by the authorities as a security problem, especially those that were located either near the border or close to Jewish settlements.

In 1951, the Government announced a 're-settlement program' for these 'internal refugees,' but certainly not to their places of origin. According to the program, each family would be given a plot, a house and some money. The first to be 're-settled' were the refugees from Safuria. They were 're-settled' in Eilut and Daburia where they received the lands of 'absentee owners.' The actual land belonging to the 'internal refugees' from Safuria was given to kibbutzim.

In 1953, the emergency regulations under which enabled the 'capture' of the 'absentee land' were about to expire. The Government realized that this would open the gateway to many law suits. Thus a new law was quickly enacted that offered compensation in money or land.

Driving this new law was the Government's fear of these law suits and their desire to avoid the confrontation. However, underlying this reasoning was also a critical interest to create facts - final confirmation that these lands that had been 'captured' now belonged to the Government and could be transferred to new Jewish settlements.

Another aim of this legal maneuver was to send a strong message to the 'internal refugees' that there would be no chance to return to their original villages. The 'Custodian of Abandoned Property' declared in 1953: "It's a dangerous illusion to think there is any property that is available to the refugees. Everything is already exploited and they have no place to return to."

The 'Law of Compensation'
For the first time, an intense protest to a land law erupted in many sectors throughout the country. The Arab members in the Knesset organized public assemblies, claiming that the law was meant only to legitimize stealing hundreds of thousands of dunam from thousands of felahin (farmers) and converting these felahin to proletariat.

Mapam, the Socialist Left Wing opposition party, tried to oppose the law. However, the Minister of Finance reminded Mapam that the expropriation of these properties and their transfer to the Jewish settlements had been initiated by the Minister of Agriculture, a member of Mapam, right after the war while Mapam was still in the coalition.

It is also facsinating to view how the Herut party (currently known as the Likud) opposed the 'Law of Compensation.' Herut argued that the properties should be given back to the 'absentee landowners.' It also argued that the Government was using the issue of security as an excuse and through this was inflicting an injustice on the Arab population. The Government that was based on the Labor party responded that the Herut attack was 'sour grapes' because they had received almost nothing from the 'abandoned land' for their settlements during the 'big loot' distribution in 1948.

Obviously, the supporters of this law were the members of the kibbutzim and moshavim. Putting their humanitarian concerns and moral values aside, they were afraid for their own future, which was based on the 'absentee land' that had been allocated to them. They were desperate to insure their legal status, even if compensation in money or land had to be paid to these Arabs.

Once the law was accepted, it was very difficult for the Government to find available land to use as compensation. All the best property had already been distributed, and for security reasons, land in dense Arab populations couldn't be used as compensation.

Eventually, the Government found small parcels of lands inside villages, in the Negev and in 'bad' land that non of the Jewish settlements had agreed to accept. When there was absolutely no other possibility, the Government used land that was being handled temporarily by Jewish settlements, although those lands had been intended for transfer to new Jewish settlements.

In reviewing the tough negotiations with the Jewish settlements that had to relinquish their land we can learn a lot about the spirit in that sector and their attitude towards the 'absentees.' To prevent the transferring of lands to Arabs in the future, they demanded that all the lands be transferred to the JNF. They claimed that the Jews were also refugees. That they were the refugees of the gas chambers of the Holocaust, and the minimum that they received was tiny flats and plots, in the new towns. That these Jewish refugees also had to become proletarians and live in bad conditions. Another argument that was made by the Jewish settlements was that the Jewish nation did not have any other territory, while the Arabs had many lands in Iraq and Syria.

In general, the representatives of the Jewish settlements could not understand why there was an identification with the 'Arab pain' and not with the 'Jewish pain.' They counter-offered to expropriate land from the big Arab landowners (like those who had 110 dunam each, in Yafia, near Nazareth) and redistribute them among the refugees.

The Arab Refusal
The compensation process was inefficient and indolent. There were not enough people to handle the task of negotiating. There was a lack of money for compensation. The land was not easy to identify. The Tabu books were difficult to locate. Above all this, there was a tremendous fear for security that generated much hostility.

At the same time, the Arabs were not in a rush. There are a number of reasons to explain this. The Arabs hesitated to cooperate with the authorities; they still hoped that their own properties would be returned; they were afraid that the 'refugee absentee landowner' owning the land would return and discover that they had taken over their property; and they refused to accept the low prices that were being offered to them.

As to the Christians, the government was willing to give foreign money to those who agreed to immigrate.

There were also bureaucratic difficulties - trials, lawyers, etc. There were some Arabs who refused to settle their claims before there was an agreement between the State of Israel and the Arab countries. Others were already settled in new places and the question was not as urgent for them. Others waited for the compensation fees to be increased.

Also, we must not forget the strong influence that MAKI, the communist party, had on the Arabs. MAKI, along with the Arab countries employed a massive propaganda campaign that made the Arabs fearful of becoming involved with the State of Israel.

The End of the 'Law of Compensation'
On the eve of the 1958 elections, the Government initatiated yet another program which brought an end to the 'Law of Compensation.' Again, it offered rehabilitation based on houses and farms to 20,000 Arabs, but this time in better condition than in 1953. The Government appointed public committees composed of a majority of Arab members to make recommendations for a 'scale of compensation.'

The inhabitants of Safurie were the first to receive such exchangeable land - 200 dunam of buildings near Nazareth, where they still live in a neighborhood called Safafre. By the end of 1958, there were more than 280 apartments being built, and there was a plan for 300 additional apartments for the following year. This program did not solve the entire problem. There were still Arabs who were adamant in their refusal.

In 1961, the Government initiated another program that improved the terms for those who hurry up in suing. At this point, we see a change in response as the younger generation began steppping up and pushing the older generation to compromise. By 1970, one half of the compensations, that the absentees were eligible to, were distributed: 45,000 dunam in addition to money. In the end, the State of Israel eventually acquired ¼ million dunam and even more from the 'present absentee' properties.

The Awkaf Properties as 'Abandoned Properties'
Another category of the 'National Land Policy' is the religious properties belonging to the Awkaf that, in the eyes of the law in the State of Israel, were seen as 'abandoned property.' This involved between 50,000 and 65,000 dunam. The State of Israel argued that she was the inheritor of the British High Commissioner and therefore the legitimate beneficiary of the fruits of these properties. The Arabs demanded the properties back, or at least the rent. This income was crucial in light of the poor condition that the Arab population was living in.

After riots broke out around this issue, the Government called for a Cabinet discussion. Most of the ministers opposed the policy and said that the State of Israel should return these properties, or at least their 'fruits.' One minister pointed out that if this sort of thing had been done to Jews, there would be an enormous outcry from around the world.

The Government's opposition, the rightest Herut party, demanded that all Awkaf lands be expropriated because the Metuals, who headed the Wakf Institute, used the money to fight the Jews during the war. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion claimed that the Metuals forfeited their right of ownership because during the war they left their religious duties, and that the war was forced on the Jews. Ben Gurion also argued that now that the State of Israel supplies religious and social services, there was no longer a need for the Wakf. And on the contrary, he also argued that the Arabs should learn to pay for these services and not to get them free from the Wakf.

Finally, in 1954, the Government reached a compromise: some of the income would be dedicated to religious and social goals including hospitals, orphanages, schools, etc. However, in reality, after 10 years, the income was estimated as dozens of million lira, while the Moslem religious and social programs only received 1.5 million. This sum was hardly even enough to repair mosques and install fences around cemeteries.

In 1958, under pressure from the Arab members of the Knesset and distinguished Moslems, the Government decided to take a 'first step.' They released the urban Wakf properties. However, only in 1965 was a law for the Awkaf properties legislated. Arab trustee committees, headed by Suheil Shukeiri of Haifa, were appointed. But, the majority of the rural Awkaf properties had already been sold to the Development Authority and to the JNF. And thus, in spite of the good will of the Government towards the Arab population, Binyamin Gur-Arie, the consultant for Arab issues between 1978-1984, summarized the Government policy as "over diligence" in keeping with the interests of the State of Israel. Gur-Arie criticized the Government for not attending to the spirit of the law, means, the Arab interest, or human rights.


The 'Land Concentration Law'
The final example in this lecture is essentially different because of the reactions which accompanied it. We are talking about the 'Land Concentration Law' which fundamentally belongs under the category of 'Land Policy of State.' However, we shall see that the policies belonging to this law were also converted to a 'National Land Policy.'

After the 1948 War, in the Arab regions there existed more than 250,000 dunam that were split between the Government and individual Arab ownership into long and narrow plots. Because of the random distribution of these parcels between the Government and individual Arabs it was difficult to use the land effectively.

The Government was interested in this land for the establishment of new Jewish settlements, and she tried, with the assistance of the JNF, to persuade the Arab owners to exchange land with her. The agreements offered the inhabitants better land, closer to the villages, and sometimes even bigger in size. In this way, the Government during the 1950s was able to secure 100,000 dunam of 'concentrated' land, while at the same time appearing to be acting in the interests of the Arab landowners. To secure these arrangements, and prevent potential opposition from the Arab sector, the Government tried to enact the 'Land Concentration Law.' However, for the first time, Arab opposition was strong enough to prevent the passing of this legislation.

At the end of 1960, the 'Land Concentration Law' was presented to the Knesset by the then Minister of Agriculture, Moshe Dayan. During the presentation Dayan included an announcement that, through this legislation, the Government was going to establish approximately 40 new Jewish Settlements. The Arab members of the Knesset were furious and they aggressively vocalized their reactions that were echoed by a storm of demonstrations in the Arab street, many of which were exploited by the Communist party.

Although the Government made a great effort to present this law as a way to improve the 'Arab condition,' it was interpeted by the Arab population as yet another discriminatory legislation that enabled the Government to dissociate them of their rights to own their lands. The ensuing outcry against this law highlighted their distrust of the 'State Land Policy,' their fear of receiving small, bad, mountainous and distant plots, or absentee lands. Furthermore, the Arabs argued that if the Government really was trying to show 'favor' to the Arab population, they should have been first addressing the condition of the roads, lack of electricity, insufficient and unhealthy water systems, and the poor quality of education in the villages. The concensus in the Arab community and their supporters was that the Government was implementing a law which was supposed to appear favorable to the Arabs, but was just another strategy for the 'Judaization' of Arab regions.

Moshe Dayan tried to save the law by explaining that his announcement of the 40 Jewish settlements was a misunderstanding. However, by then the Arabs were beyond listening. After lenghthy discussions in the Knesset as well as other forums, the 'Land Concentration Law' was dropped.

This was the first time that Arab claims and arguments were heard in the Knesset and they were successful in blocking legislation of a land law. And thus, the advantages of the law, that is characteristic to a regular State land policy like in every other country with split up lands, fell under a heavy national conflict.

The JNF and the State of Israel continued exchanging land with the Arabs, sometimes through persuasion and other times by pressure. For example, Yosef Weitz of the JNF described how in in 1958 the JNF forced the villagers of Kaukab, against their will, to exchange their land in Sahel Batouf. The JNF erected guard stations in the middle of its own parcels of land that were scattered among Arab private land. The JNF cultivated its land and physically demonstrated no intention to relinquish these small islands of parcels wedged inbetween Arab owned property. In this way the JNF was able to 'persuade' the Arabs that they would never be able to possess these lands and for 'their own sake,' it was worthwile to exchange land.


CONCLUSION
In this lecture, I attempted to identify 'State Land Policy' activities characteristic to many countries without national conflicts. In the State of israel, these activities, aimed to achieve development and improvement, were vital first steps in view of the critical needs she was facing. On the other hand, we can also clearly see land policy activities reflecting a 'National Land Policy' which the State of Israel enforced, with the aid of the JNF, in order to acquire as much Arab land as she could as part of the 'national mission,' and the 'national territorial struggle'. These activities were often camouflaged by pseudo-public excuses. But in these cases, the real intention of the term 'public' was the 'Jewish Nation.' And, the justification for this was the historical rights of the Jewish People, the Jewish blood that was spilt in war over the land, the ever-present security threat to Jewish populations as well as the State of Israel, and the fact that Israel did offer compensation.

The 'National Land Policy' is not unique to the State of Israel. Many countries use their land policies to discriminate and dissociate minorities and/or indigenous peoples. In Israel, as in other countries, uprising did occur. In the State of Israel, we can see that over the years there appeared to be a softenng in the stiffness of these types of rules and laws, as well as more of a sense of understanding. However, this was the result of the pragmatic will of the authorities to prevent uprisings, for the safety of the country.

To conclude, we cannot argue that all land policies in the State of Israel emerged from national interests. However, this lecture has demonstrated that in the majority of the cases, this was the impetus. Similar situations that are normally handled by other countries in a civil manner - serving social, economic and/or political goals were dealt according to a 'national land policy.' Historically, the implementation of 'National Land Policy' - policy based on one national interest, is characteristic of bi and multi-national countries where the conflict on territory serves as 'nation builder tools.' One should hope that this model of ethnic democracy will be replaced by model that embody compromise and cooperation.

[ Return to top ]

PASSIA
The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem

Tel: +972-2-6264426 / 6286566 • Fax: +972-2-6282819
P.O.  Box 19545,  Jerusalem
Email: passia@palnet.com
Copyright © PASSIA