The title of my lecture is a question I would assume most people here would probably answer with the assumption that it's already dead, or maybe not even born yet. Based on my own research and analysis, I will probably not be willing to make too much of an argument with that statement or assumption.

Defining what we mean by normalization seems an essential starting point in this discussion. In the Jordanian political sphere the term didn't ever mean just treating Israel like any other normal country which has a relationship with Jordan; it meant something more than simply a formal view of Israel as another state to deal with in an open way. Normalization in the Jordanian sphere meant there was going to be a 'warm' peace; that Jordan and Israel were going to be more than just neighbors. This is a view that was expounded upon in the ideas surrounding the concept labeled "the New Middle East", promoted by Shimon Peres for one. It held that economics would break down political barriers and that over time a new Middle East based on economic unification would override the old Middle East of warring boundaries.

Today that 'vision' is obviously not realized and is not held by the Jordanian public or, in a general sense, by the Jordanian regime itself. There are exceptions, in that Israel and Jordan have maintained a certain degree of security cooperation - some above board, some not talked about at all - but at a limited level. In its real sense though, normalization is dead.

Probably most people would suspect that the Intifada is what killed normalization, but actually the process of normalization was only really buried by the Intifada; it had already 'passed away'. The process of the death of normalization in Jordan is what I hope to trace here.

The story of the death of normalization in Jordan is, in some ways, the story of Jordanian politics in the 1990s and to wade through all of that in sufficient detail would be a lengthy process indeed so I will focus on three major factors. The first of these main areas is the dynamics of foreign policy and the general collapse of Israeli - Palestinian relations as well as Israel's relationships with its other neighbors. Most would argue that this factor is significant but not by itself sufficient to destroy the normalization process in Jordan, but if we note the other two factors that contributed we will begin to get a picture of the combination that worked to kill the normalization drive.

Firstly there was domestic competition between the regime and its coalition of supporters - the traditional East Bank business elites, the regime coalition as I call it, being the military and bureaucratic elites as well as the economic elites, who generally come from a Palestinian background - and the multi-headed, multi-faceted, factious opposition groups. This is not though a competition between an opposition and a regime in the sense of say Algeria, where it's an all out war, but rather a pluralistic balance of power lying underneath the monarchy. Different political groups are competing with each other for power and influence over policy, but not necessarily to change the regime per se.

The third influential factor that led to the death of normalization is that of Jordanian public opinion and its central concern with the ongoing economic crisis in Jordan. This economic factor is itself set against the context of a post-oil-boom economic decline and the post-Gulf War decline in gulf employment and remittances. Problems of rising unemployment and those caused or related to structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and implemented by the regime all fuelled a public reaction which was centered around public economic well-being.

This is an outline of the three major factors that I see contributing to the death of normalization. One question that immediately arises in an examination such as this is, "was there any normalization to begin with?" At the level of the two regimes the answer is definitely 'yes' and even, to a certain extent, amongst the public there were indications of normalization.

Normalization arose out of Jordan's participation in the 1991 Madrid process in order to escape its isolation after the Gulf War. In the Washington talks that followed those in Madrid, Jordan and Israel pretty much agreed on a level of understanding which would move them toward a peace treaty and so they almost sat back and waited as the other tracks in the Washington talks were expected to move forward, which they never did. Then the Oslo process came along and broke down the Washington talks, in some ways moving the Middle East Peace Process out of its Washington format and into a different path.

When the Oslo accords eventually broke, they were welcomed in Jordan with some fear, but in general the Jordanians used the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO to release themselves from the restrictions of Arab coordination and to instead move independently. The day after the Oslo accords were signed, Jordan and Israel initialed an agreement setting an agenda for peace talks. Later, in 1994, Jordan and Israel announced the Washington Declaration, ending the state of war and eventually the peace treaty was signed in Wadi Araba in October 26th 1994, before being quickly ratified by both Israeli and Jordanian parliaments.

The government defended its signing of a peace treaty with Israel before any other Arab partners involved in the earlier multilateral talks, through four main assertions. Firstly they said it was a strategic choice for Jordan, a state that had been left with very few other choices considering its isolation from the US as well as from the Gulf countries after the Gulf War, not to mention the absence of the Soviet Union - due to its collapse - and the defeat of neighboring Iraq. Jordan, in some ways - as it was portrayed in the Jordanian media - was "surrounded by a noose", which was gradually tightening and if they did not sign a treaty Jordan would soon be "strangled".

A further reason cited was that because of this peace treaty, as an independent state, Jordan received all that it wanted from Israeli; it reclaimed some kilometers of land, a lot of rights and most important of all it had an Israeli government formally agree that "Jordan is not Palestine." This seemed to be one of the most pivotal reasons for the Jordanian regime to sign the peace treaty, eliminating the 'alternative homeland' scenario.

Refugees, it was decided in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, were to be dealt with by placing them in a multilateral process, accepting that Jordan could not seek to solve the refugee question with Israel within a bilateral process and that the issue instead needed to be tackled with Egypt and the Palestinians themselves.

The fourth and final major assertion through which Jordan 'excused' its move to peace with Israel was the benefit that Jordan stood to receive through US economic aid and a new Middle East 'rim' economic order. This seemed to be, if not the most important point behind the signing of the treaty, the most publicized reason that the government gave for signing the treaty; they attempted their defense of the treaty with that element.

The opposition, through Islamist, Arab-Nationalist, Leftist and even some conservative 'East-Bank first factions' came up immediately with a number of critiques of this official 'presentation' of the peace treaty. In general the Jordanian opposition was not, for the most part, opposed to peace per se, but more particularly towards the peace treaty in its specifics; 'this treaty,' they argued, 'is not good for Jordan.' They argued their opposition to the peace treaty with their own four major assertions; they opposed the fact that the treaty abandoned Arab coordination; pointing to the fact that the treaty was not based on the whole series of UN Resolutions that had served as the basis of previous negotiations, but rather saw Jordan move independently and thereby abandon the Palestinians and Syrians to move ahead by itself.

Secondly, the opposition charged that the treaty abandoned the refugees and asserted that the multilateral talks, that were probably not going to take part any time soon, were no going to move forward and that the Jordanian - Israeli peace treaty had given up on the Palestinian Jordanians' right of return. Thirdly, the opposition argued that the Jordanians had not got all of their land or water back and that instead Israeli farmers would continue "leasing" some originally Jordanian land for 25-year renewable periods. Finally the opposition charged that the regime itself was curtailing public liberties by not allowing the opposition to voice any of its critiques even though the opposition itself was adhering to the rules of 'democracy' that the regime had set down. In some ways they charged that if the Jordanian regime couldn't refute its critics it was forced to silence them - as one opposition member put it. As the opposition found itself unable to block the actual treaty, it vowed to resist normalization.

By early 1995 (even late 1994), the regime itself had very much 'gone for' normalization. The public in general, as reflected by public opinion surveys, supported peace but questioned the true effects of the agreements. As the process of the Middle East Peace Process moved forward into 1995 a series of actions by Israel undermined firstly the Jordanian government's efforts for peace, which had a serious effect on weakening the public's support for peace and at the same time weakening the regime's ability to 'sell' peace to it's own public. This happened as early as 1995, when King Hussein's partner Rabin was moving to confiscate land in Jerusalem in April of that year - a policy he eventually reversed, not for Jordanian concerns but rather for domestic Israeli concerns. Nonetheless, as the confiscation policy was going on, Jordan lobbied very hard; the Foreign Minister at the time himself saying that the confiscation of the land put the agreement under 'test'. Meanwhile 60 of the 80 House deputies, who had just ratified the peace treaty, called for suspending it if the confiscations continued. When the policy was changed in Israel, things moved back to something like they had been, but already the signs indicating the difficulty of sowing peace in Jordan were showing themselves.

Then Peres came to power and in his 1996 'Operation Grapes of Wrath', Israel shelled Lebanon, greatly upsetting the Jordanians, who issued a parliamentary statement declaring that by attacking civilians in Lebanon, Israel had shown its true face. As Netanyahu came to power the situation went from bad to worse; the Israeli - Palestinian track all but stalled, then there was the opening of the tunnel under Al-Harem Ash-Sharif, which led to the killing of 70 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and also produced an echo in Jordan, where demonstrators came out onto the street. Most importantly for the regime was the fact that Netanyahu's advisor Dor Gov, had visited Amman the day before the tunnel was opened and had mentioned nothing of the impending action and King Hussein feared that this would seem to show a Jordanian acquiescence in the tunnel opening in a sphere (the Islamic Holy places in Jerusalem) which has traditionally been a Hashemite concern. The regime feared, moreover, that the Islamists in Jordan would capitalize on the threat to the holy places, adding thereby to the fallout of the 'bread riots' that had occurred in Jordan the previous month. The regime's level of trust in the Israeli government was thus further undercut and public support for the treaty soured.

As the Har Homa settlement was built in February 1997, King Hussein sent a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, criticizing Netanyahu's "tragic actions, which made peace seem more and more like a distant mirage." King Hussein himself said that he sensed that Netanyahu was "intent to destroy all that he had worked to build." If this is how he was feeling, we can imagine how the 'street' was feeling as well. A few days later a Jordanian soldier shot and killed seven Israeli girls at the border in disputed circumstances and King Hussein came to Israel to pay condolences to the Israeli families; a move that was widely praised in Israel but highly criticized (as far as one could really criticize the King) in Jordan. People raised the question; 'if an Israeli soldier had killed seven Jordanian girls, would the Israel Prime Minister be visiting in Jordanian homes?'…….the obvious conclusion being clearly, 'no'.

The final blow came in September 1997, when Israeli agents attempted to assassinate Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal in broad daylight a few blocks from my old home in central Amman! This basically meant the end of explicit security cooperation between the two states, while under the table things may have still occurred, I don't know. Formally security cooperation was over at that point, only to be renewed later on. At this point the regime could not really claim that Israel was living up to its obligations under the treaty; Israeli actions in Jordan were being blamed for the decline in the Middle East Peace Process and the public generally cooled towards Israel, while the government could no longer attempt to assert that Israel had changed into a new Middle East 'actor'.

These events had very large ramifications in domestic Jordanian politics, which brought to the surface the competition between the opposition groups, which is very fractured and manifests itself through many different voices. This opposition had long lacked any real institutionalized identity or central focus, but the anti-normalization issue became the rallying point, uniting and strengthening the diverse, and often mutually opposed, components of the opposition, while at the same time providing a venue (anti-normalization) through which to challenge the regime on issues of domestic policy. This has caused the regime no end of headaches ever since.

This institutionalization of the opposition actually began long before this point in time, before the Washington talks even, with the "Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization", which has since had at least half a dozen other names. It was founded in May 1994 by the Muslim Brotherhood's political party, The Islamic Action Front, and seven other Arab nationalist and leftists parties as well as other independents. The committee's growth gained the regime's attention quite quickly. Even before the peace treaty mosques, preachers and government employees with Islamic or leftist sympathies were purged and marches at the actual time of the treaty were banned - part of a recurring theme of banning marches in Jordan.

In May 1995, a conference of 'Anti-Normalization Forces' was banned for the main reason that it was going to unite all of these opposition factions, but particularly because it was being convened with the notable addition of a group the regime feared the most; dissatisfied members of the regime coalition itself - most notably the former Prime Minister. The regime feared a split in its own coalition around the issue of normalization and the peace treaty with Israel. The conference was also scheduled to take place on the eve of parliament's discussion on canceling laws boycotting Israel. The regime banned the conference, though it did take place later - in September '95 - but only in the much smaller venue of the meeting rooms of one of the involved political parties.

Also notable in this process of institutionalizing normalization was the involvement of the Professional Associations in Jordan. These have been a long-time home of the opposition in Jordan, even before political parties were legalized and to this day seem to be a more effective force for the promotion of opposition. This is because they have an institutional base, an economic base and also a strong showing from educated Palestinian professionals, as well as a framework that allows East Bankers to join in. As these Professional Associations moved to combat normalization, one of their main tools was to revoke the membership of their members who had visited, worked or otherwise normalized with Israel. As membership in a Professional Association in Jordan is mandatory, revoking someone's membership was equal to removing their ability to work. The threat was effective and some noticeable individuals were 'blacklisted', including Hisham Yannnis, probably Jordan's most famous comedian, as well as others in his troupe. This blacklist phenomenon continues until today, as we will later see.

One of the only real successes in institutionalizing the opposition and upsetting the regime was seen in January 1997 with the boycott of an Israeli trade fair in Jordan, when a wide range of groups called for a boycott of the fair and succeeded in making the event pretty much a non-starter. The government had given the fair its blessing but later, due to such overwhelming opposition, had to backpedal on its support for the event.

The regime's fear of the institutionalization of the opposition through the anti-normalization movement was quite noticeable through the huge crackdown on public polity in Jordan, in the years since Jordan joined the peace process. The 1993 election law amendments were a first indication of this; on the eve of 1993 elections, this amendment cut the opposition in half by introducing a law catering to the benefit basically of tribal groups and undercutting the chances of organizational groups. This guaranteed the passing of the peace treaty, which the regime knew was coming soon. Public demonstrations were then banned and with the popular and electoral arenas for opposition thus limited, the regime turned to the press, which had remained one of the few venues for voicing opposition, and began to crack down on that as well.

Between May 1993 and May 1997 the government filed 66 suits against various newspapers and journalists, resulting in only a few convictions, one imprisonment and some fines. The prosecutions were aimed at the new, independent and controversial weekly newspapers but the government was never really able to make the charges stick, so it turned to parliament to add new press restrictions but failed and so, in May 1997, the regime issued new press restrictions by decree. This resulted in the suspension of 13 newspapers, all of them weeklies with some sort of opposition slant and as a result the daily newspapers also began to fear the harsh penalties.

One of the results of these steps was that the 1997 parliamentary elections took place against a backdrop of the severe restriction of public liberties. This restriction led to the opposition boycotting the election; the regime itself being not so disappointed by such an action. The opposition demanded the reversal of the 1993 election law amendment, the revocation of the press law amendments and the cessation of normalization with Israel. The regime decided not to engage in any dialogue with the opposition, instead running the risk of illegitimate election accusations, in order to lock the opposition out of the parliament altogether. In the end the opposition almost shot itself in the foot with its election boycott, being left with only a handful of members from all opposition factions breaking the boycott and running, to take about 15% of seats in a regime coalition dominated parliament.

In general voter turnout in the 1997 elections was down, but mainly as the result of an incredibly low turnout in Amman and Zarqa, while in rural Jordan the turnout actually rose and the regime was thus able to claim the elections to be legitimate. Meanwhile the public became more and more apathetic toward the electoral venue in Jordan.

The reversal of political liberalization would actually have been quite warmly welcomed by the opposition if it had resulted in a public outcry, but the average Jordanian turned apathetic rather than angry in the face of the whole situation. One of the main reasons for this is simply that the average Jordanian was more closely watching his pocketbook than any other thing at the time. Public opinion surveys in Jordan have shown that Jordanians, first and foremost, are concerned about their economic well-being ahead of political liberties or even, in some cases, foreign policy. Thus the regimes chief policy of selling their peace treaty with Israel through its economic merits did have some public resonance. The regime promised debt relief, a huge increase in tourism, it promised new investments…and it claimed that peace was the precondition for this forthcoming boom in tourism and investment. In some way the boon that was promised was that Jordan would receive the aid package that Egypt had received for signing the Camp David, but of course with Jordan's miniscule population compared to Egypt, the average Jordanian would actually see these economics benefits.

A University of Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies poll, in July 1994, showed that 80% supported the Washington Declaration and that 82% thought that peace would improve Jordan's economic circumstances, half of them thinking that the economic benefits would be visible in the short run. Even half of those people who opposed the Washington Declaration thought that Jordan's economy would benefit from it - displaying that there was some principled as well as pragmatic opposition to the peace process. Later public opinion polls conducted in December of 1997, after all these events had taken place and the crackdown on opposition had occurred, indicated that there was still an expectation of peace for economic benefits in Jordan. In a national sample 50% of respondents still felt that peace would lead to economic benefits for Jordan, as opposed to 38% who disagreed. In contrast, a survey of so-called opinion-leaders, who often head political parties or the Professional Associations, indicated that that 58% thought Jordan would not benefit from economic growth through the peace agreement, while only 35% believed Jordan would. This showed a very pronounced rift between elite public opinion and that of the wider public, who were still expecting a return for peace in terms of cash. Nonetheless, as an indication of the failure of the normalization process and the development of a 'warm peace', 80% of those surveyed in the national sample said they still agreed with the statement "Israelis remain our enemies." The opinion-leaders poll on the same statement similarly reflected how fragile this normalization support was.

The public was ready for an economic return for their acceptance of peace, but when that failed to develop, as was becoming clear by 1997, the public became more and more apathetic about the process and gradually turned against normalization. The regime itself also felt humiliated by having to go cap-in-hand to the US congress to ask for debt relief and the economic boom of a huge aid package was never delivered; some debt relief was delivered but in general the dreams of a huge package failed to materialize. After 1995 Jordan fell into an economic decline, wherein there was only extremely slow growth and only in the very top sectors of the economy, while the rest was in virtual recession through the '90s.

By 1999 and the death of King Hussein, normalization in Jordan was, for all intents and purposes, dead - from the point of view of the regime, because of foreign policy failures, from the point of view of the opposition, as it was attempting to institutionalize against it, and from the public who didn't see any economic benefit from adopting a normal or 'warm' view of Israel. This was King Abdullah's inheritance - public disappointment and an Israeli government that was, at that time, beginning to engage in final status talks with the Palestinians, something the Jordanian government viewed as quite a threat. This allowed the new King to make a turn in refocusing Jordan's foreign policy priorities.

King Abdullah has turned away from the motif of a 'warm' peace and instead to those of economic reform and globalization. The new generation and the new culture he would like to see nurtured is geared toward a global economy and moving Jordan toward a free trade position. This entails Jordan looking away from the Middle East alone and toward the US, more than King Hussein had. Internally this process will continue relying on the existing regime coalition and will make use of traditional East Bank conservatives to implement economic reform, while externally this involves reconnecting Jordan to the Arab world, especially Syrian and the Gulf, while keeping the Iraqi tie active. Meanwhile there has been a much cooler embrace of Israel, while maintaining a formal relationship. In general, for King Abdullah, the road to Tel Aviv leads straight to Washington.

King Abdullah's position in terms of the normalization issue has been evinced by his effort to insulate Jordan from the final status talks and their later breakdown. Since the Intifada has broken out there has been a noticeable chill in Jordanian-Israeli formal relations, but in this regard it must be noted that King Abdullah has been far more willing than his father to take a back seat in foreign policy efforts, preferring instead to let Egypt take a larger role. This is seen immediately when we recall the role of King Hussein at the Wye River Plantation talks and compare it with the role assumed by King Abdullah at Sharm Esh-Sheikh. King Abdullah has preferred to focus on economic reforms and his use of an 'iron fist' in the domestic sphere to maintain the fallout of the intifada.

This 'iron fist' approach has seen the regime enforce an almost complete ban on demonstrations following a rally in the Jordan valley in October, when some 20,000 participants were dispersed by force. A couple of weeks ago, as the Islamists attempted to challenge this ban, the regime again reacted violently in Amman. The Professional Associations, after finally announcing publicly their blacklist of "normalizers" with Israel, had their leaders arrested for "undermining national unity."

It appears that the Jordanian regime will continue to reinforce what is a three-prong strategy. Firstly they are keeping a 'cool' relationship with the Israeli government, though not severing ties entirely. Meanwhile, following Egyptian and US led diplomatic initiatives, we see Jordanian sponsorship of the Jordanian-Egyptian initiative, although it must be noted that in general here it has been President Mubarak who has taken the lead in promoting this, while Abdullah has retained the backseat. Thirdly, we see the 'iron fist' at home set to continue, despite the fact that earlier this week there was a relaxation and the ban on some groups outside Amman was lightened.

There are certain preparations for possible parliamentary elections in November that the opposition may participate in, but many are currently talking about postponing these elections so that the opposition will not have the opportunity to capitalize on the regional situation to increase their membership in the parliament. This delay wouldn't bother the regime much as the parliament is currently almost completely dominated by regime supporters. The opposition may somehow raise the demand for a new election law, or a reversion to the pre-1993 one, as a 'price' for postponing these elections.

It is not a surprise that normalization has died, but it was not the Intifada that killed it; it has been long dead and perhaps even died before King Hussein. King Abdullah has only adapted to this situation and seen in it an opportunity to refocus priorities for Jordan and the need to insulate the Kingdom from what is going on around it, at first in terms of the final status negotiations and now from the Intifada.