


Candace Karp

# US Policy Towards Jerusalem and the Occupied Arab Territories 1948 and 1967



**PASSIA**

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem

**Candace Karp**

*US Policy Towards Jerusalem  
and the Occupied Arab  
Territories - 1948 and 1967*

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# *Forward*

Placed in a historical context, the relationship between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the position of the United States in the Middle East highlights the damage inflicted upon the American national interest by the various American Governments themselves. United States policy and strategy toward the conflict in both 1948 and 1967 conflicted greatly with its own Cold War and strategic interests. While Israeli policy in these two chapters of the conflict revealed itself at odds with the underlying strategic and Cold War thesis of the United States that necessitated neutralising the Arab-Israeli conflict, America's own policy constituted the greatest act of sabotage against the position of the United States in the region.

Beginning with 1948 and the debate surrounding the status of Jerusalem, President Harry S. Truman's refusal to support the internationalisation of Jerusalem is a glaring example of Washington's shortsightedness towards the conflict, and in turn, its own strategic interests in the Middle East. By refusing to contribute to a United Nations force intended to oversee demilitarisation and later, the establishment of an international regime in the city, Jerusalem remained a central and emotive element of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further hostilities were inevitable from the moment of the city's formal division into Israeli and Jordanian sectors. As the Cold War dynamic increasingly infiltrated the Arab-Israeli sphere, so too did the chances of an escalation of American involvement. Neutralising Jerusalem, then, as a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict was in Washington's Cold War and strategic interests.

The Israeli occupation of Arab territory in June 1967, and its refusal to subsequently withdraw even after United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was passed with the full support of the superpowers and the Arab countries themselves, placed the Administration of American President Lyndon Johnson in an awkward position. The White House itself had linked any Israeli withdrawal to an end to

belligerency and the natural progression of the belligerents towards the negotiation table. Furthermore, even as the Administration was endorsing the strategy and attempting to create an international consensus for it, the White House wholeheartedly refused to take the lead in any negotiations between the belligerents. The strategy was grossly negligent as it assumed that the Arab nations, collectively, could be bullied towards the bargaining table. It also presupposed the existence of Arab unity in the aftermath of the war, and that Israeli intentions would remain stagnant. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's declaration, in late September 1967, announcing the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories disputed this. Once again, American policy conflicted with its own interests in the Middle East and ensured that the Arab camp would continue to play Washington off against Moscow.

Examinations of the issue of Jerusalem in 1948-1949 and the controversies surrounding Israeli territorial acquisition in June 1967 focus upon the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Along with the refugee question, events in 1948-1949 and 1967 have produced intractable problems, for which there are now very few solutions. Both examples, however, highlight the large extent to which the United States sabotaged its own position in the Middle East. While regional actors certainly exacerbated the situation for Washington, and Moscow for that matter, throughout the Cold War, the United States was largely instrumental in its own undoing.

#### **Note on quotations :**

In order to minimise "cablese," and in the interests of clarity, when articles were absent from diplomatic cables they have been re-inserted into the text of direct quotations.

The spelling used in this dissertation conforms with Australian-English, except in the case of direct quotations, where the original spelling has been retained.

*Part One:*

*Truman, the Arab-Israeli  
Conflict and Jerusalem*

## INTRODUCTION

The policy of United States President Harry S. Truman towards the status of Jerusalem was most important in determining the future of the city and influenced the relations of the State of Israel with the whole world.<sup>1</sup> While initially supporting the November 1947 Partition Plan, which advocated the city's internationalisation, an increasing reluctance on the part of the Administration to assume responsibility for the introduction of such a regime ensured that, by the end of 1948, Washington had reversed its policy.<sup>2</sup> In the process, internationalisation was dealt a crippling blow as were American Cold War and strategic interests in the Middle East. This paper will examine Truman's position towards the status of Jerusalem in 1948-1949 and argue that his policy undermined Washington's interests in the Middle East. The

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<sup>1</sup> This is precisely the reason for the number of scholarly studies and popular publications devoted to it. Nevertheless, the historiography surrounding the Truman Administration's policy towards Jerusalem in 1948-1949 largely fails to examine the parallel between Washington's national interest and an American presence on the ground in Jerusalem. For general works on the subject, see Peter L. Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence: Israel, the United States and the Partition of Jerusalem, 1949-1953," *The International History Review*, 21, 3 (September 1999), pp. 665-689; Shlomo Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, 1947-1997*, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998); Yossi Feintuch, *U.S. Policy on Jerusalem* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Menahem Kaufman, *America's Jerusalem Policy: 1947-1948* (Jerusalem: The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> "Jerusalem" includes both the Old City, and the outlying areas including Abu Dis, Bethlehem, Ein Karim and Shu'fat. See "City of Jerusalem-Boundaries Proposed," United Nations Map no. 103 (b), November 1947, Papers of Clark Clifford, (hereafter PCC), Subject File, (hereafter SF), 1945-1954, Palestine: State Department Memoranda, box 14, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri, (hereafter HSTL). The "Holy Places" include the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Deir As-Sultan, the Garden of Gethsemane, the Sanctuary of the Ascension, the Basilica of the Nativity, the Milk Grotto, Shepherds Field, the Western Wall, Rachel's Tomb, and Haram esh-Sharif. See Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence," p. 667.

Administration's reversal eroded the American national interest by undermining Arab-American relations and providing an opportunity for Soviet encroachment into the Middle East. At the closure of the War of Independence, moreover, Jerusalem failed to be neutralised as a dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict, despite an opportunity for the Truman Administration to demilitarise the city. The United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, requested a United Nations police force to assist in the maintenance of the truce and the city's demilitarisation. Both tasks were to have led to Jerusalem's internationalisation. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted an American contribution to an international police force, arguing that an American presence on the ground increased the likelihood of Soviet intervention in the region. Lack of active American participation resulted in a "missed opportunity" for the Administration. Thereafter, efforts ultimately focussed upon a limited concept of internationalisation. Israeli, Jordanian and American interests in the city converged. None was willing to accept full international control over Jerusalem. The stalemate resulting from the War of Independence, with Jordan controlling the eastern sector, including the Old City, and Israeli occupation of the western half, prevailed as the status quo. This proved far from satisfactory for American strategic interests in the region. A divided Jerusalem virtually guaranteed further destabilisation of the region's politics and the strong possibility of future conflict arising from such an environment.

## THE PARTITION PLAN AND INTERNATIONALISATION

The November 1947 United Nations Partition Plan, supported by the Truman Administration, envisaged a *corpus separatum* for the city under which Jerusalem would be controlled by "a special international regime," administered by the United Nations. A trusteeship council would discharge the responsibilities of an administering authority by appointing a governor on behalf of the multi-lateral organisation. Implementation of a "Statute of Jerusalem" sought to "define the machinery of government for administering the international regime."<sup>3</sup> Freedom of access to the Holy Places was guaranteed while the entire region was to be demilitarised; "its neutrality ... declared and preserved,

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<sup>3</sup> Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy*, p. 40.

and no paramilitary formations, exercises or activities" would be permitted within the specified borders. A degree of local autonomy was envisaged for the surrounding "villages, townships and municipalities." The governor would control the formation of a police force, "the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine." Any disturbance hindering the governor's mandate was to be met "with such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration." The duration of the special regime was to last ten years, or until the trusteeship council recommended an earlier termination of United Nations responsibility. After the ten-year period expired, the council would review the situation, with the residents of the city participating in a referendum, voting on modifications proposed to the existing arrangements.<sup>4</sup>

In early February 1948, the United Nations Palestine Commission submitted a report documenting the security situation in and around Jerusalem, concluding,

"it may be anticipated that the situation ... will undoubtedly deteriorate further if adequate armed forces do not take possession of Palestine on the withdrawal of the Mandatory Power. Any deterioration, involving also the existence of the City of Jerusalem-territory under a special International Regime-may eventually endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>5</sup>

After the United States formally, if temporarily, abandoned partition on 19 March 1948, the role of the United Nations in Palestine was left dangerously open. A vacuum of power in Palestine was inevitable once the British Mandate ended in May.<sup>6</sup> In response, a special session of the General Assembly was convened on 16 April. The American representative to the Security Council, Ambassador Warren Austin, suggested a

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<sup>4</sup> Resolution 181, "The Future Government of Palestine," 29 November 1947, *General Assembly: Official Records*, (hereafter GA:OR), (1948), Resolutions, pp. 131-150.

<sup>5</sup> "Relations between the United Nations Palestine Commission and the Security Council," 9 February 1948, *Security Council: Official Records*, (hereafter SC:OR), (1948), 6, Committees, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Slonim maintains that hopes to internationalise Jerusalem ended when the United States abandoned the partition plan in favour of trusteeship in March 1948. Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy*, p. 57.

Palestine trusteeship to be administered by the trusteeship council. The plan was not met with enthusiasm from many delegations, although it received the support of the Arab representatives who were all too eager to put their names to anything that postponed partition. As for Jerusalem, a special committee was created on 5 May to deal with the problem, in light of the tenuous situation of the Jewish population of Jerusalem, particularly those that resided within the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.

Secretary of State George Marshall reconsidered the Jerusalem question. In late April, the Secretary forwarded a proposal to Ambassador Austin, cautiously informing Austin that his suggestions were for the Ambassador's "comment but not for discussion with other delegations." A security zone, "placed temporarily under the Trusteeship System of the United Nations" was suggested for the city and its environs.<sup>7</sup> Involving much the same machinery as the November 1947 proposal, including the creation of a police force, the plan could be "implemented without delay and without prejudice to the eventual decision of the General Assembly now meeting to consider the problem of Palestine." Clark Clifford, the President's Special Counsel, suggested that Washington "take the lead" and contribute one thousand marines to the force.

"The President should express ... the urgent necessity for the establishment of the Trusteeship and its police force. This should prevent opposition by the Moslem bloc, and preclude the contention that the fate of Jerusalem ought properly to be left to the outcome of the battle between the opposing parties."<sup>8</sup>

Subsequently, on 27 April, the White House approved the draft. Its efforts were in vain. Jointly submitted to the United Nations committee by the United States and France, the modified draft proposal failed to gain the two-thirds majority necessary when voting took place one day before the British mandate was due to terminate.

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<sup>7</sup> Marshall to Austin, 26 April 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (hereafter FRUS), (1948), 5, 2, p. 860.

<sup>8</sup> Untitled Paper, 18 April 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Correspondence and Miscellaneous, box 13, HSTL.

In particular, the draft was opposed by the Soviet Union and the Arab States. The former stated that the proposal “violated” the 1947 Partition Plan, the latter opposed any United Nations presence in the city at all.<sup>9</sup> Hours later, the British Mandate ended and Jerusalem was literally left to the mercy of the belligerents.<sup>10</sup>

## THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND JERUSALEM

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the American legation in Jerusalem documented possible impediments to the city’s internationalisation. The Irgun and Stern Gang caused the American Consul-General to Jerusalem, William Burdett, concern as both were reluctant to conform to the Haganah’s over-riding authority of the Jewish armed forces. The Consulate General feared that both would “reject … an international regime for Jerusalem on the grounds that the city should be the capital of the Jewish State, which would ultimately embrace all of Palestine.”<sup>11</sup>

Further reports from Jerusalem indicated that both groups were “bringing in reinforcements … and … fortifying the strategic positions within the city.” Statements emanating from the Stern Gang described the American, French, Belgian and Swedish observers as a “foreign body hostile to us, which penetrated into our country under [a] guise of neutrality.”<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the military strength of both Stern and the Irgun was increasing.<sup>13</sup> Israel aggression in Jerusalem was already well documented. The British Foreign Office warned Washington that the repercussions of Israeli belligerence would destabilise the region, given

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<sup>9</sup> Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy*, p. 67

<sup>10</sup> For a comprehensive interpretation of American policy towards the question of Jerusalem in the United Nations from November 1947 to the end of the British mandate in May 1948, see Kaufman, *America's Jerusalem Policy*, pp. 1-41.

<sup>11</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 25 June 1948, Naval Aide Files, (hereafter NAF), State Department Briefs, (hereafter SDB), May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL. A later report to the State Department confirmed that while Irgun would oppose the internationalisation of Jerusalem, it would not do so using force. Summary of Telegrams, 27 July 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>12</sup> Memorandum for Clifford, 28 June 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: State Department, Memorandum, box 14, HSTL.

<sup>13</sup> Possible Developments from the Palestine Truce, 27 July 1948, Papers of Harry S. Truman, (hereafter PHST), President's Secretary's Files, (hereafter PSF), Intelligence File, (hereafter IF), box 205, HSTL.

the inevitable prospect of a violent Arab reaction.<sup>14</sup> Clearly, it was in the Administration's Cold War and strategic interests that a police force be introduced into the enclave in the hope that demilitarisation of the city could be achieved, with control then passing to the United Nations.

## THE BERNADOTTE INITIATIVE

Complicating matters for the Truman Administration, in late June, Bernadotte retreated from internationalisation. The mediator suggested the inclusion of the city of Jerusalem into an eventual Arab state, arguing, "Jerusalem stands in the heart of what must be Arab territory in any partition of Palestine."<sup>15</sup> While the ultimate Bernadotte proposals advocated placing the city under United Nations control, his brief suggestion of Arab possession of Jerusalem undermined early moves towards a solution to the problem. Bernadotte's efforts, however, were also directed towards demilitarisation, and the mediator informed United Nations Secretary General Lie Trygve that 1000 men were needed for the task. State's concern was immediately aroused. Marshall instructed the American Mission at the United Nations to obtain more "explicit information," commenting that "it would not serve our interests if any considerable number of Soviet or Soviet satellite nationals made up [the] Jerusalem force." Preferable to State was the arrangement whereby the belligerents themselves could "agree on [the]

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<sup>14</sup> The British Embassy to the Department of State, 22 May 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1035.

<sup>15</sup> Bernadotte continued, "To attempt to isolate this area politically and otherwise from surrounding territory presents enormous difficulties ... While I fully appreciate that the question of Jerusalem is of very great concern for historical and other reasons, to the Jewish community of Palestine, Jerusalem was never intended to be a part of the Jewish State. In this sense, the position of the Jewish State is unaffected and the question of Jerusalem has no relationship to its status. The status of Jerusalem, therefore, is separate from the question of the constitution and boundaries of a Jewish State." Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the Security Council, 12 July 1948, *SC:OR (1948)*, 6, Supplement, p. 59.

Moscow condemned Bernadotte's suggestion, asserting that it was "disregarding" of the 29 November 1947 partition plan. Comments by Gromyko, 331<sup>st</sup> meeting, 7 July 1948, *SC:OR (1948)*, 3, 93, p. 21.

The lack of vocal opposition by the Truman Administration to the suggestions led to some members of the Israel cabinet to comment, "[t]he Christians are not in the least interested in Jerusalem." David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1971), p. 204. State instructed the Consul in Jerusalem to refute this claim. Summary of Telegrams, 19 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

source and composition of armed guards ... Arabs and Jews might agree, for example, each to supply 500 men to [a] Jerusalem force."<sup>16</sup>

The Secretary General discounted the American suggestion and, instead, asked the United States to contribute to the force together with France and Belgium. Marshall responded by maintaining that the Administration was "not in a position to second American forces for U[nited] N[ations] guard duty, nor are we able to recruit American citizens for such duty."<sup>17</sup> The Administration had previously suggested that the guard force be drawn from nations represented on the Truce Commission. This was in response to Moscow's assertions in the Security Council in June 1948 that it too be allowed to contribute military observers to Palestine. Moscow's representative to the United Nations Security Council Andrei Gromyko asserted that

"... we cannot in any circumstances agree that one, two or three countries should be given the right to send their military observers to Palestine, while at the same time the U[nion of] S[oviet] S[socialist] R[epublics] is to be deprived of that right. The U[nion of] S[oviet] S[socialist] R[epublics] is no less entitled than any other country to send its military observers to Palestine; no less entitled than the United States, for instance."<sup>18</sup>

Nevertheless, by mid-1948, the Administration was reluctant to lend its weight to a police force in Jerusalem, even though its own Consul General warned of the dangers associated with a continuation of the status quo and the inevitability of the resumption of hostilities. Both, according to Burdett, precluded "the possibility of demilitarising the city."<sup>19</sup> The Administration's concerns were understandable, as the crisis in Berlin and the Cold War were both gathering steam.<sup>20</sup> While the

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<sup>16</sup> Marshall to Jessup, 23 June 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, pp. 1138-9.

<sup>17</sup> Marshall to Jessup, 28 June 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1156.

<sup>18</sup> Comments by Gromyko, 320<sup>th</sup> meeting, 15 June 1948, *SC:OR* (1948), 3, 84, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 6 July 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL

<sup>20</sup> The Berlin Blockade began in earnest in June 1948 after Russian and East German troops blockaded the western sector of the city. Needing to sustain almost two and a half million people, President Truman ordered his airforce to re-supply the city. The blockade was lifted in May 1949.

United States sought to moderate Israeli demands in the diplomatic sphere with regards to final borders and the issue of refugees, contributing to a police force for Jerusalem was inherently different. Yet, American troops on the ground represented a clear undertaking by the Administration. Such a commitment was more difficult for Israel to dismiss.

An Arab commitment to internationalisation was impossible while fighting was still being waged for the city itself. Transjordanian control over Jerusalem was a political necessity for King Abdullah<sup>21</sup> of Jordan, as Jerusalem was the “traditional stronghold” of the Husseins. Moreover, the monarch’s fear that Palestinian nationalists would overthrow his monarchy and form their own leadership under the Mufti of Jerusalem ensured that his authority over Jerusalem was a necessity.<sup>21</sup> America’s Consul General to Tel Aviv John J. MacDonald explained Israeli intentions for Jerusalem.<sup>22</sup> He reported that a “cynical attitude towards [the] United Nations and [an] increasing demand for [the] incorporation [of] new Jerusalem within ... Israel [is] now apparent ...” Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion now justified the incorporation of the newer, western sector of Jerusalem into Israel by pointing to the inability of the United Nations to “protect the city or establish [a] government.” As for the Old City, MacDonald was wary of Jewish objectives and refused to rule out an Israeli offensive against the sector in the future.<sup>23</sup> Bernadotte was also suspicious of Israeli intentions, and on 20 July, two days after a second truce was instituted, the mediator formally requested an American Marine battalion to act as guards for Mt Scopus and Victoria Augusta Hospital. Bernadotte assured Marshall that

“the function of these guards does not involve any risk of engagement with regular or Jewish forces. Their function is a police function consisting primarily of protecting these

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<sup>21</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, 1921-1951*, (New York: York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 374.

<sup>22</sup> He is to be distinguished from Special Representative James G. McDonald who took over from MacDonald on July 24 1948 at President Truman’s instigation.

<sup>23</sup> MacDonald to Marshall, 11 July 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, pp. 1212-1213. Former Jerusalem brigade commander of the Jewish forces, Yitzhak Rabin, provides a detailed description of Israeli military activities to capture the city. See Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 29-32.

areas against possible activities of irresponsible irregular elements from both sides."<sup>24</sup>

It was hoped the guard force would be replaced by a proper international detachment, once such a body was recruited. In light of warnings detailing Israeli support for west Jerusalem's inclusion into the Jewish State and the continuing tensions between the belligerents that undermined any chance for the city's demilitarisation, Washington's strategic interests were in jeopardy.<sup>25</sup> A United Nations police force throughout the truce paved the way for a larger force and, ultimately, internationalisation of the city.

Unfortunately for Washington, the mediator's proposal greatly complicated the situation. Now that Bernadotte had suggested another option to internationalisation, namely Arab control over Jerusalem, the Administration was placed in a very difficult predicament. Essentially, its troops would lay the groundwork for occupation of the city by one of the belligerents. Maintenance of the truce, however, was essential for American security interests. One group, comprising the Secretary of Defence and Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, recommended that the Administration "should do everything we properly can to help Count Bernadotte implement the truce." It cited that "the maintenance of the truce in Palestine was of vital interest to the security of the United States."<sup>26</sup> State, nevertheless, informed the United Nations Secretary General that the United States was in no position to contribute to a police force for Mt Scopus and Victoria Augusta hospital. The American Ambassador to the United Nations General Assembly, Philip Jessup, maintained that any deployment of Marines would be met by hostile public opinion in the United States and an "adverse" Arab reaction.<sup>27</sup> Instead, State suggested that the mediator concentrate

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<sup>24</sup> Bernadotte to Marshall, 20 July 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1231.

<sup>25</sup> Demilitarisation for Jerusalem foresaw a city without any military force. Instead, an international army comprising of members of the Trusteeship Council, which included American, French and Belgian forces, would be deployed to Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History*, p. 208. Demilitarisation was provided for under Security Council Resolution 54 of 15 July 1948.

<sup>26</sup> Memorandum by Rusk, 23 July 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1236.

<sup>27</sup> Jessup to Marshall, 21 June 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1235.

on establishing a force comprising "the active cooperation and participation of the Jewish and Arab authorities."<sup>28</sup>

The Israeli response to Bernadotte's proposal for an Arab Jerusalem was predictable. Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett asserted that Israel would "fight against" any such arrangement. Ben-Gurion added, "those who want an internationalized city should realize that this can be achieved only by struggling against an Arab Jerusalem." Moreover, Israel was "deeply hurt" by Bernadotte's suggestion, the Israeli Prime Minister maintaining that the proposal demonstrated "a complete disregard both for historical facts and current reality." The latter, according to Ben-Gurion, was determined by "what happens at the western entrance to the city." Israeli designs were clear. Its occupation of west Jerusalem was "one of the territorial changes" that was to be "safeguard[ed] at all costs."<sup>29</sup> Subsequently, the Provisional Government of Israel asserted that any territory in Jerusalem currently under Israeli occupation was "occupied territory whose political future is still undecided."<sup>30</sup> In direct response to the mediator's plans for an Arab Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion, on 3 August, announced the commencement of Israeli military rule over its occupied sectors in Jerusalem.<sup>31</sup>

While the Israelis were fixated on the prospect of an Arab Jerusalem, American officials were still contemplating internationalisation. One day before State notified Bernadotte of its refusal to comply to the mediator's request for a guard force, MacDonald warned Marshall that the Jewish State resented any demilitarisation "for fear it will lead to internationalisation."<sup>32</sup> Demilitarisation of the area was still a major concern for Washington and Bernadotte. Still, the Administration ignored its own strategic interests in the region by refusing to comply with the mediator's request for a manned contribution to assist the United Nations in this task. Not surprisingly, Bernadotte protested the lack of American support for his initiatives. The mediator informed American Consul General MacDonald, that he was "very disappointed and dis-

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<sup>28</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 29 July 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>29</sup> Ben-Gurion, *Israel: a Personal History*, pp. 200, 207, 212, 149.

<sup>30</sup> Jessup to Marshall, 29 July 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, pp. 1256-1257. For a similar view, see Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy*, p. 112.

<sup>31</sup> Knox to Marshall, 3 August 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1273.

<sup>32</sup> MacDonald to Marshall, 28 July 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1250.

couraged" by the lack of support afforded him by the United Nations, "particularly" Washington. Bernadotte declared that he was "not prepared to continue in his task under such conditions." The Consul General supported the beleaguered mediator. MacDonald agreed that without logistical support from the United States, Bernadotte was unable to continue in his present capacity. Compounding the situation, or because of it, the situation in Jerusalem was "steadily deteriorating, making it more difficult and probably impossible to demilitarise Jerusalem." MacDonald also criticised State's proposal for a joint Jewish-Arab force, claiming that it was "impracticable due to the deeply rooted hatred on both sides."<sup>33</sup>

On 3 August 1948, the United States announced its intention to contribute observers to the city. The Administration made clear that "the use of [its] forces for pacification" was "distinct from observer duty," as the latter "would involve our assuming a unilateral military commitment in Palestine without adequate means to reinforce our troops." Fearing criticism for its refusal to send troops as part of a guard force, State shifted the blame, commenting that "the Security Council has not so far taken action to provide international forces to enforce the truce in Jerusalem."<sup>34</sup> The reasoning was clear. If the United Nations had failed to move in this direction, then the Truman Administration refused to do so as well. MacDonald remonstrated with State. While he believed it "still possible to secure the internationalization of [the city], the first step should be the demilitarization of Jerusalem backed by a international force of such strength as to command the respect of both the Jews and Arabs. If some force of this nature is not available immediately," MacDonald reasoned, "the project for demilitarization should be abandoned."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 2 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL. Marshall responded, asserting that the "rest of the world has [the] right to insist that they put aside their mistrust and hatred...." Marshall to MacDonald, 3 August 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1276. Upon hearing of Marshall's suggestion for a joint Arab-Jewish police force, Bernadotte maintained the suggestion provided him with "a good laugh." Count Folke Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 194.

<sup>34</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 4 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>35</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 5 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

## THE AMERICAN POSITION

Growing Israeli intransigence was of major concern to the American legation in Jerusalem, the British Foreign Office, and to the United States Mission to the United Nations. MacDonald reported that Foreign Minister Sharett had announced Israel's refusal to comply with any move towards demilitarisation of the city.<sup>36</sup> The British were particularly distressed. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin informed Washington's Ambassador to London Lewis A. Douglas that his Government favoured both demilitarisation and internationalisation of Jerusalem. He also commented that if the Truman Administration were to supply troops meeting the mediator's request, it would prove "decisive." Bevin then asserted, "in view of His Majesty's Government [the] most serious of all problems facing [the] U[nited] S[tates] and U[nited] K[ingdom] in [the] M[iddle] E[ast] is ... [the] situation in Jerusalem." Reporting his conversation with Bevin to the Secretary of State, the Ambassador agreed that American troops in the city would "be [a] restraining influence on both sides." As a compromise, Douglas proposed that if the United States were to convince the French and Belgian Governments to provide armed guards for the city, Washington should undertake to transport them to the region whilst providing logistical support.

"On this basis there would be a handful of non-combatant U[nited] S[tates] uniformed personnel... as [a] token force which would give proof of U[nited] S[tates] cooperation with [the] Mediator without risking ... U[nited] S[tates] personnel ..."<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> MacDonald to Marshall, 6 August 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1287. Bernadotte provided the Israelis with his plans for demilitarisation of the city in late July 1948. Included in his recommendations were the proposals barring "men of military age not normally residing in the demilitarised area" from Jerusalem without the permission of the UN Truce Commission in Jerusalem and "men of military age normally residing in the demilitarised area, but who at any time have been enrolled in the military (or defence) forces of either party, can only be admitted to this area with the special permission of the UN Truce Commission in Jerusalem." Proposals for Demilitarisation of Jerusalem, 22 July 1948, *Israeli Documents* (1948), vol. 1, pp. 375-378. Cited in Slonim, *Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy*, p. 103. Ambassador Eban maintained these restrictions would force 20 000 Jews to leave the city. Jessup to Marshall, 26 July 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1258.

<sup>37</sup> Douglas to Marshall, 6 August 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, pp. 1293-1294.

A different strategy altogether was offered by the American delegation in New York. It recommended that the Administration approach the Israeli Government and urge Ben-Gurion to moderate his Government's position.

"The Mission feels the situation is serious enough to warrant our making representations to the Israeli government lest the action of irresponsible elements continues unchecked and does irreparable damage to the Jewish position before the Security Council...."<sup>38</sup>

Two days later, on 12 August, the Israeli Minister-Designate to Moscow, Golda Myerson ruled out internationalisation over the entire city. At best, she reported to MacDonald, Tel Aviv would only offer the Old City as a candidate for such a regime, with the western sector of Jerusalem falling under Israeli authority. As for east Jerusalem, "allocation of some small area outside of [the] [O]ld [C]ity to [the] Arabs might be given consideration."<sup>39</sup> Considered a moderate in Israel, Myerson's statement was alarming for Washington. Marshall reported to Truman what he considered the inflammatory nature of Israeli actions in Jerusalem. The Secretary went so far as to question whether Ben-Gurion was even prepared to maintain the truce still in effect. Pointing out that demilitarisation was included in Security Council Resolution 54 of 15 July, the Secretary recommended to the President that State summon Israeli Ambassador to Washington Eliahu Epstein and "discuss frankly our concern with him." As a tactic to persuade the Israel Government to moderate its position, Marshall recommended that an Export- Import loan under consideration for Israel be used for this purpose.<sup>40</sup> Yet, the United States also disputed Bernadotte's suggestion of Arab control over the city. State reported that "we continue to believe that Jerusalem should not be placed under the sole authority of either side ..."<sup>41</sup> Certainly domestic opinion in the United States opposed Arab possession of Jerusalem.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 10 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>39</sup> MacDonald to Marshall, 12 August 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1307.

<sup>40</sup> Marshall to President Truman, 16 August 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, pp. 1313-1314.

<sup>41</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 13 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>42</sup> Jessup to Marshall, 30 June 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1167.

Epstein soon informed Washington of Israel's intentions. Insisting that Tel Aviv still adhered to the November 1947 Partition Plan, involving internationalisation, the Ambassador inferred that Bernadotte's suggestion for an Arab Jerusalem justified Israel's current position. Epstein explained, "if it were to be internationalized, that was well and good, otherwise it must be Jewish."<sup>43</sup> The Jewish seizure of Government House in Jerusalem on 17 August 1948 prompted Marshall to comment that the "Jews are seemingly lifting their sights and are campaigning to achieve [a] new objective; namely control [of] Jerusalem itself."<sup>44</sup> MacDonald agreed.<sup>45</sup> The United Nations also took stock of the situation, Security Council Resolution 56 of 19 August warning the belligerents against a resumption of hostilities. In addition to United Nations pressure, the Administration added its own. State instructed MacDonald to inform Tel Aviv that Washington would support invocation of chapter seven of the United Nations charter in the event that hostilities resumed.<sup>46</sup>

## INTERNATIONALISATION REVISITED

Bernadotte's assassination on 17 September 1948 occurred one day after he officially renounced Arab control over Jerusalem. Instead, the mediator advocated United Nations responsibility for Jerusalem.<sup>47</sup> Once again, the United States and United Nations agreed on a similar policy, although the tide against internationalisation had begun to shift at State.<sup>48</sup> Myerson's previous remarks regarding Israeli intentions for the city soon proved accurate. On 28 September 1948, Special Repre-

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<sup>43</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Hare, 17 August 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1316.

<sup>44</sup> Marshall to MacDonald, 18 August 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1321.

<sup>45</sup> MacDonald to Marshall, 19 August 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2: 1328.

<sup>46</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 19 August 1948, NAF, SDB, May-August 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>47</sup> Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, 16 September 1948, GA: OR (1948-1949), 13, Supplements, p. 18. McDonald later claimed that by advocating an Arab Jerusalem, Bernadotte "blundered fatally." James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951*, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951), p. 61.

<sup>48</sup> On 1 September, Marshall informed McDonald that "any other arrangement satisfactory to both Jews and Arabs would ... be acceptable to us, provided guarantees were given for access to and [the] safety of [the] holy places." Marshall to McDonald, 1 September 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1368.

Washington. Israel ruled out internationalisation of the entire city, but did not exclude such a regime for the Old City. For itself, Israel suggested keeping the western sector of the city currently under its occupation.<sup>49</sup> Officials within State and the Foreign Office now envisaged a similar arrangement. Sir Hugh Dow, the British Commissioner in Jerusalem, conceded that "any realistic planning must start with the assumption that there would be in effect two separate municipalities with defined frontiers." The head of State's United Nations Office, Dean Rusk, concurred. He maintained that

"it might be feasible to work out [an] arrangement whereby the state of Israel would become the administering authority of the Jewish part of Jerusalem ... and the Arab State the administering authority of the Arab portion of Jerusalem."

Both the American and British representatives agreed that Rusk's suggestion "offered attractive possibilities in that the terms of trusteeship could include guarantees for the Holy Places ..."<sup>50</sup>

The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs opposed the suggestion. Robert McClinton, Rusk's Special Assistant, was the most vocal proponent of an international regime for Jerusalem. He commented that Bernadotte's recommendations, "which are in effect identical to those recommended by [the] U[nited] N[ations] G[eneral] A[ssembly] in its resolution of Nov 29, 1947, afford [the] most equitable settlement of [the] Jerusalem problem."<sup>51</sup> Rusk's opposition to an international regime became clear when Ambassador Austin cabled Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett on behalf of Washington's delegation to the United Nations. An international regime for Jerusalem necessitated the creation of a police force and a budget that would require donors from a wide spectrum. Austin asserted that both were impractical, citing the unassailable fact that Washington would have to bear the heavy burden

<sup>49</sup> McDonald to Marshall, 28 September 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1429. Nor would Israel accept demilitarisation over the city. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, p. 79.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Cargo, 30 September 1948, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, pp. 1440-1441.

<sup>51</sup> Draft Telegram to McDonald, undated, *FRUS* (1948), 5, 2, p. 1436. This telegram was drafted on 30 September, but was never sent.

of both.<sup>52</sup> While State debated the various options, Truman continued to favour internationalisation. Weeks before the American presidential election, the White House reinforced its support for internationalisation as a plank of the Democratic Party's election platform. The President stated, "we continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the [H]oly [P]laces in Palestine."<sup>53</sup>

Before any such regime was established in Jerusalem, the demilitarisation of the city remained the focal point. Consequently, an American presence on the ground was required. Washington's Cold War and strategic interests demanded as much, given that stability within Jerusalem was deemed a strategic interest of the United States. Thus far, State had concluded that any international police force, destined for Jerusalem, would be comprised of 4000 men, to be recruited by the Secretary General "in order that it may be clearly a U[nited] N[ations] responsibility." State's conclusions were forwarded to its United Nations delegation in Paris "for use, but without commitment, as a basis for discussion with other delegations." The report contained several provisos, the first declaring the Administration's objections to the inclusion of any Soviet or Soviet satellite contribution into the police force. The second held far-reaching ramifications for the introduction of any police force. The United States was

"unwilling to have the various elements of the Bernadotte Plan taken up separately, as would be the case if that section of his report dealing with the establishment of an international police force were to be considered immediately and thus necessarily apart from the report as a whole."<sup>54</sup>

This clause precluded the possibility of a quick deployment of troops to the city. Thus ended any chance for Jerusalem's immediate demilitarisation, without which internationalisation was impossible. The Admini-

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<sup>52</sup> Austin to Lovett, 16 October 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1484.

<sup>53</sup> Statement by the President, 24 October 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, *Palestine: Statements by Truman, 1946-1949*, box 14, HSTL.

<sup>54</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 7 October 1948, NAF, SDB, September-December 1948, box 21, HSTL.

stration's unwillingness to take the lead in the initiative ignored its own long-term position in the region.

In light of Tel Aviv's desire to be admitted as a member to the United Nations, with the support of the United States, the American delegation in Paris reported that Israel's representative to the United Nations "has taken a very conciliatory line toward the Bernadotte Plan in discussions with [United Nations] Acting Mediator [Ralph] Bunche." Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations Abba Eban "stated that Israel would not resist the internationalization of Jerusalem ..." <sup>55</sup> Nor would Transjordan, who at the time, feared Israeli expansion into the city. That the United Nations advocated its own control over the city, compelled the Administration to assist in its implementation, given previous statements adhering to United Nations-United States cooperation. Previously, the White House had argued, "the policy of the United States must be to support the United Nations settlement of the Palestine issue."<sup>56</sup> There stood very little in the way for the United States, except its concern for Soviet involvement in any police force deployed to the city.

## AN AMERICAN PRESENCE

American military intervention on the ground in Palestine had been considered as early as November 1947. On 19 November 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary of Defence James Forrestal that

"any additional deployment of U[nited] S[ates] armed forces to this area will, in view of our present extended position, automatically raise the question of the advisability of partial mobilization and ... any deployment of apprecia-

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<sup>55</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 25 October 1948, NAF, SDB, September-December 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>56</sup> Memorandum for the President, 6 March 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Memorandum to the President, box 13, HSTL.

ble strength in this area will make a partial mobilization a necessity.”<sup>57</sup>

American troops in Palestine were never seriously considered to “back up” the trusteeship plan put forward by Ambassador Austin in March 1948.<sup>58</sup> Even questions of the legality of an American military presence in the area were debated.<sup>59</sup> The Administration’s final decision, however, that ruled out an American contribution to an international force in Jerusalem, was ultimately flawed. Instead of focussing specifically on Jerusalem, the decision stemmed from an initial study of American intervention in greater Palestine. National Security Council, NSC, memorandum number 27 advised against a direct American presence on the ground, fearing that if one were introduced, a Soviet force into the city would inevitably follow. The Joint Chiefs reasoned that

“entry of Soviet forces into Palestine would have the most far-reaching strategic implications in that the Soviets would then be entitled to land or sea lines of communications, either of which would entail the very serious consequence of Soviet entry into other Near and Middle East areas, and in that there would be no limitation on the number of Soviet forces that might enter Palestine with or without justification by the developing situation.”

While the Joint Chiefs also maintained that a commitment in Palestine stretched United States military capabilities already consumed by the Berlin Blockade, they never contended that its involvement in Palestine was beyond the capacity of the United States. Any

“participation in enforcement of peace in Palestine … must be viewed as the quite probable genesis of a series of United States deployments to Palestine which might ultimately attain such proportions that our military responsi-

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<sup>57</sup> Memorandum for the Secretary of Defence, 19 November 1947, PHST, PSF, National Security Council Files, (hereafter NSCF); Meetings, 20 May 1948, box 203, HSTL.

<sup>58</sup> “Send American Troops to Palestine to Back Up the Proposed Trusteeship?” undated, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Miscellaneous Memoranda, box 13, HSTL.

<sup>59</sup> Clifford to Clark, 10 May 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Correspondence and Miscellaneous, box 13, HSTL.

bilities in other parts of the world, which are vital to United States security, could not be either promptly or effectively met."

The Joint Chiefs concluded that "It would incompatible with the security interests of the United States to have either United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces introduced into Palestine." They recommended "that the United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine."<sup>60</sup>

The Secretary of Defence endorsed the conclusions forwarded by the Joint Chiefs.<sup>61</sup> However, State was more critical. Commenting upon NSC 27, State defended its own position by claiming that it "has been keenly aware" of the repercussions of a Soviet entry into the region through the insertion of a military contingent. As for an American contribution, State asserted that it had

"repeatedly refused to consider any unilateral military responsibilities in that country. In addition, the Department has firmly resisted the repeated requests of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Mediator for armed contingents of U[nited] S[ates] forces to make up a special guard for Jerusalem to insure the demilitarization of that city."

State, however, maintained that

"the considerations adduced in the memoranda of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not ... exhaust the problem. Although there appears to be no immediate prospect that U[nion of] Soviet S[ocialist] R[epublics] armed forces will be moved into Palestine, there is a constant threat of Soviet infiltration."

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<sup>60</sup> National Security Council Memorandum number, (hereafter NSC), 27, U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine, 19 August 1948, PHST, PSF, SF, National Security Council: Memoranda, Reports, box 194, HSTL.

<sup>61</sup> Memorandum for the National Security Council, 19 August 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 2 September 1948, box 204, HSTL.

tion into that area which could seriously impair the security of the United States."

State cited Czechoslovakian military aid to Israel, Soviet aid to the Stern gang and the Irgun and Moscow's attempts to create civil unrest in the Arab states. Additionally, State pointed out that

"continued warfare between Jewish and Arab forces would undermine the gains which have been made in Greece, Turkey and Iran, might permanently alienate the Arab world from western influences, and might impose upon the United States a basic re-examination of its own world security position."

Accordingly, State asserted that

"it is ... quite possible that some situation may arise in... Palestine requiring the use of armed forces to protect the vital security interests of the United States, or to prevent the deterioration of the situation in that area ..." <sup>62</sup>

NSC 27 was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council on 2 September 1948. State reiterated its position, declaring itself unwilling "to make a commitment not to send U[nited] S[tates] troops to Palestine." Moreover, Lovett pointed to the vast amounts of territory under Israeli control and the poor state of the Transjordan's army which was without ammunition. Guessing that Tel Aviv would attempt to take advantage of the situation, Acting Secretary of State Lovett stated unequivocally that "the truce should be maintained as a platform from which to reach ultimate peace." An international force of troops would provide an element of stability to the area. Yet, Forrestal maintained that the problems of the Middle East should be treated "as a whole ... getting stuck on one part would get us stuck on all." It was

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<sup>62</sup> State Department Comments on NSC 27, undated, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 2 September 1948, box 204, HSTL. Forrestal maintained that State's request for troops for Jerusalem was indicative of the fact that "the Palestine situation had drifted without any clear consequent formulations of the United States policy...." Forrestal asserted that, thus far, American policy "had been made for "squalid political purposes."" James Forrestal, *The Forrestal Diaries: The Inner History of the Cold War*, edited by Walter Millis, (London: Cassel, 1952), p. 474.

this flawed thinking that eventually ruled out an American troop commitment to Jerusalem.<sup>63</sup> The meeting concluded with no definite position being arrived at. The early repercussions of Washington's vacillation were soon evident. Sharett, citing "the inaction of the Christian world" and implausibility of a "substantial use of military force ... [to ensure] a viable international status for Jerusalem," concluded that Israel now had "the right to renew [its] demand that Jerusalem be included within the borders of the State of Israel."<sup>64</sup>

The debate continued well into October and November 1948. In mid-October, and in response to NSC 27, acting Secretary of State Lovett finally asked Secretary Forrestal to focus specifically upon the implications of an American contribution to a Jerusalem police force. Citing Marshall's previous acceptance of the Bernadotte proposals, Lovett declared that effective United Nations control of Jerusalem was dependent upon

"the United Nations ... establish[ing] an adequate police force in that area ... the Department of State believes that this Government must ... support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem."

Lovett provided the Secretary with two methods by which State deemed this possible. One consisted of "interested governments" contributing either troops or police personnel. The other involved the Secretary General recruiting the force himself. Lovett maintained that the first option was the most promising for ruling out any Soviet involvement. Nevertheless, he requested Forrestal to consider both options and decide "which type of international police for Jerusalem this Government should support ..."<sup>65</sup> Forrestal passed the memoran-

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<sup>63</sup> Memorandum to the President, 3 September 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, Memoranda for the President, Meeting Discussions, 1948, box 220, HSTL.

<sup>64</sup> Sharett also pointed to "the salvation of Jerusalem from an Arab takeover ... and the fact that today Israel controls the new section of the city..." as justification for any Israeli annexation of the areas of Jerusalem under its control. Sharett to the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 10 September 1948, Foreign Ministry File. Quoted in Uri Bialer, "The Road to the Capital: The Establishment of Jerusalem as the Official Seat of the Israeli Government in 1949," *Studies in Zionism*, Autumn 1984, p. 274.

<sup>65</sup> Lovett to Forrestal, 18 October 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

dum to the Joint Chiefs for their consideration. Their reply of 29 October 1948 advocated an international police force "recruited as individuals" as opposed to "contingents supplied by certain governments ... since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops." Again, it was advised that the presence of American citizens, civilian or otherwise, in the police force was to be avoided. In order to "mitigate the predominantly negative character of the above replies," the Joint Chiefs proposed that instead of the Secretary General recruiting the force, the responsibility fall to the administering authority, under which Jerusalem, as a trust territory, would ultimately be ruled.<sup>66</sup>

Taking into account the recommendations thus far, NSC 27/3 "determined the type of United Nations police force for Jerusalem which the United States could accept ..." Acknowledging the 29 November 1947 resolution, advocating internationalisation, and the final Bernadotte proposals, which endorsed a similar position, the report also considered State's assertion that the Administration support the establishment of a police force for Jerusalem, "in one form or another." The Joint Chief's verdict, supporting an administering authority, was also taken into account. Yet, NSC 27/3 concluded that

"there appears to be no practicable way of providing a U[nited] N[ations] police force for Jerusalem which would meet the requirements of [a] U[nited] N[ations] administration of Jerusalem and which would also be consistent with the security interests of the United States."

However, in the event that the United Nations recommended the establishment of a police force, the report recommended that recruitment of individuals was preferable to contingents supplied by governments. Recruitment was to be carried out by the "agency designated to exercise local administrative authority on behalf of the United Nations" and the involvement of American, Soviet, or Soviet satellite citizens was to be avoided.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Leahy to Forrestal, 29 October 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

<sup>67</sup> NSC 27/3, Provision of a Police Force For Jerusalem, 16 November 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

The meeting of the National Security Council on 23 November 1948 considered NSC 27/3. Included for its consideration was a Central Intelligence Agency report commenting on the effectiveness of the United Nations. Also included was NSC 35. The Agency commented, "it is doubtful if the Security Council is willing to make or able to execute the judgment that would be needed to reverse the process."<sup>68</sup> NSC 35 detailed existing international commitments requiring United States military intervention. It consisted of three groupings. The first incorporated "Military requirements essential for the support of United States policies" while the second involved "Predetermined United States military actions to be undertaken if certain events should transpire." The third included "United States pledges of military aid and assistance." While the Middle East, specifically Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran, came under the second category, Palestine was included in category three, and further described under "United Nations commitments." NSC 35 noted that the Administration was obligated to consider an American military contribution to Palestine by the 15 July 1948 Security Council resolution, which had invoked chapter seven of the charter. In accordance with chapter seven, the introduction of armed forces into Palestine to restore and maintain peace was an option. NSC 35 noted that

"the implications of this commitment are very great, since peace enforcement in Palestine, once undertaken, can lead to general war involvement extending throughout the Middle East and eventually to global war."

Coupled with the Joint Chiefs assessment that an American military commitment in Palestine would stretch United States military capabilities, NSC 35 advised against any additional commitments.<sup>69</sup>

As did NSC 27, NSC 35 approached the question of an international force in Jerusalem from the point of view of placing American troops in Palestine. The two propositions, however, were markedly different.

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<sup>68</sup> "Review of the World Situation," 17 November 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

<sup>69</sup> NSC 35, "Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of Armed Forces, 17 November 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

The City of Jerusalem was, in itself, a special case for the United Nations to consider. It did not constitute a method by which a United States commitment there would develop into an American undertaking elsewhere in disputed territory throughout the troubled region. Clear and defined objectives existed: the demilitarisation of the city, paving the way for the creation of a *corpus separatum*. Neutralising the issue within the wider scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict catered to American strategic interests in the region. Regional instability, after all, was deemed detrimental to the national security of the United States, and, as such, the city's neutralisation as a dynamic of the greater Arab-Israeli conflict was appropriate. An international presence was required on the ground to maintain the truce and assert the legitimacy of a *corpus separatum*, a scenario that the Administration itself endorsed. While the initial reasons for the Joint Chiefs warning against an American military contribution in Palestine were legitimate concerns, both reflected short-term interests of the Administration rather than the long-term benefits associated with an internationalised Jerusalem. The fear of Soviet intervention into Palestine in August 1948 was a legitimate one, yet an ongoing dispute over Jerusalem, coupled with the controversies surrounding final borders and refugees was enough to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict alight for years to come. The State Department noted that Soviet intervention in the region was, in any case, an inevitability so long as the crisis failed to resolve itself.<sup>70</sup> The Joint Chiefs second contention, that an American military commitment to Palestine would snowball into a greater, overall responsibility in the area, failed to take into account the limited nature of the proposed action in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, taken with the intelligence report questioning the ability of the United Nations to maintain an effective position on the crisis, NSC 35 proved decisive.

The National Security Council endorsed the findings of NSC 27/3. While none of the participants questioned the ability of the United States to contribute to an international force to demilitarise Jerusalem, all focussed on the various questions of implementation, the Secretary

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<sup>70</sup> The American Embassy in Moscow soon reported that the "deteriorating Western position in Palestine and [the] Arab East must encourage [the] Kremlin to follow [a] policy of seeking objectives by means short of war." Moscow to the Secretary of State, 23 December 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, Meeting 27, 23 November 1948, box 204, HSTL.

of State in particular.<sup>71</sup> On 24 November, the President approved NSC 27/3. The Administration's emphasis now shifted. Instead of internationalisation, Jerusalem would be "accorded special treatment," with a view to capitalising on any infrastructure in the surrounding Arab and Jewish authorities.<sup>72</sup> American Ambassador to the General Assembly Jessup was more explicit. He supported "the maximum integration of Jerusalem ... with the State of Israel and the Arab State..." Moreover, Washington opposed the United Nations Conciliation Commission from holding administrative functions without "the consent of the parties." This would "prejudice the conciliation functions of the commission, as well as its prospects of establishing relations of confidence with the state of Israel and the Jewish population of Jerusalem."<sup>73</sup>

No mention was made of the Arab residents of Jerusalem or the interests of the Arab world. While free access to the Holy Places was of major concern for Washington, State conceded that "arrangements to this end should be under effective U[nited] N[ations] supervision." Internationalisation was now left to a Conciliation Commission for its consideration. The Truman Administration contended that "the G[eneral] A[ssembly] should not attempt in its present session to establish a final government for Jerusalem." Instead, Washington proposed that it

"should ask a U[nited] N[ations] [C]onciliation [C]ommision to arrange with local authorities for its interim administration and to present to the fourth regular session of the G[eneral] A[ssembly] detailed proposals for a permanent international regime."<sup>74</sup>

Hence, the Administration supported the delay of the issue's consideration for another year.

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<sup>71</sup> Notes from the 27<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the National Security Council, 26 November 1948, PHST, PSF, NSCF: Meetings, Memoranda for the President, Meeting Discussions, 1948, box 220, HSTL.

<sup>72</sup> Statement Concerning Palestine by Jessup, 20 November 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Telegrams and Cables, box 14, HSTL.

<sup>73</sup> Dulles to Marshall, 28 November 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Telegrams and Cables, box 14, HSTL.

<sup>74</sup> Marshall to Lovett, 15 November 1948, *FRUS (1948)*, 5, 2, p. 1596.

## AFTER INTERNATIONALISATION: JERUSALEM'S DIVISION

General Assembly Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 called for Jerusalem to "be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine," while providing "maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area..."<sup>75</sup> Nevertheless, internationalising Jerusalem was out of the question by the end of 1948. By this stage, Foreign Minister Shattell had formally demanded the annexation of "modern Jerusalem," that is, its western sector, into Israel.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the American Consul in Jerusalem reported that Transjordan also opposed internationalisation, Amman instead preferring partition between the Arabs and Jews.<sup>77</sup> This was not surprising, as the Transjordanian army was unable to continue its military drive further west of the Old City. The final blow came from Burdett, who reported that emphasis in the Administration must now concentrate on assuring freedom of access to the Holy Places. "In the absence of a strong international police force for Jerusalem," claimed Burdett, "... the only practical solution ... would be to divide the city into permanent Arab and Jewish areas..."<sup>78</sup> In reality, such a situation already existed. It was a flawed outcome. The previous decision of November 1947 to partition territory between the Arabs and Jews had failed to produce the desired results. In time, Jerusalem proved itself no different.

In the post-1948 period, the Administration's efforts immediately focussed upon the negotiations between Israel and Transjordan. State declared that both "should be encouraged to reach any agreement on the future Arab and Jewish administrative responsibilities in Jerusalem..." Washington unequivocally ruled out

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<sup>75</sup> Resolution 194, Progress Report of the Mediator, 11 December 1948, GA:OR (1948-1949), 5, Committees, p. 645.

<sup>76</sup> Statement by the Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, 15 November 1948, GA:OR (1948-1949), 5, Committees, p. 645.

<sup>77</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 9 December 1948, NAF, SDB, September-December 1948, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>78</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 14 December 1948, NAF, SDB, September -December 1948, box 21, HSTL.

"any arrangements, which authorize the establishment of Israeli or Transjordan sovereignty over ... Jerusalem. We ... believe that some clear representation of the U[nited] N[ations] interest in Jerusalem should be included in the final settlement."<sup>79</sup>

Privately, Lovett informed the American representative to the Conciliation Commission, Mark Ethridge, of the guidelines for the American representative on the Commission to follow.<sup>80</sup> Resolution 194 formed the basis of Washington's position. According to State,

"this could be accomplished by appointing a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem and by establishing machinery to enable him to supervise the administration of the area, to guarantee free access to the city and the Holy Places, and to insure adequate protection of the latter. The effective administration of the area of Jerusalem should be left to Arabs and Jews, the delineation of the parts of the area to be administered by each party to be determined by agreement."<sup>81</sup>

The task ahead for internationalisation was bleak. As Sharett noted, "The Jews demand that Jerusalem will be theirs, the Arabs demand that Jerusalem will belong to an Arab state, and the world demands that Jerusalem will be internationalized."<sup>82</sup> Shades of the present crisis.

Almost immediately, the issue became one of sovereignty over the various sectors of Jerusalem. In the aftermath of war, Israel and Transjordan were determined to retain their respective sectors captured during the conflict.<sup>83</sup> Both would ultimately resist any interna-

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<sup>79</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 24 January 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>80</sup> The Commission had a distinct mandate from Resolution 194 to effect a solution on the issue of Jerusalem. David P. Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 65.

<sup>81</sup> Lovett to Ethridge, 19 January 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 682.

<sup>82</sup> Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, 23 February 1949, (hebrew), quoted from Peter L. Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence," p. 667.

<sup>83</sup> Ben-Gurion told the Palestine Post that "with all respect to the Conciliation Commission of the United Nations, the decision with regard to Jerusalem was made 3000 years ago

tionalisation, although Transjordan declared its opposition to internationalisation of all, or a part of, Jerusalem sooner than the Israelis.<sup>84</sup> Washington was adamant that there existed no legal or moral basis for annexation of any territory. However, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli representative charged with conducting the Israeli negotiations with Amman, informed Acting Secretary of State Lovett that it "would be very difficult politically for [the] P[rovisional] G[overnment] [of] I[srael] [to] relinquish [the] claim to sovereignty over Jewish Jerusalem." As a temporary measure, Dayan suggested that a demarcation line could distinguish between the Arab and Jewish sectors, with a final accord between the two including a clause "stating agreement without prejudice to internationalization in accord with [the] G[eneral] A[ssembly] resolution."<sup>85</sup>

For his part, Abdullah maintained that "if it did not seem possible to obtain internationalization of all Jerusalem, then autonomy of Arab and Jewish areas would be [the] best solution to [the] problem."<sup>86</sup> Foreign Minister Sharett put the matter to rest, informing the Conciliation Commission that "Israel cannot now entrust the security of the Jews in Jerusalem to any outside agency..." Ethridge conveyed his own opinion on the Israeli declaration. He reported that, in essence, Sharett had just asserted that "Israel intends to incorporate Israeli Jerusalem into Israel, and may even intend to transfer its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem."<sup>87</sup>

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when Ben Yishai [King David] made Jerusalem the Jewish centre." *Palestine Post*, 14 February 1949: 1. Quoted in Forsyth, *United Nations Peacemaking*, p. 65. In an earlier speech, made on 12 January 1949, Ben-Gurion asserted that in the aftermath of war, the Partition Plan, with its endorsement of an international regime for Jerusalem, held no legitimacy. Ben-Gurion informed the Mapai Council that "international reality has changed and the clock cannot be turned back." Speech to the Mapai Council (Hebrew), 12 January 1949, quoted in Motti Golani, "Zionism Without Zion: The Jerusalem Question, 1947-1949," *The Journal of Israeli History*, 16, 1 (1995), p. 49.

<sup>84</sup> According to Ambassador McDonald, on 31 January 1949, Abdullah announced his resistance to any form of internationalisation. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, p. 125.

<sup>85</sup> Burdett to Lovett, 29 January 1948, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Telegrams and Cables, box 14, HSTL.

<sup>86</sup> See footnote no. 2, *FRUS (1949)*, 6, p. 668.

<sup>87</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 9 February 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL. Ethridge's assessment, that Tel Aviv intended to transfer its seat of government to Jerusalem, proved correct after it was revealed that the first Israel constituent assembly would indeed be held in the city. State protested to Sharett and instructed its legation in Jerusalem and embassy in Tel Aviv to avoid attending the assembly. Summary of Telegrams, 11 February 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

State's official position on the issue had not crystallised any further by early March 1949. The Administration had "taken no final position on the exact kind of international regime which should be set up in Jerusalem," since this responsibility fell to the Conciliation Commission. Yet, its "informal thinking is that Israelis and Arabs might administer the separate sections of the city under the general supervision of a U[nited] N[ations] representative."<sup>88</sup> Moves towards such a policy gathered momentum. A paper prepared by State in conjunction with Ambassador Burdett, the French representative to the Jerusalem Committee, and the French Consul General was officially presented to the Jerusalem Committee on 3 March 1949.<sup>89</sup> The committee approved the conclusions set forth in the paper. The proposals advocated an international city, but unlike the vague provision in the November 1947 Partition Plan, allowing "local autonomous units ... wide powers of local government and administration," the plan called for "local democratic self-government in Jewish and Arab areas respectively as to all matters not placed within the jurisdiction of the international authority."<sup>90</sup> This gave the Arab and Jewish authorities vastly more power than the Partition Plan. While the Administration declared that it still "supported the principle of the internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area," as specified in Resolution 194, the shift towards separate sectors was becoming all the more entrenched.<sup>91</sup> United Nations efforts also failed to advance anything substantial with United Nations mediator Ralph Bunche, at this stage, still concerned with delineating temporary zones between the two belligerents. Nevertheless, Bunche reinforced the United Nations intent for demilitarisation of the city and the establishment of a police force. The plan ap-

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<sup>88</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 4 March 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>89</sup> The Jerusalem Committee was established in March 1949 under the Conciliation Commission.

<sup>90</sup> Halderman to Cargo, 5 March 1949, *FRUS (1949)*, 6, p. 795. The French representative to the Commission disagreed with the proposals put forward, and instead, produced his own set of guidelines with the intent to create a full international regime for Jerusalem. Ehridge protested, declaring the plan "unrealistic." Acheson to Burdett, 13 April 1949, *FRUS (1949)*, 6, p. 911.

<sup>91</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Rockwell, 1 March 1949, *FRUS (1949)*, 6, p. 783. While the British position favoured internationalisation over the entire city, the Foreign Office reported that the Attlee Government was concerned over the "practical difficulties" of such a scheme. See footnote no. 1, *ibid*.

proved by the Jerusalem Committee featured both.<sup>92</sup> Internationalisation was still uppermost in the mind of Ethridge. The American representative on the Conciliation Commission informed State that Tel Aviv's establishment of various offices in Jerusalem endangered hopes for a corpus separatum.<sup>93</sup>

## **FUNCTIONAL INTERNATIONALISATION: FOCUS ON THE HOLY PLACES**

Officially, an international regime was still favoured by Washington. For all practical purposes, however, United Nations responsibility for Jerusalem was to be kept to the bare minimum. Henceforth, the full internationalisation of the city was removed from consideration, to the detriment of the region's stability and the strategic interests of the United States. Acheson best typified the thinking of officials tasked with the problem, commenting that "only specific functions will be carried out by whatever internat[ional] and joint auth[orities] may be created."<sup>94</sup>

Israel, however, was intent on outright annexation of the western sector. Its transferal of various ministries from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem suggested as much. Acheson met with Foreign Minister Sharett on 5 April 1949, and stated clearly that "with respect to Jerusalem, the President stands behind the concept of internationalization as set forth in the solution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948." Acknowledging that worldwide interests in Jerusalem focussed upon the Holy Places, Acheson conceded that

"it should be possible to work out arrangements, perhaps under the trusteeship system, under which Israel and Arab authorities could accept responsibilities in Jerusalem, but which recognise international interest and authority for the Holy Places."

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<sup>92</sup> "Reciprocal access to [the] Holy Places" was also a mainstay of the proposal. Chairman's Suggestions for an Alternative Approach to the Problem of Armistice Lines in the Jerusalem Area, 15 March 1949, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, (hereafter DFPI), *English Companion Volume*, 3, pp. 419-423.

<sup>93</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 31 March 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>94</sup> Acheson to Burdett, 11 March 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 819.

Sharett agreed that the proposal had merit, yet failed to endorse Truman's position in light of a possible agreement reached between Israel and Transjordan. As an aside, Sharett commented that in prior discussions with Amman, Abdullah had favoured annexation instead of internationalisation.<sup>95</sup> However, the Palestine Conciliation Commission disputed this, claiming that

"Arab delegates in general are prepared to accept [the] principle of [an] international regime for [the] Jerusalem area on [the] condition [that the] U[nited] N[ations] offers [a] necessary guarantee of [the] stability and permanence of [the] regime."<sup>96</sup>

Ben-Gurion proved more illustrative. The Prime Minister stated that while "Israel was fully prepared to accept international control of [the] [H]oly [P]laces," for "historical, political and religious reasons," it could not accept the "establishment of [an] international regime in [the] city..."<sup>97</sup> Ben-Gurion demanded further that the Conciliation Commission

"should strive to achieve [a] plan acceptable to [the] parties concerned ... If [the] Committee were to proceed without reference to states immediately concerned, [the] product of its work would probably be unacceptable..."<sup>98</sup>

The White House sensed that Israel's attitude was becoming increasingly less receptive to outside opinion. In late April, Truman sent Major General J. H. Hilldring to Israel to deliver a message to Ben-

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<sup>95</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, 5 April 1949, Papers of Dean Acheson, (hereafter PDA), Memoranda of Conversation, January-July 1949, box 73, HSTL. The American embassy in Amman reported that the French representative to the Conciliation Commission was dissatisfied with Washington's policy, claiming that as a result of it, "the Israelis will annex half the city...." Summary of Telegrams, 12 April 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>96</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 9 April 1949, PHST, PSF, SF, Foreign Affairs File: Israel, box 181, HSTL.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 13 April 1949, PHST, PSF, SF, Foreign Affairs File: Israel, box 181, HSTL.

Gurion to the effect that the Administration was "embarrassed by Israel's unyielding attitude on Jerusalem..."<sup>99</sup>

The armistice concluded between Israel and Jordan on 3 April provided for the establishment of a special committee that had "exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it"<sup>100</sup> The most important of these issues to come before the attention of the committee was the status of Jerusalem. While the Israel Foreign Ministry warned Washington to expect "a month of masterly inactivity" whilst the two sides attempted to reach an agreement, the American embassy in Amman was more pensive, maintaining that Abdullah was likely to yield to Israeli pressure.<sup>101</sup> "In his desire for a settlement and belief that he can count on no outside assistance," Abdullah would, warned the charge in Amman, "be inclined to accede too easily to Jewish demands, particularly on Jerusalem."<sup>102</sup> Another worrying aspect of the committee's formation was the role of the United Nations. The organisation was excluded entirely from the proceedings on the Jerusalem question. Amman explained that while the United Nations absence was Israel's goal, Transjordan "realized [it] needed assistance [from the] U[nited] N[ations] and [the] P[alestine] C[onciliation] C[ommission] in [a] Jerusalem settlement."<sup>103</sup> State officially encouraged Jordan to abandon any separate negotiations with Israel on 1 June 1949.<sup>104</sup> Events, specifically Tel Aviv's "blackmail" of Amman prior to the armistice, were still fresh in State's mind.<sup>105</sup>

Privately, however, comments made by Acheson in April seemingly encouraged separate discussions. Acheson cabled Burdett in Jerusalem, on 13 April, authorising him to discuss with France and Turkey a proposal for Israeli and Arab trusteeships over the Holy Places. Acheson

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<sup>99</sup> McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, p. 155.

<sup>100</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 5 April 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 895.

<sup>101</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 13 April 1949, PHST, PSF, SF, Foreign Affairs File: Israel, box 181, HSTL.

<sup>102</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 18 April 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>103</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 8 April 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 901.

<sup>104</sup> Memorandum by Webb, 16 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1145.

<sup>105</sup> During the armistice negotiations between Israel and Transjordan in 1949, Ben-Gurion threatened to resume hostilities against the monarch if he did not withdraw his troops from the existing cease-fire lines on the Iraqi front.

asserted that Washington was intent on pursuing a course that offered a “minimum of internationalization of Jerusalem which will be possible of acceptance by both sides rather than to perfect [an] intricate and logical plan which will have no basis in reality.”<sup>106</sup> Hence, both State and the White House seemingly came to rely on the belligerents to provide an effective solution to the problem. Bunche questioned the wisdom of this approach, commenting that he was not optimistic for the future prospects of internationalisation, “feeling that it can only be carried out if the U[nited] S[tates] puts strong pressure on Israel.” The Administration was not prepared to do this. As it was, Arab and Israeli trusteeship over the Holy Places was now being endorsed as a substitute for internationalisation. Bunche was scathing of this option, although State described him as merely “sceptical over our plan for the creation of Arab and Jewish trusteeships for the two zones of the city.”<sup>107</sup> Ethridge, himself, was unsure of the proposal, questioning whether the “main purposes [of] trusteeship... [will] be reconciled with [the] objectives [of the] international community re Jerusalem...”<sup>108</sup>

Reliance on Israel and Transjordan to produce an arrangement for Jerusalem, one compatible with American strategic interests in the region, proved futile. By the end of April, both sides had ruled out internationalisation of the city. Jerusalem, after all, was a “primary territorial objective of both Abdullah and Ben-Gurion.”<sup>109</sup> This came much to Washington’s relief given the Administration’s current position based on a “minimal international obligation for Jerusalem.”<sup>110</sup> While the White House was still insisting that it supported the principle of an international city, Washington now approved a 18 May 1949 paper prepared by the Conciliation Commission.<sup>111</sup> It consisted of

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<sup>106</sup> Acheson to Burdett, 13 April 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 911.

<sup>107</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 21 April 1949, NAF, SDB, January-April 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>108</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 16 April 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 921.

<sup>109</sup> Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948*, (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p. 166. For a thorough examination of the early negotiations between the two belligerents over Jerusalem, see pp. 174- 191. Importantly, both kept the negotiations on Jerusalem separate from the other issues of border and refugees.

<sup>110</sup> Satterthwaite to Rusk, 26 April 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 949.

<sup>111</sup> For example, see Truman’s letter to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, undated, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1015. The letter was sent on 19 May 1949.

an international authority exercising actual governing powers only over the Holy Places, with all other powers in the hands of the Jewish and Arab authorities in their respective zones; the demilitarization of the area; an international tribunal to have jurisdiction on the competence of the organs and courts within the area and; an administrative council to be responsible for matters which must be handled in common by the Jewish and Arab zones.<sup>112</sup>

Importantly, the “sovereign of the city was to be an international body.”<sup>113</sup> The plan was similar to the one presented by Acheson to Sharett on 5 April. Indeed, by mid-May and after Israeli admission to the United Nations, Acheson admitted that the positions of Washington and Tel Aviv had converged.<sup>114</sup> Consequently, Truman’s infamous rebuke of Israeli policy with regard to borders and refugees, in a letter dated 28 May 1949 to Ben-Gurion, did not include any concerns regarding Jerusalem. While involving discussions pertaining to the territorial aspect of the question, the city itself failed to be mentioned specifically. That such a situation had developed was remarkable, given Tel Aviv’s obvious intention to assert its sovereignty over the western sector of the city by establishing various government ministries in west Jerusalem. This action constituted one of the first instances of an Israeli “projection” of a Jewish Jerusalem.<sup>115</sup>

The internationalisation of the Holy Places was far from guaranteed, so long as the Administration allowed the issue to be conducted in a forum that prevented United Nations involvement. The failure of the special committee, established by the Israeli-Transjordanian armistice, was evident by June 1949. Burdett maintained that the issue should be

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<sup>112</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 3 May 1949, NAF, SDB, May-August 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>113</sup> Ilan Pappe, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1951*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1988), p. 192.

<sup>114</sup> The Secretary commented that “it is felt that substantial progress has been made in bringing closer together the views of our two Governments...” Acheson to Epstein, 18 May 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6: 1022.

<sup>115</sup> Edward W. Said asserts that “only by first projecting an idea of Jerusalem could Israel then process to the changes on the ground,” that included “massive architectural, demographic, and political metamorphosis.” Said maintains that Israel’s capture of west Jerusalem in 1948 culminated in its “loss” to Palestinians, given that much of the sector was distinctly Arab. Said, “Projecting Jerusalem,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25, 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 6-7.

kept well away from the Lausanne Conference for fear it would “become involved in [the] whole peace treaty procedure with consequent long delays...” He therefore recommended the transferal of proceedings from the special committee to the Mixed Armistice Commission under the leadership of General William E. Riley.<sup>116</sup> The resumption of hostilities in and around the Jerusalem area and up on the Syrian border was of real concern by this point. Washington warned the Israelis to refrain from any aggressive notions it may have had. The Under Secretary of State James Webb once again noted that “peace and stability” in the region was “extremely important” to Washington, although this did not seem to extend to an effort to establish a regime in Jerusalem conducive to the city’s long-term stability.<sup>117</sup> In the midst of the special committee’s failure and the possibility of a resumption of hostilities, the United States urged a quick settlement before the issue dominated proceedings at Lausanne. Discussions would now be conducted under the Mixed Armistice Commission, and Washington instructed its representatives in Israel and Jordan to urge compliance.<sup>118</sup> State later conceded that the aims of the proposal served the self-interest of Washington. By placing Riley, an American, in charge of negotiations, the United States was once again in a position of authority. Thus far, the Administration lacked information on proceedings, and as such, was not ‘in a position where it [could] appropriately undertake to advise the parties.’<sup>119</sup> Significantly, though, the Department did not believe that its proposal would effect “any great change in [the] situation.”<sup>120</sup>

While both parties ultimately agreed to the American proposal in late June, State had already proposed that the Conciliation Commission submit its own proposals.<sup>121</sup> The Commission’s recommendations closely followed its initial 18 May draft, a plan that limited the concept of an international city.<sup>122</sup> Consequently, a 14 September position pa-

<sup>116</sup> Burdett to Acheson, 11 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1117.

<sup>117</sup> Webb to the Embassy in Israel, 14 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1137.

<sup>118</sup> Webb to the Embassy in Israel, 17 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, pp. 1153-1154.

<sup>119</sup> Acheson to United States Mission at the United Nations, 23 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1167.

<sup>120</sup> Webb to the Legation in Jordan, 19 June 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1158.

<sup>121</sup> Summary of Telegrams, 29 July 1949, NAF, SDB, May-August 1949, box 21, HSTL.

<sup>122</sup> Israel and Jordan would administer their sectors, while an administrator, appointed by the United Nations and protected by a United Nations guard force, would be responsible for the Holy Places.

per prepared by State endorsed these findings.<sup>123</sup> Israel and Jordan did not.<sup>124</sup> The remaining Arab states held out for a proposal that sought full internationalisation, inter-Arab politics ensuring that Jordan would remain unpopular if it possessed complete authority over the Old City. NSC 47/2 also agreed with State's position and the Commission's proposals, as did the White House.<sup>125</sup> On 21 November 1949, Acheson obtained Truman's support for the Conciliation Commission's proposals.<sup>126</sup> Annexation of the two sectors, barring the Old City, was not officially elaborated upon, yet the United States had unofficially endorsed the formal inclusion of both sectors into Arab and Jewish territory. State admitted as much, although hastily adding that the Administration still supported an international regime for Jerusalem.<sup>127</sup> Such a

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<sup>123</sup> Specifically, *corpus separatum* was abandoned for a more limited form of internationalisation over the Holy Places. "Powers of Government would be entrusted to the adjacent states of Israel and ... the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom." Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 14 September 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1385.

Ambassador McDonald maintained that while he understood Washington's support for the Commission's proposals, the Ambassador warned the White House that he "dreads what might happen if an attempt were made under U[nited] N[ations] auspices to force Israel to accept immediately a U[nited] N[ations] administrator. A repetition of the Bernadotte tragedy would not be improbable if internationalization were to be implemented before there has been an overwhelming demonstration of world public opinion, backed by such tangible evidence of effective material support as would discourage Jewish extremists and make it possible for the Israel Government to yield without destroying itself." McDonald to Clifford, 30 November 1949, PCC, SF, 1945-1954, Palestine: Correspondence and Miscellaneous, box 13, HSTL. Hahn maintains that this exchange represented Israeli attempts to effect a reversal of Washington's policy through the Ambassador. Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence," p. 673.

<sup>124</sup> In correspondence with the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, Sharett asserted that the Conciliation Commission's proposal "represents an effort to carry out the original proposal for the "internationalisation" of Jerusalem by means of a compromise ... this is an impracticable scheme. The solution to the problem must, in our view, be sought by limiting the concept of "internationalisation" to the care for the safety and accessibility of the Holy Places and religious institutions, which is, after all, the only real concern of the international community. Sharett to Fraser, 8 November 1949, Papers of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, (hereafter PMFA), Offices of the Minister and Director-General, (hereafter RG 130.02), 2443/4-I, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, (hereafter ISA).

Not surprisingly, Jordan also opposed the plan as Abdullah refused any internationalisation over the Old City. *Palestine Post*, 9 October 1949, p. 1. Quoted in Forsyth, *United Nations Peacemaking*, p. 66.

<sup>125</sup> NSC 47/2, Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States, 17 October 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, pp. 1438-1439.

<sup>126</sup> Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence," p. 674.

<sup>127</sup> Burdett commented, "the United States has given its blessings to annexation but at a future date and as part and parcel of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. In addition, it continues to support internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area." Burdett to Acheson, 29 October 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1456.

contradictory statement was matched only by the Israeli Foreign Ministry's confusion over its policy. The Israeli legation in London, at the end of October 1949, cabled Tel Aviv asking, "[w]hat is our policy about Jerusalem?"<sup>128</sup>

## FINAL ATTEMPTS

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 303 of 9 December 1949 reiterated its support for an international regime as specified by the November 1947 Partition Plan. The resolution endorsed an ad hoc political committee's recommendations in favour of full internationalisation as opposed to those belonging to the Conciliation Commission. The city, its borders conforming to the November resolution, would be "placed under a permanent international regime."<sup>129</sup> The United States opposed the draft resolution of the political committee and re-stated its support for the Conciliation Commission's limited internationalisation. The Soviet Union voted in favour of Resolution 303.<sup>130</sup> Plans for internationalisation, each with their varying degrees of corpus separatum, proved pointless in the face of Israeli-Jordanian determination to annex their respective sectors of Jerusalem. In the end, the reality of the situation outstripped the good intentions of the United Nations resolution. The Administration's policy towards Jerusalem in 1948-1949 failed to impress upon the Israelis and the Arab world its desire to see the city internationalised. For all practical purposes, the concept was dead by the end of 1948. Partial internationalisation of the Holy Places was indeed a viable option, yet the Administration's reli-

<sup>128</sup> Eliash to Comay, 10 October 1949, RG 130.02, 2443/ 4-I, ISA.

<sup>129</sup> Resolution 303, Palestine: Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and the Protection of the Holy Places, 9 December 1949, GA:OR (1949), 5, Resolutions, p. 25.

<sup>130</sup> Regarding Moscow's support for internationalisation, stemming back to November 1947 and its support of the partition plan, the American Embassy in Moscow suggested that it was merely a device to create a "weak, independent state or states in Palestine [which] would further its basic objective of eradicating Anglo-American influence in [the] area...." Kohler to Acheson, 1 July 1949, *FRUS* (1949), 6, p. 1194. After supporting Resolution 303, in April 1950, the Soviet Union informed the United Nations Secretariat that Moscow intended to withdraw its support for the internationalisation of Jerusalem. Yaakov Ro'i, *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973*, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), p. 115.

For the debate surrounding the Political Committee's report, see GA:OR (1949), 1, Plenary Meetings, pp. 572-607.

ance upon the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations to produce a viable outcome was remiss, particularly since its own national security in the region was dependent upon the stability of Jerusalem. Ultimately, the belligerents achieved their goals. Israel declared West Jerusalem as its capital on 13 December 1949 while Amman annexed the eastern sector on 11 April 1950.<sup>131</sup> Washington refused to recognise both acts. Jerusalem remained partitioned between the Arab world and Israel until 1967. As such, the issue remained a dynamic of the Arab-Israeli crisis, embroiling the United States on subsequent occasions and providing a context for Soviet encroachment in the region. It was not Washington's impotence that had failed to moderate Israeli and Jordanian demands. Rather, the position of the belligerents suited Washington's own policy, as the White House was opposed to American troops on the ground and reluctant to contribute financially to the maintenance of an international regime in the city. In doing so, American strategic interests were overlooked. Most importantly, however, a great historical opportunity was lost.

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<sup>131</sup> For an examination of the internal events in Israel leading up to Ben-Gurion's announcement, see Michael Brecher, "Jerusalem: Israel's Political Decisions, 1947-1977," *The Middle East Journal*, 32, 1 (Winter 1978), pp. 18-21.

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## A P P E N D I C E S



## Chronology

### 1947-1949 (Harry S. Truman)



**1947**

**Feb. 7:** The British Government announces that it will terminate its mandate for Palestine.

**Feb. 14:** The British Government announces that it will refer the problem of the future of Palestine to the UN.

**April 2:** The British Government submits to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) an account of its administration of Palestine, and asks the UNGA to make recommendations for a future government of Palestine.

**May 13:** The UNGA appoints an 11-nation Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study the Palestine problem.

**Aug. 31:** UNSCOP issues its report, recommending unanimously that Palestine be granted independence at the earliest possible date. It also recommends by a majority vote (7 of the member nations voting in favor) that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish and Arab states.

**Sep. 17:** Addressing the UN, Secretary of State George Marshall hints that the US is reluctant to endorse the partition of Palestine.

**Oct. 10:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff argue in a memorandum entitled "The Problem of Palestine" that the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states would enable the Soviet Union to replace the United States and Great Britain in the region and would endanger United States access to Middle East oil.

**Oct. 17:** President Truman writes to Senator Claude Pepper: "I received about 35,000 pieces of mail and propaganda from the Jews in this country while this matter [partition of Palestine] was pending. I put it all in a pile and struck a match to it – I never looked at a single

one of the letters because I felt the United Nations Committee was acting in a judicial capacity and should not be interfered with."

**Nov. 29:** UNGA approves the Partition Plan for Palestine put forward by the UNSCOP, dividing the area into three entities: a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone around Jerusalem.

**Dec. 2:** President Truman writes that "The vote in the UN is only the beginning and the Jews must now display tolerance and consideration for the other people in Palestine with whom they will necessarily have to be neighbors."

**Dec. 12:** President Truman writes to Chaim Weizmann, that it is essential that restraint and tolerance be exercised by all parties if a peaceful settlement is to be reached in the Middle East.

#### **1948**

**Feb. 12:** At a meeting of the National Security Council Secretary of Defence James Forrestal says that any serious attempt to implement partition in Palestine would set in motion events that would result in at least a partial mobilisation of US armed forces.

**March 8:** In a memorandum to President Truman, Special Counsel Clark Clifford writes that Truman's actions in support of partition are "in complete conformity with the settled policy of the United States."

**March 9:** Secretary of State George Marshall instructs US representative to the UNSC, Warren Austin, that if a special assembly on Palestine were convened, the US would support a UN trusteeship for Palestine.

**March 12:** UNSCOP reports that "present indications point to the inescapable conclusion that when the [British] mandate is terminated, Palestine is likely to suffer severely from administrative chaos and widespread strife and bloodshed."

**March 18:** UNSCOP reports that it has failed to arrange any compromise between Jews and Arabs, and it recommends that the UN undertake a temporary trusteeship for Palestine in order to restore peace.

**March 19:** US representative to the UNSC Warren Austin announces to the UNSC that the US position is that the partition of Palestine is no longer a viable option.

**March 25:** At a press conference President Truman says that a UN trusteeship for Palestine is no substitute for partition but only a temporary measure, intended to establish the peaceful conditions that would be the essential foundation for a final political settlement.

**April 16:** A special UNGA session convenes to discuss Palestine.


**April 26:** The US secretly proposes a security zone for Jerusalem and its environs.

**May 5:** A special committee, under the auspices of the UN, is convened to deal with the issue of Jerusalem.

**May 13:** Weizmann writes to Truman: "I deeply hope that the US, which under your leadership has done so much to find a just solution, will promptly recognize the Provisional Government of the new Jewish state. The world, I think, would regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations."

**May 14:** At 4 p.m. local time David Ben-Gurion reads a "Declaration of Independence," proclaiming the existence of a Jewish state - 'Israel' - as of 15 May 1948, at midnight, when the British mandate expires.

**May 15:** A few minutes after midnight Palestine time the US recognises Israel, stating: "This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The US recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel." (see image).



- Arab states issue a response statement; Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon attack Israel.

**June 15:** The Soviet Union demands that it be allowed to send observers to Palestine.

**July 12:** UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte officially retreats from the internationalisation of Jerusalem.

**Aug. 3:** Israel announces military rule over its occupied sectors of Jerusalem.

- The US announces its intention to contribute observers to Jerusalem.

**Aug. 12:** Israel rules out internationalisation over the entire area of Jerusalem.

**Sept. 17:** UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte is assassinated.

**Oct. 18:** The US Department of State formally requests that the Department of Defence focus specifically on an American contribution to the Jerusalem police force.

**Nov. 17:** National Security Council memorandum number 35 advises against an American troop commitment.

**Nov. 24:** US President Truman approves National Security Council memorandum number 27/3 which also advocates against an American contribution to a police force in Jerusalem.

**Dec. 11:** UNGA

Resolution 194 calls for a special international status for Jerusalem.

January 31, 1949

REVISED DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

On October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25th. The votes have now been counted, and this Government has been officially informed of the results. The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of this date.

**1949**

**Jan. 25:** Following popular elections a permanent government takes office in Israel.

**Jan. 21:** Dean Acheson succeeds Marshall as US Secretary of State.

**Jan. 31:** The US recognises Israel on a de jure basis (see image left).

**April 5:** US Secretary of State Dean Acheson meets with Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and declares that the Truman Ad-

*Approved Jan. 31, 1949  
Truman*

*B. R. J. E.*

ministration remains committed to internationalisation of Jerusalem.

**April 13:** Acheson cables the US Consul General in Jerusalem, William Burdett, and authorises him to start discussing a proposal for Arab and Israeli trusteeships over the Holy Places.

**May 18:** A Palestinian Conciliation Commission paper discusses a limited form of internationalisation.

- Acheson declares that the American and Israeli positions on Jerusalem have "converged."

**Sept. 14:** A State Department proposal endorses the Conciliation Commission's 18 May paper.

**Nov. 21:** Truman supports the 18 May paper and State's 14 September proposal.

**Dec. 9:** UNGA Resolution 303 reiterates its support for internationalising Jerusalem.


**Dec. 13:** Israel declares west Jerusalem as its capital.

## **1950**


**April 11:** Jordan annexes the eastern sector.

# Maps

## **Jerusalem and the *Corpus Separatum* proposed in 1947**



Partitioned Jerusalem, 1948-1967



## Who's Who (List of Names)

King Abdullah	Monarch of the Kingdom of Jordan
Warren Austin	United States Representative to the United Nations Security Council
David Ben-Gurion	Prime Minister of Israel
Count Folke Bernadotte	United Nations Mediator
Earnest Bevin	Foreign Secretary of Great Britain
Ralph Bunche	United Nations Acting Mediator
William Burdett	United States Consul General to Jerusalem
Clark Clifford	Special Counsel to the United States President
Moshe Dayan	Israeli representative in negotiations with Jordan
Lewis A. Douglas	United States Ambassador to London
Sir Hugh Dow	British Commissioner in Jerusalem
Abba Eban	Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations
Eliahu Epstein	Israeli Ambassador to Washington
Mark Ethridge	United States Representative to the Palestine Conciliation Commission
James Forrestal	United States Secretary of Defence
Maj-Gen. J.H. Hilldring	United States Envoy to the Middle East
Phillip Jessup	United States Representative to the United Nations General Assembly
Robert Lovett	Acting Secretary of State
John J. MacDonald	United States Consul General to Tel Aviv

George Marshall	United States Secretary of State
Robert McClintock	Special Assistant to Dean Rusk
James G. McDonald	United States Special Representative to Israel
Golda Myerson	Israeli Minister-Designate to Moscow
Gen. William E. Riley	Head of the Mixed Armistice Commission
Dean Rusk	Head of the United States' Department of State's United Nations Office
Moshe Sharett	Foreign Minister of Israel
Harry S. Truman	United States President
Lie Trygve	United Nations Secretary General
James Webb	United States Under Secretary of State

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*Part Two:*

## *Johnson, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Borders*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The former Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, stated in his memoirs that the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war “gave new force to the question whether [Israel] should be permitted to use the territory [it] has occupied as a political bargaining counter...”<sup>1</sup> United States President Lyndon Johnson’s policy towards the issue of borders and territory in 1967 was decidedly pro-Israeli and chiefly motivated by the reassessment of Israel’s strategic value to the United States. The trend began under Eisenhower and was continued during the Kennedy Administration when a “special relationship” between Washington and Jerusalem was formed. American policy was also influenced by Johnson’s own sympathies towards the Jewish nation. Special Assistant to the President, Walt Rostow described Johnson as “the most pro-Semitic man” he had ever met.<sup>2</sup> This paper will discuss Johnson’s territorial strategy towards Israeli gains throughout and immediately after the Six Day War and argue that American policy diverged from its own Cold War and strategic interests. Linking the issues of belligerency with Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including the Old City within east Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights, the White House and the Department of State viewed the newly created status quo as an opportunity to attain a comprehensive peace. There would be no Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory without an Arab declaration of an end to belligerency and an acknowledgment of the Israeli right to exist. Implicit to this arrangement lay the assumption that peace negotiations were a natural progression.

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<sup>1</sup> Andrei Gromyko, *Memories*, (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 267.

<sup>2</sup> Oral Interview with Walt Rostow, 5 November 1999, University of Texas, Austin.

The strategy was grossly negligent. Tactics of brinkmanship failed to stir the Arab world as a whole, a requirement for a legitimate peace with Israel, and only solidified resentment towards Israel and the United States. The American policy also presumed the existence of Arab unity, not to mention the fact that Israel would be willing to accept the linkage as terms for an agreement at a later date. Israel's statement in late August 1967, ruling out a "simple return" to the pre-5 June borders "even in exchange for a peace treaty," illustrated that this was not the case. The Administration ignored the possibility that Israel would harden its own position, also illustrated by Eshkol's September 1967 declaration introducing Jewish settlements into the occupied territories. The final blow came when the United Arab Republic and Jordan, in the face of opposition from Syria and Iraq, eventually declared their willingness to recognise Israel's right to exist, in early November 1967. Contingent upon an Israeli withdrawal and a solution for the refugee problem, Israeli refused. Henceforth, American strategy was inoperable as Israel refused Cairo and Amman's overtures. The Administration's policy even ignored its own strategic interests in the region and ensured that the Arab camp would continue to play Washington off against Moscow.

A fourth Arab-Israeli war became inevitable. Johnson's tactics failed to take into account the lessons of history. Israeli occupation of Arab territory after 1949 did not result in any reconciliation between the belligerents. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's initial attempts within the framework of Alpha and the Anderson Mission, in the first half of the 1950s, failed to produce a solution and also demonstrated the worthlessness of an ad hoc approach, years after the dynamics of the conflict were introduced. His strategy of "immediate deterrence," forcing an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1957, marginalised the Soviet Union and was a success for American relations with the Arab Middle East. Johnson's policy presumed that the Arab World would be bullied towards the bargaining table. The strategy of linkage failed to consider the degree to which the Arab world could hold out against a peace with Israel. It also neglected to consider Israel's future aims that precluded a peace deal based on full return of the occupied territories. Ultimately the territorial modifications resulting from the 1967 war have produced intractable problems for which there are now very few solutions.

## UNITED STATES POLICY PRIOR TO 1967

In the aftermath of Eisenhower's exhaustive efforts ending Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory, a subtle shift in American-Israeli relations transpired. While not formally espoused in a doctrine or bilateral agreement of any sort between the two nations, a growing closeness akin to a unified front against the changing Middle Eastern environment in the late 1950s signaled a respite in Washington's concerns for territorial issues within the Arab-Israeli framework. No longer did the Eisenhower Administration consider the dispute of supreme concern in terms of the degree to which it constituted a liability for American strategic interests. Instead, the inter-Arab upheavals of 1958, in which the United States militarily intervened in Lebanon, intervened diplomatically in Jordan to prevent King Abdullah's downfall, and led a concerted approach with moderates in the wake of the Iraqi revolution, ushered in the Arab Cold War. Henceforth, inter-Arab politics constituted the gravest threat to Washington's interests in the region. Israel soon became an ally of sorts for the Administration. The National Security Council Planning Board crystallised the growing feeling within the White House and State. Submitting an argument against reconsideration of America's policy towards Israel, the Planning Board pointed out that "if we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East."<sup>3</sup> Away from the Arab-Israeli dispute, Israeli annexation of the West Bank of Jordan was mooted in the event of Jordan's deterioration at the hands of Egypt in the second half of 1958. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles subtly warned Egyptian and United Arab Republic Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi.

If the U[nited] A[rab] R[epublic] really wanted to take over Jordan, they could probably do so since the United States was not willing to go to all lengths ... to keep Jordan out of U[nited] A[rab] R[epublic] hands. One question was, however, what would happen to Jordan ... if

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<sup>3</sup> "Factors Affecting U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," 19 August 1958, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower (hereafter PDDE), White House Office Files (hereafter WHOF), Special Ass., National Security Affairs, 1952-1961 (hereafter SA for NSAff, 1952-1961), National Security Council (hereafter NSC) Series, Policy Papers (hereafter PP) Subseries, box 23, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL).

the present regime should be ousted and the U[nited] A[rab] R[epublic] should not be in a position to assume the enormous financial responsibility for the country. That was quite apart from the question of the likely Israeli reaction to various contingencies.<sup>4</sup>

The shift in Washington's strategy, only a year and a half after American diplomacy disapproved of Israeli territorial gains by force, was remarkable, and proved effective. Comments made to British Ambassador to Washington Sir Harold Caccia by Dulles revealed that "the U[nited] A[rab] R[epublic] was particularly sensitive" to the prospect of an Israeli intervention<sup>5</sup> Within this changing Middle Eastern environment, Israel's territorial position was considered within the framework of its dispute with the Arab states, but only in passing. The National Security Council Planning Board recommended that Washington take "initiative through the U[nited] N[ations] or otherwise as appropriate to establish the boundaries of Israel and obtain additional U[nited] N[ations] or great power guarantees of agreed frontiers."<sup>6</sup> The effort effectively ended Eisenhower's dealings with the territorial aspect of the Arab-Israeli controversy.

President John F. Kennedy's tenure focussed predominantly upon the refugee aspect of the dispute. Nevertheless, the Administration was on record as opposing "the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East." Kennedy explained that

"in the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or put a stop to such aggression, which ... has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 21 August 1958, *FRUS (1958-1960)*, 11, p. 507.

<sup>5</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 31 October 1958, *FRUS (1958-1960)*, 11, p. 623.

<sup>6</sup> "Factors Affecting U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," 19 August 1958, PDDE, WHOF, SA for NSAff, 1952-1961, NSC Series, PP Subseries, box 23, DDEL.

<sup>7</sup> President Kennedy's Press Conference Statement, 8 May 1963, Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson (hereafter PLBJ), National Security File (hereafter NSF), National Security Council History – The Middle East Crisis (hereafter NSCH), box 17, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL).

The United States-Israel relationship throughout this era was noted for the emergence of a “special relationship” between the two nations.<sup>8</sup> The most overt consequence of the relationship involved United States military support of Jerusalem. The need for such a partnership was greater for Israel than the United States. “Superpower support was regarded not as a substitute for Israel’s self-reliance, but as a requisite supplement to it.”<sup>9</sup> In Kennedy’s meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir on 27 December 1962, the President cemented the informal alliance. “The United States,” Kennedy maintained,

“has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East  
really comparable only to that which it has with Britain ...  
But for us to play properly the role we are called to play,  
we cannot afford the luxury of identifying Israel ... as our  
exclusive friend ... and letting other countries go. If we  
pulled out of the Arab Middle East and maintained our ties  
only with Israel this would not be in Israel’s best interests.”<sup>10</sup>

Territorial matters assumed a secondary consideration for Washington’s relations with Israel. In preparation for the meeting with Meir, State submitted briefing material to the White House detailing the Administration’s territorial position. Kennedy was encouraged to make clear to the Foreign Minister that while Washington recognised “Israel’s de facto control within the Armistice Lines ... Israel’s borders are provisional pending conclusion of a peace settlement...”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov offers a definition of the term. According to Bar-Siman-Tov, “the special relationship thesis generally maintains that the United States and Israel have a unique and unparalleled partnership, with high levels of friendship, amity, trust and, political and military cooperation. Each side occupies a special position in the other’s domestic and foreign policies.” See Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel Since 1948: A ‘Special’ Relationship?”, *Diplomatic History*, 22, 2 (Spring 1998), p. 231.

<sup>9</sup> Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 85.

<sup>10</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 27 December 1962, *FRUS (1961-1963)*, 18, p. 280.

<sup>11</sup> Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, 21 December 1962, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 21, LB JL. The memorandum shows that the Administration was more concerned with the refugee issue, Israel’s nuclear facilities, United States military aid to Jerusalem and the lack of reciprocity on the part of Israel in the face of overwhelming support by the Kennedy Administration towards Israel.

For the Johnson Administration, poor relations with the Arab World justified the increasing closeness between Washington and Israel. Still, the cementing of the “special relationship” was largely the product of Washington’s assessment that Israel was now of strategic significance to the United States.<sup>12</sup> The “special relationship,” a concept that found credence with the Eisenhower Administration after the Suez crisis, and fully established by Kennedy, justified the Administration’s strategy towards the third Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, a United States Presidential Administration endorsed Israel’s territorial aggrandisement until such time that the Arab World demonstrated its willingness to enter into comprehensive negotiations. American support for Israel remained consistent throughout the tenure of the Johnson Administration. In 1966, Johnson informed Israeli President Zalman Shazar that “there would be no diminution in U[nited] S[tates] support of Israel as a result of President Kennedy’s death, but, indeed, U[nited] S[tates] support might even be greater.”<sup>13</sup> Correspondingly, Washington’s relations with its Arab counterparts grew worse. Johnson was frustrated by the Arab World, particularly by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Early statements emanating from the White House spoke of Nasser “being cut down to size.”<sup>14</sup> Differences between Johnson and the Egyptian President emerged over Egypt’s role in the Yemeni conflict. American cancellation of its economic assistance to Cairo placed relations between the two nations “back to square one.”<sup>15</sup> An obvious reason for Johnson’s resentment towards the Egyptian leader stemmed from increasing Soviet support of nationalist movements, particularly throughout the Third World. The Middle East was a growing region for superpower confrontation. Johnson himself maintained that Moscow’s tactics were designed to “expand its role in the Mediterranean ... The Soviets used Arab hostility toward Israel to inflame Arab politics to the boiling point.”<sup>16</sup> A “siege mentality” was created, responsible for increased hatred towards nationalist aspirations.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For a dissenting view see Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel Since 1948,” p.238.

<sup>13</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 2 August 1966, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 21, LBJL.

<sup>14</sup> Memorandum for the White House, 4 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

<sup>15</sup> Nadav Safran, *Israel, the Embattled Ally*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1978), p. 383.

<sup>16</sup> Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 288.

<sup>17</sup> Zaha Bustami, “The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations and the Palestinian People,” in *U.S. Policy on Palestine: From Wilson to Clinton*, edited by Michael W. Suleiman, (Illinois: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), p. 126.

## PRIOR TO WAR

In mid-May 1967, Egyptian mobilisation in Sinai preceded the eviction of the United Nations Emergency Force.<sup>18</sup> On 22 May, Nasser declared a blockade in the Straits of Tiran. As was the case in 1956, these events directly precipitated the crisis.<sup>19</sup> One day later, President Johnson declared that the United States "is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area."<sup>20</sup> Frenzied diplomatic efforts in Washington focussed on the Israeli right of passage through the Straits. Clarifying Eisenhower's commitment to Jerusalem in 1957, the Johnson Administration stood firm in its appraisal that Israel did indeed possess clear rights against Nasser's belligerency. Urging Prime Minister Eshkol to behave with restraint, Washington ultimately ran out of time in its attempts to remedy the crisis through diplomatic means.<sup>21</sup> Washington also carefully monitored Moscow's response to the growing threat. At a meeting of the National Security Council in late May, Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that Moscow was "playing a generally moderate game."<sup>22</sup> "While publicly supporting [the] Arabs and blaming Israel with [the] U[nited] S[tates] at its back for [the] present crisis," State concluded that Moscow had "stopped short of endorsing Nasser's position on [the] Straits of Tiran and would appear to be working for ... [a] freezing of [the] present situation."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> For Secretary-General U Thant's explanation of his decision to accede to Nasser's request and remove the force, see U Thant, *View From the UN*, (London: David and Charles, 1977), pp. 220-252.

<sup>19</sup> Walt Rostow holds Moscow responsible. Maintaining that the Soviet Union engaged in deception when it claimed that Israel was massing on the Syrian frontier, Rostow claims that its actions "set the pot boiling." Interview with the Walt Rostow, 5 November 1999, University of Texas, Austin.

<sup>20</sup> Statement by the President, 23 May 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Johnson to Eshkol, 3 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, Memoranda to the President (hereafter MTP), box 17, LBJL.

<sup>22</sup> Memorandum for the Record, 24 May 1967, PLBJ, NSF, National Security Council Meetings File (hereafter NSCMF), box 2, LBJL.

<sup>23</sup> Outgoing Telegram 206657, 1 June 1967, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State (hereafter RG 59), Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969: Political and Defence (hereafter CFPF, 1967-1969: PD), POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter USNA). For an examination of public Soviet statements prior to, throughout, and after the war, see Aryeh Yodfat, *Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror*, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), pp. 262-301.

Attention was also firmly focussed on the event's repercussions for American interests in the region. Washington's Ambassador to Damascus Hugh Smythe argued that the "outline [of] U[nited] S[tates] policy to date [is] directly opposed [to] short and especially long term U[nited] S[tates] national interests in [the] area." He concluded that the "deterioration [of the] U[nited] S[tates] position has been so rapid that I believe we [are] faced with few alternatives besides mounting [a] salvage mission." Washington's efforts to uphold Israeli rights through the Straits would be disasterous for the United States, Smythe claimed, and warned that the Arab states were gearing up to "smash" American influence in the region.<sup>24</sup> Further reports in the field attempted to elaborate the situation for Washington. Findley Burns, American Ambassador to Jordan, maintained that the present crisis was symptomatic of the Palestine problem. "The only thing that can prevent war in the Middle East is settlement of the Palestine problem ... a belated effort has got to be made to do so."<sup>25</sup> A set of advisors to the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs disputed the Ambassador's suggestion. They failed to see "a dramatic breakthrough on the Palestine question" on the cards. Instead, "the group felt that the best we could reasonably hope for was to emerge from the present crisis having restored a rough approximation of the balance of forces that existed previously."<sup>26</sup> One member of the group, Harvard professor Nadav Safran, warned that "we should ... beware lest in our eagerness to 'defuse' the present bomb we should obviously set off the fuses of subsequent explosions which may be worse than the one threatening now."<sup>27</sup> Clearly, it was in the best interests of Washington to steer an even course throughout the war.

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<sup>24</sup> Smythe to Rusk, 1 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, USNA. Smythe also recommended that Washington "let Israel and Egypt have it out." Rostow to Johnson, 1 June 1967, PLBJ, NSC, Walt W. Rostow Files (hereafter WRF), Memoranda to the President (hereafter MTP), box 17, LB JL.

<sup>25</sup> Burns to Rusk, 4 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, USNA.

<sup>26</sup> The advisors were Former Ambassador John Badeau, John Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations in New York, William Polk, University of Chicago and Nadav Safran, Harvard University. Memorandum for Rostow, 3 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, USNA.

<sup>27</sup> Safran to Battle, 31 May 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, USNA.

## THE JUNE WAR AND THE AMERICAN POSITION

Increasing domestic pressure in Israel itself forced Prime Minister Eshkol's hand, and on the morning of 5 June, Israel mounted its offensive as promised by Golda Meir in 1957. Israel, she previously maintained, would take action under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if the Straits were again closed. State quickly declared the Administration "neutral in thought, word and deed," having already adhered to the principle of territorial integrity "of all the countries in the Middle East."<sup>28</sup> The notion of a comprehensive peace agreement was considered immediately and several proposals were submitted to both State and the White House. Walt Rostow, Johnson's Special Assistant, summed up the growing attitude prevalent in the Administration. "A cease-fire will not answer the fundamental questions in the minds of the Israelis until they have acquired so much real estate ... that they are absolutely sure of their bargaining position."<sup>29</sup> The White House, at least, was clear as to Israel's territorial aspirations. Israel immediately denied the charge. Ephraim Evron, an Israeli Minister at its embassy in

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<sup>28</sup> Untitled, 5 June 1967, PLBJ, NSCF, Harry McPherson Files (hereafter HMCPF), box 42, LBJS; Johnson to Eshkol, 3 June 1967: Outgoing Telegram 206179, 1 June 1967: Outgoing Telegram 206672, 2 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1790, USNA.

Johnson was informed that representatives of the American Jewish community felt "sharp disillusionment and dismay" after the neutrality statement was released. Memorandum for the President, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJS. The White House attempted to cultivate the Jewish community, and throughout the crisis, granted its representatives opportunities to confer with the White House and State. For example, on 8 June, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey met with leaders of 21 national Jewish organisations. Four days later, State officials also met with Jewish groups. Walt Rostow maintains that Johnson was "susceptible but independent" of the Jewish lobby. Interview with the author, 5 November 1999, University of Texas, Austin. Ultimately, Johnson instructed Rostow "to tell McGeorge Bundy to channel future requests by leading Jewish leaders to Bundy and not to the President. The President said he was seeing too many." Notes of the President's Luncheon Meeting, 25 July 1967, Papers of Tom Johnson (hereafter PTJ), Notes of Meetings (hereafter NOM), box 1, set 2, LBJS.

American public opinion was fervently pro-Israeli. State estimated that 95 per cent of correspondence it had received from 4 to 14 June supported Israel while only a handful of letters were pro-Arab. Donnelley to Rusk, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 104, LBJS; Donnelley to Rusk, 14 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>29</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 5 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, WRF, MTP, box 17, LBJS; Meeker to Rusk, 5 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

Washington, commented that "there was no question" of his country "taking advantage of [the] situation to enlarge Israeli borders."<sup>30</sup>

On 6 June, Rostow enunciated Washington's strategy. "If the Israelis go fast enough, and the Soviets get worried enough, a simple cease-fire might be the best answer," maintained Rostow. "This would mean that we could use the de facto situation on the ground to try to negotiate not a return to armistice lines but a definitive peace in the Middle East."<sup>31</sup> That same day, a Central Intelligence Agency report intimated that the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and the Old City of Jerusalem were in Israel's sights as territorial prizes. To the Agency, Israel's aim was glaringly obvious and strikingly similar to Rostow's position. Jerusalem would extract "maximum political advantage by retaining conquered Arab territory until demands [were] satisfied."<sup>32</sup> Secretary Rusk remained unconvinced of Jerusalem's territorial objectives and sought to clarify the intelligence community's assessment. Cabling Tel Aviv, the Secretary queried Israel's intentions towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip and asked whether "a satisfactory settlement at the Strait[s] of Tiran would be sufficient."<sup>33</sup> However, after Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban intimated Eshkol's position for Rusk, the Secretary feared the worst. "Israel would not withdraw to a state of war," claimed Eban, "but only to a state of peace."<sup>34</sup> Israeli gains in Jordanian territory had been impressive and the Jordanian monarch, King Hussein, was especially concerned. State had already recommended that Israel accept Jordan's offer of a cease-fire and "make necessary arrangements immediately and directly rather than through [the] U[nitied] N[ations]."<sup>35</sup> In the face of the relentless Israeli drive into Jordanian territory, Rusk again warned Eshkol, insisting that "the pres-

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<sup>30</sup> Outgoing Telegram 208222, 5 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-ISR, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>31</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 6 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

<sup>32</sup> Objectives of the Middle East Combatants and the USSR, 6 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, Country File (hereafter CF), Middle East Crisis (hereafter MEC), box 107, LBJL.

<sup>33</sup> Rusk to Barbour, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>34</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>35</sup> Rusk to Barbour, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA. Rusk deigned that "this would split Jordan off from other Arab states."

ence of Jordan and the King has been a stabilizing influence which I do not believe the Israelis should lightly see go down the drain.”<sup>36</sup>

Complicit towards Israeli territorial gains, America’s policy inevitably filtered through to its strategy in the United Nations. On the first day of the war, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg and Moscow’s representative to the organisation, Nikolai Federenko, tentatively agreed upon an “immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all parties behind the armistice line.”<sup>37</sup> However, in light of the Administration’s strategy, Washington strongly supported a cease-fire in place. Security Council Resolution 233 of 6 June 1967 instructed the belligerents to cease-fire immediately. The resolution fell short of demands made previously by France and the Soviet Union. The French delegation, supported by India, called for a withdrawal to the pre-5 June borders, while the Soviets were determined that the Security Council condemn Israeli aggression. Goldberg was unwilling and refused both suggestions.<sup>38</sup> His speech of 6 June, explaining American support for a cease-fire in place, was largely defensive. “This resolution,” he declared, “calls for precisely the action which my delegation has been urging since we met ... to consider the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, it is consistent with the spirit in which we have approached every stage of this crisis.” Goldberg continued, “my Government considered that the first and foremost urgent step was to put an end to the tragic bloodshed by bringing an immediate halt to the hostilities.” The Ambassador then announced his Government’s willingness to “stand ready to join in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the area...”<sup>39</sup> The American position on 6 June in the Security Council was markedly different from Johnson’s declaration to Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin that same day. In his “Hot Line” message to the Prime Minister, sent at 10:21 am, the President reiterated his support for “an immediate cease-fire and prompt withdrawal ... behind the Armistice

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<sup>36</sup> Rusk to Barbour, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>37</sup> Memorandum for Rostow, 5 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

<sup>38</sup> Arthur S. Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 49-51.

<sup>39</sup> 1348<sup>th</sup> meeting, 6 June 1967, SC:OR (1967), 1, pp. 2-3.

Lines," adding that "we earnestly hope you can give it your support."<sup>40</sup> This correspondence with Moscow remained the last occasion whereby the Administration endorsed an immediate Israeli withdrawal. A subsequent message from the President to Kosygin, transmitted eight hours later, lent support to Resolution 233, yet failed to comment on Israeli occupation of Arab territory.<sup>41</sup>

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet objectives throughout the crisis rested upon various strategies, one of which was to "forestall a disastrous Arab defeat that would open [it] to the onus in Arab capitals of not having done what it could to defend the Arab cause."<sup>42</sup> Israeli gains during the first two days of conflict stunned Moscow into sponsoring Resolution 234 on 7 June.<sup>43</sup> The resolution condemned the belligerent's refusal to adhere to the previous Security Council directive. Once again, Resolution 234 called for a cease-fire in place. The move infuriated the Arab world and presented an opportunity for the United States and Israel to pursue their strategies.<sup>44</sup> Super-power support for an immediate cease-fire in place served Israeli objectives. American strategic interests in the region, however, were compromised, as were Moscow's relations with the Arab world. The Administration should have been especially concerned. By 7 June, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria and Saudi Arabia had instituted oil embargoes against Washington.<sup>45</sup> Already, Arab states were informing Washington that

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<sup>40</sup> Johnson to Kosygin, 6 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, Head of State Correspondence (hereafter HOSC), box 7, LB JL.

<sup>41</sup> Johnson to Kosygin, 6 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, HOSC, box 7, LB JL.

<sup>42</sup> Other Soviet objectives included containing the conflict "within the limits of its present locale and without the intervention of outside powers," thus avoiding direct confrontation with Washington. "Objectives of the Middle East Combatants and the USSR," 6 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, MEC, box 107, LB JL.

<sup>43</sup> By 7 June, seven Arab nations had broken off diplomatic relations with Washington. Intervention by the Shah of Iran prevented Saudi Arabia and Jordan from doing the same. Outgoing Telegram, 218168, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1791, USNA.

<sup>44</sup> Resolution 234, 7 June 1967, SC:OR (1967), *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1967*, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 208771, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA; Untitled, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 104, LB JL. The Saudi oil boycott was designed to appease Arab concerns and the need for the appearance of Arab unity. The Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources informed Aramco that it was "most anxious not [to] deprive [the] U[ited] S[tates] Military of supplies if this can be done ... covertly." Memorandum for Rostow, 8 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 104, LB JL. For the most part, the Arab oil embargo remained ineffective. The

Israel must withdraw to its pre-war borders.<sup>46</sup> Fawzi queried American policy, asking “what good was a cease-fire that merely confirmed the gains made by aggression?”<sup>47</sup> The American position was further undermined after Rusk admitted to the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Patrick Dean, that the Administration “did not think the U[nited] S[ates] could take the lead” in any future negotiations.<sup>48</sup> In sum, Washington was actively promoting the establishment of a highly unpopular status quo in absence of any intention to utilise the situation on the ground as a means of reconciling the parties. By 7 June, Johnson’s policy repudiated his own 23 May pledge committing the Administration to territorial integrity in the Middle East.

The contradiction that lay at the heart of the Administration’s policy was now apparent. Hal Saunders, a member of the National Security Council staff and Walt Rostow’s self-confessed “man on the Middle East,” recognised the dilemma.<sup>49</sup> A memorandum drafted for McGeorge Bundy highlighted the difficulty for United States-Israeli relations. Citing Israel’s predilection to replace the 1949 Armistice Agreements with a comprehensive peace, Saunders conceded,

“this raises the boundary question – a major policy issue for us. We’ve hung our flat [hat] of the ‘territorial integrity’ of all states, but the Israelis will not give up the West Bank or Sharm el Sheikh easily. We’ll need an attractive package.”<sup>50</sup>

Bundy had just been seconded to the newly formed Special Committee of the National Security Council as its Executive Secretary and, as such, he was also Johnson’s Special Consultant on the issue. Dealing specifi-

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Central Intelligence Agency maintained that “the denial of Arab oil would cut supplies for consumption in Western Europe and Japan to an estimated 85 percent of normal during the first six months.” Memorandum for Smith, 8 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 104, LBJL.

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, comments made by the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Georges Hakkim. Memorandum of Conversation, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>47</sup> Nolte to Rusk, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 6 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1792, USNA.

<sup>49</sup> Oral Interview with Walt Rostow, 5 November 1999, University of Texas, Austin.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum for Bundy, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF CF, MEC, box 107, LBJL.

cally with the dispute, other members of the committee included Rusk, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Richard Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow. Rusk would chair the meetings in Johnson's absence. Bundy proved vague describing the Committee's function for the press and failed to elaborate upon its mandate. In truth, the Administration was still reeling from events. Unable to "engage in evaluations" and without "any clear prospects" as to the time-frame involved for the scope of the Administration's thinking, Washington's declared position on territorial integrity conflicted greatly with its true strategy.<sup>51</sup> Flaws in the strategy were beginning to emerge. Expecting concessions from the Israelis on the territorial issue, State's Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Thomas Hughes, quashed any notion of an Israeli compromise. Explaining that the problem of territory and final borders "touch close to the basic issue of Israel's existence," Hughes maintained that the dilemma failed to offer much "ground for compromise except in terms of a larger political and power arrangement between the two parties."<sup>52</sup> Hence, the responsibility for achieving a settlement fell largely to Israel's enemies upon which the Arab states, collectively, would be compelled to reorganise the power structure in the region in favour of Israel. Such an expectation in 1967 proved unrealistic.

Walt Rostow, nevertheless, persisted in this line of thinking. On 7 June he reported to Johnson that Israel would control the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Sinai, "including the east bank of the Suez Canal." According to Rostow, "the Israelis ... are in a position to dominate militarily the region, including a capacity ... to move across the Suez Canal to the west bank [of Egypt]."<sup>53</sup> At the 7 June 1967 National Security Council meeting, Rusk declared, "if we do not make ourselves 'attorneys for Israel' we cannot recoup our losses [in the region]." The statement hinted that Washington would attempt to steer Jerusalem's

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<sup>51</sup> Statement of George Christian and Interview of McGeorge Bundy, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCMF, box 2, LBJL.

<sup>52</sup> Hughes to Rusk, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, MEC, box 107, LBJL.

<sup>53</sup> Memorandum for Johnson, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

territorial policy. This was also reflected in the Secretary's following comment. Sensing that Jerusalem would ignore American demands for moderation, Rusk maintained, "we do have something to bargain with in that Israel must be grateful to the U[nited] S[tates] and Israel requires continuing U[nited] S[tates] support."<sup>54</sup>

The precarious balance of power in the Middle East was shattered. Ambassador Burns reported that Jordan's territorial losses would "put Hussein in the toughest spot he has ever seen." The repercussions for Washington's position were immediate. Within Jordan itself, Burns maintained, American prestige had plummeted.<sup>55</sup> The dilemma was clear. While Arab states demanded an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-5 June borders for any cease-fire to hold, Israel refused "the reinstatement of an armistice regime..."<sup>56</sup> Conflicting perceptions of Israeli intentions emerged from Washington. While Rusk assured Deputy Egyptian President Abd el-Hakim Amer that an Israeli withdrawal "might be arranged if [a] U[nited] N[ations] presence returned to Sharm el Sheikh," Rostow admitted to the Iranian Ambassador to Washington, Hushang Ansary, that Israel "will probably agree [to] withdraw [its] troops ... only as part of [a] peace treaty recognising Israel." Rostow claimed, "we will have [an] opportunity [to] take big political steps," to which Ansary replied that he doubted that the Arab states "even after [a] military defeat would be prepared [to] acknowledge Israel's existence."<sup>57</sup> Rostow discounted the advice, advising Johnson that the Administration's objective consisted of "mov[ing] from the present situation to as stable and definitive peace as is possible." For Rostow, that included an Arab recognition of Israel. More specifically, Israel would be "accepted as a Middle Eastern state with rights..."<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> National Security Council Meeting, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCMF, box 2, LBJL. For a dissenting interpretation of Rusk's remarks, see Judith Klinghoffer, *Vietnam, Jews and the Middle East*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1999), pp. 121. Klinghoffer argues that the Secretary's comments implied that those Arab states "wishing to regain territory had to pay a price to Washington as well as Jerusalem." See p. 121.

<sup>55</sup> Burns to Rusk, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, MEC, box 107, LBJL.

<sup>56</sup> See Outgoing Telegram, 209151, 7 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA; Barbour to Rusk, 7 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

<sup>57</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 209086, 7 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

<sup>58</sup> Memorandum for Johnson, 7 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

Support for Rostow's position came from American diplomats, including Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman, academics, and finally, the Administration itself. Point three of a United States draft resolution to the Security Council on 8 June 1967 called for

"discussions ... looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East."<sup>59</sup>

Yet, various members of the Administration dissented. Goldberg and his delegation in New York warned Washington to be more circumspect. The Ambassador reported that "the Arabs [are now] less concerned ... about [the] Strait[s] of Tiran than their own territorial integrity." Accordingly, Israel's military successes "would leave [the] surrounding Arab populace more embittered than ever and does not bode well for [the] future peace of [the] area."<sup>60</sup> Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Foy Kohler agreed, as did Assistant Secretary of State for Internal Organisation Affairs Joseph Sisco. "Given the humiliation the Arabs have suffered," Kohler stated, "they in turn will be reluctant to enter into any permanent settlement ... it is likely there may be ... a long period of Israeli occupation of Arab territory until the Arabs give in." Sisco admitted that "Arab feelings [are] highly embittered ... [the] Arabs [are] not likely [to] agree [to] sit down with Israelis any more now than in [the] past."<sup>61</sup> The American Consul in Aden, Curtis Jones, explained the reasons behind an Arab unwillingness to "submit" to a peace with Israel. The evaluation

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<sup>59</sup> UN Document S/7952, 1351<sup>st</sup> meeting, 8 June 1967, SC:OR (1967), 1, p. 2. See also Memorandum of Conversation, 8 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA and "Guidelines for U.S. Position and Action in Connection with the Present Middle East Situation, 8 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, MEC, box 107, LB JL. In an attempt to entice the Arabs to the negotiating table, an outgoing telegram informed various American embassies that Israel was indeed ready to enter into negotiations and that Washington was considering "multilateral regional economic development projects" to the Arab states. Outgoing telegram, 209550, 8 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

<sup>60</sup> Goldberg to Rusk, 8 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LB JL.

<sup>61</sup> Outgoing telegram, 209956, 9 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

"is based on the cold logic of geopolitics. Near Eastern Governments will continue to dispute [Israeli] pre-eminence in the area until one of them prevails or they finally bury their differences in confederation ... Israel is hors concours. Outright conquest is beyond Israel's power – and ours."<sup>62</sup>

Attention was also directed towards the United Nations itself. Kohler pointed out that the organisation "lacks leverage" to force an Israeli withdrawal.<sup>63</sup> Whether the United States was able to determine events was also debated. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach bluntly stated that the Arab-Israeli conflict "is not a problem the U[nited] S[tates] can resolve."<sup>64</sup>

American Ambassador to the United Arab Republic Richard Nolte warned Washington that its policy "should be consistent with [a] long-range U[nited] S[tates] policy of even-handedness" in the Middle East. As such, the Ambassador argued against Rostow's position. Nolte directed the Administration to "insist with as much force as [the] Soviets on immediate Israeli withdrawal to [the] pre-June 5 lines."<sup>65</sup> The Israeli drive into Arab territory continued. By 10 June, attention turned to Israel's northern frontier with Syria. The internal stability of various Arab states was again questioned.<sup>66</sup> Goldberg warned that American national interests in the region were compromised in light of Washington's departure "from a role of non-alignment." He asked, "can the U[nited]

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<sup>62</sup> Jones to Rusk, 12 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA. McGeorge Bundy recognised that any Arab unity was detrimental to American strategy. Consequently, he advocated that the Administration attempt to split the Arab world and help it "come apart." NSC Special Committee, 9 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>63</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 8 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

<sup>64</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 9 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA.

<sup>65</sup> Nolte to Rusk, 9 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>66</sup> Jordan, as an Arab moderate, was of particular concern. See, for example, Burns to Rusk, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1793, USNA; Burns to Rusk, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

S[tates] now demonstrate the power Eisenhower showed in 'stopping' the Israelis in 1956?"<sup>67</sup>

The Administration informed Moscow of its strategy. "The United States' interest is not to force maximum gains from Israel," announced State official Raymond Garthoff, "but to help establish the basis for a stable and lasting peace in the area." "What we - and the Soviets - can and should do," continued Garthoff, "is to press both the Arabs and the Israelis to make compromises from their maximum preferences." At this point, Moscow was more and more concerned with the Israeli push towards Damascus and informed Washington of its intention to intervene directly if Israel continued to ignore the various United Nations' cease-fire resolutions. Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington Boris Sedov also denounced American policy, specifically any plan linking Arab recognition of Israel to the withdrawal from Arab occupied territory. Sedov maintained that "the Arab states couldn't agree to the recognition of Israel." In addition, he doubted whether they would grant "transit rights through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal on a non-discriminatory basis, and ... adjustment of the borders at Gaza," items that the Administration expected Israeli to demand at the very least.<sup>68</sup>

While the Administration was "tak[ing the] broadest and most imaginative possible look" at the crisis through various working groups "studying subjects including [the] economic situation, refugees, demarcation line[s], [the] Gulf of Aqaba and [the] Suez Canal," Moscow acted decisively.<sup>69</sup> It severed diplomatic ties with Israel.<sup>70</sup> Pressure on Washington from the Arab moderates, each demanding an American renunciation of continued Israeli occupation, mounted. Hussein informed Ambassador Burns, "the Soviet action will be interpreted throughout

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<sup>67</sup> Goldberg to Rusk, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>68</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>69</sup> Outgoing telegram, 210119, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>70</sup> Soviet Ambassador to the Washington Anatoly Dobrynin later argued that this was a mistake, illustrative of a "one-sided policy [that] had swung too far." Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962-1986*, (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 162.

the Arab world ... as proof Moscow seriously intends to be the only major power defending Arab interests." Hussein further added that "everyone is suspicious of your position, and the Arab countries are in ferment because they think your guarantees of territorial integrity apply only to Israel." The King urged Washington to affirm its adherence to an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-5 June lines.<sup>71</sup> Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Washington Mohamed Soweyal urged an identical course of action, adding that the Administration "should not leave [the] initiative to [the] U[union of] S[oviet] S[socialist] R[epublics] on this issue." The Ambassador also recommended that "longer-term issues, such as [the] need for [a] peaceful settlement, should for [the] moment be avoided to let present passions cool."<sup>72</sup> Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf also highlighted the Cold War angle, as well as American strategic interests in the region. He reminded the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hermann Eilts, that

"U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] influence in [the] Arab world [is] at stake. In recent years, [the] U[nited] S[tates] has lost much prestige in [the] Arab states. Now, with [the] Nasser defeat and widespread Arab disillusionment with [our] supposed Soviet friends, [the] U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] should capitalize on [the] situation to restore its influence."<sup>73</sup>

## DURING THE AFTERMATH: DEBATE CONTINUES

The National Security Council Special Committee met on 12 June and focussed upon the 23 May policy pertaining to territorial integrity. While Clifford declared that the Administration would "have to face up to [its] past statements," Johnson was blunt. Recognising the contradiction of United States policy thus far, the President asked, "how do we get out of this predicament?" Secretary McNamara was equally wor-

<sup>71</sup> Burns to Rusk, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>72</sup> Outgoing telegram, 210102, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>73</sup> Eilts to Rusk, 10 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

ried, commenting, “we’re in a heck of a jam on territorial integrity.” Secretary Fowler remained the sole advocate of an Israeli withdrawal, although the committee later agreed that there existed a “danger of freezing positions.” Fowler maintained that “Israel has to give up territory.”<sup>74</sup> Yet, the debate pertaining to territorial integrity was not the sole issue of immediate concern for the Administration. Once again, the ambiguities surrounding the practicalities of direct negotiations were raised. The Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs’ Deputy Executive Secretary, John Walsh, highlighted Washington’s predicament when he described the chances for direct negotiations between the belligerents within the United Nations as “very doubtful ... the Arabs,” he conceded, “are likely to rule out direct discussions.” Instead, maintained Walsh, Washington needed to “stimulate a third party to take on the mediating role.”<sup>75</sup> Washington’s linkage between an Israeli withdrawal and a wider settlement including an Arab declaration acknowledging Israel’s right to exist obliged the Administration to assume the position of negotiator. Complicit in Israel’s continued occupation, yet recognising that the situation could not be left to “freeze,” Washington could not remain separate from the process of negotiation. However, the Administration proved unwilling to assume the responsibility. In such circumstances, Johnson was obliged in the days after 5 June to follow Eisenhower’s example and force an immediate Israeli withdrawal. Instead, its policy contributed to a festering situation in the region and compromised American Cold War interests.

On 13 June 1967, Ambassador Goldberg introduced draft resolution s/7952 into the Security Council. A cease-fire between the belligerents was now in place yet Goldberg described it “as no more than the essential first step.” Briefly turning his attention to Soviet draft resolution s/7951, which called for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-5 June lines, Goldberg described it as “a prescription for renewed hostilities.” Instead, the Ambassador endorsed his own submission as a “genuine approach” towards a settlement. Specifically, draft resolution s/7952 called for

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<sup>74</sup> National Security Council Special Committee, 12 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>75</sup> Paper for Bundy, 12 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

discussions promptly ... among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they wish, looking towards the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force, regardless of its nature; the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East.

Goldberg claimed that the United Nations had “an urgent obligation” to “facilitate” negotiations, and to “rebuild an atmosphere in which fruitful discussions will be possible.”<sup>76</sup>

However, a 13 June “informal session” of the Special Committee of the National Security Council was unanimous in its assessment that no settlement was possible in the coming months. Its focus then turned to territorial matters. Eager to enunciate the American position, McGeorge Bundy listed possible Israeli demands that included Gaza, an international guarantee for Israeli right of passage through Aqaba, the return of Sinai to Egyptian control, albeit in a demilitarised state, the return of the West Bank to Jordan, a “more than demilitarised” Syrian [Golan] Heights and a condition of peace. “Could the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] be sympathetic to that position?,” asked Bundy. Under Secretary of State Katzenbach questioned the President’s Special Assistant, querying whether Washington should “take substantive positions.” McNamara doubted that the Administration could take any position. Bundy maintained that “the Pres[ident] can identify [the] problems.” The rest would be left up to the parties to “propose specific solutions” themselves. However, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lucius Battle, countered that “someone else [can] enumerate [the] issues,” whereupon Bundy conceded, “that’s safer.” McNamara suggested an alternative for Washington, namely, a territorial settlement without American guarantees. Bundy admitted that the White House would not “ask the Senate for guarantees,” to which McNamara stated the undesirability of directly involving the President. At the heart of the discussion lay the actual dimensions of the American commitment to Israel. Noting it unlikely

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<sup>76</sup> 1358<sup>th</sup> meeting, 13 June 1967, SC:OR (1967), 1, pp. 10-12.

that American troops would be deployed to the area, Bundy highlighted constitutional considerations and his concern that American security guarantees were “[n]ever backed” by Congress. McNamara countered that such guarantees were useless since Israel would never depend on them anyway. Israeli gains were again broached. Sisco suggested American acquiescence to Israel’s retention of Sharm el Sheikh, Gaza - “nobody wants it” - and the West Bank. Certainly the unanimous disdain for Nasser ensured that the aims of the Eshkol Government were considered sympathetically. After all, commented Rostow, “Israel had the courage of our convictions.” By the end of the meeting a consensus emerged that the President would not “lead toward a solution.” Commented Bundy, “[the] President, by stating [the] problems, leads towards [a] solution.”<sup>77</sup>

Johnson stuck to his May policy of territorial integrity. When queried by a journalist as to how the United States would honour “this commitment in view of the Israeli conquest of Arab lands,” Johnson remained defiant. He replied, “[t]hat is our policy. It will continue to be our policy. How it will be effected will be determined by the events of the days ahead. It will depend a good deal upon the nations themselves, what they have to say and what their views are, what their proposals are after they have expressed them.”<sup>78</sup> Israel’s territorial position was still not known. United States Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour requested specifics from Eban. Noting that the United States was under increasing pressure in the Security Council “to require Israeli troops to withdraw to [the] previous lines,” Barbour demanded “as much Israeli precision as to its thinking.” “What Israel wants,” announced Eban, “is quite simple, security and peace.” He also asserted that direct discussions were preferable to an “imposed [peace] by outside powers.” Instead of presenting Israel’s territorial policy, Eban recounted past Israeli grievances, although he sounded out Barbour’s opinion on the future of the West Bank. Specifically, Eban “asked whether it is intelligent to endeavor to reproduce the unity between the West Bank and Jordan or some sort of separate relationship between the West Bank and Israel and Jordan.”<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Informal Session of the NSC Special Committee, 13 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>78</sup> Johnson’s News Conference, 13 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>79</sup> Barbour to Rusk, 13 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

Israeli Minister Evron also enquired as to Washington's position. "The job for Israel is," he stated, "having won the war, now to try to win the peace." Walt Rostow reiterated the Administration's commitment to territorial integrity, yet was now emphatic on one particular aspect. "Our powers to make peace," he maintained, "are extremely limited." Rostow advised that Israel would have to consider its position very carefully. "A great deal hinges on what kind of a position [Israel] take[s] and especially whether it is one that will draw to it the majority in the U[ntited] N[ations] General Assembly and, in the end, moderate Arabs." On 13 June 1967, Foreign Minister Gromyko informed United Nations Secretary General U Thant of Moscow's request for an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly "to consider the question of liquidating the consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab states and the immediate withdrawal of Israel behind armistice lines." The impending Soviet-sponsored convention of the General Assembly weighed heavily on the Administration. Rostow described it as "a major attempt" to retrieve the Soviet position in the Arab world.<sup>80</sup> Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach maintained that the Soviet initiative was nothing more than an attempt to

"carry on a major propaganda campaign to recoup their position in the Arab world by trying to win back diplomatically as much as possible of what the Arabs have lost on the ground and by seeking to identify U[nited] S[tates] policy completely with that of Israel."

Katzenbach sensed that Soviet aims included the identification of Israel as the aggressor and the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Acting Secretary conceded that Moscow "might be willing to add an assurance that the Gulf of Aqaba would remain open."<sup>81</sup>

The Soviet initiative was shrewd. Washington was now obliged to present, fully and publicly, its position on the territorial aspect of the controversy. Support was expected for Moscow's proposals in the Assem-

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<sup>80</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>81</sup> Katzenbach to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

bly. Compounding the Administration's predicament, was "Israeli insistence on retaining at least some territorial gains and insisting that a peace settlement must come through direct negotiations without a return to the old Armistice Agreements." Katzenbach foresaw further difficulties for Johnson. "Our own interests require that we maintain as even-handed a posture as possible and that we avoid identification with Israeli demands," he stated. Yet, "we cannot acquiesce in a restoration of the situation which existed before Nasser closed the Gulf." In the event that the Arab states refused to negotiate, Israel's territorial gains would be allowed. Such a strategy contradicted Johnson's 23 May statement supporting territorial integrity. It also compromised American Cold War interests, given that further Israeli territorial gains inevitably exacerbated tensions in the region. Katzenbach outlined a "tentative plan" for the Administration. Attempting to "offset the Soviet propaganda campaign," Washington would

engag[e] the Assembly's support for a broad peace settlement which would deal with underlying causes of the hostilities. We would outline the general principles of a possible settlement, while avoiding explicit endorsements of specific positions. We would try to start indirect discussions between the parties through third party mediation as to terms of possible peace treaties with each of Israel's Arab neighbors and as to general regional agreements.

Two resolutions were sought by the American delegation, "one on the need for good neighborly relations in the area, mentioning basic principles for a peace settlement, and the other, a procedural type of resolution, designating a 'Wise Man' to extend good offices."<sup>82</sup>

Katzenbach's summary of American policy contradicted the already growing feeling within State that the United Nations was ill-equipped to deal with the crisis and its resolution. The Department's Legal Advisor Leonard Meeker maintained that the "United Nations Organization, as it has operated in the recent past, has been ineffective to perform its role of international supervision in an area of tension and con-

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<sup>82</sup> Katzenbach to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

flict.”<sup>83</sup> The implication was clear. If past experiences had proven unsatisfactory, there could be little hope for a United Nations sponsored peace in the future. Privately, Rusk informed British Ambassador Dean that the Administration favoured “individual negotiations,” as did Israel. The Eshkol Government soon informed Washington that it “would not accept a mediator.”<sup>84</sup>

## THE POSITIONS OF THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

Desperation amongst Arab moderates increased. The American embassy in Beirut reported that “Israel must withdraw from Arab lands it has occupied ... anything less than this will only prolong Arab hostility.”<sup>85</sup> Ambassador Elts relayed Saudi Arabian King Ibn Abdul Saud’s anxiety, the monarch pleading with Washington to force an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice lines.<sup>86</sup> Oil companies Aramco and Gulf reported that the region’s producers appealed for Washington to “take [a] strong position to keep [the] Israelis from gaining any territory in the present situation.”<sup>87</sup> The American Embassy in Morocco warned Washington that the Administration should “consider ways and means of discretely supporting the moderates.”<sup>88</sup> Embassy Amman advised a similar approach.<sup>89</sup> Israel’s gains polarised the Arab world and the moderates were fast losing ground. Consequently, American appeasement of Israeli occupation jeopardised the stability of its own allies in the region and made each more susceptible to subversion. Undoubtedly, Moscow would seek to capitalise on such a situation.

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<sup>83</sup> Meeker to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>84</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 15 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>85</sup> Middleton to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>86</sup> Elts to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>87</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 210875, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>88</sup> Tasca to Rusk, 13 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1794, USNA.

<sup>89</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 14 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL; Memorandum of Conversation, 15 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

Rusk foresaw that Israeli retention of occupied territory was hazardous. "Israel's keeping [of] territory," he declared, "would create a revisionism for the rest of the 20<sup>th</sup> century." He was adamant, however, that Israel "must be recognised" and informed British Ambassador Dean that any solution to the crisis would have to include the recognition of Israel.<sup>90</sup> Israel was also adamant that its gains would be utilised to "remov[e]... the restrictions on their sovereignty and existence..." Ambassador Barbour reported that Eshkol's Government was "confident that pressures created by the impact of their defeat in the neighboring countries will be sufficient to persuade the Arab regimes to seek direct peace negotiations." Current thinking in Israeli Government circles, reported Barbour, resisted the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli freedom of access to Suez and Aqaba was a requirement in any negotiation, as was the safety of Israel's border settlements running along the Golan Heights. Importantly, Barbour recommended that Washington refrain from offering specific proposals to avoid a confrontation with Moscow. "I would anticipate that as things proceed," Barbour advised, "the Israelis will discover that some ... of their stated objectives are not ... attainable and may then come to [the] U[nited] S[tates] for assistance in a more realistic frame of mind."<sup>91</sup> For his part, Walt Rostow encouraged Israel to adopt a "moderate position" on issues of territory. In his view, this would clear the way for negotiations.<sup>92</sup> Rusk was also adamant that Israel "deal generously with the Arabs."<sup>93</sup> Under Secretary for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow later informed Ambassador Ansary that the Administration contemplated a moderate Israeli position.<sup>94</sup> This was disputed by America's Consul-General in Jerusalem Evan Wilson. "We [are] inclined [to] believe it would be impossible to find any formula under which [the] Israelis would feel their security and integrity sufficiently insured as to lead them to agree to withdraw to the previous armistice lines," declared Evans.

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<sup>90</sup> NSC Special Committee Meeting, 14 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 19, LBJL.

<sup>91</sup> Barbour to Rusk, 15 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>92</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 211672, 16 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>93</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 212272, 17 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>94</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 212296, 17 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

"With their present hostile attitude toward [the] U[nited] N[ations] T[ruce] S[upervision] O[rganiſation], moreover, they would almost certainly regard any proposal for a U[nited] N[ations] presence in territories which they occupy as out of the question."<sup>95</sup>

## A STRATEGY AGREED UPON: THE JOHNSON PRINCIPLES

President Johnson's five principles speech of 19 June 1967 clearly enunciated American strategy. He declared,

there are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4 ... this is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities. Certainly, troops must be withdrawn, but there must also be recognized rights of national life ... and respect for political independence and territorial integrity ... Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to peace ... there is no escape from this fact: the main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders ... What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East.

The President emphasised the role of the United Nations. "We have been first in our support of effective peace-keeping in the United Nations, and also recognize the great values to come from mediation." Continuing, Johnson reiterated "that this Government of ours ... will do its part for peace in every forum." The President then declared,

"our country is committed ... to a peace that is based on five principles: first, the recognized right of national life; second, justice for the refugees; third, innocent maritime

<sup>95</sup> Wilson to Rusk, 17 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA. This view was supported by the last Governor of Jordanian Jerusalem Anwar Khatib. He informed the American Consul-General in Jerusalem, Evan Wilson, that Israel would never leave Hebron, given its historical significance. Wilson to Rusk, 17 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

passage; fourth, limits of the wasteful and destructive arms race; and fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all."

Recognition of Israel, an end to belligerency and a final settlement were now inextricably linked. The first and fifth principles were most relevant to the issue of territory. The latter was deigned to be effective "only on the basis of peace between the parties ... What they need now are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction and war." The former, asserted the President, was essential as "every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and have this right respected by its neighbors." Johnson qualified this by adding that

"in the same way, no nation would be true to the United Nations Charter, or to its own true interests, if it should permit military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and ... interests of their own."

These principles, maintained Johnson, are "not new, but we do think they are fundamental. Taken together, they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace."<sup>96</sup> If there was any doubt as to Washington's position, it was dispelled by State. A circular telegram to all American diplomatic posts explained that "mutual acceptance of [the] principle of territorial integrity and political independence must underlie any arrangements which are to offer more security than [in the] past."<sup>97</sup> One day later, on 20 June, Prime Minister Eshkol publicly declared that "the clock cannot be turned back. When we talk of peace ... we have in mind a permanent peace, not the armistice agreements we have known before."<sup>98</sup> Privately, Washington was informed of the Israeli position six days previously.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Remarks of the President at the National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, 19 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, NSCH, box 18, LBJL.

<sup>97</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 212724, 19 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 109, LBJL.

<sup>98</sup> Public Israeli Statements Concerning Territorial Acquisition and Other Elements of a Peace Settlement, undated, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA.

<sup>99</sup> On 14 June, Ambassador Harman "stated flatly that Israel would not go back to anything as tenuous as the 1957 Sinai settlement." Israeli Statements Made to Us Privately Concerning Their Intentions on a Peace Settlement, undated, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 109, LBJL.

In his speech to the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, Prime Minister Kosygin supported Israel's right to exist.<sup>100</sup> Privately, the Soviet Embassy in Washington informed Eugene Rostow that "the Arab doctrine of a right to destroy Israel was 'nonsense,' and the source of a great deal of the 'tragedy' in the area."<sup>101</sup> However, the Soviet Union remained resolute in its insistence that Israel withdraw, maintaining that "only the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the captured territories can change the situation by bringing about a relaxation of tension and creating conditions for peace in the Middle East."<sup>102</sup>

Moscow aligned itself to the Arab position, one that demanded complete withdrawal before any moves towards negotiations were made. Its draft resolution to the Plenary Session reinforced this notion, whilst the American contribution one day later focussed instead on the establishment of peace negotiations based on Johnson's five principles. It failed to demand an immediate Israeli withdrawal.<sup>103</sup>

Well aware that sentiment in the General Assembly fell towards the Soviet and Arab position, Rusk and Goldberg met with Foreign Minister Eban on 22 June to discuss Israel's intentions. Eban informed Washington's representatives that with regard to Egypt, the "Israelis wanted [a] peace treaty on [the] basis [of the] present international frontiers." According to Eban, "this would involve Israeli maritime passage through [the] Straits of Tiran and [the] Suez Canal." Israel also foresaw the demilitarisation of Sinai. Likewise, Israel was prepared to withdraw from Syrian territory although the "Syrian hills" overlooking the Israeli settlements would also be demilitarised. The Eshkol Government also demanded control over Gaza. Eban justified this decision by pointing out that "Egypt had never claimed Gaza, had not accepted

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<sup>100</sup> Speech by Alexei Kosygin, 19 June 1967, GA:OR (1967), Fifth Emergency Special Session, p. 4.

<sup>101</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 20 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1795, USNA.

<sup>102</sup> Speech by Alexei Kosygin, 19 June 1967, GA:OR (1967), Fifth Emergency Special Session, p. 5.

<sup>103</sup> For the Soviet submission, see A/L. 519, 19 June 1967, GA:OR (1967), Fifth Emergency Special Session, p. 6. For Goldberg's draft resolution, see A/L. 520, 20 June 1967, GA:OR (1967), Fifth Emergency Special Session, p. 4.

responsibility for occupying it, or for the refugees." With regards to the West Bank, Israeli intentions were "less crystalized." Israel was contemplating two options, one involving its return to Jordan, the other, "some kind of association between the West Bank and Israel on the basis of autonomy and economic union." Eban noted that with the latter option, "it would push Hussein back across the Jordan River." Rusk described Eban's "preliminary thoughts" as "helpful."

Commenting on Israel's second proposal for the West Bank, Rusk realised that the Israelis "were angry at Hussein but advised that they should not sell him short." Eban replied, "Israel's first reaction had been to write Hussein off but they now heard that Hussein was being properly contrite." An autonomous state in the West Bank came to be viewed as a "Palestinian solution." The Secretary later described the solution as involving "a second-class status for the Arabs," and, possibly, "lead[ing] to Palestinian demands to become the 14<sup>th</sup> Arab state."<sup>104</sup> Rusk went on to discuss the issue of refugees and future status of Jerusalem, yet failed to comment further on Israel's territorial proposals.<sup>105</sup> While Israel contemplated full withdrawal from Sinai, the Golan and the West Bank, its stance towards Gaza should have worried the Administration. America's own position on territorial integrity and its national security interests demanded no less.

## **THE GLASSBORO SUMMIT: JOHNSON AND KOSYGIN CONFER**

The United Nations special session in mid 1967 afforded Washington and Moscow the opportunity to confer at length on the matter of Israel's occupation of Arab territory. Johnson and Kosygin first met at Glassboro, New Jersey on 23 June. While Johnson's emphasis focussed upon Vietnam and arms control, Kosygin was eager to discuss the crisis in the Middle East. The Soviet Prime Minister was blunt, stating that

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<sup>104</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 15 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA. This position was in contrast to Soviet policy that decreed that "recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to create their own state" should be granted. Gromyko, *Memories*, p. 267.

<sup>105</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 22 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1796, USNA.

"the direction that U[nited] S[tates] policy was taking was not clear to him..." Referring to Johnson's about face on 6 June with regards to the issue of an immediate Israeli withdrawal, Kosygin commented that initially "the positions of the two countries calling for a cease-fire and a return to the original armistice lines had been as one. But then, four hours later, as the military situation had changed, the President had also changed his view." Johnson disputed Kosygin's charge and asserted that Washington still supported "preserving the territorial integrity of all countries." The Prime Minister stated the Soviet position firmly. "It was clear," he maintained,

"that Israel would have to withdraw its forces back to the original armistice line. If this were not done, hostilities were certain to break out again; the Arabs were an explosive people and no other solution to this problem was possible."

Commenting on Nasser's agreement to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open if the International Court of Justice decreed that such a measure was appropriate, Kosygin urged Johnson to realise that "there are many positions that [Nasser] could not publicly advocate but which he was willing to agree to in private." He recommended that "at present, it was necessary to support Nasser because otherwise the situation would be worse." Furthermore, Kosygin questioned Johnson's emphasis upon negotiations. "Was it realistic to assume that since the Arabs had not talked to Israel before the start of hostilities that they would do so now, before the troops were withdrawn?" he asked. The realities of inter-Arab politics were focussed upon. "It [is] extremely difficult, if not impossible, now for the Arab leaders to undertake anything in this direction."

Johnson's reply focussed upon "questions of security." Justifying the linkage between Israel's right to exist and its withdrawal from Arab territory, the President explained that "the Israelis felt that they had been asked to do this very same thing in the past without gaining any security. Therefore, along with the troop withdrawal someone had to provide that security for them." Johnson argued in favour of arms limitation to the region, commenting that "if we refrain from furnishing arms to Middle Eastern countries, at most they could fight with their

hands, which certainly would not be as bad as an armed conflict." Kosygin remained unimpressed with this line of reasoning, maintaining that "the Middle Eastern countries would find someone to sell them weapons no matter what the great powers do."<sup>106</sup>

Israel's withdrawal was explored in greater depth two days later whereupon the divergence between Washington and Moscow's positions was fully revealed. Johnson was keen to find a middle ground with his Soviet counterpart, and emphasised his five principles or what he described as the attainment of a "common language." According to the President, "there were a number of points on which the two sides should be able to agree." Kosygin, however, failed to see how these could offer a basis for an agreement and informed Johnson that "the Arabs would not accept such a proposition." "The only realistic approach," according to the Soviet Prime Minister, was based upon "recognition of Israel as the perpetrator of aggression, withdrawal of Israeli forces, and compensation." Johnson interjected, suggesting "that the Chairman perhaps did not understand that withdrawal was included" in the American position. Kosygin replied that "he did understand this but the problem was that the point was listed at the end whereas the Soviet Union placed it first." Moscow maintained that "withdrawal was the main question ... other questions raised ... were of a long-term nature and could be resolved only through prolonged discussion and debate." Johnson argued that his Administration "could not agree to a resolution [in the General Assembly] which would deal only with withdrawal and ignore other elements of 'common language'." The President claimed that "even if the General Assembly were somehow to make a recommendation dealing only with withdrawal, such recommendations would bring no results." Kosygin disagreed. For him, "the basic problem was withdrawal; once that was accomplished, other questions could be taken up," whereupon Johnson concluded that "the U[nited] S[tates] could not agree to confine the General Assembly's resolution to only one recommendation."

Kosygin was at pains to point out that "unless withdrawal was accomplished ... a new war would break out with the U[nited] S[tates] aiding

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<sup>106</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 23 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, temporary box 295, LB JL.

one side and the Soviet Union the other." "Under those conditions," he asserted, "there could be no question of reducing arms or military spending." Remarks made previously by Eban to a closed meeting of Latin American nations alarmed Kosygin.<sup>107</sup> Voicing his concerns, he insisted that "no Arab could ever agree to such demands," and accused Johnson of being "under pressure from ... Zionist forces." The Prime Minister reminded the Administration of its interests in the Middle East, including stable Arab-American relations. Declaring that the President's position impeded a "peaceful settlement," Kosygin warned that the United States "would incur the wrath of [a] hundred million Arabs, who [will] remember this for a long time ... [E]verything depend[s] on the U[nited] S[tates]."<sup>108</sup>

Washington was not blind to Moscow's charge that further conflict was a possibility. State conceded that if Israel failed to "recognize that [the] Arabs have ... grievances and [a] sense of frustration which must be overcome," recourse to a fourth Arab-Israeli war remained inevitable.<sup>109</sup> Nevertheless, some leeway towards Israel was granted, the Administration reasoning that Jerusalem was now "assessing its longer-term security needs." Of particular concern for State was the possibility that Israel "may be impelled toward reassessing its policy toward acquisition [of] nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles."<sup>110</sup> The issue of arms limitation had become a priority for the Administration while continuing Israeli occupation in the captured territories fuelled Arab rage. American acquiescence to Eshkol's territorial aggrandisement, in the face of Arab refusal to recognise Israel's right to exist and to enter

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<sup>107</sup> The Israeli Foreign Minister demanded that Moscow support the Israeli territorial position as previously described to Rusk with one alteration, Israeli possession of the West Bank.

<sup>108</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, temporary box 295, LBJL.

<sup>109</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 218168, 28 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1791, USNA.

<sup>110</sup> Rusk to Barbour, 24 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 110, LBJL. Debate surrounding the nuclear aspect of Israel's military strategy as a possible justification for its pre-emptive strike in June is discussed by Anvar Cohen. He argues that Egyptian flights over the Dimona installation on 17 May 1967, the same day that UNEF were withdrawn, were as much a reason for Israel's attack as other, more traditional explanations such as Egypt's massive mobilisation of the Sinai front. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 259-273. McGeorge Bundy disputes any scenario involving "nuclear overtones" for Washington in the lead-up to the crisis. Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510.

into peace negotiations, compromised American Cold War interests in the region. Those that benefited most from the situation remained in Moscow. As such, the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict remained a point of contention for superpower relations. Each was dragged further into the regional dynamics. Johnson's emphasis upon arms limitation in the region was an attempt to insulate the United States from the negative repercussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also sought to remove the conflict from the realm of superpower competition. Yet, the initiative was probably misdirected. Arms limitations were certainly legitimate, yet useless if Israeli occupation was allowed to continue.<sup>111</sup> So long as the fundamentals of the conflict remained, recourse to violence was inevitable. At the very least, continued tension in the region would not auger well for long-term Middle Eastern stability and prosperity, both crucial to American interests.

## PRELUDE TO ANNEXATION

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was enlisted to act as an intermediary between Washington and Jerusalem in an attempt to moderate Israel's behaviour. The Shah was urged to "impress upon [the] Israelis [of the] desirability [that] they not ... take unilateral action," with respect to the occupied territories.<sup>112</sup> Three days later, State noted press reports claiming that the Israeli parliament "passed enabling legislation to permit [the] extension [of] Israeli laws and administration to occupied Arab territories falling within old Palestine mandate borders. "As was clear in [the] President's June 19 speech, [the] U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] would strongly oppose any unilateral action by Israel to assert de jure control over occupied territories." State directed Ambassador Barbour to

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<sup>111</sup> After 5 June, the granting of American military licenses to Middle Eastern nations, including Israel, was temporarily suspended. While the White House focussed upon the issue throughout June and July, Soviet sales to the region began soon after. By 20 July, Rusk commented that the increased flow of Soviet weapons to the Middle East was a worrying prospect for the Administration and, according to the New York Times, hinted that American arms sales to the region would soon begin again. New York Times, 20 July 1967, quoted from Papers of Henry Fowler (hereafter PHF), MEC, box 40, LBJL. By the end of the Administration, the White House had endorsed the sale of Phantom jets to Israel. Sanders to Johnson, 24 September 1968, Papers of Harold Barefoot Sanders (hereafter PHBS), box 20, LBJL.

<sup>112</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 218168, 26 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1791, USNA.

"bring this position ... to [the] attention [of the] G[overnment] O[f] I[srael] at [the] highest level ... You should state [that] we hope there is no misunderstanding as to [the] seriousness with which [the] U[nited] S[tates] would regard [a] unilateral Israeli move."

Reports that Israel's Minister for Justice declared the Israeli move as a proclamation of "[its] sovereignty over [the] West Bank and Gaza" were especially worrying. State sought to clarify Jerusalem's position and requested an "authoritative G[overnment] O[f] I[srael] comment as to the implication of [the] legislation."<sup>113</sup> King Hussein left no doubt that the West Bank would have to be returned to Jordan. Arriving in Washington in late June, the King informed Johnson of "the necessity" of Jordan retaining control of the region. However, in light of the Administration's emphasis towards a negotiated peace, Washington contemplated demilitarisation of the West Bank. Bundy enquired as to Hussein's thoughts on this approach. The King commented that "if there were a peaceful settlement with Israel, the problem would be academic and would largely take care of itself."<sup>114</sup> The Administration's position vis-à-vis territorial integrity was shattered. Morocco warned that the American approach strongly undermined the Arab moderates. It cautioned further that failure to "take a strong position for unilateral withdrawal would strengthen Nasser ... in [his] efforts to undermine [the] U[nited] S[tates] position in [the] area and would deliver [the] M[iddle] E[ast] into Soviet hands."<sup>115</sup> For his part, Johnson recognised that Moscow's influence was increasing. Meeting with Rusk and McNamara, the President accused his Secretaries of State and Defence

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<sup>113</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 218573, 29 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1796, USNA. Barbour later cabled Rusk with the news that Israel "had no intention [to] apply [the] recently enacted enabling laws to Gaza and the West Bank." Barbour to Rusk, 6 July 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 109, LBJL.

<sup>114</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 28 June 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 109, LBJL. State later declared that a "more realistic Arab view of [the] necessity for [a] de facto peace with Israel will be easier to come by if [Israel] can use [the] period of its military occupation of [the] West Bank to try to advance Arab-Israeli peace and co-existence." Consequently, "the West Bank is a show window where [the] G[overnment] O[f] I[srael] can demonstrate ... its desire to live on friendly and mutually fruitful terms with its neighbors ... under conditions subject to Israeli control." Outgoing Telegram, 000142, 2 July 1967, PLBJ, NSF, CF, box 110, LBJL.

<sup>115</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 219759, 30 June 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL Arab-Isr, box 1791, USNA.

of complacency, declaring that "he was more concerned about the Soviet position in the Middle East" than either of them.<sup>116</sup>

Israel's grip on the occupied territories tightened to the point where Eshkol's Government was now subsidising the residents of the West Bank to improve standards of living. David Horowitz, Governor of the Bank of Israel, freely admitted that thoughts were now turned to a long-term strategy for the area.<sup>117</sup> Not surprisingly, Jordan maintained pressure upon Washington and complained bitterly at American policy. An end to belligerency, according to Jordanian's Foreign Minister Ahmed Toukan, was "extremely difficult for Jordan to accept prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces."<sup>118</sup>

State recognised "the need for maintaining as much influence toward moderation in certain ... Arab states as possible." Yet Washington's position in the region was irreparably harmed. Lebanese President Charles Helou soon confirmed that the United States was now considered "to be the enemy of Arabs."<sup>119</sup> A sense of urgency gripped the Administration. Johnson met with key advisors on 18 July to discuss the identity of a mediator. According to Johnson, "the clock is ticking. There is no question but what the Arabs have no confidence in us. We can't sit and let these things go." As such, the President declared that "he would be receptive to finding somebody to put [a deal] together ..." Rusk suggested "Sweden or Switzerland" as "more appropriate in getting the parties to a 'meeting of the minds.'" Movement towards cementing Israel's authority over the occupied territories convinced Johnson and Bundy of the urgency "to get at it with the Israelis." While Johnson maintained that "get[ting] somebody to front for you [was] well and good," he also recognised that Washington should take some

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<sup>116</sup> Notes of a Meeting, 12 July 1967, PTJ, NOM, box 1, set 2, LBJL.

<sup>117</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 4956, 11 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1797, USNA.

<sup>118</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 7456, 14 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA.

<sup>119</sup> Middleton to Rusk, 322, 14 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA. Lebanon's Minister for Information Michael Edde confided to Ambassador Middleton that an acceptable solution for the Arabs comprised of Israel keeping "certain strategic points to included [the] Syrian escarpment in Lake Tiberias and part of Gaza." Middleton to Rusk, 14 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA; Memorandum of Conversation, 15 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA.

initiative. As such, "a mediator ... would undertake the task ... with the U[nited] S[tates] behind him." Bundy remained the sole advocate of direct American intervention, claiming that "Israel will not listen to anybody but us."<sup>120</sup>

## WASHINGTON BACKPEDALS AND RETREATS

Washington now sensed disaster. Backpedaling, the Administration endorsed a Soviet-American proposal on 18 July.<sup>121</sup> The draft, a revised submission to the General Assembly by the Latin American and Caribbean bloc days earlier, recognised the principle of a right to national life. However, it also ordered an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June lines. Neither was linked. Rusk declared that the draft was "a movement toward termination of a state of belligerency." According to the Secretary, the resolution

"would find broad support in the Security Council and it could become the basis for a general settlement which deals constructively with other aspects of the problem: the refugees, protection of international rights in Jerusalem, freedom of passage through international waterways, and withdrawal of Israeli forces to agreed national boundaries."<sup>122</sup>

Upon viewing the draft, Eban understood that Israel was in "serious trouble," and protested the American turnaround. Eban informed Goldberg that he "could see no difference between this formulation and Kosygin's call for unconditional withdrawal against which the United States and Israel had battled so hard." Fortunately for Israel, word came through that the Arab states had rejected the proposal.<sup>123</sup> Nevertheless, Washington now urged Israel to compromise. According to Rusk, "some risk and [a] large measure of flexibility" from Jerusalem

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<sup>120</sup> Notes of the President's Meeting, 18 July 1967, PTJ, NOM, box 1, set 2, LB JL.

<sup>121</sup> Negotiations commenced on 17 July. See Goldberg to Rusk, 17 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1798, USNA.

<sup>122</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 19843, 12 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>123</sup> Abba Eban, *An Autobiography*, (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 442-444.

was required.<sup>124</sup> As an Egyptian official declared, “no Arab leader could afford to make peace under duress.”<sup>125</sup> Clearly, Washington was required to moderate Israeli behaviour.

After the Arab rejection, Moscow continued to use the American-Soviet draft as a working paper. Hence, the agreement itself remained in circulation, its existence continuing to disturb Jerusalem. Washington rushed to reassure Israel that Johnson’s five principles were “still the basis for U[nited] S[tates] policy.”<sup>126</sup> Israel remained unconvinced. Evron denounced American sponsorship of the draft. “While not doubting U[nited] S[tates] good intentions,” he questioned the direction of Washington’s partnership with the Soviets, maintaining that Moscow “had succeeded in eroding [the] U[nited] S[tates] position.” Eugene Rostow denied the charge. Conceding that the “Soviet aim was to get [a] withdrawal resolution at [the] cheapest price,” Rostow reassured Evron that the “U[nited] S[tates] position remained strong; there must be [an] end to belligerency if there were to be troop withdrawals.”<sup>127</sup>

On 16 August, and “at [the] behest of Eshkol,” Assistant Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry Moshe Bitan further elaborated upon Israel’s anxiety. Bitan argued that Washington was now “deviating” from President Johnson’s five principles, particularly in regards to the latter’s recognition of “recognised boundaries” for Israel. This draft resolution, according to Bitan, contained “no mention of recognised boundaries.” Eshkol was also concerned with Washington’s assessment that the Soviet contribution to the debate was motivated by a sincere desire to “act moderately.” Bitan reported that Israel was “skeptical … Israel regards [the] Soviets as merely determined to erode U[nited] S[tates] principles in favor [of] their pro-Arab attitude.” As a result, Bitan urged the Administration to refrain from “starting any further U[nited] N[ations] consideration from this point …”

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<sup>124</sup> Rusk to Barbour, 29 July 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>125</sup> Bergus to Rusk, 10 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>126</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 20918, 15 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>127</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 15899, 4 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

Yugoslavia's recent involvement in pursuing a settlement was also mentioned.<sup>128</sup> Bitan criticised "Tito's comment that [the] Arabs would be humiliated by being forced to recognize Israel." According to Bitan, "it is basic to U[nited] S[tates] and Israel[i] policy that Israel is recognized and recognition is accepted." Only days before, Rusk had clarified the American position on recognition. Sensing that Arab recognition of Israel would not be forthcoming, State now attempted to detour the controversy, declaring, "an abandonment of claims of belligerency would not necessarily entail recognition of Israel by the Arab states." According to Washington, "it would, however, eliminate any claim of a right to threaten or use armed force ... of one Near East state against another."<sup>129</sup> Final confirmation of the divergent positions between Washington and the Eshkol Government was reflected in Bitan's concluding remark. If the Administration continued with its present strategy, the United States would find itself on a "collision course" with Israel.<sup>130</sup>

On 18 August Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan declared, "Israel [will] not return to its pre-war borders."<sup>131</sup> Days before, and two and a half months after the conclusion of the conflict, State proclaimed that its diplomatic efforts in the Middle East were spent. According to Battle, "U[nited] S[tates] influence and control in Israel is as limited as that of the Soviets over the Arabs."<sup>132</sup> State concluded that "at this juncture," the "most constructive role" that the Administration could play was

"to stand on the principles which must underlie a solution  
as advanced by President Johnson and elaborated during

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<sup>128</sup> President Tito visited Nasser on 10 August with a proposal for a peace settlement. State concluded that Tito was motivated by "his belief that he enjoys the confidence of both the U[nited] S[tates] and the U[union of] S[oviet] S[ocialist] R[epublics]." Intelligence Note, 8 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969, PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>129</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 19843, 12 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

<sup>130</sup> Barbour to Rusk, 16 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA.

<sup>131</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 23385, 18 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA. Dayan later informed Barbour that his long-term plans envisaged the "Jordan River as [a] security boundary for Israel." Barbour to Rusk, 23 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA.

<sup>132</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 14 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1799, USNA.

discussions in the United Nations. Until there is some indication [that] attitudes of parties [are] changing by moving from inflexible positions, we see little or no utility [in the] U[nited] S[tates] becoming identified with specific tactics for implementing these principles."<sup>133</sup>

In reality, then, State's declaration was motivated more by a desire to exclude the Administration from the coming diplomatic struggle than any recognition of the limits of presidential power. American strategy throughout and immediately after the crisis rested upon the linkage between an Israeli withdrawal and an end to belligerency with the prospect of peace negotiations never too far away. For the Arab states, this constituted recognition of the Jewish nation. Sensing its error, Washington eventually denied that this was the case.

## THE STALEMATE COMMENCES

The Khartoum Conference at the end of August 1967 denounced the American strategy. No Arab state, moderate or otherwise, was initially prepared to disregard the directives issued at Khartoum: no negotiation with, no recognition of and no peace with Israel. American opposition to an Israeli withdrawal without corresponding Arab initiatives towards peace compromised its own position in the region. Inevitably, Moscow benefited as a result. Even Israel, prone to claiming that "the I[rael] D[efence] F[orce] did the U[nited] S[tates] and the West a great favor by decisively weakening the Soviet position in the area," admitted that Moscow gained enormously from the conflict.<sup>134</sup> Further harm was done to the Administration's interests after Evron confirmed in late August that "even in exchange for a peace treaty Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries."<sup>135</sup> In late September, Eshkol announced plans for Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Israeli attitudes had now hardened. Jordan's declaration, on

<sup>133</sup> Outgoing Telegram, 24065, 19 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA.

<sup>134</sup> Barbour to Rusk, 28 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA.

<sup>135</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 29 August 1967, RG 59, CFPF, 1967-1969: PD, POL 27 Arab-Isr, box 1800, USNA.

5 November, acknowledging Israel's right to exist in return for an Israeli withdrawal, which was also linked to an adequate solution for the refugees, was subsequently disregarded. The United Arab Republic made a similar declaration two days later, which was similarly ignored.<sup>136</sup> The Israeli reaction aside, both declarations were largely useless in the face of opposition from Arab hardliners such as Syria and Iraq.<sup>137</sup> Initiatives continued in the United Nations. On 8 November, the United States introduced a draft resolution again linking withdrawal to a termination of belligerency. Israel rejected it on the grounds that the proposal did not ascribe enough emphasis to direct negotiations between the belligerents. Instead, the resolution requested the appointment of a special representative to initiate negotiations. Gunnar Jarring was chosen for the task. On 22 November, a British proposal was accepted in the Security Council. Endorsing Johnson's five principles, Resolution 242 linked Israel's withdrawal to the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency," yet remained vague when referring to an Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the recent conflict."<sup>138</sup> Overall, Israeli occupation of the occupied territories added to the already explosive situation in the region. Arab-American relations suffered as a result.<sup>139</sup>

Johnson's strategy remained grounded in an unrealistic assessment of the Arab's willingness to reach a peace at all costs. It also presumed that Israel's position would remain stagnant, without a hardening of attitudes that came to endorse such projects as Jewish settlements. Consequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordanian announcements in early November were wasted due to Israel's about face. Johnson had miscalculated the Eshkol Government's true intentions. The Administration's policy contributed to continuing tensions between the bellig-

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<sup>136</sup> Thant, *View From the UN*, pp. 289-290.

<sup>137</sup> According to Samir A. Mutawi, "this division in the Arab World made it impossible for the formulation of a uniform policy which King Hussein believed was an essential prerequisite for the return of Arab land." Mutawi, Samir A. *Jordan in the 1967 War*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 175.

<sup>138</sup> Resolution 242, 22 November 1967, SC:OR, *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*, 1967, p. 8.

<sup>139</sup> In a coming meeting with a group of Arab ambassadors, Harry McPherson instructed the White House to be frank in discussions with the group and point out that while American support for Israel is a "broad popular feeling," "the Arab viewpoint is not as well understood." "Talking Points: Meeting with Arab Ambassadors," 3 October 1967, PLBJ, HMcPF, box 42, LB JL.

erents. Consequently, the superpowers could not help be drawn into the next round of hostilities six years later. The Administration's policy also destroyed Arab-American relations. By the end of Johnson's tenure, the Administration was well aware of the repercussions that stemmed from the ongoing Arab-Israeli controversy. A December 1968 Policy Planning Council paper concluded, "outside of East Asia, the greatest risk of great power military involvement in the developing world exists in the Middle East."<sup>140</sup> Washington was also aware that Moscow would seek to capitalise from the situation. Another Policy Planning Council paper stated,

"only in the Middle East, has the opportunity to exploit instability, in ways conceived to be advantageous for the Soviet Union, led to a more aggressive [Soviet] policy. Apparently believing that further radicalization of Arab politics ... will reduce Western influence there, the Soviets have invested heavily in support of the radical Arab states."<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> U.S. Foreign Policy: Current Issues in a Longer-Term Perspective, December 1968, PLBJ, NSF, Subject File (hereafter SF), box 49, LBJL.

<sup>141</sup> The U.S. Relationship with the Soviet Union, December 1968, PLBJ, NSF, SF, box 50, LBJL.


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## **APPENDICES**



# Chronology

## 1966-1967 (Lyndon B. Johnson)



### **1966**

**Aug. 2:** US President Lyndon Johnson assures Israeli President Zalman Shazar of continued American support for Israel.

### **1967**

**May 22:** Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announces a blockade in the Straits of Tiran.

**May 23:** The US pledges its support to territorial integrity in the Middle East.

**June 5:** The Six Day War begins.

**June 6:** US strategy supports Israeli territorial acquisition in the hope that it will hasten a "definitive peace."

**June 7:** The Soviet Union supports UNSC Resolution 234 calling for a cease-fire in place.

- Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria and Saudi Arabia institute oil embargoes against the United States.

**June 12:** Johnson asks "how do we get out of this predicament?"

**June 13:** Soviet draft resolution s/7951 calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June lines.

- American draft resolution s/7952 calls for negotiations between the belligerents.

- An informal session of the special committee of the National Security Council decides that no negotiations are possible in the coming months.

- The Soviet Union informs UN Secretary General U Thant of its request for an emergency special session of the General Assembly.

**June 19:** Johnson's "Five Principles" speech formally links recognition of Israel, an end to belligerency and a final settlement.

- The Fifth Emergency Special Session of the UNGA opens.

**June 22:** Opening of the Soviet-American Glassboro Summit.

**June 29:** The US protests the extension of Israeli legislation into the occupied Arab territories.

**July 18:** The US co-sponsors a draft with the Soviet Union calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June lines.

**Aug. 29:** Israeli Minister Ephraim Evron confirms that "even in exchange for a peace treaty Israel is not prepared for a simple return to the June 4 boundaries."


**Nov. 5:** Jordan acknowledges Israel's right to exist.

**Nov. 7:** The United Arab Republic does the same.


**Nov. 22:** UNSC Resolution 242 links Israel's withdrawal to the "termination ... of belligerency."

# Maps

## The Rhodes Armistice Line, 1949



**The Middle East after the 1967 June War**



## Who's Who (List of Names)

Abd el-Hakim Amer	Deputy President of Egypt
Hushung Ansary	Iranian Ambassador to Washington
Walworth Barbour	United States Ambassador to Tel Aviv
Lucius Battle	United States Assistant Secretary of State for the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Moshe Bitan	Assistant Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Findley Burns	United States Ambassador to Amman
McGeorge Bundy	Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council
Sir Harold Caccia	Great Britain's Ambassador to Washington during the Eisenhower Administration
Clark Clifford	Chairman of the United States Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Moshe Dayan	Defence Minister of Israel
Sir Patrick Dean	Great Britain's Ambassador to Washington
Anatoly Dobrynin	Soviet Union's Ambassador to Washington
John Foster Dulles	United States Secretary of State during the Eisenhower Administration
Abba Eban	Israeli Foreign Minister
Hermann Eilts	United States Ambassador to Riyadh
Levi Eshkol	Prime Minister of Israel
Dwight D. Eisenhower	United States President prior John F. Kennedy
Ephraim Evron	Israeli Minister at its embassy in Washington

Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi	United Arab Republic Foreign Minister during the tenure of the Eisenhower Administration
Nikolai Federenko	Soviet Union's Ambassador to the United Nations
Henry H. Fowler	United States Secretary of the Treasury
Raymond Garthoff	Official at the United States Department of State
Arthur Goldberg	United States Representative to the United Nations
Andrei Gromyko	Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
W. Averell Harriman	United States Ambassador at Large
Richard Helms	Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Charles Helou	President of Lebanon
David Horowitz	Governor of the Bank of Israel
Thomas Hughes	Director of the United States Bureau of Intelligence and Research
King Hussein of Jordan	Monarch of the Kingdom of Jordan
Lyndon Baines Johnson	United States President
Curtis Jones	United States Consul in Aden
Nicholas Katzenbach	United States Under Secretary of State
John F. Kennedy	United States President prior to Lyndon Baines Johnson
Foy Kohler	United States Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alexei Kosygin	Prime Minister of the Soviet Union
Robert McNamara	United States Secretary of Defence
Leonard Meeker	Legal Advisor to the United States Department of State

Golda Meir	Israeli Foreign Minister during the Kennedy Administration
Gamal Abdul Nasser	President of Egypt
Richard Nolte	United States Ambassador to the United Arab Republic
Eugene Rostow	United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Walt Rostow	Special Assistant to the United States President
Dean Rusk	United States Secretary of State
Nadav Safran	Advisor to the Department of State's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Omar Saqqaf	Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia
Hal Saunders	Member of the National Security Council staff
Boris Sedov	Second Secretary of the Soviet Union's Embassy in Washington
Zalman Shazar	Israeli President during the Johnson Administration
Joseph Sisco	United States Assistant Secretary of State for Internal Organisation Affairs
Hugh Smythe	United States Ambassador to Damascus
Mohamed Soweyal	Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Washington
U Thant	United Nations Secretary General
Ahmed Toukan	Foreign Minister of Jordan
John Walsh	Executive Secretary of the United States Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Earle Wheeler	Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
Evan Wilson	United States Consul General to Jerusalem

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