| Dialogue Program 2001 | ![]() |
PASSIA Forum
25 January 2001, Ambassador
Hotel, Jerusalem
The Future of the Peace Process
[
See Photos]
| The Israeli
parliament decided the early election in Israel was to be held without parliamentary
election. I suggest we do not go too far in our interpretations as to why
and rather take such things at their very superficial level - meaning, simply,
that Israeli Knesset members did not want to go home; that's all.
It is a very, very simple and, I think, a logical explanation. Israeli Knesset members - Israeli politicians - did not want to go home early, they wanted to stay in the same parliament. They don't want to go through primaries in their parties again and to encounter any risk. That's why we now witness elections only for the Prime Minister. Of course, whether or not the Knesset will hold out like this or can be sustained through the future, I don't know - it depends on many factors. For the time being though, we will have this Knesset the way it is, with a new prime minister. The System
One could look back now and explain these coalitions, these shifting, changing coalitions that slid through the changing social structure of the country and the changes accompanied them. Changes that happened in the religious parties and the effects of 'Zionizing' these religious parties; the shift to the right that happened in all the religious parties - including the orthodox "un-Zionist" party. The fact is that Israel has always been ruled by a coalition and that, with time, the coalitions became more and more complicated and more and more sophisticated. A peak in Israeli political science and history, which can be seen as a period of Zionist transition, came about in 1991 with what the Israelis refer to in slang as, the "rotten trick" Peres played against the national unity government in order to force new elections and to dissolve the government led by Shamir. Since that time there began attempts to develop a new system of voting in Israel. This led to arranging the vote for Prime Minister in such a way as to ensure that the prime minister would not become 'subordinated' to any "coincidental majority" in the parliament that might change their directives - to this end a bill was passed requiring that achieving a no-confidence vote be a matter of gaining the votes of 61 Knesset members and not just any majority of the people who might attend a particular session of parliament. Through these voting systems and this new system of elections, the Prime Minister, of course, gained more authority compared with those in the past and compared to the power held by the parliament itself. The most important characteristic of these types of election though, is the fact that they were actually calculated to strengthen the big parties through direct elections for prime minister because, naturally, only the big parties would be able to run for prime minister. Giving this independence from the parliament to the Prime Minister was aimed at strengthening the big parties and minimizing the blackmailing power of the smaller and medium size parties. What happened is exactly the opposite. Social and anthropological factors were not calculated. Political scientists and lawyers usually fail to do this and this whole system was suggested by lawyers - constitutional lawyers. They did not consider anthropology, sociology or history nothing was calculated deeply. Suddenly the individual and his identity decided everything; the Israeli individual entering the ballots to vote started calculating according to two identities: one being a political stand in terms of the big camps of Israel, concerning the peace issue for example. The calculation he did with the second gave him a possibility to express another sphere, another dimension of his individuality or of his sociality or whatever - another dimension of himself; his political opinion on the one side and his identity on the other. This time his identity was seen as belonging to a sector or a compartmental component of Israeli society. Thus, more and more Moroccans voted for Shas and Shas became, after this change, a representative of the Moroccans in Israeli society. More and more votes went to the Russian Immigrants' party and it, in turn, became a representative of Russians. More and more traditional people voted for religious parties and religious parties became the representatives not only of orthodox religious people but also of many traditional people in general; conservative people in general. More and more people voted for Arab parties and Arab parties ceased being ideological parties (as they had been in the past) but rather became representatives of Arab society. Something totally new happened which radically changed the ways in which Israelis expressed themselves in the parliament. The parliament became not a place of representation for different political programs and ideas, but of different identities - a very interesting phenomenon indeed. The Politics of Identity
In Israel this is usually referred to as the "politics of sectors". It should be remembered that different sectors of Israeli society, including some old Zionists, never shared this dream at all - they dreamt about the "melting pot" and "one republic", the "Zionist state", "one Israeli Jewish identity" etc. - they called this new 'illness' 'Angina Sectoris". Anyway what has happened to Israeli society now is something which many politicians think cannot be permanent; it has to be changed fast - otherwise Israel will carry on marching toward the presidential system - as would be liked by such super-radical politicians as Leiberman, who represents the real radical right. His is a breed of the Russian radical right, in fact; this kind of 'rightism' is not really an Israeli phenomenon at all. He represents an imitation of the Russian right, even with the name [of his party] "Israel our home" which is similar to "Russia our home" and there is a party like that in Russia. This 'presidential' thinking leans toward the belief that all Israel really needs is a "strong-man"; Netanyahu, Sharon etc., and that Israel should go to the presidential system as the first phase of allowing such a strong-man to unite Israel society. These kinds of thinkers, if we can call them that, are very dangerous people. Others think that Israel should go back to the old system and, if my guess is right, this election now [Feb 2001] will be the last held through this system. It has become very hard to go back to the old system because the new system bred so many of the people who have genuine interests in its maintenance - because if the Moroccans have more representatives now, the Arabs have more representatives, the Russians have more representatives, what they are hoping and planning for is to have even more representatives next time and if you change that system back to the old kind of unified vote for both the Prime Minister and the parliament, what you will see is far fewer representatives of sectors and many more representatives of real ideological political parties. So it will be a problem but I think the survival instinct of Israel society will win and that they will change the system. That's what I believe and I will support changing the system although many people would expect me as an Arab not to because this would mean that we will have less representatives as Arabs. Well, in response to this, I don't think only about numbers, about how many representatives we have, but also about how effective they are. I think that not all Arab parties are ideological parties, I think the Arab citizens' tendency to vote for Arab parties is not only because of this election law; I think it is genuine and I think that people who vote for Arab parties now will not go back to vote for Zionist parties if there are changes to the system. I am pretty sure of this. I think changing the system back will not change the fact that Arabs will vote for Arabs. In the case of the Arab parties there is a genuine process that is happening - a national process that's taking place among the Arabs. The Prime Ministerial Election
Enabling him to run was against their interests so they made it impossible for him to do so, while ensuring that the old parliament stayed like it is, forcing him to refuse to run - a very interesting trick this, and one I thought was unconstitutional; it was unconstitutional; It was changing the constitution for a political purpose - exactly like in Syria, for example. It was Barak's attempt to use the peace process as a part of his tricks - thinking that Netanyahu was strong, Sharon was weak, so "I can win against Sharon" look at it now! Why, though, did these people who voted for the amendment - including Arabs - think that Sharon was better than Netanyahu? Why? Clearly the "no" to Netanyahu meant an "O.K." to Sharon. Is it OK that Sharon is leading now? What exactly was achieved here? It was very interesting to see what happened then and it was very hard to hold a principled position at that time. In retrospect it all looks so irrational. Every trick was tried - including sidestepping the constitution, changing it so as not to enable Netanyahu to run etc.. Now the difference between Sharon and Barak is even more than it was between Netanyahu and Barak in terms of the polls at that time. It's pretty certain that Sharon will win this election. The disappointment of the Israeli public with Barak is not only because of the Palestinian issue; his coalition collapsed before Camp David. He went to Camp David with 41 members of the Knesset in his coalition (with the majority supporting Camp David, but with a mere 41 in the coalition) and he came back from Camp David with 31 or thirty something in the coalition. The Palestinian issue is, of course, a major issue but Barak had started his term in government by opening a dispute with his own party. This is the first step that he took and that started his gradual decline and deterioration. Barak began his term in government with a conflict with his own party. Remember the struggles over who would be heading the Keneset - Burg; remember how the General Secretary of the party started to think of copying some of the ideas developing in social democratic parties in Europe, thinking about changing the party into a kind of company and adding a "General Director" in place of the General Secretary. For all these and other divisive efforts there is only one explanation - I'm sorry to say this to those, unlike me, who held any hope for Barak; but the root of all this thinking is his arrogance. There is no other root. He thought that in one week he could change the entire history of the Labor party, "the Labor party's history of one hundred years is nothing!" "I can change it; I just have to say so". He was made to realize in two weeks that this party has a set of traditions much stronger than him. This realization led to his repeated defeat at the hands of his own party's decision-making bodies once parliament started and continued to work against him inside the coalition. In recalling this we should look back at the issue of secular/religious politics in Israeli thinking. Barak seemed to think that it was a coalition "tactical issue"; an issue whereby he could please both components and have national unity in Israel. But his voters were secular, not religious, and they expected from him secular steps! He thought that he could have his voters, keep his voters and please the religious parties. He tried the impossible; again arrogance! Actually, in order to explain it better, I would say arrogance is not enough - unless we understand that arrogance is a kind of stupidity. Only if we understand it to mean this in its political context; (I don't know what it might mean in physics or in chemistry, but in politics if you have it and you think you can overcome realities by enforcing your assumptions; i.e. if you can put up dates for the Syrians ..then we are witnessing a form of stupidity). In touching on Syria we should be again reminded that here too Barak behaved like an arrogant military commander, believing that all he had to do was to concentrate and be consistent in moving toward his goal - without taking into consideration what the other side was thinking - "I set the date already ..by this time .I have to have peace with Syria according to my conditions and if not I will withdraw from Lebanon." This is a kind of arrogance. You cannot set dates for the others. He could have achieved peace with Syria and Lebanon. He missed it and he is now ready to give what he refused at that time, he is now ready to do that! To meet the conditions that prevented him before! He thought that unilaterally leaving Lebanon would be interpreted as a victory; again he had an arrogant understanding of what victory is - he thought a victory meant that he met his promises to the Israeli public. This is nonsense. Of course he promised the Israeli public that they would get out of Lebanon, but getting out is not a victory, it's still a defeat in Lebanese terms. You cannot present it worldwide and in the region as a victory. It is a defeat and it gave a lot of moral support to the Arabs and particularly to the Intifada. The truth is that his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon granted the Palestinians one of the factors that brought about the current Intifada; only one, there are lot of others. Again, his attempt to isolate Yasser Arafat after Camp David and to isolate the Palestinian leadership and to build an international coalition (I am very sorry to note, including Europe which did not welcome Arafat after Camp David), once again after CD can be viewed as an arrogance that contributed to his demise and the rise of the Intifada. Being told we must "obey" Israeli-American coalition is the main reason for the Intifada. Barak's attempt to isolate the Palestinian leadership diplomatically, supported blindly by the United States and Europe, and to enforce Barak's conditions for the peace process brought us to the Intifada. I could, of course, mention other factors that brought us to this situation, but I am telling you simply that Barak is to blame for this. I am not speaking about us not achieving final status results; I think the Palestinian leadership could have waited with the final status, but how could the Palestinian leadership wait if he was rushing: "I don't want to implement commitments from Oslo, I want a final status now!" And he was putting up dates because he didn't want a transitional solution but a final status one. Palestinians and Israelis could live a little more time without a final status, if agreements were set and achieved, but somehow Barak convinced Europe and the US that his strategy was the only strategy and that the Palestinians reject peace. The Position of Palestinians Inside Israel
I am very sorry that the historical leaders of the national Palestinian movements (probably they are historical in both senses of the word; they are history too), think after all this time that our function in life is to be a reserve army for the Labor party - that we don't have our struggles ourselves, our national identity. How can I, after this peak we reached in the Intifada in terms of our solidarity with the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, make such a step back and tell people, "well, actually now the result of all this struggle is voting for Barak." I don't understand how some people think politically; do they think that we are only a reserve army? This 'reserve army' of voters for Barak or the Labor party in times of crisis - it is also a good argument to join the Labor party .why don't we join the Labor party? Why don't we just join ..we would be more accepted. If the Palestinian Leadership think, or some parts of it, that our function in life is this, and not to be effective concerning the peace process then it would be more effective for us to join Meretz and the Labor party; in other words, to become Zionists. But we have ourselves an issue; to keep our national identity and it is not going to take Hawatmeh to do this for me! We have a struggle for equality inside Israel - Hawatmeh is not going to help me there. We are not living only for the Palestinian state to come; this is not our function in life. Now, in addition to that, we do not agree to Barak's conducting of the final status negotiations. In our relationship with the Israeli state, there is a political custom of thinking that Arabs in Israel will vote for the Labor party anyway; whatever the Prime Minister does. Whatever the Labor party does to us .in the end we have no other choice than voting for them. We think that continuing this pattern of thinking will do a great deal of harm for generations in the future. We should not be taken for granted. If we, just after the killings that happened, vote for Barak, it means the next Prime Minister has a green light to do even more than Barak did; he knows very well that we can shout, we can say whatever, but that at the end we will be blackmailed by the "bad-worse" alternatives and end up choosing the bad. Now this pattern needs to be broken somewhere! Another factor of note in this political usury is the powerlessness that we suffer from as a result of the fact that by the weight of our numbers we cannot 'drag' the Israeli society to peace by our votes. I think it is a sort of arrogance to think, that there is a gap of 10-15% among the Jews concerning the peace process and that you can swing across this gap by relying on Arab votes. If some people have this idea, I really think they don't know what they are talking about. When we think about Israeli society in general, there is a dispute or conflict that must be conducted, in terms of rationalizing Israeli ways of thinking about Arabs. In this process we ('48 Palestinians) can be of great importance. We can be as un-provocative as possible, we can speak rationally as much as we can, we can go to schools and speak to Jews in schools, in universities and wherever we are invited. We're trying to be effective in the Israeli media of course (and we have our role there as you know), but we can't alone reconcile the gap between people who want peace and people who do not want peace. I think the result of such thinking will be very dangerous in the long run. So our position is 'no' - to Sharon first of all, and also to Barak - we are not going to participate and I think that the vast majority of the Palestinian citizens of Israel are going to hold on to this position. We are not going to change our position; I want to be clear about that. |