

# DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

## Volume III (1974-1983):

5. Post-Geneva Conference - Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty  
(1974-1979)

6. Post-Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty - Period Prior  
to the 1<sup>st</sup> Intifada (1979-1987)

**Edited by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi**



**PASSIA**  
**Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs**

**PASSIA**, the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, is an independent Palestinian non-profit institution, not affiliated with any government, political party or organization. PASSIA seeks to present the Question of Palestine in its national, regional and international contexts through academic research, dialogue and publication.

PASSIA endeavors that research undertaken under its auspices be specialized and scientific and that its symposia and workshops, whether international or intra-Palestinian, be open, self-critical and conducted in a spirit of cooperation.

The publication of this book was kindly supported by the **Finnish Representative Office** in Ramallah (<http://www.finrep.org/>) and by the **Palestine Investment Fund (PIF)**, Ramallah (<http://www.pif.ps>), which is an independent Palestinian company with all its assets and capital belonging to the Palestinian people, aiming to develop a sustainable, strong Palestinian national economy through various strategic investments in association with the private sector.



REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE  
OF FINLAND, RAMALLAH



صندوق الاستثمار الفلسطيني  
PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND

**Volumes of this series:**

Volume I: Until 1947  
Volume II: 1948-1973  
**Volume III: 1974-1987**  
Volume IV: 1987-1994  
Volume V: 1995-1999  
Volume VI: 1999-2002  
Volume VII: 2002-2005  
Volume VIII: 2005-2007

**ISBN 978-9950-305-26-7**

**Copyright © PASSIA**

PASSIA Publication – December 2007

Tel: (02)626 4426 ▪ Fax: (02)628 2819

E-mail: [passia@palnet.com](mailto:passia@palnet.com) ▪ Website: [www.passia.org](http://www.passia.org)

PO Box 19545, Jerusalem

# CONTENTS

◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ Volume III

Introduction .....	i
<b>5. <u>Post-Geneva Conference – Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1974-1979)</u> .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference, Kilometer 101 - Cairo-Suez Road, 18 January 1974 .....	1
Declaration and Resolutions of the Second Islamic Summit Conference, Lahore, Pakistan, 24 February 1974 .....	2
Secretary-General of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), Naef Hawatmeh, Statement Defending the Establishment of a Palestinian National Authority in Territories Liberated from Israeli Occupation, Beirut, 24 February 1974 .....	6
Government of Israel, Basic Principles, Jerusalem, 10 March 1974 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	7
Agreement on Disengagement of Forces between Israel and Syria, Geneva, 31 May 1974 .....	8
Palestine National Council, Political Program Adopted at Its 12 <sup>th</sup> Session, Cairo, 8 June 1974 .....	10
United States and Israel, Joint statement on Bilateral Relations, Jerusalem, 17 June 1974 .....	11
Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on Negotiations for a Peace Agreement with Jordan, 21 July 1974 .....	13
Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on Settlements in the West Bank, Jerusalem, 26 July 1974 .....	13
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Statement in the Knesset on Settlements, Jerusalem, 31 July 1974 .....	14
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Statement in the Knesset on Negotiations with Arab States, Jerusalem, 6 August 1974 .....	16
Tripartite Palestinian-Egyptian-Syrian Communiqué, Cairo, 21 September 1974 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	18
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Statement Announcing Withdrawal from the PLO Executive Committee, Beirut, 26 September 1974 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	19
PLO Central Council, Communiqué Regarding the PFLP'S Announcement to Withdraw from the PLO Executive Committee, Damascus, 30 September 1974 .....	24
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3210 Inviting the PLO to Participate in UN Debates on Palestine, 14 October 1974 .....	25

Israeli Foreign Ministry, Statement Regarding UN General Assembly Resolution 3210, Jerusalem, 15 October 1974 .....	26
General Secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), George Habash, Statement on the Occasion of the Upcoming the Arab League Summit Conference in Rabat, Beirut, 25 October 1974 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	26
League of Arab States, Communiqué of the 7 <sup>th</sup> Arab Summit Conference, Rabat, 28 October 1974 .....	28
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Statement in the Knesset on the Rabat Conference Decision, Jerusalem, 5 November 1974 .....	29
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Address to the UN General Assembly, New York, 13 November 1974 .....	35
Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, Statement to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions in Israel Regarding Arafat's Appearance before the UN General Assembly, 14 November 1974 .....	45
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3236 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 22 November 1974 .....	46
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3237 Granting Observer Status to the Palestine Liberation Organization, New York, 22 November 1974 .....	47
Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, Statement in the Knesset Regarding UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237, Jerusalem, 26 November 1974 .....	48
White House, Statement on the Meeting between US President Ford and Israeli Foreign Minister Allon, Washington, DC, 9 December 1974 .....	50
Letter to US President Henry Ford by 71 Senators Regarding Recent UN Actions on the PLO, Washington, DC, 9 December 1974 .....	51
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3336 (XXIX) on Sovereignty over National Resources in Occupied Arab Areas, New York, 17 December 1974 .....	51
PLO Representative in London Said Hammami, Views on the Palestine Question, London, 20 March 1975 .....	52
Israeli Cabinet, Statement on Peace Agreements with the Arab States, Jerusalem, 8 June 1975 .....	53
International Women's Year Conference, Resolution on Palestinian Women, Mexico City, 27 June 1975 .....	53
Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Resolutions AHG/RES. 76-77 (XII), 12 <sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, Kampala, 28 July-1 August 1975 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	54
Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, Jerusalem and Alexandria, 1 September 1975 .....	57

Israel-United States Memorandum of Understanding, 1 September 1975 .....	61
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3375 (XXX) Inviting the PLO to Participate in the Efforts for Peace in the Middle East, New York, 10 November 1975 .....	64
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3376 (XXX) on the Question of Palestine, New York, 10 November 1975 .....	64
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3379 Calling Zionism a Form of Racism, New York, 10 November 1975 .....	65
Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Chaim Herzog, Address to the UN General Assembly, 10 November 1975 .....	66
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Statement Rejecting UN General Assembly Resolutions 3375, 3376 and 3379, Jerusalem, 10 November 1975 .....	71
US Congress, Senate Resolution Condemning UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, 11 November 1975 .....	72
Statement by Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, 12 November 1975 .....	72
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3414 (XXX) on the Situation in Palestine, New York, 5 December 1975 .....	74
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3474 (XXX) Regarding a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, New York, 11 December 1975 .....	75
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3516 (XXX) Regarding Permanent Sovereignty Over National Resources in the Occupied Arab Territories, New York, 15 December 1975 .....	76
UN General Assembly, Resolution 3525 (XXX) Concerning the Report of the Special Committee Investigating Human Rights in the Occupied Territory, New York, 15 December 1975 .....	77
US State Department, Statement Regarding US Policy on the Middle East, Washington, DC, 26 January 1976 .....	80
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Address before a Joint Session of the US Congress, Washington, DC, 28 January 1976 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	82
US Ambassador William W. Scranton, Statements on the Occupied Territories before the UN Security Council, New York, 23 March 1976 .....	83
UN Security Council, President's Statement on the Situation in the Administered Areas, New York, 26 May 1976 .....	86
US Ambassador William W. Scranton, Response to the UNSC President's Statement on the Situation in the Administered Areas, New York, 26 May 1976 .....	87
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Statement in the Knesset on US Contacts with the PLO, Jerusalem, 30 June 1976 .....	88

Acting Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Letter to the UN Secretary-General Regarding a Soviet Proposal for a Middle East settlement and the Geneva Peace Conference, 7 October 1976 .....	89
President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Statement Calling for a Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on the Basis of the 1947 UN Partition Resolution, Tunis, 26 October 1976 ....	91
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon on his Plans for Peace ("The Allon Plan"), October 1976 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	91
UN Security Council, President's Statement on the "Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories," New York, 11 November 1976 .....	97
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Response to the UNSC President's Statement on the "Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories," Knesset, 17 November 1976 .....	97
UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Report to the UN Security Council on the Geneva Peace Conference, 28 February 1977 .....	99
US President Jimmy Carter, Remarks on the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Clinton, Mass., 16 March 1977 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	103
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Statement on the Middle East, Speech to the Soviet Trade Union Conference, 21 March 1977 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	104
Palestinian National Council, Political Declaration, 12 <sup>th</sup> Session, Cairo, 22 March 1977 .....	105
Joint Statement on the Middle East by US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Geneva, 21 May 1977 .....	106
European Economic Community, Statement on the Middle East, London, 29 June 1977 ....	107
US State Department, Statement Regarding Israel's Recognition of Settlements, Washington, DC, 26 July 1977 .....	107
PLO Central Council, Statement on PLO Policy, Damascus, 25-26 August 1977 .....	108
Joint US-Soviet Statement on the Middle East, New York and Moscow, 1 October 1977 ....	108
Government of Israel, Reaction to the Joint Us-Soviet Statement on the Middle East, 2 October 1977 .....	109
Israel-US Working Paper on the Geneva Conference, 5 October 1977 .....	109
US Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton, Statement on Israeli Settlements, Testifying before the US House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East, Washington, DC, 19 October 1977 .....	110
UN General Assembly, Resolution 32/5 on Israeli Settlements in the Territories, New York, 28 October 1977 .....	111
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Broadcast by to the Egyptian People, Jerusalem, 11 November 1977 .....	112

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Statement to the Knesset, Jerusalem, 20 November 1977 .....	113
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Address to the Knesset, Jerusalem, 20 November 1977 .....	121
Governments of Egypt and Israel, Agreed Communiqué issued at the Conclusion of the Visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem, 21 November 1977 .....	126
UN General Assembly, Resolution 32/20 Calling for Reconvening the Geneva Conference, New York, 25 November 1977 .....	126
UN General Assembly, Resolution 32/40, Creating a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, New York, 2 December 1977 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	127
PLO Factions, Six-Point Program Calling for the Formation of a 'Steadfastness and Confrontation Front' against Sadat's Negotiations with Israel, 4 December 1977 .....	127
League of Arab States, Declaration of the Arab Summit Conference, Tripoli, Libya, 5 December 1977 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	128
UN General Assembly, Resolution 32/171 on Living Conditions of the Palestinian People, New York, 19 December 1977 .....	130
Palestinian West Bank Mayors, Statement on Sadat's Visit to Israel, 21 December 1977 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	131
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Proposed Autonomy Plan for the Palestinians, Jerusalem, 28 December 1977 .....	132
US President Jimmy Carter, Statement on Recognition of Palestinians, Aswan, Egypt, 4 January 1978 .....	133
White House Statement on the Carter-Sadat Meetings, Washington, DC, 8 February 1978 .....	134
Government of Israel, Statement on Settlements, Jerusalem, 12 February 1978 .....	135
Israel Defense Forces, Statement on the Operation in Lebanon, Jerusalem, 15 March 1978 .....	136
UN Security Council, Resolution 425 on the Situation in Lebanon, New York, 19 March 1978 .....	137
UN Security Council, Resolution 426, New York, 19 March 1978 .....	138
Office of the Legal Advisor of the US State Department, Opinion to the US Congress, Declaring that Israeli Settlements are Inconsistent with International Law, 21 April 1978 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	138
US Ambassador at Large for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, Alfred Atherton, Status Report on the Peace Process, 15 June 1978 .....	139
Israel Cabinet, Communiqué Concerning Egyptian President Sadat's Proposals for the West Bank and Gaza, 25 June 1978 .....	146

Heds of Governments of the European Economic Community, Statement on the Middle East, London, 29 June 1978 .....	147
US President Jimmy Carter, Statement on the Peace Negotiations, 1 July 1978 .....	147
Government of Egypt, Proposals Relative to Withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and Security Arrangements ("Egyptian Six-Point Peace Plan"), 3 July 1978 .....	148
Government of Israel, Communiqué Turning down the Egyptian Peace Plan, Jerusalem, 9 July 1978 .....	149
The Camp David Accords - Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Camp David, 17 September 1978 .....	149
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Letter to US President Carter on Implementing the Comprehensive Settlement, 17 September 1978 .....	153
Camp David Accords: Exchange of Letters, 17-22 September 1978 .....	154
US President Jimmy Carter, Letter on Definition of Terms to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 22 September 1978 .....	156
Anti-Sadat "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" (Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and PLO), Summit Agreement, Damascus, 23 September 1978 .....	156
US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Letter to Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman Accompanying the Documents Agreed to at Camp David, 28 September 1978 .....	157
West Bank National Conference, Statement Rejecting the Camp David Accords, Beit Hanina, Jerusalem, 1 October 1978 .....	157
Gaza National Conference, Statement Rejecting the Camp David Accords, Gaza, 18 October 1978 .....	158
World Zionist Organization, Department for Rural Settlement, Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983, October 1978 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	159
League of Arab States, Final Statement of the Arab Summit Conference, Baghdad, 5 November 1978 .....	165
UN General Assembly, Resolution 33/71 Banning Military Cooperation with Israel, New York, 14 December 1978 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	167
Israel Cabinet, Communiqué on the Peace Treaty with Egypt, Jerusalem, 15 December 1978 .....	167
UN General Assembly, Resolution 33/113 on the Report of the Special Committee on Palestine, New York, 18 December 1978 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	168
Palestinian National Council, Political and Organizational Program, Damascus, 23 January 1979 .....	169
UN Security Council, Resolution 446 on Settlements, New York, 22 March 1979 .....	172
Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, Washington, DC, 26 March 1979 .....	173

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty: Exchange of Letters, 26 March 1979 .....	185
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty: Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel, 26 March 1979 .....	186
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty: Letter on Superseded Articles of 1 September 1975, Washington, DC, 30 March 1979 .....	187
League of Arab States, Arab Summit Conference Resolution, Baghdad, 31 March 1979 ....	188

## **6. Post-Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty - Period Prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> Intifada (1979-1987)**

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Remarks on the Future of Settlements, Jerusalem, 24 April 1979 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	191
Opening Statements by the heads of the Negotiations Delegations, Autonomy Talks, Beersheba, 25 May 1979 .....	192
US State Department, Statement on Israeli Settlements, Washington, DC, 4 June 1979 .....	198
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, Statement on Israeli Settlements, Jerusalem, 11 June 1979 .....	199
Negotiation Delegations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States, Joint Press Statement, Conclusion of the Second Round of Autonomy Talks, Alexandria, 12 June 1979 .....	200
UN Security Council, Resolution 450, New York, 14 June 1979 .....	200
European Economic Community, Council of Foreign Ministers, Statement on the Situation in the Middle East, Brussels, 18 June 1979 .....	201
Negotiation Delegations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States, Joint Statement and Statements by the Chief Delegates, Conclusion of the Third Round of Autonomy Talks, Herzliya, 26 June 1979 .....	202
UN Security Council, Resolution 452 on Settlements, New York, 20 July 1979 .....	204
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Statement on the Middle East Problem, UN General Assembly, New York, 25 September 1979 .....	204
Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on Settlements, Jerusalem, 14 October 1979 .....	205
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Statement to the Press Following his Resignation from the Israeli Government, Bet Agron, Jerusalem, 23 October 1979 .....	205
UN General Assembly, Resolution 34/65 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 29 November 1979 .....	207
UN General Assembly, Resolution 34/70 on the Situation in the Middle East, New York, 6 December 1979 .....	209
UN General Assembly, Resolution 34/89 on Israeli Nuclear Armament, New York, 11 December 1979 .....	211

Government of Israel, Model for the Self-Governing Authority, 16 January 1980 <i>[Excerpts]</i> .....	212
Government of Egypt, Proposed Model of Full Autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Cairo, 28 January 1980 .....	216
UN Security Council, Resolution 465, New York, 1 March 1980 .....	220
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Regarding US Policy in the Middle East, Washington, DC, 20 March 1980 ....	221
Israeli Foreign Ministry, Statement on Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 2 April 1980 .....	224
Letter from the 'Steadfastness Front' to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Tripoli, 28 April 1980 .....	224
UN Security Council, Resolution 468 on the Expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, New York, 8 May 1980 .....	229
UN Security Council, Resolution 469 on the Expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, New York, 20 May 1980 .....	229
Palestinian Liberation Movement (Fateh), Fourth General Conference, Political Program, Damascus, 31 May 1980 .....	230
UN Security Council, Resolution 471 on Attacks Against West Bank Mayors, New York, 5 June 1980 .....	233
European Economic Community, Declaration on the Middle East ("Venice Declaration"), Venice, 13 June 1980 .....	234
UN Security Council, Resolution 476 on Jerusalem, New York, 30 June 1980 .....	235
Government of Israel, Statement Rejecting UN Security Council Resolution 476 on Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1 July 1980 .....	235
US Ambassador Donald McHenry, Statement Regarding UN Security Council Resolution 476 on Jerusalem, 1 July 1980 .....	236
UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-7/2 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 29 July 1980 .....	237
Government of Israel, Israeli Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, Knesset, 30 July 1980 .....	238
PLO Executive Committee, Statement on Jerusalem, Damascus, 1 August 1980 .....	238
UN Security Council, Resolution 478 on Jerusalem, New York, 20 August 1980 .....	239
General Secretariat of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Resolution of the Special Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Question of Jerusalem, Fez, 18-20 September 1980 .....	240
UN General Assembly, Resolution 35/169e Regarding the Israeli Basic Law, New York, 15 December 1980 .....	242

UN General Assembly, Resolution 35/207 on the Situation in the Middle East, New York, 16 December 1980 .....	243
UN Security Council, Resolution 484 on the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, New York, 19 December 1980 .....	244
Final Declaration and Resolutions, Third Islamic Summit Conference ("Mecca Declaration"), Mecca, 25-28 January 1981 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	244
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Position on Peace, Address before the 26 <sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party, Moscow, 23 February 1981 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	254
Palestinian National Council, Political Statement, 15 <sup>th</sup> Session, Damascus, 21 April 1981 ....	255
Foreign Minister Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Eight-Point Peace Plan ("Fahd Plan"), 6 August 1981 .....	260
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, Statement on Egyptian President Sadat's Assassination, Jerusalem, 6 October 1981 .....	260
Israel Military Order No. 947 Concerning the Establishment of a Civilian Administration, 8 November 1981 .....	261
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel, 30 November 1981 .....	262
UN General Assembly, Resolution 36/70 Regarding Assistance to the Palestinian People, New York, 4 December 1981 .....	263
UN General Assembly, Resolution 36/120 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 10 December 1981 .....	264
UN Security Council, Resolution 497, New York, 17 December 1981 .....	268
UN General Assembly, Resolution 36/226 on the Situation in the Near East, New York, 17 December 1981 .....	268
Government of Israel, Proposals for the Self-Governing Authority in the Territories ("Autonomy Plan"), 31 January 1982 .....	270
UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-9/1 Regarding the Situation in the Occupied Territories, New York, 5 February 1982 .....	273
UN Security Council, Resolution 508 Regarding Hostilities in Lebanon, New York, 5 June 1982 .....	274
UN Security Council, Resolution 509 Regarding Israel's Advance into Lebanon, New York, 6 June 1982 .....	275
UN Security Council, Resolution 512 on the Situation in Lebanon, New York, 19 June 1982 .....	275
The Paris Declaration, 2 July 1982 .....	276

UN Security Council, Resolution 518 Regarding Military Activities in Lebanon, New York, 12 August 1982 .....	276
Israeli Army Spokesman, Statement on the Expulsion of the PLO and Syrian Army from Beirut, 1 September 1982 .....	277
US President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on US Policy for Peace in the Middle East ("Reagan Peace Plan"), Burbank, California, 1 September 1982 .....	278
US President Ronald Reagan, Talking Points Sent to Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, Washington, DC, 1 September 1982 .....	282
Israeli Cabinet, Resolution on the Reagan Plan, Jerusalem, 2 September 1982 .....	283
League of Arab States, Final Declaration of the 12 <sup>th</sup> Arab Summit Conference ("Fez Plan"), Fez, 9 September 1982 .....	285
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Speech at a Dinner In Honor of A. N. Mohammed, Prime Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Moscow, 15 September 1982 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	287
Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on the Entry of the Israeli Army into West Beirut, 16 September 1982 .....	289
UN Security Council, Resolution 520 Regarding the Situation in Beirut, New York, 17 September 1982 .....	289
Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on the Massacre at Sabra and Shatilla Refugee Camps, Jerusalem, 19 September 1982 .....	290
UN Security Council, Resolution 521 Regarding the Massacre of Palestinian Civilians in Beirut, New York, 19 September 1982 .....	291
UN General Assembly, Resolution Es-7/9 Condemning the Massacre of Palestinian Civilians in Beirut, New York, 24 September 1982 .....	291
UN General Assembly, Resolution 37/88 - Report of a Committee Investigating Israeli Practices in the Territories, New York, 10 December 1982 .....	292
Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, Communiqué on Their Meetings, Amman, 14 December 1982 .....	297
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (Kahan Commission), 8 February 1983 .....	298
Palestinian National Council, Political Resolutions, Algiers, 22 February 1983 .....	360
Government of Jordan, Communiqué on the End of Negotiations with the PLO, Amman, Jordan, 10 April 1983 .....	364
Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon, 17 May 1983 .....	368
Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Resolutions AHG/Res. 109-109 (Xii), 19 <sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session, Addis Abeba, 6-12 June 1983 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] ...	373

World Council of Churches, Sixth Assembly Statement on the Middle East, Vancouver, Canada, July/August 1983 .....	377
International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva Declaration, 7 September 1983 .....	379
UN General Assembly, Resolution 38/58 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 13 December 1983 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	380
UN General Assembly, Resolution 38/144, New York, 19 December 1983 .....	381
Final Communiqué and Resolutions, Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, Morocco, 16-19 January 1984 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	382
Joint Communiqué, 17 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 9-10 July 1984 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	392
Deputy Permanent Observer of the PLO to the UN, Riyad Mansour, Letter to the UN Secretary-General, 6 August 1984 .....	393
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Statement to the UN General Assembly, 39 <sup>th</sup> Session, New York, 28 September 1984 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	393
Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Accords, 11 February 1985 .....	395
Joint Communiqué, 18 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 9 July 1985 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] ...	396
King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, Statement Delivered on his Behalf by Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz, Commemorative 40 <sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 1 October 1985 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	396
UN Security Council, Resolution 573 on the Israel Raid on the PLO Base in Tunis, New York, 4 October 1985 .....	398
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Statement on Terrorism ("The Cairo Declaration"), Cairo, 7 November 1985 .....	399
Resolutions of the Tenth Session of the Jerusalem Committee, Marrakech, Morocco, 22 January 1986 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	400
Palestine Liberation Organization, Three Proposals Submitted to American and Jordanian Negotiators, Clarifying the PLO's Positions on the Peace Process, Amman, 5 February 1986 .....	402
King Hussein of Jordan, Address on Middle East Peace, Amman, 19 February 1986 .....	403
PLO Executive Committee, Statement on the Political Situation, Tunis, 7 March 1986 .....	425
Joint Communiqué, 19 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 23-28 June 1986 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] ...	432
Government of Israel and Morocco, Joint Communiqué, Rabat and Jerusalem, 24 July 1986 .....	433
King Hassan II of Morocco, Address to the Moroccan People, 24 July 1986 .....	433

Joint Communiqué by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Alexandria, 12 September 1986 .....	440
UN Security Council, Resolution 592, New York, 8 December 1986 .....	441
Final Communiqué and Resolutions, Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	441
European Community, Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve Member States, Brussels, 23 February 1987 .....	453
Three-Part Understanding between Jordan and Israel (The "London Document"), 11 April 1987 .....	453
Soviet President Michail Gorbachev, Statement on the Middle East, Moscow, 24 April 1987 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	454
Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Ar-Rifai, Statement Regarding an International Middle East Conference, Amman, 3 May 1987 .....	455
Joint Communiqué, 20 <sup>th</sup> ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 15-16 June 1987 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	456
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Statement to the Un General Assembly, 42 <sup>nd</sup> Session, New York, 28 September 1987 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	456
Moshe Amirav, "Outline for Advancement of Negotiations between the Likud and the PLO," Jerusalem, September 1987 [ <i>Excerpts</i> ] .....	457
<b>Map Annex</b> .....	459

## Introduction

Palestine has enjoyed geographic, religious and political centrality in the Middle East and has since the beginning of the last century been vulnerable to the plans and ambitions of foreign powers. The resulting conflicts have led to the dispersal and prolonged suffering of the Palestinian people, and during the past eight decades in particular the Palestinian people have fought continuously to defend their internationally recognized rights to freedom and independence.

The ambitions and policies of the various external powers involved over the years have had an undeniable impact on inter-Arab relations, and on the international relations of Arab states. They have also had a direct effect on shaping the history of Palestine and the evolution of its future. Despite this external pressure, the Palestinians have succeeded in defending and maintaining their Arab identity and political presence by organizing socio-economic institutions and a political infrastructure which have allowed them to challenge the power of the various conquerors in the ongoing national struggle. Having legitimate representation forced other parties to recognize and engage with them despite attempts to deny them their rights to self-determination and national independence.

This volume is one of a series that organizes key political documents covering the time from the pre-Ottoman period to 2007. This volume includes the text or excerpts of over 210 documents, covering the period after the Geneva Conference, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1974-1979) and the period following up to the 1st *Intifada* in 1987. This chapter outlines the history of this period to provide a framework to guide the reader to the historical context of the papers.

### ***Post-Geneva Conference - Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1974-1979)***

In November 1974 the Arab Summit recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of Palestinian interests. This placed the Palestinian Question at centre-stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PLO meanwhile established a mini-state in Lebanon and Arafat delivered his first speech to the UN calling for a united Palestine with a secular government and equality for all citizens, Arab or Israeli.

Various Israeli solutions were also proposed. In 1976 the Foreign Minister (Allon) proposed an autonomous Palestine under Israeli sovereignty and an extension of Israeli borders eastward to the Jordan Valley. Prime Minister Begin proposed a similar plan in 1977.

US President Jimmy Carter took on the task of bringing a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement was finally signed at Camp David in 1978.

***From the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty to the 1st Intifada (1979-1987)***

In Baghdad in 1979 Arab governments reacted to Egypt's treaty with Israel by boycotting Egypt, suspending its membership of the Arab League, and moving the League's headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. They planned a ten-year assistance program for the Palestinian people in recognition of the ongoing Israeli occupation.

Israel continued its policies of settlement in the occupied territories and undermined Palestinian leadership when it could. Several new peace initiatives were presented in 1982: the Prince Fahd Plan, the Brezhnev Plan, the EEC Paris Statement and the Reagan Plan. All these plans acknowledged Palestinian autonomy and Israeli security concerns. The 1982 Arab Summit endorsed the Prince Fahd Plan and called for a Palestinian state.

From its Lebanon base the PLO continued to confront the Israeli army. The Lebanon civil war and Israeli invasion was costly for the Palestinian people, most notably in the 1982 massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Soon after the PLO left Lebanon and relocated to Tunis.

In 1985 the Palestinian Council first convened and signed an accord with Jordan for cooperation in building a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation but this was never implemented.

Arab-Israeli contacts continued in the quest for an understanding. The London Document outlined the respective political views of Israel and Jordan, but in circumstances representative of the time, the document was never ratified. Arab-Israeli diplomatic contacts continued. In 1987 one contact led to the highly controversial (in both countries) Amirav-Nusseibeh Document. These various moves contributed to the many proposals that followed.

***A Final Note***

Although we have endeavored to make this publication as reader/user friendly as possible, one should be aware that there is some inconsistency in terms of the spelling of non-English words - names and places (such as Haram Ash-Sharif or *Intifada*) – since we adhered, wherever possible, to the original version rather than apply our usual spelling rules. It is for the same reason that the volumes contain a number of minor typographical errors such as the omission of apostrophes, inconsistent capitalization, and spelling mistakes found in the originals.

Footnotes included in the volumes - excluding those marked “the ed.” - are mostly those that appeared in the original texts though the readership note that the numbering will not necessarily be accordance with the original version.

*Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi*  
*Chairman of PASSIA*

## 5. Post-Geneva Conference – Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1974-1979)

### EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE, KILOMETER 101 - CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD, 18 JANUARY 1974

*[The agreement was reached with the help of US Sec. of State Kissinger who had come to the Middle East and to narrow the gap between the parties].*

- A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or para-military actions against each other.
- B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
  2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
  3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
  4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.
  5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.
  6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
- C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometre 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.
- D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

For Egypt  
General Abdul Gani al Garnasy

For Israel  
Lt. Gen. David Elazar, Chief of Staff of IDF



**DECLARATION AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECOND ISLAMIC SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE, LAHORE, PAKISTAN, 24 FEBRUARY 1974**

**DECLARATION OF LAHORE**

**I**

The Kings, Heads of State and Government and Representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, State of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Republic of Chad, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Gabon, Republic of Gambia, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Indonesia, Empire of Iran, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Morocco, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, State of Kuwait, Republic of Lebanon, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, Malaysia, Republic of Mali, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Niger, Sultanate of Oman, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, State of Qatar, Republic of Senegal, Democratic Republic of Somalia, Democratic Republic of Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Uganda, State of United Arab Emirates, The Yemen Arab Republic, Palestine, represented by the PLO,

The Representative of the Republic of Iraq attended as an Observer, met at the Second Islamic Conference held in Lahore from 22 to 24 February, 1974. The Secretary General of Rabita AI Alam AI Islamia attended as guest. His Béatitude Patriarche of Antioch and All Orient also attended the Summit Conference.

**II**

The Kings, Heads of State and Government and the Representatives of the Islamic countries and Organisations proclaimed:

1. Their conviction that their common Faith is an indissoluble bond between their peoples, that the solidarity of the Islamic peoples is based, not on hostility towards any other human communities nor on distinctions of race and culture, but on the positive and eternal precepts of equality and dignity of man, freedom from discrimination and exploitation and struggle against oppression and injustice;
2. Their identification with the joint struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for social and economic progress and prosperity of all nations of the world;
3. Their desire that their endeavours in promoting world peace based on freedom and social justice will be imbued with the spirit of amicability and cooperation with other Faith, in accordance with the tenets of Islam;
4. Their determination to preserve and promote solidarity among Muslim countries, to respect each other's independence and territorial integrity, to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to resolve their differences through peaceful means in a fraternal spirit and, wherever possible to utilize the mediatory influence or good office of fraternal Muslim State or States for such resolution;
5. Their appreciation of the heroic role played by the front-line States and the Palestinian Resistance in the Ramadhan War, as well as of the Arab effort and Muslim Solidarity which became more prominent at that decisive stage;
6. Their appreciation of the activities of the Islamic Conference and its Secretariat which will continue to be the vehicle for their dedication in promoting close and fraternal co-operation among themselves, and in their other joint endeavours.

**III**

Having considered the present situation in the Middle East, they declared that:

1. The Arab cause is the cause of all countries which oppose aggression and will not tolerate that the use of force be rewarded by territory or any other gains;
2. Full and effective support should be given to the Arab countries to recover, by all means available, all their occupied lands;
3. The cause of the people of Palestine is the cause of all those who believe in the right of a people to determine their own destiny by themselves and by their free will;

4. The restitution of the full national rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland is the essential and fundamental condition for a solution to the Middle East problem and the establishment of lasting peace on the basis of justice;
5. The international community and particularly those States which sponsored the partition of Palestine in 1947, bear the heavy responsibility to redress the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian people;
6. Al-Quds is a unique symbol of the confluence of Islam with the sacred divine religions. For more than 1300 years, Muslims have held Jerusalem as a trust for all who venerate it. Muslims alone could be its loving and impartial custodians for the simple reason that Muslims alone believe in all the three prophetic religions rooted in Jerusalem. No agreement, protocol or understanding which postulates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the Holy City of Jerusalem or its transfer to any non-Arab sovereignty or makes it the subject of bargaining or concessions will be acceptable to the Islamic countries. Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for lasting peace in the Middle East;
7. The constructive efforts undertaken by the Christian Churches, all over the world and in the Arab countries, notably in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to explain the Palestinian question to international public opinion and to world religious conferences and to solicit their support for Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem and other Holy Places in Palestine should be appreciated;
8. Any measure taken by Israel to change the character of the occupied Arab territories and in particular of the Holy City of Jerusalem is a flagrant violation of international law and is repugnant to the feelings of the States, members of the Islamic Conference, and of the Islamic World, in general;
9. Those African and other countries which have taken an honourable and firm position in support of the Arab cause are worthy of the highest appreciation;
10. The present trends towards a just peace cannot but concentrate, on the roots of the question and disengagement cannot be viewed but as a step towards the complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and the full restitution of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

#### IV

Having considered the world economic situation and in particular that obtaining in the Islamic countries in the light of the addresses made by the Heads of State and Government and specially those made by the President of The Summit Conference, the President of Algeria and the President of Libya and realising the need for:

- I) Eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance from the Islamic countries;
- II) Ending exploitation of developing countries by the developed countries;
- III) Regulating the terms of trade between developed countries and developing countries in the matters of supply of raw materials and import of manufactured goods and know-how;
- IV) Ensuring the sovereignty and full control of the developing countries over their natural resources;
- V) Mitigating current economic difficulties of the developing countries due to recent increase in prices;
- VI) Mutual economic cooperation and solidarity among Muslim countries.

They decided to establish a Committee consisting of the representatives and experts of Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and United Arab Emirates with powers to coopt other interested Muslim countries, for devising ways and means for the attainment of the above objectives and for the welfare of the peoples of the Member countries. They directed that the Committee should commence its work immediately and submit its proposals to the next Conference of Foreign Ministers for immediate consideration and action;

The Committee will meet in Jeddah, at the invitation of the Secretary General who shall fix a date for the meeting not later than one month after the conclusion of the present Summit Conference.

#### V

The Kings, Heads of State and Government and the Representatives approved resolutions on Jerusalem, Middle East and Palestinian cause, Islamic Solidarity Fund, Development and International Economic Relations and other matters. These are annexed to this Declaration and all form an integral part of it.

VI

In furtherance of these and other common objectives, they direct their representatives at the United Nations and other international bodies to consult together with a view to adopting joint and agreed positions.

RESOLUTION NO. 1/2-IS: THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PALESTINE CAUSE

The Kings, Heads of State and Government meeting in the Second Islamic Summit Conference, in Lahore, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, from 29 Moharram to 1st Safar, 1394 H (22-24 February, 1974),

*Recalling* the Declaration adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of Islamic Countries held in Rabat from 9 to 12 Rajab (22 to 25 September, 1969) and the resolutions adopted by Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the issue of Palestine and the Middle East crisis;

*Inspired* by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the Islamic Conference and that of the United Nations;

*Noting* with appreciation and pride the heroic sacrifices made by the Palestinian people and the front-line Arab countries facing the Zionist aggressor;

*Having considered* the recent developments in the Middle East and the serious situation resulting from the continued Israeli occupation of the territories of three sister Arab States members of the Islamic Conference Organisation, the continued usurpation of the land of Palestine and expulsion of its people;

*Considering* that this situation constitutes a violation of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seriously jeopardising international peace and security;

*Affirming* that the acquisition by Israel of Arab territories through war and the use of force is inadmissible and constitutes a flagrant violation of the objectives and principles of the United Nations posing a serious threat to world peace jeopardising the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Arab States;

*Reaffirming* the legitimate character of the struggle of the Palestinian people against Zionist racist colonialism and for the restoration of their full legitimate national rights, and above all for the right to return to their homeland and to self-determination;

*Expressing* its deep concern over Israel's, persistence in Judaizing Jerusalem and altering its demographic, religious, historical, social, cultural and economic character in violation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in this respect and the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;

*Considering* that the support given by the member countries of the Islamic Conference to their sister Arab States in their struggle to recover all occupied territories and to restore the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine, is a duty imposed by Muslim solidarity which should take a concrete and effective form;

*Convinced* that the military, economic, political and moral support given to Israel by some countries, particularly the USA, enables it to pursue the execution of its policy of aggression and to consolidate its occupation of Arab territories.

*Considering* that maintaining relations with Israel in the political, economic, commercial, communications and other fields, would enable it to consolidate its occupation of Arab lands and to persist in the execution of its expansionist policy;

1. *Decides:*

- a) To give full and effective support to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle for recovering all their occupied lands by all means;
- b) To take action in all fields to force Israel to withdrawal immediately and unconditionally from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, and undertakes to adopt every adequate measures to bring about that withdrawal;

2. *Requests* all States to support, by all means, the people of Palestine in their struggle against Zionist, racist-and settlers colonization and for the restoration of their full national rights, and confirms that the restoration of these rights is a sine qua non for the establishment of adjust and lasting peace;

3. *Reaffirms* that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Nation in its just struggle;
4. *Requests* Member States where no PLO offices exist as yet to provide all facilities towards that end in conformity with the resolutions of previous Islamic Conferences;
5. *Proclaims* the strong attachment of Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem and the firm determination of their governments to liberate it and to restore Arab sovereignty over it and Jerusalem should not be the subject of bargaining or concessions;
6. *Condemns* Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, its rejection to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians during war and its policy of judaizing the very nature and culture character of the occupied territories, and consider that such Israel practices are war crimes and challenges to humanity at large;
7. *Regards* as null and void all the measures and their effects taken by Israel to change the demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic character of the occupied Arab territories, including those designed to annex and judaize the Holy City of Jerusalem;
8. *Condemns* all States that provide Israel with military, economic and human assistance and requests them to put an end to this practice immediately;
9. *Hails* the constructive initiative of sister African Countries, Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, as well as of other friendly countries in supporting Arab rights and severing diplomatic relations with Israel;
10. *Calls upon* Member States of the Islamic Conference to continue their support of African causes and their struggle against colonialism and racist regimes, particularly in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and to put an end to all forms of cooperation and dealings with these regimes, in particular to stop all shipments of oil and prevent any derogation to that rule;
11. *Calls upon* Member States which still have relations with Israel to sever these relations in all fields, thus supporting Islamic solidarity;
12. *Calls upon* the representatives of all Member States to coordinate their activities in international forums so as to ensure the implementation of these resolutions;
13. *Requests* the Secretary General to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and to report to the Conference thereon.

#### RESOLUTION No. 2/2-IS: JERUSALEM

The Kings, Heads of State and Government meeting in the Second Islamic Summit Conference, in Lahore, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, from 29 Moharram to Ist Safar, 1394 H (22-24 February, 1974),

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the resolutions of the First Islamic Summit and of the preceding conferences of Islamic Foreign Ministers concerning Al-Quds, the Holy City of Jerusalem.,

*Recalling* once again, the deep attachment of the Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem which for them is the First Qibla and the Third Holiest Shrine;

*Considering* that Israel's continued occupation of Jerusalem and its attempts to annex and judaize it, in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the acts of destruction and profanation, of the Holy Places that have occurred under its occupation, have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East and aroused indignation among peoples throughout the world;

*Aware* of the necessity to safeguard the spiritual and moral values symbolized by the sacred shrines in the Holy City of Jerusalem.,

*Noting* the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2253 (WS-V) and 2254 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolutions 250(1968), 251(1968), 267(1969), 271 (1969), 298(1971) on Jerusalem and in particular resolution 252(1968) which expressly enunciate the principle that acquisition of territory by the use of force is inadmissible;

1. *Condemns* the measures taken by Israel to judaize the Holy City of Jerusalem and its refusal to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council demanding that

- all measures purporting to annex the Holy City of Jerusalem to Israel or to change the religious and historical character of Jerusalem be rescinded and considered as being null and void;
2. *Calls* for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the Holy City of Jerusalem;
  3. *Declares* that the restoration of the Holy City of Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for any solution in the Middle East and that any solution which does not restore this position will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries and rejects any attempt to internationalize it-
  4. *Decides* to continue the struggle for the liberation of the Holy City of Jerusalem and the preservation of holy shrines and insists that it should not become the object of any bargaining or concessions, and welcomes any friendly effort for this purpose.



**SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT  
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDFLP), NAEF HAWATMEH,  
STATEMENT DEFENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL  
AUTHORITY IN TERRITORIES LIBERATED FROM ISRAELI OCCUPATION,  
BEIRUT, 24 FEBRUARY 1974**

We know that American imperialism seeks a settlement of surrender and liquidation to the detriment of the rights of the people to the dangers of dispersal and subjection, caught between Zionism, expansionism and subjection to the Hashimites. Imperialism believes that the interests of the Palestinian people are best served within the framework of Zionist expansion, with Israel not returning to the borders of June 4, 1967, and that they are best served by dissolving the Palestinian people once more in the proposed United Kingdom and in places of their exile in the Arab countries and abroad. Imperialism further presents schemes for dissolution, resettlement and relocation in the countries of the region. Our position with regard to these schemes is clear.

Yes, we are Arabs but we are, at the same time, Palestinians. Just as every Arab people has full right to an independent national existence, so the Palestinian people too has full right to an independent national existence and to fight all schemes which agree with American imperialist schemes, for these latter seek to obliterate our national existence and refuse to grant it prior recognition.

Knowing all this, we still find opportunistic currents of thought which at times counsel wisdom and at others call upon us to remain within the framework of nationalist unity, such as took place with the regime of King Hussein. We also find leftist opportunist Palestinian opinions attempting to obscure their true positions, which do not in the least lead to a clash with imperialism, Zionism and Arab and Hashemite reaction, by putting forth bombastic slogans (“The whole of Palestine at once,” Palestinian territories liberated from occupation are to go to the regime of King Hussein”). Our answer to these currents of thought is: they shall not succeed in directing the attention of the revolution from its objectives at this stage. Our people, our revolutionary bases and all the vanguard of the revolution know well that they must submit a pragmatic programme which puts the Palestinian people as a whole, the revolution as a whole and the movement for Arab national liberation against the American-Israeli-Hashemite solution of surrender and liquidation, together with any other solution presented by any Arab country which ignores our people’s national and historic rights at this stage.

...We are fighting to end occupation and to stand effectively against imperialist solutions. We are fighting for our people’s right to establish their national authority on their own land after the occupation has been ended. We also maintain that the logic of events in the world today demands that we inflict more defeats imperialism and racist regimes, whether in Palestine, Rhodesia or South Africa. And while these regimes came into existence at a certain historical stage, our own age is witnessing the end of that stage. We are entering upon a new age whose basic feature is further defeats for imperialism, local reaction and racist regimes. To inflict further defeats upon these regimes, we must follow a correct international policy which enables our people to become self-reliant and stand on its own land. This is a necessary step if the struggle is to continue on the long path ahead, the path of a

long popular war of liberation. We know the road well and shall not allow these opportunistic currents, both of the left and the right, both in the Palestinian and in the Arab fields, to lead us astray by endangering the rights of our people and making us surrender.

These opportunistic forces do not have a leg to stand on. At times they claim that a national authority would not have the means necessary for economic subsistence and would not be able to survive on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. To these opportunists we answer that we are not at the stage of searching for a homeland. Over there is our homeland, even if it is a desert with nothing but thorn and sand. There is our homeland, whether it has the economic means of survival or not, although we should bear in mind that the economic potentialities of Palestinian territories occupied after 1967 are greater and more promising than those of many African and Asian countries for example, Democratic Yemen. If we adopt this lunatic theory, half of Africa and the greater part of Asia would have been bounded to fight to keep imperialism in their countries until such time as their economic means of subsistence would have allowed them to become independent.



## GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, BASIC PRINCIPLES, JERUSALEM, 10 MARCH 1974

[EXCERPTS]

*[Israeli elections were held on 31 Dec. 1973; two months later, the Knesset approved PM Meir's new govt. as well as its Basic Principles. The following excerpts deal with security and foreign policy issues.]*

### CHAPTER 'A'- CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

The principal target of the Government of Israel during the coming four years is to work for the attainment of permanent peace with each of the neighbouring states. The efforts of the Government shall be directed towards the utilization of all the possibilities and prospects involved in the peace conference which opened in Geneva.

The Government shall persevere in the strengthening of all branches of the Israel Defence Forces, insofar as is required to ensure its strength and capacity to defend the State and overcome its aggressors. The necessary lessons shall be drawn from the experience of the Yom Kippur War, ensuring their application in the deployment of the IDF and in the Defence establishment in general. Within the IDF, the forging of internal solidarity shall continue, it shall remain above all party considerations, and its qualities as an army of the people shall continue to be fostered.

#### *1. Decisions of the Government and the Knesset*

The principal tasks of the Government and its actions on questions of foreign policy and defence shall be based fundamentally on Chapters 'A' and 'E' of the Basic Principles of the outgoing Government (approved by the Knesset on 15 December 1969) see Section XII, Document 20) and on the decisions on principle adopted by the Government and the Seventh and Eighth Knessets, including:

The Government's decisions, approved by the Knesset on 4 August 1970, concerning the cease-fire; the Government's decision of 22 October 1973 to accede to the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire; the Government's decision of 11 November 1973 on the Six-Point Agreement with Egypt; the Government's decision of 17 December 1973 agreeing to participate in the Geneva Conference; the Government's decision of 22 January 1974 to sign the agreement on disengagement and separation of forces on the Egyptian front.

#### *2. Jerusalem*

The Government shall take steps for the continued building and development of Jerusalem, Eternal Capital of Israel. The pace of populating the city shall be increased, infrastructure investments shall be assured, and industrial development shall be continued. In the building and development of the Capital, Jerusalem's special character, its historic sites and its scenic grandeur shall be preserved. Rehabilitation of the Old City's Jewish Quarter shall be completed. The holy places of all faiths shall be preserved.

In the Capital of Israel, the rights of all residents shall be observed, without distinction of religion or nationality, and the religious status of the holy places of Islam and Christianity shall be safeguarded in the peace settlements.

### *3. Settlement on the Land*

Steps shall be taken for the continuation of settlement on the land in accordance with resolutions to be adopted by the Government of Israel.

### *4. Agreements on the Road to Peace*

The Government of Israel shall strictly maintain and observe the cease-fire agreements on a basis of reciprocity.

Pending peace settlements, the Government shall continue to be ready to make agreed arrangements with the Arab States: these agreements shall aim at consolidating the cease-fire, preventing the resumption of hostilities, and promoting negotiations with a view to permanent peace.

The Government shall continue to pursue a policy aimed at ensuring security and maintenance of law and order while showing due respect and understanding for the population. The open-bridges policy shall be continued; independent activity on the part of the population shall be encouraged in the domains of administration, education, culture and religion and in fostering democratic patterns in public and municipal life.

The Government shall endeavour, to the best of its ability, to assure full employment and to maintain the education, health and welfare services. Efforts shall be made to raise funds from international sources in order to improve living and housing conditions among the refugees living within the jurisdiction of the Military Government, without prejudice to their legal and civil status.

### *6. Countering Terrorist Activity*

The Government shall endeavour to safeguard the citizens, residents and representatives of Israel, and to protect them against terrorist activity by the terrorist organizations. It shall maintain Israel's right to act against the terrorist organizations, their bases and their collaborators, with a view to preventing and frustrating terrorist activities. The Government of Israel shall continue to hold any State which identifies itself with the terrorist organizations and affords them bases of operation, fighting equipment and political support responsible for their dastardly deeds.

### *7. Activity in the International Arena*

In the international arena, the Government shall act to strengthen Israel's standing among the nations of the world. It shall strive to strengthen the friendly relations between Israel and the people and Government of the United States, and shall take action to rehabilitate and re-establish relations with States which have severed their links with Israel.



## **AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, GENEVA, 31 MAY 1974**

*[The agreement was the outcome of negotiations held in Feb.-March 1974 between Syrian and Israeli officials and US Sec. of State Kissinger in Washington, followed by the latter's visit to the Middle East in May. On 29 May, Israel agreed to sign the agreement, once approved by the Knesset.]*

- A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.
- B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Kuneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1.
  2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and the Syrian civilians will return to this territory.
  3. The area between Line A and the Line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.
  4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
  5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.
  6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
- C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.
- D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than May 31, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group, who will agree on the stages of this process. The military working group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the military working group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.
- E. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.
- F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the military working group, all remaining prisoners of war will be repatriated.
- G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within 10 days after the signing of this agreement.
- H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.

#### PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE.

Israel and Syria agree that:

The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defence. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,200, who will be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The UNDOF will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council.

The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a regular basis, not less often than once every fifteen days, and, in addition, when requested by either party. It shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown on the map attached to the agreement.

Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the United Nations Security Council which will provide for the UNDOF contemplated by the agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.



**PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, POLITICAL PROGRAM  
ADOPTED AT ITS 12<sup>TH</sup> SESSION, CAIRO, 8 JUNE 1974**

*[In the session, the PNC reiterated the aim to achieve the Palestinians' rights to return and to self-determination in their homeland. However, departing from its previous strategy which called for the immediate elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state over all of Palestine, the following "Phased Plan" was adopted:]*

The Palestinian National Council:

On the basis of the Palestinian National Charter and the Political Program drawn up at the eleventh session, held from January 6-12, 1973; and from its belief that it is impossible for a permanent and just peace to be established in the area unless our Palestinian people recover all their national rights and, first and foremost, their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their homeland; and in the light of a study of the new political circumstances that have come into existence in the period between the Council's last and present sessions, resolves the following:

1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization's previous attitude to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.
2. The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favour of our people and their struggle.
3. The Liberation Organization will struggle against any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprivation of our people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland.
4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils.
5. Struggle along with the Jordanian national forces to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim will be to set up in Jordan a democratic national authority in close contact with the Palestinian entity that is established through the struggle.
6. The Liberation Organization will struggle to establish unity in struggle between the two peoples and between all the forces of the Arab liberation movement that are in agreement on this program.
7. In the light of this program, the Liberation Organization will struggle to strengthen national unity and to raise it to the level where it will be able to perform its national duties and tasks.
8. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.
9. The Liberation Organization will strive to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries, and with forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, with the aim of frustrating all the schemes of Zionism, reaction and imperialism.
10. In light of this program, the leadership of the revolution will determine the tactics which will serve and make possible the realization of these objectives.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization will make every effort to implement this program, and should a situation arise affecting the destiny and the future of the Palestinian people, the National Assembly will be convened in extraordinary session.



**UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, JOINT STATEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS,  
JERUSALEM, 17 JUNE 1974**

*[At the end of his visit to Israel, US Pres. Nixon emphasized, inter alia, America's readiness to conclude long term arrangements for aid to Israel and to help Israel build a nuclear power station.]*

The President of the United States, Richard Nixon, visited Israel, June 16-17, 1974. This is the first visit ever to have been paid by an American President to the State of Israel. It symbolizes the unique relationship, the common heritage and the close and historic ties, that have long existed between the United States and Israel.

President Nixon and Prime Minister Rabin held extensive and cordial talks on matters of mutual interest to the United States and Israel, and reviewed the excellent relations between their two countries. They discussed, in a spirit of mutual understanding, the efforts of both countries to achieve a just and lasting peace which will provide security for all States in the area, and the need to build a structure of peace in the world. United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and members of the Israeli Cabinet participated in these talks.

Prime Minister Rabin expressed Israel's appreciation for the outstanding and effective role of the United States in the quest for peace under the leadership of President Nixon, assisted by the tireless efforts of Secretary Kissinger, and indicated Israel's intention to participate in further negotiations with a view of achieving peace treaties with its neighbours, which will permit each State to pursue its legitimate rights in dignity and security.

President Nixon and Prime Minister Rabin agreed that peace and progress in the Middle East are essential if global peace is to be assured. Peace will be achieved through a process of continuing negotiations between the parties concerned, as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the necessity to work energetically to promote peace between Israel and the Arab States. They agreed that States living in peace should conduct their relationship in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and the U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which provides that every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, or encouraging, the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state. They condemned acts of violence and terror, causing the loss of innocent human lives.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their great pleasure in the intimate cooperation which characterizes the warm relationship between their two countries and peoples. They agreed to do everything possible to broaden and deepen still further that relationship in order to serve the interests of both countries and to further the cause of peace.

President Nixon reiterated the commitment of the United States to the long-term security of Israel and to the principle that each State has the right to exist within secure borders and to pursue its own legitimate interests in peace.

Prime Minister Rabin expressed his appreciation for the U.S. military supplies to Israel during the October War and thereafter. The President affirmed the continuing and long-term nature of the military supply relationship between the two countries, and reiterated his view, that the strengthening of Israel's ability to defend itself is essential in order to prevent further hostilities and to maintain condi-

tions conducive to progress towards peace. An Israeli Defense Ministry delegation will soon come to Washington in order to work out the concrete details relating to long-term military supplies.

President Nixon affirmed the strong continuing support of the United States for Israel's economic development. Prime Minister Rabin expressed the gratitude of Israel for the substantial help which the United States has provided, particularly in recent years. The President and Prime Minister agreed, that future economic assistance from the United States would continue and would be the subject of long-range planning between their Governments. The President affirmed that the United States, in accordance with congressional authorization, will continue to provide substantial economic assistance for Israel at levels needed to assist Israel to offset the heavy additional costs inherent in assuring Israel's military capability for the maintenance of peace.

In the economic field, the President and the Prime Minister note with satisfaction the effective working relationship between their Governments at all levels, and the depth of the relationship between the economies of the two nations. They agreed to strengthen and develop the framework of their bilateral relations. The primary goal will be to establish a firmer and more clearly defined structure of consultation and cooperation. Where appropriate, they will set up special bi-national committees. Both sides recognize the importance of investments in Israel by American companies, the transmission of general know-how and marketing assistance, and cooperation of American companies with Israeli counterparts on research and development. The United States Government will encourage ventures by American enterprises and private investment in Israel, designed to increase Israel's economic growth, including in the fields of industry, power, and tourism. They agreed to begin immediately negotiations for concrete arrangements to implement such policy, including in the area of avoidance of double taxation.

The President and Prime Minister announce that their two governments will negotiate an agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, technology and the supply of fuel from the United States under agreed safeguards. This agreement will in particular take account of the intention of the Government of Israel to purchase power-reactors from the United States. These will secure additional and alternative sources of electricity for the rapidly developing Israel economy. As an immediate step, Israel and the United States will in the current month reach provisional agreement on the further sale of nuclear fuel to Israel.

Prime Minister Rabin particularly expressed the view that the supply of oil and other essential raw materials to Israel must be assured on a continuous basis. President Nixon proposed that United States and Israeli representatives meet soon in order to devise ways of meeting this problem.

The President and the Prime Minister stressed, as an important mutual aim, the further encouragement of the fruitful links already existing between the two countries in the scientific - and technical field, including space research. Special emphasis will be put on exchanges of scientists and the sponsorship of joint projects. With this end in view, they will explore means to widen the scope and substance of existing agreements and activities, including those pertaining to the bi-national science foundation. In the area of water desalination, the two countries will expand their joint projects.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with gratification the large number of tourists from their respective countries visiting both the United States and Israel, and affirmed that they would continue their efforts to foster this movement. To this end, the two Governments will resume negotiations on an agreement granting landing rights to the Israel National Carrier in additional major cities in the Continental United States. The President and the Prime Minister discussed the plight of Jewish minorities. The Prime Minister thanked the President for his efforts in support of the right of free emigration for all peoples without harassment, including members of Jewish minorities. The President affirmed that the United States would continue to give active support to these principles in all feasible ways.

The President was particularly pleased at the opportunity to meet with former Prime Minister Golda Meir, whose courage, statesmanship, patience and wisdom he greatly admires. The President expressed his satisfaction at the constructive cooperation between Israel and the United States under

Prime Minister Meir's leadership which had led to the conclusion of the agreements between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and Syria respectively on the disengagement of their military forces.

In departing, President and Mrs. Nixon expressed their deep appreciation of the warm reception accorded to them in Israel and their admiration for the achievements of the Israeli people. They were deeply impressed by the manner in which the overwhelming problems of integrating many hundreds of thousands of immigrants of many various backgrounds and cultures were being successfully overcome.

The President gave him renewed assurance of the support of the people of the United States.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the cordiality of Israel's reception of the President reflected the long friendship between Israel and the United States and pledged their continued energies to nurture and strengthen that friendship. To this end, the President invited Prime Minister Rabin to pay an early visit to Washington.



**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, 21 JULY 1974**

The cabinet today held a political discussion upon conclusion of which the following resolution was adopted:

Israel will continue to strive for peace agreements with the Arab states within defensible borders, to be achieved through negotiation without prior conditions.

The government will work towards negotiations for a peace agreement with Jordan.

The peace will be founded on the existence of two independent states only - Israel with United Jerusalem as her capital, and a Jordanian-Palestinian Arab state, east of Israel, within borders to be determined in negotiations between Israel and Jordan. This state will provide for expression of the self determination of the Jordanians and the Palestinians, in peace and good-neighbourliness with Israel.

The cabinet endorses the Prime Minister's statement of 3 June 1974 in the Knesset, that the government of Israel will not conduct negotiations with terrorist organizations whose aim is the destruction of the State of Israel.



**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, JERUSALEM, 26 JULY 1974**

*[After extremists from Gush Emunim trying to settle in a railway station of Sebastia near Nablus on 25 July 1974 were expelled by the army, the cabinet unanimously voted for the following statement. (See also next document).]*

Settlements in the Administered territories are established solely in accordance with the government's decisions. The government will prevent any attempt at settling without its approval and decision.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence are authorized to implement this policy.

The proposals put forward by the Prime Minister were passed unanimously.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN, STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET  
ON SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 31 JULY 1974**

*[In his speech, PM Rabin explained his gov't's policy on the issue of settlements following the Gush Emunim failed attempt to settle at Sebastia near Nablus. See also previous document.]*

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

On the Thursday of last week, when I learned the facts about the Sebastia incident, I had no doubt about the negative significance of the act. The Attorney-General was consulted and expressed the opinion that this was a breach of the law. I had no doubt that it was the duty of the government to expel the people who had occupied the location without its approval, as governments of Israel have done since the Six-Day War. I submitted the subject to the entire cabinet. The government of Israel thoroughly discussed the matter. At the end of the discussion, the government adopted the decision proposed by the Prime Minister:

Outposts and settlements in the administered areas are established solely according to the decisions of the government. The government will prevent any attempt to occupy a location or establish a settlement without its approval and decision. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence are authorized to implement this policy.

I see no need to describe the course of events. The government's decision was carried out. The Israel Defence Forces acted according to orders. I cannot say that the people evacuated the place of their own free will, but their evacuation was carried out without it being necessary to adopt measures which we wished to avoid so long as it was possible to carry out the evacuation without resorting to them.

We acted irrespective of considerations of prestige, but consistently and according to plan. It was clear to the people in Sebastia that there would be no negotiations with them on settlement elsewhere before they evacuated Sebastia. In determining the timing of the operation, we took into account the observance of the Sabbath and the Ninth of Av fast. The timetable we adopted enabled the people to realize the strength of the government's determination, to consider their actions, and to choose evacuation without a clash with the I.D.F. I regard this event as a test of the inner strength of Israeli society and not as a test of strength for the I.D.F. I am glad that we have saved ourselves pain and shame - and perhaps even more.

Members of the Knesset,

In the basic principles of the government's policy, it is stated that we will work for the continuation of settlement in accordance with the decisions that the government of Israel will adopt. This undertaking is being carried out, in practice. The policy on this subject has been repeatedly clarified and the Knesset has also decided to hold a debate on the matter. I must therefore emphasize at the outset of my remarks that in this statement I shall not discuss plans and criteria, possibilities and limitations affecting our actions in the sphere of settlement.

Today, after the events of last week, the Knesset must first of all discuss the public and national significance of the incident in order to resolve once again that in the state of Israel the procedures of the rule of law shall be maintained and no one shall be permitted to violate them. This is vital for the democratic stability of Israeli society. It is vital for the continuation of responsible action in the sphere of settlement.

The Knesset cannot evade its duty to resolve once again that the law in Israel is binding on all citizens in various fields, including settlement in the administered areas. Our country protects the rights of the citizen and respects his liberty, but these precious principles cannot be preserved without meticulous compliance with the laws enacted to the Knesset.

The rules were violated in the Sebastia incident. Members of the group which concentrated in Sebastia met me and a few of my ministerial colleagues before they decided on this inadmissible act. We explained to them the policy of the government, which engages in rural and urban settlement in keep-

ing with an order of priorities, security, political and settlement considerations, possibilities and limitations. During the meetings, principal proposals were made to them and other locations designated where the population is sparse and its reinforcement vital. They were promised consideration of specific proposals. They were not convinced. From the course of the meetings it was clear that according to their concepts they were entitled to decide where and when settlement should take place. That they believed that their will would prevail and that ultimately they would impose their decision and their plan on the government. It was in this conviction that the Sebastia operation was born. The people knew that the government would use its authority, and nevertheless they believed that they would create an accomplished fact and the government of Israel would say amen.

Thus, the argument today is not over settlement, but over the maintenance of state responsibility and authority, over the foundations of the democratic system, over the authority of the government, which is subject to the Knesset. The Knesset must reject acts whose aim is to undermine the foundations of the democratic system and governmental authority in Israel. This is vital not only as a judgement on the past, but also to secure the future. The Knesset's ruling will be of the utmost educational and political importance. Aspirations in the sphere of settlement must not serve as justification for actions against the authority of the state.

Israel is a free society which respects various views and differences of opinion. Differences of opinion exist, inter alia, regarding various aspects of the settlement issue. Every person and group holds its opinion dear, and many of us are zealous in their views. It is intolerable, however, that any group of people in Israel - whatever its motives - should take the law into its own hands in spheres which are not the private domain of the individual but are subject to the decision of the community. The people of Israel do not adopt their decisions by arbitrary will, but according to democratic rules and processes, and by the will of the majority. These rules must also apply to settlement in the administered areas, which have not been annexed to Israel, and in every act of settlement in the areas security and political considerations must be taken into account. Every act of settlement in the areas imposes obligations on the Israel's defence forces and involves national responsibility.

Only the government of Israel is authorized to decide where and when to settle, whether at one time or another, and no government can tolerate the violation of this authority.

The government's decisions can be influenced by means of the ballot box. By the Knesset's decisions, by public opinion, but not by deeds which undermine the foundations of our regime. This consciousness is binding on all sections of the community, and first and foremost on the people's representatives and emissaries.

In conclusion, under the circumstances in which Israel is placed, every new settlement requires the prior approval of the government of Israel, which is subject to the authority of the Knesset. Provocative and unauthorized initiatives in the administered areas cannot be tolerated. Settlement is not a demonstration, nor is it compatible with violation of the law. The IDF should not have security obligations stemming from irresponsible acts imposed on it. The IDF should not be burdened with tasks that disrupt its preparations and plans, and it should not be confronted with a situation wherein it is obliged to use force to prevent occupation of a location without prior and authorized sanction.

The government will, in the future as in the past, scrupulously maintain the customary procedures in the sphere of settlement. It will work for the continuation of settlement in line with its authoritative decisions. It will do whatever has to be done to prevent any attempt to exploit the ideal of settlement for an anti-democratic purpose.

Member of the Knesset,

Our right to this land is indisputable. That is not what the argument is about. The Knesset is asked today not to divert its mind from its duty.

The government calls upon the house to give its full support to this policy, which provides a guarantee for the maintenance of the rule of law and the authority of the administration and the Knesset.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN, STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET  
ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAB STATES, JERUSALEM, 6 AUGUST 1974**

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

On Monday I instructed the Secretary to the government, who attended the meeting of the Knesset presidium, not to object to the recognition of the motions for the agenda as urgent. But in fact I see no reason to justify urgency, and certainly not any kind of haste, in discussing in the Knesset plenary the subject before us. The Knesset could have been perfectly confident that the government itself would have asked for a debate in the plenary at the proper time. The motions for the agenda are concerned with two matters: The question of negotiations between Israel and one or more of her neighbours, and the question of the government of Israel's positions in preparation for negotiations if and when they take place. I should like to clarify in general our policy on these matters.

Israel's policy is not detached from the actual circumstances in every different period. We study the circumstances, follow the changes, and also try to look ahead and decide on our measures in accordance with all these considerations. But there is one constant theme in our policy: The effort to achieve peace agreements with each of the neighbouring countries, including the Kingdom of, Jordan.

At the beginning of the week, at a meeting of the cabinet, I clarified the main points of our political approach at this time as follows:

"Israel is not interested in the continuation of the situation of no-peace. Israeli policy is interested in speeding up negotiations for peace, without prior conditions, with each of the Arab countries.

"In the Arab states, first and foremost in Syria, there are growing and systematic preparations for the renewal of the war. Israel has no right to ignore this dangerous fact. Israel is confident of her strength, but it is her duty to organize at an accelerated pace to meet the danger which is forced upon her. At the same time as she continues to organize against the danger of aggression, she will persevere in her political activity aimed at achieving progress from cease-fire and disengagement of forces to peace. Israel will continue to meticulously observe the cease-fire arrangements and the Disengagement of Forces Agreements on a basis of mutuality. The observance of these arrangements in letter and spirit is vital in order to prevent a renewal of the fighting. The Disengagement of Forces Agreements were not designed to constitute a permanent situation, but were defined by consent as a first step towards peace. These agreements may be a step towards peace if all parties concerned act consistently for this purpose. Israel is wholeheartedly prepared for this."

As we have said, our policy is to strive for peace as a result of negotiations. When I speak of negotiations I mean direct dialogue with each of the neighbouring countries, without prior conditions, openly and honourably, as equals to equals, not as victors and vanquished. We on our part will neglect no opportunity to discuss peace, or even interim arrangements, with our neighbours. We shall present no prior conditions, just as we shall not agree to give any undertakings in advance on subjects which have to be discussed in negotiations.

Readiness for negotiations is a fundamental basis of our policy - mutual negotiations, not a dictate, not an order that must be obeyed, but an effort for agreement, without coercion. Therefore, we said of our own free will, true to our own convictions, that it is our purpose to advance towards peace with readiness for territorial compromise. I repeat, and I say it expressly: The effort to achieve defensible borders and, at the same time, readiness for territorial compromise are among the principal characteristics of our policy. There is no need to obscure this fact or to be ashamed of it. We have made it clear that the Arab demand that we return to the lines of 4 June 1967 is unacceptable. We have re-

jected this ultimative demand of the Arab rulers. The government of Israel has submitted no map to the Arab states, but has invited them to conduct negotiations without prior conditions.

It is the duty of this government to defend the lines which we now hold, and it will strive to achieve defensible borders in the framework of peace agreements. In working for this aim, we are acting with the authority of the people, with the authority of the Knesset, fully aware of our duty and the commands of conscience. We are acting with full authority and we do not exceed this authority. We are well aware of our duty and our authority, and we may be confident that the Knesset will be on the alert to see to it that we do not, heaven forbid, exceed our authority. We want peace with Jordan, and in so far as it may appear justified to recommend an agreement which involves giving up areas of Judea and Samaria, we shall go and ask the people in elections, as we have promised the Knesset and in the accordance with the oath of allegiance sworn by the members of the government when they received its confidence.

Members of the Knesset,

Ahead of us are discussions following the Separation of Forces Agreements, in the context of the Geneva Conference. We hope that in this context there will also be negotiations with Jordan, and we have made it clear that we have no reason to postpone such negotiations with Jordan. Recently, after the discussion in the cabinet on the Palestinian issue, we restated the need for negotiations with Jordan, while rejecting negotiations with terrorist organizations whose policy is the destruction of Israel.

Once again, meanwhile, we are not sitting back to await developments, but are doing everything possible - concurrently with reinforcing our strength - to remove obstacles from the path and to avail ourselves of the assistance of anyone prepared to help us to achieve contacts and dialogue for the purpose of peace.

The preparations in the Arab countries - primarily Syria - for a new round of fighting call for an appropriate deployment on our part, but at the same time we shall not let up in our efforts to achieve negotiations, since negotiations for peace or for political arrangements may be of value for the prevention of war.

Members of the Knesset,

Mrs. Golda Meir, the former Prime Minister, authorized the Spokesman of the Prime Minister's Office to deny the report of her meeting with the king of Jordan, recently broadcast over the N.B.C. network. I have nothing to add to Mrs. Meir's statement. I will not waste the Knesset's time on the discussion of details of a report which has been denied.

I hope a day will come when negotiations for peace will develop between Israel and each of her neighbours, without prior conditions. This is still in the nature of a goal which we are striving to attain by our political efforts. Prior to such negotiations, we shall strive to get the maximum possible benefit from settings such as the Geneva Conference, or from the good services of Dr. Kissinger, and shall aspire to hasten the day when there will be no reason to recoil or refrain from open, continual and continuous diplomatic dialogue, as is customary between neighbouring countries - not merely diplomatic dialogue, but variegated mutual relations, as befits neighbouring nations with open borders.

In any case - and let the House have no doubt of this - Israel has not neglected, nor will she neglect, any opportunity to achieve contacts, as open as possible, as direct as possible, with every neighbouring country, in so far as this is attainable. Nor shall we reject even opportunities to conduct dialogue without publicity, should the opposite side so desire for reasons of its own, in order to prepare the conditions for open negotiations. Always, whether in open or covert contacts, we shall remain faithful to our authority and the limits of our authority, as befits the government of a democratic country, which must be scrupulously faithful to its duty, its responsibility and the limits of its authority.

Political contacts for the achievement of peace with Egypt, Jordan and Syria will not be like a motor race on an autostrada without bends and twists in the road.

Sometimes these will be open contacts and sometimes they will be covert, at the request of our interlocutors, or through emissaries or volunteers who offer their good services.

In the course of the contacts, sometimes ideas are raised for discussion and examination. In many cases, the press and the communications media publish "details" which are not in keeping with the truth or have been taken out of context. In general, we are not in the habit of issuing denials every other day and we have no intention of deviating from this custom.

It is in the nature of things that in connection with the Israel-Jordan issue, ideas and thoughts are raised in various contexts according to the aims, immigration, vision or realistic insight with which the person in question has been endowed by providence. Few political issues involve such numerous and variegated aspects as that of Judea and Samaria in the Israel-Jordan context: The historical aspect, Jerusalem, settlement, defensive and strategic aspects, the Palestinian problem, "territorial" separation or "functional" separation, as well as different varieties of various proposals.

From Jordanian sources there have been recent reports that Jordan proposed an agreement on the separation of forces which is mainly based on the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces west of the Jordan all along the Jordan valley. We have also heard of this proposal from the United States. I have already said publicly that we do not regard this proposal as appropriate and if there are other proposals we shall examine them. So far the government of Israel has not received other proposals and has not decided on any detailed model for a peace agreement or any other arrangement between ourselves and Jordan.

Hence I see no advantage in debating hypothetical detailed proposals in the Knesset plenary, premature public debate may be pointless or even harmful.

The Knesset may be perfectly confident that any negotiations which have been conducted or will be conducted by the government have been carried out and will be carried out in accordance with the basic principles of the government's policy and its statements approved by the Knesset, and without exceeding its authority.

I propose that the Knesset should remove from the agenda the motions submitted today by members of the Knesset.



**TRIPARTITE PALESTINIAN-EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN COMMUNIQUÉ,  
CAIRO, 21 SEPTEMBER 1974 [EXCERPTS]**

Based on the decisions of the sixth Arab Summit Conference at Algiers, those attending the [tripartite] meeting agreed on the following:

1. To continue action to achieve the goal of Arab struggle- withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people.
2. Not to accept any attempt to bring about any partial political settlements, in view of the unity of the cause.
3. To consolidate Arab solidarity so as to ensure that the Arabs' political, economic and military resources are mobilized and utilized in all fields of confrontation.
4. To affirm that an independent Palestinian authority is to be established in the Palestinian territory that is liberated by Political or military means.
5. To continue to support the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, and to help it to ensure steadfastness in the occupied territories.
6. To strengthen coordination as follows:
  - a. Regular monthly meetings to ensure coordination between Syria and Egypt.
  - b. Regular meetings to ensure coordination between Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
  - c. Coordination and contacts with other Arab states.

7. To take action to obtain a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations under the item of the Palestine problem on the Agenda for the twenty-ninth session, on the basis of the principles set out below, which were approved by the Council of the Arab League at its ninety-second session in Cairo in September 1974:
  - a. The affirmation of the established Fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and the rejection of any invalidation or usurpation of them.
  - b. The affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination without the outside interference and the affirmation of their national independence and the right to return.
  - c. The affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to take action by all means to obtain their basic rights in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations.



**POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), STATEMENT  
ANNOUNCING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, BEIRUT,  
26 SEPTEMBER 1974 [EXCERPTS]**

*[See also document dated 30 Sept. 1974 below for the PLO's reaction to this decision.]*

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine announces its withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization so as to avoid bearing the responsibility for the historical deviation that is being pursued by the command of the Organization. The Popular Front will continue to struggle in the ranks of the masses in order to rectify this deviation and to express the will of the masses and impose the correct revolutionary line on the commands that have become subservient to the reactionary regimes that are in favor of surrender.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has taken this step only after serious and responsible attempts to establish national unity at this stage on an unambiguous national basis; to set the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization on the revolutionary course; and to warn the command of the Organization against continued subservience and deviation. All these attempts having failed, it was no longer able to remain within the framework of the Executive Committee. Had it done so, it would have been sharing in the responsibility for the dangerous course of increasing deviation the committee is pursuing for its suspect contacts with America, which we have established took place recently, and for deluding our masses so that they may daily become more deeply immersed in the mire of imperialist settlement. This settlement is being planned by American imperialism, Arab reaction with timorous persons in favor of surrender, with deceptive gradualness, so that our struggling masses may be induced to accept a liquidation settlement step by step. In this way they will not realize the seriousness with which Arab and Palestinian events have been deviating for some time.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine wishes to affirm to our Palestinian masses, our Arab masses and all forces hostile to imperialism, Zionism and reaction throughout the world, that it has only taken this step after long and careful thought, accompanied by the profoundest sense of responsibility. As a result of this it has reached the profound, certain and unshakable conviction that the settlement which is being prepared for the area can only be an imperialist liquidation settlement. Its only consequence could be, on the one hand, the expansion and extension of American imperialist influence in the area and, on the other the establishment of Israeli's legality and the safeguarding of her future and her security.

It has also arrived at the unshakable conviction that for a long time there have been serious attempts to make the Palestine Liberation Organization a party to such an imperialist liquidation settlement, to ensure that the situation arising from this settlement lasts as long as possible, and also to act as a cover for the readiness to surrender of certain Arab regimes. It is also clear to us that the command of the Liberation Organization is ready to be a party to this settlement and that; indeed, it is now struggling to ensure that it does not miss the opportunity of playing such role.

In the light of these facts and conclusions one course only is open to the Front: it must unambiguously and definitely separate its political line from the political line based on surrender which the command of the Liberation Organization is following; it must struggle on behalf of this line in the ranks of the masses, devoting itself to exposing every step taken along the road of deviation, and exposing the operation of gradual tactical deceit. The forces which favour surrender are following this deviant path when they represent withdrawals as being victories, and participation in the Geneva Conference as being a great victory for our people and their cause.

The only course now open to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is that of resolute opposition to these deviations, so that our masses and their revolutionary forces may be able to expose all these errors. This will enable the masses to generate the historical force that will ensure that the revolution continues until Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Safad, Gaza, Nablus, and every inch of the land of Palestine are liberated. The revolution must continue until the fascist Zionist racist entity established in the land of Palestine is smashed, and along with it the reactionary Arab regimes linked to imperialism in Jordan and elsewhere, and until Arab territory is liberated from all imperialists influence or exploitation, even if this means that our nation has to go on fighting for dozens of years and lose the lives of millions of martyrs.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has adopted this attitude in the light of its belief and convictions that the grave stage now reached by the revolution makes it imperative that it should be absolutely explicit, be absolutely frank with the masses. It should confront all with their responsibilities to their revolution, their masses, their cause, their home-land and the future of their struggle.

We therefore wish to give our Arab and Palestinian masses the reasons for our withdrawal from the Executive Committee, so that things may be absolutely clear and so that we may perform our duty of blazing the revolutionary trail for the movement of the masses.

1. After the October War an international and Arab situation took shape in which there was a trend towards arranging what was called a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. America was the force that showed the greatest zeal for this settlement and made efforts to impose it, relying first and foremost on the approval of Saudi and Egyptian reaction. It was absolutely clear to what consequences such a settlement would lead: The price paid to Israel for any pressure exerted on her by the United States would take the form of the penetration of her influence and the safeguarding of her interest in our territory. The price paid to her for withdrawal from any Arab territory would take the form of support for her economy and her armed forces, of reinforcement of her security and stability, and of action to pave the way for recognizing her existence in the area. The truth of this picture is incontestable now that its consequences have taken tangible shape before the eyes of all the masses of our people.

Confronted with this situation, it was the duty of the Palestinian revolution to provide all the masses, Palestinian and Arab, with a precise analysis of this picture and to define its consequences, at the same time demanding that they be disclosed, attacked and laid bare to all. Only then can our revolution carry the torch for the revolution of the Arab Millions, rather than act as a cover for the timidity and advocacy of surrender of some of their rulers.

As soon as the October War ended and the picture of the imperialist liquidation conspiracy took shape, the Front called on the Palestinian revolution to publish an analysis of the new political situation, to announce its intention of attacking the liquidation settlement and to prohibit the Liberation Organization from being used as a cover the timidity of certain Arab regimes that advocated surrender. It was the duty of the Palestinian revolution to reveal the facts about the Geneva conference and about the consequences it would lead to, to set itself unambiguously outside the framework of this liquidation settlement and to continue to mobilize the masses to continue fighting for dozens of years, whatever the sacrifices.

The value of the Palestinian revolution lies in its presenting a programme in accordance with which the masses of the whole Arab nation can settle the contradiction with their enemies by force of arms through a people's war of liberation, rather than through timidity and advocacy of

surrender under the auspices of a balance of forces that makes the price paid for every piece of land we recover dearer than the land itself.

The Front made every effort to ensure that this (post-war) period should provide an opportunity to consolidate the revolution and to strengthen its national unity on the basis of unambiguous and definite rejection of the Geneva Conference and the liquidation conspiracy, and of continuation on the line of the revolution. But the command of the Organization still refused to take any position, on the pretext that it had not received an official invitation to attend the Geneva Conference. This was in spite of all the evidence that it was the wish of many international and Arab forces to contain the Organization and rob it of its revolutionary character by setting it on the course surrender. The Organization's position continued to be a non-position; it thereby lost the vitality necessary for action and influence in the Palestinian, Arab and international fields.

2. On the eve of the twelfth session of the National Council, which met in Cairo last June, the command of the Liberation Organization started talking about national unity and its importance at this stage, and expressed its readiness to move from its non-position to an attitude of (temporary) refusal to attend the Geneva Conference.

In this it was employing a fraudulent "tactic" whose objective was to give the forces that rejected the settlement the impression that it knew the fact about this liquidation conspiracy, but intended to frustrate it by subtle means rather than by confrontation.

Aware of its profound responsibility to give serious consideration to any chance of national unity in these critical circumstances, the Front thought it best to give this chance a try, and we see what it would lead to in practice, we therefore approved the Ten Point Programme although it was a flimsy compromise formula for national unity. But before doing so we insisted that the minutes of the sessions of the National Council should record how we understood it, that is to say, that the programme involved rejection of the Geneva Conference and set the Liberation Organization outside the framework of the liquidation settlement.

After the twelfth session of the National Council it became clear what the commands who had advocated surrender had in mind when they approved the Ten Point Programme. This command regarded it as legalizing its pursuit of the course of deviation and surrender. It started to interpret it as it liked, after which it made what statements it liked, however inconsistent with the Organization's charter and the resolutions of its National Council, including the eleventh and twelfth (Councils).

The fraud was disclosed, and it was clear that the tactic that the forces advocating surrender had been talking of was that of misleading fellow comrades and the masses, rather than the enemy.

We continued to struggle within the framework of the Executive Committee and the Liberation Organization so as to establish a sound understanding of the Organization's charter and the resolutions of its National Councils. But everyday we discovered further evidence of the Organization's command being implicated in the settlement operation, which it intended to foist on the masses piecemeal, proceeding on its deviationist course a step at a time so that it might eventually confront the masses with a *fait accompli*.

3. The command of the organization started to represent the possibility of its attending the Geneva Conference - the conspiracy- as being a great victory won by it over Jordanian reaction and Israel. It also started talking of the possibility of coordination with the subservient reactionary regime in Jordan should certain conditions be met, thereby acting inconsistently with the resolutions of previous sessions of the National Council calling for the overthrow of the reactionary regime and the establishment of a democratic regime in its place. At one session of the Executive Committee, before the Egyptian-Jordanian Joint Communiqué was issued, the Executive Committee adopted a resolution to coordinate with the subservient regime in Jordan on two conditions: firstly, that it recognized the Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and, secondly, that it recognized the Cairo Agreements (September 1970 Summit Conference), although these Agreements did not prevent the subservient re-

gime striking at the resistance movement and terminating its public existence. It was as if the resistance's long experience with this regime had never taken place, and the National Council had never adopted resolutions calling for it to be blockaded and opposed until it was completely destroyed.

4. Some time after the National Council's meeting, when the Organization's command had implemented its resolutions in so fearful a manner that it was in fact, no more than the obedient servant of the regimes that advocated surrender; the Egyptian-Jordanian Joint Communiqué came as a cruel slap in the face to the command and its policy.

The issue of such a communiqué would have been a suitable occasion for the Organization's command to face up to all the policies it had pursued since the October 1973 War, in general, and since the twelfth session of the National Council, in particular. Three organizations belonging to the Executive Committee therefore, submitted to the Liberation Organization's command a memorandum calling for a pause for reappraisal and criticism. This pause would enable the Command to learn from the lessons of past experience and define its Arab relations in the light of the regimes' attitude to the imperialist liquidation settlement. This would depend first and foremost on the masses of our Arab nation rather than the American agents in the area. But the organizations command persisted in its deviationist view of things, disregarding the points raised in the memorandum and refusing to accept them. It continued to pursue its previous policy, and no longer regarded the principal battle as that against the imperialist liquidation settlement, with the object of thwarting it and insisting on continued Palestinian and Arab fighting. Instead of this it now regarded the principal battle to be against the subservient regime in Jordan in deciding shares in the settlement operation.

5. The command of the Liberation Organization is now trying to make our masses forget their fundamental national battle, which is related to the imperialist liquidation settlement and the necessity to thwart it. It is making every effort to distract the attention of the masses from their principal battle, so that they may engage exclusively in the command's battles with the subservient Jordanian regime about its share in the settlement. It wants to be sure that the masses will rally round it sympathetically should the share of the subservient Jordanian regime be increased at the expense of its own share, and applaud it if its own share increases at the expense of its own share, and applaud it if its own share increases at the expense of that of the subservient regime in Jordan-and all this within the framework of the imperialist liquidation settlement.

The command of the Liberation Organization is making every effort to represent the battle as being exclusively between Israel and Jordan, on the one hand, and to assert that, within the framework of this battle, it is entitled to pursue alliances of every kind and to obtain the support of the masses. We hereby declare in the strongest terms that this is a grave misrepresentation of the battle and a distortion of the map of contradictions. It is in fact a continuous battle between Israel, Jordan, Arab reaction and the forces that advocate surrender, on the one hand, and the masses of the Palestinian and the Arab revolution, on the other. No force whatsoever will succeed in concealing this truth from the masses.

The Palestinian masses do not want the command of the Liberation Organization to win their battles against Jordanian reaction within the framework of the settlement, just so that they may compete with the subservient regime as to who is to negotiate with the Israeli enemy.

The Palestinian masses want the command of the Liberation Organization to win their battles against all the forces that are trying to impose this imperialist liquidation settlement, so that they may carry on their popular revolution against Israel, the subservient regime in Jordan, imperialism and all reactionary forces that advocate surrender.

6. The command of the Liberation Organization ignored the memorandum of the three organizations and, as soon as it had had time enough to anaesthetize and deceive the masses, it took part in convening a tripartite conference in Cairo, which those who advocated a settlement represented as being a great victory for the Liberation Organization. This was in spite of the fact that the communiqué issued

by the tripartite conference did not mention disengagement on the Jordanian front; on the contrary it stipulated coordination with the other Arab states (including the subservient regime in Jordan).

The uproar raised by the subservient rulers, and their suspension of Jordanian political activity until the Arab summit conference, was to be expected and was perfectly understandable, this is in the context of the formula of competition for each party's share in the spoils of a settlement- conducted by America with the object of imposing "permanent" stability on the area, along with safeguarding the existence of Israel and maintaining her stability and security.

Our masses will not allow them to get away with this deception and play-acting a second time. Our masses are not prepared to confine their battle to the framework that the organization's command is now establishing, so that they may rally around it in sympathy if its share in the settlement is small and applaud it if the share is large.

7. But things have gone further than this. While the organization's command was denying that there had been any secret contacts with America, we obtained undeniable evidence that such secret contacts were being made without the knowledge of the masses. We submitted this information to the Central Council of the Liberation Organization at its last session and we now submit it to our Palestinian and Arab masses.

We regard this as being a secret contact with the imperialist enemy made without the knowledge of the masses of the revolution and its forces and bases. Certain commands may have come to see such contacts as something normal, but we leave it to the masses to define their own view, understanding and appraisal of the matter.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, having obtained this information, would be wronging the masses if it did not place it at their disposal so they may form their own judgment of the situation. The time is past when the commands could regard the masses of our people and the bases of our revolution as a flock of sheep.

8. These are the most important reasons for our withdrawal from the Executive Committee. But they are not the only reasons. However, we do not intend to go into the organizational and administrative situation of the Liberation Organization now. Nor do we intend to touch on the repercussions of such a policy on a number of specific matters, such as the questions of building shelters, fortifying the camps in Lebanon, etc.

In the light of all this and in the aftermath how can we continue to bear any responsibility within the framework of the Executive Committee?

In the light of this important step we want, on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to stress the following points:

1. We shall exercise to the full our right to submit our attitude to the masses in all its aspects by all ways and means. We call on all cadres and bases convinced of the correctness of this analysis to perform their duty of mobilizing the masses and making them aware so that they may perform their duty.
2. We believe in the soundness of our attitude and shall defend it strongly and resolutely. We are aware of a heavy responsibility vis-à-vis the future of our revolution and our struggle, and this requires us to make our attitude know as widely as possible in the Palestinian, Arab and international fields.
3. We truly believe that by adopting this attitude we are serving real Palestinian national unity. Only one course is now open to Palestinian national unity- the course of struggle on the part of the masses and the bases of the organizations to impose a sound political line.
4. We shall not allow the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy to take advantage of this situation in any way whatever. All rifles will be in a single rank directed against any Zionist-imperialist-reactionary aggression aimed at the Palestinian revolution or any section of it.

5. Our object in adopting this attitude is to mobilize the Palestinian masses and their revolutionary forces so that they may have their say and impose their will, which they have expressed throughout history on a variety of occasions. In this way we are establishing the unity of our revolution on sound national foundations so as to combat liquidation settlements to expose the timid and to play an effective role in training the forces of all our Arab masses to win their battle once and for all against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy.
6. Although we are withdrawing from the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization, we shall remain in the Palestinian National Congress and the mass federations and organizations, and the popular committees for the camps. We shall continue to fight in the ranks of our masses, profoundly aware of our responsibility to rectify the deviation in the advance of the revolution, and to protect the Palestinian rock from being swept away by the currents of the imperialist settlement.
7. We shall remain fully prepared for serious participation in building a true national unity based on clear, frank and definite rejection of the Geneva conspiracy and the political settlements that are now in the air, and of all settlements and resolutions recognizing the legality of the existence of our Zionist enemy.
8. We shall continue to employ the method of armed struggle and all the methods of struggle linked thereto until we succeed in eliminating the Zionist entity and the subservient regime in Jordan, and in establishing a democratic Arab society in Palestine as part of a comprehensive and unified democratic Arab society.
9. We promise our people that we shall be truthful in every word we say, working among them, with them and for them in the service of their goals, whatever the difficulties, however long the battle and however great the sacrifices.



**PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL, COMMUNIQUÉ REGARDING THE PFLP'S  
ANNOUNCEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,  
DAMASCUS, 30 SEPTEMBER 1974**

*[For the PFLP's announcement, see document dated 26 Sept. 1974 above.]*

At the summons of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization held a meeting on Monday, September 30, 1974, to discuss the decision of the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine to withdraw from Executive Committee and the Central Council.

The meeting reviewed the communiqué issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to this effect and took note of the grave implications of its timing and of the political attitudes and concepts contained in it that the command of the Popular Front regarded as being different from and incompatible with the general political line of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and therefore sufficient to justify the Front's decision to withdraw from the executive Committee and the Central Council.

The Central Council discussed all these concepts in the course of a detailed analysis of the general political situation in the area and in the light of recent developments and of the great political victories won by the Liberation Organization, the latest being its success in having the Palestine problem placed on the Agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

It was clear to the Council that the facts cited by the command of the Popular Front to justify its withdrawal are neither true nor rational, that they are no more than information foisted on the Popular Front by suspect and disingenuous quarters, and that in no way can they be considered as amounting to a charge against anyone.

It was also clear to the Council that the command of the Popular Front based its political attitude on convictions and information lacking any logical basis. In fact, events and developments established

that their convictions are groundless, as it also the notion of despair contained in the communiqué, which can only impair the fighting and struggle spirit of the members of our people.

The council therefore stressed the necessity for dialogue with the Popular Front so that these convictions may be discussed with it. It therefore appointed a special committee, composed of members of the Council, to perform this task, in the hope of inducing the Popular Front to return the unified national ranks within the Palestine Liberation Organization. The council also reaffirmed the importance of strengthening and consolidating national unity and raising the level of the relations between all sections, which are so many organizations forming a front. It regarded this as a national necessity imposed by the interests of the revolution and the requirements of its protection and security.

This necessity is also imposed by concern for the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the one national command of the Palestinian people. The Council observed with satisfaction the escalation of combat operations inside the occupied territory, and stressed the need for them to be multiplied and developed. It also reaffirmed its approval of the intensive political efforts which the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization has been making and is still making in this period, and of the important victories it has won, the latest being the important statement issued by the tripartite meeting held in Cairo in September 20. The Council expressed its disapproval of the Jordanian regime's withdrawal from the ranks of Arab unanimity and its continued adoption of attitudes hostile to the Palestinian people and their national cause.

It demanded that resistance to this regime be continued, that it be isolated and that its conspiratorial trends and links be exposed by consolidating relations with the two patriotic confrontation states, Egypt and Syria, inasmuch as they constitute the principal front of resistance to the Zionist enemy, and inasmuch as the coherence of this front is the basis of consolidating the unity of national struggle and strengthening the unity of Arab solidarity.

The Central Council while holding the command of the Popular Front responsible for the repercussions of its position on the security and safety of the revolution, once more calls on it to reconsider its attitude and to again take part in the responsibilities of national action and of dealing with all the problems and differences within the national institutions.

Long Live Free Arab Palestine.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3210 INVITING THE PLO  
TO PARTICIPATE IN UN DEBATES ON PALESTINE, 14 OCTOBER 1974**

*[Prior to this resolution, since 1965, PLO representatives had been permitted to address the UN on the issue of the Palestine refugees. On 14 Oct. 1974, 71 Arab, Asian, African and Eastern European nations sponsored the following resolution which was approved by 105:4 (Israel, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, US) with 20 abstentions (mainly Western European and Latin American nations.)]*

The General Assembly,

Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,  
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, STATEMENT REGARDING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3210, JERUSALEM, 15 OCTOBER 1974**

*[A day earlier, Israel had voted against the resolution which invited the PLO to participate in UN debates on Palestine, calling it illegal and damaging to the peace process.]*

The U.N. vote on the subject of the Palestine Liberation Organization proves that in the parliamentary composition of the Assembly, and the prejudices prevailing amongst its delegates, a majority complies with the demands of the PLO. The Palestine Liberation Organization is not a national liberation movement, but the roof organization for terrorist groups who have perpetrated dastardly acts of terrorism in Israel as well as in other countries.

This resolution is illegal and will not be binding upon Israel in any way. Any country would have rejected such a resolution, which strikes at the very roots of its existence. The acceptance of this motion may well condemn the prospects for a peaceful solution in this area, which have just gathered new momentum.

The resolution that was adopted is diametrically opposed to the United Nations Charter. In view of the declared aims of the PLO as expressed in the Palestine National Covenant. These aims categorically deny Israel the right to exist, and determine the destruction by armed force of a member of the United Nations Organization.

The fact that, of the European Economic Community, France and Italy have sided with the approach of the most extremist Arab states gives rise to astonishment, for this stand does not accord with the declarations made by these two countries concerning their desire to refrain from interfering with the process of dialogue in the region.

To Israel's particular regret the countries who voted in favour of official recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization include France, who only a few weeks ago was herself witness to the role of the Arab terrorist organizations as part of the international terrorist organizations, when the French embassy in The Hague was attacked and the French Ambassador held hostage.

Israel also regrets the decision of Italy to vote in favour of awarding the right of appearance in the U.N. to the very organization which - on Italian soil - perpetrated acts of bloody terrorism, resulting in the killing and wounding of a large number of innocent people including Italian nationals as well as others.

Israel is also greatly disappointed by the votes of Ireland, Sweden, Norway and other countries who, we had hoped, would not lead their support to an organization of murderers, but would have preferred progress towards peace over the encouragement of Arab extremism.



**GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), GEORGE HABASH, STATEMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE UPCOMING THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN RABAT, BEIRUT, 25 OCTOBER 1974 [EXCERPTS]**

The Palestinian revolution's slogan of a democratic society in Palestine is the only way to the freedom and progress of all inhabitants of the area, including the Jews themselves. It is only way to a just and permanent peace. The proposal for a "just and permanent peace" discussed by Kissinger, the emissary of imperialism is a proposal to ensure the survival of the "cockpit of tension" in the area.

This is what Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine wanted to say on the occasion of the Rabat Summit Conference.

Are we saying this because there is a real possibility of certain Arab regimes reassessing their previous policies and constructing this nationalist political line? Of course we wish from the bottom of our hearts what this was so. But it is not a question of wishing. The interests of certain Arab regimes are completely opposed to the policy of the people's war of national liberation. The place-dwellers who are linked to imperialism, and those who join with imperialism in exploiting the wealth of peoples and the toil of workers- these regimes and social forces, immersed as they are in a life of luxury, can never follow this course of the revolutionary political line. They want stability and tranquility so that they may continue to wallow in their life of corruption, ease and luxury at the expense of the millions. These reactionary and subservient regimes and forces execrate such a policy and revile those who advocate it.

But this policy is the only one that serves the interests of the millions of the masses of our Arab nation and its overwhelming majority.

It is our afflicted and deprived working class who live in shanty towns around the Arab capitals and cities, and our poor peasants who eke out a wretched existence in the countryside of Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and the Arabian Peninsula- it is these who daily experience the harshness of life, it is these who every moment realize how heavy is the yoke of national and class oppression they are living under. It is they who want change. It is they who realize that the rifle and the people's national war are the way of settling their contradiction with their national and class enemies, starting with Israel and imperialism and ending with the reactionary and subservient forces.

The national policy proposed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine as an alternative to the policy of settlement and surrender, is the policy of the nationalist forces and regimes, the policy of the revolutionary classes of the masses of our nation.

Our object in presenting this policy on the occasion of the Rabat conference is: First, to disclose the inability of the reactionary, subservient and surrenderist regimes to embrace this nationalist line; secondly, to establish the political line which our Palestinian and Arab masses want the nationalist, progressive and anti-imperialist regimes as represented by Iraq, Algeria Democratic Yemen and Libya to make the basis of their struggle; thirdly, our object is also to help the masses to distinguish between Arab solidarity in support of a nationalist political line, and "Arab solidarity" in support of the line of settlement and surrender.

Our Palestinian people, in particular, have had bitter experience of so-called "Arab solidarity" -the solidarity of the Arab regimes- on more than one occasion in the history of their national struggle. It was in the name of Arab solidarity that the great strike in Palestine in 1936 and our people's armed revolt were defeated. It was in the name of Arab solidarity, too, that the armies of the Arab states came in in 1948, under the command of King Abdullah and Glubb Pasha, to anaesthetize the Palestinian and Arab masses and to carry out this conspiracy of the foundation of Israel.

Today we are entitled to declare in a loud voice that under the banner of the summit conference and Arab solidarity an attempt is being made to bring about a political settlement that will give Israel a stronger foothold and restore imperialist domination of the area. At the summit conference the subservient forces will submit Kissinger's proposal for a declaration of the termination of the state of war with Israel in return for promises- mere promises- of withdrawal from certain Arab territories. Our masses resolutely declare that the termination of the state of war with the usurping Zionist enemy is flagrant treachery to the history of our struggle. It is the duty of the nationalist regimes to thwart this conspiracy.

Our Palestinian and Arab masses call on the representatives of Iraq, Algeria, Democratic Yemen and Libya to resist this surrenderist attitude and to struggle for Arab solidarity based on the people's national war... and not on the secret diplomatic manoeuvres at which Kissinger is so expert and which the Arab rulers who admire Kissinger are so fond of praising. We warn against all manoeuvres aimed at bringing in the nationalist forces and regimes to provide cover for surrender and imperialist settlements.

By settling the Arab-Israeli conflict American policy hopes to implement a comprehensive plan covering the whole of the Arab area. The object of this plan is: firstly, to consolidate the reactionary regimes; secondly, to encircle and destroy the progressive regimes; thirdly, to silence Arab guns in Palestine, Amman and Eritrea. After that American imperialism will be assured of obtaining full control of Arab oil wealth- production, prices and profits-thereby depriving our masses of the possession of this important basic resources and preventing their use of it to combat the poverty, misery, disease, distress and hunger from which they suffer.

These are the outlines of the proposed American plan for the area which imperialism hopes to implement through the “settlement” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore all forces must unequivocally face up to their responsibilities before the masses during this fateful period in the history of Arab struggle.

As for the Palestinian field, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has struggled, since the end of the fighting in the October War, to make the Palestine Liberation Organization declare its total condemnation of all policies of settlement which have led to these results. It has advised the Palestine Liberation Organization to submit an alternative political line- the line of continued fighting the line of the people’s war of national liberation- relying on its bases, its masses and its fighters, the national and progressive regimes and the masses of our people who are eager to fight and who sincerely condemn all treacherous policies involving liquidation. We should have liked the Liberation Organization to be a vanguard, in the true sense of the word, for the movement of the Arab masses, not by virtue of its size and its traditional military forces, but by virtue of its revolutionary political line. This line is capable of releasing the energies of millions of our masses and acting as a rallying point for all nationalist and progressive forces at the Arab level. But the Palestine Liberation Organization has followed the political line laid down by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which has led to the adverse results mentioned above.

In view of the grave consequences of the surrenderist political line, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has withdrawn from the framework of the Executive Committee because it cannot before the masses and all of history, bear the responsibility for such a dangerous line. It does not believe in it nor is it convinced by all the justifications. However, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has remained within the framework of the Organization as represented by the National Council, so that it may struggle, along with all Palestinian revolutionary cadres, forces and bases, to correct the Organization’s line. In this way the Palestinian revolution may continue to be a revolutionary vanguard for the movement of all the oppressed, deprived and afflicted members of our Arab people.



### **LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 7<sup>TH</sup> ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE, RABAT, 28 OCTOBER 1974**

The Seventh Arab Summit Conference after exhaustive and detailed discussions conducted by their Majesties, Excellencies and Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents, and Amirs on the Arab situation in general and the Palestine problem in particular, within their national and international frameworks;

*and after hearing* the statements submitted by His Majesty King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and his Excellency Brother Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and after the statements of their Majesties and Excellencies the Kings and Presidents, in an atmosphere of candour and sincerity and full responsibility;

*and in view* of the Arab leaders’ appreciation and the joint national responsibility required of them at present for confronting aggression and performing duties of liberation, enjoined by the unity of the Arab cause and the unity of its struggle;

*and in view* of the fact that all are aware of Zionist schemes still being made to eliminate the Palestinian existence and to obliterate the Palestinian national entity;

*and in view* of the Arab leaders' belief in the necessity to frustrate these attempts and schemes and to counteract them by supporting and strengthening this Palestinian national entity, by providing all requirements to develop and increase its ability to ensure that the Palestinian people recover their rights in full;

*and by meeting* responsibilities of close cooperation with its brothers within the framework of collective Arab commitment;

*and in light of* the victories achieved by Palestinian struggle in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy, at the Arab and international levels, at the United Nations, and of the obligation imposed thereby to continue joint Arab action to develop and increase the scope of these victories;

*and having received* the views of all on all the above, and having succeeded in cooling the differences between brethren within the framework of consolidating Arab solidarity, the Seventh Arab Summit resolves the following:

1. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and to self-determination.
2. To affirm the right of the Palestine people to establish an independent national authority, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, on any liberated territory. The Arab States are pledged to uphold this authority, when it is established, on any spheres and at all levels.
3. To support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of its national and international responsibilities, within the context of the principle of Arab solidarity.
4. To call on the Kingdom of Jordan, Syria and Egypt to formalize their relations in the light of these decisions and in order that they be implemented.
5. To affirm the obligation of all Arab States to preserve Palestinian unity and not to interfere in Palestinian internal affairs.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN, STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET  
ON THE RABAT CONFERENCE DECISION, JERUSALEM, 5 NOVEMBER 1974**

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

First of all, I should like to express from this rostrum our profound appreciation and gratitude to the hundreds of thousands of United States citizens, Jews and non-Jews, who yesterday, at the United Nations Plaza in New York, demonstrated their solidarity and sympathy with the State of Israel, protesting against the U.N. Assembly's decision to invite the representatives of the terrorist organizations to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly. This was a powerful demonstration of support for the State of Israel and its struggle for survival against its attacks.

This mass demonstration gave vivid expression to the determined stand, not only of the demonstrators, but of millions of other Americans who are not prepared to tolerate this decision, which is void of all moral force, even if the representatives of 105 states voted in its favour as against the opposition of four: the U.S., Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Israel. The Jewish people and the State of Israel appreciate the stand of these countries, headed by the United States, as an expression of friendship and true concern for peace in our region.

At a time characterized by fear and defeatism in the face of oil blackmail, we may draw encouragement from the awakening of the masses who demonstrated in New York, and see it as a sign of things to come.

The irresponsible decision of the U.N. Assembly undoubtedly gave added momentum to the Rabat conference and helped to harden the position of the Arab states. The Rabat conference may have adopted some decisions of which we are not yet aware, but the decisions on the Palestinian question have been published, and they are clear and unambiguous. Here are the decisions word for word, and I quote:

"The Conference:

- "A) Affirms the Palestinian people's right to its homeland and its right to self-determination.
- "B) Affirms the right of the Palestinian people to set up an independent national authority under the leadership of the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on any liberated Palestinian land. The Arab countries will support such an authority once it is established in all spheres.
- "C) Support for the PLO in exercising its national and international responsibilities within the framework of Arab commitments.
- "D) Calls upon the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Syria and the PLO to outline a joint formula for a coordination of their relations in the light of these decisions, and for their implementation.
- "E) All the Arab countries undertake to consolidate the national Palestinian unity and avoid intervention in the internal affairs of the Palestinian action."

The meaning of these resolutions is clear. The Rabat conference decided to charge the organizations of murderers with the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the Arab countries gave the organizations a free hand to decide on their mode of operations. The Arab countries themselves will refrain, as stated in the resolution, from intervening in the "internal affairs" of this action.

We are not fully aware of the significance of the fourth resolution, which refers to "outlining a formula" for the coordination of relations between Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the PLO. It is by no means impossible that it is also intended to bring about closer military relations between them.

The significance of these resolutions is extremely grave. The aim of the terrorist organizations is well-known and clear. The Palestine National Covenant speaks bluntly and openly about the liquidation of the State of Israel by means of armed struggle, and the Arab states committed themselves at Rabat to support this struggle. Any attempt to implement them will be accompanied by at least attempts to carry out terrorist operations on a larger scale with the support of the Arab countries.

The decisions of the Rabat conference are merely a continuation of the resolutions adopted at Khartoum. Only, further to the "noes" of Khartoum, the roof organization of the terrorists has attained the status conferred upon it by the presidents and kings at Rabat. Throughout this conference not a voice was raised expressing readiness for peace. The recurring theme of this conference was the aspiration to destroy a member-state of the United Nations.

The content of this gathering has nothing whatsoever in common with social progress or the advancement of humanity among the Arab nations or in the relations with the peoples in the region and throughout the world.

There is no indication of any deviation from the goal and policy of the terrorist organizations, so let us not delude ourselves on this score. The terrorist organisations had no successes in the administered territories, but the successes they achieved at the U.N. General Assembly and at Rabat are encouraging them to believe that the targets they had so confidently set themselves are now within reach.

Members of the Knesset,

The policy laid down in Khartoum and Rabat shall not be executed. We have the power to prevent its implementation. The position of the government of Israel in the face of these resolutions of the Rabat conference is unequivocal:

- A) The government of Israel categorically rejects the conclusions of the Rabat conference, which are designed to disrupt any progress towards peace, to encourage the terrorist elements, and to foil any step which might lead to peaceful co-existence with Israel.

- B) In accordance with the Knesset's resolutions, the government of Israel, will not negotiate with terrorist organizations whose avowed policy is to strive for Israel's destruction and whose method is terrorist violence.
- C) We warn the Arab leaders against making the mistake of thinking that threats or even the active employment of the weapon of violence or of military force will lead to a political solution. This is a dangerous illusion. The aims of the Palestinian National Charter will not be achieved, either by terrorist acts or by limited or total warfare.

The Rabat conference resolutions do not justify the adoption of other resolutions, and merely add force to our determination. To anyone who recommends negotiations with the terrorist organizations, I have to say that there is no basis for negotiation with the terrorist organizations. It does not enter our minds to negotiate with a body that denies our existence as a state, and follows a course of violence and terrorism for the destruction of our state.

Negotiations with such a body would lend legitimacy and encouragement to its policy and its criminal acts. The U.N. General Assembly's decision to invite this body to its debates is a serious error from the moral and political standpoints, but it has no substance so long as Israel denounces this body, its policies and its deeds, as incompatible with the very existence of the State of Israel. Israel will grant no recognition to those who conspire against her existence.

Rabat is not a surprising innovation, but our policy will not be determined by its decisions. We shall carefully watch the steps the Arab states will take in the wake of this conference and, in particular, we shall watch the moves of those states with whom we were about to embark on negotiations on stages of progress towards peace. Above all - we shall see whether Egypt is in fact ready for this, or whether she has committed herself to the ban on reaching a separate agreement with Israel. We shall be watching Jordan's moves too, to see whether she surrenders to Arafat.

In the face of this development, we believe that the strength and stability of the State of Israel, and the Israel Defence Forces, powerful and prepared for any test, are the guarantee for our safety. As long as we are strong and follow a wise and courageous policy, the chances will increase that our neighbours will be ready to seek ways of coming to terms with us.

I can report to the Knesset today on the satisfactory progress made in the increase in the army's strength and its programme of work:

- The army has increased its strength and the number of its regular and reserve formations. Methods of mobilization have been examined and improved.
- The army is trying to make the maximum use of the manpower at its disposal, including re-examination of those who have not yet served.
- A great effort is being made to increase the numbers in the regular army.
- The lessons of the Yom Kippur War have been learned and intensive training programmes are being carried out to put them into practice.
- Large-scale fortification works are under way, as well as a massive repair programme to get our weapons into a condition of maximum capacity and readiness.
- Large arms purchasing efforts have been made, which cannot be described in any detail here.

I can confidently assure the Knesset that, although our neighbours have grown much stronger, we are succeeding in our efforts to achieve the strength to ensure that the Israel Defence Forces can do their job. We are also making every effort to give the IDF the best weapons so as to increase its fighting power and maintain its qualitative superiority.

The maintenance of the quantitative proportions and our qualitative superiority is not a one-time effort, and we shall have to continue to invest considerable efforts and resources in the future.

During the last two months, our security forces have been built up and restored to full capacity at an impressive rate. The number of volunteers for the regular army has risen. Many have given up more comfortable and well-paid jobs and undertaken the military burden out of a sense of national responsibility.

Members of the Knesset,

As I have already stated, Israel's steadfastness, the strength of the Israel Defence Forces and a wise and courageous policy are the guarantee of our safety. A correct policy is an important condition for the building up of our strength and the safeguarding of our future.

Despite the hostility surrounding us, we have not abandoned our clear consciousness of the fact that peace is a cardinal need for all the nations in the region. The government of Israel is convinced that the central effort of its policy must be the attainment of peace with each and every one of the neighbouring states in the region. This has been Israel's policy since she overcame the invasion of the Arab armies which sought to prevent the establishment of the state. The effort is to achieve a contractual peace which will put an end to the conflict and usher in a new era in the relations between the nations of this region. The effort is to achieve a peace which incorporates defensible borders for Israel, as well as conditions which guarantee Israel and each of the states in this area undisturbed development and social progress, without the horrors of wars and slaughter, conditions enabling all the nations in the region to display their productive and cultural potential, which has remained unexpressed owing to the wars. Our policy is geared and directed towards this goal. In order to progress towards this goal, we are prepared to venture and even take deliberate risks. Hence our readiness to agree to territorial compromise within the framework of peace settlements and the assurance of defensible borders. We believe that peace is both necessary and possible for the members of this generation. We are not content with rejecting the Rabat resolutions, and we have constructive proposals on how to advance towards peace.

Members of the Knesset,

Our evaluation is that there are two ways for progressing towards peace:

- (A) By achieving full peace which would assure Israel secure borders - namely, defensible and recognized borders. As aforementioned, a peace treaty assuring Israel of defensible borders can be founded on territorial compromise. A peace agreement under any conditions or at any price is out of the question, for we shall not agree to return to the borders of 4 June 1967.
- (B) Insofar as the Arab states are not yet prepared to make peace with us, we can nevertheless see a way open to make progress towards peace. Such progress can be made by stages. The House has more than once noted the government's statements concerning its readiness to try this method, which is based on interim settlements.

Members of the Knesset,

As far back as June 1971, Israel expressed its readiness to make interim settlements, insofar as these can assure progress on the road to peace. This was also included in the Alignment's election platform for the Eighth Knesset and in the basic principles of the present government's programme.

The interim settlements for which we are prepared are not the same as the Separation-of-Forces Agreements which were concluded following the cease-fire in the Yom Kippur War, but settlements of a political nature resulting from political contacts. I am referring to settlements which are not confined only to the general maintenance of the cease-fire, or merely to the elementary military paragraphs covered by a cease-fire - but constitute a stage in the conscious progress towards peace, a progress which consolidates a continuous situation of non-belligerency. This must find expression in the political atmosphere and in the economic arena. What is meant here is an agreement - not for brief periods of time, but for periods that do not expire at the end of a few months. Such agreements must liberate this region from the tensions of the peril of renewed war, without being dependent on the meetings and deliberations of the Security Council every six months. I am speaking of agreements which, even though not peace agreements, will entail reciprocal obligations, they must contain ele-

ments of progress towards the peace to which the parties aspire. At any event, such interim settlements cannot involve one-sided advantages and cannot be applicable to each of the fronts.

At this stage it might be harmful to refer in detail in public to matters which we shall have to discuss in the course of the negotiations. Detailed discussions will be held in due course in the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset.

Members of the Knesset,

I must stress the following: Our consent to an interim settlement with Egypt stands. This interim settlement, which cannot constitute a further edition of the Separation-of-Forces Agreement, must not deprive the Israel Defence Forces of the conditions required for holding their positions in Sinai as long as peace has not been reached. To repeat - this is not the time to go into detail as to the components of the agreement, or to make precise juridical definitions. If we reach an agreement on the contents, we shall have no difficulty in finding the appropriate juridical definitions.

As for Jordan, the government of Israel is convinced that, within the framework of peace with Jordan, the Palestinian issue can and must also be solved. On 21 July 1974 the government adopted the following resolution:

"The government will work towards negotiations for a peace agreement with Jordan.

"The peace will be founded on the existence of two independent states only - Israel, with united Jerusalem as her capital, and a Jordanian-Palestinian Arab state, east of Israel, within borders to be determined in negotiations between Israel and Jordan. In this state, the specific identity of the Jordanians and the Palestinians will find expression in peace and good-neighbourliness with Israel."

I have made it clear on more than one occasion in the Knesset that the government of Israel will conduct negotiations with Jordan and adopt decisions at every stage of the negotiations, but will not conclude a peace agreement with Jordan that involves territorial concessions of parts of Judea and Samaria before we consult the nation in new elections, should one of the coalition factions demand this. This promise holds good and remains valid.

The government of Israel has not taken any decision on the subject of an interim settlement with Jordan. We shall continue - as we have done so far - to shoulder the responsibility of guaranteeing the normal life of the population of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. We shall continue to maintain the open-borders policy. We shall not allow the emissaries of the terrorist organisations to gain a foothold among the population of the administered territories.

We continue to regard Jordan as our natural neighbouring partner in negotiations for peace on our eastern border. As for Syria, as already stated, Israel wants peace with each of her neighbours. We have no interest in suspending or delaying the process of dialogue. We are convinced that negotiations for peace, without prior conditions, can bring about a change in relations with Syria and further the prospects of peace between our two countries.

Members of the Knesset,

On 31 July the Knesset held a debate following the Sebastia episode. In my statement of that date I referred to the negative significance of this act, which constituted an attempt to undermine national authority and a blow to the principles of government in Israel, which is subject to the Knesset. The instigators of the happenings in Sebastia repeated their attempt in the week following the Succot festival - this time on a larger scale and with a wider scope. These attempts ended like that of Sebastia. Since the 9th of Av nothing has occurred that could change the government's determination on this issue. The government will conduct its policy as submitted to and confirmed by the nation and the Knesset.

I say again: The government's stand remains firm and unchanged: settlements in the administered territories are established and will be established solely in accordance with the government's deci-

sions. All those desirous of settling can send in their names to the competent authorities and they will be accorded assistance according to the priorities set forth by the government from time to time.

Once more, I appeal to those who are anxious to settle to come forward and volunteer to fill the ranks of our settlers in the Jordan Rift, the Rafiah Salient and the Golan Heights.

Members of the Knesset,

Side by side with the problems that lie before us, let us also take note of the positive developments and encouraging signs. Greatly encouraging is the agreement that has been reached on the subject of aliya from the Soviet Union.

On behalf of the entire Knesset I voice our pleasure at the hopeful tidings of an increase in the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel. This hope has been strengthened thanks to the helpful efforts of President Ford of the United States, Secretary of State Kissinger, and distinguished figures in both Houses of Congress, especially Senator Jackson and, with him, his colleagues Senators Ribicoff and Javits, and Congressmen Vannick and Mills. These men have stood by the rights of the Jews and their struggle to settle in Israel. Their stand is a phenomenon of human and moral value, for which the Jewish people expresses its profound appreciation.

The agreement between the two powers will go down in history as a significant event in the history of our people and the annals of American democracy. The agreement reached is a message of glad tidings not only to the Jewish people but to all men of goodwill everywhere.

It is noteworthy that the chosen representatives of the American people had the courage to struggle for moral and humanitarian principles. Their courageous support for the rights of the Jews is worthy of gratitude from the nation and the Knesset in Israel.

The Israeli government and nation faces an ennobling and momentous challenge and a great burden. The government will intensify its efforts to solve the problems of immigrant absorption. But the efforts of the government will not be enough. The entire nation faces a great test. Every household in Israel can and must contribute to successful absorption. Every man and woman in Israel can and must do much for the absorption of the immigrants with a warm heart, with generous help. Every civil servant and public worker will be asked to do more than his formal duty. We should not be satisfied with the work of the official machinery. I also call on immigrants, who are already Israeli citizens, who are building the country and moulding its character. Each of them must help. Let us face this momentous task and be worthy of the great opportunity that is opening before us. And to our brethren in the Soviet Union let us say: We are watching for you. To the extent that the gates open, do not delay: precious hours should not be wasted: home is waiting for you.

Let us hope that the Soviet Union observes the spirit of the agreement without disappointing the hopes of the Jews who wish to immigrate to Israel, and of all those everywhere who defend the rights of man.

Members of the Knesset,

I must give a word of praise to the members of settlements who, on their own initiative, volunteered to aid the army in its programme of repair and returning to service: Men of the valleys, the southern settlements, regional schools and farmers in the south who volunteered for this effort to shorten the time of these repair programmes. These men, who come from field and factory in their turn, are mainly veterans of wars and battles who are no longer subject to military service. Men who work on tractors and trucks are helping to repair tanks. Women and girls are helping to organize emergency supplies. This is an exemplary display of good citizenship. In the name of the entire Knesset, I say to them: Keep up the good work.

A gladdening and encouraging phenomenon is the steadfastness of the northern settlements. If we have succeeded in preventing a large number of acts of terrorism and sabotage, it was largely due to their alertness and efforts.

Also to be commended is the widespread volunteering for the Civil Guard. The Israel Police have undertaken the organization of the Civil Guard in addition to their regular duties. In spite of the short period that the Civil Guard is in existence and the special efforts needed to organize such an extensive body, 35 to 40 thousand people from nearly every settlement in Israel. The organization is on the rise and its results are already perceptible.

We must encourage all forms of volunteering, because their substantial and educational importance is inestimable. These manifestations of volunteering effort are evidence of the spirit of the people and of its readiness to carry the strain.



**PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY,  
NEW YORK, 13 NOVEMBER 1974**

Mr. President,

I thank you for having invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am grateful to all those representatives of United Nations member states who contributed to the decision to introduce the question of Palestine as a separate item on the Agenda of this Assembly. That decision made possible the Assembly's resolution inviting us to address it on the question of Palestine.

This is very important occasion. The question of Palestine is being re-examined by the United Nations, and we consider that step to be as much a victory for the world organization as it is for the cause of our people. It indicates anew that the United Nations of today is not the United Nations of the past, just as today's world is not yesterday's world. Today's United Nations represents 138 nations, a number that more clearly reflects the will of the international community. Thus today's United Nations is more capable of implementing the principles embodied in its Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as being more truly empowered to support causes of peace and justice.

Our people are now beginning to feel that change. Along with them, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America also feel the change. As a result, the United Nations acquires greater esteem both in our people's view and in the view of other peoples. Our hope is thereby strengthened that the United Nations may contribute actively to the pursuit and triumph of the causes of peace, justice, freedom and independence. Our resolve to build a new world is fortified - a world free of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its forms, including Zionism.

Our world aspires to peace, justice, equality and freedom. It hopes that oppressed nations, at present bent under the weight of imperialism, may gain their freedom and their right to self-determination. It hopes to place the relations between nations on a basis of equality, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for each other's internal affairs, secure national sovereignty, independence and territorial unity on the basis of justice and mutual benefit. This world resolves that the economic ties binding it together should be grounded in justice, parity and mutual interest. It aspires finally to direct its human resources against the scourge of poverty, famine, disease and natural calamities, toward the development of productive scientific and technical capabilities to enhance human wealth - all this in the hope of reducing the disparity between the developing and the developed countries. But all such aspirations cannot be realized in a world that is at present ruled by tension, injustice, oppression, racial discrimination and exploitation, a world also threatened with unending economic disaster, wars and crises.

Many peoples, including those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Palestine, among many others, are still victims of oppression and violence. Their areas of the world are gripped by armed struggles provoked by imperialism and racial discrimination. These, both merely forms of aggression

and terror, are instances of oppressed peoples compelled by intolerable circumstances into a confrontation with such oppression. But wherever that confrontation occurs it is legitimate and just.

It is imperative that the international community should support these peoples in their struggles, in the furtherance of their rightful causes and in the attainment of their right to self-determination.

In Indo-China the people are still exposed to aggression. They remain subjected to conspiracies preventing them from the enjoyment of peace and realization of their goals. Although peoples everywhere have welcomed the peace agreements reached in Laos and South Vietnam, no one can say that genuine peace has been achieved, for the forces responsible in the first place for aggression are determined that Vietnam should remain in a state of disturbance and war. The same can be said of the present military aggression against the people of Cambodia. It is therefore incumbent on the international community to support these oppressed peoples, and also to condemn the oppressors for their designs against peace. Moreover, despite the positive stand taken by the Democratic Republic of Korea with regard to a peaceful and just solution of the Korean question, there is as yet no settlement of that question.

A few months ago the problem of Cyprus erupted violently before us. All peoples everywhere shared in the suffering of the Cypriots. We ask that the United Nations continue its efforts to reach a just solution in Cyprus, thereby sparing the Cypriots further war and ensuring peace and independence for them instead. Undoubtedly, however, consideration of the question of Cyprus belongs within that of Middle Eastern problems as well as of Mediterranean problems.

In their efforts to replace an outmoded but still dominant world economic system with a new, more logically rational one, the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America face implacable attacks on these efforts. These countries have expressed their views at the special session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development. Thus the plundering, exploitation, and the siphoning off of the wealth of impoverished peoples must be terminated forthwith. There must be no deterring of these peoples' efforts to develop and control their wealth. Furthermore, there is a grave necessity for arriving at fair prices for raw materials from these countries.

In addition, these countries continue to be hampered in the attainment of their primary objectives formulated at the Conference on the Law of the Sea at Caracas, at the population conference and at the Rome food conference. The United Nations should therefore bend every effort to achieve a radical alteration of the world economic system, making it possible for developing countries to advance rapidly. The United Nations must resolutely oppose forces that are trying to lay the responsibility for inflation of the shoulders of the developing countries, especially the oil-producing countries. The United Nations must firmly condemn any threats made against these countries simply because they demand their just rights.

The world-wide armaments race shows no sign of abating. As a consequence, the entire world is threatened with the dispersion of its wealth and the utter waste of its energies. Armed violence is made more likely everywhere. Peoples expect the United Nations to devote itself single-mindedly to putting an end to the armaments race; to convert the vast sums spent on military technology until the stage is reached where nuclear weapons are destroyed, and resources go into projects for development, for increasing production, and for benefiting the world.

And still, the highest tension exists in our part of the world. There the Zionist entity clings tenaciously to occupied Arab territory; the Zionist entity is holding on to the Arab territories it has occupied and persisting in its aggressions against us. New military preparations are feverishly being made. These anticipate another, fifth war of aggression to be launched against us. Such signs behoove the closest possible watching, since there is a grave likelihood that this war would forebode nuclear destruction and cataclysmic annihilation.

The world is in need of tremendous efforts if its aspirations to peace, freedom, justice, equality and development are to be realized, if its struggle is to be victorious over colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its forms, including Zionism. Only by such efforts can actual form be given to the aspirations of all peoples, including the aspirations of peoples whose states oppose such efforts. It is this road that leads to the fulfillment of those principles emphasized by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Were the status quo simply to be maintained, however the world would instead be exposed to the most dangerous armed conflicts, in addition to economic, human and natural calamities.

Despite abiding world crises, despite the powers of darkness and backwardness that beset the world, we live in a time of glorious change. An old world order is crumbling before our eyes, as imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism, the chief form of which is Zionism, ineluctably perish. We are witnessing a great wave of history bearing peoples forward into a new world which they have created. In that world just causes will triumph. Of that we are confident.

The question of Palestine is crucial amongst those just causes fought for unstintingly by masses laboring under imperialism and oppression. I am aware that, if I am given the opportunity to address the General Assembly, so too must the opportunity be given to all liberation movements fighting against racism and imperialism. In their names, in the name of every human being struggling for freedom and self-determination, I call upon the General Assembly urgently to give their just causes the same full attention the General Assembly has so rightly given to our cause. Such recognition once given, there will be a secure foundation thereafter for the preservation of universal peace. For only with such peace will a new world order endure in which peoples can live free of oppression, fear, injustice and exploitation. As I said earlier, this is for the General Assembly, keeping firmly in mind both the perspective and the goal of a coming world order.

Even as today we address this General Assembly from an international rostrum we are also expressing our faith in political and diplomatic struggle as complements, as enhancements of armed struggle. Furthermore we express our appreciation of the role the United Nations is capable of playing in settling problems of international scope. But this capability, I said a moment ago, became real only once the United Nations had accommodated itself to the living actuality of aspiring peoples, towards which this international organization owes unique obligations.

In addressing the General Assembly today our people proclaims its faith in the future, unencumbered either by past tragedies or present limitations. If, as we discuss the present, we enlist the past in our service, we do so only to light up our journey into the future alongside other movements of national liberation. If we return now to the historical roots of our cause we do so because present at this very moment in our midst are those who, as they occupy our homes, as their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same time that we are ghosts without an existence, without traditions or future. We speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded - and continue to regard - our problem as merely a problem of refugees. They have portrayed the Middle East question as little more than a border dispute between the Arab States and the Zionist entity. They have imagined that our people claim rights not rightfully their own and fight neither with logic nor legitimate motive, with a simple wish only to disturb the peace and to terrorize others. For there are amongst you - and here I refer to the United States of America and others like it - those who supply our enemy freely with planes and bombs and with every variety of murderous weapon. They take hostile positions against us, deliberately distorting the true essence of the problem. All this is done not only at our expense, but at the expense of the American people and its well-being, and of the friendship we continue to hope can be cemented between us and this great people, whose history of struggle for the sake of freedom and the unity of its territories we honor and salute.

I cannot now forego this opportunity of appealing from this rostrum directly to the American people, asking them to give their support to our heroic and fighting people. I ask them wholeheartedly to endorse right and justice, to recall George Washington to mind - heroic Washington whose purpose

was his nation's freedom and independence, Abraham Lincoln, champion of the destitute and the wretched, and also Woodrow Wilson whose doctrine of Fourteen Points remains subscribed to and venerated by our people. I ask the American people whether the demonstrations of hostility and enmity taking place outside this great hall reflect the true intent of America's will? What, I ask you plainly, is the crime of the people of Palestine against the American people? Why do you fight us so? Does this really serve your interests? Does it serve the interests of the American masses? No, definitely not. I can only hope that the American people will remember that their friendship with the whole Arab nation is too great, too abiding, and too rewarding for any such demonstrations to harm it.

In any event, in focusing our discussion of the question of Palestine upon historical roots, we do so because we believe that any question now exercising the world's concern must be viewed radically, in the true sense of that word, if a real solution is ever to be grasped. We propose this radical approach as an antidote to an approach to international issues that obscures historical origins behind ignorance, denial and a slavish obedience to the *fait accompli*.

The roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the nineteenth century, in other words, to that period which we call the era of colonialism and settlement and the transition to the eve of imperialism. This was when the Zionist imperialist plan was born: its aim was the conquest of Palestine by European immigration, just as settlers colonized, and indeed raided, most of Africa. This is the period during which, pouring forth our of the West, colonialism spread into the furthest reaches of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, building colonies everywhere, cruelly exploiting, oppressing, plundering the peoples of those three continents. This period persists into the present. marked evidence of its totally reprehensible presence can be readily perceived in the racism practiced both in South Africa and in Palestine.

Just as colonialism and the settlers dignified their conquests, their plunder and limitless attacks upon the natives of Africa and elsewhere, with a appeals to a "civilizing mission", so too did waves of Zionist immigrants disguise their purposes as they conquered Palestine. Just as colonialism used religion, color, race and language to justify the people's exploitation and its cruel subjugation by terror and discrimination, so too were these methods employed as Palestine was usurped and its people hounded from their national homeland.

Just as colonialism used the wretched, the poor the exploited as mere inert matter with which to build and to carry out settler colonialism, so too wee destitute, oppressed European Jews employed on behalf of world imperialism and of the Zionist leadership. European Jews were transformed into the instruments of aggression; they became the elements of settler colonialism and racial discrimination.

Zionist ideology was utilized against our Palestinian people: the purpose was not only the establishment of Western-style settler colonialism but also the severing of Jews from their various homelands and subsequently their estrangement from their nations. Zionism is an ideology that is imperialistic, colonialist, racist; it is profoundly reactionary and discriminatory; it is united with anti-Semitism in its tenets and is the other side of the same coin. For when what is proposed is that adherents of the Jewish faith, regardless of their national residence, should neither owe allegiance to their homeland nor live on equal footing with its other, non-Jewish citizens - when that is proposed we hear anti-Semitism being proposed. When it is proposed that the only solution for the Jewish problem is that Jews must alienate themselves from communities or nations of which they have been a historical part, when it is proposed that Jews solve the Jewish problem by immigrating to and settling the land of another people by terrorism and force, this is exactly the same attitude as that of the anti-Semites to the Jews.

Thus, for instance, we can understand the close connection between Rhodes, who promoted settler colonialism in Southeast Asia, and Herzl, who had colonialist designs upon Palestine. Having received a certificate of good settler conduct from Rhodes, Herzl then turned around and presented this certificate to the British government, hoping thus to secure a formal resolution supporting Zionist policy. In exchange, the Zionists promised Britain an imperialist base on Palestinian soil so that imperial interests could be safeguarded as the most important chief strategic point in the Middle East.

So the Zionist movement allied itself directly with world colonialism in a common raid on our land. Allow me now to present a selection of historical facts about this alliance.

The Jewish invasion of Palestine began in 1881. Before the first large wave of settlers started arriving, Palestine had a population of half a million, most of these Muslims or Christians, and about 10,000 Jews. Every sector of the population enjoyed the religious tolerance characteristics of our civilization.

Palestine was then a verdant land, inhabited by an Arab people in the course of building its life and enriching its indigenous culture.

Between 1882 and 1917 the Zionist movement settled approximately 50,000 European Jews in our homeland. To do that it resorted to trickery and deceit in order to plant them in our midst. Its success in getting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration demonstrated the alliance between Zionism and colonialism. Furthermore, by promising to the Zionist movement what was not hers to give. Britain showed how oppressive the rule of colonialism was. As it was then constituted, the League of Nations abandoned our Arab people, and Wilson's pledges and promises came to naught. In the guise of a mandate, British colonialism was cruelly and directly imposed upon us. The mandate document issued by the League of Nations was to enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland.

In thirty years the Zionist movement succeeded, in collaboration with its colonialist ally, in settling more European Jews on the land, thus usurping the properties of Palestinian Arabs.

By 1947 the number of Jews had reached 600,000; they owned less than 6 per cent of Palestinian Arab land. The figure should be compared with the [Arab] population of Palestine, which at that time was 1,250,000.

As a result of the collusion between the mandatory power and the Zionist movement and with the support of the United States, this General Assembly early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian homeland. This took place on November 30, 1947, in an atmosphere of questionable actions and strong pressure. The General Assembly partitioned what it had not right to divide - an indivisible homeland. When we rejected that decision, our position corresponded to that of the real mother who refused to permit Solomon to cut her child in two when the other women claimed the child as hers. Furthermore, even though the partition resolution granted the colonialists settlers 54 per cent of the land of Palestine, their dissatisfaction with the decision prompted them to wage a war of terror against the civilian Arab population. They occupied 81 per cent of the total area of Palestine, uprooting a million Arabs. Thus, they occupied 524 Arab towns and villages, of which they destroyed 385, completely obliterating them in the process. Having done so, they built their own settlements and colonies on the ruins of our farms and our groves. The roots of the Palestine question lie here. Its causes do not stem from any conflict between two religions or two nationalisms. Nor is it a border conflict between neighboring states. It is the cause of people deprived of its homeland, dispersed and uprooted, the majority of whom live in exile and in refugee camps.

With support from imperialist and colonialist powers, headed by the United States of America, this Zionist entity managed to get itself accepted as a United Nations member. It further succeeded in getting the Palestine question deleted from the Agenda of the United Nations and in deceiving world public opinion by presenting our cause as a problem of refugees in need either of charity from do-gooders, or settlement in a land not theirs.

Not satisfied with all this, the racist state, founded on the imperialist-colonialist concept, turned itself into a base imperialism and into an arsenal of weapons. This enabled it to assume its role of subjugating the Arab people and of committing aggression against them, in order to satisfy its ambitions of further expansion in Palestinian and other Arab lands. In addition to the many instances of aggression committed by this entity against the Arab States, it has launched two large-scale wars, in 1956 and 1967, thereby endangering world peace and security.

As a result of Zionist aggression in June 1967, the enemy occupied Egyptian Sinai as far as the Suez Canal. The enemy occupied Syria's Golan Heights, in addition to all Palestinian land west of the Jordan. All these developments have led to the creation in our area of what has come to be known as the "Middle East Problem". The situation has been rendered more serious by the enemy's persistence in maintaining its unlawful occupation and in further consolidating it, thus establishing a beachhead for world imperialism's thrust against our Arab nation. All Security Council decisions and calls by world public opinion for withdrawal from the lands occupied in June 1967 have been ignored. Despite all the peaceful and diplomatic efforts on the international level, the enemy has not been deterred from his expansionist policy. The only alternative open to our Arab nations, chiefly Syria and Egypt, was to expend exhaustive efforts to prepare, firstly, to resist this barbarous armed invasion by force and, secondly, to liberate Arab lands and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, after all other peaceful means had failed.

Under these circumstances, the fourth war broke out in October 1973, bringing home to the Zionist enemy the bankruptcy of its policy of occupation and expansion and its reliance on the concept of military might. Despite all this, the leaders of the Zionist entity are far from having learned any lesson from their experience. They are making preparations for the fifth war, resorting once more to the language of military superiority, aggression, terrorism, subjugation and, finally, always to war in their dealings with the Arabs.

It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth that is homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the settler entity caused no harm to any human being. No, such lies must be exposed from this rostrum, for the world must know that Palestine was the cradle of the most ancient cultures and civilizations. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building, spreading culture throughout the land for the thousands of years, setting an example in the practice of religious tolerance and freedom of worship, acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions. As a son of Jerusalem, I treasure for myself and my people beautiful memories and vivid images of the religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City before it succumbed to catastrophe. Our people continued to pursue this enlightened policy until the establishment of the State of Israel and their dispersion. This did not deter our people from pursuing their humanitarian role on Palestinian soil. Nor will they permit their land to become a launching pad for aggression or a racist camp for the destruction of civilization, culture, progress and peace. Our people cannot but maintain the heritage of their ancestors in resisting the invaders, in assuming the privileged task of defending their native land, their Arab nationhood, their culture and civilization, and in safeguarding the cradle of the monotheistic religions.

By contrast, we need only mention briefly some instances of Israel's racist attitudes: its support of the Secret Army Organization in Algeria, its bolstering of the settler-colonialists in Africa - whether in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Rhodesia or South Africa - and its backing of South Vietnam against the Vietnam revolution. One can also mention Israel's continuing support of imperialism everywhere, its obstructionist stand in the Committee of Twenty-four, its refusal to cast its vote in support of independence for the Africa states, and its opposition to the demands of many Asian, African and Latin American nations, and several other states in the conferences on raw materials, population, the law of the sea, and food. All these facts offer further proof of the character of the enemy who has usurped our land. They justify the honorable struggle which we are waging against it. As we defend a vision of the future, our enemy upholds the myths of the past.

The enemy we face has a long record of hostility even towards the Jews themselves, for there is within the Zionist entity ugly racial discrimination against Oriental Jews. While we were vociferously condemning the massacres of Jews under Nazi rule, Zionist leadership appeared more interested at that time in exploiting them as best it could in order to realize its goals of immigration into Palestine.

If the immigration of Jews to Palestine had had as its objective the goal of enabling them to live side by side with us, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, we would have opened our doors to them, as far as our homeland's capacity for absorption permitted. Such was the case with the thousands of Armenians and Circassians who still live among us in equality as brethren and citizens. But no one

can conceivably demand that we submit to or accept that the goal of this immigration should be to usurp our homeland, disperse our people, and turn us into second-class citizens. Therefore, since its inception, our revolution has not been motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target has never been the Jews, as a person, but racist Zionism and aggression. In this sense, ours is also a revolution for the Jews, as a human being. We are struggling so that Jews, Christians, and Muslims may live in equality, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, free from racial or religious discrimination.

- (a) We distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. While we maintain our opposition to the colonialist Zionist movement, we respect the Jewish faith. Today, almost one century after the rise of the Zionist movement, we wish to warn of its increasing danger to the Jews of the world, to our Arab peoples and to world peace and security. For Zionism encourages the Jews to emigrate from his homeland and grants him an artificially-made nationality. The Zionists proceed with their destructive activities even though these have proved ineffective. The phenomenon of constant emigration from Israel, which is bound to grow as the bastions of colonialism and racism in the world falls, is an example of the inevitability of the failure of such activities.
- (b) We urge the people and governments of the world to stand firm against Zionist attempts at encouraging world Jewry to emigrate from their countries and to usurp our land. We urge them as well firmly to oppose any discrimination against any human being, as to religion, race, or color.
- (c) Why should our people and our homeland be responsible for the problems of Jewish immigration, if such problems exist in the minds of some people? Why do the supporters of these problems not open their own countries, which are much bigger, to absorb and help these immigrants?
- (d) Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defense.

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from invaders, settler and colonialists would have been incorrectly called terrorist; the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists, the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism. It is actually a just and proper struggle of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, consecrated by the United Nations Charter and by the Declaration of Human Rights. As to those who fight against just causes, those who wage war to occupy the homelands of others, and to plunder exploit and colonize their peoples - those are the people whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the just cause determines the right to struggle.

Zionist terrorism which was waged against the Palestinian people to evict them from their country and usurp their land is on record in your documents. Thousands of our people have been assassinated in their villages and towns; tens of thousands of others have been forced by rifle and artillery fire to leave their homes and the crops they have sown in the lands of their fathers. Time and time again our children, women and aged have been evicted and have had to wander in the deserts and climb mountains without any food or water. No one who in 1948 witnessed the catastrophe that befell the inhabitants of hundreds of villages and towns - in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, and Galilee - no one who has been a witness to that catastrophe will ever forget the experience, even though the mass blackout has succeeded in hiding these horrors as it has hidden the traces of 385 Palestinian villages and towns destroyed at the time and erased from the map. The destruction of 19,000 houses during the past seven years, which is equivalent to the complete destruction of 200 more Palestinian villages, and the great number of maimed as a result of the treatment they were subjected to in Israeli prisons, cannot be hidden by any blackout.

Their terrorism fed on hatred and this hatred was even directed against the olive tree in my country, which they saw as a symbol of our spirit, a flag, and which reminded them of the indigenous inhabitants of the land, a living reminder that the land is Palestinian. Hence they uprooted or killed it by neglect, or used it for firewood. How can one describe the statement by Golda Meir in which she expressed her disquiet about "the Palestinian children born every day"? They see in the Palestinian child, in the Palestinian

tree, an enemy which should be exterminated. For tens of years Zionists have been harassing our people's cultural, political, social and artistic leaders, terrorizing popular folklore and have claimed it as theirs. Their terrorism even reached our sacred places in our beloved city of peace, Jerusalem. They have endeavored to deprive it of its Arab (Muslim and Christian) character by evicting its inhabitants and annexing it.

I need not dwell on the burning of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the theft of the treasures of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the disfiguring of so many aspects of its culture and civilization. Jerusalem, with its beauty, and atmosphere redolent of history, bears witness to successive generations of our people who have lived in it, leaving in every corner of it proof of our eternal presence, of our love for it, of our civilization, of our human values. It is therefore not surprising that under its skies the three religions were born and that under that sky these three religions have shone to enlighten mankind so that it might express the tribulations and hopes of humanity, and that it might mark out the road of the future with its hopes.

The small number of Palestinian Arabs whom the Zionists did not succeed in uprooting in 1948 are at present refugees in their own country. Israeli law treats them as second-class citizens - even as third-class citizens since Oriental Jews are second-class citizens - and they have been subject to all forms of racial discrimination and terror after the confiscation of their land and property. They have been victims of bloody massacres such as that of Kafr Qassim; they have been expelled from their villages and denied the rights to return, as in the case of the inhabitants of Iqrit and Kafr Bir'im. For 26 years, our population has been living under martial law and has been denied freedom of movement without prior permission from the Israeli military governor - this at a time when an Israeli law was promulgated granting citizenship to any Jew anywhere who wanted to emigrate to our homeland. Moreover, another Israeli law stipulated that Palestinians who were not present in their villages or towns at the time they were occupied are not entitled to Israeli citizenship.

The record of Israeli rulers is replete with acts of terror perpetrated on those of our people who remained under occupation in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The criminal bombardment of the Bahr al-Baqar School and the Abu Za'bal factory in Egypt are but two such unforgettable acts of terrorism. The destruction of the Libyan aircraft is another unforgettable act. The total destruction of the city of Qunietra is yet another tangible instance of systematic terrorism. If a record of Zionist terrorism in south Lebanon were to be compiled, and this terrorism is still continuing, the enormity of its acts would shock even the most hardened: piracy, bombardments, scorched earth, destruction of hundreds of homes, eviction of civilians and the kidnapping of Lebanese citizens. This clearly constitutes a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and is in preparation for the diversion of the Litani River waters.

Need one remind this Assembly of the numerous resolutions adopted by it condemning Israeli aggressions committed against Arab countries, Israeli violations of human rights and the articles of the Geneva Convention, as well as the resolutions pertaining to the annexation of the city of Jerusalem and its restoration to its former status?

The only description for these acts is that they are acts of barbarism and terrorism. And yet, the Zionist racists and colonialists have the temerity to describe the just struggle of our people as terror. Could there be a more flagrant distortion of truth than this? We ask those who usurped our land, who are committing murderous acts of terrorism against our people and are practicing racial discrimination more extensively than the racists of South Africa, we ask them to keep in mind the United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. Such is the inevitable fate of every racist country that adopts the law of the jungle, usurps the homeland of others and oppresses its people.

For the past 30 years, our people have had to struggle against British occupation and Zionist invasion, both of which had one intention, namely the usurpation of our land. Six major revolts and tens of popular uprisings were staged to foil these attempts, so that our homeland might remain ours. Over 30,000 martyrs, the equivalent in comparative terms of 6 million Americans, died in the process.

When the majority of the Palestinian people was uprooted from its homeland in 1948, the Palestinian struggle for self-determination continued in spite of efforts to destroy it. We tried every possible means to continue our political struggle to attain our national rights, but to no avail. Meanwhile we had to struggle for sheer existence. Even in exile we educated our children. This was all a part of trying to survive.

The Palestinian people have produced thousands of engineers, physicians, teachers and scientists who actively participated in the development of the Arab countries bordering on their usurped homeland. They have utilized their income to assist the young and aged amongst their people who could not leave the refugee camps. They have educated their younger brothers and sisters, have supported their parents and cared for their children. All along the Palestinian dreamt of return. Neither the Palestinian's allegiance to Palestine nor his determination to return waned; nothing could persuade him to relinquish his Palestinian identity or to forsake his homeland. The passage of time did not make him forget, as some hoped he would. When our people lost faith in the international community which persisted in ignoring its rights and when it became obvious that the Palestinians would not recoup one inch of Palestine through exclusively political means, our people had no choice but to resort to armed struggle. Into the struggle it poured its material and human resources and the flower of its youth. We bravely faced the most vicious acts of Israeli terrorism which were aimed at diverting our struggle and arresting it.

In the past ten years of our struggle, thousands of martyrs and twice as many wounded, maimed and imprisoned have been offered in sacrifice, all in an effort to resist the imminent threat of liquidation, to regain the right to self-determination and our right to return to our homeland. With the utmost dignity and the most admirable revolutionary spirit, our Palestinian people have not lost their spirit either in Israeli prisons and concentration camps or in the great prison of Israeli occupation. The people struggle for sheer existence and continue to strive to preserve the Arab character of their land. Thus they resist oppression, tyranny and terrorism in their grimmest forms.

It is through the armed revolution of our people that our political leadership and our national institutions finally crystallized and a national liberation movement, comprising all Palestinian factions, organizations and capabilities, materialized in the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Through our militant Palestine national liberation movement our people's struggle has matured and grown enough to accommodate political and social struggle in addition to armed struggle. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been a major factor in creating a new Palestinian individual, qualified to shape the future of our Palestine, not merely content with mobilizing the Palestinians for the challenges of the present.

The Palestine Liberation Organization can be proud of having a large number of cultural and educational activities, even while engaged in armed struggle, and at a time when it faced the increasingly vicious blows of Zionist terrorism. We have established institutes for scientific research, agricultural development and social welfare, as well as centres for the revival of our cultural heritage and the preservation of our folklore. Many Palestinian poets, artists and writers have enriched Arab culture in particular, and world culture generally. Their profoundly human works have won the admiration of all those familiar with them. In contrast to that, our enemy has been systematically destroying our culture and disseminating racist, colonialist ideologies; in short, everything that impedes progress, justice, democracy and peace.

The Palestine Liberation Organization has earned its legitimacy because of the sacrifice inherent in its pioneering role, and also because of its dedicated leadership of the struggle. It has also been granted this legitimacy by the Palestinian masses, which in harmony with it have chosen it to lead the struggle according to its directives. The Palestine Liberation Organization has also aimed its legitimacy by representing every faction, union or group as well as every Palestinian talent, either in the National Council or in people's institutions. This legitimacy was further strengthened by the support of the entire Arab nation which supports it, and further consecrated during the last Arab Summit Conference, which affirmed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, to establish an independent national authority on all liberated Palestinian territory.

Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization's legitimacy has been intensified as a result of fraternal support given by other liberation movements and by friendly, like-minded nations that stood by our side, encouraging and aiding us in our struggle to secure our national rights.

Here I must also warmly convey the gratitude of our revolutionary fighters and that of our people for the honorable attitudes adopted by the nonaligned countries, the socialist countries, the Islamic countries, the African countries and friendly European countries, as well as all our other friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Palestine Liberation Organization represents the Palestinian people. Because of this, the Palestine Liberation Organization expresses the wishes and hopes of its people. Because of this, too, it brings these very wishes and hopes before you, urging you not to shirk a momentous historic responsibility towards our just cause.

For many years now, our people have been exposed to the ravages of war, destruction and dispersion. They have paid with the blood of their sons which cannot ever be compensated. They have borne the burdens of occupation, dispersion, eviction and terror more than any other people. And yet all this has made our people neither vindictive nor vengeful. Nor have they caused us to resort to the racism of our enemies. Nor have we lost the true method by which friend and foe are distinguished.

For we deplore all those crimes committed against the Jews; we also deplore all the open and veiled discrimination suffered by them because of their faith.

I am a rebel and freedom is my cause, I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same position of resistance as I now occupy and from which I must fight. You once had to convert dreams into reality by your struggle. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dream into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine's sacred land.

As he stood in an Israeli military court, the Jewish revolutionary Ehud Adiv said: "I am no terrorist; I believe that a democratic state should exist in this land." Adiv now languishes in a Zionist prison among his co-believers. To him and his colleagues I send my heartfelt good wishes.

And before those same courts there stands today a brave prince of the church, Archbishop Capucci. Raising his fingers to form the same victory sign used by our freedom-fighters, he said: "What I have done, I have done that all men may live in peace in this land of peace." This princely priest will doubtless share Adiv's grim fate. To him we send our salutations and greetings.

Why therefore should I not dream and hope? For is not revolution the making real of dreams and hopes? So let us work together that my dream may be fulfilled, that I may return with my people out of exile, there in Palestine to live with this Jewish freedom-fighter and his partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers, in one democratic state where Christian, Jew and Muslim live in justice, equality, fraternity.

Is this not a noble goal and worthy of my struggle alongside all lovers of freedom everywhere? For the most admirable thing about this goal is that it is Palestinian, from the land of peace, the land of martyrdom, heroism, and history.

Let us remember that the Jews of Europe and here in the United States have been known to lead the struggles for secularism and the separation of church and state. They have also been known to fight against discrimination on religious grounds. How can they reject this humane and honorable program for the Holy Land, the land of peace and equality? How can they continue to support the most fanatic, discriminatory and closed of nations in its policy?

In my capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and commander of the Palestinian revolution I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews no living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

In my capacity as commander of the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization I call upon Jews to turn away one by one from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. They are offering Jews perpetual bloodshed, endless war and continuous thralldom.

We invite them to emerge into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's efforts to implant in them a Masada complex and make it their destiny. We offer them the most generous solution - that we should live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization I announce here that we do not wish one drop of either Jewish or Arab blood to be shed; neither do we delight in the continuation of killings for a single moment, once a just peace, based on our people's rights, hopes, and aspirations has been finally established.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and commander of the Palestinian revolution I appeal to you to accompany our people in its struggle to attain its right to self-determination. This right is consecrated in the United Nations Charter and has been repeatedly confirmed in resolutions adopted by this august body since the drafting of the Charter. I appeal to you, further, to aid our people's return to its homeland from an involuntary exile imposed upon it by force of arms, by tyranny, by oppression, so that we may regain our property, our land, and thereafter live in our national homeland, free and sovereign, enjoying all the privileges of nationhood.

I appeal to you to enable our people to set up their national authority and establish their national entity in their own land. Only then will our people be able to contribute all their energies and resources to the field of civilization and human creativity. Only then will they be able to protect their beloved Jerusalem and make it, as they have done for so many centuries, the shrine of all religions, free from all terrorism and coercion.

Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YIGAL ALLON,  
STATEMENT TO THE HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN ISRAEL REGARDING  
ARAFAT'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 14 NOVEMBER 1974**

The address by the leader of the Arab terrorist organizations, Yasser Arafat, at the General Assembly of the UN, is one more proof of what ought to have been clear to every State in the world long ago: that the real aim, indeed the one and only aim, of the Arab terrorist gangs, is the liquidation of the State of Israel. All the empty rhetoric and verbal posturing designed to create an impression of apparent moderation have not availed. The voice of Arafat was and remains the voice of indiscriminate terror, the crack of the gun, without any suggestion of the olive branch of peace. It is not by accident that the terrorist organizations have insisted stubbornly this year on forcing their view and their presence at the Rabat Summit and at the General Assembly of the UN. Their purpose was transparent: to

block every opportunity of political progress towards a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, at a moment when the first signs of such a possibility could perhaps be seen.

The day on which the leader of the terrorist organizations appeared upon the rostrum of the General Assembly was a dark day, a day of shame, for the UN. What he said is conclusive proof of the lamentable fact that the UN, which in its origin was meant to be a platform for peace, has become a platform for calls for battle and to wars of annihilation. A combination of enmity, hypocrisy, appeasement and surrender to blackmail has made it such.

Israel has declared again and again that the unprecedented decision to invite the terrorist organization known as the "PLO" to appear before the General Assembly would not bring about any moderation but merely feed its extremism. Indeed, Yasser Arafat's speech demonstrates that he and his accomplices saw in the decision of the General Assembly to invite them to appear before it, a success and an encouragement for terrorism and for aggressive extremism - and not the opposite. Whoever deludes himself into thinking that to provide a political platform, such as that of the General Assembly, would moderate the positions of the "PLO", must recognize his grave error. The decision of the General Assembly of 14 October 1974 strengthened extremism at Rabat, which in turn fed the extremism and hatred of Arafat's speech.

In exercise of its natural right to self-survival, Israel will neither recognize nor negotiate with terrorist organizations that seek its destruction. In exercise of its fundamental right of self-defence, it will fight these armed gangs to the bitter end by every means it sees fit.

In accordance with the Cabinet's decision of 21 July of this year, Israel is making, and will go on making, every effort to attain a just peace with all its neighbours - a peace that will give an answer to all issues in dispute, including an expression of the identity of the Palestinians.

Along with the maintenance of its capacity to defend itself and the welfare of its citizens, Israel will exhaust every prospect of settling the Arab-Israel conflict by diplomatic means, so as to advance peace and understanding with every Arab State that wishes it. Israel calls upon all States that want to further peace in the Middle East to draw the right conclusion from the invitation to the leader of the "PLO" and from his appearance at the General Assembly, and to oppose the Arab draft resolution lest it serve as a further encouragement to the extreme elements in the Arab world that are pushing the region into renewed warfare.

Excellencies, I will be grateful to you if you will convey this statement of mine urgently to your Governments, in its letter and spirit.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3236 ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,  
NEW YORK, 22 NOVEMBER 1974**

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the Question of Palestine,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

*Having also heard* other statements made during the debate,

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Expressing* its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,  
*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter,  
*Recalling* its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:
  - a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
  - b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;
2. *Reaffirms* also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;
3. *Emphasizes* that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the Question of Palestine;
4. *Recognizes* that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;
5. *Further recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
6. *Appeals* to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;
8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
9. *Decides* to include the item "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its 30<sup>th</sup> session.



### **UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3237 GRANTING OBSERVER STATUS TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, NEW YORK, 22 NOVEMBER 1974**

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the question of Palestine,

*Taking into consideration* the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

*Recalling* its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

*Taking into account* Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

*Noting* that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

*Noting also* that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
2. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
3. *Considers* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YIGAL ALLON,  
STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET REGARDING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
RESOLUTIONS 3236 AND 3237, JERUSALEM, 26 NOVEMBER 1974**

*[A Foreign Ministry statement of 23 Nov. 1974 "totally rejects these resolutions. It regards them as not valid, harmful and unworthy of consideration." In his Knesset statement three days later, FM Allon elaborated further.]*

The truth must be told: The fact that the UN General Assembly adopted its resolutions of last Friday did not come as a surprise for us. Not only did we foresee it, but we also predicted it, for example in my address to the Assembly on 3 October. Experience - and not only ours - has taught us that the UN is completely dominated by an arbitrary combination, an Arab-Soviet combination, which does whatever it desires in the Assembly, unrelated to - and sometimes in complete contravention of - the UN Charter, its aims and the spirit which stirred its founders after defeating the Nazi tyranny. The degeneration of the Assembly has reached such depths that any proposal, even the most absurd, can receive its blessing, if the combination of powers dominating it so desires. When the Arab-Soviet votes do not suffice, they are supplemented by the votes of those trying to curry favour with the Arabs and those yielding to oil-blackmail.

In the circumstances, no one can expect us to accord any weight whatsoever to these recommendations, which the Assembly accepted at the instigation of our enemies. No state in the world would behave differently if the Assembly were to adopt such resolutions against it. We totally reject and deplore the resolutions of the Assembly on the Palestinian question.

As regards public announcements and recommendations Israel did not, and does not hope for anything from the UN General Assembly in its present form. I would not say that the proceedings of the Assembly have no significance whatever. Its resolutions will have a certain political and propaganda value - a fact that will certainly be used to our detriment in other UN forums. However, that is as far as their value goes, and no further. The debates at the Assembly and its resolutions will not decide our behaviour or our fate, just as the resolution of the General Assembly of UNESCO will not decide the level of culture, education and scientific development in Israel. In the final analysis we alone shall determine both our actions and our future. It is our strength, resilience and policy, being correct and courageous, which will determine the outcome of the struggles ahead. They are at our command, and not at the command of our enemies at the UN headquarters in New York, and at UNESCO in Paris.

However, despite the Assembly's lack of real significance, we must sound a warning the uncontrolled callousness of the combination of powers which dominates the Assembly - a callousness which reached its peak in the resolutions of last Friday - is not a phenomenon which affects only Israel. This combination of powers, which is against us today, can very easily turn against any other state which tomorrow may fall out of favour for any reason. So long as the Assembly continues in its present form, so long as it is permitted to continue on its present course the result will not only be resolutions injurious to Israel. On the contrary: These resolutions are the beginning of a process which will turn the assembly into a forum for barbarity. The next candidates designated for similar treatment are the states of the democratic world, the civilized states of the free world. And the very fact that nations can already be intimidated, that their voting can be influenced by means of blackmail proves that this dangerous process has already commenced.

And indeed, there are already signs - to my regret, only initial signs as yet - that this realization has begun to penetrate the consciousness of not a few nations. The sense of outrage among hundreds of world-famous scientists and men of letters against the UNESCO resolutions, which are the antithesis of its cultural aims, is one such sign. The response of public opinion and of the information media in enlightened countries is another, and the cool reception given to the Assembly's resolutions of last Friday - much cooler than the Arab states expected - can also be seen as another sign in the same direction. I only hope that these will in fact herald a revolt against the barbarizing of international life and of international organization, and not prove to be just a momentary awakening.

In any event, the Israeli Foreign Service is engaged in a ramified diplomatic information campaign of unprecedented intensity, to encourage, strengthen and deepen this awareness. It will continue with this campaign with even greater force in the future.

I do not see any purpose in discussing the contents of the resolutions which were adopted by the Assembly on the Palestinian question four days ago. They are so distorted, extreme, and detached from reality that only delegations completely under the thumb of the Arab-Soviet combination could bring themselves to vote for them. Apart from the 74 states which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, only 15 others joined in supporting the more important of the two resolutions, and among them there were those who did so with distinct unwillingness. All the others - including all the enlightened states of the world - expressed their reservations vis-à-vis these resolutions, either by courageously and openly opposing, or more evasively by abstaining or absenting themselves. The Arab states obtained many less than the 120 votes which they so arrogantly expected on the eve of the vote. They scarcely received a single vote from states whose voice carries more than merely numerical significance, in fact, they received 16 votes less than the number received when the PLO was invited to take part in the Assembly's deliberations. The joint communiqué published by the two leaders of the superpowers at the end of the summit conference at Vladivostok shows the extent to which no practical importance should be attached to the Assembly's resolutions. The same Soviet Union, which at the Assembly supported the PLO position all along the line, deserted -or was forced to desert - the PLO in its joint communiqué with the United States. Not only is there no detrimental deviation from parallel communiqués published in the past, but this communiqué makes no reference at all to the PLO on the other hand, it makes explicit mention of Security Council Resolution 338, the resolution which the Arab states so ardently wished to circumvent in the debate which ended in the Assembly last Friday.

With the approval of the vast majority of the people of Israel, the government, as I have said, totally rejected the shameful resolutions which the UN Assembly accepted on the Palestinian question on 22 November. The government is united in its recognition that these resolutions are devoid of any moral basis and political justification, and that they are a denial of the very essence of the United Nations. No one can expect us to recognize the terrorist organization called the PLO as representing the Palestinians - because it does not. No one can expect us to negotiate with the heads of terror-gangs, who through their ideology and actions, endeavour to liquidate the State of Israel. The heads of the PLO will not be a party to the dialogue seeking through peaceful means a constructive expression for the identity of the Palestinian Arabs.

Fortunately for the Palestinians, their destiny is not in the hands of the leaders of the terrorist gangs, who have slaughtered more Palestinian Arabs than anyone else. As a result of international circumstances - concrete circumstances which reek of the smell of oil the PLO is at the moment at the height of its conceit and reaching the maximum of publicity. But, it was not, and is not, a national liberation movement-It was and remains the roof organization of terror and murder groups, which have learnt nothing, and forgotten nothing, which seek to gain control over the Palestinian masses and to foist on them the line which in the past inflicted disaster after disaster upon them. Just as the PLO's "success" is liable to surpass all previous disasters, so the eclipse of the terrorist organization would prepare the ground for a rational solution - a just and honourable solution for the deep desire of the Palestinian Arabs to find an expression for their identity. In the wide expanse between the Mediterranean and the desert - in the historical land of Israel - there is room alongside the State of Israel for an Arab state, of whatever name, which will give expression to that identity, not in place of the State of Israel - as the lunatic desire of the PLO would have it - but alongside the State of Israel, with borders which will be defined through negotiations. This is the only logical course open to the Palestinian masses - and on this course they will find a sincere partner in the State of Israel.

Despite the Assembly's resolutions - which are the result of obstinacy and intransigence, inviting the same reply -the prospects of a political settlement to the Arab-Israel dispute have not been closed completely, It is true that what happened at the last Arab summit at Rabat, and at the UN Assembly

before and after that summit, has harmed its prospects. Perhaps they have even been harmed severely but, for the time being at least, they have not been harmed disastrously. There is still point in allowing some prospect to the political moves. There is still room to continue with the sincere efforts to exhaust every possibility in the political dialogue to prevent war. At any event we must not give into despairing of peace, nor give way to desperate solutions. This is the aim of the terrorist organizations, which seek to propel the region into another war. There is no doubt that many formidable obstacles face us on the way to peace, but there is also no doubt that we are capable of overcoming them.

If, God forbid, we are fated to have another war, we shall carry it through in a manner which will surprise our neighbours. We do not want wars, and we do not seek further victories. We have done everything in our power to prevent wars, and to settle the differences between ourselves and our neighbours peacefully - and we shall continue to do so, but at the same time, we shall not yield to the blackmail of war or threats of war. Whoever wishes to draw parallels between our situation and that of Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich is making a grave error. We are not Czechoslovakia. We shall not act like Czechoslovakia, nor shall we allow fearful governments to try to appease our enemies at our expense. If any government attempts this course, its own people will rebel.

Without surrendering any of our rights and vital interests to the slightest degree, we have no option but to continue to seek, and examine every possible way of progressing towards understanding and peace in this area.

The policy of the government of Israel thus far has been marked by a double emblem: The emblem of preparedness in the face of any military adventures on the part of our neighbours, and the emblem symbolising the wish to exhaust every possible way to peace. The policy of the government of Israel will continue to bear this double banner.



**WHITE HOUSE, STATEMENT ON THE MEETING BETWEEN US PRESIDENT FORD AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON, WASHINGTON, DC, 9 DECEMBER 1974**

*[FM Allon was in Washington to discuss next moves in the Middle East following the Rabat Conference, Arafat's appearance in the UNGA, and recent UNGA resolutions. Both sides agreed to make efforts towards another Israel-Egypt agreement.]*

President Ford and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon met in the Oval Office for one hour and fifteen minutes. Secretary of State Kissinger, Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Lt.-General Brent Scowcroft were present on the American side, and Ambassador Simcha Dinitz and Mordechai Shalev, Minister at, the Embassy of Israel on the Israeli side.

The occasion gave President Ford and Minister Allon an opportunity to get better acquainted. The meeting was conducted with the cordiality and friendship usual when Americans and Israelis meet. The President and the Deputy Prime Minister had a full exchange of views of the situation in the Middle East.

The President stressed the importance of moving ahead on further steps in the negotiations towards a genuine peace settlement. He was assured by Minister Allon that the Israeli Government shares this views. The meeting provided the chance for both sides to review possible approaches in this next stage of negotiations. As is normal on these occasions, the two sides also reviewed a number of bilateral matters. Both expressed satisfaction at the excellent state of relations between the United States and Israel.



**LETTER TO US PRESIDENT HENRY FORD BY 71 SENATORS REGARDING RECENT  
UN ACTIONS ON THE PLO, WASHINGTON, DC, 9 DECEMBER 1974**

*[The senators, comprising almost 75% of the Senate members, expressed concern over UN actions on the PLO, calling them a "direct threat to American foreign policy." ]*

Dear Mr. President:

In writing to you about recent developments in the Middle East, we wish to reaffirm the commitment to the survival and integrity of the state of Israel that has been the bipartisan basis of American policy over 26 years and under five administrations.

We believe that the prominence of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Rabat Conference and at the United Nations General Assembly poses a direct threat to American Foreign policy which must be met vigorously and promptly. Mr. Arafat's own statements from the rostrum of the United Nations strip away any illusions about the values and mentality which dominate the PLO. His espousal of terrorism and his repeated calls for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish homeland must be resolutely opposed by the United States in order to make progress toward a genuine peace in the Middle East.

We are deeply disturbed by the United Nations vote to give recognition to the PLO and by the spectacle of Western cynicism, apathy and disunity. The action of the General Assembly to limit Israel's right to reply is a serious departure from the original principles of the United Nations. Moreover, the decision by UNESCO to withhold assistance to Israel is a shameful example of the transformation of that international humanitarian organization into a political weapon.

These recent events dramatize the need for the United States to take the lead in organizing our friends and allies to resist political and economic blackmail in the future. We do not believe that a policy of appeasement will be any more successful now than it proved to be in Europe in the 1930's because we confront an appetite which grows on what it is fed.

We therefore urge you to initiate a comprehensive and coordinated diplomatic response that will unite our friends and allies in meeting these new challenges to peace in the Middle East.

We urge that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commitment to Israel's security by a policy of continued military supplies and diplomatic and economic support. In doing so, you will be acting in the best interests of the United States and with the support of the Congress and the American people.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3336 (XXIX) ON SOVEREIGNTY OVER  
NATIONAL RESOURCES IN OCCUPIED ARAB AREAS, NEW YORK, 17 DECEMBER 1974**

The General Assembly,

*Bearing in mind* the relevant principles of international law and the provisions of the international conventions and regulations, especially the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the occupying Power,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, particularly their provisions supporting resolutely the efforts of developing countries and the peoples of the territories under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation in their struggle to regain effective control over their natural resources,

*Recalling* the pertinent provisions of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, and its Resolution 3176 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 on the first biennial over-all review and appraisal of progress in the implementation of the Strategy,

*Recalling* also its Resolution 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, in which it affirmed the principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over its national wealth and resources and called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize or co-operate with, or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by the occupying Power to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character of institutional structure of these territories,

*Bearing in mind* the pertinent provisions of its Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and its Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,

*Recalling further* its Resolution 3175 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", and deploring that Israel has not complied with the provisions, in particular those contained in paragraph 2.

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab States and people whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty over all their resources and wealth;
2. *Also reaffirms* that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources and wealth of the occupied Arab territories are illegal, and calls upon Israel immediately to rescind all such measures;
3. *Further reaffirms* the right of the Arab states, territories and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion and loss of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources and wealth of those States, territories and peoples;
4. *Declares* that the above principles apply to all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, colonial rule, alien domination and apartheid, or subjected to foreign aggression;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples, resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.



#### **PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON SAID HAMMAMI, VIEWS ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION, LONDON, 20 MARCH 1975**

*[Hammami expressed the following views during a 3-day seminar at the National-Liberal Club].*

- The end of the state of belligerency if the PLO became a partner in the negotiating process.
- The establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas that would be returned by Israel as a result of a peace settlement.
- Open borders between the state of Israel and the Palestinian state, in order to "encourage" mutual cultural and economic activities.
- The granting of the right of Israeli Jews to live in Palestine, in exchange for the right of an equivalent number of Palestinian Arabs to return to Israel.
- Security guarantees for the Palestinian state and for the state of Israel.
- The withdrawal of Israel to the borders of June 4, 1967, as a part of the peace settlement.
- The opening of a dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli seekers of peace, in which both sides would freely express their opinions.
- The aspiration for the reunion of the country, based upon the agreement of both nations, eventually, "perhaps not during our lifetime," in the form of a federation, or any other form.



**ISRAELI CABINET, STATEMENT ON PEACE AGREEMENTS WITH THE ARAB STATES, JERUSALEM, 8 JUNE 1975**

*[The cabinet adopted the following resolution on the eve of PM Rabin's departure for Washington.]*

- A. The government of Israel seeks to reach peace agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states. The government will cooperate in any political negotiations designed to further this aim, be it within the framework of the Geneva Conference or outside it, be it through peace treaties or by means of an interim settlement with Egypt which will pave the way towards peace.
- B. At this juncture, in view of the position of the Arab states with regard to an overall peace, the government of Israel considers progress towards peace by means of an interim settlement with Egypt, through the good offices of the United States, to be a feasible possibility.
- C. The decision of the government of Israel not to accept the conditions put forward by Egypt at the time of the negotiations in March of this year, remains in force. Consonant with changes that may occur in the Egyptian position, the government of Israel will be prepared to review its own position.
- D. In the course of the discussions with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and representatives of the U.S. administration, Israel will strive to achieve understanding and accord with regard to further stages of the political process towards the attainment of peace, which may be undertaken after an interim agreement with Egypt is reached.
- E. Israel desires to enter negotiations with each of her neighbours on peace within defensible borders. In his discussions with the President of the United States, in presenting Israel's position regarding peace and all its attendant components, as well as regarding the interim settlement with Egypt, the Prime Minister will be guided by the basic policy programme, as well as by the decisions of the government and its statements approved by the Knesset. In the course of negotiations regarding peace treaties, the government will adopt, within the ambit of its authority, detailed decisions regarding each one of the neighbouring states.
- F. The government authorises the Prime Minister to discuss with the President of the United States subjects relevant to the attainment of peace and bilateral relations between Israel and the United States. The government hopes that the discussions will prove fruitful, in the spirit of the existing friendship between the United States and Israel.



**INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR CONFERENCE, RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN WOMEN, MEXICO CITY, 27 JUNE 1975**

*[The conference adopted 35 resolutions as well as a declaration on the equality of women, which included the following paragraph: "international cooperation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, racial discrimination in all forms as well as the recognition of peoples and their right to self determination." Similar language was used in the following resolution on Palestinian Women, which was adopted by a vote of 66:3 (Israel, Holland, US), with 35 abstentions.]*

The World Conference of International Women's Year,

*Mindful of the objectives and goals of International Women's Year,*

*Reaffirming the fundamental principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, in particular the maintenance of international peace and world security, the development of friendly relations among nations,*

*Deeply concerned* about the prevailing conditions - political, social, demographic and economic - of the Palestinian people and in particular, the conditions under which the Palestinian woman lives, and recognizing the close relationship between such conditions and the question of Palestine,

*Reaffirming* the futility of speaking about equality of human beings at a time when millions of human beings are suffering under the yoke of colonialism,

*Considering* that international co-operation and peace requires national independence and liberation, the elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism, fascism, Zionism, apartheid and foreign occupation, alien domination and racial discrimination in all its forms and also the respect of human rights,

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East continue to endanger international peace and world security,

*Expressing* its grave concern that the Palestinian woman and people have been prevented from enjoying their inalienable rights, and in particular their right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, the right to self determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty,

*Recognizing* that mass uprooting from the homeland obstructs the participation and integration of woman in the efforts of progress,

*Affirming* the right of the Palestinian woman to develop a strong and more effective impetus to peace and the development of friendly relations among nations,

*Recalling* General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 adopting the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

*Recalling* the final resolutions and declarations of the regional seminars held in Mogadishu, Kinshasa and Caracas,

*Appeals* to all women of the world to proclaim, their solidarity and support to the Palestinian women and people in their drive to put an end to flagrant violations of fundamental human rights committed by Israel in the occupied territories,

*Appeals* to all women in the world to take the necessary measures to secure the release of thousands of persons, fighters for the cause of self-determination, liberation and independence, held arbitrarily in the prisons of the forces of occupation,

*Appeals* to all States and international organizations to extend assistance - moral and material - to the Palestinian and Arab woman and people in their struggle against Zionism, foreign occupation and alien domination, foreign aggression, and help them restore their inalienable rights in Palestine, and in particular the right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, the right to self determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

*Requests* the United Nations Organization, its organs and specialized agencies as well as all national, regional and international women's organizations to extend their help moral and material - to the Palestinian woman and its organization and institutes.



**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, RESOLUTIONS AHG/RES. 76-77 (XII), 12<sup>TH</sup> ORDINARY SESSION, KAMPALA, 28 JULY-1 AUGUST 1975 [EXCERPTS]**

[...]

**RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES**

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session from 28 July to 1st August 1975 in Kampala, Having heard the statements delivered during the Session of the Council of Ministers by the representatives of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the PLO and other delegations,

*Having received* the report of the OAU Administrative Secretary-General (CM/660 and 660 Add. I (XXV),

Recalling resolution AHG/res. 67 (IX), AHG/Res. 70 (X), CM/Res. 332 (XXIII), as well as the resolution CM/Res. 393 (XXIV), and the declaration concerning Palestine and the Middle East, CM/ST.14 (XXIV),

*Guided by* the principles and objectives of the Charter of the OAU and the UN and by the common destiny of the Arab and African peoples, as well as their continuous struggle, for their rights, freedom, peace and independence.

*Noting with deep concern* the constant deterioration of the situation in the Middle East as a result of Israel's persistent policy of aggression and refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions together with its continued aggression on the Arab people within and outside the occupied Arab territories, and its continuous obstruction of every effort to achieve a just and durable peace, with the aim of gaining time and imposing a fait-accompli to establish aggression and occupation,

*Reaffirming* that just and permanent peace in Palestine and the Middle East can only be attained on the basis of complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the exercise by the Palestinians of their full national rights to sovereignty, national independence and self-determination,

*Asserting* that continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands by force and violation of the national rights of Palestinian people are, in themselves, a continued aggression and a serious threat to the security, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Arab countries and peoples,

*Deeply concerned* by the invalidity and illegitimacy of the measures taken by Israel to alter the human geographical and cultural features in the occupied Arab territories with the aim of Judaization of Jerusalem and other parts of occupied Arab territories,

*Convinced* that owing to Israel's continued violation of the principles of the UN Charter and its continued aggression against Arab countries and the Palestinian people, it is time to apply the sanctions stipulated by the Charter of the UN against Israel,

*Further convinced* of the necessity for the OAU to adopt adequate and practical measures to confront the Zionist enemy's continued aggression and violation:

1. *Reaffirms* its total and effective support for the frontline states and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore all the occupied territories and usurped rights by every possible means;
2. *Condemns* Israel's policy of aggression, expansion, and annexation of Arab territories by force, and its attempts to alter their demographic, geographic, economic and cultural features;
3. *Condemns* Israel's continued refusal to abide by the resolution of the United Nations and its deliberation, obstruction, by all means of maneuvering, of every effort exerted to establish a just and permanent peace in the area;
4. *Further condemns* the persistent policy of repression pursued by Israeli occupation authorities against Arab inhabitants in the occupied Arab territories, as well as its persistent violation of their human rights, and its violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention, in particular the fourth, concerning the protection of civilian inhabitants, and its barbaric attacks and raids of refugee camps and bombardment of civilians targets in the towns and villages of Southern Lebanon in violation of all principles of international and human laws;
5. *Strongly condemns* the attitude of the States supplying Israel with assistance, arms and means of killing and destruction, and holds that the real purpose underlying the flooding of Israel with such enormous quantities of weaponry is to establish it as an advanced case of racism and colonialism in the heart of the Arab and African World and the Third World and further considering that any aid or support to Israel is actually an encouragement and a participation in the consolidation of Israeli occupation and persistent aggression;
6. *Reaffirms* once more its resolution CM/Res. 20 of the Eighth Extra-Ordinary Session;
7. *Invites* all African States to extend all possible potentialities available in the African World to the Arab confrontation powers so as to reinforce their struggle against the Zionist aggression;
8. *Calls upon* all OAU Member States to take the most appropriate measures to intensify pressures exercised against Israel at the UN and other Institutions, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its status as member of these Institutions.

9. *Considers* Zionism a danger to world peace, and decides to organize an information campaign in which all African information media participate to unmask the racist aggressive nature of the Zionist entity in a continuous and planned manner, and to confront and refute all Zionist misleading propaganda campaign aimed at arousing hostility against both the Arab and African Worlds;
10. *Request* the OAU Administrative Secretary-General to closely follow up developments in the Middle East and to report thereon to the 26th Session of the Council of Ministers and decides to keep the situation in the Middle East as one of the agenda of the next Session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

Reservation: Sierra-Leone, Senegal, Liberia

Opposition: Zaire.

### RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Twelfth Ordinary Session from 28 July to 1st August 1975 in Kampala,

*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers at its Twenty Fourth Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa from February 13 – 21 1975,

*Guided by* the principles and provisions of the Charter of the OAU and the UN, and noting with appreciation the heroic sacrifices of the Palestine people in the face of the Zionist aggression for the liberation of Palestine,

*Having studied* the developments of the Palestine cause and the grave situation arising from the continued occupation by Israel of Arab territories, its usurpation of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people, its refusal to abide by the United Nations resolutions in this respect, particularly United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 3236 adopted at its 29th Session, its denial of the national rights of the Palestine people in Palestine, including their return to their homeland, their right to recover their property and to self-determination without any foreign intervention, and having likewise condemned the continued Israeli usurpation of Palestine and the dispersal of its people,

*Considering* that this situation constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolutions as well as of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that its continuation represents a grave threat to international peace and security, Considering that the Palestinian question is the root cause of the struggle against the Zionist enemy,

*Reasserting* the legality of the struggle of the Palestine people for the restoration of their full national rights,

*Considering* that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being,

*Expressing* its conviction that the military, economic, political and moral support of Israel by a member of states, notably the U.S., enables it to persist in its policy of aggression and to further reinforce its usurpation of Palestine and its occupation of Arab territories,

*Considering* that maintaining relations with Israel in the political, economic, trade, communication and other domains assists it to reinforce its usurpation of Palestine and to persist in its expansionist policy of aggression,

*Considering* that the continuation of the membership of Israel in the United Nations contradicts the principles and Charter of the United Nations and encourages Israel to ignore UN resolutions and to collude with various racist, expansionist and aggressive regimes,

#### 1. *Decides:*

- a) to provide full and effective support to the Palestine people in their legitimate struggle to restore their national rights, including:
  - Their right to return to their homeland, Palestine, and to recover their property,
  - Their right to self-determination without any foreign intervention,
  - Their right to sovereignty over their territory,
  - Their right to establish their independent national authority.

- b) To work in all domains to concretise recognition of these rights and ensure respect for them, The Member States of the OAU also undertake to adopt all appropriate measures towards that end;
- c) that the OAU Liberation Committee and the Palestine Liberation Organization should jointly lay down a strategy aiming at liberating Palestine, considering that the cause of Palestine is an African cause;
2. *Calls* upon all Member States to support the people of Palestine by every means in its Struggle against Zionist racist colonialism to restore their full national rights. Member States, moreover, assert that restitution of their rights is an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
  3. *Calls* upon the United Nations to work for the application of Resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly at its 29th Session;
  4. *Reasserts* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legal representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle;
  5. *Requests* Member States to implement the pertinent resolutions of previous OAU Summits and Foreign Ministers Conferences on the Palestinian Cause as soon as possible;
  6. *Reiterates* that it is desirable, in order to ensure the success of the PLO in its struggle to concretize the future of the Palestinian People's State, to provide it with all facilities and opportunities to intensify its contact with the governments of Member States;
  7. *Condemns* Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories and its refusal to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians in times of war, its policy of Judaizing the physical and cultural aspects of the occupied territories and considers that such acts and behavior are war crimes and a challenge to mankind at large;
  8. *Considers* that all the measures adopted by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and designed to alter their demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic aspects - including those aiming at Judaizing the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and that under no circumstances can these measures or their consequences be recognized;
  9. *Condemns* all States that provide military, economic and human support to Israel, and calls upon them to desist from doing so forthwith;
  10. *Calls upon* all countries that have not yet done so, to sever political, cultural and economic relations with Israel;
  11. *Calls upon* all OAU Member States to take all appropriate measures to intensify pressure against Israel at the United Nations and the other Agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its status as a Member of these Agencies;
  12. *Decides* to inscribe the item of the "Question of Palestine" on the Agenda of the 26th Session of the Council;
  13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the developments of the question of the question of Palestine to the next Session.

Reservations: Ghana - Sierra-Leone - Senegal - Liberia

Against: Zaire [...]



**INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, JERUSALEM AND ALEXANDRIA, 1 SEPTEMBER 1975**

*[The agreement - officially signed in Geneva on 4 Sept. - provided for a limited forces zone, a UN supervised buffer zone, electronic surveillance stations and an early warning system.]*

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

Article I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the parties on 18 January 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

#### Article II

The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

#### Article III

The parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other. The parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

#### Article IV

- A. The military forces of the parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:
- (1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as lines J and M on the attached map.
  - (2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as line E on the attached map.
  - (3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.
  - (4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.
  - (5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and J will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18 January 1974.
  - (6) In the area south from line E and west from line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex.
- B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

#### Article V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

#### Article VI

The parties hereby establish a joint commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the chief co-ordinator of the United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The joint commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

#### Article VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

#### Article VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

#### Article IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

## ANNEX TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two parties shall meet in the military working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The working group will complete the Protocol within two weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and other elements of the Agreement, the two parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the working group.

### 1. DEFINITIONS OF LINES AND AREAS

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000 - United States edition).

### 2. BUFFER ZONES

- (A) Access to the buffer zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the working group and the United Nations Emergency Force.
- (B) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.
- (C) In the buffer zone, between lines E and J, there will be established under article IV of the Agreement an early warning system entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.
- (D) Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for transit to and from the early warning system; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

### 3. AREA SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE M

- (A) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.
- (B) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work and live in the above indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such number and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.
- (C) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at either points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.
- (D) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the working group.
- (E) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.
- (F) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the Protocol.

### 4. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East.

#### 5. LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

- (A) Within the areas of, limited forces and armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:
- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
  - (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.
  - (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e. with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
  - (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
  - (5) Both parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
  - (6) Both parties agree that in the areas between line A (of the disengagement agreement of 18 January 1974) and line E they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.
- (B) The major limitations beyond the areas of limited forces and armament will be:
- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
  - (2) The parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of line K and west of line F, respectively.
- (C) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

#### 6. PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, annex and Protocol shall be determined by the working group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the military working group. Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within five months after signature of the Protocol.

### PROPOSAL

In connexion with the early warning system referred to in article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement (hereafter referred to as the basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The early warning system to be established in accordance with article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the basic agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:
  - A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
  - B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connexion with the operation and maintenance of these stations.
  - A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 A. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of

visual and electronic surveillance to the parties to the basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

- B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 B. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the parties to the basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.
- C. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this proposal.
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.
  4. The United States personnel serving the early warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.
  5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of 13 February 1957.
  6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of 13 February 1957.
  7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the basic Agreement.
  8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the parties to the basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both parties to the basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.
  9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State



#### ISRAEL-UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, 1 SEPTEMBER 1975

*[The same day Israel and Egypt signed the Interim Agreement (see previous document) three other, related documents were signed: one dealing with US aid to Israel, one with arms, and one with the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. In addition, there was a set of US assurances to Egypt. These were not published officially but were revealed by the New York Times and the Washington Post.]*

#### MEMORANDUM

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on Sept. 1, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That agreement has full United States support.

1. The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an ongoing and long-term basis, to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in fiscal year '76 and later fiscal years.
2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the U.S. and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate U.S.-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within three weeks. In conducting this study,

which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government, of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one year's notice.
  - (a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.
  - (b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport. Israeli and U.S. experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.
4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs and as part of the over-all annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:
  - (a) In determining the over-all annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).
  - (b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks, now standing at approximately six months, up to one year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.
5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertaking under the January 1974, disengagement agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli Ports through the Suez Canal.
6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.
7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.
8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgement affects or alters adversely the agreement.
9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interest of Israel.
10. In view of the long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support diplomatic or otherwise, of assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.
12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the agreement as standing on its own.
13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an over-all peace settlement.
14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.
15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel agreement and the United States before this agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.
16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the protocol of the Egypt-Israel agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the U.S. role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the agreement and its annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

#### ADDENDUM ON ARMS

On the question of military and economic assistance to Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments what the memorandum of agreement states.

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

#### ASSURANCES TO EGYPT

1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to help bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance through diplomatic channels.
2. In the event of an Israeli violation of the agreement, the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian early-warning station.

#### ACCORD ON GENEVA

1. The Geneva peace conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.
2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

3. The-United States will make every effort to insure at the conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.
4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.
5. The United States will seek to insure that the role of the co-sponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the memorandum of understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of Dec. 20, 1973.
6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3375 (XXX) INVITING THE PLO  
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,  
NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 1975**

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the item entitled "Question of Palestine",

*Reaffirming* its Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, in which it recognized the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

*Recognizing* the necessity of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East at the earliest possible time,

*Believing* that the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is a prerequisite to achieving a just and lasting peace in the area,

*Convinced* that the participation of the Palestinian people is essential in any efforts and deliberations aiming at the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. Requests the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX);
2. Calls for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of Resolution 3236 (XXIX);
3. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the present resolution and to take all necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the work of the Conference as well as in all other efforts for peace;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on this matter to the General Assembly as soon as possible.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3376 (XXX) ON THE QUESTION OF  
PALESTINE, NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 1975**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of that resolution,

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved,

*Recognizing* that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

1. *Reaffirms* its Resolution 3236 (XXIX);
2. *Expresses* its grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards:
  - (a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty;
  - (b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted;
3. *Decides* to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People composed of twenty Member States to be appointed by the General Assembly at the current session;
4. *Requests* the Committee to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme of implementation, designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX), and to take into account, in the formulation of its recommendations for the implementation of that programme, all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations;
5. *Authorizes* the Committee, in the fulfilment of its mandate, to establish contact with, and to receive and consider suggestions and proposals from, any State and intergovernmental regional Organization and the Palestine Liberation Organization;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks;
7. *Requests* the Committee to submit its report and recommendations to the Secretary-General no later than 1 June 1976 and requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Security Council;
8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 3236 (XXIX);
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Committee of the action taken by the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 8 above;
10. *Authorizes* the Committee, taking into consideration the action taken by the Security Council, to submit to the General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, a report containing its observations and recommendations;
11. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3379 CALLING ZIONISM  
A FORM OF RACISM, NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 1975**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolution 1904(XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures,"

*Recalling* also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, *inter alia*, the unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism.

*Taking note* of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their rights to self-determination,"

*Taking note also* of resolution 77(XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28

July to 1 August 1975, which considered “that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being.”

*Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology.*

*Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.*



**ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, CHAIM HERZOG,  
ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 10 NOVEMBER 1975**

Mr. President,

It is symbolic that this debate, which may well prove to be a turning point in the fortunes of the United Nations and a decisive factor in the possible continued existence of this organization, should take place on November 10. Tonight, thirty-seven years ago, has gone down in history as Kristallnacht, the Night of the Crystals. This was the night in 1938 when Hitler's Nazi storm-troopers launched a coordinated attack on the Jewish community in Germany, burned the synagogues in all its cities and made bonfires in the streets of the Holy Books and the Scrolls of the Holy Law and Bible. It was the night when Jewish homes were attacked and heads of families taken away, many of them never to return. It was the night when the windows of all Jewish businesses and stores were smashed, covering the streets in the cities of Germany with a film of broken glass which dissolved into the millions of crystals which gave that night its name. It was the night which led eventually to the crematoria and the gas chambers, Auschwitz, Birkenau, Dachau, Buchenwald, Theresienstadt and others. It was the night which led to the most terrifying holocaust in the history of man.

It is indeed befitting Mr. President, that this debate, conceived in the desire to deflect the Middle East from its moves towards peace and born of a deep pervading feeling of anti-Semitism, should take place on the anniversary of this day. It is indeed befitting, Mr. President, that the United Nations, which began its life as an anti-Nazi alliance, should thirty years later find itself on its way to becoming the world center of anti-Semitism. Hitler would have felt at home on a number of occasions during the past year, listening to the proceedings in this forum, and above all to the proceedings during the debate on Zionism.

It is sobering to consider to what level this body has been dragged down if we are obliged today to contemplate an attack on Zionism. For this attack constitutes not only an anti-Israeli attack of the foulest type, but also an assault in the United Nations on Judaism - one of the oldest established religions in the world, a religion which has given the world the human values of the Bible, and from which two other great religions, Christianity and Islam, sprang. Is it not tragic to consider that we here at this meeting in the year 1975 are contemplating what is a scurrilous attack on a great and established religion which has given to the world the Bible with its Ten Commandments, the great prophets of old, Moses, Isaiah, Amos; the great thinkers of history, Maimonides, Spinoza, Marx, Einstein, many of the masters of the arts and as high a percentage of the Nobel Prize-winners in the world, in the sciences, in the arts and in the humanities as has been achieved by any people on earth? ...

The resolution against Zionism was originally one condemning racism and colonialism, a subject on which we could have achieved consensus, a consensus which is of great importance to all of us and to our African colleagues in particular. However, instead of permitting this to happen, a group of countries, drunk with the feeling of power inherent in the automatic majority and without regard to the

importance of achieving a consensus on this issue, railroaded the UN in a contemptuous maneuver by the use of the automatic majority into bracketing Zionism with the subject under discussion.

I do not come to this rostrum to defend the moral and historical values of the Jewish people. They do not need to be defended. They speak for themselves. They have given to mankind much of what is great and eternal. They have done for the spirit of man more than can readily be appreciated by a forum such as this one.

I come here to denounce the two great evils which menace society in general and a society of nations in particular. These two evils are hatred and ignorance. These two evils are the motivating force behind the proponents of this resolution and their supporters. These two evils characterize those who would drag this world organization, the ideals of which were first conceived by the prophets of Israel, to the depths to which it has been dragged today.

The key to understanding Zionism is in its name. The easternmost of the two hills of ancient Jerusalem during the tenth century BCE was called Zion. In fact, the name Zion, referring to Jerusalem, appears 152 times in the Old Testament. The name is overwhelmingly a poetic and prophetic designation. The religious and emotional qualities of the name arise from the importance of Jerusalem as the Royal City and the City of the Temple. "Mount Zion" is the place where God dwells. Jerusalem, or Zion, is a place where the Lord is King, and where He has installed His king, David.

King David made Jerusalem the capital of Israel almost three thousand years ago, and Jerusalem has remained the capital ever since. During the centuries the term "Zion" grew and expanded to mean the whole of Israel. The Israelites in exile could not forget Zion. The Hebrew Psalmist sat by the waters of Babylon and swore: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." This oath has been repeated for thousands of years by Jews throughout the world. It is an oath which was made over 700 years before the advent of Christianity and over twelve hundred years before the advent of Islam, and Zion came to mean the Jewish homeland, symbolic of Judaism, of Jewish national aspirations.

While praying to his God every Jew, wherever he is in the world, faces towards Jerusalem. For over two thousand years of exile these prayers have expressed the yearning of the Jewish people to return to their ancient homeland, Israel. In fact, a continuous Jewish presence, in larger or smaller numbers, has been maintained in the country over the centuries.

Zionism is the name of the national movement of the Jewish people and is the modern expression of the ancient Jewish heritage. The Zionist ideal, as set out in the Bible, has been, and is, an integral part of the Jewish religion. Zionism is to the Jewish people what the liberation movements of Africa and Asia have been to their own people. Zionism is one of the most dynamic and vibrant national movements in human history. Historically it is based on a unique and unbroken connection, extending some four thousand years, between the People of the Book and the Land of the Bible.

In modern times, in the late nineteenth century, spurred by the twin forces of anti-Semitic persecution and of nationalism, the Jewish people organized the Zionist movement in order to transform their dream into reality. Zionism as a political movement was the revolt of an oppressed nation against the depredation and wicked discrimination and oppression of the countries in which anti-Semitism flourished. It is no coincidence that the co-sponsors and supporters of this resolution include countries who are guilty of the horrible crimes of anti-Semitism and discrimination to this very day.

Support for the aim of Zionism was written into the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and was again endorsed by the United Nations in 1947, when the General Assembly voted by overwhelming majority for the restoration of Jewish independence in our ancient land.

The re-establishment of Jewish independence in Israel, after centuries of struggle to overcome foreign conquest and exile, is a vindication of the fundamental concepts of the equality of nations and of self-

determination. To question the Jewish people's right to national existence and freedom is not only to deny to the Jewish people the right accorded to every other people on this globe, but it is also to deny the central precepts of the United Nations.

As a former Foreign Minister of Israel, Abba Eban, has written: "Zionism is nothing more - but also nothing less - than the Jewish people's sense of origin and destination in the land linked eternally with its name. It is also the instrument whereby the Jewish nation seeks an authentic fulfillment of itself. And the drama is enacted in twenty states comprising a hundred million people in 4 1/2 million sq. miles, with vast resources. The issue therefore is not whether the world will come to terms with Arab nationalism. The question is at what point Arab nationalism, with its prodigious glut of advantage, wealth and opportunity, will come to terms with the modest but equal rights of another Middle Eastern nation to pursue its life in security and peace."

The vicious diatribes on Zionism voiced here by Arab delegates may give this Assembly the wrong impression that while the rest of the world supported the Jewish national liberation movement the Arab world was always hostile to Zionism. This is not the case. Arab leaders, cognizant of the rights of the Jewish people, fully endorsed the virtues of Zionism. Sherif Hussein, the leader of the Arab world during World War I, welcomed the return of the Jews to Palestine. His son, Amir Faisal, who represented the Arab world in the Paris Peace Conference, had this to say about Zionism: "We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement.... We will wish the Jews a hearty welcome home.... We are working together for a reformed and revised Near East, and our two movements complement one another. The movement is national and not imperialistic. There is room in Syria for us both. Indeed, I think that neither can be a success without the other."

It is perhaps pertinent at this point to recall that when the question of Palestine was being debated in the United Nations in 1947, the Soviet Union strongly supported the Jewish independence struggle. It is particularly relevant to recall some of Andrei Gromyko's remarks:

"As we know, the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with the problem of Palestine and of its future administration. This fact scarcely requires proof.... During the last war, the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. Without any exaggeration, this sorrow and suffering are indescribable. It is difficult to express them in dry statistics on the Jewish victims of the fascist aggressors. The Jews in the territories where the Hitlerites held sway were subjected to almost complete physical annihilation. The total number of Jews who perished at the hands of the Nazi executioners is estimated at approximately six million...."

"The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference, since this would be incompatible with the high principles proclaimed in its Charter, which provides for the defense of human rights, irrespective of race, religion or sex...."

"The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defense of the elementary rights of the Jewish people and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration."

How sad it is to see here a group of nations, many of whom have but recently freed themselves of colonial rule, deriding one of the most noble liberation movements of this century, a movement which not only gave an example of encouragement and determination to the peoples struggling for independence but also actively aided many of them either during the period of preparation for their independence or immediately thereafter.

Here you have a movement which is the embodiment of a unique pioneering spirit, of the dignity of labor, and of enduring human values, a movement which has presented to the world an example of social equality and open democracy being associated in this resolution with abhorrent political concepts.

We in Israel have endeavored to create a society which strives to implement the highest ideals of society - political, social and cultural - for all the inhabitants of Israel, irrespective of religious belief, race or sex.

Show me another pluralistic society in this world in which despite all the difficult problems, Jew and Arab live together with such a degree of harmony, in which the dignity and rights of man are observed before the law, in which no death sentence is applied, in which freedom of speech, of movement, of thought, of expression are guaranteed, in which even movements which are opposed to our national aims are represented in our Parliament.

The Arab delegates talk of racism. What has happened to the 800,000 Jews who lived for over two thousand years in the Arab lands, who formed some of the most ancient communities long before the advent of Islam. Where are they now? The Jews were once one of the important communities in the countries of the Middle East, the leaders of thought, of commerce, of medical science. Where are they in Arab society today? You dare talk of racism when I can point with pride to the Arab ministers who have served in my government; to the Arab deputy speaker of my Parliament; to Arab officers and men serving of their own volition in our border and police defense forces, frequently commanding Jewish troops; to the hundreds of thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East crowding the cities of Israel every year; to the thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East coming for medical treatment to Israel; to the peaceful coexistence which has developed; to the fact that Arabic is an official language in Israel on a par with Hebrew; to the fact that it is as natural for an Arab to serve in public office in Israel as it is incongruous to think of a Jew serving in any public office in an Arab country, indeed being admitted to many of them. Is that racism? It is not! That, Mr. President, is Zionism.

Zionism is our attempt to build a society, imperfect though it may be, in which the visions of the prophets of Israel will be realized. I know that we have problems. I know that many disagree with our government's policies. Many in Israel too disagree from time to time with the government's policies ... and are free to do so because Zionism has created the first and only real democratic state in a part of the world that never really knew democracy and freedom of speech.

This malicious resolution, designed to divert us from its true purpose, is part of a dangerous anti-Semitic idiom which is being insinuated into every public debate by those who have sworn to block the current move towards accommodation and ultimately towards peace in the Middle East. This, together with similar moves, is designed to sabotage the efforts of the Geneva Conference for peace in the Middle East and to deflect those who are moving along the road towards peace from their purpose. But they will not succeed, for I can but reiterate my government's policy to make every move in the direction towards peace, based on compromise.

We are seeing here today but another manifestation of the bitter anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish hatred which animates Arab society. Who would have believed that in this year, 1975, the malicious falsehoods of the "elders of Zion" would be distributed officially by Arab governments?

Who would have believed that we would today contemplate an Arab society which teaches the vilest anti-Jewish hate in the kindergartens?... We are being attacked by a society which is motivated by the most extreme form of racism known in the world today. This is the racism which was expressed so succinctly in the words of the leader of the PLO, Yassir Arafat, in his opening address at a symposium in Tripoli, Libya: "There will be no presence in the region other than the Arab presence...." In other words, in the Middle East from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf only one presence is allowed, and that is Arab presence. No other people, regardless of how deep are its roots in the region, is to be permitted to enjoy its right to self-determination.

Look at the tragic fate of the Kurds of Iraq. Look what happened to the black population in southern Sudan. Look at the dire peril in which an entire community of Christians finds itself in Lebanon. Look at the avowed policy of the PLO, which calls in its Palestine Covenant of 1964 for the destruction of the State of Israel, which denies any form of compromise on the Palestine issue and which, in the words of its repre-

sentative only the other day in this building, considers Tel Aviv to be occupied territory. Look at all this, and you see before you the root cause of the twin evils of this world at work, the blind hatred of the Arab proponents of this resolution, and the abysmal ignorance and wickedness of those who support them.

The issue before this Assembly is neither Israel nor Zionism. The issue is the fate of this organization. Conceived in the spirit of the prophets of Israel, born out of an anti-Nazi alliance after the tragedy of World War II, it has degenerated into a forum which was this last week described by [Paul Johnson] one of the leading writers in a foremost organ of social and liberal thought in the West as "rapidly becoming one of the most corrupt and corrupting creations in the whole history of human institutions ... almost without exception those in the majority came from states notable for racist oppression of every conceivable hue." He goes on to explain the phenomenon of this debate: "Israel is a social democracy, the nearest approach to a free socialist state in the world; its people and government have a profound respect for human life, so passionate indeed that, despite every conceivable provocation, they have refused for a quarter of a century to execute a single captured terrorist. They also have an ancient but vigorous culture, and a flourishing technology. The combination of national qualities they have assembled in their brief existence as a state is a perpetual and embittering reproach to most of the new countries whose representatives swagger about the UN building. So Israel is envied and hated; and efforts are made to destroy her. The extermination of the Israelis has long been the prime objective of the Terrorist International; they calculate that if they can break Israel, then all the rest of civilization is vulnerable to their assaults...."

"The melancholy truth, I fear, is that the candles of civilization are burning low. The world is increasingly governed not so much by capitalism, or communism, or social democracy, or even tribal barbarism, as by a false lexicon of political clichés, accumulated over half a century and now assuming a kind of degenerate sacerdotal authority.... We all know what they are...."

Over the centuries it has fallen to the lot of my people to be the testing agent of human decency, the touchstone of civilization, the crucible in which enduring human values are to be tested. A nation's level of humanity could invariably be judged by its behavior towards its Jewish population. Persecution and oppression have often enough begun with the Jews, but it has never ended with them. The anti-Jewish pogroms in Czarist Russia were but the tip of the iceberg which revealed the inherent rottenness of a regime that was soon to disappear in the storm of revolution. The anti-Semitic excesses of the Nazis merely foreshadowed the catastrophe which was to befall mankind in Europe.... On the issue before us, the world has divided itself into good and bad, decent and evil, human and debased. We, the Jewish people, will recall in history our gratitude to those nations who stood up and were counted and who refused to support this wicked proposition. I know that this episode will have strengthened the forces of freedom and decency in this world and will have fortified the free world in their resolve to strengthen the ideals they so cherish. I know that this episode will have strengthened Zionism as it has weakened the United Nations.

As I stand on this rostrum, the long and proud history of my people unravels itself before my inward eye. I see the oppressors of our people over the ages as they pass one another in evil procession into oblivion. I stand here before you as the representative of a strong and flourishing people which has survived them all and which will survive this shameful exhibition and the proponents of this resolution.

The great moments of Jewish history come to mind as I face you, once again outnumbered and the would-be victim of hate, ignorance and evil. I look back on those great moments. I recall the greatness of a nation which I have the honor to represent in this forum. I am mindful at this moment of the Jewish people throughout the world wherever they may be, be it in freedom or in slavery, whose prayers and thoughts are with me at this moment.

I stand here not as a supplicant. Vote as your moral conscience dictates to you. For the issue is neither Israel nor Zionism. The issue is the continued existence of this organization, which has been dragged to its lowest point of discredit by a coalition of despots and racists.

The vote of each delegation will record in history its country's stand on anti-Semitic racism and anti-Judaism. You yourselves bear the responsibility for your stand before history, for as such will you be viewed in history. We, the Jewish people, will not forget. For us, the Jewish people, this is but a passing episode in a rich and event-filled history. We put our trust in our Providence, in our faith and beliefs, in our time-hallowed tradition, in our striving for social advance and human values, and in our people wherever they may be. For us, the Jewish people, this resolution based on hatred, falsehood and arrogance, is devoid of any moral or legal value.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN, STATEMENT REJECTING  
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 3375, 3376 AND 3379,  
JERUSALEM, 10 NOVEMBER 1975**

*[See also texts of those UNGA resolutions above.]*

I regard it as necessary to react without delay, on behalf of the government of Israel, to the resolutions adopted today in the U.N. General Assembly.

The majority in the Assembly today reached a nadir in two resolutions, both of which alike have the significance of an assault on the right of existence of the State of Israel, of disavowal of the role designated the U.N., and of sabotage of the effort to achieve peace between Israel and the Arab states.

The countries that supported each of these two resolutions have assumed a heavy responsibility for a step whose meaning is the granting of encouragement by the U.N. General Assembly to organizations whose method is terrorism an whose declared objective is to destroy a member state of the U.N. - the State of Israel. Any anti-Israeli terrorist element seeking to thwart any effort to promote peace between Israel and its neighbours will find justification for its criminal acts in these contemptible resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly.

This is not the first time that the majority in the U.N. General Assembly has adopted discriminatory resolutions which ignore the rights of the State of Israel. But the resolutions now adopted seek to integrate the anti-Zionist ideological aspect with a practical anti-Israel aspect. The majority in the Assembly among whose tasks will be to work for the implementation of U.N. General Assembly resolutions contravening the rights of Israel as a sovereign an independent state.

These resolutions are devoid of any moral validity. The government of Israel will not negotiate with terrorist organizations calling themselves the Palestine Liberation Organization.

We made it clear at an early stage to all the political factors that we reject the invitation of the P.L.O. to the Geneva Conference. It was agreed with us that only factors to whose invitation all sides would agree upon would be invited to the conference. The countries that voted for the Arab initiative in the Assembly must, therefore, be aware that the said resolutions constitute an obstacle on the road to the convening of the Geneva Conference. No resolution of the U.N. General Assembly will bind Israel to negotiate with the terrorist organizations.

We express our esteem to all the states that did not lend a hand to these disgraceful resolutions, and did not yield to appeasement vis-à-vis Israel's enemies.

The people of Israel totally reject the Assembly's resolutions. Our reply - together with the Jewish people throughout the world - will be: Increasing unity in the effort to reinforce the strength of the State of Israel in the fulfilment of its historic tasks.



**US CONGRESS, SENATE RESOLUTION CONDEMNING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
RESOLUTION 3379, 11 NOVEMBER 1975**

*[Note: The US House of Representatives passed an identical resolution but with the final paragraph deleted. On 12 Nov., US Sec. of State Kissinger called the UNGA resolution "extremely unhelpful and highly irresponsible."]*

*Resolved* that the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), sharply condemns the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 10, 1975,

In that said resolution encourages anti-Semitism by wrongly associating and equating Zionism with racism and racial discrimination, thereby contradicting a fundamental purpose of the United Nations Charter; and be it

*Resolved* that the Congress strongly opposes any form of participation by the United States government in the decade for action to combat racism and racial discrimination so long as that decade and program remain distorted and compromised by the aforementioned resolution naming Zionism as one of the targets of that struggle; and be it

*Resolved* that the Congress calls for an energetic effort by all those concerned with the adherence of the United Nations to the purposes stated in its Charter to obtain reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution with a view to removing the subject of Zionism, which is a national but in no way a racist philosophy, from the context of any programs and discussions focusing on racism or racial discrimination; and be it further resolved that the (Senate) Committee on Foreign Relations and the (House) Committee on International Relations begin hearings immediately to re-assess the United States' further participation in the United Nations General Assembly.



**STATEMENT BY HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR  
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE US HOUSE FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, 12 NOVEMBER 1975**

*[Saunders' speech on 'US Foreign Policy and Peace in the Middle East' is considered to have expressed or molded US thinking on the Israeli-Arab conflict for several decades.]*

Mr. Chairman, a just and durable peace in the Middle East is a central objective of the United States. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have stated firmly on numerous occasions that the United States is determined to make every feasible effort to maintain the momentum of practical progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians... The U.S. has provided some \$620 million in assistance - about sixty-two percent of the total international support (\$1 billion) for the Palestinian refugees over the past quarter of a century.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

The statement is often made in the Arab world that there will not be peace until the "rights of the Palestinians" are fulfilled, but there is no agreed definition of what is meant and a variety of viewpoints have been expressed on what the ultimate objectives of the Palestinians are:

Some Palestinian elements hold to the objective of a binational secular state in the area of the former mandate of Palestine. Realization of this objective would mean the end of the present state of Israel, a member of the United Nations, and its submergence in some larger entity. Some would be willing to accept merely as a first step toward this goal the establishment of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza. Other elements of Palestinian opinion appear willing to accept an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, based on acceptance of Israel's right as an independent state within roughly its pre-1967 borders.

Some Palestinians and other Arabs envisage as a solution a unification of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. A variation of this which has been suggested would be the reconstitution of the country as a federated state, with the West Bank becoming an autonomous Palestinian province. Still others, including many Israelis, feel that with the West Bank returned to Jordan, and with the resulting existence of two communities - Palestinian and Jordanian - within Jordan, opportunities would be created thereby for the Palestinians to find self-expression.

In the case of a solution which would rejoin the West Bank to Jordan or a solution involving a West Bank/Gaza state, there would still arise the property claims of those Palestinians who before 1948 resided in areas that became the State of Israel. These claims have been acknowledged as a serious problem by the international community ever since the adoption by the United Nations of Resolution 194 on this subject in 1948, a resolution which the United Nations reaffirmed and which the United States has supported. A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab states of the many Jews from those states who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.

In addition to property claims, some believe they should have the option of returning to their original homes under any settlement.

Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel.

No one, therefore, seems in a position today to say exactly what Palestinian objectives are... What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests - a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

Another requirement is the development of a framework for negotiations - a statement of the objectives and the terms of reference. The framework for the negotiations that have taken place thus far and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt, has been provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In accepting that framework, all of the parties to the negotiation have accepted that the objective of the negotiations is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and the resolution of the specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The major problem that must be resolved in establishing a framework for bringing issues of concern to the Palestinians into negotiation, therefore, is to find a common basis for the negotiation that Palestinians and Israelis can both accept. This could be achieved by common acceptance of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, although they do not deal with the political aspect of the Palestinian problem.

A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians. It has been our belief that Jordan would be a logical negotiator for the Palestinian-related issues. The Rabat Summit, however, recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." ...

However, the PLO does not accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions, does not recognize the existence of Israel, and has not stated its readiness to negotiate peace with Israel; Israel does not recognize the PLO or the idea of a separate Palestinian entity. Thus we do not at this point have the framework for a negotiation involving the PLO. We cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other - rather than the objective of negotiating peace with it.

There is one other aspect to this problem. Elements of PLO have used terrorism to gain attention for their cause. Some Americans as well as many Israelis and others have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. The international community cannot condone such practices, and it seems to us that there must be some assurance if Palestinians are drawn into that negotiating process that these practices will be curbed.

This is the problem which we now face. If the progress toward peace which has now begun is to continue, a solution to this question must be found. We have not devised an American solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East - an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature. It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible.

Our consultations on how to move the peace forward will recognize the need to deal with this subject. Secretary Kissinger has said, "We are prepared work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining – including the issue of the future of the Palestinians." We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians. We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally open-minded.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3414 (XXX) ON THE  
SITUATION IN PALESTINE, NEW YORK, 5 DECEMBER 1975**

*[The resolution - condemning Israel for the continued occupation of Arab territory –  
was adopted by 84:17 with 27 abstentions, 11 absent and 5 not participating.]*

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Guided by* the purposes and principles of the Chapter of the United Nations and resolutions of the United Nations as well as those principles of international law which prohibit the occupation or acquisition of territory by the use of force and which consider any military occupation, however temporary, or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part thereof, as an act of aggression,

*Gravely concerned* at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's persistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

*Recalling* relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those concerning the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate in any efforts for peace,

*Convinced* that the early reconvening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

*Convinced* that the present situation prevailing in the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, and that urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,

*Recognizing* that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solution under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,

1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and therefore all territories thus occupied must be returned;
2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated United Nations resolutions;
3. Requests all States to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;
4. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those rights;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3474 (XXX) REGARDING A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NEW YORK, 11 DECEMBER 1975**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolution 3263 (XXIX) of December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the replies contained therein, on the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recognizing*, on the basis of the above-mentioned reports, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

*Mindful of* the prevailing political situation in the region and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area, Conscious, therefore, of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

*Taking note of* the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, prepared by the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

*Recalling* its Resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. Expresses the opinion that the Member States with which the Secretary-General has consulted through his notes verbales of 10 March 1975 and 13 June 1975 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3263 (XXIX) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;
2. Urges all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective;
3. Recommends that the Member States referred to in paragraph 1 above, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:
  - (a) Proclaim, solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons, in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party;
  - (b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;
4. Recommends to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East."

*[Adopted by 125:0 and 2 abstentions (Israel and Cameroon)]*



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3516 (XXX) REGARDING PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATIONAL RESOURCES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 15 DECEMBER 1975**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", in paragraph 5 of which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories.

*Recalling* the statement, made at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly on behalf of the co-sponsors in introducing the revised draft resolution, underlining the need to seek the assistance of relevant United Nations organizations in preparing the report requested of the Secretary-General as these organizations had the machinery needed to carry out studies and research which would be useful in preparing the report,

*Recalling further* the statements on administrative and financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General, in which he proposed that the report would be prepared on the basis of inquiries from the visits to the States concerned and consultations with the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,

*Recalling also* that, in his two statements, the Secretary-General indicated that a large part of the work involved would be carried out in co-operation with the Economic Commission for Western

Asia, and that the Commission would require four economists, appointed for six months each, and General Service secretarial support as well as travel funds for the preparation of the report,

*Noting that*, in view of the staffing proposals for the Economic Commission for Western Asia, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended an additional provision in the amount of \$37,000 to cover the cost of two economists only for a period of six months each and that the General Assembly approved this additional appropriation to supplement the staff and resources of the Commission in the work involved in the preparation of the report,

*Noting also that* the report of the Secretary-General was not prepared in conformity with paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 3336 (XXIX), the related statements made on behalf of the co-sponsors and by the Secretary-General, and the administrative and financial implications and provisions approved by the Assembly, but contained only annexes setting forth information available to Governments and to some of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs which were not involved in the preparation of substantive studies related to the report,

1. Notes that the report of the Secretary-General is inadequate as it did not incorporate the necessary substantive and comprehensive studies required in conformity with paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 3336 (XXIX) and related documents, including the record of the meeting of the Second Committee, the statements on administrative and financial implications and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question;
2. Requests the heads of the relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, particularly the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to co-operate actively and adequately with the Secretary-General in the preparation of a final and comprehensive report;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session his final comprehensive report, which should fulfil the above-mentioned requirements.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 3525 (XXX) CONCERNING THE REPORT OF  
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED  
TERRITORY, NEW YORK, 15 DECEMBER 1975**

A

The General Assembly,

*Guided by* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations.

*Recalling* its resolutions on the subject, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies concerned and by specialized agencies.

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which contains, *inter alia*, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel.

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;
2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
3. *Calls again* upon Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
4. *Deplores* the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments;
5. *Condemns*, in particular, the following Israeli policies and practices;

- (a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
  - (b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;
  - (c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
  - (d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
  - (e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;
  - (f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
  - (g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
  - (h) The interference with religious freedoms and practices, as well as family rights and customs;
  - (i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
6. *Declares* that those policies and practices of Israel constitute grave violations of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the principles and provisions of international law concerning occupation, and constitute as well an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace;
  7. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, are null and void;
  8. *Reaffirms* further that Israel's policy of setting parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and urges all States to refrain from any action which Israel will exploit in carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories;
  9. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the annexation and colonization of the occupied Arab territories as well as from all the policies and practices referred to in paragraph 5 above;
  10. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
  11. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
  12. *Requests* the Secretary-General:
    - (a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
    - (b) To make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
    - (c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat;
    - (d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on the tasks entrusted to him;
  13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

B

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolutions 3902 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974.

*Considering* that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic Purposes and principles of the United Nations.

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.

*Noting that* Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to the Convention.

*Taking into account* that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances.

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;
3. *Calls once* more upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
4. *Urges* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

#### C

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolution 3240 C (XXIX) of 29 November 1974

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in particular section V thereof concerning action by the Special Committee to implement the provisions of paragraph 3 of Resolution 3240 C (XXIX),

*Noting that* the Special Committee was not able to submit to the General Assembly at its current session a full report in accordance with the request made in paragraph 3 of Resolution 3240 C (XXIX),

1. *Requests* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to continue its efforts to undertake a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to make available to the Special Committee all the facilities necessary in the performance of its tasks and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

#### D

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its Resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 and 3240 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974 and Security Council Resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971,

*Taking note* of the information contained in the report of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,

*Noting* with concern the actions of the Israel authorities in changing the institutional structure and established religious practices in the sanctuary of Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil.

*Considering* that these actions constitute grave violations of human rights and religious freedom and of the norms of international law, in particular article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Considering* also that these violations of established religious rights are a challenge to the susceptibilities of hundreds of millions of Moslems all over the world.

*Considering* furthermore that these violations which have already caused civil and religious disturbances, constitute a new threat to peace and security in the area,

1. *Declares* all measures taken by the Israeli authorities with a view to changing the institutional structure and established religious practices in the sanctuary of Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil null and void;
2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind and to desist forthwith from all such measures;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to investigate the situation in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque by contacting the Islamic, Arab and other authorities concerned, and to report as soon as possible on the implementation of paragraph 2 above;
4. *Calls upon* Israel to co-operate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate his task.



**US STATE DEPARTMENT, STATEMENT REGARDING US POLICY  
ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WASHINGTON, DC, 26 JANUARY 1976**

*[The statement was issued on the eve of PM Rabin's state visit to Washington.]*

At the conclusion of the Security Council's consideration of the Middle East problem, it is important to turn from the debates that have taken place in New York and look to the year ahead. In doing so we must ask ourselves, where has this debate left us in our search for a Middle East peace? The United States has perhaps a particular responsibility to do this because, in being faithful to its concept of the search for peace, it has felt obliged to veto a resolution that others believed mapped out a preferable route. We did not do so lightly, nor in a spirit of negation. We believed that with this resolution the Council would have blocked the surer and the tested way to a settlement in favor of one that would not have worked. It is important that it be understood why we believed this to be the case and, more especially, how we see the process continuing within the framework that we have, with our vote, preserved.

There is surely no other problem of our time that has seen so much effort devoted to a solution and where the successes and the failures are so evident as guides for our future endeavors. There has been no lack of resolutions, no lack of plans; but looking back over the years, we can discern those few developments that have gradually constructed a basis, a framework, for whatever progress has been made in all this time.

In 1967 the Security Council devised Resolution 242, which contained the fundamental principles that should be applied in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including withdrawal from occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency; acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area; and respect for the, right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The comprehensiveness, fairness, and balance of Resolution 242 have won it acceptance by all the Middle East states directly involved in the conflict in addition to approval by the outside world. One of the great values of the resolution is its wide acceptance, despite the differences each side has over its meaning.

In 1973, the Security Council approved a resolution that complemented Resolution 242 by establishing a negotiating process between the parties as the means of implementing the principles set forth in the earlier resolution. This was, of course, Resolution 338, which also won wide acceptance and, with Resolution 242, formed a negotiating basis and framework that had been lacking since the early years of the Middle East problem.

The decision was then taken to provide a specific forum - a concrete context - for the negotiating process. The parties agreed to participate in a conference at Geneva under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. The nature of the conference reflected recognition of the fact that the negotiating process, if it was to have any chance of success, had to be based on the consent and voluntary participation of all the parties. The composition of the conference, accordingly, was itself a matter for agreement among the parties.

Finally, as the parties confronted the substance of the problem, they decided to approach it in stages rather than all at once. The United States was pleased that, at the request of the parties, it could play a helpful role in this step-by-step negotiating process, keeping always in mind that each step was taken within the Geneva framework and with a view to insuring the ultimate success of the Geneva Conference. It was always recognized that moving directly to an overall approach was an alternative to which the parties could turn at any time, and there was no doubt that an overall settlement, whatever the approach, was the end goal of all concerned, including the United States.

And what was the result? For the first time in 25 or more years, genuine progress was made toward a resolution of the immensely deep and complex problems that constitute the Middle East question. Through the courage and statesmanship of the Governments of Egypt, Israel, and Syria - and working within this common framework - agreements were reached, concessions made in return for other concessions; land was returned on the basis of binding agreements.

Less tangible, but perhaps more important, was the progress in the attitudes of the countries of the Middle East. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant hope. We are fully aware that only a start has been made, that many problems remain to be dealt with and resolved. It was the nature of the process that the easier issues would be dealt with first and the more difficult and complex left until later, when the momentum of the process itself would be working for us. The U.S. Government is committed to devote itself to the resolution of these remaining issues as it has to the issues that have already been resolved.

There would be no chance of further progress, however, if this negotiating framework, painfully erected over years of trial and error, were not left intact. Whatever its imperfections, however great the temptation to tamper with the resolutions and the Geneva formula that constitute it, if it were pulled apart now it could not be put back together and the clock would have been turned back to the years of futility in which no basis existed for negotiation to take place.

The negotiating framework is sufficiently flexible that it can provide the basis for negotiating fair and durable solutions to all the issues involved. The issues of withdrawal, of borders, of the termination of states or claims of belligerency, of reciprocal obligations to peace, of the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries - all these and more - must be carefully considered. Reciprocity is a fundamental concept in this process. All of the principles must be clothed with substance and given practical form. The nature of peace must be defined for all the peoples involved.

If there are limitations in the present framework, they result from the attitudes of the parties. What is needed is that all the parties go on from here to work out the substance of the solutions and that if any party feels there is a need to reconsider the framework in order to proceed further, that this emerge from negotiations among the parties in the Geneva context.

It is evident from the debate that led to the convening of the Security Council that there is concern on the part of some of the parties to the dispute, shared by members of the Council, regarding those aspects of the Middle East problem that relate particularly to the Palestinian people and their future. It is important that we work to develop a common understanding of this particularly complex issue. The Palestinian question was for many years considered primarily a refugee problem. It is widely accepted today that this is only one aspect of a larger question. The United States has repeatedly affirmed its recognition that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. The United States is prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining, including the issue of the future of the Palestinian people. We have no preconceptions as to the nature of such a solution as it involves them, which can only be worked out as part of the negotiating process. But we recognize that a solution must take into account their aspirations within the framework of principles laid down in Resolutions 242 and 338.

This issue, as is the case with the other issues, can be successfully dealt with, however, only by maintaining the momentum of practical progress in the negotiating process. We look to this process to clarify issues and to help develop a reasonable and accepted definition of Palestinian interests, without which negotiation on this aspect of the overall problem cannot be successfully addressed. However, it is not realistic to expect one party to the dispute to agree to the participation of another in the negotiations if the latter's policy is to seek the disappearance of the former as a state. As far as the United States is concerned, no negotiating framework is viable that calls the existence of the State of Israel into question.

We appreciate that, at this stage, the particular negotiating means that have been used so successfully to date present difficulties to one or another of the parties. We have therefore suggested an informal preparatory conference of the present Geneva parties looking toward a convening of the Geneva Conference, in which the parties can discuss questions relating to the agenda, procedures, and participants of the formal conference without prejudice to their positions on the conference itself. What is important is to continue the process. The goals all want to achieve cannot be achieved without movement, but at the same time there is no shortcut. They require the cooperation of both sides at every stage.

We understand also that the process appears at times to be unduly slow. When one looks at the issues that lie ahead one is tempted, indeed, to question whether we shall ever deal with them all. But when one looks back over the years and sees how much more has been accomplished in the last two years than in the quarter of a century that came before, he is encouraged to hope that the process we are engaged in will in fact lead us where we all want to go. The years 1974 and 1975 were years of signal accomplishment. The United States is firmly and irrevocably committed to progress in the negotiation of a settlement. In keeping with this commitment, it will do all it can to press ahead this year to consolidate what has been achieved and lay the groundwork for rapid progress. We believe that we have an obligation to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us. We are confident that progress leading to an eventual solution of all the issues is possible, utilizing and, in fact, only by utilizing - the present framework; and we are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress. We will be active in the months ahead, and our efforts will be seen to speak for themselves.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN, ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION  
OF THE US CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC, 28 JANUARY 1976 [EXCERPTS]**

*[Excerpts of Rabin's speech dealing with the Palestinian issue.]*

Mr. Vice-President, Mr. Speaker, Distinguished Members of Congress,

[...] Until 1967, Israel did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or the Golan Heights. Israel held not an acre of what is now considered disputed territory. And yet we enjoyed no peace. Year after year Israel called for - pleaded for - a negotiated peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was a blank refusal and more war.

The reason was not a conflict over territorial claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a Free Jewish State sits on territory at all.

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to peace as some would suggest. Certainly, it has to be solved in the context of a final peace. But to assert that this is the key to peace, the formula for peace, or the breakthrough to peace, is to misread the realities. It is to put the cart before the horse.

The Palestinian issue began with, and is a product of, the overall Arab posture on the legitimacy of a Jewish State of Israel. Only when that posture changes will the Palestinian issue be constructively and finally tackled.

The clock of history cannot be put back. It was not Israel that prevented the establishment of a Palestinian State in 1947, as the Partition Plan had proposed. What did prevent it, was the Arab declaration of war on the Plan itself, because it called for the creation of a Jewish State.

For nineteen years no Arab government saw fit to establish a Palestinian State, even though the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were under Arab control. Neither was there a Palestinian demand to do so. In January 1964, the organization that calls itself the P.L.O. was established by Arab Heads of State. Yet, even then, statehood in those territories, then held by Jordan and Egypt, was never the objective. We know what the objective is. It is written large into the Palestinian Covenant which is their binding constitution. Every paragraph of it spits out the venom calling for Israel's destruction.

These are the truths that lie at the heart and the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. And since, to date, the Arab version of peace does not depart from these truths, no honest being can blame us for refusing to cooperate in our own national suicide.

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross the Rubicon from aggressive confrontation to harmonious reconciliation. Then there is no problem between us that cannot be solved in negotiation. That includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the geographic and political context of peace with Jordan. When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestinian representation in the peace delegation of that country. And when I say geography, I do not discount a negotiation concerning the future final peace boundaries of the territories involved.

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready to give up much and compromise much on territory. In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is final reconciliation, we shall go more than half way to assure its success. [...]



**US AMBASSADOR WILLIAM W. SCRANTON, STATEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED  
TERRITORIES BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NEW YORK, 23 MARCH 1976**  
*[EXCERPTS]*

First of all, may I say to you, Mr. President, that I am very grateful personally for your kind comments at the opening of this hearing and likewise for your extraordinarily calm and measured leadership in this question, which, of all those facing us, is among the most passionate.

Likewise, I am equally grateful to all representatives who have been kind enough to give me the kind of welcome that is very warming to the heart. I hope that I can live up to some of the very kind things that have been said.

On purpose I have been here personally for each and every representative who has spoken and I plan to be here, if I possibly can, for all the other speakers on this very difficult problem - with one exception. To him I have already personally apologized and should like to do so publicly. Yesterday, in the middle of the comments of the representative of Egypt, I had to get up and leave because I was scheduled to be at a small luncheon for the Ambassador from Japan, whom we are very sorry to have leave the Council. But I did read what he had to say, and I was here for his reply this morning.

Now I too would like to indulge, for just a couple of minutes, in some personal comments from notes, very well aware that it is impossible for a barbarian to equal the gentleman from Saudi Arabia, with

his inimitable wit and remarkable eloquence and, most important of all and truly and seriously, his very extraordinary knowledge of history. But nevertheless I shall try, because I want to make it meaningful and personal. Just a few comments about what has happened here so far in these deliberations.

First of all, I still am quite concerned, and say so openly, at the decision that was taken concerning procedure, not - and I want this thoroughly understood - because the United States Government or far as I can make out, any other Government here" did not want the Palestine Liberation Organization to be heard. Quite the contrary; we did, and we welcome the hearing. But I am concerned personally because I think that unless a major international body of deliberation abides by rules it writes for itself we can in the future regret it, and I can see on the horizon the number of times that could be forthcoming when forgetting rules and simply doing what the majority wants - whatever the majority may be - could later come back to haunt that majority. I think it is very important for us to have rules of procedure and to abide by them.

Secondly, with regard to the event which is purported to have initiated the recent difficulties the West Bank and Jerusalem, there were many references made by other speakers about media reports, some of them based on hear-say, on what other persons had said. This is natural and understandable, but it does lead us away from what is extremely important, and that is the facts - important in any kind of deliberation but particularly in a deliberation which has to do with such a very emotional part of the world, more so, I suspect, than anywhere in the world, because of its long and enduring varied cultures, the remarkable differences and extraordinary religions, and the other emotions that are there in such depth.

Events have taken place over the last several years which have deeply hurt us all: terrorist raids and equally senseless retaliations and reprisals. These and other events have meant human killing, and a good deal of it, and last but by no means least, very intense and very wide-spread human suffering. It seems to me that it is our responsibility in this international body not to add fuel to those fires as they individually or collectively arise, but to do everything we can to lessen tensions, to deal with facts, and to help in every way possible to bring peace there and everywhere else in the world.

As several of you have said, and said correctly, in my judgement, the big issue here is not each of the events to which I have referred, as deplorable as they may be. The big issue is the question of the occupied territories and the people that are there vis-à-vis Israel's right to be and to be secure - to which, as everyone knows, we Americans are strongly and deeply dedicated.

Yesterday, when I left this room, I went to that small luncheon and sat next to a very lovely woman, and we were discussing this very major issue, and she said to me, rather yearningly, "Can it ever be resolved?" That is clearly the major question here, and the one to which we should be devoting all our efforts. My answer to her was something quite simple and simple to say, it is very difficult to do.

And one last personal comment to you all. I really would greatly appreciate it, over the next few weeks and months that I am here, if any one of you and all of you would be kind enough to talk with me in the corridors or at the social functions or any-where else so that I can get as deep and penetrating an understanding as possible of what each of you and your Governments are thinking and wanting about his, the most critical problem, I think, that besets world.

And now for some written comments.

At the outset it is especially noteworthy, I think, that Israel has joined in our deliberations, and my Government warmly welcomes Israel's decision to do so. For the events that have brought us together today are a corollary and a consequence of the tragic dispute that has occupied the Council with such regularity over the years. As such, they raise two categories of issues that we must have in mind if we are to deal with them constructively.

First is the question of bringing to an early end the situation that gives rise to these disturbances and to other forms of violence in the Middle East. So long as the situation persists, we can expect con-

tinuing tension and occasional violence, however much we might and must regret it. It is not necessary for me to be labour this point; surely it is evident to all of us.

The occupation of territories in the 1967 war has always been seen by the world community to be an abnormal state of affairs that would be brought to an end as part of a peace settlement. In resolution 242 (1967), adopted shortly after the end of the 1967 war that led to the occupation, the Council established the basic bargain that would constitute a settlement. This bargain was withdrawal of Israeli forces in return for termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

My Government has committed itself to do all it can to bring about this settlement - in the words of resolution 338 (1973), to implement resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and to further negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East, which is what we are here for. We are engaged at this moment in an effort to regain momentum, as all members of the Council know, in the negotiating process that has brought some unusual progress and that must bring more.

The second focus of our consideration must be the conduct of the occupation itself. Together with the request for this meeting, the letter of complaint circulated by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and of Pakistan [S/12017] identifies three issues the administration of the Holy Places, the situation in Jerusalem, and Israeli actions in regard to the civilian population of the occupied territories, including the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

The position of the United States on these issues is clear and of long standing. I propose to review it today once more to point out that there are proper principles and procedures under international law and practice which when applied and maintained will contribute to civil order and, over the longer, run, will facilitate a just and lasting peace.

First, there is the matter of the Holy Places and practice of religion in the occupied areas. The deep religious attachment of Moslems, Jews and Christians to the Holy Places of Jerusalem has added a uniquely volatile element to the tensions that inhere in an occupation situation. The area known to Moslems as Al-Haram Al-Sharif and to Jews as the Temple Mount is of particular sensitivity. Israel's punctilious administration of the Holy Places in Jerusalem has, in our judgement, greatly minimized the tensions. To my Government the standard to be followed in administering the Holy Places is contained in article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.<sup>1</sup> All parties to the Arab-Israel conflict are signatories of the Convention. Article 27 prescribes, *inter alia*: "Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs."

With regard to the immediate problem before us - a ruling by a lower Israeli court which would have the effect of altering the status of Al-Haram - it is our view that Israel's responsibilities under article 27 to preserve religious practices as they were at the time the occupation began cannot be changed by the ruling of an Israeli court. We are deeply gratified that the Supreme Court of Israel has upheld the Israeli Government's position.

The status of the Holy Places is, of course, only one facet, however important - and it is very important - of the problem of the status of Jerusalem itself. The United States position on the status of Jerusalem has been stated here on numerous occasions since the Arab portion of that city was occupied by Israel in 1967. Ambassador Yost said in 1969: "The part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June 1967 war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying Power." [1483rd meeting, para. 97.]

Ambassador Goldberg said in 1968 to the Council: "The United States does not accept or recognize unilateral actions by any States in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem." [1424th meeting, para. 45.]

I emphasize, as did Mr. Goldberg, that as far as the United States is concerned, such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land or other administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. The United States position could not be clearer. Since 1967 we have restated here, in other forums and to the Government of Israel that the future of Jerusalem will be determined only through the instruments and processes of negotiation, agreement and accommodation. Unilateral attempts to predetermine that future have no standing.

Next I turn to the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Again, my Government believes that international law sets the appropriate standards. An occupier must maintain the occupied areas as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be consistent with international law. The fourth Geneva Convention speaks directly to the issue of population transfer in article 49: The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Clearly, then, substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the Convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my Government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbours. The real issues of peace and stability in the Middle East are very difficult indeed, and unilateral acts, such as civilian population transfers, have been taken which serve to inflame emotions on both sides.

I welcome the opportunity this meeting of the Council has provided to review the issues involved in the administration of the Holy Places, the status of Jerusalem and, in addition, the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Now, as for prospective action by the Council, my Government will apply three tests. First, do the facts and judgements on which the draft resolution is based correspond to the actual situation? Secondly, will the Council's action in practice advance the proper administration of the areas involved? Thirdly, and most important of all, will the Council's action help or hinder the peaceful settlement process, the framework for which was established by resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)?



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE ADMINISTERED AREAS, NEW YORK, 26 MAY 1976**

*[After the Arab states were unable to table a resolution against Israel's occupation that would secure the UNSC's approval, they finally settled for a President's statement expressing the majority view.*

*See also next document.]*

Following the request submitted by Egypt on May 3, 1976, the Security Council had seven meetings from May 4 to May 26, 1976 to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories. After consulting all the members, the President of the Security Council concludes that the majority of the members agreed (to) the following:

Grave anxiety was expressed over the present situation in the occupied Arab territories; concern was also expressed about the well-being of the population of these territories.

The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying power was therefore called upon to comply strictly with the provisions of that convention and to refrain from and rescind any measure that would violate them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab

territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements, were accordingly deplored. Such measure which cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace, constitute an obstacle to peace.

The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely.



**US AMBASSADOR WILLIAM W. SCRANTON, RESPONSE TO THE UNSC PRESIDENT'S  
STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE ADMINISTERED AREAS, NEW YORK, 26  
MAY 1976**

*[See also previous document.]*

Mr. President, first may I say that the statement which I am about to make clearly indicates I believe that the United States of America is not unrelentingly supporting "Zionist aggression," nor it is making its position because of internal matter within the United States, but rather because it believes thoroughly that in any matter that comes before this Council it is important that we have a balanced answer, particularly as this Council is instructed through the Charter of our great organization first and foremost to be thinking of peace.

Mr. President, my delegation has disassociated itself from the statement you have read out which represents the view of the majority of the council's members. As you know from views that my government has expressed on past occasions in this chamber and elsewhere, there is much in the statement of the majority view with which we could agree.

We agree, for example, that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war is applicable to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. We believe in the importance of following its prescriptions. In fact we made our position on this question clear during the March deliberations in this Council. From the unanimous agreement, therefore, of this Council that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the occupied territories, it follows that all of its provisions apply. We also agree that Israel should scrupulously comply with all the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Our position about the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is similarly well known.

We are concerned, however, that the statement of the majority view lacks balance, and it is the element of balance which should be the hallmark of the deliberations of a body charged, as this one is, with maintaining the peace. While the summary statement does contain references to certain provisions of the fourth Geneva convention describing the obligation of an occupying power, there is no corresponding reference in the statement to those provisions of the convention which explicitly recognize that the occupying power had the duty to maintain law and order and the right to protect its forces. We object, furthermore, to the fact that the statement is unrelieved by any recognition of the many areas in which Israeli administration of the occupied territories has been responsible and just. As in its administration of the holy places in Jerusalem and in its substantial efforts to permit the population to choose their own elected representatives to local government.

In particular, we believe the statement's sweeping injunction to Israel to rescind measures is out of place in this context and at this time.

Having said this, however, and having disassociated ourselves from the view of the majority, we would be remiss if we did not call the attention of the government of Israel to the fact that there are aspects of its policies in the occupied territories, in particular that involving the establishment of settlements, that are increasingly a matter of concern and distress to its friends throughout the world and are not helpful to the process of peace.

Israel has ample reason, with the experience of recent years, to feel that this Council too seldom approaches the Middle East problem with objectivity. It would be mistaken, however, to dismiss as products of blind partisanship all the points contained in the statement read out in this chamber today.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON, STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET  
ON US CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, JERUSALEM, 30 JUNE 1976**

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

If there is one subject regarding which there is no difference between the position of the government and of the opposition, it is that of the organization of murderers called the Palestine Liberation Organization. This is, an organization whose avowed aim is genocide, and whose function is murder, terrorism and kidnappings. Since it is composed of various groups, and truth has no importance for them, it is easy for them to lie, deny and disavow this or that operation. Only a short time ago, the Arab press was full of headlines regarding the reconciliation meeting between Arafat and another arch-murderer named Dr. Habash. At this very time, 225 peaceful civilians - men, women and children of various nationalities - are undergoing the harsh torment of captivity, as a result of the hijacking of an Air France plane which, according to all indications, was carried out by the murderous gang of that same Dr. Habash. Since the efforts for liberating the passengers are in their midst, I shall not expand on the hijacking of the plane, I shall state only that, so far, we draw a certain encouragement from two facts:

- From the firm position of principle of France, and its acknowledgement of the heavy responsibility devolving on it.
- From the resoluteness being evinced by other governments - whose citizens are among those kidnapped, or to which the hijackers demands have also been directed - not to surrender to the extortion of murderers.

I regret that at this stage I am unable to bring the house better tidings on this subject - but the government of Israel will not rest until those being held hostage at the Entebbe airport are released. The Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee will receive detailed and ongoing reporting on developments.

Members of the Knesset,

The people of Israel were deeply shocked by the murder of the American Ambassador in Beirut, along with the Economic Counsellor and the Ambassador's chauffeur. We expressed our condolences over the murder to the President, the Secretary of State and the people of the United States.

A short time after the murder, we were dismayed to hear reports of an expression of thanks from the State Department on the PLO's part in the evacuation of American citizens. In an inquiry we made in Washington, the following points emerged:

- Following the evacuation of American citizens and others from Beirut, verbal thanks to "the Palestinians" for their assistance in the evacuation were conveyed via a third party - without mention being made of the organization called the PLO.
- The United States emphasized that these thanks do not constitute recognition of, or any change whatsoever in the American policy on the Palestine Liberation Organization.

These explanations notwithstanding, we expressed to Washington our amazement and our reservation at the administration's having found fit to express its thanks to the murderers. And for what, in fact? That they had not murdered more? And when? They are engaged in murdering hundreds and thousands of members of the Maronite community, among them many children, women and the elderly?

Shortly thereafter, we learned that the PLO representative in New York, who serves as an Observer at the U.N., had visited Washington at the invitation of a Senator of Arab origin named Abourezk. We expressed - in Washington and Jerusalem - our dissatisfaction over the approval the State Department gave the PLO representative to visit the capital of the United States. And I should like to again express amazement and criticism that respected personages acted with distressing rashness in finding fit to add prestige to an organization whose members are daily slaughtering hundreds of Christians in Lebanon, in addition to various acts of murder, kidnapping and extortion.

U.S. administration officials reiterated and told us that, despite the combination of circumstances, there was no change in U.S. policy or attitude vis-à-vis the PLO. On this subject, the spokesman of the State Department yesterday stated that:

- The PLO representative violated the conditions on the basis of which the State Department had approved his visit to Washington on 25 June.
- The condition attending the PLO man's visit was that he should not engage in any public activity - yet he appeared on a local television broadcast, which was contrary to the condition of the approval.

A similar case occurred with another PLO representative, whose visit to Chicago had been approved. In future - so the spokesman stated - the State Department, when asked to approve visits of PLO men outside the 25-mile New York radius, would take into account the incidents in Washington and Chicago.

The spokesman described as "nonsense" the assumption that approval of the visit constituted de facto recognition of the PLO. I regret to say that the providers of the approval fell into an undignified trap. Approval of further visits by PLO members outside the restricted sphere will be viewed by us as a prejudicial act.

Members of the Knesset,

It is clear that our foes are interested in inflating a chance combination of two events that followed each other. But we must bear in mind that the United States' policy is determined by the President and the Secretary of State, and not by the prattle of anonymous officials. U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue was given incisive and bold expression barely a few hours ago by the American veto in the Security Council. In diplomatic talks and in public, authoritative U.S. spokesmen have stressed that no change has occurred in the United States' attitude and position vis-à-vis the PLO. This position naturally has the fullest esteem of the people and government of Israel.

I move that the subject be referred for further discussion to the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee.



**ACTING SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL REGARDING A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE, 7 OCTOBER 1976**

Among the complex international problems requiring a solution in the interests of the preservation and strengthening of peace, the problem of a Middle East settlement is particularly acute. The red-hot tension in the Middle East is not abating. The situation in this region is extremely precarious and unstable. At any moment there may be a new military outburst there. The peoples of the Middle East countries are living in a state of uncertainty, under a permanent threat to their security. They are being prevented from devoting their efforts to peaceful construction and the improvement of living conditions. Attempts are being made to keep the Arab people of Palestine in the position of an exiled people.

The entire course of events in the Middle East in recent years demonstrates one fact: There cannot and will not be peace in this region until the causes which gave rise to the Middle East conflict have been removed: the occupation of the Arab territories by Israel, the denial of their inalienable rights to the Pal-

estine Arabs now and the continuing state of war. It is impossible to hope that it will be sufficient to eliminate any one particular individual hotbed of armed conflict in order to restore peace in the Middle East.

The tragic events in Lebanon provide a very clear confirmation of all this. The Lebanese crisis could not have arisen if a comprehensive political settlement had been achieved in the Middle East. There is another undeniable fact: if there had been such a settlement, or if serious efforts had been made to achieve one, it would have been easier to find a solution to the problems rending this small Middle Eastern country.

Only those who are trying for their own narrow ends to preserve the existing situation in the Middle East can oppose a broad political settlement or work against its achievement. It is the conviction of the Soviet Union that the situation in the Middle East requires urgent measures capable of achieving a change from war to peace there.

The Soviet Union has already proposed a resumption for this, purpose of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. This is precisely the forum which has been recognized as being politically acceptable by all the interested parties. Concerned about the dangerous course of events in the Middle East, the Soviet Union now again appeals to all the parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict and to all the participants in the Geneva Peace Conference to resume the work of the conference. The Soviet Union, for its part, would be prepared to take part in the work of the conference in October-November 1976.

The experience of international negotiations and conferences has shown that an important factor in their success is the precise definition of the range of issues to be discussed by the parties, when these issues are spelt out and placed before the participants in the negotiations. The prospects of achieving the necessary understanding also become clearer.

In an attempt to expedite the achievement of a Middle East settlement and for this purpose to promote the resumption of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, the Soviet Union submits for the consideration of the participants the following proposal for the agenda of the conference:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967.
2. Realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestine Arab people, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of their own state.
3. Preservation of the right to an independent existence and to security of all the states directly participating in the conflict. The Arab states bordering on Israel, on the one hand, and the State of Israel, on the other, and the granting to them of appropriate international guarantees.
4. Cessation of the state of war between the Arab states concerned and Israel.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, this proposed agenda covers all the key aspects of a settlement. It takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties directly involved in the conflict - the Arab states, the Palestine Arab people and the State of Israel.

With regard to the organization of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference, the Soviet Union has already, expressed the view that it should be conducted in two phases. The Palestine Liberation Organization should naturally participate in the work of the conference from the very beginning and with equal status. In the first, preparatory phase, final agreement could be reached on the agenda of the conference and the procedure for considering the specific aspects of a settlement could be determined. In the second, fundamental phase, efforts would be concentrated on arriving at an understanding on the substance. The conference should conclude with the adoption of a final instrument (or instruments) in the nature of a treaty.

The Soviet Union is convinced that a real possibility exists of eliminating the underlying causes of the Middle East conflict and agreeing on a comprehensive settlement. To this end, it is perhaps to press on with the work, together with all the other participants in the Geneva Peace Conference.



**PRESIDENT HABIB BOURGUIBA OF TUNISIA, STATEMENT CALLING FOR A  
SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ON THE BASIS OF THE 1947 UN  
PARTITION RESOLUTION, TUNIS, 26 OCTOBER 1976**

It was intolerable that we should be blamed for the misdeeds of others and that the atrocities of Nazism should be atoned for in the heart of our land, our homes and our fields.

We therefore decided that we must fight to recover our usurped rights and to put an end to this injustice which is without precedent in modern history.

After nearly a third of a century we realized that this was impossible without exposing the security of the area- and perhaps world peace-to the gravest dangers.

We therefore decided that the maintenance of peace must be preferred to the cause of the homeland, to our love of it and our passionate attachment to it.

Therefore I have come to you today bearing an olive branch in both hands, calling for the implementation of the resolution adopted in 1947, hoping that the passage of time may gradually bring about detente between the two communities, that as the years go by links of mutual exchange and cooperation may be established between them and that rapprochement in one form or another may lead to the two groups coexisting in a single community. This at rate is the one wager to which should direct our hopes and energies. This is what I have said to the international community, although I know how heavy is the responsibility involved in this decision, and the reactions it may give rise to in certain circles of the Palestine revolution. In the past I staked all on just such a wager as regards Tunisia, thereby risking my reputation and my life.

But the leader must not be afraid to take decisions leading to peace which, although they appear to indicate weakness, are really, and in the sight of history, revolutionary decisions.

If Abu Ammar did this he would be entitled to as prominent a place in the register of freedom fighters as those who daily lay down their lives in Nablus, Acre and Jerusalem.

If he did this he would open up to Palestine a new era of hope for the building of honor and self-respect.

If he did this it would also be the prelude to many benefits for the Eastern Arab countries which have been trying since the fifties to achieve a reconciliation between two irreconcilable things, between war against Israel and war against backwardness, between the cost of armaments and planning for development. One of them is certainly important, but the second is vital as regards our destiny and it is therefore in my view more important, as without it the other goals and objectives cannot be achieved.

The most important of our duties as Arabs, in both the East and the West, is to give priority to organized and planned development so that we may rescue our peoples from backwardness and promote them to the ranks of the nations that are developing, growing and becoming strong enough to control not only their political destiny, but also, and in particular, their economic destiny, because in our times economic capacity is the key to political capacity.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON ON HIS PLANS FOR PEACE (“THE  
ALLON PLAN”), OCTOBER 1976 [EXCERPTS]**

The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the Arab States and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the anticipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army.

To our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative to survive. And I would venture to say every other state in our place would behave exactly as we do.

There are, of course, many elements constituting the essential strength that Israel must maintain, ranging from its social, scientific and economic standards, as well as its idealistic motivation, to the quality and quantity of its armaments. A discussion of all of these elements is not within the compass of this article; my concern here is with one of them - but one essential to them all and without which Israel might well lack the strength to defend itself. I am referring to the territorial element; to what can be defined as defensible borders that Israel must establish in any settlement, as an essential part of any effective mutual security arrangements and without any desire for territorial expansion per se.

The most cursory glance at a map is sufficient to ascertain how little the armistice lines of 1949 - lines which were never in the first place recognized as final - could be considered defensible borders. And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the Arab States as an encouragement to try their strength again against us. The truth of the matter is that Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council has already recognized, in its original English text, the need to provide Israel with secure and recognized boundaries - in other words, that changes must be introduced in the old lines of the armistice agreements.

It is no coincidence that this resolution does not speak about Israel's withdrawal from *all* the territories that came under its control in the war that was forced upon Israel in June 1967, nor even from *the* territories. In the original text (which was the outcome of long and exhaustive negotiations), Resolution 242 speaks only of withdrawal from territories. That the meaning was clear was demonstrated by the statement of the United States at the time, made by its UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg on November 15, 1967, in the Security Council discussions that preceded the passage of Resolutions 242. He stated:

"Historically, there never have been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the Armistice Lines of 1949, nor the Cease-Fire Lines of 1967, have answered that description."

As is known, Israel expressed more than once its willingness to withdraw from the cease-fire lines of 1967, within the framework of a peace agreement. On the other hand, it is clear - even according to the Security Council decision - that Israel is not obliged to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949 that preceded the 1967 war, but to revised lines. The question is what borders will provide Israel with that essential minimum of security? And without such security it is difficult to expect to pacify the area and provide a lasting solution to the conflict within it.

If the sole consideration were the purely strategic-military one, then possibly the most convenient security borders would have been those Israel maintained following the Six-Day War, or perhaps those which it maintains today. There is even a basis for the claim that the 1973 Yom Kippur War - begun as a surprise attack in concert by the armies of Egypt and Syria - proves that these lines were ideally the best. Had the Yom Kippur War commenced on the 1949 armistice lines, for example, there can be little doubt that the price Israel would have had to pay in repelling the aggressors would have been unimaginably higher than that paid so painfully in October 1973. But we are not merely talking about purely military-strategic matters, to the extent that they ever exist in isolation. Nor are we discussing the maximum security that borderlines can provide Israel. As stated, our preoccupation is only with the essential minimum.

One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centres of Israel's population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point,

to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.

Of course I do not wish to overlook the fact that there are some who would claim that in an era of modern technological development such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the appearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers, and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has concealed out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers. Personally, I do not know of a single state which is willing and ready to give up a convenient border line for this reason. At any rate, this argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the context of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased.

With all the heavy damage that warheads and bombs can inflict, they alone cannot be decisive in war, as long as the other side is resolved to fight back. Recent military history demonstrates this only too clearly. The German air "blitz" did not knock England out of World War II, nor did the heavy allied air bombardments bring Germany to its knees. This happened only when the last bunker in Berlin fell. Even massive American air bombardments did not defeat North Vietnam which, in the final analysis, proved to be the victor in the war. At least as far as conventional wars are concerned, the following basic truth remains: without an attack by ground forces that physically overrun the country involved, no war can be decisive. This is all the more so in the Middle East where the Arab side is no less vulnerable to rocket and aerial bombardment than Israel, a factor that can greatly minimize the use of this kind of weaponry, and will leave to the ground forces the role of really deciding the issue.

### III

Fortunately, the geo-strategic conditions that have existed in the Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon a fair political compromise. This would provide Israel with the minimal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise, so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides. But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.

According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel - within the context of a peace settlement - would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.

For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, together with a number of effective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the counter offensive needed to defeat any such aggression.

The armistice lines of 1949 extend along the foothills of the Judean and Samarian mountains and along the Mediterranean coastal plain - that is, flat territory without any topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June 4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop. Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to strike at Israel's densest population and industrial

centers, but also in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with a surface-to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly equipped.

According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its heart - the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer attack.

In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominating Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest of the entire northern part of our country.

According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in the naive belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel, following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's southern port entrance at Eilat on a tiny strip of shoreline only six miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover, Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a *casus belli* in both 1956 and 1967.

A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weaknesses in the current geo-strategic and demographic situation existing in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be along the following general lines.

Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green line", this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab populations, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samaritan and Judean mountains to the west - from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population. Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.

Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south, it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution becomes possible - one that also helps resolve the problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian State. (After all, the population of both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians).

Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim State, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being partitioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its inhabitants, a solution for the religious interests connected with it can be found, a religious and not a political solution. For example, special status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in the place holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon sub-districts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account.

While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling are sniping at Israeli villages and fishermen below, which is basically a tactical question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal strategic reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel's other frontiers.

In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be necessary to place at the disposal of traffic between Gaza and the Jordanian-Palestinian State the use of a land route (as distinct from a land corridor) similar to that for example, connecting the United States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza strip to the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to invade the land of Israel, and further north.

A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure security sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its defense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am referring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and Kuntilla, which comprise the principle strategic crossroads on the main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Eilat shore line which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this vantage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place. In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner of the Sinai - and over a land route reaching it - is not only critical to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing deterrent against such blockade attempts.

To sum up, there were numerous bitterly deficient points in the pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal corrections to them required for an overall peace settlement. The necessity for these corrections is all the more apparent when it is realized that Israel not only faces the military strength of its contiguous neighbours, but may also not only face the military strength of its contiguous neighbours, but may also have to face the combined strength of many other Arab countries. This has already happened to no small extent in the 1973 war, when contingents from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries participated in the fighting, together with the armies of Egypt

and Syria. Thus, in a very practical sense, solid defense lines are indispensable to Israel in order to withstand the attacks of the entire Arab world. In addition, these may well be supported by contingents of so-called volunteers who can be sent from certain countries from outside the area that are hostile to Israel.

Let me stress again that defensible borders are vital to Israel not out of any desire to annex territories per se, not out of a desire for territorial expansion, and not out of any historical and ideological motivation. Israel can compromise on territory but it cannot afford to do so on security. The entire rationale of defensible borders is strategic. This is also the only rationale for the selective settlement policy that Israel is pursuing, as an integral part of its unique defense system, in those strategic zones so vital to its security.

Of course, when the peace for which we strive is achieved, the borders will not divide the two peoples but be freely open to them. In short, good fences make good neighbors.

#### IV

As I have pointed out, border adjustments essential for Israel's security, and hence for the long-term stability of the entire area, must also be linked with mutually effective security arrangements designed to prevent surprise attacks by one side on the other, or at least to reduce to a minimum the danger of such attacks. In the geo-strategic circumstances of the Middle East, to reduce the possibility of surprise offensives is, in fact, to reduce the danger of all offensives. I am referring to such arrangements as the delineation of both totally and partially demilitarized zones under joint Arab-Israeli control, with or without the participation of a credible international factor; or such arrangements as the delineation of parallel early-warning systems like those functioning in the Sinai according to the terms of the 1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

I will not enter here into the technical details of such arrangements, their nature, placement and scope. Not that they are unimportant or nonessential; on the contrary, without them, Israel could not permit itself to make the far-reaching territorial compromises which, in my opinion, it should be prepared to make within the context of peace agreements with its neighbors. Let me give one example, albeit, the most important, in order to illustrate this point. According to the principles I have already outlined, if Israel were to forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria, it would not be able to forego - under any circumstances - the effective demilitarization of these areas. Apart from civilian police to guarantee internal order, these areas would have to be devoid of offensive forces and heavy arms. In the same way as any other country, Israel would be unable to abandon areas so close to its heartland if they were liable once again to become staging areas for full-scale, limited or guerrilla attacks upon its most vital areas.

In short, Israel cannot permit itself to withdraw from a large part of the West Bank unless the area from which it withdraws is shorn of all aggressive potential. For this purpose, absolute Israeli control, as proposed above, of a strategic security zone along the Jordan Basin will not be adequate. Effective demilitarization of the areas from which the Israel Defense Forces withdraw will also be essential. Here as elsewhere, the two elements are interwoven: without a security zone, Israel cannot be satisfied with demilitarization alone; without effective demilitarization, Israel cannot be satisfied with just the security zone.

It should be clear from what I have said, that Israel does not hold most of the territories that fell into its hands in the war, which was imposed on it in 1967, as an end in itself. Despite the paucity of its territory compared with the vast areas of the Arab countries, and despite the historical, strategic and economic importance of these areas, Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal - peace with all its neighbors.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE "SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES," NEW YORK, 11 NOVEMBER 1976**

As a result of consultations over which I presided with all members of the Council, I am authorized as President to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 20 October 1976, the Security Council held four meetings between 1 November and 11 November 1976 to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories,

With the participation of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After consulting all the members, the President of the Council states that the Council has agreed on the following:

- (1) To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation;
- (2) Reaffirmation of its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area since the outbreak of hostilities;
- (3) Its reaffirmation that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly deplored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment "of peace constitute an obstacle to peace;
- (4) It considers once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and transfer of populations which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently calls upon Israel once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connection the Council deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council Resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly Resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967;
- (5) Its recognition that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security.

The Council decides to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances require.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON, RESPONSE TO THE UNSC PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE "SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES," KNESSET, 17 NOVEMBER 1976**

The Israel government's attitude regarding the summing-up statement delivered by the President of the Security Council, following the debate on the situation in the administered areas, is well-known to be entirely negative. We consider this summing-up, delivered with the consent of all fifteen Council members, an erroneous, misleading and damaging statement, in its contents as well as in its timing. As such, we reject it out of hand, and as far as we are concerned, it has no validity. And this is indeed

the way in which we immediately reacted in all ways open to us: At the Security Council itself, through diplomatic channels at our disposal with those member-nations of the Security Council maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as by means of a large-scale information effort. I feel duty-bound to reiterate and emphasize from this rostrum at least two central themes.

One: Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people, is an integral part of the sovereign State of Israel, not to be partitioned ever again. We do, of course, respect the holiness of Jerusalem also for other faiths, and we are self-guarding, and shall continue to safeguard there, the freedom of worship for all believers, as we have stated time and again. In the peace agreement to be, we shall be prepared to take into consideration the religious interest of the members of other faiths in the places holy to them within the eternal city. The religious discrimination common to Jerusalem up to its liberation - mainly, but not exclusively, directed against Jews - will never be permitted to recur. But the one and undivided Jerusalem, the capital of Israel under the sovereignty of the State of Israel is a fact not to be challenged from whatever quarter.

The second subject: The policy of selective settlement Israel follows in the administered areas does not stem from a wish for territorial expansion as such, nor from ideological or theological reasons - but from purely strategic-defensive considerations. This policy, which not only determined where settlements should go up, but also where it must be avoided to establish settlements, is a vital concern of the first order for Israel. As such it will continue to be determined by us according to our deliberations, which include our readiness for a peace of compromise, including the essential need to ensure defensible borders for us and our sons after us. This policy represents no obstacle to genuine peace in the region. On the contrary, it is an essential factor in the stable and lasting peace our region needs so badly.

We shall continue in this considered policy in the areas, guided by our vital interests, to the best of our understanding, for our security, and the security of our sons is at stake. And those who lend their support to resolutions or summaries such as adopted at the end of last week by the Security Council - and this holds especially true for Israel's friends in the Council - are accepting a grave responsibility: The responsibility for sowing delusions in the Arab world, as if it could attain (the objectives) outlined in that miserable consensus, responsibility for encouraging the extremist element in the Arab world to harden its stance - just when it seemed that, following the bitter fate of Lebanon, and in the wake of the U.S. elections, prospects had appeared for reviving the political momentum in the Middle East.

The plain truth is, that the summing-up statement adopted by the Security Council last week - in its contents as well as in its timing - has struck a heavy blow at those positive prospects and all they imply. The entire responsibility for this falls on those who supported that statement, whether out of short sightedness or opportunism. For statements and resolutions like those are the very nourishment of Arab inflexibility which alone prevents a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the only possible kind of peace: a peace of compromise.

I suggest to the members of this House that our disappointment, our criticism, and even our anger at this or that step of the U.S. government or at the futile summing-up of the Security Council should not cloud our judgement, and lead us into unjustified generalizations. Nor do I accept the heading given by Knesset member Be'ery to his motion, and I reject the exaggerated complaints directed against the present U.S. administration. Ultimately, that administration's account with regard to Israel is definitely a positive one, and on some subjects, very positive indeed.

Though from time to time differences of opinion appear between us on one subject or another - and such differences have been appearing with every U.S. administration those are disputes and differences of opinion among friendly nations, who have far more (matters) in common than under dispute. Where discussion is necessary, we have discussed, and shall discuss (those differences of opinion). But let us not forget, at the same time, that the values and subjects common to both countries, and the range of subjects in which the U.S. is lending us its support and assistance - a support and an assis-

tance for which there is no substitute - are of far greater weight than the matters and subjects in which the U.S. differs from our view.

To conclude: Israel wants peace, is prepared for peace and is striving for peace with each of its neighbours. But such peace can be achieved only in negotiations between Israel and her neighbours. Without preconditions, without outside interference regarding its contents - whether from third power or from international bodies. Such interference not only fails to bring peace nearer, but must produce obstacles and setbacks.



### UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM, REPORT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE, 28 FEBRUARY 1977

*[UNGA Res. 31162 of 9 Dec. 1976 had requested the Sec.-Gen. to discuss with the parties to the Mideast conflict and the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference the possibility of an early convening of that conference. During his visit to the region, Waldheim noted a growing spirit of moderation and realism, but felt that differences were yet too wide to enable the early reconvening of the Conference.]*

1. The General Assembly in paragraph 1 of its Resolution 31/62 adopted on 9 December 1976, requested the Secretary-General

*"(A) To resume contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with his initiative of 1 April 1976, in preparation for an early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.*

*(B) To submit a report to the Security Council on the results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle East not later than 1 March 1977."*

In the latter part of December and in January, in pursuance of that resolution, I held initial consultations with the representatives of the parties and of the two co-Chairmen at the invitation of the Government of Egypt, and after consultations with all the parties concerned, I decided to visit the region in early February with a view to making contact in the area with the parties directly concerned before making my report to the Security Council.

2. I departed for the Middle East on 31 January and left the area on 12 February. During that period I visited Egypt, Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. I held extensive consultations in those countries with heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers and other leaders involved in the Middle East problem. I also met with Chairman Arafat of the PLO in Damascus. At the termination of my visit to the region, I sent representatives to the respective capitals in order to keep the two co-Chairmen of the Middle East Peace Conference informed of my consultations with the parties in the Middle East and to consult with them on the question of an early reconvening of the Peace Conference.
3. The main object of my mission was to get clarification of the views of the parties concerned as to the best course to follow in resuming the negotiating process and to consult with them as to the best means of overcoming the various obstacles in the way of that objective. My consultations also provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on wider aspects of the Middle East problem itself. All the parties expressed their desire for an early resumption of the negotiating process through the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. The problem, therefore, was to find agreement on the conditions under which the Conference could be convened.

#### Participation in the Peace Conference on the Middle East

4. The most immediate difficulty is the question of participation. The position of the Arab states is that the PLO should be invited to participate in any future meetings of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. The position of the Israeli Government is that the Conference should be convened on the original basis, namely, the letter of the two co-Chairmen which I circulated with my letter of 18 December 1973 convening the Conference (S/11161). Participation would thus be the same as at the

meeting of the Conference which took place in December 1973. The Arab governments maintain that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Israel, on the other hand, is not prepared to recognize the PLO as representative of the Palestinians but is prepared to negotiate with Jordan concerning the Palestinian question. Israel would not object to the inclusion of a Palestinian representative in the delegation of Jordan. The position of the PLO is that it must be invited to participate in the Geneva Peace Conference from the outset on an equal footing with all the parties as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. I may add that this view was shared by all of the Arab governments, especially as related to the importance of issuing a separate invitation to the PLO.

5. I discussed the question of participation at length with all of the parties in an effort to find a means of overcoming this primary obstacle to reconvening the Conference. In this context, the possibility of the Conference discussing the question of participation as its first order of business in a resumed session of the Conference in accordance with the abovementioned letter of 18 December 1973 or in a preparatory stage, the possibility of a unified Arab delegation and other procedural solutions were discussed. It would appear, however, at the present time that the difference between the parties on this matter is too fundamental to be bridged by procedural devices.
6. During my visit to Beirut the question of participation of Lebanon in the Peace Conference on the Middle East was among the subjects discussed. The Government expressed its interest in participating, although it has not yet formalized its position on this matter.

#### Timing

7. The question of the timing of convening of the Peace Conference was also discussed. In principle, all the parties concerned were in favour of convening the Peace Conference at the earliest possible date. The Government of Israel made it clear that it was prepared to attend the meeting of the Conference immediately, provided it was convened on the same basis as the first phase of the Conference in December 1973. The Arab states supported the convening of the Conference within the time-limit set by paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 31/62. The PLO stated that in the absence of an invitation and as long as the Agenda of the Conference was not known, it was not able to express its view on timing. My own impression is that the parties would be prepared to be flexible as regards timing, provided there is a prospect of the Conference being convened within reasonable time-limit.

#### Terms of Reference

8. Another matter which was discussed during the course of my contacts was the terms of reference of the Conference. In 1973, the Conference was convened on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 (1973). It seems to be generally accepted among the original participants in the Conference that Resolution 338 (1973) remains the basis for convening the Peace Conference. In fact, the Government of Israel insists that this is the only basis on which the Conference can legitimately be convened. However, it was noted by the Arab governments that since the adoption of Resolution 338 (1973), the General Assembly had adopted resolutions pertaining to the Geneva Conference and that those should be taken into account.
9. In my conversations with the representatives of the PLO, they made clear its position that Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) cannot be considered the legal basis for the Geneva Peace Conference, since Resolution 242 (1967) had been superseded by General Assembly Resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3376 (XXX). In this regard, the position of the PLO is that, in principle, it is keen on participating in any conference on the Middle East, irrespective of its feelings as regards basis of conference, because it is a party directly involved. However, before taking final decision to participate, the PLO would wish to know the Agenda of the Conference.

#### Agenda and Organization of Work

10. Although the Agenda and the Organization of work of the Conference can be fruitfully discussed only when problems of participation have been overcome, these matters were to some extent explored in the course of my discussions on the general problem of convening the Conference. It is clear that there is a divergence of views on several aspects of this matter which will have to be resolved before the Conference can get down to its work. On the question of working groups, the Arab

side expressed preference for working groups organized on functional rather than geographical basis in which all parties would participate, on grounds that the problem of the Middle East is indivisible. On the other hand, the view was expressed in Israel that negotiations should take place within the Geneva framework on government-to-government basis according to the specific issue involved.

11. Israel regards the Geneva Conference as a continuous ongoing process, within which framework negotiations could take place in different forms and, if necessary, in different places, according to the aspect of the problem involved. Israel prefers a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. If, however, in the present circumstances, this cannot be achieved, it is prepared to work out limited arrangements within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference. For their part, the Arab side emphasized that their interest is to work out a comprehensive settlement, within the Geneva framework and under the United Nations and withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories.

#### Possible Interim Arrangements

12. Even though there has been no convergence of views as to the number of differences which will have to be resolved before it is possible to convene the Peace Conference on the Middle East, all concerned agree that it is of crucial importance to preserve the momentum towards resumption of the negotiations and to avoid hiatus in the efforts to achieve this objective. In this context, various possible interim measures which might be considered if no early agreement of reconvening the Conference could be reached were discussed. Among these possibilities was some form of preparatory working group to be set up in the United Nations Secretariat under the Secretary-General's auspices to maintain contact with all parties and with the co-Chairmen on problems of reconvening the Conference, with a view to their early resolution. This would be largely the formalization of existent activities.
13. Another possibility mentioned was the formation of a contact group in Geneva consisting of representatives of the two co-Chairmen, of the Secretary-General and of the parties concerned in order to explore further procedural problems involved in convening the Conference. A further possibility which came up in the discussion would be the setting up of an interim conference secretariat to maintain contact with the parties and the co-Chairmen and to work on preparations for the Conference, including agenda, rules of procedure and organization of work. The general feeling about such interim measures seemed to be that while it would be desirable to maintain the present contacts on the informal basis, it would not seem advisable to formalize them at the present stage.

#### Consultations with the co-Chairmen

14. By identical letters dated 6 January 1977, I transmitted to the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference the text of General Assembly Resolution 31/62 of 9 December 1976. I also informed them of my plans regarding the resumption of my contacts with the parties and the co-Chairmen along the lines of my initiative of 1 April 1976. On 21 January 1977, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Mr. A. Gromyko, in response to my letter, set out the position of the Soviet Union with respect to the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference, as well as the general problem of the Middle East.
15. Following consultations with Soviet officials in Moscow, it emerged that the Soviet Union remains committed to the position of the principle outlined in its proposal of 2 October 1976, which is contained in document A/31/257 and S/12208 of 7 October 1976. The Soviet Union favours an over-all Middle East settlement in the interest of stable peace in the Middle East and of international security as a whole. Accordingly, it makes an urgent appeal for resumption of work of the Geneva Conference without delay on the basis of the United Nations resolution. It suggests that the Geneva Peace Conference can be held in two stages and attaches importance to the representation of the PLO at the Conference on an equal footing with other parties concerned.
16. On the eve of his departure of the Middle East, Mr. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States, on 14 February 1977, responded to my letter of 6 January 1977, expressing his Government's support for my own efforts concerning the resumption of the negotiating process. At the conclusion of his visit to the area from 14 to 21 February, I was again in touch with the Secretary of State. The Secretary informed me that he found a clear determination among all parties that, if the procedural questions can be resolved, they are prepared to go to Geneva to discuss substantive issues without preconditions. In Mr. Vance's talks the principal substantive issues were agreed to

be the nature of peace, the withdrawal/territorial boundary questions, and the settlement of the Palestinian problem. It was apparent to the Secretary of State that the principal procedural problem that must be resolved arises from differences among the parties over the question of Palestine participation at the Geneva Conference. On the issue of timing, the United States has found consensus that all concerned should work toward reconvening the Geneva Conference in the second half of 1977. It is the stated intention of the United States to work with the Governments in the area to make progress this year toward a Middle East peace.

#### Observations

17. While the immediate purpose of my consultations was to discuss the early convening of the Peace Conference, the wider problems of the Middle East were also discussed. I do not believe that the Council will expect me at this stage to attempt to provide a detailed report on the Middle East question, but it may be of some value to record briefly my own impressions of the attitudes now current among the parties to the Middle East problem.
18. As I have stated before, there can be no doubt that all concerned are earnestly desirous of moving toward a negotiated settlement. In order to achieve this, however, it will be necessary to make a determined effort to overcome the lack of confidence, and mutual distrust and fears of all parties as to the consequences of making compromises and concessions. In the existing situation, the lack of communication and understanding presents a major obstacle in the way of the efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the area. I have done my best during my conversations to try to bridge this gap by conveying faithfully the views of each side to the other. I know that several concerned governments are also making efforts in this regard;
19. The main elements of the Middle East problem remain intractable and extremely difficult to deal with. On the other hand, there is, I believe, an increasing consciousness in the area that the opportunity now exists to resume negotiations in a meaningful way and that, if this opportunity is not seized, there are grave dangers that the situation will deteriorate once again, with incalculable consequences not only for the Middle East but for the international community as a whole.
20. As I have said earlier, the immediate problem in reconvening the Peace Conference is the participation of the PLO and the representation of interests and rights of the Palestinian people. Although I have explored with the parties the possibility of surmounting this obstacle by various arrangements, I do not believe that it can be surmounted by purely procedural means without certain changes in the attitude on all sides. Such changes would involve mutual recognition of legitimacy of claims of different parties in suitable forms and with adequate guarantees and effort on all sides to define more clearly the shape of the ultimate peace settlement in the Middle East. Obviously, the attitude of the PLO toward Israel as reflected in the Palestine National Charter (formerly called Covenant), the attitude of Israel toward the PLO and the nature and context of a Palestinian entity in a future settlement are among the key issues where adjustment of attitude would have an important bearing on prospects of success of the, Peace Conference.
21. Without such basic changes in attitude it will be difficult to make progress in resolving the substantive aspects of the Middle East problem. I discussed these questions at some length with my interlocutors in the Middle East. I hope very much that, through further efforts on all sides, it will prove possible to bring about adjustments which are indispensable to further progress in solving the problem.
22. However great the difficulties may be, I am convinced that we must maintain the movement toward peaceful negotiation for a just and lasting settlement and, specifically, intensify our search for means through which the Peace Conference on the Middle East can be convened at the earliest possible date. We must seize the opportunities that exist, however far apart the positions of the different parties still are. Neither the parties in the Middle East nor the international community as a whole can afford a continuing stalemate. It is vital that we catch the prevailing spirit of moderation and realism before it evaporates and assist the parties to channel that spirit into the arduous process of negotiation.
23. I shall continue my own contacts with the parties and the two co-Chairmen in order to keep myself informed of their positions in the light of the developments since my visit to the Middle East. I shall not fail to inform the Council of further developments.



**US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, CLINTON, MASS., 16 MARCH 1977 [EXCERPTS]**

*[Pres. Carter's address to a town meeting in Clinton was remarkable because it was the first time that a US President used the phrase "there has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees." The following is his reply to the question "What do you personally feel must be done to establish a meaningful and a lasting peace in that area of the world?"]*

I think all of you know that there has been either war or potential war in the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever since Israel became a nation. I think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel.

So, the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural, exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.

The second one is very important and very, very difficult, and that is the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines; Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure their security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other.

But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion now.

And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claims up 'til this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome.

There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years. And the exact way to solve the Palestinian problem is one that first of all addresses itself right now to the Arab countries and then, secondly, to the Arab countries negotiating with Israel.

Those three major elements have got to be solved before a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.

I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.

We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit and start talking and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a hope.

I hope that we will all pray that that will come to pass, because what happens in the Middle East in the future might very well cause a major war there which would quickly spread to all the other nations of the world; very possibly it could do that.

Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their life. We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and other countries, like in Europe - Germany, Italy, France - are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.

So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I will be devoting a major part of my time on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution. Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the best answer I can give you to that question.



**SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST,  
SPEECH TO THE SOVIET TRADE UNION CONFERENCE, 21 MARCH 1977 [EXCERPTS]**

The Middle East is another area that continues to attract attention. A noticeable increase in diplomatic activity is observed there in recent weeks. Judging by everything, the resumption of the Geneva Conference is gradually becoming an ever more realistic matter. Such a course of events, naturally, can only be welcomed.

But the conference in Geneva, of course, is not an end in itself. Fruitful and just results of its work are the main thing. It goes without saying that the drawing up of peace terms in all their details is primarily a matter for the conflicting sides themselves. But the Soviet Union, as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference and a state situated in direct proximity of the area in question, has its own, opinion about the main principles and directions of the future peace settlement. We hold, in particular, that the final document (or documents) on peace in the Middle East should be based on the principle of the impermissibility of acquisition of territory by way of war, on the right of all states of the area to independent existence and security. It goes without saying the inalienable rights of the Palestine Arab people should be ensured, including its right to self determination, to the creation of its own state.

We regard as unquestionable that the documents on peace should provide for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. Such a withdrawal could be carried out not at once, but in stages, in the course, say, of several months, within strictly defined date lines. The appropriate border lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours, participants in the conflict, should be clearly defined. These borders should be declared finally established and inviolable. We proceed from the premise that from the moment of the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops the state of war between the Arab states, participating in the conflict, and Israel will be ended and relations of peace established. In this all sides will undertake mutual obligations to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence, and resolve their international disputes by peaceful means.

Demilitarized zones, without unilateral advantages for any party, could be created on both sides of the established borders, of course, with the consent of the respective states, either a United Nations Emergency Force or United Nations observers could be stationed within these zones for some clearly stipulated period of time.

Evidently, the final documents of the conference should contain also a provision about free passage for ships of all countries, including Israel (after the ending of the state of war) through the Strait of Tiran and the Aqaba Gulf, as well as a statement by Egypt about the passage of ships through the Suez Canal Which is entirely under Egyptian sovereignty. In 'our opinion the fulfilment of the terms of the peace settlement could be guaranteed, should the contracting parties so desire, by the United Nations Security Council or, perhaps, by individual powers, for instance, the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Britain. The guarantor states could have their observers in the United Nations contingents in the respective zones.

Such, comrades, are our preliminary ideas, in briefest form, on the possible mainstays of a just peace in the Middle East. We are not imposing them on anyone, but find it useful to let them be known, just as we, naturally, will be prepared to hear the views of others.

We already said that in connection with a peace settlement in the Middle East the relevant states could study the question of facilitating an ending of the arms race in that area. In general, the problem of international arms trade seems to merit an exchange of views.



**PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, POLITICAL DECLARATION,  
12<sup>TH</sup> SESSION, CAIRO, 22 MARCH 1977**

*[The following declaration, rejecting UNSC Res. 242 and seeking to escalate the "armed struggle," was adopted by a vote of 194 to 13.]*

On the basis of the Palestinian National Covenant, and resolutions passed at the previous session of the National Council; with insistence on the political achievements of the PLO on the Arab and the international level following the 12th session of the Council; following a discussion of the recent developments in the Palestine issue, and emphasizing the support of Arab and international circles in the national Palestinian struggle, the Palestinian National Council stresses the following points:

1. The Palestinian National Council emphasizes that the Palestinian issue is the root and base of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and that Security Council Resolution 242 takes no heed of the Palestinian nation and its unchallengeable rights. The Council therefore emphasizes its opposition to this Resolution and its refusal to negotiate on the basis of it in the Arab and the international arena.
2. The Council emphasizes the position of the PLO, which is unshakably resolved to continue the armed struggle and its concomitant forms of political and mass struggle, to realize those unchallengeable national rights.
3. The Council emphasizes that the struggle on the occupied soil, in all its forms military, political and mass, is the central link in its plans to wage the fight. On that basis, the PLO is striving to escalate the armed struggle on the occupied soil, and all other concomitant forms of struggle, and to provide all forms of moral assistance to the masses of our people on the occupied soil, so as to intensify this struggle and strengthen their stand to defeat and wipe out the occupation.
4. The Council emphasizes the position of the PLO which opposes all forms of American settlements of capitulation and all plans to blot out (the Palestinians). It emphasizes the determination of the PLO to act to thwart any settlement that might be made at the expense of our nation's unchallengeable national rights, and calls upon the Arab nation to fulfil its national responsibility and mobilize all of its resources to face up to these imperialist and Zionist plans.
5. The Council emphasizes the importance and the need of military and political national unity among all the factions of the Palestinian revolution within the PLO, as a basic condition of victory. National unity must, therefore, be coordinated on the several levels and with the several activities, on the basis of adherence to resolutions and the formulation of blueprints for carrying them out.
6. The Council emphasizes its insistence on the right of the Palestinian revolution to exist on the soil of sister Lebanon, within the terms of the Cairo Agreement and its appendices, as ratified by the PLO and the Lebanese authorities. The Council emphasizes its adherence to the performance of this agreement to the letter, so as to safeguard the status of the revolution. The Council opposes every interpretation of the Agreement and its appendices by any one party, while it is solicitous for the sovereignty and security of Lebanon.
7. The Council greets the Lebanese nation, its heroic brother, and emphasizes the steadfast insistence of the PLO on the unity of its soil, its security and independence. The Council is proud of this heroic nation's support of the PLO, which is fighting for the restoration of its national rights on its own soil, and its right to return to it. The Council vehemently emphasizes the need to strengthen the linkage between the Lebanese national forces and the Palestinian revolution.

8. The Council emphasizes the need to strengthen the Arab front which is a partner in the Palestinian revolution, and the linkage with all its partnered forces in all the Arab States. It emphasizes the need to intensify the common Arab struggle and amplify the support for the Palestinian revolution so that it may resist the imperialist and Zionist plots.
9. The Council has resolved to reinforce Arab solidarity and struggle on the basis of the fight against imperialism and Zionism. It has resolved to act for the liberation of all the occupied Arab lands and to cling to the aims of strengthening the Palestinian revolution, and restoring the permanent national rights of the Palestinian nation, without peace (with Israel) or recognition (of Israel).
10. The Council emphasizes the right of the PLO to bear the responsibility (for the struggle) on the Arab and international level, and through every Arab state, for the liberation of the occupied soil.
11. The Council has resolved to continue the struggle for restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian nation, and foremost among them its right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of its national independent State on its independent soil.
12. The Council emphasizes the importance of strengthening cooperation and solidarity with all socialist, non-aligned, Muslim and African States, and movements of national liberation throughout the world.
13. The Council welcomes the positions and struggle of all the democratic States and forces that have withstood Zionism as a form of racism, and its aggressive conduct.
14. The Council emphasizes the importance of relations and coordination with Jewish democratic and progressive forces inside the occupied homeland, and outside, which are fighting against Zionism as an ideology, and against its conduct. It calls on all States and forces in the world which stand for freedom, justice and world peace, to stop all forms of assistance and cooperation with the racist Zionist regime, and to refuse to maintain contacts with it.
15. Considering the achievements attained on the Arab and the international level since the close of its 12th session, the Council has resolved as follows:
  - a. It emphasizes its insistence on the right of the PLO to participate independently and on equal terms in all international conferences and forums connected with the Palestine issue and the Arab-Zionist conflict, 'with the object of realizing our unchallengeable national rights as confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 3236 of 1974.
  - b. The Council declares that any settlement or agreement which might injure the rights of our Palestinian nation in its absence is totally invalid. Long live the Palestinian revolution! Long live Palestinian unity! Glory to our slain! Revolution until victory!



**JOINT STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY US SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO, GENEVA, 21 MAY 1977**

*[The Vance-Gromyko meeting was part of the Carter Admin. attempt to coordinate its Mideast efforts with the USSR to ensure that the latter's Arab friends would not oppose US-sponsored moves.]*

Gromyko and Vance also had a thorough exchange of views on the problem of the settlement in the Middle East.

Both sides proceed on the premise that elimination of the continuing source of tension in the Middle East constitutes one of the primary tasks in ensuring peace and international security. They are convinced that in achieving this goal an important role belongs to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. Having confirmed that mutual efforts of the USSR and the USA, who are co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, are of substantial importance for achieving a just, durable and stable peace in the Middle East the sides agreed to direct their joint efforts towards resuming the work of the conference during the fall of 1977, while recognizing the importance of careful preparation before the conference meets. For these purposes the USA and the USSR will be conducting monthly consultations at the level of ambassadors in Washington or Moscow. They agreed too that they will be working in this direction also in their contacts with the parties immediately involved in the Middle East conflict.



**EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST,  
LONDON, 29 JUNE 1977**

*[Reaffirming the EEC's 1973 position, the statement called for the establishment of a national home for the Palestinians, saying no peace would survive without a solution for the Palestinians.]*

At the present critical stage in the Middle East, the Nine welcome all efforts now being made to bring to an end the tragic conflict there. They emphasise the crucial interest which they see in early and successful negotiations towards a just and lasting peace. They call on all the parties concerned to agree urgently to participate in such negotiations in a constructive and realistic spirit: At this juncture in particular all parties should refrain from statements or policies which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.

The Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of 6 November 1973, 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

- I. The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
- II. The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
- III. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;
- IV. Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.

The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognise the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the states of the region can be assured: but it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.

The Nine believe that the peace negotiations must be resumed urgently, with the aim of agreeing and implementing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. They remain ready to contribute to the extent the parties wish in finding a settlement and in putting it into effect. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.



**US STATE DEPARTMENT, STATEMENT REGARDING ISRAEL'S RECOGNITION OF  
SETTLEMENTS, WASHINGTON, DC, 26 JULY 1977**

*[Earlier the day, the Israeli govt. had issued the following announcement: "The joint Government-World Zionist Organization Settlement Affairs Committee today decided to recognize Ma'aleh Adumim, Ofra and Elon Moreh as full-fledged settlements, and charged the settlement institutions with granting them commensurate treatment."]*

We have been in touch with the Israel Government about the report regarding the settlements. It has informed us that it is taking action to give legal status to the existing settlements on the West Bank. It is our understanding that the former government has refused to legalize at least one of these settlements. We have consistently made clear, including in our recent talks in Washington, our view that

the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories is not only contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but also constitutes an obstacle to progress in the peace making process. We are deeply disappointed in this development.



**PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON PLO POLICY,  
DAMASCUS, 25-26 AUGUST 1977**

Condemnation of all the United States and Zionist maneuvers ignoring the right of our people to return, to self determination, to establish an independent state on its national soil and to gather under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

On this basis the council reiterates its rejection of any attempt, aimed at liquidating the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council and to change the Arab attitude as decided during the Arab summit conferences of Rabat and Cairo, as far as the rights of our people and their representation commitment to the Palestinian cause is concerned.

The Central Council has discussed the situation in occupied Palestine and warns those cowards and those suspected of cooperating with the plans of the Zionist enemy. The Council also highly praises the heroic and struggle role of the masses of our people in the occupied territories and its national leaderships in Galilee, the West Bank and Gaza and the loyalty of these masses to the PLO. The Council also insisted on the importance of increasing our continuous armed struggle against Zionist occupation.



**JOINT US-SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST,  
NEW YORK AND MOSCOW, 1 OCTOBER 1977**

Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation which remains in the Middle East, United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and member of the politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko have the following statement to make on behalf of their countries, which are Co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East:

1. Both governments are convinced that vital interest of the people of this area, as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general, urgently dictate the necessity of achieving, as soon as possible, a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian People, termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for insuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab States as the establishment of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of UN troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as the observance of the terms of the settlement can also be established should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees subject to their constitutional processes.
2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, specially convened for these purposes,

with participation in its work of the representatives of all parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference. In their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the USSR. affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977. The co-chairmen note that there still exist several questions of a procedural and organizational nature which remain to be agreed upon by the participants to the conference.

3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political settlement in the Middle East and to eliminating the explosive situation in this area of the world, the United States and the USSR. appeal to all parties in the conflict to understand the necessity for careful consideration of each other's legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual readiness to act accordingly.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, REACTION TO THE JOINT US-SOVIET  
STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, 2 OCTOBER 1977**

1. The Soviet Union's demand for Israel to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines, which contradicts the real meaning of Security Council Resolution 242, is known to all.
2. Although the United States and Israel Governments agreed on 19 July 1977 that the purpose of the negotiations at Geneva is "an overall peace settlement that will find expression in a peace treaty," the expression "peace treaty" is not mentioned at all in the Soviet-American statement.
3. There is no reference in the statement to Resolutions 242 and 338, despite the fact that until now the United States has repeatedly stated that these resolutions constitute the sole basis for the convening of the Geneva Conference.
4. There can be no doubt that this statement, published at a time when discussions are being held regarding the convening of the Geneva Conference, must necessarily have the effect of hardening even more the positions of the Arab countries, and of making the peacemaking process in the Middle East more difficult.
5. As the Prime Minister has stated, Israel will continue to strive for free and open negotiations with its neighbors, aimed at achieving the signing of peace treaties with them.



**ISRAEL-US WORKING PAPER ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, 5 OCTOBER 1977**

*[After consultation between US and Israeli officials, Israel – in this paper - in effect rejected the US-Soviet statement (see document dated 1 Oct. 1977 above), insisted on UNSC Res. 242 as the basis for talks but said that 242 did not mean territorial withdrawal; the PLO was not mentioned and there would be no Palestinian state. The paper was rejected by Syria while Egypt reserved judgement.]*

Working paper on suggestions for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference.

1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening session, the conference will split into working groups.
2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows:

- A. Egypt-Israel
- B. Jordan-Israel
- C. Syria-Israel
- D. Lebanon-Israel\*<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> \* All the parties agreed that Lebanon may join the conference when it so requests.

3. The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Arabs.
4. The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.
5. The agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East are U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
6. All the initial terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference remain in force, except as may be agreed by the parties.



**US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ALFRED ATHERTON, STATEMENT  
ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS TESTIFYING BEFORE THE US HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES ON  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,  
WASHINGTON, DC, 19 OCTOBER 1977**

I am here to respond to your request for the State Department's views on the subject of Israel's settlements in territories occupied in the 1967 war. With your request, you forwarded a number of questions dealing with the legal, political and factual aspects of this subject. In this statement, I will review briefly the legal and political considerations that form the basis of our policy and touch on those questions relating to the relationship of the settlements to the future status of the occupied territories. Following my statement, I am at the sub-committee's disposal to answer today, or subsequently in writing for the record, your questions on these and other aspects of this subject.

*The U.S. position*

The U.S. position on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories has been consistent since this subject first became an issue in 1968. There are two elements to our position:

First, we have viewed those settlements as an obstacle to peace because their establishment could be perceived as prejudging the outcome of negotiations dealing with the territorial aspects of final peace treaties.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 establishes the principles that peace must be based on withdrawal by Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict and the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. In brief, Resolution 242 envisages Israeli relinquishment of occupied territories in return for Arab agreement to recognize Israel's right to exist and to live in peace with it.

The Arabs perceive Israel's settlements in the occupied territories as indicating that Israel intends to retain permanent control in the areas where the settlements are located and therefore as prejudging agreement in the negotiations on the location of the final secure and recognized boundaries called for in Resolution 242. The Israeli government has taken the position that all issues are negotiable and that the settlements will not be an obstacle to negotiations and peace. In our view, however, once settlements are established, they inevitably create psychological and political conditions which will make it more difficult to negotiate the final disposition of areas where they are located. This is especially troublesome at a time when one of the main problems in launching peace negotiations is to persuade each side that the other intends to negotiate a settlement within the framework of Resolution 242. Thus, the settlements complicate the work of beginning the negotiations because they raise questions in Arab minds whether the negotiations, once begun, have a reasonable chance of succeeding.

In this respect, they are analogous to statements from some Arab quarters which raise questions in Israeli minds whether the Arabs are really prepared to make genuine peace.

Second, we see the Israeli settlements as inconsistent with international law.

The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, which contains many of the internationally recognized rules under which military occupation should be conducted, states in article 49 the following: "The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies."

Both Israel and its Arab neighbors are signatories of the convention, although Israel maintains that it does not apply to any of the territories it has occupied since 1967, and that, in any case, it does not prohibit the establishment of settlements in occupied territory. We do not agree with this view of the convention. In addition, we believe that under international law generally a belligerent occupant is not the sovereign power and does not have the right to treat occupied territory as its own or to make changes in the territory except those necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation. In general, an occupant may only use the resources of the territory including public lands to meet the expenses of administering the territory and the military needs of the army of occupation and for the direct benefit of the indigenous inhabitants.

*The settlements and the future of the territories*

You have asked me to comment on the relationship between the settlements in occupied territories and the right to self-determination of the people of those territories. To begin with, it is essential to understand an important difference between the Sinai and the Golan Heights, on the one hand, and the West Bank and Gaza, on the other.

- Territory in the Sinai and the Golan from which Israel withdraws as a result of a negotiated agreement will clearly revert respectively to Egypt and Syria, whose sovereignty is not disputed. The issue of self-determination is therefore not germane in these two cases.
- In the West Bank and Gaza, however, the situation is different. Both of these territories were part of the British Mandate of Palestine. While the legitimate existence of a sovereign Israel in part of Palestine is recognized, the question of sovereignty in the part of Palestine remaining outside of Israel under the 1949 Armistice Agreements has not been finally resolved. Jordan in May 1950 declared that its annexation of the West Bank was without prejudice to the final settlement of the Palestine issue, and Egypt did not make any sovereign claim to the Gaza Strip during the time it was the administering authority there. Israel similarly notes the undefined nature of sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza.

The relationship between the settlements and the principle of self-determination cannot be discussed in isolation, because the settlements are but a single factor involved in negotiating peace treaties that will provide among other things for the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the view of the United States, the important thing concerning the future disposition of the West Bank and Gaza is that the arrangement be acceptable to the parties concerned. There is no clear consensus with respect to the question of whether, and if so how, self-determination might be expressed, or to the timing of such an expression. Whether such a consensus can be achieved in the negotiating process that lies ahead remains to be seen. This question, however, together with all the other complex issues of achieving peace in the Middle East Peace Conference so that the negotiating process can be resumed as soon as possible. We are now engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts to that end.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 32/5 ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS  
IN THE TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 28 OCTOBER 1977**

The General Assembly,

*Stressing* the urgent need to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Expressing* grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and the measures and actions taken by the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, and designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories,

*Considering* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967,

1. Determines that all such measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
2. Strongly deplores the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories;
3. Calls upon Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;
4. Calls once more upon the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. Urges all States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
6. Requests the Secretary-General:
  - (a) To undertake urgent contacts with the Government of Israel to ensure the prompt implementation of the present resolution;
  - (b) To submit a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council, not later than 31 December 1977, on the results of his contacts;
7. Requests the Security Council to review the situation in the light of the present resolution and of the report of the Secretary-General.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, BROADCAST BY TO THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, JERUSALEM, 11 NOVEMBER 1977**

*[On 9 Nov., Pres. Sadat had told the People's Assembly in Cairo, that he was ready to come to Jerusalem and address the Knesset and to negotiate a Middle East settlement. ("I state in all seriousness that I am prepared to go to the end of the world - and Israel will be surprised to hear me tell you that I am ready to go to their home, to the Knesset itself, to argue with them, in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier from being wounded. Members of the People's Assembly, we have no time to waste."). Begin's official response follows below:]*

Citizens of Egypt: This is the first time that I address you directly; but it is not for the first time that I think and speak of you. You are our neighbours and always will be.

For the last 29 years, a tragic, completely unnecessary conflict has continued between your country and ours. Since the time when the Government of King Farouk gave the order to invade our land, Eretz Israel, in order to strangle our newly-restored freedom and independence, four major wars have taken place between you and us. Much blood was shed on both sides. Many families were orphaned and bereaved, in Egypt and Israel.

In retrospect, we know that all those attempts to destroy the Jewish State were in vain, as were all the sacrifices you were called upon to make - in life, in development, in economy, in social advancement - all these superfluous sacrifices were also in vain. And may I tell you, our neighbours, that so it will be in the future.

You should know that we have come back to the Land of our forefathers, that it is we who liberated the country from British rule, and that we have established our independence in our Land for all generations to come.

We wish you well. In fact, there is no reason whatsoever for hostility between our peoples. In ancient times, Egypt and Eretz Israel were allies, real friends and allies, against a common enemy from the north. Indeed, many changes have taken place since those days. But perhaps the intrinsic basis for friendship and mutual help remains unaltered.

We, the Israelis, stretch out our hand to you. It is not, as you know, a weak hand. If attacked, we shall always defend ourselves, as our forefathers, the Maccabees did - and won the day.

But we do not want any clashes with you. Let us say one to another, and let it be a silent oath by both peoples, of Egypt and Israel: no more wars, no more bloodshed, and no more threats. Let us not only make peace. Let us also start on the road of friendship, of sincere and productive cooperation. We can help each other. We can make the lives of our nations better, easier, happier.

Your President said, two days ago, that he is ready to come to Jerusalem, to our Parliament - the Knesset - in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier from being wounded. It is a good statement. I have already welcomed it, and it will be a pleasure to welcome and receive your President with the traditional hospitality you and we have inherited from our common father, Abraham. And I, for my part, will of course be ready to come to your capital, Cairo, for the same purpose: No more wars - peace - a real peace and forever. It is in the holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to this Land was stated and sanctified. May I read it to you, this eternal surah:

"Recall when Moses said to his people: Oh my people, remember the goodness of Allah towards you when he appointed prophets amongst you... Oh my people, enter the Holy Land which Allah hath written down as yours..."

It is in this spirit of our common belief in God, in divine providence, in right and in justice, in all the great human values which were handed down to you by the prophet Mohammed and by our prophets - Moses, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yehezke'el - it is in this human spirit that I say to you with all my heart: Shalom.

It means *sulh*. And vice-versa: *sulh* means shalom.



**EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT, STATEMENT TO THE KNESSET,  
JERUSALEM, 20 NOVEMBER 1977**

*In the name of God, the Gracious and Merciful.*

Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Peace and the mercy of God Almighty be upon you and may peace be for us all, God willing. Peace for us all on the Arab land, and in Israel as well, as in every part of this big world, which is so complexed by its sanguinary conflicts, disturbed by its sharp contradictions, menaced now and then by destructive wars launched by man to annihilate his fellow man. Finally, amidst the ruins of what man has built and the remains of the victims of Mankind, there emerges neither victor nor vanquished. The only vanquished remains man, God's most sublime creation, man whom God has created - as Ghandi the apostle of peace puts it: to forge ahead to mould the way of life and worship God Almighty.

I come to you today on solid ground, to shape a new life, to establish peace. We all, on this land, the land of God; we all, Muslims, Christians and Jews, worship God and no one but God. God's teachings and commandments are love, sincerity, purity and peace.

I do not blame all those who received my decision - when I announced it to the entire world before the Egyptian People's Assembly - with surprise and amazement. Some, gripped by the violent surprise, believed that my decision was no more than verbal juggling to cater for world public opinion. Others, still, interpreted it as political tactics to camouflage my intention of launching a new war. I would go as far as to tell you that one of my aides at the Presidential Office contacted me at a late hour following my return home from the People's Assembly and sounded worried as he asked me: "Mr. President, what would be our reaction if Israel should actually extend an invitation to you?" I replied calmly, I will accept it immediately. I have declared that I will go to the end of the world; I will go to Israel, for I want to put before the People of Israel all the facts.

I can see the point of all those who were astounded by my decision or those who had any doubts as to the sincerity of the intentions behind the declaration of my decision. No one would have ever conceived that the President of the biggest Arab State, which bears the heaviest burden and the top responsibility pertaining to the cause of war and peace in the Middle East, could declare his readiness to go to the land of the adversary while we were still in a state of war. Rather, we all are still bearing the consequences of four fierce wars waged within thirty years. The families of the 1973 October War are still moaning under the cruel pains of widowhood and bereavement of sons, fathers and brothers.

As I have already declared, I have not consulted, as far as this decision is concerned, with any of my colleagues and brothers, the Arab Heads of State or the confrontation States. Those of them who contacted me, following the declaration of this decision, expressed their objection, because the feeling of utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence between the Arab States and the Palestinian People on the one hand, and Israel on the other, still surges in us all. It is sufficient to say that many months in which peace could have been brought about had been wasted over differences and fruitless discussions on the procedure for the convocation of the Geneva Conference, all showing utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence.

But, to be absolutely frank with you, I took this decision after long thinking, knowing that it constitutes a grave risk for, if God Almighty has made it my fate to assume the responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian People and to share in the fate-determining responsibility of the Arab Nation and the Palestinian People, the main duty dictated by this responsibility is to exhaust all and every means in a bid to save my Egyptian Arab People and the entire Arab Nation the horrors of new, shocking and destructive wars, the dimensions of which are foreseen by no other than God himself.

After long thinking, I was convinced that the obligation of responsibility before God, and before the people, make it incumbent on me that I should go to the farthest corner of the world, even to Jerusalem, to address Members of the Knesset, the representatives of the People of Israel, and acquaint them with all the facts surging in me. Then, I would leave you to decide for yourselves. Following this, may God Almighty determine our fate.

Ladies and Gentlemen, there are moments in the life of nations and peoples when it is incumbent on those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to overlook the past, with all its complexities and weighing memories, in a bold drive towards new horizons. Those who, like us, are shouldering the same responsibility entrusted to us, are the first who should have the courage to take fate-determining decisions which are in consonance with the circumstances. We must all rise above all forms of fanaticism, self-deception and obsolete theories of superiority. The most important thing is never to forget that infallibility is the prerogative of God alone.

If I said that I wanted to save all the Arab People the horrors of shocking and destructive wars, I most sincerely declare before you that I have the same feelings and bear the same responsibility towards all and every man on earth, and certainly towards the Israeli People.

Any life lost in war is a human life, irrespective of its being that of an Israeli or an Arab. A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or an Israeli. Innocent children who are deprived of the care and compassion of their parents are ours, be they living

on Arab or Israeli land. They command our top responsibility to afford them a comfortable life today and tomorrow.

For the sake of them all, for the safeguard of the lives of all our sons and brothers, for affording our communities the opportunity to work for the progress and happiness of man and his right to a dignified life, for our responsibilities before the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child born on our land - for all that, I have taken my decision to come to you, despite all hazards, to deliver my address.

I have shouldered the prerequisites of the historical responsibility and, therefore, I declared - on 4 February 1971, to be precise - that I was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel. This was the first declaration made by a responsible Arab official since, the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Motivated by all these factors dictated by the responsibilities of leadership, I called, on 16 October 1973, before the Egyptian People's Assembly, for an international conference to establish permanent peace based on justice. I was not in the position of he who was pleading for peace or asking for a ceasefire.

Motivated by all these factors dictated by duties of history and leadership, we signed the first disengagement agreement, followed by the second disengagement agreement in Sinai. Then we proceeded trying both open and closed doors in a bid to find a certain path leading to a durable and just peace. We opened our hearts to the peoples of the entire world to make them understand our motivations and objectives, and to leave them actually convinced of the fact that we are advocates of justice and peace-makers.

Motivated by all these factors, I decided to come to you with an open mind and an open heart, and with a conscious determination, so that we might establish permanent peace based on justice.

It is so fated that my trip to you, the trip of peace, should coincide with the Islamic feast, the holy Feast of Courban Bairam, the Feast of Sacrifice when Abraham - peace be upon him - great-grandfather of the Arabs and Jews, submitted to God; I say when God Almighty ordered him, and to Him Abraham went, with dedicated sentiments, not out of weakness, but through a giant spiritual force and by a free will, to sacrifice his very own son, prompted by a firm and unshakable belief in ideals that lend life a profound significance.

This coincidence may carry a new meaning to us all, which may become a genuine aspiration heralding security and peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let us be frank with each other, using straight-forward words and a clear conception, with no ambiguity. Let us be frank with each other today while the entire world, both East and West, follows these unparalleled moments which could prove to be a radical turning point in the history of this part of the world, if not in the history of the world as a whole. Let us be frank with each other as we answer this important question: how can we achieve permanent peace based on justice?

I have come to you carrying my clear and frank answer to this big question, so that the people in Israel as well as the whole world might hear it, and so that all those whose devoted prayers ring in my ears, pleading to God Almighty that this historic meeting may eventually lead to the results aspired to by millions, might also hear it.

Before I proclaim my answer, I wish to assure you that, in my clear and frank answer, I am basing myself on a number of facts which no one can deny.

The first fact: no one can build his happiness at the expense of the misery of others.

The second fact: never have I spoken or will ever speak in two languages. Never have I adopted or will adopt two policies. I never deal with anyone except in one language, one policy, and with one face.

The third fact: direct confrontation and a straight line are the nearest and most successful methods to reach a clear objective.

The fourth fact: the call for permanent and just peace, based on respect for the United Nations resolutions, has now become the call of the whole world. It has become a clear expression of the will of the international community, whether in official capitals, where policies are made and decisions taken, or at the level of world public opinion which influences policy-making and decision-taking.

The fifth fact: and this is probably the clearest and most prominent, is that the Arab Nation, in its drive for permanent peace based on justice, does not proceed from a position of weakness or hesitation, but it has the potential of power and stability which tells of a sincere will for peace. The Arab-declared intention stems from an awareness prompted by a heritage of civilization that, to avoid an inevitable disaster that will befall us, you and the entire world, there is no alternative to the establishment of permanent peace based on justice - peace that is not shaken by storms, swayed by suspicion, or jeopardized by ill intentions.

In the light of these facts which I meant to place before you the way I see them, I would also wish to warn you in all sincerity; I warn you against some thoughts that could cross your minds; frankness makes it incumbent upon me to tell you the following:

*First:* I have not come here for a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not part of the policy of Egypt. The problem is not that of Egypt and Israel. Any separate peace between Egypt and Israel, or between any Arab confrontation State and Israel, will not bring permanent peace based on justice in the entire region. Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation States and Israel were achieved, in the absence of a just solution to the Palestinian problem, never will there be that durable and just peace upon which the entire world insists today.

*Second:* I have not come to you to seek a partial peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency at this stage, and put off the entire problem to a subsequent stage. This is not the radical solution that would steer us to permanent peace.

Equally, I have not come to you for a third disengagement agreement in Sinai, or in the Golan and the West Bank. For this would mean that we are merely delaying the ignition of the fuse; it would mean that we are lacking the courage to confront peace, that we are too weak to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of a durable peace based on justice.

I have come to you so that together we might build a durable peace based on justice, to avoid the shedding of one single drop of blood from an Arab or an Israeli. It is for this reason that I have proclaimed my readiness to go to the farthest corner of the world.

Here, I would go back to the answer to the big question: how can we achieve a durable peace based on justice? In my opinion, and I declare it to the whole world from this forum, the answer is neither difficult nor impossible, despite long years of feud, blood vengeance, spite and hatred, and breeding generations on concepts of total rift and deep-rooted animosity. The answer is not difficult, nor is it impossible, if we sincerely and faithfully follow a straight line.

You want to live with us in this part of the world. In all sincerity, I tell you, we welcome you among us, with full security and safety. This, in itself, is a tremendous turning point; one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change.

We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our claims, yes. We used to brand you as "so-called" Israel, yes. We were together in international conferences and organizations and our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings, yes. This has happened and is still happening.

It is also true that we used to set, as a precondition for any negotiations with you, a mediator who would meet separately with each party. Through this procedure, the talks of the first and second disengagement agreements took place.

Our delegates met in the first Geneva Conference without exchanging a direct word. Yes, this has happened. Yet, today I tell you, and declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice. We do not want to encircle you or be encircled ourselves by destructive missiles ready for launching, nor by the shells of grudges and hatred. I have announced on more than one occasion that Israel has become a *fait accompli*, recognized by the world, and that the two super powers have undertaken the responsibility of its security and the defence of its existence.

As we really and truly seek peace, we really and truly welcome you to live among us in peace and security.

There was a huge wall between us which you tried to build up over a quarter of a century, but it was destroyed in 1973. It was a wall of a continuously inflammable and escalating psychological warfare. It was a wall of fear of the force that could sweep the entire Arab Nation. It was a wall of propaganda, that we were a Nation reduced to a motionless corpse. Rather, some of you had gone as far as to say that, even after 50 years, the Arabs would not regain any strength. It was a wall that threatened always with the long arm that could reach and strike anywhere. It was a wall that warned us against extermination and annihilation if we tried to use our legitimate right to liberate the occupied territories. Together we have to admit that that wall fell and collapsed in 1973.

Yet, there remained another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us. A barrier of suspicion. A barrier of rejection. A barrier of fear of deception. A barrier of hallucinations around any action, deed or decision. A barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretations of all and every event or statement. It is this psychological barrier which I described in official statements as representing 70 percent of the whole problem.

Today, through my visit to you, I ask you: why don't we stretch our hands with faith and sincerity so that, together, we might destroy this barrier? Why shouldn't ours and your will meet with faith and sincerity, so that together we might remove all suspicion of fear, betrayal and ill intentions? Why don't we stand together with the bravery of men and the boldness of heroes who dedicate themselves to a sublime objective? Why don't we stand together with the same courage and boldness to erect a huge edifice of peace that builds and does not destroy? An edifice that is a beacon for generations to come - the human message for construction, development and the dignity of man? Why should we bequeath to the coming generations the plight of bloodshed, death, orphans, widowhood, family disintegration, and the wailing of victims?

Why don't we believe in the wisdom of God conveyed to us by the Proverbs of Solomon:

"Deceit is in the heart of them that imagine evil; but to the counsellors of peace is joy. Better is a dry morsel, and quietness therewith, than a house full of sacrifices with strife."

Why don't we repeat together from the Psalms of David:

"Hear the voice of my supplications, when I cry unto thee, when I lift up my hands toward thy holy oracle. Draw me not away with the wicked, and with the workers of iniquity, which speak peace to their neighbours, but mischief is in their hearts. Give them according to their deeds, and according to the wickedness of their endeavours."

To tell you the truth, peace cannot be worth its name unless it is based on justice, and not on the occupation of the land of others. It would not be appropriate for you to demand for yourselves what you deny others. With all frankness, and with the spirit that has prompted me to come to you today, I tell you: you have to give up, once and for all, the dreams of conquest, and give up the belief that force is

the best method for dealing with the Arabs. You should clearly understand and assimilate the lesson of confrontation between you and us.

Expansion does not pay. To speak frankly, our land does not yield itself to bargaining. It is not even open to argument. To us, the national soil is equal to the holy valley where God Almighty spoke to Moses - peace be upon him. None of us can, or accept to, cede one inch of it, or accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.

I sincerely tell you that before us today lies the appropriate chance for peace, if we are really serious in our endeavours for peace. It is a chance that time cannot afford once again. It is a chance that, if lost or wasted, the plotter against it will bear the curse of humanity and the curse of history.

What is peace for Israel? It means that Israel lives in the region with her Arab neighbours, in security and safety. To such logic, I say yes. It means that Israel lives within her borders, secure against any aggression. To such logic, I say yes. It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that ensure those two factors. To this demand, I say yes. More than that: we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you envisage and accept. We declare that we accept all the guarantees you want from the two super powers or from either of them, or from the Big Five, or some of them.

Once again, I declare clearly and unequivocally that we agree to any guarantees you accept because, in return, we shall obtain the same guarantees.

In short, then, when we ask: what is peace for Israel, the answer would be: it is that Israel live within her borders with her Arab neighbours, in safety and security within the framework of all the guarantees she accepts and which are offered to the other party. But how can this be achieved? How can we reach this conclusion which would lead us to permanent peace based on justice?

There are facts that should be faced with all courage and clarity. There are Arab territories which Israel has occupied by armed force. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem.

I have come to Jerusalem, as the City of Peace, which will always remain as a living embodiment of coexistence among believers of the three religions. It is inadmissible that anyone should conceive the special status of the City of Jerusalem within the framework of annexation or expansionism, but it should be a free and open city for all believers.

Above all, the city should not be severed from those who have made it their abode for centuries. Instead of awakening the prejudices of the Crusaders, we should revive the spirit of Ornar ibn el-Khattab and Saladdin, namely the spirit of tolerance and respect for rights. The holy shrines of Islam and Christianity are not only places of worship, but a living testimony of our uninterrupted presence here politically, spiritually and intellectually. Let us make no mistake about the importance and reverence we Christians and Muslims attach to Jerusalem.

Let me tell you, without the slightest hesitation, that I did not come to you under this dome to make a request that your troops evacuate the occupied territories. Complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 is a logical and undisputed fact. Nobody should plead for that. Any talk about permanent peace based on justice, and any move to ensure our coexistence in peace and security in this part of the world, would become meaningless, while you occupy Arab territories by force of arms. For there is no peace that could be in consonance with, or be built on, the occupation of the land of others. Otherwise, it would not be a serious peace.

Yes, this is a foregone conclusion which is not open to discussion or debate - if intentions are sincere and if endeavours to establish a just and durable peace for ours and the generations to come are genuine.

As for the Palestinians cause, nobody could deny that it is the crux of the entire problem. Nobody in the world could accept, today, slogans propagated here in Israel, ignoring the existence of the Palestinian People, and questioning their whereabouts. The cause of the Palestinian People and their legitimate rights are no longer ignored or denied today by anybody. Rather, nobody who has the ability of judgement can deny or ignore it.

It is an acknowledged fact received by the world community, both in the East and in the West, with support and recognition in international documents and official statements. It is of no use to anybody to turn deaf ears to its resounding voice which is being heard day and night, or to overlook its historical reality. Even the United States, your first ally which is absolutely committed to safeguard Israel's security and existence, and which offered and still offers Israel every moral, material and military support - I say - even the United States has opted to face up to reality and facts, and admit that the Palestinian People are entitled to legitimate rights and that the Palestinian problem is the core and essence of the conflict and that, so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimensions. In all sincerity, I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.

I shall not indulge in past events since the Balfour Declaration sixty years ago. You are well acquainted with the relevant facts. If you have found the legal and moral justification to set up a national home on a land that did not all belong to you, it is incumbent upon you to show understanding of the insistence of the People of Palestine on establishing, once again (sic) a state on their land. When some extremists ask the Palestinians to give up this sublime objective, this, in fact, means asking them to renounce their identity and every hope for the future.

I hail the Israeli voices that called for the recognition of the Palestinian People's rights to achieve and safeguard peace. Here I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is no use to refrain from recognizing the Palestinian People and their rights to statehood and rights of return.

We, the Arabs, have faced this experience before, with you and with the reality of Israeli existence. The struggle took us from war to war, from victims to more victims, until you and we have today reached the edge of a horrifying abyss and a terrifying disaster, unless, together, we seize the opportunity, today, of a durable peace based on justice.

You have to face reality bravely as I have done. There can never be any solution to a problem by evading it or turning a deaf ear to it. Peace cannot last if attempts are made to impose fantasy concepts on which the world has turned its back and announced its unanimous call for the respect of rights and facts. There is no need to enter a vicious circle as to Palestinian rights. It is useless to create obstacles. Otherwise the march of peace will be impeded or peace will be blown up.

As I have told you, there is no happiness to the detriment of others. Direct confrontation and straightforwardness are the short-cut and the most successful way to reach a clear objective. Direct confrontation concerning the Palestinian problem, and tackling it in one single language with a view to achieving a durable and just peace, lie in the establishment of their state. With all the guarantees you demand, there should be no fear of a newly-born state that needs the assistance of all countries of the world. When the bells of peace ring, there will be no hands to beat the drums of war. Even if they existed, they would be soundless.

Conceive with me a peace agreement in Geneva that we would herald to a world thirsty for peace, a peace agreement based on the following points:

*First:* ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

*Second:* achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian People and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.

*Third:* the right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, which will be secure and guaranteed through procedures to be agreed upon, which provide appropriate security to international boundaries, in addition to appropriate international guarantees.

*Fourth:* commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principles concerning the non-resort to force and the solution of differences among them by peaceful means.

*Fifth:* ending the state of belligerency in the region.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Peace is not the mere endorsement of written lines; rather, it is a rewriting of history. Peace is not a game of calling for peace to defend certain whims or hide certain ambitions. Peace is a giant struggle against all and every ambition and whim. Perhaps the examples taken from ancient and modern history teach us all that missiles, warships and nuclear weapons cannot establish security. Rather, they destroy what peace and security build. For the sake of our peoples, and for the sake of the civilizations made by man, we have to defend man everywhere against the rule of the force of arms, so that we may endow the rule of humanity with all the power of the values and principles that promote the sublime position of Mankind.

Allow me to address my call from this rostrum to the People of Israel. I address myself with true and sincere words to every man, woman and child in Israel.

From the Egyptian People who bless this sacred mission of peace, I convey to you the message of peace, the message of the Egyptian People who do not know fanaticism, and whose sons, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, live together in a spirit of cordiality, love and tolerance. This is Egypt whose people have entrusted me with that sacred message, the message of security, safety and peace. To every man, woman and child in Israel, I say: encourage your leadership to struggle for peace. Let all endeavours be channelled towards building a huge edifice for peace, instead of strongholds and hide-outs defended by destructive rockets. Introduce to the entire world the image of the new man in this area, so that he might set an example to the man of our age, the man of peace everywhere.

Be the heralds to your sons. Tell them that past wars were the last of wars and the end of sorrows. Tell them that we are in for a new beginning to a new life - the life of love, prosperity, freedom and peace.

You, bewailing mother; you, widowed wife; you, the son who lost a brother or a father; you, all victims of wars - fill the earth and space with recitals of peace. Fill bosoms and hearts with the aspirations of peace. Turn the song into a reality that blossoms and lives. Make hope a code of conduct and endeavour. The will of people is part of the will of God.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before I came to this place, with every beat of my heart and with every sentiment, I prayed to God Almighty, while performing the Curban Bairarn prayers, and while visiting the Holy Sepulchre, to give me strength and to confirm my belief that this visit may achieve the objectives I look forward to, for a happy present and a happier future.

I have chosen to set aside all precedents and traditions known by warring countries, in spite of the fact that occupation of the Arab territories is still there. Rather, the declaration of my readiness to proceed to Israel came as a great surprise that stirred many feelings and astounded many minds. Some opinions even doubted its intent. Despite that, the decision was inspired by all the clarity and purity of belief, and with all the true expression of my People's will and intentions.

And I have chosen this difficult road which is considered, in the opinion of many, the most difficult road. I have chosen to come to you with an open heart and an open mind. I have chosen to give this great impetus to all international efforts exerted for peace. I have chosen to present to you, and in your own home, the realities devoid of any schemes or whims, not to manoeuvre or to win a round, but for us to win together, the most dangerous of rounds and battles in modern history - the battle of permanent peace based on justice.

It is not my battle alone, nor is it the battle of the leadership in Israel alone. It is the battle of all and every citizen in all our territories whose right it is to live in peace. It is the commitment of conscience and responsibility in the hearts of millions.

When I put forward this initiative, many asked what is it that I conceived as possible to achieve during this visit, and what my expectations were. And, as I answered the questioners, I announce before you that I have not thought of carrying out this initiative from the concept of what could be achieved during this visit, but I have come here to deliver a message. I have delivered the message, and may God be my witness.

I repeat with Zechariah, "Love right and justice."

I quote the following verses from the holy Koran: "We believe in God and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, and the tribes and in the books given to Moses, Jesus, and the prophets from their lord. We make no distinction between one and another among them and to God we submit."



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, ADDRESS TO THE KNESSET,  
JERUSALEM, 20 NOVEMBER 1977**

Mr. Speaker, Honourable President of the State of Israel, Honourable President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Worthy and Learned Knesset Members:

We send our greetings to the President and to all adherents of the Islamic faith, in our own country and wherever they may be, on the occasion of the Feast of Sacrifice, Id el-Adha.

This feast reminds us of the binding of Isaac on the altar, the test with which the Creator tried the faith of our forefather Abraham - our common father; the challenge which Abraham met. But, from the point of view of morality and the advancement of Mankind, this event heralded the principle of a ban on human sacrifice. Our two Peoples, in their ancient tradition, learned and taught that humanitarian prohibition, while the nations around us continued to offer human sacrifices to their idols. Thus we, the People of Israel and the Arab People, contributed to the advancement of Mankind, and we continue to contribute to human civilization until this very day.

I greet the President of Egypt on the occasion of his visit to our country and his participation in this session of the Knesset. The duration of the flight from Cairo to Jerusalem is short but, until last night, the distance between them was infinite. President Sadat showed courage in crossing this distance. We Jews can appreciate courage, as exhibited by our guest, because it is with courage that we arose, and with it we shall continue to exist.

Mr. Speaker, this small People, the surviving remnant of the Jewish People which returned to our historic Homeland, always sought peace. And, when the dawn of our freedom rose on the 14th of May, 1948, the 4th of Iyar, 5708, David Ben-Gurion said, in the Declaration of Independence, the charter of our national independence:

"We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish People settled in its own Land."

A year earlier, in the midst of the fateful struggle for the liberation of the Land and the redemption of the Nation, while still in the underground, we issued the following call to our neighbours:

"Let us live together in this Land and together advance towards a life of freedom and happiness. Our Arab neighbours - do not reject the hand which is outstretched to you in peace."

But it is my duty - my duty Mr. Speaker, and not only my privilege - to assert today in truth that our hand, extended in peace, was rejected. And, one day after our independence was renewed, in accordance with our eternal and indisputable right, we were attacked on three fronts, and we stood virtually without arms - few against many, weak against strong. One day after the declaration of our independence, an attempt was made to strangle it with enmity, and to extinguish the last hope of the Jewish People in the generation of Holocaust and Resurrection.

No, we do not believe in might, and we have never based our relations with the Arab Nation on force. On the contrary, force was exercised against us. Throughout all the years of this generation we have never ceased to be attacked with brute force in order to destroy our Nation, to demolish our independence, to annul our right. And we defended ourselves.

True, we defended our right, our existence, our honour, our women and our children against recurrent attempts to crush us by brute force, and not on one front alone. This, too, is true: with the help of God we overcame the forces of aggression and assured the survival of our nation, not only for this generation, but for all those to come.

We do not believe in might; we believe in right, only in right. And that is why our aspiration, from the depths of our hearts, from time immemorial until this very day, is peace.

Mr. President, in this democratic chamber sit commanders of all the Hebrew underground fighting organizations. They were compelled to conduct a battle of few against many, against a mighty world power. Here sit our top military commanders, who led their forces in a battle that was imposed on them, and to a victory that was inevitable, because they defended right. They belong to various parties, and have different outlooks. But I am sure, Mr. President, that I am expressing the views of them all, without exception, when I say that we have one aspiration at heart, one desire in our souls, and we are all united in this aspiration and this desire - to bring peace: peace to our nation which has not known it for even one day since the beginning of the Return to Zion; and peace to our neighbours to whom we wish all the best. And we believe that if we achieve peace, true peace, we shall be able to assist one another in all realms of life, and a new era will be opened in the Middle East: an era of flourishing and growth, of development and progress and advancement, as in ancient times.

Therefore, allow me today to define the meaning of peace as we understand it. We seek a true, full peace, with absolute reconciliation between the Jewish People and the Arab People. We must not permit memories of the past to stand in our way. There have been wars; blood has been shed; our wonderful sons have fallen in battle on both sides. We shall always cherish the memory of our heroes who gave their lives so that this day, yea even this day, might come. We respect the valour of an adversary, and we pay tribute to all members of the young generation of the Arab Nation who have fallen as well.

Let us not be daunted by memories of the past, even if they are bitter to us all. We must overcome them, and focus on what lies ahead: on our Peoples, on our children, on our common future. For, in this region, we shall all live together - the Great Arab Nation in its States and its countries, and the Jewish People in its Land, Eretz Israel - forever and ever. For this reason the meaning of peace must be defined.

As free men, Mr. President, let us conduct negotiations for a peace treaty and, with the help of God, so we believe with all our hearts, the day will come when we will sign it, with mutual respect. Then will we know that the era of wars has ended, that we have extended a hand to one another, that we have shaken each other's hand, and that the future will be glorious for all the Peoples of the region. Of prime significance, therefore, in the context of a peace treaty, is a termination of the state of war.

I agree, Mr. President, that you have not come here and we did not invite you to our country in order, as has been suggested in recent days, to drive a wedge between the Arab Peoples, or, expressed more cleverly

in accord with the ancient saying, "divide et impera." Israel has no desire to rule and does not wish to divide. We want peace with all our neighbours - with Egypt and with Jordan, with Syria and with Lebanon.

There is no need to differentiate between a peace treaty and the termination of the state of war. We neither propose this, nor do we seek it. On the contrary, the first article of a peace treaty determines the end of the state of war, forever. We wish to establish normal relations between us, as exist among all nations after all wars. We have learned from history, Mr. President, that war is avoidable. It is peace that is inevitable.

Many nations have waged war against one another, and sometimes they have made use of the foolish term "eternal enemy." There are no eternal enemies. After all wars comes the inevitable - peace. Therefore, in the context of a peace treaty, we seek to stipulate the establishment of diplomatic relations, as is customary among civilized nations.

Today, Jerusalem is bedecked with two flags - the Egyptian and the Israeli. Together, Mr. President, we have seen our little children waving both flags. Let us sign a peace treaty and establish such a situation forever, both in Jerusalem and in Cairo. I hope the day will come when Egyptian children will wave Israeli and Egyptian flags together, just as the Israeli children are waving both of these flags together in Jerusalem; when you, Mr. President, will be represented by a loyal Ambassador in Jerusalem, and we, by an Ambassador in Cairo and, should differences of opinion arise between us, we will clarify them, like civilized peoples, through our authorized emissaries.

We propose economic cooperation for the development of our countries. God created marvelous lands in the Middle East - virtual oases in the desert - but there are also deserts, and these can be made fertile. Let us join hands in facing this challenge, and cooperate in developing our countries, in abolishing poverty, hunger and homelessness. Let us raise our nations to the status of developed countries, so that we may no longer be called developing states.

With all due respect, I am prepared to endorse the words of His Highness, the King of Morocco, who said, publicly, that, if peace were to be established in the Middle East, the combination of Arab and Jewish genius can together convert the region into a paradise on earth.

Let us open our countries to free movement, so that you shall come to us and we will visit you. I am prepared today to announce, Mr. Speaker, that our country is open to the citizens of Egypt, and I do not qualify this announcement with any condition on our part. I think it would be only be proper and just that there be a mutual announcement on this matter. And, just as Egyptian flags are flying in our streets, there is also an honoured Egyptian delegation in our capital and in our country today. Let there be many visitors. Our border will be open to you, just as will be all the other borders, for, as I noted, we would like the same situation to prevail in the south, in the north and in the east.

Therefore, I renew my invitation to the President of Syria to follow in your footsteps, Mr. President, and to come to our country to begin negotiations on the establishment of peace between Israel and Syria and on the signing of a peace treaty between us. I am sorry to say, there is no justification for the mourning that has been decreed on the other side of our northern border. On the contrary, such visits, such contacts and discussions, can and should be a cause of happiness, a cause of elation for all peoples.

I invite King Hussein to come here and we shall discuss with him all the problems that exist between us. I also invite genuine spokesmen of the Palestinian Arabs to come and to hold talks with us on our common future, on guaranteeing human freedom, social justice, peace and mutual respect.

And, if they should invite us to come to their capitals, we shall respond to their invitation. Should they invite us to begin negotiations in Damascus, Amman or Beirut, we shall go to those capitals in order to negotiate there. We do not wish to divide. We seek true peace with all our neighbours, to be expressed in peace treaties, the context of which shall be as I have already clarified.

Mr. Speaker, it is my duty today to tell our guests and all the nations who are watching us and listening to our words about the bond between our People and this Land. The President mentioned the Balfour Declaration. No, sir, we took no foreign land. We returned to our Homeland. The bond between our People and this Land is eternal. It was created at the dawn of human history. It was never severed. In this Land we established our civilization; here our prophets spoke those holy words you cited this very day; here the Kings of Judah and Israel prostrated themselves; here we became a nation; here we established our Kingdom and, when we were exiled from our country by the force that was exercised against us, even when we were far away, we did not forget this Land, not even for a single day. We prayed for it; we longed for it; we have believed in our return to it ever since the day these words were spoken:

"When the Lord brought back the captivity of Zion we were like those who dream. Then our mouth was filled with laughter and our tongue with joyful shouting."

That song applies to all our exiles, to all our sufferings, and to the consolation that the Return to Zion would surely come. This, our right, has been recognized. The Balfour Declaration was included in the Mandate which was recognized by the nations of the world, including the United States of America. And the preamble to that authoritative international document states:

"Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish People with Palestine (or, in Hebrew, 'Eretz Israel') and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country (that is, in 'Eretz Israel')..."

In 1919, we also gained recognition of this right from the spokesman of the Arab People. The agreement of 3 January 1919, signed by Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, states:

"Mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish People, and realizing that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and of Palestine..."

Afterwards, follow all the articles on cooperation between the Arab State and Eretz Israel. That is our right; its fulfilment - the truth.

What happened to us when our Homeland was taken from us? I accompanied you this morning, Mr. President, to Yad Vashem. With your own eyes you saw what the fate of our People was when this Homeland was taken from it. It is an incredible story. We both agreed, Mr. President, that whoever has not himself seen what is found in Yad Vashem cannot understand what befell this People when it was homeless, robbed of its own Homeland. And we both read a document dated 30 January 1939, in which the word "vernichtung" appears - "if war breaks out the Jewish race in Europe will be annihilated." Then, too, we were told to pay no heed to such words. The whole world heard. No one came to our rescue; not during the nine critical, fateful months following this announcement - the likes of which had never been heard since God created man and man created Satan - and not during those six years when millions of our people, among them a million and a half small Jewish children were slaughtered in every possible way.

No one came to our rescue, not from the East and not from the West. And therefore we, this entire generation, the generation of Holocaust and Resurrection, swore an oath of allegiance: never again shall we endanger our People; never again will our wives and our children - whom it is our duty to defend, if need be even at the cost of our own lives - be put in the devastating range of enemy fire.

And further: ever since then it has been, and will continue to be, our duty, for generations to come, to remember that certain things said about our People are to be related to with all seriousness. We must not, Heaven forbid, for the future of our People, accept any advice suggesting that we not take such words seriously.

President Sadat knows, as he knew from us before he came to Jerusalem, that our position concerning permanent borders between us and our neighbours differs from his. However, I call upon the President of Egypt and upon all our neighbours: do not rule out negotiations on any subject whatsoever. I propose, in the name of the overwhelming majority of this Parliament, that everything will be negotiable. Anybody who says that, in the relationship between the Arab People - or the Arab Nations in the area - and the State of Israel there are subjects that should be excluded from negotiations, is assuming an awesome responsibility. Everything is negotiable. No side shall say the contrary. No side shall present prior conditions. We will conduct the negotiations with respect.

If there are differences of opinion between us, that is not exceptional. Anyone who has studied the history of wars and the annals of peace treaties knows that all negotiations for peace treaties have begun with differences of opinion between the parties concerned, and that, in the course of the negotiations, they have reached solutions which have made possible the signing of agreements or peace treaties. That is the path we propose to follow.

We shall conduct the negotiations as equals. There are no vanquished and there are no victors. All the Peoples of the region are equal, and all will relate to each other with respect. In this spirit of openness, of readiness of each to listen to the other - to facts, reasons, explanations - with every reasonable attempt at mutual persuasion - let us conduct the negotiations as I have asked and propose to open them, to conduct them, to continue them persistently until we succeed, in good time, in signing a peace treaty between us.

We are prepared, not only, to sit with representatives of Egypt and with representatives of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon - if it so desires - at a Peace Conference in Geneva. We proposed that the Geneva Conference be renewed on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council. However, should problems arise between us prior to the convening of the Geneva Conference, we will clarify them today and tomorrow and, if the President of Egypt will be interested in continuing to clarify them in Cairo - all the better; if on neutral ground - no opposition. Anywhere. Let us clarify - even before the Geneva Conference convenes - the problems that should be made clear before it meets, with open eyes and a readiness to listen to all suggestions.

Allow me to say a word about Jerusalem. Mr. President, today you prayed in a house of worship sacred to the Islamic faith, and from there you went to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. You witnessed the fact, known to all who come from throughout the world, that, ever since this city was joined together, there is absolutely free access, without any interference or obstacle, for the members of all religions to their holy places. This positive phenomenon did not exist for 19 years. It has existed now for about 11 years, and we can assure the Moslem world and the Christian world - all the nations - that there will always be free access to the holy places of every faith. We shall defend this right of free access, for it is something in which we believe - in the equality of rights for every man and every citizen, and in respect for every faith.

Mr. Speaker, this is a special day for our Parliament, and it will undoubtedly be remembered for many years in the annals of our Nation, in the history of the Egyptian People, and perhaps, also, in the history of nations.

And on this day, with your permission, worthy and learned Members of the Knesset, I wish to offer a prayer that the God of our common ancestors will grant us the requisite wisdom of heart in order to overcome the difficulties and obstacles, the calumnies and slanders. With the help of God, may we arrive at the longed-for day for which all our people pray - the day of peace.

For indeed, as the Psalmist of Israel said, "Righteousness and peace have kissed," and, as the prophet Zecharia said, "Love truth and peace."



**GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AGREED COMMUNIQUÉ  
ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADAT  
TO JERUSALEM, 21 NOVEMBER 1977**

In response to the sincere and courageous move by President Sadat, and believing in the need to continue the dialogue along the lines proposed by both sides during their exchanges and the presentation of their positions in the historic meeting in Jerusalem, and in order to enhance the prospect of a fruitful consummation of this significant visit, the Government of Israel, expressing the will of the people of Israel, proposes that this hopeful step be further pursued through dialogue between the two countries concerned, thereby paving the way towards successful negotiations, leading to the signing of peace treaties in Geneva with all the neighbouring Arab states.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 32/20 CALLING FOR RECONVENING  
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, NEW YORK, 25 NOVEMBER 1977**

The General Assembly,

*Having discussed* the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 and 31/61 of 9 December 1976,

*Taking into account* the decisions of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

*Deeply concerned* that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than ten years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, are still deprived of the exercise of their inalienable national rights,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

*Reaffirming also* the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

*Taking note* with satisfaction of the Joint statement on the Middle East issued on 1 October 1977 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America in their capacities as Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on the Middle East,

*Reaffirming* that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlements of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all their inalienable national rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories,

*Convinced* that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. *Condemns* Israel’s continued occupation of Arab territories, is violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated resolutions of the United Nations;
2. *Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, cannot be achieved without Israel’s withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights;
3. *Calls a new* for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization;

4. *Urges* the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations,
5. *Requests* the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;
7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a comprehensive report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 32/40, CREATING A SPECIAL UNIT  
ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, NEW YORK, 2 DECEMBER 1977 [EXCERPTS]**

The General Assembly,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights which would:
  - (a) Prepare, under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, studies and publication relating to:
    - (i) The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
    - (ii) Relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations;
    - (iii) The activities of the Committee and other United Nations organs, in order to promote the attainment of those rights.
  - (b) Promote maximum publicity for such studies and publications through all appropriate means;
  - (c) Organise, in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, annual observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People;
2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;
3. *Invites* all Governments and organisations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the implementation of the present resolution.



**PLO FACTIONS, SIX-POINT PROGRAM CALLING FOR THE FORMATION  
OF A 'STEADFASTNESS AND CONFRONTATION FRONT' AGAINST SADAT'S  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, 4 DECEMBER 1977**

In the wake of Sadat's treasonous visit to the Zionist entity, all factions of the Palestinian Resistance Movement have decided to make a practical answer to this step. On this basis, they met and issued the following document:

We, all factions of the PLO, announce the following:

*First:* We call for the formation of a "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" composed of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syria and the PLO, to oppose all confrontationist solutions planned by imperialism, Zionism and their Arab tools.

*Second:* We fully condemn any Arab party in the Tripoli Summit which rejects the formation of this Front, and we announce this.

*Third:* We reaffirm our rejection of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

*Fourth:* We reaffirm our rejection of all international conferences based on these two resolutions, including the Geneva Conference.

*Fifth:* To strive for the realization of the Palestinian people's rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land, without reconciliation, recognition or negotiations, as an interim aim of the Palestinian Revolution.

*Sixth:* To apply the measures related to the political boycott of the Sadat regime.

In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unification document.

- The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fateh: Abu Ayyad [Salah Khalaf]
- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Dr. George Habash
- The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Nayef Hawatmeh
- The PFLP-General Command: Ahmad Jibril
- Vanguard of the People's Liberation War, Saiqa: Zuhair Muhsin
- Arab Liberation Front: Abdul-Rahim Ahmad
- Palestinian Liberation Front: Talaat Ya'qoub
- PLO: Hamed Abu Sitta



**LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, DECLARATION OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE,  
TRIPOLI, LIBYA, 5 DECEMBER 1977 [EXCERPTS]**

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: An Arab summit conference was held in Tripoli, the capital of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 2 to 5 December 1977 at the invitation of brother Colonel Mu'ammar al-Quadhafi. It was attended by the following:

1. President Houari Boumediene for the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic;
2. President Hafiz al-Assad for the Syrian Republic;
3. Col. Mu'ammar al-Quadhafi, secretary general of the General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
4. Brother 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, secretary general of the Unified Political Organization-National Front, for the FDRY;
5. Brother Taha Yasir Ramadan, for the Iraqi Republic;
6. Brother Yasser; Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and commander of the Palestinian revolution forces.

With a sense of complete pan-Arab responsibility, the conference discussed the dimensions of the current phase through which the Arab cause in general and the Palestinian question in particular are passing and the American-Zionist plans aimed at imposing capitulatory settlements on the Arab nation, prejudicing the established national rights of the Palestinian people, liquidating the national Arab accomplishments and striking at the Arab liberation movement as a prelude to subduing the Arab area and controlling its destiny and tying it to the bandwagon of world imperialism.

The conference also discussed the visit made by President el-Sadat to the Zionist entity as being a link in the framework of the implementation of the hostile schemes. The conference reviewed the results of the visit, which constituted a flagrant violation of the principles and objectives of the pan-Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy, a squandering of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, a departure from the unity of the Arab ranks, a grave violation Arab people, a departure from the unity of the Arab ranks, a grave violation of the Arab League Charter and the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and the

withdrawing of Arab Egypt from the front of conflict with the Zionist enemy - a matter which the conference considered a great service by President el-Sadat to Zionism and American imperialism and their designs and a consecration of the Zionist entity, which is their tool and base in the Arab area.

Those attending the conference studied the current situation with all of its dimensions and concluded that the objectives of the plot are as follows:

1. To undermine the possibility of the establishment of a just and honorable peace which would safeguard the national rights of the Arab nation and guarantee for it the liberation of its occupied territories, the foremost of which is Jerusalem, and for the Palestinian people their established national rights.
2. To isolate the Arab nation from its allies and friends on the African Continent who have adopted a historic stand in support of the Arab issue and exposed the organic link between the Zionist entity and the racist regimes in South Africa.
3. To isolate the Arab nation from the group of non-aligned states and Islamic states which have supported the Arab issue in all of its stages and stood on the side of the just struggle of the Palestinian people.
4. To harm the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Arab States on the one hand and the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp, which have given support and backing to the Arab nation in its historic struggle against the imperialist-Zionist enemy.
5. To enable the forces hostile to the Arab nation, headed by the United States, to realize gains that will upset the international balance in favor of the Zionist imperialist forces and Zionism and undermine the national independence of the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries.
6. To establish an alliance between the Zionist enemy and the current Egyptian regime aimed at liquidating the Arab issue and the issue of Palestine, split the Arab nation and forfeit its national interests.

Out of its belief in the nature of the Zionist and imperialist challenges aimed at weakness the Arab will for liberation and harming the firm national rights of the Palestinian people which have been confirmed by international legitimacy- the foremost of which is their right to return and decide their own destiny and build their independent state on the soil of their homeland under the leadership of the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people- and proceeding from the reality of pan-Arab and historic responsibility, the summit conference decided the following:

1. To condemn President el-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity since it constitutes a great betrayal of the sacrifices and struggle of our Arab people in Egypt and their armed forces and of the struggle, sacrifices and principles of the Arab nation. While appreciating the role of the great Egyptian people in the national struggle of the Arab nation, the conference stresses that Egypt is not the beginning nor the end and that if the Arab nation is great with Egypt, the latter's greatness is only possible within the Arab nation, without which it can only diminish in importance.
2. To work for the frustration of the results of President al-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity and his talks with the leaders of the Zionist enemy and the subsequent measures including the proposed Cairo meeting. The conference warns that anyone who tries to pursue a similar line or to have any dealings with the said results shall be held responsible for his deed nationally and on the pan-Arab level.
3. To freeze [*tajmid*] political and diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government, to suspend dealings with it on the Arab and international level and to apply the regulations, provisions and decisions of the Arab boycott against Egyptian individuals, companies and firms which deal with the Zionist enemy.
4. To decide not to take part in Arab League meetings which are held in Egypt and to undertake contacts with the Arab League member states to study the question of its headquarters and organs and the membership of the Egyptian regime.
5. The conference salutes the Palestinian Arab people, who are standing fast in the occupied homeland, including all of their national and other popular organizations which are struggling against the occupation and which reject the visit of el-Sadat to occupied Palestine. The conference also warns against any attempt to prejudice the legitimacy of the PLO representation of the Palestinian people.

6. The conference takes satisfaction in recording the preliminary positions taken by the Arab States which have denounced the visit the rejected its consequences. Out of its responsibility and in compliance with its commitment and collective resolutions, the conference calls on these states to adopt practical measures to face the serious character of this capitulatory policy, including the suspension of political and material support. The conference also condemns the disgraceful stands adopted by those who praise this visit or support it and warn them of the consequences of their despondent and defeatist policies.
7. The conferences appeals to the Arab nation on the official and popular levels to provide economic, financial, political and military aid and support to the Syrian region, now that it has become the principle confrontation state and the base of steadfastness for dealing with the Zionist enemy and also to the Palestinian people represented by the PLO.
8. The conference greets our Arab people in sisterly Egypt and particularly their national and progressive forces, which have rejected the capitulatory policy being pursued by the Egyptian regime as being a betrayal of the scarifies of the people and their martyrs and an insult to the dignity of their armed forces.
9. In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism between Syria and the Palestinians, the Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamashiriyah and the PDRY have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus of a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join.
10. Members of pan-Arab front consider any aggression against any one member as an aggression against all members.

The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to all objectives of the Arab struggle. The conference also expresses its deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during its long history of struggle – a struggle which abounds with heroism- is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solitary and departed from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God.

The conference records with satisfaction the national Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO.



#### **UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 32/171 ON LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, NEW YORK, 19 DECEMBER 1977**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976, and the relevant recommendations for national action adopted by Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976,

*Recalling* also resolution 3 on living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories, as contained in the recommendations of the Conference for international cooperation, and Economic and Social Council resolution 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and expresses the view that there is need for further analysis in order to meet fully the objectives of General Assembly resolution 31/110;
2. *Requests* therefore the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

for Palestinian refugees in the Near East and the Economic Commission for Western Asia to prepare and to submit to the General Assembly at its 33rd session a comprehensive report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

3. *Requests* the Secretary General in preparing the above mentioned report to consult and to cooperate with the Palestine Liberation Organization the representative of the Palestinian people.
4. *Urges* all states to cooperate with the Secretary General in the preparation of the report.



**PALESTINIAN WEST BANK MAYORS, STATEMENT ON  
SADAT'S VISIT TO ISRAEL, 21 DECEMBER 1977 [EXCERPTS]**

We state our dissatisfaction with this step taken by President Sadat, because of the results and dangers likely to arise from it and because in his speech to the Knesset he made no mention of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We also declare that the PLO had every right, and indeed the duty, to adopt the attitude it has taken to this visit. In adopting this attitude it was clearly expressing the view and the attitude of the Palestinian people. However, our sense of responsibility prompts us to record that President Sadat has committed himself not to resort to a separate solution with "Israel" and that he has declared that he insists on the Arab character of Jerusalem, "Israel" withdrawing from all the occupied territories, on the refugees returning to their homes and on the Palestinian people being granted their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state.

While recalling the word's commitment to the resolutions of the United Nations and, in particular, General Assembly resolution 3236, adopted on November 22, 1974 and the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits which regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be, we affirm our adherence to these resolutions, as also to the resolutions of the Thirteenth Palestine National Council held in Cairo. We call on all quarters to respect the commitment of the peoples of the world, including our Palestinian people, and we condemn any attempt to prejudice the legitimate rights of our people and, first and foremost, their right to self-determination. In the light of the above we assert the following principles:

1. While stating our attitude to President Sadat's visit to "Israel" we affirm our belief in the role Egypt has played and the sacrifices she has made on behalf of the Palestinian cause and the problems of Arab struggle. We stress the strength of the alliance between our people and the people of Egypt, and our unshakable belief in the central role occupied by Egypt in the battle of Arab liberation, and we salute the struggle and great sacrifices of her people.
2. The ferocity of the battle that is being fought to counter the present imperialist attack on the achievements of our people and the Arab people requires the establishment of a broad Arab front comprising all the Arab countries that reject the imperialist attack on the area in all its forms. This front should also include the Arab popular organizations and the PLO. Also required is the mobilization of all economic, political and military resources to resist this attack and to put an end to the conspiracy against all the national gains in Arab lands, and to strengthen the alliance of this front with all forces opposed to imperialism and Zionism.
3. The Palestinian people in the occupied territories unambiguously affirm their belief in the unity of the Palestinian people inside and outside the country. They also stress that all Palestinians are represented by the PLO alone, which is the only quarter entitled to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people. We condemn any attempt to establish an alternative or parallel leadership.
4. The rights of the Palestinian people, as affirmed by the various resolutions of the UN, are not subject to bargaining, and first and foremost among these rights is their legitimate right to self-determination in their land and in full freedom.

We therefore reject any form of tutelage, whatever its source, and all kinds of solutions which detract from the independence of the Palestinian people and the independence of their will.

We therefore cannot agree that the Palestinian state should be forcibly linked to any other quarter; as such a trend is incompatible with our people's freedom to decide their own destiny.

5. From the occupied territories we salute the struggle of all the Arab peoples. We also salute all the forces that have provided support for our just struggle. Above all we salute the struggle of our people outside the country under the leadership of the PLO and we call for resolute resistance to all attempts to shake the Arab solidarity which is based on the will of the Arab nation for delivery from the imperialist attack and Zionist aggression.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, PROPOSED AUTONOMY PLAN FOR  
THE PALESTINIANS, JERUSALEM, 28 DECEMBER 1977**

SELF-RULE FOR PALESTINIAN ARABS, RESIDENTS OF JUDAEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA  
DISTRICT, TO BE INSTITUTED UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AS ANNOUNCED IN THE  
KNESSET, 28 DECEMBER 1977

1. The administration of the Military Government in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be abolished.
2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, administrative autonomy of the residents, by and for them, will be established.
3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will elect an Administrative Council composed of 11 members. The Administrative Council will operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paper.
4. Any resident, 18 years old and above, without distinction of citizenship, or if stateless, will be entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative Council.
5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of candidates for the Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years old or above, will be entitled to be elected to the Council.
6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personal, equal and secret ballot.
7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from the day of its election.
8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem.
9. All the administrative affairs relating to the Arab residents of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the direction and within the competence of the Administrative Council.
10. The Administrative Council will operate the following Departments: education; religious affairs; transportation; construction and housing; industry, commerce and tourism; agriculture; health, labour and social welfare; rehabilitation of refugees; and the administration of justice and supervision of local police forces; and promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these Departments.
11. Security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities.
12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman.
13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days after the publication of the election results.
14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, or if stateless, will be granted free choice (option) of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship.
15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the state.
16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to the Knesset in accordance with the election law.
17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option will become citizens of Jordan, will elect and be eligible for election to the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that country.

18. Questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian Parliament by residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations between Israel and Jordan.
19. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, and to determine which legislation will continue in force which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.
20. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the free option granted them, will become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.
21. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. The committee will determine the norms whereby Arab refugees residing outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be permitted to immigrate to these areas in reasonable numbers. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.
22. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.
23. The Administrative Council will appoint one of its members to represent the Council before the Government of Israel for deliberation on matters of common interest, and one of its members to represent the Council before the Government of Jordan for deliberation on matters of common interest.
24. Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in the areas be left open.
25. With regard to the administration of the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all the faiths to the shrines holy to them.
26. These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period.



**US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, STATEMENT ON RECOGNITION OF  
PALESTINIANS, ASWAN, EGYPT, 4 JANUARY 1978**

*[The statement came at the end of an unscheduled stop in Aswan to confer with  
Pres. Sadat, ten days ahead of the talks of the Israel-Egypt Political Committee.]*

It is an honor and a pleasure for us to be in this great country, led by such a strong and courageous man.

Mr. President, your bold initiative in seeking peace has aroused the admiration of the entire world. One of my most valued possessions is the arm, personal relationship which binds me and President Sadat together and which exemplifies the friendship and the common purpose of the people of Egypt and the people of the United States of American.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative must succeed, while still guarding the sacred and historic principles held by the nations who have suffered so much in this region. There is no good reason why accommodation cannot be reached.

In my own private discussions with both Arab and Israeli leaders, I have been deeply impressed by the unanimous desire for peace. My presence here today is a direct result of the courageous initiative which President Sadat undertook in his recent trip to Jerusalem.

The negotiating process will continue in the near future. We fully support this effort, and we intend to play an active role in the work of the Political Committee of Cairo, which will soon reconvene in Jerusalem.

We believe that there are certain principles, fundamentally, which must be observed before a just and a comprehensive peace can be achieved.

- First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency.
- Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Some flexibility is always needed to insure successful negotiations and the resolution of conflicting views. We know that the mark of greatness among leaders is to consider carefully the views of others and the greater benefits that can result among the people of all nations which can come from a successful search for peace.

Mr. President, our consultations this morning have reconfirmed our common commitment to the fundamentals which will, with God's help, make 1978 the year for permanent peace in the Middle East.



**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON THE CARTER-SADAT MEETINGS,  
WASHINGTON, DC, 8 FEBRUARY 1978**

*[The statement - issued after three days of talks in which Pres. Carter persuaded Pres. Sadat not to call off the peace process - reiterated the Aswan formula regarding the Palestinian issue as well as the US position on the settlements.]*

President Carter and President Sadat had a final meeting this afternoon.

President Carter and President Sadat continued their talks-today in the same spirit of friendship and openness which characterized their stay together at Camp David over the weekend. The hours they have spent together, both alone and with their advisers, have provided the essential opportunity both sought for a relaxed and thorough review of the Middle East situation. They have concluded that the mutual trust and understanding between them which were reinforced by these meetings, will be extremely useful in helping to maintain momentum toward their common goal of peace in the Middle East.

During the course of their meetings over the past five days, President Carter reaffirmed to President Sadat the broad principles which underlie United States participation in the search for that peace:

The United States will remain faithful to its historic commitments to the security of Israel and to the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

Helping the parties achieve a negotiated comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict remains of highest importance in American policy, and President Carter will spare no effort in seeking ways to move the peace process forward.

A peace settlement must go beyond the mere termination of belligerency. It must provide for the establishment of normal peaceful relations between Israel and its neighbors.

The peace settlement should be comprehensive and should be embodied in peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors.

The settlement must be based on all the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, including withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 and the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Resolution 242 is applicable to all fronts of the conflict.

There can be no just and lasting peace without resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The President reaffirmed what he said at his meeting with President Sadat in Aswan January 4: There must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects; it must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

President Carter also reaffirmed the longstanding United States view that Israeli settlements in occupied territory are contrary to international law and an obstacle to peace, and that further settlement activity would be inconsistent with the effort to reach a peace settlement.

President Sadat affirmed that the door remains open to negotiations and that Egypt will continue to do its part to assure continuity in this negotiating process in an atmosphere conducive to tangible progress.

The two Presidents also spent some time reviewing the current situation in the Horn of Africa and agreed that continuing conflict and instability there are of concern to them both. President Carter and President Sadat have agreed to consult with other countries on this matter.

Finally, the two Presidents committed themselves to remain in close personal touch through direct correspondence and diplomatic channels. In this way they are determined to ensure continuing full understanding between them both in the peace process and in bilateral relations between Egypt and the United States.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENTS,  
JERUSALEM, 12 FEBRUARY 1978**

*[After US Sec. of State Vance had declared on 10 Feb. that the Sinai settlements "should not exist," the angered Israeli govt. issued the following statement.]*

The government of Israel expresses its regret and protest over the statement made by Secretary of State Vance at the press conference of February 10, 1978. The Secretary of State declared, *inter alia*:

*"With respect to the Sinai settlements, we have said that we believe that all of these settlements are contrary to international law and that, therefore, they should not exist."*

The Cabinet registers the fact that the latter part of this statement by the Secretary of State is in complete contradiction to the remarks made by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister on December 16 and 17. Following the Prime Minister's presentation to the President of the Israeli peace plan, in presenting this plan to the President, the Prime Minister included a specific reference to the continuous existence of the settlements within a United Nations zone, and an Israeli defense contingent for their protection. During the course of the exchange in the White House, not only was no reservation whatsoever made with regard to this reference, but the plan as a whole was received with a positive reaction.

The government of Israel stands by its view that the Israeli settlement program is in full harmony with international law and that it always has been legal, legitimate and essential. The United States holds a different viewpoint. However, no communication was transmitted to us, even during the seven weeks after having forwarded on December 27, 1977 the full text of the peace plan in writing to the government of the United States that the settlements "Should not exist."

Immediately after having made this part of his statement the Secretary added that, "This, however, is a problem that has to be resolved by the parties. They are going to have to negotiate it themselves."

We face here an obvious contradiction-in-terms between taking sides by a "Mediator" and his advice to conduct negotiations.

With regard to the areas of Eretz Israel, Judea and Samaria, the Secretary of State announced that "There should be a homeland for the Palestinians and that it should be linked to Jordan."

Whatever the theoretical assumptions and interpretations, there is absolutely no doubt that this plan would lead, in reality and unavoidably, to the establishment of a Palestinian state ruled by the terrorist organizations as the front-line spearhead of a potential military alignment of Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Already today, this alignment has at its disposal nearly 6,000 tanks, over 1,100 fighter aircraft, and more than 4,200 heavy guns. Israel, under such conditions, would find itself nine miles from the sea and a situation would thus be created of mortal danger to its very existence. No political goal, whatever it be, can move Israel to place almost all its civilian population within the range of an enemy's fire and endanger the very existence of the Jewish state.

We wish to point out that it was only after the Israeli peace plan, in both its parts obtained the moral support of the United States that the government decided to send its delegation composed of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister to Ismailia in order to bring the plan to the knowledge of the government of Egypt.

The Cabinet expresses its hope that the government of the United States will reconsider its position in light of the positive talks held between the President and the Prime Minister in December 1977, in connection with the Israeli peace plan.



**ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, STATEMENT ON THE OPERATION IN LEBANON,  
JERUSALEM, 15 MARCH 1978**

*[Earlier the day Israeli forces had crossed into Southern Lebanon to wipe out PLO bases from where allegedly attacks on Israel were launched.]*

IDF forces a short while ago began a mopping-up operation along the Lebanese border. The purpose of the operation is - to root out the terrorist bases near the border and to strike at their special bases from which terrorists set out on missions deep inside Israeli territory. It is not the IDF's intention to harm the population, the Lebanese army or the inter-Arab force, but only the terrorists and their helpers, in order to safeguard the life and security of the population of Israel.

The objective of the operation is not retaliation for the terrorists' crimes, for there can be no retaliation for the murder of innocent men, women and children - but to protect the state of Israel and its citizens from incursions of members of the Fatah and PLO, who use Lebanese territory in order to attack citizens of Israel.

IDF OPERATION BACKGROUND PAPER:

The IDF operation of the night of 14 March 1978 against concentrations of terrorists in Southern Lebanon comes in response to a long series of acts of murder and sabotage carried out by the Palestinian terrorists which reached their peak with the murder strike of Saturday, 11 March 1978. In this last act, the brutal nature of which shocked the entire world, 33 innocent Israeli citizens were indis-

criminally cut down in cold blood and another 78 were wounded, most of them seriously. Among the victims were 6 women and 13 children.

There can be no shadow of doubt that the terror organizations, in their attempt to present their disgusting acts of brutality and murder as a war of liberation, are deliberately and in pre-meditated fashion planning their strikes against civilian populations and are even priding themselves on this. Thus for example, Habib Tarzi, the PLO representative to the United Nations, announced on Monday, 13 March, in the U.N. centre that terror attacks like that perpetrated on Saturday Israel will continue. PLO leader Yasser Arafat also stated explicitly on the same day in Beirut that some of the members of the terrorist team (the reference being to the murderers who penetrated the Israeli coast on Saturday) are still operating on the main highway to Tel Aviv. In this context, it should be noted that the Israeli authorities, wanting to prevent any further continuation of Saturday's bloodshed, imposed curfew on an entire area populated by 300.000 people.

Further confirmation of these objectives was given by Fatah intelligence department head (and central committee member) Salah Hdlef - known as "Abu Iyad" - who said in an interview with "El-Arab" of Qattar on 13 March 1978 that there would shortly be further commando operations "In the style of the Tel Aviv operation." He even emphasized that these operations would be carried out "On the Northern shore of Falastin."

It is noteworthy that Lebanon has for some time served as the main "Hothouse" of the terror organizations. Israeli settlements have since the Yom Kippur war been bombarded 1,548 times by artillery. Katyushas and mortars - for the most part from Lebanese territory. In these attacks and in terror strikes resulting from penetrations from Lebanon, 108 Israeli citizens were killed - mostly women and children - and 221 were injured. The terrorists recently deepened their penetrations of Southern Lebanon and were reinforced by units of As-Aika (an organization operated by the Syrians). The number of terrorists at present in Southern Lebanon close to the Israeli frontier, is 5,000. They are housed and trained in bases and camps alongside civilian populations - this in the knowledge that the IDF is sensitive about harming civilian communities.

The IDF raid in the night of 14 March 1978, comes in order to guarantee the life and security of the residents of Israel to defend the state and its citizens, and to prevent the attacks of Fatah and P.L.O. members - who use Lebanese territory to attack the citizens of Israel.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 425 ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON,  
NEW YORK, 19 MARCH 1978**

*[Resolution in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon on 15 March,  
calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces.]*

The Security Council,

*Taking note* of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,

*Having heard* the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

*Gravely concerned* at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

*Convinced that* the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 426, NEW YORK, 19 MARCH 1978**

The Security Council,

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978,
2. *Decides* that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter if required, provided the Security Council so decides.



**OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR OF THE US STATE DEPARTMENT,  
OPINION TO THE US CONGRESS, DECLARING THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS  
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, 21 APRIL 1978 [EXCERPTS]**

*The Territories Involved*

The Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights were ruled by the Ottoman Empire before World War I. Following World War I, Sinai was part of Egypt; the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (as well as the area east of the Jordan) were part of the British Mandate for Palestine; and the Golan Heights were part of the French Mandate for Syria. Syria and Jordan later became independent. The West Bank and Gaza continued under British Mandate until May, 1948.

In 1947, the United Nations recommended a plan of partition, never effectuated, that allocated some territory to a Jewish state and other territory (including the West Bank and Gaza) to an Arab state. On May 24, 1948, immediately prior to British termination of the Mandate, a provisional government of Israel proclaimed the establishment of a Jewish state in the areas allocated to it under the partition plan. The Arab League rejected partition and commenced hostilities. When the hostilities ceased, Egypt occupied Gaza, and Jordan occupied the West Bank. These territorial lines of demarcation were incorporated, with minor changes, in the armistice agreements concluded in 1949. The armistice agreements expressly denied political significance to the new lines, but they were de facto boundaries until June, 1967.

During the June, 1967 war, Israeli forces occupied Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

*The Settlements*

\*\*\* Israel began establishing civilian settlements in 1968. Civilian settlements are supported by the government, and also by non-governmental settlement movements affiliated in most cases with political parties. Most are reportedly built on public lands outside the boundaries of any municipality, but some are built on private or municipal lands expropriated for the purpose.

Legal Considerations

1. As noted above, Israeli armed forces entered Gaza, the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights in June, 1967, in the course of an armed conflict. Those areas had not previously been part of Israel's sovereign territory nor otherwise under its administration. By reason of such entry of its armed forces, Israel established control and began to exercise authority over these territories; and under international law, Israel thus became a belligerent occupant of these territories.

Territory coming under the control of a belligerent occupant does not thereby become its sovereign territory. International law confers upon the occupying state authority to undertake interim military administration over the territory and its inhabitants; that authority is not unlimited. The governing rules are designed to permit pursuit of its military needs by the occupying power, to protect the security of the occupying forces, to provide for orderly government, to protect the rights and interests of the inhabitants and to reserve questions of territorial change and sovereignty to a later stage when the war is ended.

On the basis of the available information, the civilian settlements in the territories occupied by Israel do not appear to be consistent with these limits on Israel's authority as belligerent occupant in that they do not seem intended to be of limited duration or established to provide orderly government of the territories and, though some may serve incidental security purposes, they do not appear to be required to meet military needs during the occupation.

2. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, provides, in paragraph 6:

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

Paragraph 6 appears to apply by its terms to any transfer by an occupying power of parts of its civilian population, whatever the objective and whether involuntary or voluntary.

The Israeli civilian settlements thus appear to constitute a "transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" within the scope of paragraph 6. [...]

4. It has been suggested that the principles of belligerent occupation, including Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, may not apply in the West Bank and Gaza because Jordan and Egypt were not the respective legitimate sovereigns of these territories. However, those principles appear applicable whether or not Jordan and Egypt possessed legitimate sovereign rights in respect of those territories. Protecting the reversionary interest of an ousted sovereign is not their sole or essential purpose; the paramount purposes are protecting the civilian population of an occupied territory and reserving permanent territorial changes, if any, until settlement of the conflict.

Conclusion

While Israel may undertake, in the occupied territories, actions necessary to meet its military needs and to provide for orderly government during the occupation, for the reasons indicated above the establishment of the civilian settlements in those territories is inconsistent with international law.



**US AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,  
ALFRED AHERTON, STATUS REPORT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, 15 JUNE 1978**

The 30-year search for peace between Arab and Jew in the Middle East has been called a history of lost opportunities. Our concern as a nation, and as a friend of both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, must be to seize the opportunity of the present and the promise of the future - to do all in our power to ensure that the tragedies of the past are not again repeated in the Middle East. I would urge that all of us here today keep our eyes fixed on this overriding objective as we reflect on the complex issues, the fears and hopes, and the difficult choices that must be faced by all concerned in the search for peace in the Middle East.

There are few areas in the world where so many compelling American interests intersect. These interests have been constant over recent years and are generally familiar to us all, but it is worth taking a few moments to review them in light of changes that have taken place in the area in recent years and of our own evolving perceptions in response to these changes.

- A. We have long recognized that it is imperative that the United States seek to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint for global crisis. We have also recognized that helping strengthen the independence of Middle Eastern countries will contribute to stability in the region and make war less likely.

The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have demonstrated to us in the heat of crisis that the Middle East is an area where U.S. and Soviet forces could confront each other in the context of a local war. Now, with estimates of the Soviet Union's own changing energy needs, a new dimension has been added to the traditional Soviet interest in a strong position in that area. These facts provide an important part of the backdrop against which we pursue our interests in the area.

- B. Our irrevocable commitment to the security, strength, and well-being of Israel has been reaffirmed by every American Administration since the modern state of Israel was born thirty years ago. It is a permanent feature of American foreign policy. Many Americans share this commitment to a people who have suffered beyond our ability to comprehend and who have yet contributed so much to our heritage and to our world.

In this decade this commitment has been broadened and strengthened by the passage of time and the steady development of relations between our two countries.

Today Israel and the U.S. must face together new and more difficult circumstances.

It is increasingly obvious that Israel's security can best be guaranteed over the long term by a policy of continued military strength coupled with a peaceful relationship with its neighbors. Close American cooperation with key Arab states is essential to achieving and guaranteeing that peace.

In the past year, the opportunity for peace has increased dramatically. Before 1967, when no Arab state would talk of recognizing Israel and making peace with it, the basis for a final, peaceful settlement of this conflict did not exist. Following President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem and Israel's warm reception, Israel for the first time since its founding as a modern state is dealing with an Arab state which has stated as a matter of official record that it is prepared to accept and recognize a Jewish State in the Middle East and to make peace and establish normal relations with it. Attitudes in the Arab world toward Israel have shifted gradually since 1967, and the shift accelerated after the 1973 war. In going to Jerusalem, President Sadat dramatized that shift and broke out of the thirty year cycle of war and truce to create a new psychological climate in which there can be progress toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors. The issue is no longer whether there can be peace, but whether there can be agreement on the terms of peace.

In considering what those terms must encompass, we have come to recognize increasingly the importance of a just resolution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs for a peace settlement. This is no longer seen as only a refugee problem; it is a problem of fulfilling the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in ways that enable them to participate in the determination of their own future. The Palestinians for their part must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace and mutual security with Israel.

- C. We have long recognized the importance of the Arab world. The strength and moderation of the major Arab countries have been a bulwark against radical forces in the Middle East, and they have in turn looked increasingly to the United States for support in ensuring their security and independence. The oil which some of them produce has long been vital to our allies and it is increasingly so to us.

Today, there is a new degree of interdependence between the U.S. and the key Arab nations that are prepared to work with us constructively. The achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is surely a central goal in this relationship. There are other benefits as well.

The rapid increase in investable surplus which the Arab governments hold - now approximately 140,000 million dollars - has added a new dimension to our interests in this area. Some of their increased revenues come from the willingness of some oil-producing states to meet increasing demand in the rest of the world by producing more oil than their domestic revenue needs would require them to sell. How those revenues are used will affect the ups and downs of the world economy and of the dollar, and they can play a significant role in the development of poorer nations. At the same time, the U.S. economy is important to the Arab oil-producing nations in accommodating these enormous amounts of capital,

Thus, the Middle East figures in our calculations on energy, as well as in our balance of payments position and efforts to maintain a stable dollar, in ways that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

Finally, the key oil-producing nations of the Middle East are increasingly important to the world economy as well. The rise in oil prices in 1973 demonstrated clearly how oil pricing decisions and the related decisions on production levels can be a major cause of economic dislocation in most countries of the world, from the most industrialized to the least developed. They also play an increasingly positive role in development. For example, by the end of 1977 cumulative OPEC bilateral aid commitments totalled about 26,000 million dollars.

- D. America has long felt a moral and human commitment to the people of the Middle East to help end a conflict that has caused a generation of suffering and to help remove other obstacles that have impaired social and economic progress.

In the past year in this administration, we as a nation have redoubled our commitment to a fuller realization around the world of basic human rights. Leaders in the Middle East have repeated to us in many ways at many times that they want to achieve peace so that they can devote their energies and their resources to the well-being of their people. Many of them have a vision of an era of growth and development which could follow a peace agreement. Many of them have asked us to cooperate with them in making that vision a reality. We remain prepared and want very much to provide this cooperation.

This analysis of U.S. interests in the Middle East in the (mid) 1970's suggests four premises about U.S. policy toward that area in the late 1970's.

*First:* Because each of our interests in the Middle East is important, the only viable national policy is one which enables us to pursue all of those interests at the same time.

Defining our interests this broadly and recognizing how they are interrelated helps us in seeking the most effective ways the U.S. can help strengthen all of its allies and friends. Reciprocally, all of our friends share a common interest in our strength, in our success, and in a strong American role in fostering peace, independence, and growth in the Middle East. This interdependence of all our interests deserves the most serious consideration.

For the United States, the pursuit of all of these interests reflects a coherence of policy in which our moral commitments and our human concerns on the one hand and our strategic and pragmatic national interests on the other are mutually reinforcing.

*Second:* The experience of the past four years has shown that we are best able to pursue all of those interests simultaneously in circumstances where there is progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When there is no movement toward a settlement, tension between Israel and the Arab states rises and relations between the U.S. and Arab nations become strained. The pressure on Arab states to look elsewhere for assistance increases and there is a corresponding diminution in the U.S. ability to play a role in influencing events. Additionally, Israel becomes increasingly isolated and harmony between the U.S. and its allies is jeopardized. When the U.S. is actively engaged in the peace process and when progress is being made toward achieving agreements as has been the case in the past four years, Israel has enjoyed greater security. When as a consequence, the U.S.

can strengthen its ties with all of the important Middle Eastern countries, the momentum toward peace grows and our vital interests become self-reinforcing.

Peace, therefore, is not only the best assurance of a secure and prosperous Israel, but also would strengthen moderate governments in the region and enhance U.S. global interests. It is crucial to the understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East to recognize that our urgent national commitment to an Arab-Israel settlement is based both on our enduring commitment to Israel's security and on the fact that peace is a necessity for the U.S. and its allies.

Before leaving this point, I want to address openly a question that deeply concerns many Americans today, as well as our friends in Israel. The question is often put obliquely this way: What kind of U.S. relationship with the Middle East can we see five or ten years from now? Usually the real underlying question is: Are we not reducing our support for Israel in favor of the Arab nations?

The answer to the latter question is unequivocally no.

So long as all of our friends in the Middle East share a common interest in peace, in a strong U.S. role in the Middle East and in checking the growth of radical influence, close relations with one party do not mean diminished relations with others. None of our friends, nor we, will gain from a diminished U.S. relationship with any of the key states there. To the contrary, a closer relationship with each party enhances our ability to pursue objectives common to all.

It follows from this that, in pursuing all of our interests in the Middle East, including our historic and unchangeable commitment to a strong Israel, our diplomacy must work toward creating conditions and a framework of relationships that make pursuit of these interests complementary. To do otherwise would not be consistent with our moral, strategic or economic interests. We believe our friends have an interest in our success.

*Third:* There has been a significant shift toward the West in the relations between principal Middle Eastern nations and the major powers outside the Middle East over the last several years.

Compared with the two decades beginning the mid-1950's, when the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies appeared to be in the ascendant and the U.S. position was eroding to a point that most Arab countries broke diplomatic relations with us after the 1967 war, the present position of the U.S. is a significant change for the better. This is not to say that the Soviet Union does not have legitimate interests in the Middle East or that it will not have an important role to play in the future of that area. Our present position does, however, testify to recognition in many of these nations that their economic progress and national independence require a significant relationship with the West.

Entirely apart from political ideology, many Middle Eastern nations have recognized that the West offers the technology and the managerial skills needed to develop their countries, and that U.S. diplomacy can make an essential contribution to a peace which will lift the burden of heavy defense expenditures from their shoulders and let them get on with the constructive work of economic and social development.

The future orientation of the important nations of the Middle East is thus also at stake in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moderate Arab leaders have turned to the U.S. for cooperation in achieving both peace and development. Their success will in turn in large part determine whether Israel faces the future surrounded by radical and hostile states or by nations which are committed to peace and orderly progress.

The fourth premise is that without in any way detracting from our other commitments a definition of U.S. interests in the Middle East must take serious account of the new dimensions of U.S. economic relations with the area.

These economic factors explain why our strategy in the past four years has had two thrusts - not one. The more dramatic has been our high priority drive for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Less dramatic, but of great importance, has been the effort to encourage the broadest possible range of relationships between the economic and social sectors of the U.S. and of the Middle Eastern countries. We have recognized not only the nation's economic need for these relationships, but also the fact that the U.S. presence in the future of the Middle East will be a truly national presence - not just a governmental one.

Let me turn briefly from this general framework to the details of the peace process. The focus of attention in recent weeks has been on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted unanimously by the council in November 1967. That resolution was and remains the basis for all the peacemaking efforts over the past decade. At its heart is a very simple formula: In return for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, the Arabs will recognize Israel within a framework of peace and security agreed by both. It calls for a just and lasting peace based upon the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and upon Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. Resolution 242 is clearly a package. The parts are linked together to make a balanced whole, to be carried out together or not at all.

It took another war in 1973 to reach the point where the parties were ready to negotiate in the real sense of the word on the basis of Resolution 242. The result was the disengagement agreements of 1974-75, within the framework of the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, which helped lay the groundwork for future, more comprehensive negotiating efforts.

In a visit to the Middle East early in this administration, Secretary Vance and the Governments involved agreed on a definition of the three issues at the core of the dispute that would have to be resolved in an overall settlement:

The nature of peace; withdrawal from occupied territories in conjunction with security arrangements that will make recognized boundaries also secure boundaries; and resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Beginning in March 1977 in Clinton, Massachusetts, the President, and subsequently other Administration officials, set forth our thinking on these issues. We did this not to put forward an American blue print or plan for a settlement, but to help stimulate the thinking of the parties about new ways to overcome old obstacles to the peace process. Let me elaborate a bit on our thinking about each of these three issues.

- First, the definition of true peace. Peace does not mean simply a cessation of hostility of belligerency. It means open borders, normal commerce and tourism, diplomatic relations and a range of official and unofficial contacts, free navigation through waterways, and an end to all boycotts. The keystone of normal relations is the recognition of Israel's right to exist permanently, and formal recognition of her nationhood.
- Second, is the dilemma of providing borders that are both secure and acceptable to all this is the other half of the withdrawal-for-peace equation in Resolution 242. Israel, which has fought for its very existence for thirty years, must be able to feel secure within recognized borders. But borders that might give Israel the greatest sense of security in geographic and military terms are not those acceptable to Israel's neighbors. They could not, therefore, provide true security. We understand the very real security concerns posed for Israel by withdrawal from occupied territory. But we also believe that without withdrawal, coupled with meaningful security arrangements, there can be no peace, and without peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israel can have no true security. The goal has to be -the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the area.
- Third, is the issue of the future of the Palestinian people.

While Resolution 242 calls for a just settlement of the "Refugee" problem, it does not deal in a comprehensive way with a solution to the Palestinian issue. In the decade since the passage of that resolution it has become inescapably clear that a solution to the Palestinian problem is essential in reaching a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. No party to the conflict today disputes that the Palestinians have a sense of identity which must be taken into account. President Carter has recognized this by speaking of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians. In our own view, as I said earlier, no settlement in the Mid-

dle East can endure which does not include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. This involves meeting the humanitarian need of the Palestinian refugees, responding to the aspiration of Palestinian Arabs for an identity of their own, and agreement on the future status of the West Bank and Gaza - those parts of the former Palestine mandate outside Israel's 1967 boundaries.

It also involves vital security considerations for Israel which must be taken into account, as well as interests of other Arab states, in particular Jordan and Egypt, and the interests of the Palestinian Arabs themselves, over one million of whom reside still in the West Bank and Gaza.

A way must be found for the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. Any solution, if it is to be viable and lasting, must be based ultimately on the consent of the governed.

Throughout 1977 sharp differences over procedural problems related to reconvening the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference divided the parties as they began to focus on these issues. President Sadat's initiative and Israel's response last November sought to break the impasse. His visit to Jerusalem, and Prime Minister Begin's visit to Ismailiya, did not resolve the basic issues in the dispute, but these historic steps began to break down the psychological barriers which have prevented serious negotiations for so long.

For the first time, the leader of an Arab state demonstrated not by words alone but by a tangible act his country's acceptance of the peace-for-withdrawal formula of Resolution 242. President Sadat recognized in an unprecedented official and public act Israel's sovereign existence. Prime Minister Begin, on his part, responded with serious negotiating proposals relating both to the Sinai and to the West Bank and Gaza - proposals which in our judgement represent a good first step and a basis for negotiations.

Since November, the negotiating process has proceeded on two tracks. Following an initial preparatory conference in Cairo in December, attended by Egyptian and Israeli delegations and also by representatives of the United States and U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, Egypt and Israel agreed to establish two committees at ministerial level. A military committee was convened in Cairo to negotiate essentially Egyptian-Israeli bilateral issues. A political committee was convened in Jerusalem to negotiate multilateral Arab-Israeli issues, in which we participated.

The United States from the beginning has supported Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Our efforts are directed toward assuring, first, that there is tangible and early progress in the negotiating process begun by Egypt and Israel in Jerusalem last November, and second that out of this process there emerge a basis and an incentive for the negotiations to be broadened to include other Arab parties. Both Egypt and Israel have stated that this is also their objective.

When President Sadat withdrew his delegation from Jerusalem in January, we continue as a middleman with the support of both parties to seek to advance the work of the political committee. Our role is in many ways unusual by traditional diplomatic standards. We are not a party to the conflict, nor are we a negotiator only for our own interests with the parties to the conflict. We have used our good offices to convey the positions of one party to another, and we have played an active role in trying to help the parties resolve their differences. Rather than substituting ourselves for the parties in these negotiations, we are complementing their own efforts while encouraging them to return to direct negotiations.

The initial focus of our consultations with Egypt and Israel was on helping them achieve agreement on the first objective they set for themselves in the political committee - the negotiation of a declaration of principles for a comprehensive peace settlement. This declaration, building on Security Council Resolution 242, is fundamental to bringing other Arab parties, in particular Jordan and Palestinian representatives, into the negotiating process.

A large measure of agreement has already been achieved on those principles dealing with the nature of peace and the recognition of Israel. We and the Arab governments who are key to the peace process agree that the common objective is a peace settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 which, among other things recognizes Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. Specifically, with Egypt

we have reached agreement that such a settlement should encompass the full range of normal relations that are customary between states at peace with one another.

The key differences remaining to be bridged related to the issue of withdrawal and an approach to the Palestinian problem, including the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Some understanding between the parties on these issues as they relate to these territories is essential to achieve agreement on the declaration of principles itself. Therefore, in the most recent consultations with Mideastern leaders, the President and Secretary Vance have reviewed a number of ideas for coming to grips in concrete ways with these questions. We shall continue this intensive consultation with both Israel and Egypt. Since this question is the key to progress at this stage in the negotiations, let me try to explain where the present difficulties lie.

In 1967 the authors of Resolution 242 and all the Governments concerned understood that the withdrawal-for-peace concept applied wherever territory was occupied in 1967. Today, the Israeli government does not agree that Resolution 242 involves a prior obligation in principle to withdraw from any West Bank and Gaza territory. I emphasize here an obligation in principle because actual withdrawal would of course take place only in the context of a final peace treaty embodying commitments to normal peaceful relations and agreed security arrangements which can include agreed border modifications. We have stated frankly that we differ with Israel on this issue, which has not only complicated efforts to make progress in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, but has also inhibited efforts to broaden those negotiations to include other Arab parties, in particular Jordan and Palestinian representatives. At the same time, it is important to emphasize the areas where Israel and we are in fundamental agreement. We agree on the need for full peace and normal relations. We also agree that potential threats to Israel's security from areas from which Israel withdraws must be dealt with satisfactorily - both the threat of invasion by conventional military forces and the treat of terrorist and guerrilla attack.

There are also areas of agreement and disagreement between ourselves and the Arab governments concerned. We and they agree that a settlement must include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. We also agree that all the principles of Resolution 242, including the principle of withdrawal, apply to all fronts where territory was occupied in 1967, including the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, we have made it clear over the past months that we do not agree with some key elements of the position of some Arab states. For instance, we do not agree with their call for a prior commitment of Israel to total withdrawal from every bit of occupied territory. That is not part of Resolution 242. We have also made clear that in our view the future of the West Bank and Gaza lies in close association with Jordan and that an independent Palestinian state harboring irredentist feeling in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution. In the end, of course, these are issues that can only be resolved in the negotiating process itself.

Because the West Bank-Gaza issue is so complex and no instant solution seems possible, we believe that there need to be interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza agreed between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian representatives. During this interim period an ultimate solution can be worked out combining security for Israel and its neighbors and a territorial solution which will not threaten the peace in the future.

We realize that the withdrawal-for-peace formula as it applies to the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian issue generally, raise difficult security issues for Israel. But we believe that formula must apply if there is to be progress. In all our deliberations, we constantly have before us the very real security questions posed for Israel. We cannot conceive of any solution the United States - or Israel - could accept which did not make fullest provisions for these security concerns as part of a peace settlement.

To supplement the commitments and security arrangements the parties may agree to incorporate in peace treaties between themselves, and if we judge it essential to cement final agreement, we have said we are prepared to consider whatever bilateral United States security guarantees Israel may consider desirable as part of the peace settlement. This would of course be done in close consultation with the Congress in full consonance with its constitutional authority and responsibilities.

At this stage of the negotiating process, we are awaiting responses to questions we have put to the Israeli Government which seek to clarify Israel's views about when and how an ultimate solution to the West Bank/Gaza question will be achieved. In effect, we are exploring whether a way can be found to separate the issue of security from the issue of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. We understand the need for time for these questions to be debated within Israel's democratic political process. We know that these questions - dealing as they do with the key issues for Israel of security, withdrawal, the Palestinian question, and the future of the West Bank and Gaza - require agonizingly difficult choices to be made. We hope nevertheless that Israel's responses will be positive, because we believe this offers perhaps the only possibility for renewing the momentum of the Egyptian-Israeli talks and ultimately the overall Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

Nothing stands still in the Middle East, it is always moving - toward peace, or toward war, so long as the basic conflict is unresolved. Despite the apparent deadlock, the deep differences, and the cycle of violence so tragically reflected in terrorist attacks and counterattacks, we still believe the dynamics of the process favor a negotiated peace.

What we are seeing today, for the first time in the history of the conflict, are genuine attempts by key parties involved to come to terms. We are also seeing an unprecedented public debate over the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the depth of hostility and suspicion which underlie that conflict, and the painful decisions needed to make negotiations succeed, no one should expect results overnight.

There are strong forces - forces of historical distrust and suspicion of bitterness and violence, of national ambition and ideological commitment, of perceived injustices on both sides - which are working against the success of all that we and our friends in the middle east are seeking to achieve. And time is on their side, not ours.

But despite the risks and difficulties, this is a period of dramatic new opportunities for the people of the Middle East and for the relationships between the United States and the Middle East. How we together handle these opportunities may well determine the character of the Middle East, the American role there, and many aspects of the economic health of the world for many years to come. It is because the stakes are so high that I have taken so much time today to analyze them in detail. We are engaged in an intensive effort, of which today's meeting is a part, to discuss this issue with the American people, because it is essential that we enter this period of opportunity with a truly national policy and sense of direction. Our purpose is to formulate a policy that encompasses the full range of American interests and concerns; and that has the support of the American people, of our friends around the world, and of our friends on both sides of the conflict in the Middle East.

We must not, we do not intend, to let this moment in history become simply another lost opportunity.



#### **ISRAEL CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ CONCERNING EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT'S PROPOSALS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, 25 JUNE 1978**

The President of Egypt, Mr. Anwar Sadat again proposed according to Cairo radio, that Israel turn over Judea and Samaria to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt as a precondition for negotiations over what he calls "Security problems of Israel."

Israel unreservedly rejects these proposals of President Sadat. Israel proposed conducting negotiations without preconditions over the establishment of peace and the institution of administrative autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza as part of the peace treaties over which free negotiations should be conducted between the parties.



**HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,  
STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, LONDON, 29 JUNE 1978**

*[The EEC leaders called for the resumption of negotiations between Israel and Egypt, based on UNSC Res. 242 and 338, and for the granting of "effective expression" to the national identity of the Palestinian people.]*

1. At the present crucial stage in the Middle East, the Nine welcome all efforts now being made to bring to an end the tragic conflict there.  
They emphasize the crucial interest which they see in early and successful negotiations towards a just and lasting peace. They all on all the parties concerned to agree urgently to participate in such negotiations in a constructive and realistic spirit; at this juncture, in particular, all parties should refrain from statements or policies which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.
2. The Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of November 6, 1973, September 28, 1976 and December 7, 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:
  - the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
  - the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
  - respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
  - recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
 It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.
3. The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.  
They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner, to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned.  
In the context of an overall settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; equally, the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.  
It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the states of the region can be assured; but it must be based on commitments to peace, exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing truly peaceful relations.
4. The Nine believe that the peace negotiations must be resumed urgently, with the aim of agreeing and implementing a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. They remain ready to contribute to the extent the parties wish in finding a settlement and in putting it into effect. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.



**US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, STATEMENT ON THE  
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, 1 JULY 1978**

*[By late June the US submitted to Israel a series of questions on the future of the West Bank and Gaza; Israel's answer did not satisfy the US, as became clear in Carters remarks.]*

As I said in my news conference, we have been disappointed in the last few days at the response of the Israeli government to the questions that we asked them. And I believe that to the extent possible, it is better to let the negotiations be directly between Israel and her individual neighbours.

We have not been able so far to get Begin and Sadat to continue their discussions. There have been some periodic discussions at the Foreign Minister level and Defence Minister level.

I believe the next step in the process, probably following the Vice-President's visit, will be the promulgation, or at least the delivery to Israel, of the Egyptian peace proposal. I don't now what is in it. I don't have any way to know yet. It is still in the formative stages, but I don't think it will be delayed. We will receive it from Egypt, I understand, and we will deliver it to the Israelis. Whether it is made public will be up to the Israel and Egypt governments' desires.

My guess is it will be a step in the right direction but inadequate, in which case my own inclination would be to try to bring those two nations together, at least at the Foreign Minister level, to search out the compatibility and incompatibility of the two proposals.

Following that, I think my responsibility would be to analyse those differences and compatibilities and see if we can put forward, as we have for years, some compromise proposals which the two governments would then consider.

If all of this should ultimately fail, then, of course, the UN has a role to play in the Middle East and has for a long time. And as you know, the Geneva Conference is, as a result of the UN resolution, the basic framework for peace; and that is always a fallback position if we fail as an intermediary or mediator.

I cannot give you a prediction of success, but I am determined as long as I am in the White House as president, not ever to give up the hope of realizing the desire of the people involved.



**GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO WITHDRAWAL  
FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS  
("EGYPTIAN SIX-POINT PEACE PLAN"), CAIRO, 3 JULY 1978**

*[The plan - issued after the departure of US Vice-Pres. Walter Mondale from Egypt at the end of a visit to the region - aroused a storm of protest in Israel (see next document for the response).]*

1. The establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates a just solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects on the basis of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and taking into consideration the legitimate security concerns of all the parties.
2. In order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority there shall be a transitional period not exceeding five years at the end of which the Palestinian people will be able to determine their own future.
3. Talks shall take place between Egypt, Jordan, Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people with the participation of the UN with a view to agreeing upon:
  - A. Details of the transitional regime.
  - B. Timetable for the Israeli withdrawal.
  - C. Mutual security arrangements for all the parties concerned during and following the transitional period.
  - D. Modalities for the implementation of relevant UN resolutions on Palestinian refugees.
  - E. Other issues considered appropriate by all parties.
4. Israel shall withdraw from the West Bank, including (East) Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, occupied since June 1967. The Israeli withdrawal applies to the settlements established in the occupied territories.
5. The Israeli military government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be abolished at the outset of the transitional period. Supervision over the administration of the West Bank shall become the responsibility of Jordan, and supervision over the administration of the Gaza Strip shall become the responsibility of Egypt. Jordan and Egypt shall carry out their responsibility in coop-

eration with freely elected representatives of the Palestinian people who shall exercise direct authority over the administration of the West Bank and Gaza. The UN shall supervise and facilitate the Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of Arab authority.

6. Egypt and Jordan shall guarantee that the security arrangements to be agreed upon will continue to be respected in the West Bank and Gaza.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, COMMUNIQUÉ TURNING DOWN  
THE EGYPTIAN PEACE PLAN, JERUSALEM, 9 JULY 1978**

The proposals submitted by the Egyptian Government on July 3, 1978 entitled: Proposals relative to withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and security arrangements are unacceptable to Israel and cannot by their nature lead to the establishment of peace in the Middle East and the conclusion of peace treaties with Israel.

The Cabinet decided to accept the invitation of the U.S. Secretary of State and to delegate Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to the meetings with the Foreign Minister of Egypt Mr. Kamel which will take place in London on the 18th and 19th July, 1978.

Foreign Minister Dayan will present Israel's peace plan to the London conference with the view to resume the work of the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee and the promotion of the peace-making process aiming at the conclusion of peace treaties.



**THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS - FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,  
CAMP DAVID, 17 SEPTEMBER 1978**

*[See also Map 1 in the Annex]*

**I. FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID**

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

**PREAMBLE**

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

#### FRAMEWORK

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

#### A. WEST BANK AND GAZA

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
  - (a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
  - (b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
  - (c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These ne-

negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations will be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiation must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- i) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
  - ii) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
  - iii) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
  - iv) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
  3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
  4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

#### B. EGYPT-ISRAEL

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with the goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

#### C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
  - (a) full recognition;
  - (b) abolishing economic boycotts;

(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

*For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt*  
*A. Sadat*

*For the Government of Israel*  
*M. Begin*

*Witnessed by:*

*Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America*

## II. FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, 17 SEPTEMBER 1978

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within free months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location of locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm al Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

### *Stationing of Forces*

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations. Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

- (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
- (b) in the Sharm al Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

#### *Interim Withdrawal*

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Mohammed, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

*For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt*  
A. Sadat

*For the Government of Israel*  
M. Begin

*Witnessed by:*  
Jimmy Carter, *President of the United States of America*



### **EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT, LETTER TO US PRESIDENT CARTER ON IMPLEMENTING THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, 17 SEPTEMBER 1978**

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Mohammed Anwar El Sadat



**CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, 17-22 SEPTEMBER 1978**

I. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON THE SINAI SETTLEMENT

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN TO US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

the vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both on the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,

*(Signed)* Menachem Begin

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT TO US PRESIDENT CARTER

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.
2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Mohammed Anwar El Sadat

US PRESIDENT CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the Latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Jimmy Carter

Enclosure: Letter from Prime Minister Begin

US PRESIDENT CARTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Jimmy CarterEnclosure: Letter from President SadatII. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON JERUSALEMEGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT TO US PRESIDENT CARTER

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem:

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored.
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.
4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City are null and void and should be rescinded.
5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.
6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.
7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the City shall be undivided.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Mohammed Anwar El SadatISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN TO US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER

17 September 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Menachem Begin

US PRESIDENT CARTER TO EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Jimmy Carter



**US PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER, LETTER ON DEFINITION OF TERMS TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN, 22 SEPTEMBER 1978**

His Excellency Menachem Begin  
Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

- (a) In each paragraph of the Agree Framework Document the expressions “Palestinians” or “Palestinian People” are being and will be construed and understood by you as “Palestinian Arabs”.
- (b) In each paragraph in which the expression “West Bank” appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,

*(Signed)* Jimmy Carter



**ANTI-SADAT “STEADFASTNESS AND CONFRONTATION FRONT” (ALGERIA, LIBYA, SOUTH YEMEN AND PLO), SUMMIT AGREEMENT, DAMASCUS, 23 SEPTEMBER 1978**

FOUR-POINT AGREEMENT

There was an agreement on four main points:

1. Economic and political relations with Egypt to be served, and encouragement to be given to “progressive and nationalist forces” within Egypt to overthrow the Sadat government;
2. The Arab League headquarters to be removed from Cairo or, failing that, a new league to be set up elsewhere in the Arab world;
3. Closer relations with the soviets union, to which end Syrian President Assad would go to Moscow to strengthen co-operation between the front and the Soviet Union;
4. A joint political and military command to be set up to co-ordinate moves against Israel and Egypt.

Front as Basic for Arab Unity

The conference also voiced its wish to transform the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front into “a base for the Arab nation struggle”, a base which would be committed to the following goals:

1. Arab unity and “support of all efforts aimed at removing obstacles in the way of ultimate unity of the Arab world”.
2. Recognition of the fact that the Palestinian problem is “the basic concern of the Arabs and, consequently, no single Arab party may bargain on or undermine this commitment or take any action that would cause damage to the Palestine case and the national rights of the Palestinian people.”
3. Complete liberation of all Arab and Palestinian lands, no concession or abandonment of any part of these lands, and “no-one may undermine Arab sovereignty” over them.
4. Commitment to the restoration of the “inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to repatriation, self-determination and statehood.”
5. Support for the Palestinian people’s struggle “under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people.”



**US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN, LETTER TO  
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER EZER WEIZMAN ACCOMPANYING THE  
DOCUMENTS AGREED TO AT CAMP DAVID, 28 SEPTEMBER 1978**

Dear Mr. Minister:

The US understands that, in connection with carrying out the agreements reached at Camp David, Israel intends to build two military airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be concluded between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency and priority which Israel attached to preparing the new bases in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai airbases until the new ones are operational.

I suggest that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases as well as on related forms of assistance which the United States might appropriately provide in light of the special problems which may be presented by carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such assistance as may be agreed upon the US side as a result of such consultations.

*(Signed)* Harold Brown



**WEST BANK NATIONAL CONFERENCE, STATEMENT REJECTING THE  
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, BEIT HANINA, JERUSALEM, 1 OCTOBER 1978**

*[The statement was issued by prominent Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.]*

On this day Sunday, October 1, 1978, in the professional union’s centre in Jerusalem, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, mayors and city council members, representatives of the unions, clubs and national institutions, and leading personalities in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories held a national conference and studied the results of the Camp David conference, its agreements explanations, letters and the declarations of those who signed it. All those present have unanimously decided the following:

1. To totally reject and oppose these agreements, and all the documents, explanations and annexes related to them.
2. The Camp David agreements are in contradiction to the all-Arab character of our battle, as they actually constitute a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, which will take Egypt out of the Arab arena in order to strike at the Arab and African liberation movements.

3. The above-mentioned agreements are a clear deviation from the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences in general and the Algiers and Rabat summits in particular, which clearly opposed separate solutions and demanded that the confrontation forces work jointly in all fields.
4. The above-mentioned agreements contradict the UN General Assembly resolutions on the Palestinian issue and are an open defiance of the international will and an attack on the Palestinian people's natural rights.
5. The above-mentioned agreements have denied the rights of the Palestinian people and ignored their just cause, which is the crux of the conflict in the Middle East, and ignored their usurped rights and their right of self-determination on their land. The agreements have also ignored the PLO, which is the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, and attempt to create an alternative leadership to the PLO under the auspices of occupation by establishing self-rule which time after time all sectors of our people have absolutely rejected.
6. The struggle of the Palestinian people was and still is an integral part of the struggle of the Arab peoples for freedom, unity and progress, and is part of the world liberation movement. And the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory are a unified, inseparable whole.
7. No peace is possible in the area without the complete and genuine withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories, nor without securing for the Palestinian people the right of return, self-determination and the creation of their own independent state on their land, with Jerusalem as its capital.
8. We reject the self-government plan both in its form and content. It is a plan to consolidate the occupation, to continue the oppression of our people and the usurping of our legitimate rights. It is an open and out right to our own homeland and to self-determination.
9. From our beloved Jerusalem, the throbbing heart of Palestine, we appeal to our Arab people everywhere to retain their national unity, confirm their allegiance to their legitimate leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and stand united in the face of all efforts to implement the proposed self-government plan and other capitulationist solutions.

On this occasion we salute our Palestinian people inside and outside (Palestine), the memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for their country and the resisters in the Israelis prisons. We salute the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and the resolutions of its summits in Tripoli and Damascus. These are an extension of the Arab militant stance established by the Arab people through their struggles. And we salute all friendly nations for their clear position in support of our national rights.



**GAZA NATIONAL CONFERENCE, STATEMENT REJECTING  
THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, GAZA, 18 OCTOBER 1978**

On October 16 and 18, 1978, the municipalities, rural councils, benevolent societies, trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry and business establishments of the Gaza Strip met to discuss the contents of the Camp David agreements and the documents appended thereto.

In affirming the concern of the Palestinian Arab people of the Gaza Strip that a just peace should prevail in the Middle East, and in desiring that all causes and consequences of wars should disappear so that all peoples of the region can live in a permanent peace which will come about by fulfilling the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people, they set forth their views, in a positive, constructive and objective spirit:

1. The Camp David agreement ignores the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, their right to freedom and self-determination and their right to create an independent national state in their homeland. The agreement also violates the UN Charter, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the provisions of international law.

2. The Camp David agreement violates the consensus of Arab states arrived at in the various Arab summit meetings, especially the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits.
3. The Camp David agreement violates UN General Assembly resolutions, especially resolutions 3236 of November 22, 1974 and resolution 3375 of November 10, 1975.
4. The agreement entrenches Israeli occupation for an unlimited period of time, endows it with legality, disrupts the unity of the Palestinian people at home and abroad, creates a new situation and new facts that essentially and basically conflict with the interests of the Palestinian Arab people and, in addition, does not specify the removal of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
5. The agreement ignored the future of Arab Jerusalem. This deliberate oversight represents a grave danger to its Muslim and Christian shrines and to the rights of its Palestinian Arab population.
6. A just solution to the Palestinian question can only be achieved when the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their soil and homeland and to the exercise of their natural right to freedom, justice and self-determination are respected and when the Israeli forces have completely and immediately withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories.
7. The participants affirm that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and that its participation on an equal footing with all other sides is essential for the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian question. The cause of peace in the Middle East is not served by deliberately ignoring the PLO.
8. Self-government according to the Camp David agreement is without content or meaning since it does not fulfill even the minimum demands and rights of the Palestinian Arab people, nor does it represent the correct manner in which that people can exercise their right to freedom and self-determination. This is because it is obscure, ambiguous and complex and lacks specific and genuine guarantees which ensure for that people their freedom, their return and self-determination on their soil and in their homeland.
9. Accordingly, the participants condemn the Camp David agreements and call upon all who love justice and peace in the world, upon the Arab and Islamic worlds, upon world public opinion and the United Nations to help the Palestinian Arab people obtain their just rights and put an end to their continuing tragedy. The participants affirm that they fully support a just peace. They assert that the Palestinian Arab people aspire to that just peace. Of all nations in the world, they need and desire this most in order to be rid of their sufferings and of the cruel fate imposed upon them against their will. They affirm that they have always been the victim of continuous wars and have been denied their natural right to freedom and a life of dignity on their own soil and in their homeland.



**WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT FOR RURAL SETTLEMENT,  
MASTER PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SETTLEMENT IN JUDEA AND  
SAMARIA 1979-1983, OCTOBER 1978 [EXCERPTS]**

I. INTRODUCTION

For some considerable time now the lack has been felt of a comprehensive, well-founded and professional plan of settlement for Judea & Samaria (J&S). Therefore, upon my assumption of the post of head of the Jewish Agency's land settlement and head of the rural settlement department of the World Zionist Organization, I began, with the help of the first-rate and highly experienced staff in the department, to seek out various possibilities for the consolidation of a general master plan in J&S whose implementation would extend, in the first stage, five years. At the center of his examination stands a comprehensive and systematic land survey, which is still in its midst. When the survey is completed, it is probable that we will be able to plan the disposition of settlements additional to those proposed below.

The following are the principles which guided the plan:

1. *Settlement throughout the entire Land of Israel* is for security and by right. A strip of settlements at strategic sites enhances both internal and external security alike, as well as making concrete and realizing our right to Eretz-Israel.

2. *The disposition of the proposed settlement will be implemented* according to a settlement policy of blocks of settlements in homogeneous settlement areas which are mutually interrelated - this enabling, in time, the development of common services and means of production. Moreover, in the wake of the expansion and development of the community settlements, some of them may combine, in the course of time, into an urban settlement which would consist of all the settlements in that particular bloc. Only in four instances was there no choice but to propose the establishment of an isolated settlement in an area, due to territorial and land limitations at the site.
3. *The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not only around* the settlements of the minorities, but also *in between them*, this in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in Galilee and in other parts of the country. Over the course of time, with or without peace, we will have to learn to live *with* the minorities and *among them*, while fostering goodneighborly relations - and they with us. It would be best for both peoples - the Jewish and the Arab - to learn this as early as possible, since when all is said and done the development and flowering of the area will be to the benefit of all the residents of the land. Therefore the proposed settlement blocs are situated as a strip surrounding the (Judea & Samaria) ridge - starting from its western slopes from north to south, and along its eastern slopes from south to north: both *between* the minorities population and *around* it.
4. *New settlements will be established only on State-owned land*, and not on private Arab-owned land which is duly registered. We should ensure that there is no need for the expropriation of private plots from the members of the minorities. This is the chief and outstanding innovation in this master plan: *all* the areas proposed below as sites for the establishment of new settlements have been meticulously examined, their location precisely determined, and all of them are without any doubt State-owned - this according to the preliminary findings of the fundamental and comprehensive land survey not being carried out.
5. *The location of the settlements was determined* following a thorough examination of the various sites with respect to their being suitable and amenable to settlement, taking into account topographical conditions, land-preparation possibilities, etc.
6. *In order to create as broad a disposition as possible* and to establish settlements which will excel in a high quality of life, we suggest that the majority of the settlements in J&S be established from the outset as community settlements. In addition to these, a number of agricultural and combined settlements will be established at locations where there are suitable means for production. The settlers' employment will be mainly in industry, tourism and services, with a minority engaging in intensive agriculture.

\* \* \*

As is known, it is the task of the land settlement department to initiate, plan and implement the settlement enterprise according to the decisions of the Government and of the joint Government-World Zionist Organization Committee for Settlement. I hope and believe that this plan - which is based on experience, professional know-how, surveys and planning, all of which are aimed at ensuring effective implementation - will in fact be approved, and soon, by these bodies.

It must be borne in mind that it may be too late tomorrow to do what is not done today. I believe that we should encourage and direct the tendency which exists today of moving from city to country, because of the quality of life which characterizes rural settlement. This will enable us to bring about the dispersion of the population from the densely populated urban strip of the coastal plain eastward to the presently empty areas of J&S. There are today persons who are young or young in spirit who want to take up the challenge of national goals and who want to settle in J&S. We should enable them to do so, and sooner is better.

Upon the approval of the plan proposed herein, the land settlement department will devote itself to drawing up a detailed plan for the development of settlement in J&S - including a timetable for the establishment of the proposed settlements - and the same applies for the thickening and development of the existing settlements and those now under construction. We must also ensure, from the State and WZO budgets, the required investments for realizing and executing this task.

\* \* \*

According to the plan here presented, 46 *new settlements* in J&S will be added within five years, which at the end of that period will be inhabited by 16,000 *families*, this at an investment of *IL32 billion*. In the first year of the plan's execution the number of families in the new settlements will total, according to the plan, 5,000 at an investment of *IL10 billion*; this the annual investment in each of the plan's four remaining years will be *IL5.5 billion*.

With respect to the thickening of the existing settlements and those under construction, an additional 11,000 families at the end of five years is proposed, at an investment of *IL22 billion*. For the first year of the thickening project, a total of 3,000 additional families is proposed, which will necessitate an investment of *IL6 billion* in that year. Therefore, the annual investment in each of this project's four remaining years will be *IL4 billion*.

Altogether, then five years there will be added in J&S - in the proposed settlements, the existing ones and those under construction - 27,000 *families*, this necessitating an overall investment of *IL54 billion*. In the first year of the project's implementation 8,000 *families* will be added at an investment of *IL16 billion*. Thus the annual overall investment in each of the remaining four years will be *IL9.5 billion*.

This investment is absolutely essential and is a condition for the execution of a paramount national mission.

## II. DISPOSITION OF THE SETTLEMENTS

### REIHAN BLOC

It is proposed to establish a new settlement in this bloc - Reihan B - to go up west of the village of Arakah. This will be a settlement based on agriculture and industry, and which will have after one year 50 families, and within five years 100 families.

There are presently two settlements in this bloc: Reihan (which it is proposed to thicken by adding 50 families in the first year and 100 by the end of five years); and Mei-Ami (an additional 80 families). In addition, there are already plans for establishing in this bloc the settlements of Mei-Ami B and Barkai B, with each of them to have 50 families at the end of the first year and 100 families at the end of five years. The Reihan Bloc settlements will be moshavim (small-holders' collective settlement) based on a combination of agriculture and industry.

### MAARAV BLOC

Here it is proposed to establish four new agricultural settlements which will constitute a strip descending from north to south on the border of the green line, with the farming areas to lie west of that line. Each of the four settlements will have 50 families in the first Year and 100 families within five years. Maarav A will go up southeast of Kafin village; Maarav B will be southeast of Baka-al-Gharbiyeh; Maarav C would be east of Kibbutz Bahan (and south of Maarav B); and Maarav D is slated for east of Tulkarm.

The Maarav Bloc settlements will be lined by a new national highway parallel to the Nahal Iron road, which will pass by Baka-al-Gharbiyeh and continue to Kfar Sava.

### DOTAN REGION

At this stage just one site has been found for settling this bloc: the Mirka junction, which overlooks the Dotan Valley. Here it is proposed that a large community settlement be established, to be called Dotan, to be inhabited after the first year of the project's implementation by 150 families and after five years by 500 families.

### SLA'IT BLOC

Two settlements already exist in this bloc: Sla'it and Zur-Batan. For the two of them together it is proposed that another 100 families be added in the first year and 200 families at the end of five years.

### SHOMRON BLOC

Here it is proposed that two new community settlements be established: Maaleh Nahal (north of the village of Bourkah), and Maaleh Nahal B on Jabl Yazzid (east of Malleh Nahal). Each of these two settlements will be populated by 100 families in the first year and by 300 families after five years. To date two settlements have been established in this bloc: Sanour and Shomron. For each, it is proposed to add 50 families in the first year and 200 families within five years.

#### KEDUMIM BLOC

In addition to the already existing settlement of Kedumim (to which it is proposed to add 50 families in the first year and 200 by the end of five years), it is proposed to establish another three community settlements, to be based on industry and intensive agriculture: Kedumim B, at a site located at “Imam Ali” (north of Kedumim)\*; Kedumim C, at Ras-a-Bayyad (southeast of Kedumim); Kedumim D, at a site on A-Ras (south of the village of Tal). Each of these settlements will have 100 families in the first year and 300 families at the end of five years.

The Shomron and Kedumim Blocs will be linked by an electricity grid which today ends at the town of Anabtah. This line will be extended to the Shomron settlement and from there will be set up to the rest of the settlements in the two Blocs.

The water supply system for the settlements in these two Blocs will be based on local well-drillings. There are today two drillings, at Kedumim and at Beit Abba. Should the need arise (and in accordance with the detailed plan to be drawn up and implemented in the future) the drilling of additional wells in these areas should be considered.

#### KARNEI SHOMRON BLOC

Here it is proposed to establish four new community settlements: Karnei Shomron B (south of Karnei Shomron), Karnei Shomron C (east of Karnei Shomron), Karnei Shomron D (southeast of Karnei Shomron C) and Karnei Shomron E (east of Karnei Shomron C). Each of these settlements will have 100 families in the first year and 300 families after five years. With respect to the urban settlements in the Bloc-Karnei Shomron and Elkana - it is proposed to add 200 families to each of them in the first year, and 800 families each by the end of five years.

#### ARIEL BLOC

In this Bloc the urban settlement of Ariel (Haris) has already been established, which it is proposed to thicken by adding 260 families in the first year of the plan's execution and 1,500 families by the end of five years. This settlement lies on the Samaria transverse road, which links the center of the country with the Jordan Rift.

In addition to this urban settlement it is proposed to establish a new community settlement: Ariel B, at the site located at Hirbet a-Shelal (west of Ariel), which is planned to have 100 families by the end of its first year and 300 families five years later.

#### NEVEH-ZUF BLOC

In addition to the already existing community settlement of Neveh-Zuf (to which it is proposed to add another 50 families in the first year and 200 after five years), it is proposed to establish in this bloc, three new community settlements: Neveh-Zuf B, at Hirbet Rushniyeh (southwest of Neveh-Zuf), Neveh-Zuf (north of Neveh-Zuf) and Neveh-Zuf D (northeast of Neveh-Zuf) - the later two near Kafr Ayin. Each of these three settlements will, according to the plan, have 100 families in the first year and 300 families within five years. Neveh-Zuf already has an electric line hookup. The water supply will be from the direction of Bir-Zeit, from the Ramallah water line.

#### MODIIM BLOC

Four settlements - on both sides of the green line - already exist here, united within the Modiim regional council. For the settlements of Shilat, Kfar Ruth and Mevoh Modiim, an additional 20 families each is proposed for the first year and 80 families within five years. For Mevoh Horon the figures are 50 families and 150 families within five years. Also planned for this area is the settlement of Matityahu, which is expected to be inhabited by 100 families in the first year and 300 families five years later.

In addition to these existing and planned settlements it is proposed to establish, on Hill 386, a new community settlement, Matityahu B (west of the village of Ibil'in). This settlement will be populated by 100 families after one year and by 300 families after five years.

#### GIVON BLOC

Two settlements exist in this area: Beit Horon (a community settlement for which 200 or more families are proposed within five years) and Givon, which was originally slated as an urban settlement but which, it is proposed - due to land limitations there - be a community settlement to which 150 fami-

lies will be added within five years. Instead, it is proposed to establish, on a hill north of Givon, a new urban settlement, Givon B, to be inhabited by 500 families in the first year and by 3,000 families after five years. It is also proposed to establish, west of Givon B, a new community settlement, Givon C, where 100 families would live at the end of the first year and 300 after five years.

#### ETZION BLOC (GUSH ETZION)

Six settlements already exist here: Rosh Tzurim (where an additional 30 families would come within five years), Elon Shvut (an additional 100 families within five years), Kfar Etzion (20 more families), Elazar (another 15 families), Migdal Oz (another 70 families within five years) and Tekoah (which it is proposed become an urban settlement because of its relative distance from the other Etzion Bloc settlements), which would have another 200 families within one year and 800 families after five years. Planned for this Bloc is the settlement of Haforit, to be based on agriculture and industry (50 families in the first year and 100 at the end of five years). There was a suggestion to establish an urban settlement - Efrat - at a site located south of Bethlehem, but ground conditions there do not enable such extensive development, so it is proposed that this be a community settlement. In addition to Efrat 5 it is proposed to establish another four community settlements in this Bloc: Etzion B, in the Beit Fajr Forest (between Migdal Oz and Kfar Etzion), Etzion C, at Givat Hamukhtar (west of Kfar Etzion), Elazar B, at Sheikh Abdallah Ibrahim (northeast of Elazar) and Nahalim (west of Nahlin village). Each of the five settlements mentioned would have 100 families in the first year and 300 families five years later. This new disposition of Etzion Bloc settlements will form a territorial continuity with the settlements of the Abdulam District. (The Abdulam District lies between Beit Shemesh and Beit Goubrin. - RM).

#### TARKUMYAH REGION

East of the village of Tarkumyah (which lies northwest of Hebron), in the Tarkumyah forest, it is proposed to establish a large community settlement, Tirat-Horesh, which is slated for 150 families within a year of its establishment and for 400 families five years later. For its services the settlement will rely on the Etzion Bloc settlements to the north, or, alternatively, on the settlements of the Mount Hebron slopes to the west and the south.

#### ADORAYIM BLOC

Here, two settlements can be established: at the Dorah junction, east of Sikha village, it is proposed to establish a community settlement to be based on a combination of agriculture and industry. To be called Adorayim, the settlement would have 100 families within one year and 300 families within five years. It is also proposed to establish a new agricultural settlement, Eiton (near Tel Eiton), where 50 families would live within the first year and 100 families after five years.

#### YATIR BLOC

Here, too, settlements would be established on both sides of the green line which together would constitute one unified bloc. There are in this area two settlements at present: Yatir (Ardon) and Lutsifer. For each of them an additional 100 families is proposed for the first year and 300 within five years. Also planned for this area is an agricultural settlement, Kramim (50-100 families).

In addition to these three settlements it is proposed to establish another five new community settlements to be based on agriculture, industry and tourism: Raveh (at the Rahaveh police station site, northeast of Kramim), Yatir B, Yatir C, Yatir D (all three of them northeast of Yatir), Susiya (at the site of the ancient synagogue northeast of Samua). Each of these five settlements would have 100 families in the first year and 300 families five years later. It should be noted that at the impressive site of the ancient synagogue, as well as at Yatir and environs a tourist project could be set up which would provide employment to many families in the area.

#### AMOS REGION

In the area of Rujm-a-Nakah (between Nahal Amos and Nahal Arugot, northeast of Hebron) it is proposed to establish a large community settlement to be called Amos. It would have 150 families in its first year and 400 families at the end of five years.

This settlement, along with others to be established to its east, could form a territorial continuity with the settlements planned for the Dead Sea shoreline, including the already existing Mitzpeh Shalem. It

is proposed that the Amos Region settlements be linked with Tekoah and with the Etzion Bloc settlements by means of a Judean transverse road to be paved from east to west, extending to the settlements of the Mount Hebron slopes and the Adulam District.

#### ADUMIM BLOC

The temporary settlement of Maaleh-Adumim already exists here, along with its adjacent industrial zone. The permanent urban settlement is now under construction at a site near Aizariyah, just outside Jerusalem, and where an additional 300 families would take up residence in the first year and 1,500 families within five years. Also in the area is the settlement of Mitzpeh Jericho, for which an additional 100 families is proposed in the first year of plan and 300 after five years.

In addition to these two settlements it is proposed to establish a series of three new settlements which will form a territorial continuity with the Beit-El Bloc settlements to the north: Pe'era (Maaleh Adumim B, near Air Farah), which is to be a large community settlement based mainly on tourism and holidaying, to be inhabited by 150 families in the first year and 400 families five years later; Maaleh Adumim C, north of Pe'era; and still further north Maaleh Adumim D - the latter two being community settlements meant to be inhabited by 300 families each within five years.

#### BEIT-EL BLOC

Four community settlements have already been established in this Bloc: Beit-El (where it is proposed to add 400 families within five years), Ofra (an additional 300 families), Rimonim and Kohav Ha-Shahar (for each of which it is proposed to add 300 families within five years). East of Kohav Ha-Shahar it is proposed to establish a new community settlements, Kohav HaShahar B, to be inhabited by 100 families within one year and by 300 families within five years.

#### EPHRAIM BLOC

New settlements to go up in this Bloc will form a territorial continuity with the Jordan Rifts settlements. At present there are three settlements in this area, Gitit, Maaleh Ephraim and Mevoh Shiloh. It is proposed to establish a new community settlement, Mevoh Shiloh B, west of Mevoh Shiloh, which would have 100 families in the first year and 300 families at the end of five years.

#### SHILOH BLOC

Two community settlements have already been established here: Shiloh and Tapuah (it is proposed to add 300 families to each of them within five years of the project's implementation).

Another three community settlements could be established in this area, with each of them having 100 families in their first year and 300 families five years later: Shiloh B, at the Batan Hiluah site (west of Shiloh), Shiloh C, at the Jabl Batan site (northwest of Shiloh B) and Shiloh D, on Jabl Rawat (northeast of Shiloh C).

#### ELON MOREH REGION

In this area, southeast of Nablus, on Jabl Rujaib, it is proposed to establish a large community settlement, Elon Moreh, to be inhabited by 400 families within five years of its establishment.

#### NAHAL TIRZAH REGION

Near Nahal Tirzah, on Jabl Thayur, it is proposed to establish a large community settlement (400 families within five years) called Tirzah.

### III. EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC BRANCHES IN SETTLEMENTS

Employment and the economic basis of the residents in J&S will be in accordance with the nature of the settlement and the surrounding area.

In the *urban settlements* some 60% of the families will be employed in industry, handicrafts, holidaying & tourism, and the rest in services and work outside the settlement. In the towns close to Jerusalem the proportion of those employed in outside work will be higher.

In the *community settlements* the economic basis in the development state will be as follows: about 50% of the families will earn their living from industry and handicrafts; about 12% from capital-based intensive agriculture; about 25% from outside work; and about 13% from local services.

The *agricultural* and the *combined settlements* will be based on agricultural branches (mainly intensive, depending on the means for production in the area), as well as on industry, handicrafts and tourism. Some of the settlers will engage in local and regional services.

#### IV. SERVICES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

*The regional services* in education, health, culture, etc. will be planned and set up already in the first stage of plan's execution, in each bloc, in one of the bloc's central settlements. Their preparation as early as possible will prove a boon to the settlers in the new settlements.

**Social Integration:** The detailed planning of the settlements will be carried out along with the formation of settlement core groups and their organization in anticipation of settlement. The absorption unit in the land settlement department will draw up an action framework in the sphere of the social absorption of the settlers (new immigrants and veterans) through coordination with the land settlement movements and other social bodies.

*by Matityahu Drobles Jerusalem, October 1978*



#### **LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, FINAL STATEMENT OF THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE, BAGHDAD, 5 NOVEMBER 1978**

The Arab summit conference issued a final statement at the conclusion of its meetings, which lasted for four days. The following is the text of the final statement:

*By the initiative* of the Government of the Republic of Iraq and at the invitation of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the ninth Arab summit conference convened in Baghdad 2-5 November 1978.

*In a high spirit* of pan-Arab responsibility and joint concern about the unity of the Arab stand the conference studied confrontation of the dangers and challenges threatening the Arab nation, particularly after the results of the Camp David agreements signed by the Egyptian Government and the effects of these agreements on the Arab struggle to face the Zionist aggression against the Arab nation.

*Proceeding from* the principles in which the Arab nation believes, acting on the unity of Arab destiny and complying with the traditions of joint Arab action, the Arab summit conference has emphasized the following basic principles:

*First:* The Palestinian question is a fateful Arab issue and is the essence of the conflict with the Zionist enemy. The sons of the Arab nation and all the Arab countries are concerned with it and are obligated to struggle for its sake and to offer all material and moral sacrifices for this cause. The struggle to regain Arab rights in Palestine and in the occupied Arab territory is a general Arab responsibility. All Arabs must share this responsibility, each in accord with his military, economic, political and other abilities. The conflict with the Zionist enemy exceeds the framework of the conflict of the countries whose territory was occupied in 1967, and it includes the whole Arab nation because of the military, political, economic and cultural danger the Zionist enemy constitutes against the entire Arab nation and its substantial and pan-Arab interests, civilization and destiny. This places on all the countries of the Arab nation the responsibility to share in this conflict with all the resources it possesses.

*Second:* All the Arab countries must offer all forms of support, backing and facilities to all forms of the struggle of the Palestinian resistance, supporting the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied land, struggling for liberation and restoration of the national rights of its people, including their right to return to their homeland, to determine their future and to establish their independent state on their national soil. The Arab States pledge to preserve Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Palestinian action.

*Third:* Commitment is reaffirmed to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, particularly the sixth and seventh summit conferences of Algiers and Rabat.

*Fourth:* In light of the above principles it is impermissible for any side to act unilaterally in solving the Palestinian question in particular and the Arab-Zionist conflict in general.

*Fifth:* No solution shall be accepted unless it is associated with a resolution by an Arab summit conference convened for this purpose.

The conference discussed the two agreements signed by the Egyptian Government at Camp David and considered that they harm the Palestinian people's rights and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab territory. The conference considered that these agreements took place outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility and are opposed to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, particularly the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences, the Arab League Charter and the UN resolutions on the Palestinian question. The conference considers that these agreements do not lead to the just peace that the Arab nation desires. Therefore, the conference has decided not to approve of these two agreements and not to deal with their results. The conference has also rejected all the political, economic, legal and other effects resulting from them.

The conference decided to call on the Egyptian Government to go back on these agreements and not to sign any reconciliation treaty with the enemy. The conference hopes that Egypt will return to the fold of joint Arab action and not act unilaterally in the affairs of the Arab-Zionist conflict. In this respect the conference adopted a number of resolutions to face the new stage and to safeguard the aims and interests of the Arab nation is capable of confronting the difficult circumstances and all challenges, just as it has always been throughout history, because it is defending right, justice and its national existence.

The conference stressed the need to unify all the Arab efforts in order to remedy the strategic imbalance that has resulted from Egypt's withdrawal from the confrontation arena.

The conference decided that the countries that possess readiness and capability will coordinate participation with effective efforts. The conference also stressed the need to adhere to the regulations of Arab boycott and to tighten application of its provisions.

The conference studied means to develop Arab information media beamed abroad for the benefit of the just Arab issues. The conference decided to hold annual meetings for the Arab summit conferences and decided that the month of November will be the date.

After studying the Arab and international situation, the conference asserts the Arab nation's commitment to a just peace based on the comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, the guaranteeing of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people including the right to establish their independent state on their national soil.

The conference decided to embark on large scale international activity to explain the just rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. The conference expressed appreciation to the Syrian Arab Republic and its heroic army, and to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its heroic army, and expressed its pride in the struggle of the Palestinian people and its steadfastness inside and outside the occupied territories, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The conference praised the "charter for joint national action" signed by fraternal Syria and Iraq, and the conference regarded the charter as a great achievement on the way to Arab solidarity. The conference also expressed its great appreciation for the initiative of the Iraqi Government using President Hasan al-Bakr in calling for the convening of an Arab summit conference in Baghdad so as to unify Arab ranks and to organize Arab efforts to face the threats to which the Arab nation is currently exposed. The conference expressed its thanks for President Al-Bakr's efforts to make the conference a success.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 33/71 BANNING MILITARY  
COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL, NEW YORK, 14 DECEMBER 1978 [EXCERPTS]**

The General Assembly,

*Gravely concerned* over the continued and rapid Israeli military build-up,

*Alarmed* by the increasing evidence regarding Israeli attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

*Expressing* its alarm over the use by Israel of cluster bombs against refugee camps and civilian targets in southern Lebanon,

*Recalling* its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976 and 32/82 of 12 December 1977 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recognizing* that the continued escalation of Israeli armament constitutes a threat to international peace and security and underlies Israel's persistent defiance of General Assembly resolutions and its policy of expansion, occupation and denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

*Further recalling* its repeated condemnations of the intensifications of military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its resolution 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa",

1. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate fully in effective international action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assert this grave menace to international peace and security;
2. *Requests* the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all States, under Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts:
  - (a) To refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefore, to Israel, without any exception;
  - (b) To ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties;
  - (c) To end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel;
3. *Further requests* the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above;
4. *Invites* all Governments and organizations to take all appropriate actions to promote the purposes of the present resolution.



**ISRAEL CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT,  
JERUSALEM, 15 DECEMBER 1978**

*[The cabinet rejected the US-support of Egyptian demands for the peace treaty and the proposals themselves as being "inconsistent with the Camp David framework". However, in order not to end the process, Israel agreed to reformulate its own ideas on the autonomy arrangements as follows:]*

1. The Government of Israel is prepared to sign, without delay, the draft peace treaty between Egypt and Israel including the Annexes, as formulated on the 11 of November 1978 with the approval of the U.S. Government. Full responsibility for the fact that the treaty has not been signed rests entirely with the Egyptian Government.
2. During this week, we have received through the Secretary of State of the U.S. new demands from Egypt, namely:
  - a) Making the exchange of Ambassadors conditional upon the implementation of the Autonomy, at least in the Gaza District.
  - b) A basic change in Article 4 of the Peace Treaty with the intent to bring about a review of the security arrangements in Sinai after five years.
  - c) An addition of an interpretive note to Article 6 which negates its contents.

- d) Inclusion of a date, called a "target date," for the implementation of the Autonomy in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.
3. These demands are inconsistent with the Camp David Framework, or are not included in it and change substantially provisions of the aforementioned peace treaty. They are therefore unacceptable to Israel and are rejected by it.
4. The Government of Israel rejects the attitude and the interpretation of the U.S. Government with regard to the Egyptian proposals.
5. The letter concerning the autonomy arrangements can be clarified and re-formulated.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 33/113 ON THE REPORT OF THE  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE, NEW YORK, 18 DECEMBER 1978 [EXCERPTS]**

The General Assembly,

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

*Recalling* all its resolution on the subject, in particular resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations organs concerned and by the specialized agencies,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 18 / which contains, *inter alia*, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in thoroughness and impartiality;
2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
3. *Calls again upon* Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
4. *Deplores* the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as "grave breaches" thereof;
5. *Condemns* the following Israeli policies and practices:
  - a) Annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
  - b) Establishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private and public Arab lands and transfer of an alien population thereto;
  - c) Evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and denial of their right to return;
  - d) Confiscation and expropriation of private and public Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
  - e) Destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
  - f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
  - g) Ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
  - h) Pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
  - i) Interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
  - j) Illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
6. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immi-

- grants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
7. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
  8. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution.
  9. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
  10. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
  11. *Requests* the Secretary-General;
    - a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
    - b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
    - c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;
    - d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;
  12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".



**PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL  
PROGRAM, DAMASCUS, 23 JANUARY 1979**

The US settlement of the Arab-Zionist conflict embodied in the Camp David agreements poses grave threats to the cause of Palestine and of Arab national liberation. That settlement condones the Zionist enemy's continued usurpation of the national soil of Palestine, abrogates the inalienable right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, Palestine, as well as their right to return to it and their right to self-determination and to the exercise of their national independence on their soil. It dissipates other Arab terrorizes and overrides the PLO, the leader of our people's national struggle and their sole legitimate reprehensive and spokesman expressing their will.

In addition, these agreements violate Palestinian, Arab and international legitimacy and pave the way for tighter imperialist and Zionist control over our Arab region and Africa, employing the Egyptian regime, in the context of its alliance with imperialism and Zionism, as a tool for the repression of the Arab and African national liberation movements.

Motivated by our awareness of the gravity of this new conspiracy and its implications and by our national responsibilities in the PLO, which represents our Palestinian Arab people with all their national groups and

forces, we are obliged to reject this new conspiratorial scheme, to confront it and to defend our people and their inalienable rights to their homeland, Palestine, as well as to safeguard our Palestinian revolution.

The courageous position adopted by our Palestinian masses inside and outside the occupied homeland and by the masses of our Arab nation through their rejection of the Camp David agreements and their open determination to confront this new conspiracy against our people and their inalienable national rights and our Arab nation strengthens our resolve to resist this conspiracy and our faith in defeating it.

At the same time, we shoulder a great responsibility which can be carried out only by adopting a united national and popular stand, within the framework of the PLO.

In response to the will of our people and to the challenges that we face, and motivated by our faith in national unity within the PLO as the sole means to achieve victory; basing ourselves upon the Palestine National Charter, the resolutions of the Palestine National Councils and the Tripoli document which established unity among the various organizations of the Palestinian revolution; believing in the right of our people to establish a democratic state on the whole of our national soil and in order to confront this critical and dangerous stage in the struggle of our people, we, the representatives of all organizations of the revolution and Palestinian national forces, declare the following:

#### IN THE PALESTINIAN SPHERE

1. [That we] adhere to the inalienable rights of our people to their homeland, Palestine, and to their right to return and to self-determination on their soil without foreign interference, and to their right to establish their independent state on their soil unconditionally.
2. [That we shall] defend the PLO and adhere to it as the sole legitimate representative of our people, as leader of their national struggle and as their spokesman in all Arab and international forums; resist all attempts to harm, override or circumvent the PLO, or to create alternatives or partners to it as regards representation of our Palestinian people; adhere to the resolution of the Arab summits of Algiers and Rabat and to UN resolutions- especially resolutions 3236 and 3237- which affirm our inalienable national rights as well as Arab and international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
3. [That we] resolve firmly to continue and escalate the armed struggle and use all other forms of political and mass struggle, especially inside the occupied homeland which is the principal arena of conflict with the Zionist enemy, in order to achieve the inalienable and non-negotiable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.
4. [That we] affirm that the problem of Palestine in the crux and the basis of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and [we] reject all resolutions, agreements and settlements that do not recognize or that impinge upon the inalienable rights of our people to their homeland, Palestine, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independence national state. This applies in particular to Security Council resolution 242.
5. [That we] reject and resist the self-rule scheme in the occupied homeland, which entrenches Zionist settle colonization of our occupied land and denies the rights of our Palestinian people.
6. [That we] affirm the unity of our Palestinian Arab people inside and outside the occupied homeland, and their sole representation through the PLO; [we shall] resist all attempts and schemes that seek to divide our people or to circumvent the PLO; work to support the struggle of our people in the occupied territories and to fortify their unity and their steadfastness.
7. [That we shall] consolidate the framework of the Palestinian National Front inside Palestine since it is an integral part of the PLO, we [shall] furnish it with all the means of political and financial aid so that it can mobilize our masses inside to face the Zionist occupation, its schemes and its projects which are inimical to our people and to their inalienable national rights.
8. [That we] cling to Palestine as the historical homeland of the Palestinian people for which there can be no substitute; resist all schemes for resettlement or for an “alternative homeland”, which the imperialist and Zionist enemy is proposing in order to liquidate the Palestinian cause and Palestinian national struggle, and to circumvent our return.

## IN THE ARAB SPHERE

1. [That we] emphasize that the task of confronting the Camp David agreements, their annexes and their consequences, with the fateful dangers they pose to the cause of Arab struggle, is the responsibility of all the Arab masses and their national and progressive forces, that the Arab Front for steadfastness and confrontation, with Syria and the PLO as its central link, is the primary base from which to confront the US-Zionist conspiratorial settlement.
2. [That we must] work to fortify and strengthen the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and to expand its scope on the basis of resistance to imperialist and Zionist settlement schemes; adhere to the objective of liberating the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, and not dissipate or infringe upon these rights; [we must] furnish all possible mass and financial support to the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, especially to the PLO and the Syrian Arab region.
3. The PLO calls upon all national and progressive parties, movements and forces in the Arab homeland to support the Arab Front for Steadfastness and confrontation and to furnish it with all possible mass and financial aid, it further calls upon them to unite and to struggle on the basis of resistance to the imperialist and Zionist schemes for settlement.
4. a) The PLO asserts its firm commitment to the unity, Arab character and independence of Lebanon, its respect for Lebanese sovereignty and its adherence to the Cairo Agreement and its sequels which regulate relations between the PLO and Lebanon's legitimate authority.  
b) The PLO highly values the role that has been and is being played by the Lebanese people and their national, progressive and patriotic forces in support of and in defence of the struggle of the Palestinian people. In expressing its pride in the solidarity between our Palestinian people and the people of Lebanon and their national, progressive and patriotic forces in defense of Lebanese territory and of the Palestinian revolution against Zionist aggression, its schemes and its local agents, the PLO emphasizes the importance of continuing and strengthening this solidarity.
5. a) The PLO affirms the special character of the relationship linking the two fraternal peoples, Palestinian and Jordanian, and its concern that the solidarity between these two fraternal people should continue.  
b) The PLO declares its adherence to the resolutions of the Arab summits of Algiers and Rabat which affirm that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that our people have a right to establish their national and independent state. The PLO considers that the commitment of the Jordanian regime to these resolutions, its rejection of the Camp David agreements and their aftermath as well as its refusal to be involved in them and its role in enabling the PLO to exercise its responsibility for militant and mass struggle against the Zionist enemy, constitute the basis that governs relations between PLO and the Jordanian regime.
6. The PLO affirms its right to exercise its responsibility for struggle on the Arab and national levels, and across any Arab territory, in order to liberate the occupied Palestinian territories.
7. The PLO declares that its policies toward and its relations with any Arab regimes are determined by the policy of that regime as regards adherence to the resolutions of the summits of Algiers and Rabat and to the rejection of and the opposition to the Camp David agreements with their annex and their consequences.
8. The PLO calls upon all Arab and national forces and all national and friendly regimes to support and aid the Egyptian people and their national movement to enable them to confront the Sadat conspiracy and to foil the Camp David agreement and its effect upon the Egyptian people, their Arabism and their history of struggle against Zionist and imperialism.

## IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

1. The role played by the US against our Palestinian people and their national struggle and against the Arab national liberation movement and its objectives of liberation and independence, whether this is manifested in its support of the Zionist entity or through its agents in the Arab region, constitutes a naked aggression against our people and their national cause. The PLO, by acting in solidarity with all groups in the Arab national liberation struggle and their national and progressive forces and regimes, declares its determination to resist the policy, objectives and actions of the US in the region.

2. The PLO affirms the importance of alliance with the socialist countries, and first and foremost with the Soviets Union, since this alliance is a national necessity in the context of confronting American-Zionist conspiracies against the Palestine cause, the Arab national liberation movement and their achievements.
3. The PLO affirms the importance of consolidating its cooperation with the non-aligned, Islamic, African and friendly states which support the PLO and its struggle to achieve the national rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to establish their independent national state.
4. The PLO, as a national liberation movement, expresses its solidarity with national liberation movements throughout the world, especially with Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and its determination to consolidate relations of struggle with them since the fight against imperialism, Zionism and racism is a joint cause for all forces of liberation and progress in the world.
5. The PLO declares its firm adherence to the achievements won by Palestinian struggle in the international sphere, such as the wide international recognition accorded to the PLO and to the inalienable right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, Palestine, Their right to return, to self-determination and to establishment of their independent national state on their national soil. These are the achievements embodied in UN resolutions adopted since 1974 and up to the present, especially resolutions 3236 and 3237. It underlines the right of the PLO to participate in all meetings and conferences that discuss the Palestine question on these bases and considers that any discussion or agreement that takes place in its absence about matters related to the Palestine question are totally invalid.

#### IN THE SPHERE OF ORGANIZATION

1. All the organization of the Revolution and all Palestinian national forces participate in all institutions of the PLO, and principally in the National Council and the Central Council and the Executive Committee, on a representative basis and in a democratic manner.
2. Palestinian leadership is a collective one. This means that decisions are the responsibility of all, both through participation in the adoption of decision and in its execution. This takes place in a democratic manner where the minority adheres to the view of the majority, in accordance with the political and organizational programme and with the resolutions of the National Councils.
3. [The PLO will work] to ensure that the departments, institutions and organs of the PLO carry out their functions in full, each within its own specific sphere as defined in the basic regulations of the PLO, The Executive Committee will form higher organs, composed on a representative basis, which will undertake to formulate the plans for the various institutions of the PLO and supervise their execution by them, especially in the military, informational and financial spheres.
4. The executive Committee and the Central Council are composed in accordance with what is agreed upon as stated in the basic regulations of the PLO and the resolutions of the National Council.
5. The next Executive Committee undertakes as soon as it commences its activity to lay down the necessary plans to implement the interim programme and to review the departments and organs of the PLO in a manner that would take merit and quality into account in order to achieve optimal performance from these departments and organs.



#### UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 446 ON SETTLEMENTS, NEW YORK, 22 MARCH 1979

The Security Council,

*Having heard* the statement of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and other statements made before the Council,

*Stressing* the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Affirming once more* that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. *Determines* that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1969 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
2. *Strongly deplotes* the failure of Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and the consensus statement by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, 32/5 of 28 October 1977 and 33/113 of 18 December 1978;
3. *Calls once more upon* Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories;
4. *Establishes* a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be appointed by the President of the Council after consultation with the members of the Council, to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. *Requests* the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 1 July 1979;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its mission;
7. *Decides* to keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny and to reconvene in July 1979 to review the situation in the light of the findings of the Commission.



#### **PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, WASHINGTON, DC, 26 MARCH 1979**

*[16 months after Sadat's visit to Israel, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in Washington. It contains nine articles, two annexes (military and on relations between the parties), and agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty.]*

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel,

#### PREAMBLE

*Convinced* of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

*Reaffirming* their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

*Noting* that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

*Desiring* to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

*Convinced* that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

*Inviting* the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

*Desiring* as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

*Agree* to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel";

*Article I*

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

*Article II:*

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

*Article III:*

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:
  - a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
  - b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
  - c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.
2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.
3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

*Article IV:*

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.
2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

*Article V:*

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels

and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI:

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.
4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.
5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII:

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX:

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL CONCERNING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS

Article I: Concept of Withdrawal

1. Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
2. To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map 1, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones."
3. The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:
  - a. The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
  - b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
4. A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above.

Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

*Article II: Determination of Final Lines and Zones*

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be established and organized as follows:

**a. Zone A**

- (1) Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map 1.
- (2) An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.
- (3) The main elements of that Division will consist of:
  - a) Three mechanized infantry brigades.
  - b) One armed brigade
  - c) Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.
  - d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.
  - e) Up to 230 tanks.
  - f) Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.
  - g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.

**b. Zone B**

- (1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map 1.
- (2) Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements in the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.
- (3) Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.
- (4) There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.

**c. Zone C**

- (1) Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map 1.
- (2) Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.
- (3) Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.
- (4) The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this annex.
- (5) The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:
  - a) In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.
  - b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area.

**d. Zone D**

- (1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map 1.
- (2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.
- (3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.

- (4) The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.
2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.
3. Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.

*Article III: Aerial Military Regime*

1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.
2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.
3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian border unit, may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.
4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.
5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the Zones.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.

*Article IV: Naval Regime*

1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.
2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.
3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.
4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.
5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.

*Article V: Early Warning Systems*

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.

*Article VI: United Nations Operations*

1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:
  - a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
  - b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
  - c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.
  - d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.
3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in ones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.
4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.
5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.

6. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.
7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.
8. The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They "ill be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.

*Article VII: Liaison System*

1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.
2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.
3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.

*Article VIII: Respect for War Memorials*

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.

*Article IX: Interim Arrangements*

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Map 2.

APPENDIX TO ANNEX I:  
ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS IN THE SINAI

*Article I: Principles of Withdrawal*

1. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.
2. Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of military movements.
  - a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.
  - b) As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.
  - c) Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

- d) Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.
- e) Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.
- f) Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
- g) Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be offered in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

Article II: Sub-phases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line

1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in sub-phases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each sub-phase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty:
  - a) First sub-phase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.
  - b) Second sub-phase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.
  - c) Third sub-phase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
  - d) Fourth sub-phase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor-Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
  - e) Fifth sub-phase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.
2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:
  - a) Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim zone.
  - b) The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of areas I, III and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth sub-phases, respectively.
  - c) Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first sub-phase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in Area II upon completion of the second sub-phase. A third battalion will be deployed in Area III upon completion of the third sub-phase. The second and third battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.
3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1976 Agreement will redeploy to enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the sub-phase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.
4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.

Article III: United Nations Forces

1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in the Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.

2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
3. When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.

*Article IV: Joint Commission and Liaison*

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.
3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:
  - a) coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
  - b) address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
  - c) assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verification when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and this Appendix;
  - d) organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
  - e) supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
  - f) agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
  - g) organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Mohamed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
  - h) conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;
  - i) provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
  - j) discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.
4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party of the Command of the United Nations Force requests a specific meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.
5. The Joint Committee will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

*Article V: Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities*

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.
3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 5933-1527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:
  - a) The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:
    - T1 - up to 150 personnel;
    - T2 and T3 - up to 350 personnel;
    - T4 - up to 200 personnel.
  - b) Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.
  - c) Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation's visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.
  - d) Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.
  - e) Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.
  - f) As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:
    - (1) Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.
    - (2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the site. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to 12 un-armed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.
  - g) Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:
    - (1) T1: Through a United Nations checkpoint, and via the road between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at km 161), as shown on Map 2.
    - (2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
    - (3) T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.
  - h) Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.
  - i) Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.
4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.
5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the parties.

*Article VI: Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers*

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.
2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructures, utilities, and installations intact, *inter alia*, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of the facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.
3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.
4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:
  - a) Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads and major installations and utilities.
  - b) For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.
  - c) Egyptian engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

*Article VII: Surveillance Activities*

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:
  - a) Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.
  - b) Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.
  - c) Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.
2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission be terminated.

*Article VIII: Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty*

Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.

ANNEX III:

PROTOCOL CONCERNING RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES

*Article I: Diplomatic and Consular Relations*

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

Article 2: Economic and Trade Relations

1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.
2. As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3: Cultural Relations

1. The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.
2. They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

Article 4: Freedom of Movement

1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.
2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a non-discriminatory basis.

Article 5: Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations

1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.
2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.
3. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6: Transportation and Telecommunications

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.
2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.
3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El-Arish, Rafah, Ras El-Nagb and Sharm El-Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.
4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.
5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.
6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.
7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access will be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.

*Article 7: Enjoyment of Human Rights*

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

*Article 8: Territorial Seas*

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY:  
AGREED MINUTES

*Article I:* Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 1 shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

*Article IV:* It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both parties.

*Article V:* The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows: "The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

*Article VI(2):* The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty".

*Article VI(5):* It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

*Annex I:* Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows: "The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council." The Parties have agreed as follows: "With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a US proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."

*Annex III:* The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders of such oil.

For the Government of Israel:  
M. BEGIN

For the Government of Arab Republic of Egypt:  
A. SADAT



**EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY: EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, 26 MARCH 1979**

JOINT LETTER ON WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATIONS BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND  
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO US PRESIDENT CARTER.

Dear Mr. President:

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 1978, the annexed documents entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel."

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose of the negotiations shall be to agree, prior to the elections, on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel.

The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing authority, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East." A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

For the Government of Israeli:  
*Menachem Begin*

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:  
*Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat*

PRESIDENT CARTER, LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT  
OF A UN OR AN ALTERNATE MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty. The United States believes that the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

*Jimmy Carter*

LETTERS REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

US President Jimmy Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador. I would be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will be agreeable to the Government of Israel.

Sincerely,

*Jimmy Carter*

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to US President Jimmy Carter:

Dear Mr. President,

I am pleased to be able to confirm that the Government of Israel is agreeable to the procedure set out in your letter of March 26, 1979, in which you state:

"I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador."

Sincerely,

*Menachem Begin*

HERBERT J. HANSELL, LEGAL ADVISOR, US STATE DEPARTMENT, LETTER TO MEIR ROSENNE OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF DEFENSE PACTS

Dear Meir:

You asked about the status of the draft legal opinion from me to the Secretary of State concerning interpretation of Article VI of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and the draft letter from the US to Israel, both of which had been given consideration in connection with discussions of the relation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty to existing defense pacts.

Neither of those drafts was ever made final. Both have now been abandoned. Accordingly, neither has any standing or significance whatever.

Sincerely,

*Herbert J. Hansell*



**EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 26 MARCH 1979**

*Recognizing* the significance of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt and considering the importance of full implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Israel's security interests and the contribution of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the security and development of Israel as well as its significance to peace and stability in the region and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and

*Recognizing* that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional heavy security, military and economic burdens on Israel;

The Governments of the United States of America and of the State of Israel, subject to their constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows:

1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the parties' desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace.
2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the parties with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure observance of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures as described below.
3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, *inter alia*, a blockade of Israel's use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights to order to put an end to the violation.
4. The United States will support the parties' rights to navigation and overflight for access to either country through and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty of Peace.
5. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the United Nations which in its judgment adversely affects the Treaty of Peace.
6. Subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, the United States will endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.
7. The United States will continue to impose restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any country which prohibit their unauthorized transfer to any third party. The United States will not supply or authorize transfer of such weapons for use in an armed attack against Israel, and will take steps to prevent such unauthorized transfer.
8. Existing agreements and assurances between the United States and Israel are not terminated or altered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel (United States-Israeli Assurances) of September 1, 1975.
9. This Memorandum of Agreement sets forth the full understandings of the United States and Israel with regard to the subject matters covered between them hereby, and shall be carried out in accordance with its terms.



**EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY: LETTER ON SUPERSEDED ARTICLES OF 1  
SEPTEMBER 1975, WASHINGTON, DC, 30 MARCH 1979**

Mr. William B. Bader  
Staff Director, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC 20510

Dear Bill:

When Roy Atherton and I discussed with you the other day the Memorandum of Agreement recently signed between the US and Israel, you asked for some additional explanation of the references in paragraph 8 to various provisions of the September 1, 1975, Memorandum of Agreement.

I am enclosing another copy of the recent MOA, and also copies of the September 1, 1975, MOA and of the Peace Treaty. You will see that the various paragraphs of the 1975 MOA that are referred to in the new MOA all make reference to the 1975 disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Under Article IX(2) of the Peace Treaty, the Treaty supersedes the September 1975 disengagement agreement, and consequently, the provisions of the 1975 MOA that relate to the disengagement agreement are effectively terminated by the Peace Treaty. Hence, it was thought desirable that those terminated provisions should be specifically identified as such in paragraph 8 of the new MOA.

If you would like any further information on the subject, please don't hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely,

Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, State Department, Washington



**LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE RESOLUTION,  
BAGHDAD, 31 MARCH 1979**

As the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has ignored the Arab summit conferences' resolutions, especially those of the sixth and seventh conferences held in Algiers and Rabat; as it has at the same time ignored the ninth Arab summit conference resolutions - especially the call made by the Arab kings, presidents and princes to avoid signing the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy - and signed the peace treaty on 26 March 1979.

It has thus deviated from the Arab ranks and has chosen, in collusion with the United States, to stand by the side of the Zionist enemy in one trench; has behaved unilaterally in the Arab-Zionist struggle affairs; has violated the Arab nation's rights; has exposed the nation's destiny, its struggle and aims to dangers and challenges; has relinquished its pan-Arab duty of liberating the occupied Arab territories, particularly Jerusalem, and of restoring the Palestinian Arab territories, particularly Jerusalem, and of restoring the Palestinian Arab people's inalienable national rights, including their right to repatriation, self-determination and establishment of the independent Palestinian State on their national soil.

In order to safeguard Arab solidarity and the unity of ranks in defense of the Arabs' fateful issue; in appreciation of the Egyptian people's struggle and sacrifices for Arab issues and the Palestinian issue in particular; in implementation of the resolutions adopted by the ninth Arab summit conference that convened in Baghdad 2-5 November 1978, and at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Iraq, the Arab League Council convened in Baghdad from 27 March 1979 to 31 March 1979 on the level of Arab foreign and economy ministers.

In light of the ninth Arab summit conference resolutions, the council studied the latest developments pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict, especially after the signing by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt of the peace [*as-sulh*] agreement with the Zionist enemy on 26 March 1979.

The Arab League Council, on the level of Arab foreign ministers, has decided the following:

1. A. To withdraw the ambassadors of the Arab States from Egypt immediately.  
B. To recommend the severance of political and diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government. The Arab governments will adopt the necessary measures to apply this recommendation within a maximum period of 1 month from the date of issuance of this decision, in accordance with the constitutional measures in force in each country.
2. To consider the suspension of the Egyptian Government's membership in the Arab League as operative from the date of the Egyptian Government's signing of the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy. This means depriving it of all rights resulting from this membership.
3. A. To make the city of Tunis, capital of the Tunisian Republic, the temporary headquarters of the Arab League, its General Secretariat, the competent ministerial councils and the permanent technical committees, as of the date of the signing of the treaty between the Egyptian Government and the Zionist enemy. This shall be communicated to all international and regional organizations and bodies. They will also be informed that dealings with the Arab League will be conducted with its secretariat in its new temporary headquarters.  
B. To appeal to the Tunisian Government to offer all possible aid in facilitating the settlement of the temporary Arab League headquarters and its officials.

- C. To form a committee comprising representatives of Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, in addition to a representative for the General Secretariat. The aim of this committee will be to implement this resolution's provisions and to seek the aid it requires from the member-states. The committee will have all the authorization and responsibilities from the Arab League Council necessary to implement this resolution, including the protection of the Arab League's properties, deposits, documents and records. It is also entitled to take necessary measures against any action that may be taken by the Egyptian Government to hinder the transfer of the Arab League headquarters or to harm the Arab League's rights and possessions. The committee will have to accomplish its task of transfer to the temporary headquarters within 2 months from the date of this resolution. This period of time may be extended another month if the committee to decides. The committee shall submit a report on its accomplishments to the first forthcoming meeting of the Arab League Council.
- D. A sum of \$5 million shall be placed at the committee's disposal to cover the transfer expenses. This sum shall be drawn from the credit accounts of various funds. The committee has the right to spend more than that amount if required. Expenditures for this purpose shall come under the supervision of the committee or of those it authorize. The expenses shall be paid by the member-states, each according to the percentage of its annual contribution to the Arab League budget.
- E. To transfer the Arab League General Secretariat officials who are employed at the time of the issuance of this resolution from the permanent headquarters to the temporary one during the period defined in paragraph 3C of this resolution. The committee referred to in the above-mentioned paragraph 3 will have the responsibility of paying them financial compensation compatible with the standard of living in the new headquarters and for settling their affairs until a permanent system is drafted for this purpose.
4. The competent and specialized Arab organizations, bodies, establishments and federations named in the attached list No. I will take the necessary measures to suspend Egypt's membership. They will transfer their headquarters from Egypt to other Arab State on a temporary basis, similar to the action that shall be taken regarding the Council General Secretariat. The executive councils and boards of these bodies, organizations, establishments and federations shall meet immediately following the implementation of this decision within a period not to exceed the period specified in Paragraph 3C above.
  5. To seek to suspend Egypt's membership in the non-aligned movement, the Islamic conference organization and OAU for violating the resolutions of these organizations pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict.
  6. To continue to cooperate with the fraternal Egyptian people and with Egyptian individuals, with the exception of those who cooperate with the Zionist enemy directly or indirectly.
  7. The member-States shall inform all foreign countries of their stand on the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and will ask these countries not to support this treaty as it constitutes an aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation as well as a threat to world peace and security.
  8. To condemn the policy that the United States is practicing regarding its role in concluding the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.
  9. To consider the measures in this decision to be temporary and subject to cancellation by an Arab League Council decision as soon as the circumstances that justified their adoption are eliminated.
  10. The Arab countries will pass legislation, decisions and measures necessary for the implementation of this resolution.

The Arab League Council, on the level of Arab foreign and economy ministers, has also decided the following:

1. To halt all bank loans, deposits, guarantees or facilities, as well as all financial or technical contributions and aid by Arab governments or their establishments to the Egyptian Government and its establishments as of the treaty signing date.
2. To ban the extension of economic aid by the Arab funds, banks and financial establishments within the framework of the Arab League and the joint Arab cooperation to the Egyptian Government and its establishments.
3. The Arab governments and institutions shall refrain from purchasing the bonds, shares, postal orders and public credit loans that are issued by the Egyptian Government and its financial foundations.
4. Following the suspension of the Egyptian Government's membership in the Arab League, its membership will also be suspended from the institutions, funds and organizations deriving from the Arab

League. The Egyptian Government and its institutions will cease to benefit from these organizations. The headquarters of those Arab League departments residing in Egypt will be transferred to other Arab States temporarily.

5. In view of the fact that the ill-omened Egyptian-Israeli treaty and its appendices have demonstrated Egypt's commitment to sell oil to Israel, the Arab States shall refrain from providing Egypt with oil and its derivatives.
6. Trade exchange with the Egyptian State and private establishments that deal with the Zionist enemy shall be prohibited.
7. The Economic Boycott.
  - A. The Arab boycott laws, principles and provisions shall be applied to those companies, foundations and individuals of the Arab Republic of Egypt that deal directly or indirectly with the Zionist enemy. The boycott office shall be entrusted with following up the implementation of these tasks.
  - B. The provisions of paragraph A shall include the intellectual, cultural and artistic activities that involve dealing with the Zionist enemy or have connection with the enemy's institutions.
  - C. The Arab States stress the importance of continued dealings with those private national Egyptian institutions that are confirmed not to be dealing with the Zionist enemy. Such institutions will be encouraged to work and maintain activities in the Arab countries within the framework of their fields of competence.
  - D. The Arab countries stress the importance of caring for the feelings of the Egyptian people's sons who are working or living in the Arab countries as well as looking after their interests and consolidating their pan-Arab affiliation with Arabism.
  - E. To consolidate the role of the Arab boycott and to enhance its grip at this stage, in affirmation of Arab unanimity, the assistant secretary general for economic affairs will be temporarily entrusted with the task of directly supervising the major boycott office in Damascus. He will be granted the necessary powers to reorganize and back the said department and to submit proposals on developing the boycott in method, content and scope. He shall submit a report in this regard to the first meeting of the Arab League Council.
8. The United Nations will be asked to transfer its regional offices, which serve the Arab region, from the Arab Republic of Egypt to any other Arab capital. The Arab States will work collectively toward this end.
9. The Arab League General Secretariat will be assigned the task of studying the joint Arab projects so as to take the necessary measures for protecting the Arab nation's interests in accordance with the aims of these resolutions. The General Secretariat shall submit its proposals to the Arab League Council in its first forthcoming meeting.
10. The Zionist plot must be faced by drafting an Arab strategy for economic confrontation. This will lead to utilizing the Arabs' own strength and will emphasize the need for realizing Arab economic integration in all aspects. The strategy will strengthen joint Arab development and regional development within the pan-Arab outlook and will expand the establishment of joint Arab projects - projects that serve the aims of emancipating, developing and integrating the Arab economy - and will promote the projects already in operation. The strategy will also develop the methods, systems and substance of the Arab boycott of Israel and will diversify and promote international relations with the developing countries. The Arab League General Secretariat shall rapidly submit studies relevant to the strategy of joint Arab economic action to the forthcoming session of the Arab Economic Council. This will be a prelude to the convention of a general Arab economic conference.
11. The above-mentioned committee shall be assigned the task of supervising the implementation of these decisions and of submitting a follow up report to the Arab League Council in its first forthcoming meeting.
12. The Arab States will issue the decisions and legislations pertaining to these decisions and will take the necessary measures to implement them.
13. These measures taken by the Arab and economy ministers are considered a minimal requirement to face the threats of the treaty. Individual governments can take whatever measure they deem necessary in addition to these measures.
14. The Arab foreign and economy ministers call on the Arab nation in all Arab countries to support the economic measures taken against the Zionist enemy and the Egyptian regime.



## 6. Post-Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty – Period Prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> Intifada (1979-1987)

### **ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN, REMARKS ON THE FUTURE OF SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 24 APRIL 1979 [EXCERPTS]**

Gaza, even according to the Egyptian view and certainly in the view of all other states, is not a part of Egypt, for after having been part of the territory under the British Mandate which came to an end in 1948, this area was first occupied by Egypt and later taken by Israel from Egypt.

Jordan harbours claims to Judea and Samaria, but no state in the world except Pakistan and Britain has ever recognized Jordan's sovereignty over these territories. Jordan's position was that of a conqueror, and when we took Judea and Samaria from Jordan, we in turn became the ruling power. The future of these territories is therefore a matter for negotiation [...].

With regard to Judea and Samaria, the Camp David Accord provides that no decision should be taken for the time being as to a final settlement. Here a provisional arrangement is made for a five-year transition period which is to commence with the setting up of autonomy. Only at the expiration of this period will negotiations be held as to a final settlement. The final settlement will deal with permanent boundaries, with peace, and with security provisions. This final settlement will be one with the government of Jordan, and this will be a peace settlement in the same way that our settlement in Egypt is a peace settlement.

It follows that there will be two distinct phases of settlement - one, a permanent settlement which is definite peace, and another, an entirely different matter - the autonomy, which is a provisional arrangement, with no definition of boundaries and no peace agreement.

The issue of Jerusalem is not included in the provisional arrangement nor even mentioned in its context, nor is the issue of the Jewish settlements included or mentioned. As is well known, the Arabs are opposed to the establishment of settlements, and we totally reject their opposition. This does not mean that the Arabs will be unable to raise the matter in future negotiations. The matter will in all probability be raised when the permanent settlement comes to be negotiated, but meanwhile, during the transition period, as we have made clear, we are resolved not to discuss it.

During the five-year transition period I think there will be no change in the situation and status of our settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, or in their bond with Israel. In practice I think there will be no change in the ties, the obligations and rights, and the jurisdiction of the State of Israel to and over yourselves, and no change in your obligations towards Israel; everything, in my opinion, will remain as it is today. And after the expiration of the five-year transition period I cannot conceive any government in power taking a different view of the situation.

Generally, however, things in Judea and Samaria will change, and must change. The military administration will be abolished. The Arab population must manage its life in a more independent way than it does today. No government has imposed the Israeli law on Judea and Samaria, and the present government will not do so during the transition period.

But to the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria this will not matter at all. They will be in no different situation than if they were, not here, but next to Maoz Haim, or Degania, or Nahalal.

To this end it is necessary to lay a water pipe-line, to bring in more settlers, and to turn this region into an extension of the Beth-Shean Valley. In other words, it is necessary to establish settlements along the whole length of the Jordan Valley. There is no hindrance to this, since the Camp David Accord provides not only that the Israel Army will be the only armed force in Judea and Samaria, but also that the Israel Army will remain permanently along the Jordan.

The fact that Egypt agreed to the Israel Army remaining along the Jordan does not mean that she agreed to the river Jordan forming the boundary between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan. As autonomy is a provisional arrangement, it has been agreed that during the transition period no territorial changes will be made and that the Israel Army will remain on guard both within the territories and along the Jordan.

The change which autonomy will bring about will be in status and not in the way of living of the Arab population and of the Jewish settlers.

I cannot imagine that we ought to, or could, continue indefinitely to maintain our relations with the Arab population on the footing of a military administration. This will not work, and it is not necessary. I don't mean to imply that the Israel government will have no say at all with regard to the Arab population; we live in a real world and I can't say that we shall under no circumstances and in no case feel obliged to intervene. But we shall intervene only in cases where our intervention is indispensable, in matters affecting not only the life of the Arab population but also our own life here. Anyway, the present regime, under which Israel governs and manages the Arab inhabitants' affairs by means of a military administration, must be abolished.



**OPENING STATEMENTS BY THE HEADS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DELEGATIONS,  
AUTONOMY TALKS, BEERSHEBA, 25 MAY 1979**

*[The autonomy plan was first presented by PM Begin to Pres. Sadat in Ismailia on 25 Dec. 1977 and approved by the Knesset on 28 Dec. 1977. It foresaw the creation of an administrative council, elected by the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, while Israel would retain responsibility for security and public order. The delegations to the Beersheba talks were headed by Israeli Interior Minister Yosef Burg, Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hasan Ali and US Sec. of State Cyrus Vance.]*

**OPENING SPEECH OF EGYPTIAN DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL KAMAL HASSAN ALI**

Before I deliver my speech I would like to inform you that according to the instructions of President Sadat, Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil, for procedural considerations, was not able to participate in the opening session and requested me to deliver the speech he prepared for that occasion. He will be very pleased to welcome the delegations for our next meeting, on June the 3rd, in Alexandria.

In another historic day we meet again in our relentless pursuit of peace that was initiated by President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on that unforgettable day. Ever since, we pledged ourselves to end forever enmity, hatred and wars, and to establish a just and comprehensive peace which will lead to normal and friendly relations between our nations in the Middle East. Thus our nations would have the opportunity to devote their energies and creative potentials to the common cause of bringing about prosperity and progress for each and every individual in our region.

To achieve this noble goal, Egypt and Israel, in spite of being in a state of war, resolved to take the pioneering step of sitting together and negotiating with the determination to reach, not a separate peace agreement, but a comprehensive peace settlement in the region, with the active participation of the United States of America as a full partner. The three parties recognize, without any doubt, that establishing a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is not only in the interest of their peoples, but is also a vital achievement in the interest of all nations of the world, as it will be a solid

foundation for establishing order and stability and eliminating the causes of future conflict, instability and outside intervention.

We knew that the task was difficult and that the challenge was tremendous. Yet we were equally aware of the necessity for making peace for the living generations and the generations to come. From the very beginning we were confronted with difficulties which were considered insurmountable. It is true that President Sadat's historic initiative broke the psychological barrier and threw the entire conflict into a different perspective. However, we were still at war with each other. A certain degree of tension persisted. The shortcomings of Security Council Resolution 242 left their impact throughout the process. Many were discouraged and even demoralized by these difficulties. At times it appeared as if we were moving in a wicked circle. Nevertheless, the momentum for peace proved to be stronger than all these obstacles combined.

President Sadat has emphasized repeatedly that the Palestinian problem is the heart and crux of the entire conflict. Through patience and perseverance we were able to reach agreement in Camp David on a framework for peace in the Middle East. It was the first time such a comprehensive document was drafted and approved, as the basis for a big peace settlement. It dealt with the aspects of the problem in a clear manner. It was unlikely to invite different interpretations.

With the breakthrough we proceeded to translate the document into a workable mechanism for peace. The outcome was two treaties, two complementary documents, which were signed simultaneously on the 26th of March.

We are here today to implement the agreement we signed on the establishment of the self-governing authority in West Bank and Gaza. Much has been said about the difficulties for reaching agreement on that point. Positions taken and actions carried out lately have blurred the hopes of many of us for a solution that would constitute a second but most crucial step along the road to a comprehensive settlement. However, I believe that we should not be discouraged.

The issues at stake should not make us lose sight of the new reality. We are today negotiating under circumstances which are different altogether. We are no longer the enemies of the past; rather we are the good neighbours who are laying the solid foundation for a lasting friendship between the Israelis and all the Arabs.

In addition, we are not working from a vacuum. We have the framework and the agreement on the establishment of the self-governing authority, with full autonomy, in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Arabs and Israelis, and in fact millions of friends throughout the world, are watching our deliberations with hope and anticipation. None of us can bear the responsibility of defeating these hopes or suppressing these expectations. None of us will be forgiven if he violates the new spirit of peace and reconciliation.

What is needed is a more enlightened attitude, based on the realization of the grave consequences of the failure of our effort. We all know that much will depend on the success of our endeavour. What remains to be done is to have faith in peace, and proceed to tackle the problem with hope and confidence. We have to be determined to reach agreement.

I suggest that we bear in mind the following guidelines:

First, that we are not here to determine the future of the Palestinian people. Only the Palestinians themselves can make such a decision. For self-determination is their God-given right. Our task is merely to define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority with full autonomy, and the modalities for electing it. In this endeavour we shall be guided by the letter and the spirit of the Camp David framework, as well as related documents.

It is our joint responsibility to agree on the necessary steps for the transfer of authority from the Israeli Military Government to the Palestinian government.

Second, the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, as stipulated in Resolution 242, should be respected and implemented in connection with the West Bank, including Arab Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, which were occupied in 1967. In this context, Arab Jerusalem will become a living testimony to the possibility of coexistence and cooperation between all peoples of the area.

Third, Resolution 242 in all its parts should be respected in the overall solution of the Palestinian problem, as provided for in the Framework.

Fourth, the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Consequently, all the measures taken by Israel in the West Bank and "Yaza which tend to alter their demographic composition or geographic character, and in particular the establishment of settlements, have no legal validity. On the other hand, Israeli legislative and administrative measures or actions which were taken to change the status of Arab Jerusalem, are null and void.

Fifth, the human rights and fundamental freedom of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be strictly and immediately respected.

In conclusion, I would like to state that our ability to carry out our commitment will be greatly enhanced by the constructive role of our full partner. President Carter pioneered in pledging to play this role, throughout the peace process, until peace is established between Israel and all her neighbours. We highly value such a firm commitment from the leader of this great nation. We hope to remain together on the road to peace until all the grievances are remedied and until all suffering is eliminated. Thank you.

#### OPENING SPEECH OF ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTER DR. YOSEF BURG

On September 17, 1978, President Sadat and Prime Minister Menahem Begin signed the Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East, witnessed by President Jimmy Carter. This document, and the subsequent joint letter of March 26, 1979, are the mandate that brings us here today.

We are met with the goal of reaching agreement on the establishment of an elected administrative council in order to provide full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza district. Our task is to reach an accord between us, prior to the election of this administrative council, on the modalities of its establishment, define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. Having reached such an agreement we would wish that the envisaged democratic elections speedily take place in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

The tasks ahead of us are great, and no doubt complex. We enter negotiations mindful of the responsibility which history has placed on our shoulders. It is obvious that it is not possible to resolve overnight the bitter conflict which has gone on for so many years. We realize that before us lies a long and difficult road of negotiations. I am confident that we, Egypt and Israel, shall work together to reach understanding and agreement as expeditiously as we can. In this effort we shall benefit, as before, from the valuable assistance of the government of the United States, whose representatives will participate fully in all stages of the negotiations.

Mr. Secretary, I deem it appropriate at this time and this place to reiterate to you, and through you to the president of the United States, the deepest gratitude for America's important role in advancing the course of our regional peace, as reflected in the first Indispensable and historic step, the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel.

We have already proven to each other how the common will for peace provides solutions to problems that otherwise seem elusive, how obstacles to progress fade away in the presence of common purpose, and how a patient ear precludes polemic and misunderstanding. We, Egypt and Israel, both have lived through the convulsions and agonies of our region for so long. Drama and trauma have gone hand in hand, caught in the vicious grip of enmity and warfare and bereavement.

No more. We are now bent on a different course, and already the pure fresh breeze of coexistence plus dialogue and peace is dispersing the ugly pollution of the past.

We meet in Beersheba, the city of our common forefather Abraham. It is perhaps most appropriate that here in this place, we, Egypt and Israel, make our rendezvous with history, ancient and modern, to talk of Eretz Israel. Our founding patriarchs and matriarchs he buried just to the north, in the town of Hebron. Jerusalem, the eternal city of

Israel, founded by David the King, crowns the hills of Judea, from where our prophets preached the message of eternal peace in a land which has known so much strife.

Yes, it is to end the strife, to expand the peace, to ensure security and to promote the coexistence of its inhabitants, Jew and Arab, that we are met. Herein lies the justice and the validity of the autonomy, the details of which we shall negotiate in the weeks and months ahead.

At its very heart lies the conviction that the Palestinian Arabs should and must conduct their own daily lives for themselves and by themselves. It was this that motivated the government of Israel, as early as December 1977, to propose autonomy - full autonomy - for the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

What I must make clear, and what must be understood from the outset, is that autonomy does not and cannot imply sovereignty. If it is peace and welfare of people that we seek - and this above all has to be our common task ahead - then we must by definition reject a priori an independent Palestinian statehood. Israel will not agree, and indeed totally rejects, the proposition, declaration or establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. By everything we know to be true, it would be the certain prescription for violence and war. Indeed, it would be a mortal danger to Israel and a grave peril to the whole free world. No hostile element or agent or force dare control the heartland of this land to threaten the lives of its city dwellers and villagers, and thereby hold a knife to the jugular vein of Israel.

Twenty-two independent Arab states, astride Africa and Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean - surely there has never been such an expression in the families of nations of self-determination and sovereignty. Our world has but one Jewish state - as of right in its ancient land - and the people of this land - nay, people of goodwill and decency everywhere - will not and cannot acquiesce in any measure that will put that surviving remnant of our unspeakable Holocaust into jeopardy. After having walked through the valley of the shadow of death, we shall never again allow life, liberty - indeed, existence itself - to be imperiled.

This is acknowledged and reflected in the Camp David accord, which addresses itself to Israel's right to security as an essential condition of the peace. It is an integral feature of the autonomy. It is upon this foundation that the autonomy shall be built: thereby the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district shall exercise control over their own daily lives and activities through their self-elected administrative council. Israel shall enjoy security. These are the principles and provisions stipulated in the Camp David agreement.

Distinguished members of the delegations: We meet here in sincere purpose. We meet with you with a sense of responsibility to the past and towards the generations of the future. We meet together for the sake of the peace with all our neighbours, with whom we wish to live always in mutual respect and cooperation.

We have problems to solve - together; challenges to overcome - together. I am confident that we shall find the appropriate solutions. To do so we shall all of us have to muster our statesmanship, our moral integrity and our diplomatic ingenuity. Let us do so with courage and caution, as befits the historic responsibility we share. There is urgency to our work but there is also much need for the patient draftsmanship of devoted negotiators who are moved by high purpose.

Let us now set about constructing the next step on the ladder of peace. We hope that others might join us in our work. I call upon the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district to seize this opportunity

to embark upon this new beginning and to share with us, Egypt and Israel both, in mapping a future that will guarantee the peace and welfare of this land in which we are destined to live together for all time.

"To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven. A time to keep silent and a time to speak, a time to love and a time to hate, a time of war and a time of peace." We pray that the Almighty might grant us His guidance in our efforts.

Thank you very much.

OPENING SPEECH OF US SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE

President Carter has asked me to bring to all of you his warm best wishes. Today marks a milestone on the road to a comprehensive peace. In reaching this point, we have overcome many obstacles - obstacles lie ahead - but we are confident that those obstacles will also be overcome.

The president will be following with great interest the proceedings of the following weeks and months, and with the anticipation that the differences will be overcome; that we will achieve the goals that all of us seek.

This historic occasion can be considered one of both achievement and renewed commitment. Achievement -because the parties represented at this table have given the world a stunning demonstration that negotiations can transfer enmity into peaceful relations. Renewed commitment - because we all face an even more formidable task in the months ahead, in which we are determined to succeed.

The achievement of a comprehensive peace depends on success in each negotiation, and each new negotiation builds on the achievement of those which have preceded it. The full peace, stability, justice, and progress which we all want for the peoples of the Middle East can only be attained by carrying forward a dual effort: Implementing both the letter and the spirit of the treaty between Egypt and Israel; while at the same time, taking the treaty package as the cornerstone for the task of structuring continued progress towards a comprehensive settlement.

The treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel has fulfilled one of the two frameworks agreed at Camp David between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President Carter. Today we see the first fruits of that treaty, as El-Arish is restored to Egyptian control and we look forward to normalized relations between the two countries. At Camp David, and in the agreements that have followed, the governments of Israel and Egypt also committed themselves to principles, procedures, and a time-frame for a series of negotiations leading to a peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbours. The important objective of that process, in the words of the framework, is the resolution of the Palestinian question in all of its aspects.

We have come here to launch a new phase of this effort, as agreed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in their joint letter of March 26, which has already been referred to. With the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, we are able for the first time in more than three decades to turn our attention to the practical solution of a central issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Peace between Israel and the Palestinian people, with security and acceptance for both. We have come to the issues which will shape the destiny of the peoples of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinians beyond those areas who identify with the people there, while assuring peace, acceptance, and security to Israel.

Today we are beginning this stage of the peace process by dealing with the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. In their joint letter, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat agreed to negotiate continuously and in good faith, and they set a goal of completing the negotiations within the next 12 months so that elections can be held as expeditiously as possible thereafter.

The range of issues involved in the Palestinian problem is far too complex to be resolved all at once. The only realistic approach, therefore, is to establish a transitional -period, during which the decisions

that need to be made can be dealt with in a measured and logical way. That approach was agreed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David, and they have invited other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to support it and to join the negotiations.

We regret the absence of the Kingdom of Jordan and of Palestinian representatives from these proceedings today. If we do not agree with their decision not to attend at this time, we nevertheless respect their right to have a different view. We want to make it clear that the invitation to them to join us remains open. At the same time, their absence need not check the progress of these negotiations. We are determined to proceed and to show that these negotiations can make progress towards the objectives which Jordan and the Palestinians hold no less than those of us at this table.

I want to assure you in the strongest possible terms, that the United States understands the deep emotion and interests on all sides that are touched by the process which begins today. For Egypt and the Arab world, the primary focus is upon the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. No peace can either be just or secure for any participant, if it does not resolve this problem in its broad sense. In the United States, we believe deeply in the proposition that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We believe that the Palestinian people must have the right for themselves and their descendants to live with dignity and freedom, and with opportunity for economic fulfilment and political expression.

For Israel, meanwhile, a lasting solution to the Palestinian question and the wider Arab-Israeli conflict will be possible only if there is genuine acceptance of its right to live in peace and security. Throughout Israel there is an ardent desire for peace. There is also deep anxiety that, in order to achieve that peace, Israel must make enormous sacrifices and take major risks. With regard to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of peace, this desire and this anxiety will soon become tangible with the redeployment of Israel's forces from strategic territories three times its size, and the evacuation of vitally important airfields and oil resources.

In the United States, we believe that Israel is entitled to very solid assurances that its security will be realized. It is essential to ensure that, as this second stage of the peace process unfolds, it does so in a fashion that guarantees the enhancement of a true and permanent peace, and does not contain elements which would endanger Israel's security.

The Camp David framework provides practical guidelines as we seek in these negotiations to translate these principles into concrete arrangements. First, the framework states the solution ultimately negotiated must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. To give reality to this goal, it provides that in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, and a self-governing authority will be instituted. It provides for full autonomy for the inhabitants, and it also gives the Palestinians a vital role in shaping their destiny, by recognizing them as participants in all aspects of the negotiations that determine their future: in the negotiations that set up their self-governing authority; in those which determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza; and in those which can lead to a Jordan-Israel peace treaty.

Finally, the agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be submitted to a vote of representatives of the peoples who live there for either ratification or rejection.

We must also go beyond these negotiations to the broader aspects of the Palestinian problem. We must make a start to deal with the problem of Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza. They, too, must know that an accepted and respected place exists for them within the international community.

Second, the security of Israel is equally a central feature of the Camp David framework. As we seek ways to solve the range of issues of the West Bank and Gaza, we must recognize that Israel's security is of critical importance to the success of these negotiations, because of the special geographic and demographic factors involved. The negotiators must be sensitive to these concerns, and imaginative and far-sighted in proposing ways to meet them.

Third, it is worth restating that the United Nations Security Council resolution 242 remains the basic statement of principles covering a peace settlement. The Camp David frameworks are built upon it. It

establishes as the fundamental equation for peace withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for commitments to live at peace with Israel, within secure and recognized boundaries. It is axiomatic that resolution 242 applies to all fronts of the conflict. The negotiating history of the resolution leaves no doubt that' this was the understanding of all parties when the resolution was passed in 1967.

We ask all parties to see the Camp David process as a way of dealing with these problems in logical sequence, making progress where this is possible, and using the success achieved at each stage to open new solutions to the next. Peace cannot be achieved by declarations or resolutions alone, as the experience of the last 30 years has demonstrated. A practical way to proceed must be devised, one that takes advantage of the fact that the process of negotiation itself can transform the attitudes of peoples and governments. We believe that the process defined by the Camp David framework and the joint letter signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin gives us this practical way of proceeding.

I am convinced that a just and secure settlement of the Palestinian question is not beyond the capabilities of men and women of compassion and goodwill, who will set their hand to the task. I have no doubt that solutions which the majority of Palestinians and other Arabs will consider fair can be fashioned in negotiations, and in ways that answer as well the fundamental concerns for the security of Israel. We are nevertheless conscious, as we meet here today, that some of our friends in the Arab world have doubts about what we are setting out to do. We regret that an atmosphere of opposition has been created, before we have even begun our work. We wish to assure them that we are mindful of the major responsibility which is upon us.

At the same time, we must make it clear that the responsibility is also a shared one. As we embark on these negotiations, this is a time for maximum restraint and farsightedness on the part of all who seek a fair and peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The intentions of either side will be called into question, if it attempts to pursue its own national objectives in a manner that conflicts with the purposes of these negotiations.

We call on both sides - and I use that term in its broadest sense - to include not only those here at this table, but other parties whose interests will be affected by what is accomplished, or not accomplished, here - we call on both sides to suspend acts and statements of hostility, that could only make the work here more difficult. Let us give the proceedings here a fair chance to see what can be achieved.

The challenges ahead are formidable, and overcoming them without doubt will, without doubt, tax our patience, our energy, and our fortitude. But no one can deny that, for the first time, a practical beginning has been made toward peace for this tragically troubled region. No one can deny that an unprecedented and realistic opportunity is before us. No one can deny that no workable alternative has been proposed.

The United States is determined to make the most of this opportunity, to remain fully engaged, and to continue on this road until we reach its final destination.

Thank you.



**US STATE DEPARTMENT, STATEMENT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS,  
WASHINGTON, DC, 4 JUNE 1979**

*[On 3 June the Israel govt. had approved a decision taken in April to give permanent status to Elon Moreh settlement near Nablus and confiscate additional land nearby. The US denounced the move.]*

We deeply regret the Israeli Government's action in approving this new settlement. Establishing new settlements is harmful to the peace process and is particularly regrettable at this time with the negotiations just beginning, which aim at establishing a new relationship between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza.

All parties have stressed their commitment to the peace process. We hope the parties will forgo any actions detrimental to the peace negotiations.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN,  
STATEMENT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 11 JUNE 1979**

During the last few days a campaign of incitement conducted by certain circles has been launched against the Government of Israel and against me personally. Only a few months ago these same circles pronounced words of praise for Israeli actions that led to the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, for our love of peace and our desire to achieve peace with all our neighbours, who to this day, however, refuse to join the peacemaking process.

These circles, in referring to Jewish settlement in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, do not shrink from employment the term "provocation". This is perhaps the most distasteful element in the whole incitement campaign. One recalls times when it was asserted that the presence of Jews was of itself a provocation; and if now there are Israelis of certain outlooks who accept the assumption that the presence of Jews alongside of Arabs in our historic homeland, Eretz Israel, is a provocation - then shame on them. By so doing they follow the evil path of the enemies of the Jewish people.

Distortions, too, the product of cynicism or ignorance, are published about our settlement in our land. The New York Times, for example, alleges that I promised someone that we would never carry out settlement work in areas of Eretz Israel "seized" - so the paper writes - "from the Arabs". There is absolutely no foundation to this allegation. At Camp David I promised President Carter that during the three months of negotiations with Egypt about the peace treaty we would abstain from establishing settlements. The three months ended on December 17, 1978. During those months a debate arose between us and the Americans on this matter. That debate was laid to rest a few weeks ago when the Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, affirmed before a Congressional Committee that the obligation to which I had committed myself consisted of this and nothing more - three months only.

Ever since my first visit to President Carter on July 22, 1977, I have stated and reiterated that we have an absolute right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel, as this is our land, parts of which, in the east and in the south, were conquered in 1948, by aggression and invasion, by Jordan and Egypt. Under no circumstances did I ever agree with the thesis, whatever its origin may be, alleging that our settlements are illegal or that they are an obstacle to peace.

There are circles abroad which rely on minority votes in the Knesset, or on the official Opposition, or on a demonstration by groups of Israeli citizens, or on an article by an opposition member defeated in democratic elections, in order to justify their criticism of the Government of Israel and of me personally. One cannot but express wonder at this approach, which is clearly anti-democratic. In a democracy, not a minority but the majority decides, and foreign countries conduct relations with the legitimately elected government, not with groups of demonstrators or authors of opposition articles.

Since forming the present Government we have not misled anybody, on every occasion, and particularly during the twelve days of the Camp David discussions, we declared and reiterated -

- (a) That Jerusalem is the eternal, indivisible capital of Israel.
- (b) That we have the full right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel, and that such settlement is also a vital security need to prevent the murder of our citizens and children.
- (c) That under no circumstances will we permit the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

We have promised autonomy to the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. We wish to carry out this promise in accordance with every word we signed in the Camp David agreement.

The true meaning of the Camp David agreement is this: Autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, Jews and Arabs living together in Eretz Israel, and security for Israel and all its citizens.

Therefore, we shall pay no attention to abuse, spoken or written, in Israel or abroad. We shall ensure, as elected representatives and spokesmen of the nation, the peace of the people of Israel in the Land of Israel.



**NEGOTIATION DELEGATIONS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND ROUND OF  
AUTONOMY TALKS, ALEXANDRIA, 12 JUNE 1979**

The delegations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States, at their meetings in Alexandria, Egypt, June 11-12, 1979, decided on a number of procedures for organizing the negotiations in the months ahead. By these procedures, the three sides seek to ensure wide-ranging and frank give-and-take in an atmosphere of maximum informality. Therefore, they decided:

The plenary meetings which all three will attend will be closed and no official agreed record will be kept. Each delegation will be responsible for taking its own notes, and no tape recorders will be used in the conference room.

The host side for each session will be responsible for supplying secretarial services for the meetings during that session.

The sessions will be held, as a rule, every other week, alternating between Egypt and Israel. The next session will be held in Herzlia, June 25-26, 1979, but thereafter the effort will be to hold them on Wednesday and Thursday of the appointed weeks.

The three sides also agreed that public statements they make about the work of the meetings after the meetings' end will be, if possible, agreed among all three at the meetings. They also agreed that the work of the negotiations and the progress sought in them will be best served by a minimum of public debate.

The three sides also discussed ways to organize the work of the negotiations in the months ahead.

Specifically, they agreed that three members from the three delegations will meet within one week in Herzlia to begin work on a draft list of topics for the negotiations. If agreed, this list will be presented to the plenary meeting on June 25-26 with the aim of reaching a decision on it at that meeting.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 450, NEW YORK, 14 JUNE 1979**

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978, and 434 (1978) of 18 December 1978, and the statement of the President of the Security Council of 8 December 1978 (S/12958),

*Recalling* also, and particularly, resolution 444 (1979) of 19 January 1979, and the statements of the President of the Security Council of 26 April 1979 (S/13272) and of 15 May 1979 (S/PV.2144),

*Having studied* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/13384),

*Acting* in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon and noting with concern the questions raised in its letters addressed to the Security Council on 7 May 1979 (S/13301), 30 May 1979 (S/13361) and 11 June 1979 (S/13387),

*Reaffirming* its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

*Expressing* its anxiety about the continued existence of obstacles against the full deployment of the Force and the threats to its very security, its freedom of movement and the safety of its headquarters which prevented the completion of the phased programme of activities,

*Convinced* that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and impedes the achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the area,

1. Strongly deploras acts of violence against Lebanon that have led to the displacement of civilians, including Palestinians, and brought about destruction and loss of innocent lives;
2. Calls upon Israel to cease forthwith its acts against the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, in particular its incursions into Lebanon and the assistance it continues to lend to irresponsible armed groups;
3. Calls also upon all parties concerned to refrain from activities inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and to co-operate for the fulfilment of these objectives;
4. Reiterates that the objectives of the Force as set out in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 444 (1979) must be obtained;
5. Highly commends the performance of the Force and reiterates its terms of reference as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611) and approved by resolution 426 (1978), in particular, that the Force must be enabled to function as an efficient military unit, that it must enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks and that it must continue to be able to discharge its duties according to the above-mentioned terms of reference, including the right of self-defense;
6. Reaffirms the validity of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon in accordance with its relevant decisions and resolutions and calls upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission and to ensure full respect for the safety and freedom of action of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;
7. Urges all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;
8. Decides to renew the mandate of the Force for six months, that is, until 19 December 1979;
9. Reaffirms its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);
10. Decides to remain seized of the question.



**EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS,  
STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BRUSSELS, 18 JUNE 1979**

*[The statement was highly critical of Israeli policies and prompted Israel to denounce it both in the Knesset and in a message to the EEC.]*

The Nine have examined the situation in the Middle East.

1. They recall, in accordance with their previous declarations, in particular those of 29 June 1977 and of 26 March 1979, that a just and lasting peace can be established only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement which should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

- The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
  - The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict;
  - Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the region and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders;
  - Recognition of the fact that, to establish a just and lasting peace, account will have to be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.
2. The Nine deplore any action or declaration which might stand in the way of the quest for peace. They consider, in particular, that certain attitudes and declarations of the Israeli Government are such as to create obstacles in the search for a comprehensive settlement of this kind, notably: Israel's ultimate claim to sovereignty over the occupied territories, which is incompatible with Resolution 242, which laid down the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; The policy of the establishment of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, which is illegal in international law.
  3. As regards the Lebanon, the Nine support its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They deplore all acts endangering the security of the population and hindering the restoration of the authority of the Government of the Lebanon throughout the whole of its territory and particularly in the south of the country. Gravely concerned at the difficulties which UNIFIL, to which some of the Nine contribute, is encountering in carrying out its mandate, they appeal to all parties to respect the decisions of the Security Council.

The above are the comments which the Nine wish to make at this moment. They reserve the right to return to all of these questions at a later date.



**NEGOTIATION DELEGATIONS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT STATEMENT AND STATEMENTS BY THE CHIEF DELEGATES, CONCLUSION  
OF THE THIRD ROUND OF AUTONOMY TALKS, HERZLIYA, 26 JUNE 1979**

In implementation of the agreed schedule as stipulated in the joint letter addressed by President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Carter, dated March 26, 1979, the delegations of Egypt, Israel and the United States met in Herzliya, Israel, on 25 and 26 June 1979 to continue their talks and negotiations as set out in the "framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David" and in the above-mentioned letter.

They discussed the outcome of the work of the technical committee that met in Herzliya last week to consider proposals for a draft agenda.

The delegations reiterated their determination to adhere fully to the agreed bases and principles of the Camp David framework, and the joint letter.

The delegation of Egypt, led by Prime Minister, Dr. Mustafa Khalil, introduced the position of the Egyptian Government concerning the bases and objectives of the process and the future work based on the Camp David framework and the joint letter.

The delegation of Israel, led by Minister Dr. Josef Burg, put forward its suggestions for dealing with the practical ways and means to advance the negotiations.

The delegation of the United States, led by Ambassador James Leonard, stressed that the U.S. attaches the highest importance to these negotiations and has made clear its intentions to do all it can to assure their success.

A thorough and detailed discussion took place. It was agreed that the three delegations will continue their talks in Alexandria on July 5th and 6th, 1979.

STATEMENT BY ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTER DR. YOSEF BURG

Dear Friends,

First of all I have to apologize for being a little bit late. The reason is that Prime Minister Dr. Khalil received a telephone call from Prime Minister Begin, who is at this moment in Ma'alot, and there were a little bit of troubles to get the proper telephone connection - just in time, but it worked out. What secrets we have talked about the Prime Minister can say afterwards.

Second, I would like here, in public, to express gratitude and satisfaction to the Egyptian delegation and to the American delegation. We had talks - not always easy but always sincere - and I believe that yesterday, especially the deliberations, talks and negotiations in the afternoon, were helpful, constructive and will be fruitful. I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, personally, and the members of your delegation. I thank you, Ambassador at Large Mr. Leonard, and the members of your delegation, and I hope that in this worthy company also my friends and members of the Israeli delegation, members and delegates and counsellors also did a good job.

I would like to say that not only did we decide that on the 5th and 6th of July we will meet in Alexandria, but we also -more than tentatively - we decided to have at this lovely place on the 5th and 6th of August a meeting, and then again the 20th and 21st of August in Alexandria. I have to explain the little gap between the meeting next week in Alexandria and next month in Herzliya. This gap has three reasons, and they are in the open: there is no secret diplomacy needed.

One reason is the Conference for African Unity that will take (place) in Monrovia, and our Egyptian friends want to be present there. One reason is, everyone of us understands, Ramadan, and the third reason is the nine days of mourning between Rosh Hodesh Av and the Ninth of Av, where we feel what we are prevented from participating in a conference of this kind. So, Monrovia plus Ramadan plus the Nine Days of Mourning are the reason why we from the 6th of July to the 5th of August will have no meeting but we intend that subcommittees or technical committees should work in this time and clarify the different matters.

STATEMENT BY EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER MUSTAFA KHALIL

Thank you very much, Dr. Burg, Excellency, Ambassador Leonard:

I would like really to express my deepest thanks and gratitude not only to Dr. Burg and to the distinguished delegation, but I would like also to express my deepest thanks to the Israeli Government for their hospitality, and also to the management of this lovely hotel.

We have been engaged in very serious talks during our three sessions. We represented our points of view and we had a very fruitful discussion, and as Dr. Burg mentioned, specially last evening. And then (today) we agreed on this statement which has been read to you. We have also agreed that certain suggestions that we had put forward had to be studied so that they can be taken in Alexandria and afterwards, so that we'll be able to work an agenda to proceed with the negotiations and, as it came in the text, to enhance it. And so we are looking forward, really, for our future meetings - that statements that will be read will contain more substance and material than the present one.

Thank you very much.

STATEMENT BY US AMBASSADOR JAMES LEONARD

I would like to join the Prime Minister in thanking Dr. Burg, and through him the Government of Israel and the people of Israel for the hospitality which we have been shown, and in particular for the very warm hospitality which was demonstrated to us over the past two days.

I would also like to record here in public, as we have in private, in our meetings, the very real satisfaction which the American delegation feels with the way in which this discussion has gone here. Both with the spirit in which it's been conducted and with the substance which has been dealt with during these discussions. We look forward to achievements in these negotiations in the near future,

which I think will be more visible than these perhaps intangible achievements which we feel have been registered here in the past 24 hours.

We would be very pleased, of course, when these do come out. But we are not in any way dissatisfied with the rate of progress which has been recorded already in the three sessions which these talks have now had.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 452 ON SETTLEMENTS,  
NEW YORK, 20 JULY 1979**

The Security Council,

*Taking note* of the report and recommendations of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in document S/13450,

*Strongly deploring* the lack of co-operation of Israel with the Commission,

*Considering* that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories has no legal validity and constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

*Deeply concerned* by the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlements policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local Arab and Palestinian population,

*Emphasizing* the need for confronting the issue of the existing settlements and the need to consider measures to safeguard the impartial protection of property seized,

*Bearing in mind* the specific status of Jerusalem, and reconfirming pertinent Security Council resolutions concerning Jerusalem and in particular the need to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in that city,

*Drawing attention* to the grave consequences which the settlements policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East,

1. *Commends* the work done by the Commission in preparing the report on the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Accepts* the recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;
3. *Calls upon* the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
4. *Requests* the Commission, in view of the magnitude of the problem of settlements, to keep under close survey the implementation of the present resolution and to report back to the Security Council before 1 November 1979.



**SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE  
EAST PROBLEM, UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, 25 SEPTEMBER 1979**

The Middle East problem, if divested of the immaterial, boils down to the following- either the consequences of the aggression against the Arab states and peoples are eliminated or the invaders get a reward by appropriating lands that belong to others.

A just settlement and the establishment of durable peace in the Middle East requires that Israel should end its occupation of all the Arab lands it seized in 1967, that the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine including the right to create their own state be safeguarded and that the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to independent existence under conditions of peace be effectively guaranteed.

The separate deal between Egypt and Israel resolves nothing, it is a means designed to lull the vigilance of people. It is a way of piling up on a still greater scale explosive material capable of producing a new conflagration in the Middle East. Moreover, added to the tense political atmosphere in this and the adjacent areas in the heavy smell of oil.

It is high time that all states represented in the United Nations realized how vast is the tragedy of the Arab people of Palestine. What is the worth of declarations in defense of humanism and human rights- whether for refugees or not- if before the eyes of the entire world the inalienable rights of an entire people driven from its land and deprived of a livelihood are grossly trampled upon?

The Soviet policy with respect to the Middle East problem is one of principle. We are in favour of a comprehensive and just settlement, of the establishment of durable peace in the Middle East, a region not far from our borders.

The Soviet Union sides firmly with Arab peoples who resolutely reject deals at the expense of their legitimate interests.



**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON SETTLEMENTS,  
JERUSALEM, 14 OCTOBER 1979**

The cabinet today unanimously approved decisions concerning the allotment of land for existing settlements or those settlements whose establishment was previously decided upon in Judea and Samaria. For this purpose there will be no expropriation or seizure of private land whatsoever. The following are the particulars of the decisions:

1. The settlement at Givon will be established partly on land belonging to state and partly on land owned by Jews, which will be purchased from its owners for this purpose.
2. The settlement at Beit Horon will be established on state lands.
3. The settlement at Efrat will be established on state lands.
4. The settlements of Elkana and Kedumim will be expanded by additional of state land.
5. An inter-ministerial committee will be established which will examine the situation in the settlements of Ophra and Kedumim, and which will recommend solutions for their problems in the framework of government policy.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN, STATEMENT TO THE PRESS  
FOLLOWING HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT,  
BET AGRON, JERUSALEM, 23 OCTOBER 1979**

*[Dayan resigned over the govt.'s handling of the talks with Egypt on the implementation of the Camp David autonomy plan for the Palestinians. He believed that Israel should have negotiated more vigorously, unencumbered by internal political restraints.]*

First of all, I want to speak about the reasons for my leaving.

I have said this and explained that the issue is substantive in that I did not see myself as someone who is capable or able to give loyal expression to the conception concerning autonomy and the future of Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, because of most of the members of the Coalition, that is, of the Likud and the MRP parties.

Well, in my view, first of all we must, in the days ahead, we should be bound to the Camp David accords. There is no need to deviate from them. It may be that an agreement or understanding which will be achieved during the autonomy negotiations will be more detailed or different in various matters. Even now, I regard the Camp David accords as a framework that should not be breached. There is no objective need to deviate from them. It is sufficiently suitable ... in my opinion, it is possible to reach an agreement with the Arabs of the territories as well and to guarantee our basic interests. They are the security interests, the settlement issue, a guarantee that we will not have the status of aliens - as though we were foreigners in the territories, in Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip - and not touching upon the question of sovereignty at present but, in accordance with the Camp David agreement, to say: 5 years after the establishment of the autonomy there will be discussed, and this will be done with Jordan, not with a Palestinian state and not with the autonomy and not with any other body.

The United States and Egypt have signed this. Well, now comes the time when the first difficult question arises: the autonomy agreement must be fulfilled by the Arabs, the Palestinian Arabs, and the fact that the United States and Egypt and Israel I have signed this does not yet bind the Palestinian Arabs and the difficulty exists. However, I do not advise any one of us to scorn these three signatures when they appear together. After all, when there is a signature by the president of Egypt in addition to a peace agreement with Egypt and a signature by the President of the United States and a signature by the Prime Minister of Israel, so from the aspect of the formal framework, Israel is committed to it. In any view, this is no less than, let us say, Security Council Resolution 242. Go and ask Eban how many resolutions the Security Council makes which are not fulfilled.

So there is Resolution 242, but its strength lies in the fact that the parties agree to it. So I very much admire the Camp David agreement, and I think we should not deviate from it. It gives us, in my opinion, the following things: an interim period - and we must now deal with an interim period - and the guaranteeing of our basic issues from the military aspect. From the security aspect, there is no restriction. On the contrary, it is stated that the IDF will be along the Jordan. The matter of settlement is not mentioned in it at all. What it does say is that the peace agreement will be made with Jordan, and we will hear about it from it. That is, there is no other state, Palestinian or other, which is a candidate for this.

I want to say, with regard to the settlements - this has also appeared in that letter I wrote on 2 October - I am in favour of our settling according to a plan, and we are entitled to settle in all the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The claim by the Alignment concerning areas densely populated is, in my opinion, indirectly connected with this issue only via the Allon plan. That is, I see nothing wrong in establishing Jewish settlements in centers of dense Arab population. Nor did the Alignment see anything wrong in this. As an example, in the Gaza Strip, in the Qatif settlements, one cannot say that the Gaza Strip is not a dense Arab settlement. There can be no more dense than that. It is much more dense than the region of Elon More or something else. The logic in the Alignment position on this matter lies in the fact that if we build on a partition program - the Allon plan any sort of partition plan - and say we do not want, neither we nor the Arabs, to add the parts densely populated by Arabs to Israeli sovereignty, and we do not want to establish settlements in places which will not remain in our possession. So we must establish settlements only in places which will afterward be a part of Eretz Yisra'el, and they do not include the densely populated places. But anyone who does not think that the solution to coexistence with the Arabs is partition - and I do not think so - does not see anything wrong in the establishment of Jewish settlements, even close to dense Arab population.

What is the only reservation I have concerning the settlements? Not to take, not to seize private land, whether this private land is barren or not. So one Arab has a barren hill; that does not give the right, in my view, to us to say, since this land is barren, even if it is under private ownership, we can take it and give it to our settlements. This is the point that I voted against, because of it I voted against the establishment of Elon More. This is the only matter on this issue. The matter of private land. Maybe I should also say - and I am sure that there is nobody in the Cabinet who thinks differently from the way I do on this matter, but it is good to emphasize this - when I say that we should not take private land for the purpose of establishing our settlements - I have already said this in public and I want to say it

again - there is a lot of land which belongs to the state and, in my view, there will be no quantitative limit, if they are not intransigent about specific places, on establishing settlements on state lands, from the aspect of the quantity of land belonging to the government which is at our disposal.

The second point I wanted to make is in regard to autonomy. I think that it is necessary to end the government, the military government, not what is called the source of authority. On the contrary, on the matter of the source of authority my position is perhaps one of the most extreme in the government: What is called the source of authority must remain in Israel's hands. I will explain in simple language what source of authority means. I am in favor - in accordance with the autonomy agreement, if the agreement materializes; and if it does not, we should do this unilaterally - of our removing to the extent possible the military, urban, Israeli command headquarters from the towns, from Gaza or Nablus, of our being satisfied with military units which are in the field nearby, and of our maintaining routine contact with the municipalities or the inhabitants on various issues via the Israeli Government ministries. For example, on the agriculture issue, contact should be via the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture; on the health issue, via the Ministry of Health. We should do this because it is impossible to maintain this colony without a government. And I am speaking, for the moment, about a situation in which autonomy has not been established.

The prevailing view is that the Arab of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza cannot take part in the talks or accept such a program because the PLO does not agree, or without the PLO representing them and so on. Well, I do not know whether you all remember the period after the Six Day War when the PLO came out firmly against Arabs from the territories working in Israel. They simply sent territories to fire at the cars and trucks that brought the workers. But when the Arabs themselves wanted this ... in the end they knew who was firing at them from the ditch at the side of the road. The reference here is not to the PLO in Lebanon. The reference here is to someone who waits between Nablus or Gaza and Tel Aviv. So, when the Arabs of Gaza or the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria wanted to work in Israel, then even when the PLO took an extreme opposite position on this matter to the point of using terror, with our aid they found a way to overcome this. In my opinion, the same thing applies to the autonomy program. The key is in the hands of the local Arabs. Whether or not the PLO gives them permission, we must first of all come to an understanding with them about what they want. If they do not want this, we will not be able to impose it on them. But, in my view, from Israel's viewpoint, if they do not want this, then the administrative autonomy will not be established. There will not be elections; there will not be any of these authorities given to a representative body. To the extent possible, this should not prevent us from following a policy which does not interfere with their affairs and which safeguards our security and settlement interests, but lets them run their lives as far as possible as they want to run them - and this includes the removal of the military government from within the towns.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 34/65 ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,  
NEW YORK, 29 NOVEMBER 1979**

A

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* and reaffirming its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977 and 33/28 A to C of 7 December 1978,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

1. *Expresses* its grave concern that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security;

2. *Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
3. *Calls once more* for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties;
4. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People as contained in paragraphs 52 to 55 of its report;
5. *Expresses* its regret and concern that the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20, 32/40 A and 33/28 A have not been implemented;
6. *Notes* with regret that the Security Council has not taken the action it was urged to take by the General Assembly in paragraph 4 of its resolution 32/40A;
7. *Once again urges* the Security Council to consider and take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 A, 32/40 A and 33/28 A and in the present resolution;
8. *Authorizes and requests* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in the event of the Security Council failing to consider or to take a decision on those recommendations by 31 March 1980, to consider that situation and to make the suggestions it deems appropriate;
9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session.

B

The General Assembly,

*Recalling and reaffirming* the declaration, contained in paragraph 4 of its resolution 33/28 A of 7 December 1978, that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization,

*Taking note* of paragraphs 33 to 35 of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. *Notes* with concern that the Camp David accords have been concluded outside the framework of the United Nations and without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;
2. *Rejects* those provisions of the accords which ignore, infringe upon, violate or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, the right of self-determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and which envisage and condone continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
3. *Strongly condemns* all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the Charter and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue;
4. *Declares* that the Camp David accords and other agreements have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

C

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolutions 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977 and 33/28 A to C of 7 December 1978,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;
2. *Requests* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to keep the situation relating to the question of Palestine under review and to report and make suggestions to the General Assembly or the Security Council, as appropriate;
3. *Authorizes* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session and thereafter;
4. *Requests* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, as well as other United Nations bodies associated with the question of Palestine, to co-operate fully with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to make available to the Committee, at its request, the relevant information and documentation which the Commission has at its disposal;
5. *Decides* to circulate the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to all the competent bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks.

#### D

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

*Noting* in particular, the information contained in paragraphs 45 to 51 of the report, Recalling its resolutions 32/40 B of 2 December 1977 and 33/28 C of 7 December 1978,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, in the light of the consultations held in accordance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/28 C, to redesignate the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights as the Division for Palestinian Rights and to provide it with the resources necessary to discharge the increased responsibilities assigned to it by the Assembly;
2. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Division for Palestinian Rights, in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and under its guidance:
  - (a) Shall continue to discharge the tasks detailed in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B;
  - (b) Shall undertake an expanded programme of work, including, *inter alia*, the following:
    - (i) Establishment of closer co-operation within the United Nations framework and with non-governmental organizations;
    - (ii) Organization of four seminars during the biennium. 1980-1981, sponsoring of annual internship programmes and arrangements for lecture tours;
    - (iii) Monitoring of political and other relevant developments affecting the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
    - (iv) Assistance in the preparation of visual material, such as posters;
    - (v) Expansion of the scope of the bulletin issued by the Division for Palestinian Rights to include all items relevant to the question of Palestinian rights;
3. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Department of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Division for Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;

4. Invites all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Division for Palestinian Rights in the performance of their tasks;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to direct the United Nations Postal Administration to issue a series of United Nations commemorative postage stamps to publicize as widely as possible the grave situation and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
6. Requests member States to observe annually on 29 November the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People and to issue special postage stamps for the occasion;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to direct the Department of Public Information to set up, in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, a photographic display in the public areas of United Nations headquarters with a view to keeping visitors informed of the grave situation and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 34/70 ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NEW YORK, 6 DECEMBER 1979**

The General Assembly:

*Having discussed* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975, 31/61 of 9 December 1976, 32/20 of 25 November 1977, 33/28 and 33/29 of 7 December 1978, *Recalling also* its resolution 34/65 of 29 November 1979,

*Taking into account* the support extended to the just cause of the Palestinian people and the other Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli aggression and for a genuine, comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the full exercise of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, both by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana, and by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia,

*Deeply concerned* that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than twelve years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, is still deprived of the exercise of its inalienable national rights,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

*Reaffirming also* the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

*Convinced* that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
2. Declares once more that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem;
3. Condemns all partial agreements and separate treaties which violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradict the principles of just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem to ensure the establishment of a just peace in the area;

4. Reaffirms that until Israel, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the United Nations, withdraws from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, and until the Palestinian people attains and exercises its inalienable national rights, as affirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, will not be achieved;
5. Calls anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, \*including the Palestine Liberation Organization in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX);
6. Urges the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problem and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations;
7. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, including Assembly resolution 34/65 A and the present resolution, and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution, to forward the records of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East to the Security Council and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;
9. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 34/89 ON ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT,  
NEW YORK, 11 DECEMBER 1979**

The General Assembly,

*Alarmed* by the increasing information and evidence regarding Israel's activities aiming at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons,

*Recalling* its resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 concerning military and nuclear collaboration with Israel,

*Recalling* its repeated condemnation of the military and nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977 and 33/64 of 14 December 1978 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Convinced* that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region and further threaten international peace and security,

1. Appeals to all States to put an end to any co-operation with Israel which may assist it in acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and also to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation that may result in providing Israel with nuclear weapons;
2. Calls upon all States to take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer to Israel of fissionable material and nuclear technology which could be used for nuclear arms;
3. Calls upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. Strongly condemns any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store or test nuclear weapons or introduce them into the Middle East,
5. Requests the Security Council to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions concerning Israeli nuclear armament;
6. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
7. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the work of the group of experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, MODEL FOR THE SELF-GOVERNING  
AUTHORITY, 16 JANUARY 1980 [EXCERPTS]**

At the conclusion of the last plenary meeting held at Mena House, Giza, Egypt on 19th December 1979 it was decided:

"The plenary also approved the recommendation of the working group in its report that it proceed simultaneously to prepare for the plenary's future consideration a proposed model for the power & responsibilities to be exercised by the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council)."

In accordance with this decision, the Israeli working group has prepared a proposed model for full autonomy for Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In this model the Israeli party presents a draft for the proposed model of the powers and responsibilities and functions which the administrative council should have in accordance with the provisions of the Camp David framework.

The Israeli team tried to express its thoughts through this draft model on the organizational concept of the administrative council and its administrative tools. In order to more easily convey our conception to all the participants here, we have made intense and minute preparations and we have in fact prepared a graphic representation of the model. On this poster we have delineated the powers and responsibilities of the administrative council itself, its chairman, and its essential functions and attributes. Also on this poster you will see a list of the divisions of the administrative council, the divisions which will fulfill the powers and responsibilities and functions of the council.

The other posters depict, in detail, the suggested structure of each of the divisions with details of all the various sections of each division. We have attempted to provide the model in detail and to present it clearly by using graphic illustrations so as to express Israel's position and Israel's preparedness to ensure full autonomy for Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.

As we have said on numerous occasions, Israel sees three different categories of powers and responsibilities.

The first is that described in the model, and includes all the powers and responsibilities to be given to the administrative council. In our opinion, this model covers all those elements needed to ensure full autonomy for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

The second category includes powers and responsibilities which will be administered jointly and through cooperation, the so-called "shared powers" between Israel and the administrative council.

The third category includes those powers and responsibilities which will remain in Israel's authority, the so-called "residual" powers.

It should be clear before presenting the detailed review that this is a draft, a proposed model, of the Israeli party to the negotiation. Not every detail of it is of crucial importance. We know that we have to shape together the final form of the proposed model we were requested to prepare by the plenary, but we were also requested, as we are the nearest to the problem, after we gave a presentation of the current situation, to prepare also a draft for the model and I believe that all of us can afterwards relate to it.

1. The administrative council will be composed of 11 members, a chairman and 10 members each of whom will be head of a division.

#### *General Powers of the Administrative Council*

2. a) The administrative council will have the following general powers:
  1. The power to issue regulations;
  2. The power to determine the budget and mode of financing of the administrative council;
  3. The power to enter into contracts;
  4. The power to sue and be sued in the local courts;
  5. The power to employ personnel.
- b) The administrative council will be entitled to delegate all or part of its powers to the heads of divisions functioning within its frame.

#### *Divisions of the Administrative Council*

3. The following divisions will function within the frame of the council: Agriculture, Health, Religions, Labor and Welfare, Commerce and Industry, Finance, Transport and Communications, Education and Culture, Administration of Justice and Local Affairs (including police).
4. The Agriculture Division will deal with all branches of agriculture and fisheries and with nature reserves and parks.
5. The Health Division will supervise the hospitals, clinics and other health and sanitary services.
6. The Religious Division will deal with matters of religious services to all religious communities.
7. The Labor and Welfare Division will be responsible for the welfare, labor and employment services including the operation of labor exchanges, and will be responsible for the rehabilitation of refugees.
8. The Industry and Commerce Division will be responsible for all branches of commerce, industry and workshops.
9. The Finance Division will deal with the budget of the administrative council and its distribution among the various divisions, and will be responsible for matters of direct taxation.
10. The Transport and Communications Division will coordinate matters of transport, road traffic, meteorology, shipping and ports, and will be responsible for post and communications services.
11. The Education and Culture division will operate the local system of educational institutions from kindergarten to institutions of higher education and will supervise cultural, art and sports activities.
12. The Administration of Justice Division will supervise the administrative system of the local courts, and will also deal with matters of the prosecution framework and with all matters of registration and association under the law (such as: companies, partnerships, patents, trademarks, etc.)
13. The Local Affairs Division will deal with matters of housing and construction inclusive of building licenses, matters of local authorities, tourism and will be responsible for the operation of the local police force, including prisons for criminal offenders sentenced by the local courts.
14. Each division of the administrative council will be managed by its own director-general who will have under his jurisdiction special assistants and section directors. The following sections will function in each of the divisions:  
 The administration section will deal with organization and management of the division, employee affairs, budgets, finances and internal audit of the division and its sections. The section will also be responsible for training and professional upgrading for employees of the division.  
 The legal department of each division will provide legal advice to the head of the division, the director-general, his assistants and the sections.

*The Chairman of the Administrative Council - Office of the Chairman*

The chairman of the administrative council will be responsible for coordinating the operations of the various divisions of the council. In addition, there will be in this office a number of non-elected functionaries appointed by the chairman or the council, as follows:

- a. The statistics section will be responsible for planning, collection, processing, and publication of data in the form of surveys as, for example, on the following: population, labor force, wages and employment, consumption and standard of living, agriculture, industry and workshops, building, transportation, prices, etc.
- b. The civil service commissioner will be responsible for employees of the administrative council in the following matters:
  1. Establishment for the council's divisions;
  2. Salaries and terms of employment;
  3. Employing and dismissing workers;
  4. Ongoing handling of all employee affairs.

This section will, inter alia, supervise work and organizational arrangements of the employees, will define their powers, their duties, their rights and obligations.

- c. The official publications section will plan, carry out and publish the official publications of the administrative council and the various divisions. Thus, for example, the section will publish regulations issued by the council and the by-laws of the local authorities, the various announcements of divisions of the council, such as trademarks, patents, designs, companies, etc.
- d. The archives will be responsible for the following areas:
  1. Collection of archive material from meetings of the council and its divisions, and the preservation thereof to the extent that its legal, administrative and research value so justifies.
  2. The opening of protected material for research by means of cataloguing and publication.
  3. Professional supervision in order that they should be properly kept.
  4. Destruction of archive material held by private individuals and public institutions and which is of concern to the population at large.

The following will function alongside the chairman's office: the legal advisor, ombudsman and comptroller of the administrative council.

- a. The legal advisor will provide legal advice to the council and its divisions in all matters arising from its ongoing functions, and guidance on future affairs. Within its responsibility will also be the regulatory system under the powers of the council Preparation, drafting and coordination of regulations.
- b. The legal department will also be responsible for the function of the departments within each division.
- c. The ombudsman will deal with all requests submitted to the chairman of the council or directly to him, and which relate to matters where regular channels cannot provide satisfactory answers. The ombudsman will deal with all requests relating to: administrative methods, regulations, attitudes of officials and the establishment - whether himself or by causing speedier handling by the divisions concerned.
- d. The comptroller will audit the activities of the various divisions, and of the institutions connected with them: local authorities, legal entities in the management of which the council participates or which it supports. The activities that he will audit are: functions according to law and regulations, public ethics, regular and efficient working and economies.

The council secretary will be responsible, under the direction of the chairman, for preparing the agenda and other material connected with council meetings, for relaying resolutions taken and for supervising their implementation. He will also be responsible for the functioning of those sections that operate the frame of the chairman's office.

The coordinator of divisional activities, alongside the secretary, will coordinate activities between the divisions whenever this is necessary in order to implement council decisions.

Two separate representatives will operate in liaison roles:

- a. Liaison with the continuing committee in accordance with article of the Camp David framework.
- b. Liaison representative with the Israeli authorities who will deal together with Israeli authorities on an ongoing basis with all matters of common interest to the council and Israel. This representative will also be responsible for coordination of all matters that require coordination according to the model to be presented.

### *General Remarks*

We have put a considerable amount of effort into the construction of an organizational and functional model; not because we want this model to be accepted per se, as written here, but because we have tried to illustrate our concrete, practical approach. We may very well have to shape and modify this model. This can be done in accordance with practical suggestions which we can work out together. Our basic approach, however, is represented by the principles incorporated in this model.

This is the first time that the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district have been offered full autonomy, full autonomy which includes the effective daily administration and conduct of a wide range of fields of activity. This is a turning point in their history and we should be united in realizing this truth. It is upon us to present the subject to them in this light. They should consider Israel's offer seriously and they should utilize this moment and this important product of our negotiating effort. The Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district would do well to join these negotiations within the delegations of Egypt and Jordan as provided for in the Camp David framework, and together with them we can work the framework for their future.

Certain items in this model need to be defined in greater detail. The Israeli team suggests that we consider setting up sub-committees composed of experts in various fields in order to study the issues and assist in finding solutions -in a spirit of understanding and agreement.

The Israeli party believes that today we have entered upon the second stage of our work.

The Israeli delegation sees its suggestion as one comprehensive and integral proposal. There is a connection between the three categories and we must discuss them simultaneously and we know that it is also the approach of the other parties to these negotiations, and we agree with it. We would, therefore, suggest that this debate and our discussions be considered to be ad referendum until we have attained final agreement. We should proceed to discuss the range of issues before us in the various categories, simultaneously and in parallel.

It would, of course, be ideal if we could submit later on an agreed proposal to the plenary. But it will also be useful if we can agree at least upon what we can agree and to note our differences of opinion for the plenary's consideration.

At the same time, motivated by a feeling of responsibility and a sense of the importance of this occasion, allow us to suggest to you all that we utilize fully the opportunity afforded us by this presentation of a proposed model for full autonomy. This is the first time, according to our understanding, since the beginning of these negotiations that concrete and significant expression has been given in the broadest sense to the powers and responsibilities which the self-governing authority (administrative council) should have. This should surely be a means to stimulate, to interest and to attract those for whom we are working here. They should not let this moment slip by, who so ever does not sit at the negotiating table harms in the first instance himself. I believe that over and above our differences of approach, we can be united at least on this issue.



**GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, PROPOSED MODEL OF FULL AUTONOMY  
FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, CAIRO, 28 JANUARY 1980**

I - Introduction

- (a) The Camp David Framework stipulates the withdrawal of the military government and its civilian administration, and the transfer of its authority to the self-governing authority which will replace it.
- (b) In reviewing the powers and responsibilities of the military government and its civilian administration, the working group was seeking to envisage, through a practical approach, the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA (Self-Governing Authority) in the context of its replacement of the military government and its civilian administration as stated in the Camp David Framework. That was the purpose of the survey of the current situation, it was a way out of the deadlock caused by the conceptual discussions of the comprehensive approach, and a step to provide the parties with basic information for discussing the transfer of authority. Indeed, the presentations of the powers and responsibilities of the military government and its civilian administration were meant to lead the working group, in the light of these presentations, and in the context of the transfer of authority, to prepare a model for the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA (Self-Governing Authority).

This method was endorsed by the decision taken at the London meeting of the heads of delegation on October 26, 1979: "... Presentations on the current situation will provide the parties with basic information for discussing transfer of authority as stated in the Camp David Framework."

This led subsequently to the call of the plenary on December 19, 1979 to the working group: "To proceed to prepare for the plenary's future consideration a proposed model for the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA".

- (c) When the method is thus set in perspective, it becomes clear that when a model of the powers and responsibilities of the SGA is to be prepared, the guiding frame should be the powers and responsibilities of the military government and its civilian administration and that the focal points in discussing such a model should be:
- 1 - Withdrawal of the Israeli military government and its civilian administration.
  - 2 - The transfer of authority.
  - 3 - Organs of the SGA which will take over from, and replace, the military government and its civilian administration.

II - The Military Government and its Civilian Administration

- (a) On June 7, 1967, the Israeli military command published proclamation No. 2 entitled "Laws and administration proclamation". A section of which is concerned with the assumption of government by the Israeli defence forces, and under the title "Assumption of powers" it reads: "Any power of government, legislation, appointment, or administration with respect to the region or its inhabitants shall henceforth vest in me alone and shall be exercised only by me or a person appointed by me to that end or acting on my behalf."
- (b) The Israel military government currently existing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has full comprehensive authority. It assumes the power of formulating all policies and coordinating all activities. Its decision making emanates from different and interconnected channels of Israeli cabinet and interministerial levels as well as a chain of military command leading to the area or regional commander (one for the West Bank and one for Gaza) who was vested with full legislative and executive authority in the area as shown in the aforementioned proclamation. Mandatory orders issued by the military commander presented legislative enactments and revisions. Policy is determined according to considerations adopted by the office of the coordinator of activities, the Israeli ministry concerned and the regional command.

- (c) Administrative authority is delegated to regional and district commanders. Routine administrative duties and conduct of ordinary activities are left to the relevant institutions that were already operating in the West Bank and Gaza or to newly organized units of administrative service.

The civil administration of the military government is carried out by branches, each branch supervising a number of units. The units carry out the conduct of every day life. Heads of units who operate in the areas are directly subordinated through the chief of branch to the military com-

mander while they come, at the same time, under the corresponding ministries in Israel on professional matters. From the ministry they get instructions on professional matters, how to act, how to deal with the problems arising out of the daily life. From the commander, through the chief of branch, they get the policy, the command.

- (d) The military government and its civilian administration is therefore composed of different levels manifesting different layers of authority. One layer legislates and formulates policies while another layer executes and carries out the policies.

The Camp David Framework stipulates the transfer of both. It is not a matter of transferring the administrative set-up which implements the orders but first and foremost transferring the strata of authority which holds the power to issue the orders.

- (e) It may be recalled that the civil administration of the military government is mainly composed, even now, of local inhabitants. According to the figures of December 1978 there were in the West Bank 11,165 local employees in the civil administration (and only 980 Israelis) while in Gaza there are local director-generals heading 14 of the main units.

So, it may be said, that even now the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are bearing most of the responsibility for running the affairs of their daily life but only carrying out decisions which were made for them and implementing policies which were formulated over their heads.

When the Camp David Framework promises them full autonomy, it can only mean that under the SGA they will be able to take their own decisions and formulate their own policies.

The full autonomy which the Camp David Framework provides for cannot amount to a reorganization of what the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip already have, but rather the transformation of that set-up in an authority which is self-governing. Hence, the withdrawal of the military government and the transfer of its manifold authority to the inhabitants.

### III - Withdrawal of the Military Government and the Transfer of Authority

- (a) The first step in establishing the SGA should be the withdrawal of the military government, the Camp David Framework for peace states clearly that: "The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government."

The joint letter of March 26, 1979 states that: "The Military Government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the SGA."

- (b) Distinction is made in both the Camp David Framework and the joint letter between two kinds of withdrawals:

- 1 - The withdrawal of the military government and its civilian administration which is total and absolute. It is an unqualified withdrawal; and
- 2 - A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces which is going to be partial and there will be a redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations.

- (c) The withdrawal of the military government and its civilian administration, which occurs as soon as the SGA is elected, is the first step towards the assumption by the SGA of its powers and responsibilities. The transfer of authority takes place by handing over the powers and responsibilities of the military government and its civilian administration to the newly elected SGA. The SGA replaces the outgoing regime.

- (d) In this respect, the following elements should be stressed:

- (1) The transfer of authority implies the handing over of all powers and responsibilities presently exercised by the military government and its civilian administration.
- (2) The transfer of authority should be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner.
- (3) Whenever Palestinian Institutions already exist in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as part of the prevailing system of civil service, they will, in the course of such transfer of authority, take over the functions of, and replace, the military government and its civilian administration. It is only when new functions, or new powers, are transferred to the SGA which were not exercised before under the military regime by the Palestinian people that new organs should be sought.

- (e) Stress should be focused more on the powers and functions that are not exercised by the Palestinian people under the military regime so that the necessary relevant organs would be suggested.

The Palestinian people already played the major role in the civil service which obeyed the commands and implemented the policies of the military regime. Under the autonomy there will be need for an organ to fulfill their newly acquired power to make their own decisions and formulate their own policies. The elected body of the SGA is obviously that organ.

#### IV - Powers and Responsibilities to be Exercised by the Self-Governing Authority

For a model of powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the SGA, some keywords and guidelines from the Camp David Framework for peace should be stressed at the outset.

- (a) It is a self-governing authority, which means that it governs itself by itself. It is a self-generating authority. No outside source vests it with its authority.
- (b) It provides full autonomy, and not an impaired or partial autonomy.
- (c) This self-governing authority with full autonomy comes through free elections. It is a democratic structure of government by the people and for the people. As an elected body it has a representative character and its membership fulfill the functions and exercise the powers that an elected representative body usually does.

##### *1 - Nature of the SGA:*

The SGA is an interim arrangement for a period not exceeding 5 years. This transitional process, at the outset of which the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn and the SGA established, can demonstrate that the practical problems arising from a transition to peace can be satisfactorily resolved. The transitional period is aimed at bringing about the changes in attitudes that can assure a final settlement which realizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people while assuring the security of all the parties. The purpose of this transitional arrangement is:

- (a) To ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- (b) To help the Palestinian people to develop their own political, economic and social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip so as to give expression to the principle of full autonomy which the SGA provides.
- (c) To provide the proper conditions for the Palestinian people to participate in negotiations leading to the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the realization of their legitimate rights including their right to self-determination.

##### *2-Scope of the SGA:*

- (a) The jurisdiction of the SGA will encompass all of the Palestinian territories occupied after 5 June 1967 and which are delineated in the relevant armistice agreements of 1949 (Egyptian Israeli armistice agreement of 2 April, 1949 regarding the Gaza Strip and Jordanian Israeli armistice agreement of 24 February, 1949 regarding the West Bank including Arab Jerusalem).
- (b) Authority of the SGA extends to the inhabitants as well as the land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- (c) All powers and responsibilities of the SGA apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip which shall be regarded under the autonomy as one territory and integral whole.
- (d) All changes in the geographic character, the demographic composition and the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip or any part thereof are null and void and must be rescinded as they jeopardize the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as provided for in the Camp David Framework.

This applies in particular to:

- 1 - East Jerusalem, the annexation of which by Israel is null and void and must be rescinded. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267 must be applied to Jerusalem which is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored.
- 2 - Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are illegal and, in the course of a final settlement should be withdrawn.

During the transitional period there should be a ban on the establishment of new settlements or enlarging the existing ones. After the inauguration of the SGA all settlers in the West Bank and Gaza will come under the authority of the SGA.

3 - *General Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA:*

- 1 - Promulgation of laws and regulations
- 2 - Policy formulation and supervision
- 3 - Budgetary provisions
- 4 - Taxation
- 5 - Employment of staff
- 6 - Issuance of identity and travel documents
- 7 - Control of in and out movement of persons and goods
- 8 - Power to assume obligations and own property
- 9 - Power to hold title to public land
- 10 - Power to sue and to be sued
- 11 - Power to enter into contracts
- 12 - Power to participate in negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to ascertain in the views of the Palestinians
- 13 - Assuming responsibility for:
  - (a) Public administration;
  - (b) Public services;
  - (c) Public order and internal security and police;
  - (d) Public domain and natural resources;
  - (e) Economic and financial fields;
  - (f) Social and cultural fields;
  - (g) Human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- 14 - Administration of Justice.

4 - *Structure of the SGA:*

- (a) The SGA will be composed of 80-100 members freely elected from the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- (b) The structure of the SGA contains two main organs:
  - An assembly composed of all freely elected representatives from the West Bank and Gaza.
  - A council composed of 10-15 members to be elected from among the membership of the assembly.
- (c) The Assembly:
  - (1) It will take over, and replace, the authority of the military government in enacting laws and regulations, formulating and supervising policies, adopting the budget, levying taxes, etc...
  - (2) Its internal organization of a chairman with one or more vice-chairmen, its rules of procedure and the number and composition of its committees will be determined by the Assembly itself.
- (d) The Council:
  - (1) It assumes the actual administration of the West Bank and Gaza and implements the policies formulated by the assembly in the different domains.
  - (2) It covers the whole range of activities and has full power in organizing, operating, employing staff and supervising the following executive branches: Education - Information and Culture - Transportation and Communications - Health - Social Welfare - Labour - Tourism - Internal Security - Housing - Religious Affairs - Agriculture - Economy and Finance - Commerce - Industry - Administration of Justice.
  - (3) The Council will constitute its divisions as it deems necessary for the proper conduct of its functions and will determine the number of divisions, the internal organization of divisions and the machinery for coordination as befits the best and the most effective conduct of its activities. It may get in this respect, and if requested, expert help from the parties.
- (e) The Judicial authority will be manifested in a system of courts of law, courts of appeal and supreme court enjoying full guarantees for independence and efficiency in their administration of justice.

- (f) The SGA will have a representative, alongside with the representatives of Israel, Egypt (and Jordan), on the continuing committee in accordance with Article 3 of the Camp David Framework. Matters of common concern to Israel and the SGA which need mutual arrangements could be dealt with through the committee.

*5 - Seat of the SGA:*

The seat of the SGA will be East Jerusalem.

*6 - Additional Arrangements:*

- (a) As soon as the SGA is established and inaugurated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. Permission will be required for any movement of military troops into or through the territory.
- (b) The Camp David Framework requires the parties to negotiate an agreement which includes, *inter alia*, arrangements for assuring internal security and public order. Responsibility for security and public order will be decided jointly by the parties including the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Egyptians (and the Jordanians).
- (c) A strong police force will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It will be constituted by the SGA and composed of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 465, NEW YORK, 1 MARCH 1980**

The Security Council,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Commission of the Security Council established under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in documents S/13450 and Corr. 1 and S/13679,

*Taking note* also of letters from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/13801) and the Permanent Representative of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic Group (S/13802),

*Strongly deploring* the refusal by Israel to co-operate with the Commission and regretting its formal rejection of resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979),

*Affirming once more* that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

*Deploring* the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,

*Deeply concerned* over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlement policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local Arab and Palestinian population,

*Taking into account* the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of private and public land and property, and water resources,

*Bearing in mind* the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

*Drawing attention* to the grave consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Recalling* pertinent Security Council resolutions, specifically resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, as well as the consensus statement made by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976,

*Having invited* Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), in the occupied territory, to supply it with information pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure,

1. *Commends* the work done by the Commission in preparing the report contained in document S/13679;
2. *Accepts* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;
3. *Calls upon* all parties, particularly the Government of Israel, to co-operate with the Commission;
4. *Strongly deplures* the decision of Israel to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh in order to appear before the Security Council, and requests Israel to permit his free travel to the United Nations Headquarters for that purpose;
5. *Determines* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
6. *Strongly deplures* the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem,
7. *Calls upon* all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories;
8. *Requests* the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources, with a view to ensuring the protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution;
9. *Requests* the Commission to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980, and decides to convene at the earliest possible date thereafter in order to consider the report and the full implementation of the present resolution.



**US SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE, STATEMENT TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REGARDING US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WASHINGTON, DC, 20 MARCH 1980**

There has been a great deal of discussion about the subject of today's hearings: The events surrounding the United States' votes in the United Nations Security Council on March 1. Mr. Chairman, I know that all of us here are aware of the importance of approaching our discussions today with a view to their possible impact on our efforts for a comprehensive peace. In this regard, Ambassador Linowitz is leaving tomorrow for a round of particularly sensitive negotiations with the Egyptians and Israelis.

Over the years the United States has been forthright in staging its position on these issues. We have made clear:

- Our unwavering support for Israel's security and well-being;
- Our longstanding commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- Our support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its part as the foundation of a comprehensive peace settlement;
- Our belief confirmed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David that negotiations are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our conviction shared by Egypt and Israel that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;

- Our firm position that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our unwavering commitment to the negotiations process laid out at Camp David; and
- Our strong view that in the interim the parties should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and common-sense restraint so as to build trust that a sequence of successful negotiations can bring about a just, honorable and lasting peace for all.

After nearly 30 years of stalemate and strife, we finally have seen concrete progress toward peace through negotiations. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter embarked on a process that has led to the Camp David framework, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and the present negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. At the request of the parties, the United States is a full partner in these negotiations.

It is important to stress that the objective of all three partners is a peaceful settlement compatible with the Camp David accords and achieved through negotiation. The approach which has begun to bear fruit in the last two years is to reach accommodation on those issues that can be tackled now and then to use the progress made in the present stage to facilitate resolution of the tougher issues in later phases of negotiations. It is critical to this process that each side gain trust that a negotiated settlement on fair terms is possible.

Let me turn now to several specific issues.

#### THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS

The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.

They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and therefore to undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.

The current negotiations are an effort to establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.

The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely-elected body called for by the Camp David framework. Those elections should assure that that body has the popular support necessary to carry out during the transitional period its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.

On the question of security, let me reaffirm the statement in the Camp David accords that "all necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond". That commitment is an integral part of the Camp David framework, and this administration intends to see that it is honored in full.

#### THE U.N. RESOLUTION

In February, we were faced with a draft resolution on the question of Israeli settlements which was circulated in the Security Council.

We disagreed with a reference in the resolution to dismantling existing settlements, and sought unsuccessfully to have it removed. As often happens in the U.N. Security Council, therefore, we stated our reservations without opposing the resolution as a whole. President Carter has stated clearly our view that this call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical.

As you know, we did succeed in removing paragraph seven of the draft, which called on Israel to assure the exercise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, thereby wrongly implying that it is not already doing so.

There was a misunderstanding, however, with regard to our position on other references to Jerusalem in the resolution. The president understood that all references to Jerusalem would be removed before we would vote for the resolutions, believing that in the present phase of the autonomy negotiations it would not be helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I believed, that what the president wished to have removed was the reference to Jerusalem and related material contained in paragraph seven. I was mistaken and have accepted full responsibility for this misunderstanding.

As Ambassador McHenry stated in the Security Council immediately following the vote, the U.S. considers Resolution 465 as recommendatory rather than binding. With regard to the reference in the resolution to "Palestinian and other Arab lands", it is our position that this phrase should not be construed as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

As the president unequivocally stated on March 3, our policies with respect to settlements in occupied territory, and with respect to Jerusalem, have not changed. I think it is important that I take a moment to reiterate briefly our policies on these two issues.

#### SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. We have consistently urged Israel to halt actions to create new settlements or to seize land to expand existing ones. We regard such restraint as particularly important while the autonomy negotiations are underway.

The Camp David framework does not refer specifically to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning the status of the settlements during the transitional period will obviously have to be resolved in the course of the autonomy negotiations.

The permanent resolution -of the settlements issue must then be decided in the subsequent negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.

#### JERUSALEM

Our policy on Jerusalem has remained consistent under the past four presidents. As President Carter stated March 3, our position remains, on the status of Jerusalem, unchanged. That position remains as indicated by the president in his letter to President Sadat signed at the time of the Camp David accords.

With respect to the future of Jerusalem, it has been our consistent position that the final status of the city must be settled in the context of negotiations for a final peace. We believe that whatever solution is eventually agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as an undivided city. It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim and Christian holy sites without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise of worship. The solution should have taken no position on exactly how the final status of Jerusalem might be defined.

#### THE PEACE PROCESS

In sum, Mr. Chairman, there has been no change in U.S. policy as we continue our dedicated efforts toward a comprehensive settlement.

Before turning to your questions, I would like to say a few final words about the Middle East peace process as a whole. Over the past three years, there is no foreign policy goal on which the president and I have worked harder than a genuine peace in the Middle East. The achievement at Camp David, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the launching of negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza are historic accomplishments, particularly when viewed against the past history of this tragic conflict.

It is certainly important that we concentrate our full and undivided attention on the autonomy negotiations and do all we can to give these talks best possible prospect or success. The autonomy negotiations offer the first real opportunity for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to achieve full autonomy within the context of assured Israel security, as the next step toward achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement.

As reflected in the agreement reached at Camp David, such a peace is deeply in the interests of the United States, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, and of the world. Every decision we have made - and will make - is designed to move us toward that goal.

With this in mind, the president has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin each to come to Washington in early April to discuss with him how best we can accelerate the movement toward our mutual objective.



**ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM,  
JERUSALEM, 2 APRIL 1980**

*[A day earlier the Egyptian National Assembly had proclaimed that East Jerusalem was Arab sovereign territory and an occupied "integral part of the West Bank." Israel rejected this resolution and made its position clear by the following statement.]*

In response to yesterday's resolution by the Egyptian National Assembly, the Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that Israel's stand regarding Jerusalem is well known and that the decision of the Egyptian National Assembly or latest decision of the U.N. Security Council will not determine or alter anything on this matter. Our position, shared by all not only in Israel, but among the Jewish nation abroad, is that Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel, and will never again be divided.

In the nineteen years during which the city was partitioned, the Jews were deprived of free access to the holy places. The Jewish quarter of the Old City was destroyed and historical synagogues and cemeteries were shattered and despoiled. On the other hand, since 1967, as all know, complete free access has been given to members of all nations and faiths to the city and its holy places.

At this moment, when the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the U.S. are working to find a way to establish autonomy according to what was agreed upon at Camp David, declarations of the kind included in the decision of the Egyptian National Assembly are not only impractical and incompatible with the Camp David agreements, but they also do nothing to help the delicate negotiations.



**LETTER FROM THE 'STEADFASTNESS FRONT' TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL  
KURT WALDHEIM, TRIPOLI, 28 APRIL 1980**

On behalf of the Permanent Representatives of the States members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation National Front, I have the honour to convey herewith the text of the Declaration made at the conclusion of the Fourth Summit Conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation National Front, held at Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, between 12 and 15 April 1980.

I have the further honour to request that the said Declaration be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 24 and 26 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mansur R. KIKHIA  
Permanent Representative

#### ANNEX

#### Declaration made at the conclusion of the Fourth Summit Conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation National Front

Upon invitation from Colonel Muammar Al Qathafi, leader of the glorious September 1st revolution, an Arab summit conference for the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front was convened in Tripoli from 26-29 Jumada Al-Awwal 1389 corresponding to 12-15 April 1980. The attendants were as follows:

President Shad li Ben Jedid, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.

President Hafiz Al-Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Colonel Muammar Al Qathafi, leader of the glorious September 1st revolution of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Brother Abdul Fatah Ismail, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party and Chairman of the People's Supreme Congress in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Brother Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and General Commander of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces.

The Conference reviewed all the developments in both the Arab and international arenas since the convening of the Front's Third Conference in Damascus, and discussed at length the current situation of the Arab-Israeli-Imperialist conflict, and the grave consequences of the continuation of the Camp David policies which revealed and clarified the extent of the conspiracy being perpetrated by international Zionism and American imperialism against the Arab Nation seeking its fragmentation, the elimination of its national unity, and the creation of contradiction between the Arab states by drawing them into irrelevant battles employing the Sadat regime against the Arab Nation, foremost, the people of Egypt, all of which is done for the sake of complete domination over the Arab homeland and the subjugation of the Arab Nation by destroying its national achievements, and plundering its wealth and placing it under the Zionist-American umbrella. After the thorough analysis of the situation the Conference concluded the following:

1. What the Camp David parties have done is but one link in the chain of the vicious conspiracy designed by imperialism and Zionism against the Arab Nation and its central cause, Palestine.
2. The normalization of relations between Egyptian regime and the Zionist entity constitutes a new step toward the consolidation of the aggressive alliance between the United States of America, the Zionist enemy, and the Sadat regime - an alliance that is directed basically against the Arab Nation including the Arab people in Egypt.
3. The principle objective of the imperialist-Zionist scheme seeks the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, the fragmentation of the Arab people in Palestine, the obliteration of their national character and infringement upon their representative unity. It further seeks the elimination of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the armed leader of the Palestinian people and the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian Arab people; hence, the determination of the Camp David parties to carry out the conspiracy of liquidating the Palestinian revolution, to proceed with the establishment of Zionist settlements and to implement the conspiracy of liquidating the Palestinian revolution, to proceed with the establishment of Zionist settlements and implement the conspiracy of self-determination for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resettling Palestinian refugees and ousting the Palestinian people from their homeland.
4. Syria, at this stage, represents the chief target for strike and liquidation, being the base of steadfastness and confrontation by virtue of its geographic location and national position on the Palestine cause, and because it constitutes the main political and military power confronting the Zionist enemy

and its allies; hence, the explanation of the vicious attack against the Syrian Arab State in an attempt to cease its national role by striking its internal front as the main support of the steadfastness and strength of Syria, employing certain circles that are involved with the parties to Camp David.

5. The extension of American hegemony over some Arab states, in establishing American military bases in them to protect western interests is under the guise of defending the independence of these states against alleged threats.
6. The attempt to narrow the gap between the Sadat regime and the Arab regimes as a step toward drawing them into the framework of the Camp David policy, and toward the liquidation of unity in the Arab stance set by the resolutions of the Arab summit, is an escalation of conflict in the Arab region by pitting Arab against Arab rather than having a united Arab front against the chief enemy represented in the Zionist entity, American imperialist ambitions, and the parties to Camp David.
7. Some West European countries are still vacillating in adopting attitudes consistent with the interests of their people, attempting to encircle the Arab stance through projects complimentary to the Camp David formula and Security Council Resolution No. 242, driven in so doing by the United States policy in the Middle East region disregarding the justice of the Arab cause and its essence, Palestine, and disregarding further the dangerous consequences of continuing the United States policy in the Arab region.
8. The Arab position, embodied in the resolutions of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and of the Arab Summit Conferences in Baghdad and Tunis, and the support of the Islamic Nations, the Non-Aligned Nations, the Socialist and African states, the friendly nations and the Liberation and Progressive Forces the world over, which they extended to the Arab Nation in its rejection of the Camp David Accords, has given a tremendous thrust to the struggling forces in Arab Egypt to intensify their campaign against the Sadat regime and his capitulationist path, leading to the escalation of nationalist action reflecting the determination of the masses in Arab Egypt to defeat the schemes aimed at snatching Egypt from its natural pioneering position in the Arab Nation's struggle against imperialism and Zionism.
9. The events and developments which the Arab homeland has witnessed since the establishment of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation in Tripoli in 1977 have proven that this Front constitute the nucleus for an Arab stand that rejects the capitulationist course for the Arab region and assumes a leading role in international and Arab conferences. The development of this Front, the mobilization of the energies of its parties, and the materialization of its institution have all now become an urgent requirement for its transformation into a more effective retaliation against the conspiracy and its challenges, and in the consolidation of Arab solidarity on the basis of confronting and defeating the Camp David schemes, and in supporting and promoting the progressive liberation trends in the Arab homeland. In light of the above and after a thorough examination of both the Arab and international situation, the Conference ratified a number of resolutions, some of which are the following:

- 1.) The Conference reaffirms the continuation of the policy of steadfastness and confrontation against Zionism and American Imperialism as the two main enemies of the Arab Nation and calls upon the Arab governments to reconsider their relations with the United States of America, and views the establishment of any American base in the Arab Nation as a direct aggression against the parties of the Front and the Arab Nation that should be resisted by all the means and urges an appeal to the Arab masses to accelerate their struggle against these bases.
- 2.) The formation of the following councils to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front as stipulated in the Damascus Declaration:
  - a) The Supreme Command
  - b) The Political Committee
  - c) The Information Committee
  - d) The Military Command

It has been resolved that these councils should assume their duties immediately and appoint their executive officers. It has been further resolved to establish a joint military force for the Front responsible to the Military Command.

- 3.) Charging the Political Committee to draft a program for joint Arab action to be presented to the parties of the Front and, after their endorsement, to be submitted to the Arab governments. The program is to be founded on the following principles:
  - a) Resistance to the Zionist presence and the struggle against the imperialist policy in the region.
  - b) The enlistment of political, economic and military efforts in the struggle against the enemy, and the provision of a program for the establishment of military forces to help regain military parity with the Zionist enemy.
  - c) The concentration of the principle Arab effort and its direction toward confrontation with the Zionist enemy.
  - d) The drawing of a clear-cut position against the policy of the United States of America of providing support and assistance to the Zionist enemy leading to the reinforcement of the Zionist entity and the solidification of its occupation of the Arab lands.
  - e) The presentation, by the parties of the Front, of an economic program to the Arab Summit's preparatory meeting of the Arab Ministers of Economy and Foreign Affairs, with the purpose of using the Arab economy in both passive and active confrontation.
- 4.) To proceed with the action of resisting the Camp David policy and the confrontation of the Zionist and imperialist schemes, and the mobilization of the Arab masses to thrust all their capabilities into the confrontation arena and the enlistment of the energies of all popular organizations, trade unions and associations to confront the Camp David parties and their interests in the region, since the Arab masses are the actual leaders of the national struggle and the main force in the battlefield, and it is they who are targeted by Zionism and imperialism as those who possess genuine interest in liberation, progress and the defeat of all the schemes and conspiracies aimed at the domination of the region.
- 5.) The Conference resolves to support the General People's Congress and condemns all attempts aimed at splitting or infringing upon its unity.
- 6.) The Conference resolves to redefine the economic relations of the Front's parties with European countries if they proceed to play a role on behalf of America in Arab development.
- 7.) The Conference reaffirms its determination on tightening the boycott against the Sadat regime economically, politically, technically and media-wise, and on applying the boycott rules against the Israeli enemy to the Sadat regime, its establishments and institutions, and calls upon the Arab governments to apply the same rules.
- 8.)
  - a) Support of the Palestinian Arab People's resistance in and outside the occupied homeland materially and politically, and the reinforcement of their capabilities in facing the self-administration conspiracy, and resisting the occupation, and support of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the leader of the armed struggle of the Palestinian people and the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people in and outside the occupied homeland.
  - b) The states of the Front commit themselves to dealing with all suspect attempts promoted by imperialism, Zionism and the reactionary elements within the occupied homeland and aimed at infringing upon the unity of the Palestinian people, the unity of its representation and the unity of its leadership through the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- 9.) Standing by the Syrian Arab country in the face of the imperialist Zionist vicious attack it is subjected to since it is considered the main link in the Arab steadfastness, and to take further action to reinforce its resistance in order to restore the strategic balance between itself and the Zionist enemy as an inevitable stage toward liberation and the restoration of national rights.
- 10.) The resistance of any attempt aimed at the encirclement of the Arab position, and the rejection of any settlement of the Palestinian cause based on Security Council Resolution No.242 or any amendment stemming from said resolution.
- 11.) The Conference asserts the right of the Palestinian Revolution to operate on all Arab fronts, and calls upon the government of Jordan to enable the Palestinian Revolution to exercise its role and combative responsibilities against the Zionist enemy across the Jordanian front.

- 12.) Support of the struggle of the Arab people in Egypt to counter the treason of the Sadat regime and the Zionist penetration and support for all the Egyptian Patriotic and Progressive Forces in their national struggle for the liberation of Egypt and its restoration to the Arab Nation.
- 13.) The Conference affirms the unity and Arab character of Lebanon, its independence and sovereignty and honours agreements concluded between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization and also the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conferences and Beit El-Din and support of the principles of Lebanese National reconciliation and appeals to all parties in Lebanon to put them into force.  
It also reaffirms its firm support of Lebanon against the Zionist aggression against the Arab lands and demands of the Arab governments to take joint action to confront this aggression.
- 14.) The Conference resolved to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and calls upon the Arab States to recognize it.
- 15.) The parties of the Front will act on the solidification and promotion of their relations on various areas with the countries of the Socialist bloc, foremost, the Soviet Union, and the development of the formula of these relations in a manner to strengthen the firm and effective resistance against the Camp David Accords and the parties involved. Within this framework the Conference confirms its belief in the principles of non-alignment, and that non-alignment does not mean assuming neutrality in the conflict between the imperialist and Zionist forces on the one hand and the forces of liberation and progress on the other, since it is not possible to place both friend and foe on equal footing.
- 16.) The Conference has resolved that Brother Colonel Muammar Al Qathafi contact the Soviet Union in the name of the Front to explore the possibilities of developing relations between the Soviet Union and the Front in a manner conducive to greater military and political support for the Steadfastness Front, and the restoration of the political and military balance to the region, and also the cementing of relations between the Soviet Union and the Front's States.
- 17.) The Conference reaffirms its solidarity with the Iranian Revolution in its struggle against the plotting of the United States of America and considers any aggressive American measures against it to constitute a grave threat to peace and security in the region and the world.
- 18.) The Conference reaffirms its respect for the determination of Afghanistan to defend its homeland and the security of its territory and its non-alignment.
- 19.) The Conference stresses the importance of the reinforcement of relations with the African States and the consolidation of African-Arab solidarity in the face of the imperialist and Zionist schemes and the racist presence in the African continent and occupied Palestine, and the importance of granting priority in Arab support and assistance to the friendly African States which stand in support of the Palestinian and the Arab rights.
- 20.) The Conference affirms its support and assistance to the legitimate government in Chad, headed by Mr. Goukouni Oueddei which, issued out of the Lagos Agreement, against the colonialist schemes and the parties cooperating with colonialism and demands the evacuation of the colonialist forces whose presence in Chad is considered an obstacle to the achievement of national reconciliation in Chad in accordance with the aforementioned Agreement.
- 21.) The provision of all forms of support and assistance to the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America to accelerate their struggle against imperialism, zionism and racism and for the sake of achieving their goals in freedom, independence and progress.
- 22.) The Conference emphasizes the firm linkage between security in the Mediterranean and security in the Arab region and in this respect confirms its support and backing of the Republic of Malta which, declaring its neutrality, has carried out the evacuation of the colonial forces from its lands.
- 23.) The continuation of action for the reinforcement of Arab solidarity to be more effective in confronting the Zionist enemy and imperialism, and the dedication of the Arab Nation's energies to the battlefield of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and further action to maintain the unity of the Arab position in the face of the great dangers threatening the Arab Nation which are represented in the Camp David Accords, and to appeal to the Arab governments to avoid petty differences and face the chief enemy in occupied Palestine and the other occupied Arab lands.

The Conference resolves further to continue following the developments in both the Arab and international arenas and to stay in contact with the friendly Arab States with the aim of reinforcing the joint Arab action to increase the Arab Nation's capabilities in total confrontation with the Zionist enemy and the Camp David policy.

It was resolved to make further contact with the non-aligned nations, the Socialist bloc countries and the European States to provide the widest international support for the just struggle of the Arab Nation.

The Conference, while renewing its commitment to the Steadfastness and Confrontation policy until the Arab Nation's goals are realized, affirms that the Arab Nation with its moral and material capabilities, its vast masses and its national forces, is capable of facing aggression and conspiracy, and achieving victory, God willing, over all its enemies.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 468 ON THE EXPULSION OF THE  
MAYORS OF HEBRON AND HALHOUL, NEW YORK, 8 MAY 1980**

The Security Council,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention of 1949,

*Deeply concerned* at the expulsion by the Israeli military occupation authorities of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron,

*Calls upon* the Government of Israel as occupying Power to rescind these illegal measures and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders so that they can resume the functions for which they were elected and appointed,

*Requests* the Secretary-General to report upon the implementation of this resolution.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 469 ON THE EXPULSION OF THE  
MAYORS OF HEBRON AND HALHOUL, NEW YORK, 20 MAY 1980**

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the report by the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 468 (1980) of 13 May 1980 (S/13938),

*Recalling* the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and in particular article 1, which reads "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances," and article 49, which reads "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive;"

1. *Strongly deplores* the failure of the Government of Israel to implement Security Council resolution 468 (1980) of 8 May 1980;
2. *Calls again upon* the Government of Israel, as occupying Power, to rescind the illegal measures taken by the Israeli military occupation authorities in expelling the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron, and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders, so that they can resume their functions for which they were elected and appointed;
3. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts and requests him to continue his efforts in order to ensure the immediate implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council on the result of his efforts at the earliest possible date.



**PALESTINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT (FATEH), FOURTH GENERAL CONFERENCE, POLITICAL PROGRAM, DAMASCUS, 31 MAY 1980**

I. AT THE PALESTINIAN LEVEL

*In the light* of the unity of the Palestinian people, and the unity of their territory and their political representation, and in affirmation of their independent national will for continuation and victory of their revolution;

*Inasmuch* as armed popular revolution is the sole and inevitable road to the liberation of Palestine, and inasmuch as the road to liberation is the road to unity; and in confirmation of the principle that democracy governs relations in the Palestinian arena and that democratic dialogue is the proper way to develop these relations, the Conference affirms the following:

1. Ceaseless efforts to consolidate Palestinian national unity at all levels inside and outside the occupied territory under the leadership of our Movement and within the framework of the PLO, so as to ensure the continuing escalation of all forms of Palestinian struggle.
2. The importance of stepping up our Movement's participation-with its proper weight-in the PLO, so as to ensure that it plays an effective role and so as to develop its internal regulations and organs in such a way as to guarantee the independence of all its institutions.
3. The escalation of armed struggle inside the occupied territory and via all lines of confrontation with the Zionist enemy.
4. Increasing concern for the organization of our people wherever they may reside, and expansion of the framework of the activities of popular and professional organizations and federations; protection of our people in their places of temporary residence and defense of them against persecution exploitation or absorption.
5. Support at all levels for the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied territory, and provision of the necessary material support to enable them to maintain their steadfastness, escalate their struggle and develop all their national institutions and, in particular, efforts to strengthen the links with the Palestinian masses in the territories occupied in 1948 to enable them to resist the plan to fragment their unity and suppress their Arab identity.
6. Stress on the necessity of independent Palestinian decision-making, and efforts to develop the ability of all organizations of the Palestinian revolution to abide by the independent Palestinian decision.
7. In conformity with the leading position occupied by our Movement in the PLO, with what the political programme outlines on this subject and with the legitimacy of the PLO in the Arab and international arenas, the resolutions of the PLO's Palestinian National Council currently in force are to be regarded as complementing the Movement's Political Programme, since they do not conflict with the goals and principles of our Movement and its political programmers.
8. Consolidation of the role of the Palestinian woman in all the fields of struggle, and efforts to ensure that she participates effectively in all frameworks and at all levels.

II. AT THE ARAB LEVEL

*A. At the Mass level:*

*Inasmuch* as Palestine is part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people as part of the Arab nation and their struggle part of its struggle, and inasmuch as the Palestinian revolution is the vanguard of the Arab nation in the battle for the liberation of Palestine [the Conference affirms that]:

1. The relationship with the Arab masses is a strategic relation that enjoins more extensive participation by these masses in the protection of the revolution and in the conduct of all forms of struggle against the imperialist Zionist base in Palestine and against all the enemies of our people and our nation, and in the liquidation of imperialist and colonialist interests in the region.
2. There must be closer cohesion with the Arab national liberation movements and the Arab nationalist and progressive forces for the joint battle for the liberation of Palestine, and the achievement of the objectives of the Arab nation in the liberation of its regions and the building of a unified progressive Arab society.

3. [There must be] consolidation of the militant cohesion with the Lebanese national movement and all other nationalist forces that are valiantly fighting in the same trench as the Palestinian revolution against the enemies of the Palestinian and Lebanese people and the Arab nation, and participation with them in the struggle to protect Lebanon's unity, Arab character and territorial integrity. This requires strenuous efforts [both] to eliminate all negative manifestations that threaten relations with the masses, and to consolidate our relations with them by all ways and means.
4. The cohesion of the Lebanese masses with, and heroic support for, the Palestinian revolution in confronting the war of liquidation and annihilation must be safeguarded, supported and developed so that it may become a model for relations with the masses throughout the Arab homeland on the basis of kinship ties, this requires further support with all our energies and resources.
5. The special importance of the Jordanian arena requires that special attention be devoted to its recovery as one of the principal bases of support in the struggle against the Zionist enemy; the energies of the masses must be harnessed for the achievement of this goal.
6. [It is necessary to] reinforce the common struggle with the Egyptian people, represented by their nationalist and progression forces, to abort the Camp David conspiracy and its consequences, and to bring Egypt back into Arab ranks to assume its natural position in the Arab struggle.

*B. At the level of Relations with Arab regimes:*

*Inasmuch* as the aim of relations with the Arab regimes is to develop their positive aspects, these relations must be governed by the following principles:

1. The principles, goals and methods of the Movement.
2. These relations must not conflict with the strategic relations with the masses.
3. The position of each regimes with regard to the cause of Palestine and the armed revolution of its people and, in particular, recognition of and commitment to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and rejection of any attempt from any quarter to prejudice this.
4. No interference in our internal affairs, and confrontation of any attempts to impose tutelage on or to subjugate our people, or to persecute or exploit them, also confrontation of any attempt to settle [our people] in any land other than their homeland, Palestine.
5. Confrontation of any attempt to deny the revolution freedom of action within the ranks of our people, whether they reside.
6. The revolution exercise its responsibilities at the pan-Arab level and via any Arab territory for the sake of [regaining] the occupied Palestine Arab territories, and very effort must be made to mobilize the human and material resources of the Arab nation, in particular its oil wealth, as a weapon for the achievement of this goal.
7. Efforts to develop the Steadfastness and confrontation Front so that it may become a primary instrument of action based on supporting the PLO, continuing the struggle against the Zionist enemy and confronting and thwarting all liquidations solutions; efforts to harden Arab positions with a view to confronting and foiling the settlement in whatever form and under whatever name, and resolute resistance to any attempt to provide the Camp David agreements with a cover of legitimacy.
8. Efforts to create a broad Arab front, as stipulated by the resolutions of steadfastness and Confrontation Front, for the confrontation of all imperialist and Zionist conspiracies, and first and foremost, the Camp David conspiracy in all its forms.

III. AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

*Inasmuch* as the cause of Palestine is the central cause of the Arab nation in its just struggle against the Zionist-imperialist enemy;

*And inasmuch* as the Middle East area is of international strategic importance, the cause of Palestine, in addition to its justice and the struggle of its people, has always had an important international dimension and [has always] been the focus of world conflict that has led to the emergence of two camps: That of the enemies, and that of The friends of the cause and the struggle of our people.

Our Movement is part of the international liberation movement in the common struggle against imperialism, Zionism, racism and their agents, and we establish our alliances with all international parties in conformity with our principles and with the Palestinian National Charter.

*A. International Organizations:*

[The Conference affirms the need for:]

1. Efforts through the PLO to secure the adoption of more comprehensive resolutions on the rights of the Palestinian Arab people in all international forums and organizations - in particular the UN - so as to increase the isolation of the Zionist-American enemy in these organizations and in the international arena.
2. Efforts to embody the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Zionism, as a form of racism and racial discrimination in measures and sanctions against the imperialist and settler Zionist base in Palestine, as stipulated by the UN Charter.
3. Intensification of efforts to maintain the UN positions rejecting the Camp David agreements and to develop these positions to involve the rejection of all forms of settlement reached at the expense of our people and their cause.

*B. Friendly Forces:*

[The Conference affirms the importance of:]

1. Consolidating the strategic alliance with the socialist countries, headed by the USSR, since this alliance is essential for the serious and effective confrontation of American and Zionist conspiracies against the cause of Palestine and liberation causes in the world.
2. Consolidating our relations with the world liberation movements that are fighting in the same trench with us against American imperialism, Zionism, racism, Fascism and reaction; Fatah supports the struggle of all liberation movements and all freedom-fighters against injustice, coercion and tyranny.
3. Consolidating our Movement's external relations and intensifying its political activity on the basis of the Movement's principles and programmes, for the establishment of alliances with democratic and progressive political forces that support our just struggle and our legitimate rights.
4. Consolidating relations with the Islamic revolution in Iran which has swept away the most arrogant fortress of American imperialism in the region, and which supports us in our struggle for the liberation of Palestine.
5. Strengthening relations with the people and governments of the Islamic, African and non-aligned countries, with a view to developing their positions towards greater support of the Palestinian cause and our struggle, and to winning greater recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

*C. The American Position:*

The US heads the enemies of our people and our nation in that it pursues a policy hostile to our people, our revolution and the Arab nation, and to all Arab and international forces of liberation; it supports the Zionist enemy and its agents in the area, and establishes military pacts with the aim of subjecting the area to its military influence so that it may continue to plunder the wealth of our nation. It is, therefore, imperative to consolidate the international front opposed to US policy, to fight against it and abort it, and to strike at American interests in the area.

*D. The Positions of Western Europe (EEC), Japan and Canada:*

1. [The Conference affirms the need to] intensify political activity in these countries and benefit from the support of democratic and progressive political forces in them to reduce and then halt support for the Zionist entity, and achieve its isolation through the recognition by these forces of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and [the need to] achieve maximum political and material support for our cause, our struggle and our national rights.
2. Many of the Western European countries and Canada still pursue a policy that does not recognize the national rights of our people, and they provide support at all levels to the Zionist enemy. They

are following a policy in conformity with that of the US and its schemes in the area, and Japan's policy is not dissimilar. Therefore, efforts must be intensified to resist and thwart any plan or initiative that conflict with the national rights of our people.

In conclusion, the General Conference of our Movement stresses the need to safeguard and consolidate the political gains that have been achieved in the international political arena, and that have kept the cause of Palestine a living cause that enjoys such extensive international support that it is now the vanguard and standard-bearer of the world liberation movement.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 471 ON ATTACKS AGAINST  
WEST BANK MAYORS, NEW YORK, 5 JUNE 1980**

The Security Council,

*Recalling once again* the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), and in particular article 27 which, *inter alia* reads:

*"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons ... They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof,"*

*Reaffirming* the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

*Recalling* also its resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980) of 8 and 20 May 1980,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 465 (1980), by which the Council determined "that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or in any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive just and lasting peace in the Middle East" and strongly deplored the "continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices",

*Shocked* by the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh,

*Deeply concerned* that the Jewish settlers in the occupied Arab territories are allowed to carry arms thus enabling them to perpetrate crimes against the civilian Arab population,

1. *Condemns* the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh and calls for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes;
2. *Expresses deep concern* that Israel, as occupying Power, has failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949);
3. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of these crimes;
4. *Calls again* upon the Government of Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
5. *Calls once again* upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories;
6. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution.



**EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST  
("VENICE DECLARATION"), VENICE, 13 JUNE 1980**

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3. In this regard, the nine countries of the Community base on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community; the right to existence and to security of all the States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground.
6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination.
7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavoring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.
8. The Nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.
9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of the Sinai. They are deeply convinced that Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.
10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.
11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 476 ON JERUSALEM,  
NEW YORK, 30 JUNE 1980**

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the letter of 28 May 1980 from the representative of Pakistan, the current Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as contained in document S/13966 of 28 May 1980,

*Reaffirming* that acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

*Bearing* in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,

*Recalling* the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

*Deploring* the persistence of Israel, in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

*Gravely concerned* over the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with the aim of changing the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Strongly* deplores the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;
3. *Reconfirms* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
4. *Reiterates* that all such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
5. *Urgently calls on* Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by this and previous Security Council resolutions and to desist forthwith from persisting in the policy and measures affecting the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem;
6. *Reaffirms* its determination in the event of non-compliance by Israel with this resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of this resolution.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, STATEMENT REJECTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 476 ON JERUSALEM, JERUSALEM, 1 JULY 1980**

A Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Israel rejects the Security Council resolution of 30 June 1980 on Jerusalem, and does not accept its principles.

This resolution is the most recent of a long series of condemnations by this organization, all of which are basically no more than the result of a hostile approach that completely ignores the realities of the region and the rights of Israel.

The adoption of this resolution jeopardizes the peace efforts that Israel is promoting.

The future of Jerusalem will not be determined by discussions of this nature. United Jerusalem was, is, and will be the capital of sovereign Israel and will never be divided.

The Government of Israel will continue to guarantee free access to all the holy places and freedom of worship to members of all faiths and religions as it has done since the city has been united under its sovereignty.



**US AMBASSADOR DONALD MCHENRY, STATEMENT REGARDING UN SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476 ON JERUSALEM, 1 JULY 1980**

Mr. President, the United States is deeply committed to making practical progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which would permit peoples of all faiths to live at peace in an undivided Jerusalem.

We strongly believe that Jerusalem must become a city of peace - undivided with free access to people of all faiths. We also believe that its status should be determined in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace.

The process of achieving a durable peace requires negotiations among the parties. Only in the give-and-take of negotiations can solutions be worked out with which all parties to an agreement can live in dignity and peace with each other.

In recent weeks and months we have faced in this Council a series of debates on issues related to the Middle East. These debates and the unilateral acts of the parties have the effect if not the intention of undercutting the one active negotiation currently in progress. Progress in any negotiation will be more difficult so long as we are expending our energy in the tread-mill of actions and reactions in the Security Council rather than devoting those energies to a realistic process of negotiation.

The United States, Israel and Egypt are currently engaged in a process of negotiations designed to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations, under the Camp David Accords, are designed to resolve the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects, while fully protecting the security of Israel. This is the first effort in 30 years aimed at resolving some of the most intractable problems that stand in the way of a just and lasting peace. We do not believe resolutions which undermine the negotiating process are consistent with the search for a peaceful settlement to which this Council and its members are committed.

The resolution before us contains a number of deficiencies in its formulations. It does not, for instance, root considerations of the Jerusalem issue in the context of the negotiated peace envisioned in Resolution 242 but rather quotes selectively from that resolution. It contains a provision which affirms the need for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 without any reference to the other central provision of Resolution 242 - Israel's right to secure and recognized boundaries in a just and lasting peace. Resolution 242 in all its parts remains the basis for a comprehensive peace.

What is really needed in a resolution on Jerusalem is a practical method for bringing peace to the people of that city. We must establish the basis for a negotiation to resolve the final status of Jerusalem in the context, of peace. We must find a way to assure in clear and unequivocal terms that the city is not again divided and that people of all faiths have free access to the holy places.

The real challenge to those who seek peace in this holy city is to develop the basis for such a negotiation. In such a negotiation, the issues must be addressed in a more realistic manner than the present resolution's impractical call for rescinding past actions.

At the same time I must note that this resolution contains much which is consistent with the policy of my government because it deplores unilateral acts which have sought to change the character of the city outside a negotiated settlement. The significance of those acts is they are inconsistent not only with international law but, indeed, with the very nature of negotiation, which is essential to peace.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem has been stated consistently by successive American administrations and remains as stated in this Council by Ambassador Goldberg on July 14, 1967, and by Ambassador Yost on July 1, 1969. Beyond that, the policy of the United States is reflected in "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David." It remains the view of the United States that the comprehensive peace envisioned there can only come about when an agreement has been negotiated on the final status of Jerusalem.

We do not intend to be diverted from our course of negotiation by a series of actions and reactions resulting in resolutions in this Council which do not contribute to a negotiated peace. The clearest way for us to indicate that determination is for us to abstain in the vote on the resolution before the Council.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION ES-7/2 ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,  
NEW YORK, 29 JULY 1980**

*[ The core of the resolution linked a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East with Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories including Jerusalem and called for the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including their right "to return to their homes and property", "to self-determination" and "their own independent sovereign state." ]*

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the question of Palestine at an emergency special session,

*Convinced* that the failure to solve this question poses a grave threat to international peace and security,

*Noting* with regret and concern that the Security Council, at its 2220th meeting on 30 April 1980, failed to take a decision, as a result of the negative vote of the United States of America, on the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40 A of 2 December 1977, 33/28 A of 7 December 1978 and 34/65 A of 29 November 1979,

*Having considered* the letter dated 1 July 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

*Having heard* the statement by the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

1. *Recalls and reaffirms* its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions pertinent to the question of Palestine;
2. *Reaffirms*, in particular, that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions, without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine;
3. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property in Palestine, from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return.
4. *Reaffirms* also the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including:
  - (a) The right to self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty;
  - (b) The right to establish its own independent sovereign State;
5. *Reaffirms* the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestine people, to participate on an equal footing in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations;
6. *Reaffirms* the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

7. *Calls upon* Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact, and urges that such withdrawal from all the occupied territories should start before 15 November 1980;
8. *Demands* that Israel should fully comply with provisions of resolution 465 (1980) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 1 March 1980.
9. *Further demands* that Israel should fully comply with all United Nations resolutions relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980;
10. *Expresses* its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their homeland.
11. *Requests and authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 59 to 72 of the report of the Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-first session as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
13. *Requests* the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter;
14. *Decides* to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, ISRAELI BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM,  
CAPITAL OF ISRAEL, KNESSET, 30 JULY 1980**

1. Jerusalem united in its entirety is the capital of Israel.
2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the state, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court.
3. The holy places shall be protected from desecration and any other offense and from anything that is likely to prejudice the freedom of access of the religious communities to the places holy to them.
4. (a) The Government shall attend to the development and prosperity of Jerusalem and to the well-being of its inhabitants by means of allocation of special funds, including a special annual grant to the Jerusalem municipality, subject to the approval of the Economic Committee of the Knesset.  
(b) Jerusalem shall be granted special preferences in the activities of the authorities of the state, for the development of its economy and infrastructure and in other areas.  
(c) The Government shall appoint a special body or bodies for the execution of this clause.



**PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM,  
DAMASCUS, 1 AUGUST 1980**

1. The Israeli measures relating to Jerusalem constitute a flagrant violation of UN resolutions concerning Jerusalem, and represent another link in the long chain of Israeli aggressions against the Palestinian people and their national soil. The move also constitutes an aggression against the Islamic and Christian religions.
2. The issuing of this law in the wake of the resolutions taken by the UN concerning the Palestine question and Jerusalem, the latest of which [was taken] only days before the Israeli law was passed, once more reveals the phenomenon of Zionist settler colonialism as being in absolute contradiction with international law.

3. The responsibility for this Israeli aggression against Jerusalem lies first and foremost on the shoulders of the US, which continues to provide colossal and unconditional material, military and political backing to Israel, thus enabling it to perpetuate its occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories and to continue to defy international resolutions.
4. Jerusalem has been the capital of our homeland, Arab Palestine, since the time it was built by our ancestors the Canaanites. Thus the liberation of Jerusalem from its Zionist occupiers is an issue of destiny for our people, besides being the only means to secure freedom of worship in it for all believers.
5. The PLO Executive Committee, while appreciating the stands of the states which denounced this aggression against Jerusalem, calls on the UN to shoulder its responsibilities and to implement the sanctions mentioned in its Charter.

The PLO Executive Committee finally pledged to continue struggle by all means to liberate the national soil of Palestine, at the heart of which lies the holy city of Jerusalem.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 478 ON JERUSALEM,  
NEW YORK, 20 AUGUST 1980**

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980,

*Reaffirming* again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

*Deeply concerned* over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security,

*Noting* that Israel has not complied with Security Council resolution 476 (1980),

*Reaffirming* its determination to examine practical ways and means, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of non-compliance by Israel,

1. *Censures* in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the "basic law" on Jerusalem and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions;
2. *Affirms* that the enactment of the "basic law" by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;
3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
4. *Affirms* also that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
5. *Decides* not to recognise the "basic law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all Members of the United Nations:
  - (a) to accept this decision;
  - (b) and upon those States that have established diplomatic Missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such Missions from the Holy City;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution before 15 November 1980;
7. *Decides* to remain seized of this serious situation.



**GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE,  
RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN  
MINISTERS ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM, FEZ, 18-20 SEPTEMBER 1980**

The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, meeting in special session, on the recommendation of the Jerusalem Committee, in the City of Fez from 8 to 10 Dhu'l-Qa'ada 1400 A.H. (18 to 20 September 1980), studied the grave situation facing the question of Jerusalem and Palestine as a result of the adoption by the Israeli Knesset of its decision to annex the City of Jerusalem as the "undivided and eternal capital" of the Zionist entity and regarded that decision as an open challenge to the sentiments of Muslims, as an act of aggression directed against the Islamic States and as a confirmation of Israel's refusal to be bound by the recent Security Council resolution 478 declaring null and void all Israeli legislative and administrative measures and actions which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and calling for their rescission forthwith.

Whereas the Islamic States are committed to meet this challenge, intent on the liberation of Jerusalem and resolved to secure Arab Islamic sovereignty over the Holy City; and in affirmation of their support for the people of Palestine, their determination to face up to this Israeli aggression with all the potential and resources at their disposal and their resolve to continue to provide support for the heroic struggle of the people of Palestine until Jerusalem is liberated and the Palestinian people recover their inalienable rights, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent State on their territory; and in keeping with the spirit of Islamic solidarity, the Conference adopted the following resolution:

1. Adoption of the recommendations and resolutions formulated by the Jerusalem Committee at its special meeting held at Casablanca and the commitment of the Islamic States to their implementation.
2. Affirmation of the commitment of the Islamic States to the utilization of all their political, financial, oil and military resources to counter the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem and confirmation that the political and economic boycott will be applied to States which recognize the Israeli decision, contribute to its implementation or establish embassies in Jerusalem.
3. The Conference calls upon all States not to have dealings with the Israeli authorities in any form which might be construed by those authorities as constituting recognition of a *fait accompli* in Jerusalem and the other occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and consequently render them liable to the provisions of the boycott.
4. The Conference welcomes Security Council resolution 478 of 20 August 1980 and calls upon the Council to take the necessary measures for the imposition against Israel of the military and economic sanctions specified in the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The Conference expresses its complete satisfaction at the way in which States have responded by transferring their embassies from Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the invalidity and illegality of the Israeli decision, and notes that the compliance by all States with the call of the Islamic States for the transfer of their embassies from Jerusalem emphasizes the unanimous rejection by the international community of the Israeli action in annexing Jerusalem and making it the capital of their entity.
6. The Conference notes with satisfaction the position adopted by the Federal Government of Switzerland in declining to sign an agreement with Israel in Jerusalem and hopes that all States will follow that example.
7. Affirmation that the Islamic States will assist the Palestine Liberation Organization with every means at their disposal and will provide that Organization with the support needed to face up to the war of aggression which Israel is launching against the Palestinian people in occupied Palestine and South Lebanon with a view to their liquidation and annihilation. The Conference condemns Israeli aggression against South Lebanon and calls upon member States to help the Lebanese Government to stop such acts of aggression.
8. Material and political support for the Palestinian Arab people both within and outside their occupied homeland and the strengthening of their abilities to counter the schemes of the autonomy conspiracy and to resist the occupation and its racist practices.

9. The Conference calls upon States members of the Islamic Conference which previously recognized Israel to withdraw such recognition and to sever all their political and economic relations with Israel.
10. Continued resistance to the procedures and accords formulated at Camp David until they are abandoned and rendered abortive.
11. The Conference emphasizes its condemnation of the policy of the United States of America for the support which it is giving to the Israeli occupation authorities in their settlement practices and in their acts of aggression against Islamic Holy Places in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and for the positions which it has adopted in favour of Israel and against Palestinian rights in international fora in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, with the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Any support for the Zionist entity in its illegal occupation and in its aggression Holy Places, whether openly or secretly, directly or indirectly, represents defiance of the Islamic World.
12. Non-acceptance of any political settlement to resolve the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict while the balance of power is disturbed as a result of the signing of the accords at Camp David and Washington (the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty) and Israeli practices; considering Security Council resolution 242 as incompatible with Arab and Islamic rights and as an inappropriate basis for a solution of the Middle East crisis and, in particular, of the question of Palestine; adherence to the implementation of United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and, in particular, resolution 1 adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh special session and the rejection of any initiatives which are incompatible with those resolutions.
13. The undertaking of political action at the United Nations and with the great Powers, particularly the European Group, with a view to winning more support for the Palestinian cause and increasing the isolation of Israel.
14. Endeavours to obtain the adoption by the General Assembly at its current session of a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding Israeli practices and measures in violation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and regarding the acts of aggression committed by the Israeli authorities against the Palestinian people in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, provided that the procedures for the submission of the request for the advisory opinion shall not prejudice the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and that this shall be done with the approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization, sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
15. Calling upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to decline to accept the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the United Nations on the grounds that it represents a Government which is violating international legality and making Jerusalem its capital.
16. Requesting the great Powers and international organizations to shoulder their responsibilities and to face up to the Israeli challenge by imposing sanctions against Israel in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
17. The Conference calls upon all States to endeavour to prevent Jewish emigration to the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories in view of the Zionist policy of settlement in those territories and Israel's persistence in refusing to recognize the Palestinian people's right to return to their homeland, to exercise their right of self-determination and sovereignty and to establish their independent State on their national soil.
18. Intensification of contacts with the Vatican and Christian bodies with a view to explaining the Islamic position with regard to the recent Israeli decision and calling upon them to support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.
19. The conducting of an extensive information campaign to censure the Israeli decision, and endeavours to implement the information plan to meet the Israeli challenge.
20. Calling upon member States to halt their loans and contributions to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank unless the latter agree to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization as a member with observer status.
21. The establishment of an Islamic Office for the Boycott of Israel to implement the resolutions of the Islamic Conference in this regard, provided that there is co-ordination between that Office and the principle Office for the Boycott of Israel established by the secretariat of the League of Arab States.

22. Coverage of the capital of the Jerusalem Fund and consideration of the Fund as a religious endowment.
23. The Islamic States declare their commitment to a holy "jihad" with all its broad human implications of steadfastness and resistance against the Zionist enemy on all fronts, whether military, political, economic, informational or cultural.
24. Assigning the Jerusalem Committee with the task of preparing a comprehensive plan for the mobilization of all the resources of the Islamic States to counter Israeli aggression, referring the contents of the Palestinian-Syrian working paper concerning economic, military and political issues to that Committee, and the submission of that plan to the forthcoming Islamic Summit Conference due to be held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 35/169E REGARDING  
THE ISRAELI BASIC LAW, NEW YORK, 15 DECEMBER 1980**

The General Assembly,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967,

*Recalling* the resolutions of the Security Council relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 and 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980,

*Reaffirming in mind* the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

*Expressing its satisfaction* at the decision taken by the States which have responded to Security Council resolution 478 (1980) and withdrawn their diplomatic representatives from the Holy City of Jerusalem,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Deploring* the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

*Deeply concerned* over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security,

1. *Censures* in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the "Basic Law" on Jerusalem;
2. *Affirms* that the enactment of the "Basic Law" by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;
3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
4. *Affirms also* that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
5. *Decides* not to recognize that "Basic Law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all States, specialized agencies and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all States, specialized agencies and other international organizations to comply with the present resolution and other relevant resolutions and urges them not to conduct any business which is not in conformity with the provisions of the present resolution and the other relevant resolutions.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 35/207 ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NEW YORK, 16 DECEMBER 1980**

*[The resolution repeated the main points of the previous one, but added the annexation of Jerusalem and Lebanon into its contents.]*

The General Assembly,

*Having discussed* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Taking into account* the support extended to the just causes of the Palestinian people and the other Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli aggression and occupation in order to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as affirmed by previous resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East,

*Deeply concerned* that the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, still remain under illegal Israeli occupation, that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations have not been implemented and that the Palestinian people is still denied the restoration of its land and the exercise of its inalienable national rights in conformity with international law, as reaffirmed by resolutions of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem,

*Reaffirming* further the necessity of establishing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the Charter and the principles of international law,

1. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and renews its call for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all these occupied territories;
2. *Reaffirms* its conviction that the question of Palestine is at the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights;
3. *Reaffirms further* that a just and comprehensive settlement of the situation in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the participation on an equal footing of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;
4. *Declares* once more that peace in the Middle East is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which ensures complete and unconditional withdrawal from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, and enables the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights, including the right of return, and the right to self-determination, national independence and the establishment of its independent State in Palestine under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations relating to the question of Palestine, in particular General Assembly resolutions ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 and 35/169 A of 15 December 1980;
5. *Rejects* all partial agreements and separate treaties which violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradict the principles of just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem to ensure the establishment of a just peace in the area;
6. *Further reaffirms* its strong rejection of Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem, declare it as its "capital" and alter its physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and status, considers all these measures and their consequences null and void, requests that they should be rescinded immediately and calls upon all Member States, specialized agencies and other international organizations to abide by the present resolution and all other relevant resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 35/169 E of 15 December 1980,

7. *Strongly condemns* Israel's aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian people as well as its practices in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, particularly the Syrian Golan Heights, including annexation, the establishment of settlements, assassination attempts and other terrorist, aggressive and repressive measures which are in violation of the Charter and the principles of international law;
8. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a report covering the developments in the Middle East in all their aspects.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 484 ON THE MAYORS OF  
HEBRON AND HALHOUL, NEW YORK, 19 DECEMBER 1980**

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980),

*Taking note* of General Assembly resolution 35/122 F,

*Expresses* its grave concern at the expulsion by Israel of the Mayor of Hebron and the Mayor of Halhoul,

1. *Reaffirms* the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967;
2. *Calls upon* Israel, the occupying Power, to adhere to the provisions of the Convention;
3. *Declares* it imperative that the Mayor of Hebron and the Mayor of Halhoul be enabled to return to their home and resume their responsibilities;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible.



**FINAL DECLARATION AND RESOLUTIONS, THIRD ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE  
("MECCA DECLARATION"), MECCA, 25-28 JANUARY 1981 [EXCERPTS]**

We the Kings, Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

*Assembled* at the Third Islamic Summit Conference (Palestine and Al Quds Session) held in Mecca Al Mukarramah from 19 to 22 Rabi Al Awal 1401 H, corresponding to 25-28 January 1981;

*Bow in gratitude* to Allah, the Almighty, who has, in His Infinite Grace, enabled us to congregate in this Sacred City, in the vicinity of the Holy Ka'bah, venue of Divine Revelation and the Qibla of all Muslims, at the dawn of the new Hijra Century in an assembly which we consider to be a momentous event in the history of the Islamic Ummah and the beginning of an all-embracing Islamic resurgence, demanding of all Muslims to pause and take stock of their past, evaluate their present, and look forward with confidence to a better future in a spirit of Islamic solidarity in order to restore the unity of their ranks, work for their prosperity and advancement, and achieve, once again, an exalted position in the world community and human civilization.

Strict adherence to Islam and Islamic principles and values, as a way of life, constitutes the highest protection for Muslims against the dangers, which confront them. Islam is the only path, which can lead them to strength, dignity and prosperity and a better future. It is the pledge and guarantee of the authenticity of the Ummah safeguarding from the tyrannical onrush of materialism. It is the powerful stimulant for both leaders and peoples in their struggle to liberate their holy places and to regain their

rightful place in this world so that they may, in concert with other nations, strive for the establishment of equality, peace and prosperity for the whole of mankind.

The belief of all Muslims in the eternal principles of liberty, justice, human dignity, fraternity, tolerance and compassion and their constant struggle against injustice and aggression reinforces their determination to establish just peace, and harmony among peoples, to ensure respect for human rights, and to work for the strengthening of international organizations based on humanitarian principles and peaceful co-existence among nations. Thus a new age would dawn wherein relations between nations would be governed by principles and not by force, and wherein all forms of oppression, exploitation, domination, injustice, colonialism and neo-colonialism, as well as all kinds of discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed or sex would be banished forever from this earth.

We declare that only firm adherence to our faith will enable us to retain the strength of our social structures and help our communities to avoid succumbing to the disunity and degradation of the past when many Muslim homelands, particularly Al Quds Al Sharif - the first Qibla and the third holiest shrine of the world of Islam fell prey to foreign domination. History is replete with instances where Muslim communities have fallen victim to injustice and aggression; their intellectual achievements eroded; their share of their own material resources diminished. Indeed the dawn of the century saw the Muslim world confronting dangers and challenges to its independence, security, honour and dignity.

We are saddened to note that despite all its material scientific and technological achievements, mankind today suffers from poverty of the spirit, from moral and ethical decay, and societies are marred by inequities, economies are crippled by severe crises, and international political order is in constant danger of destabilization.

The forces of evils are now on the march, multiplying the hotbeds of war, sowing the seeds of dissensions, threatening the security of the world, man's peace of mind, and jeopardizing human civilization.

We consider that the innate qualities of the Muslim Ummah point the way to unity and solidarity, to progress and advancement, to prosperity and power. It possesses the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon Him), in them can be found a complete way of life leading us, guiding us along the path of goodness, righteousness, and salvation. This is our cultural heritage. It enables us to break the shackles of subservience and mobilize in us the spiritual strength to utilize to the fullest extent our inherent capabilities. It is our sheet anchor for a righteous life.

It is our conviction that the Ummah of 1000 million people, composed of various races, spread over vast areas of the globe and possessing enormous resources, fortified by its spiritual power and utilizing to the full its human and material potential, can achieve an outstanding position in the world and ensure for itself the means of prosperity in order to bring about a better equilibrium for the benefit of all mankind.

We meet today in this August assembly and in this Serene City on this momentous juncture in the annals of Islam, determined to reinforce our solidarity and set in motion the process of our renaissance. To this end, we make the following solemn declaration:

1. All Muslims, differing though they may be, in their language, color, domicile or other conditions, form but one nation, bound together by their common faith, moving in a single direction, drawing on one common faith, cultural heritage, assuming one mission throughout the world. Thus, they stand as a nation of moderation, rejecting alignment to any and all blocs and ideologies, steadfastly refusing to surrender to divisive influences or to conflicts of interests.

We are, therefore, determined to move forward to reinforce our solidarity, to overcome rifts and divisions and to settle in a peaceful manner all disputes that may arise amongst us on the basis of covenants and the principles of brotherhood, unity and inter-dependence and on our belief in the justice and compassion derived from the Holy Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet, which constitute for us the eternal source of justice.

In fulfillment of the aspirations of our peoples, we shall intensify consultations, amongst ourselves and complement and coordinate our endeavors in the international field in order to better defend our common causes and thus to enhance our prestige and position in the world.

We are equally determined to engage in Jihad with all the means at our disposal to liberate our occupied territories, to support one another in defending our independence and territorial integrity, in vindicating our rights and in eliminating the injustice wreaked on our nation, depending on our own strength and firm solidarity.

2. Conscious that Muslims today are victims of innumerable injustices and are faced with multiple dangers due to the reign of force and aggression and the politics of violence in international behavior; Conscious also of the fact that Islam enjoins justice and equity both for its followers and others and it also enjoins tolerance and magnanimity towards those who do not combat us, do not force us to leave our homes, do not violate our sacred values and who never take the side of wrong doing, injustice or oppression;

We reaffirm our unflinching resolve to combat the Zionist usurpation by force of arms of Palestinian lands and other Arab territories and to frustrate all Zionist designs and actions in this regard. We condemn and reject the policies of those who assist this aggression by giving the Zionist entity political, economic, demographic and military support. We equally reject all initiatives that are not consistent with the Palestinian choice which calls for a just solution of the Palestinian question based on the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people including their right to return to their homeland, their right to self-determination including the right to establish an independent Palestinian State in their homeland under the leadership of Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We also reject all attempts to exert pressure on us or on other countries of the world to accept a fait accompli and to surrender to unjust solutions. We affirm our resolve to confront this aggression and pressure with all the means at our disposal to prepare ourselves for Jihad in order to liberate the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the holy places and to recover the incontrovertible rights of the Palestinian people as recognized by International Law and the UN. Resolutions relating to the question of Palestine.

The violations committed against the Haram of Al Quds Al Sharif, the aggression perpetrated against the people of Palestine and their established national and religious rights, and the continuation of aggression through the annexation of Al Quds Al Sharif leave us no choice but to firmly stand up to this aggression and to denounce its supporter. We therefore pledge to wage jihad with all the means at our disposal for the liberation of Al Quds and the occupied territories. We shall make this liberation struggle the prime Islamic cause of this generation until God willing Al Quds Al Sharif and all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories are restored to their legitimate owners.

Faced with the open invasion of the territory of Afghanistan, a Sovereign Muslim State and the violation of the right of Afghan people to freedom and self-determination and their right to preserve their Islamic identity, we are determined to continue to support the struggle of the people of Afghanistan and to feel deeply concerned over the situation created by the foreign military intervention in Afghanistan.

We reaffirm our determination to seek a political solution of this crisis, on the basis of an immediate and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, respect for political independence and territorial integrity, as well as the non-aligned nature of Afghanistan. and respect for the inalienable rights of the heroic Afghan people to self determination without any foreign intervention or pressure.

We declare our full solidarity with the people of Afghanistan, who are engaged in a Jihad to attain their freedom and independence.

3. Taking note of the present state of international relations, which are characterized by the evils of bigotry and racism, dominated by the rule of force and the arms race, by greed and injustice, colonialism and exploitation of weak nations, factors which threaten our civilization and disturb social and material equilibrium of the world; desirous of seeing that the forces of good throughout the world establish the human values of fraternity, humility and justice; we call upon all states and peoples of the world to re-build it anew, through sincere and concerted efforts, so that peace may prevail and conflicts and wars may be avoided. We call for the disputes to be settled peacefully, and for relations to be conducted constructively, for man's capacities to be harnessed in the service of humanity, instead of being

wasted in a race for the acquisition of armaments and of weapons of death and destruction. Should this come to pass, justice would prevail and human relations would be established on the basis of equality and fraternity, benevolence and compassion, and not on the basis of discrimination and injustice. Thus, would the oppressed peoples of the earth be liberated; thus would they avoid the mischief of warmongers; thus would mankind be blessed with peace, and basic human rights be once again triumphant. We express our deep concern over the increasing rivalry between the Superpowers, their competition for spheres of influence and their increasing endeavors to intensify their military presence in the areas near and adjacent to the states of the Islamic world, such as the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf.

We affirm our common conviction that the peace and stability of the Gulf and the Security of its Sea-lanes, is the exclusive responsibility of the Gulf States without any foreign interference.

The persecution of Muslim minorities and communities in many parts of the world constitutes a violation of human rights and is contrary to the dignity of man. We call upon all countries which have Muslim minorities to enable them to perform their religious rites in full freedom and to extend to them equal rights as citizens protected by the State in accordance with the sanctity of law.

We resolutely support and call others to support, the United Nations' Organization and all other inter-Governmental institutions, which provide a suitable framework for cooperation, an important platform for dialogue and understanding, and an instrument for settling disputes and resolving crises. We strongly denounce any tendency to impose tutelage on and obstruct the activity of the UN. We condemn Israel and the States, which systematically violate the principles of the UN Charter. We confirm our loyalty to the principles and aims of non-alignment and support the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, and our full solidarity with the countries of the Third World.

4. Convinced of the need of our people to adhere strictly to their faith and to rely on their heritage in the building up of a society committed to faith, justice and morality, we confirm our determination to be guided by the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet in shaping our lives and our societies and in strengthening our relations with peoples and countries of the world. In this, we proceed from the belief that this is the best guarantee for the triumph of truth and virtue and for the establishment of justice and peace it is also the surest path to dignity, prosperity and security for the Islamic Ummah.

We reiterate our desire to establish the practice of "Shura" (consultation) among all Muslims, to normalize this principle in all walks of life, in order that the doing of good deeds may be promoted and wrongdoing eliminated. Thus would solidarity be implanted in the collective conscience and people would participate in the running of their affairs putting an end to dissension and discord. We shall make every effort to facilitate contacts between individual Muslims and between specialized institutions in order to provide opportunities for continuous consultation. Inspired by the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, which are a basic source of guidance, in this regard we affirm our determination to protect human rights and dignity. We like-wise affirm our determination to ensure the rights, freedoms and basic needs of mankind.

We shall endeavor, to this end, to establish the basis and the means for the protection of rights and sacred values, for the removal of injustices for the triumph of all people struggling to achieve independence, freedom and justice and for the upholding of the principles of justice and dignity whenever they are violated, including Palestine and South Africa.

5. Aware of our common interests, we declare our determination to eliminate poverty from which some of our peoples continue to suffer, by consolidating our economic cooperation on the basis of complementarity and pooling of our resources to achieve coordinated development of our countries, we also declare our resolve in a spirit of Islamic solidarity, to promote economic development of the countries which are least developed amongst us. We further pronounce our resolve to rationalize our development policies in order to ensure balanced progress in both the material and spiritual domains.

We call for efforts to be made to establish economic relations in the world on bases of justice, interdependence and mutual interest, to ensure the disappearance of the wide gap separating the industrialized countries and the developing and poor countries, and the institution of a new economic order based on equity and solidarity, under which development policies are rationalized and integrated to eliminate, once and for all, famine and its dangers, as well as all kinds of deprivation and all forms of exploitation

of peoples suffering under the effects of colonialism and backwardness and to ensure the development of these countries and the proper utilization of their resources. We reaffirm the right of States to have sovereignty over their natural resources and to control their exploitation.

6. Believing the tenets of Islam which preach that the quest of knowledge is an obligation on all Muslims we declare ourselves determined to cooperate in spreading education more widely and strengthening educational institutions until ignorance and illiteracy have been eradicated and to take measures aimed towards the strengthening of Islamic educational curricula and to encourage research and Ijtihad among Muslim thinkers and Ulema while expanding the studies of modern sciences and technologies.

We also pledge ourselves to coordinate our efforts in the field of education and culture, so that we may draw on our religious and traditional sources in order to unite the Ummah consolidate its culture and strengthen its solidarity, cleanse our societies of the manifestations of moral laxity and deviation by inculcating moral virtues, protecting our youth from ignorance and from exploitation of the material needs of some Muslims to alienate them from their religion.

Believing in the need to propagate the principles of Islam and the spread of its culture, glory throughout the Islamic societies and in the world as a whole and to emphasize its rich heritage, its spiritual strength, moral values and laws conducive to progress, justice and prosperity, we are determined to cooperate to provide the human and material means to achieve these objectives. We also pledge to exert further efforts in various cultural fields to achieve rapprochement in the thinking of Muslims and to purify Islamic thought of all that may be alien or divisive.

We further pledge ourselves, within a framework of cooperation and a joint program to develop our mass-media and information institutions, guided in this effort by the precepts and teachings of Islam, in order to ensure that these media and institutions will have an effective role in reforming society, in a manner that helps in the establishment of an international information order characterized by justice, impartiality and morality, so that our nation may be able to show to the world its true qualities, and refute the systematic media campaigns aimed at isolating, misleading, slandering and defaming our nation.

7. Recalling with satisfaction the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and noting with pleasure the progressive development of this Organization, as well as its growing status in international fora as symbol of the unity of Muslims and a framework of understanding and rapprochement among them, and noting also the establishment of other institutions emanating from the Organization, and the continuation of joint efforts in this direction, we commit ourselves to support and develop our Organization, and to provide it with appropriate skills and adequate resources, so that it may discharge the noble tasks assigned to it, and further to support the Islamic Solidarity Fund and Al Quds Fund as well as other organs and projects of the Organization to ensure their success.

We jointly pledge to support all international and inter-governmental Islamic bodies and institutions which conform to the objectives of our Organization for the purpose of strengthening the bonds of brotherhood between Muslims, intensifying their cooperation in various fields and reinforcing their international role. We also jointly pledge to support non-official Islamic bodies and institutions, which serve the purposes and principles of the Charter of our Organization in a manner that is not contrary to the legislation of the Member States.

We appeal to our peoples to hold fast to the teachings and cultural values of our religion, to unify their forces so as to face the challenges that confront them and to support one another in improving their conditions and achieving strength, dignity and prosperity.

We appeal to all other States and peoples to reciprocate the sentiments of the States' Members of the OIC and their peoples in a sincere spirit of human brotherhood. Let us banish all hatred, injustice and oppression so that we may together build a world fit for mankind and so that we may enhance the level of our spiritual and material life

We pray to God to set us on the right path, to crown our efforts with success, and to lead us to a righteous life.

"Allah hath promised such of you as believe and do good works that He will surely make them to succeed (the present rulers) in the earth even as He caused those who were before them to succeed (others); and that He will surely establish for them their religion which He hath approved for them, and will give them in exchange safety after their fear. They serve me. They ascribe no thing as partner unto me. Those who disbelieve henceforth, they are the miscreants". SURAH XXIV "LIGHT" Versus 55

#### FINAL DECLARATION

1. At the kind invitation of His Majesty King Khalid Bin ABDUL AZIZ, Monarch of the Kingdom of SAUDI ARABIA and pursuant to the Resolution adopted by the Tenth Islamic Conference held in Fez, Kingdom of MOROCCO, from 10-14 Jumada Al Thani 1399 H., corresponding to 8-12 May 1979 A.D.;
2. The Third Islamic Summit Conference was held in MECCA AL MUKARRAMAH, Kingdom of SAUDI ARABIA from 19-22 Rabi Al Awal 1401 H., corresponding to 25-28 January 1981, under the title of "PALESTINE AND AL QUDS AL SHARIF SESSION"
3. The Conference was attended by the Kings, Heads of State and Emirs of the following Islamic States: People's Democratic Republic of ALGERIA, The State of BAHRAIN, People's Republic of BANGLADESH United Republic of CAMEROON, Republic Of DJIBOUTI, United Arab EMIRATES, Republic of GABON, Republic of the GAMBIA, People's Revolutionary Republic of GUINEA, Republic of GUINEA-BISSAU, Republic of UPPER VOLTA, Islamic Federal Republic of COMORO, Republic of INDONESIA, Republic of IRAQ, Hashemite Kingdom of JORDAN, The State of KUWAIT, Republic of LEBANON, MALAYSIA, The MALDIVES, Republic of MALI, Islamic Republic of MAURITANIA, Kingdom of MOROCCO, Republic of NIGER, The Sultanate of OMAN, Republic of UGANDA, Islamic Republic of PAKISTAN, The State of QATAR, Kingdom of SAUDI ARABIA, PALESTINE, Republic of SENEGAL, Democratic Republic of SUDAN, SYRIAN Arab Republic, Republic of CHAD, Democratic Republic of SOMALIA, Republic of TUNISIA, Republic of TURKEY, YEMEN Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of YEMEN. [...]
14. The Conference has adopted a number of resolutions including:

#### IN THE POLITICAL FIELD

##### A. AL QUDS AL SHARIF: BASIC PROGRAM OF ACTION TO CONFRONT THE ZIONIST ENEMY.

1. The Conference confirmed its commitment to liberate Arab JERUSALEM to make it the capital of PALESTINIAN STATE, and invited all states to observe the United Nations' resolutions which ban dealing with the Israeli occupation authorities in a manner that might be invoked by these authorities as implicit recognition or acceptance of the STATUS QUO imposed by them in declaring JERUSALEM the united capital of the "Zionist entity".
2. The Conference also decided to utilize all economic capacities and natural resources of Islamic States to undermine the Israeli economy, to block the flow of financial, economic and political support to Israel, to seek to change international political positions in favor of the Palestinian people, and to support the Palestine Liberation Organization.

##### B. THE ISSUE OF PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Conference decides to consider the issue of Palestine as the essence of the Middle East problem which is the first question facing the Muslim nation. The Conference affirms the commitment to the liberation of all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the rejection of any situation that may prejudice Arab sovereignty over AL QUDS AL SHARIF, the inadmissibility of reacting any unilateral solution to the issue of PALESTINE or the issue of the occupied Arab territories by any one party of the Arab and Islamic parties.

2. The Conference stressed that just peace in the Middle East can only be achieved on the basis of complete and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and on the recovery of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self determination and to the establishment of their independent State on the soil of Palestine under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
3. The Conference decides to continue the resistance to the Camp David Accord and to consider the Security Council resolution 242 as inconsistent with the Palestine.
4. The Conference decided to support the LEBANESE GOVERNMENT in all international fields with a view to exerting the utmost possible pressure on the Israeli enemy to induce it to cease its attacks on South Lebanon and bring about Israeli withdrawal from it. The Conference also appealed to Member States, particularly those concerned to lay down a comprehensive integral strategy defining a role for each State in its struggle against Israel and which should be binding on each State, and Arab right and that it does not constitute a sound basis for a solution to the Middle East crisis and the issue of Palestine.
5. The Conference decides that Islamic States are committed to utilize all their military political and economic capacities and natural resources, including oil, as an effective instrument to support the national inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and to confront those States that provide the Zionist entity with military economic and political support.
6. The Conference invited Member States of the European Economic Community to honor their pledge not to extend the application of their bilateral and multilateral economic agreements with Israel to the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. [...]

#### F. HOLY JIHAD

1. The Kings, Emirs, and Heads of State of Islamic countries have agreed to declare holy Jihad for salvaging AL QUDS AL SHARIF, supporting the Palestinian people and bringing about Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. In their resolve to launch JIHAD, the Islamic states have made it clear that JIHAD has its Islamic concept that permits no misinterpretations or misunderstandings. They have also agreed that the practical measures to put JIHAD into effect would be taken in accordance with the Islamic concept of JIHAD and in continuous consultation among themselves. [...]

#### RESOLUTION NO. 2/3-P(IS) ON THE CAUSE OF PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Third Islamic Summit Conference (Palestine and Al Quds Session) meeting in Mecca Al Mukarramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from 29th to 22nd Rabi Al Awal 1401 H. (25-28 January 1981)

*Proceeding* from the principles and objectives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the principles and objectives of the United Nations' Charter,

*Guided by* the resolutions of the two Islamic Summit Conferences, the first in Rabat and the second in Lahore and those of the Foreign Ministers on the Palestine Question, AL- QUDS AL-SHARIF and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories,

*Reaffirming* the link between the destiny of Islamic States and their commitment to the aims of their joint struggle for peace, justice and progress and against colonialism, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, Zionism and racism.

*Seriously concerned* over the deteriorating situation in the Middle East which could result in a new war thus endangering international peace and security, in view of Israel's persistence in its aggressive, colonialist and racist policy, and as a result of the collusion with the Egyptian regime and the United States,

*Reaffirming* that the Palestine Question is the core of the struggle against Zionism, and that Israel's continued refusal to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and its flouting of the inalienable national rights of the Arab Palestinian people constitute a flagrant violation of the principles of the Islamic Conference Organization and UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the principles of International Law,

*Noting with great concern* the recent developments of the Middle East problem and the Palestine Question in the region, particularly the normalization by the Egyptian regime of its relations with the

Zionist entity and its persistence in carrying out the autonomy conspiracy and the dangers that ensue therefrom which imperil Islamic principles, values, heritage, culture and civilization,

*Considering* that the Liberation of Al Quds and its restoration to Arab sovereignty as well as the liberation of the holy places from Zionist occupation, are a pre-requisite to the Jihad that all Islamic States must wage, each according to its means,

*Convinced* that time has come to apply the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, against Israel, since it is persistently violating the principles of the Charter, refusing to implement the resolutions of the International Organizations and pursuing its aggression against the Arab States and the Palestinian people.

*Convinced* that the Islamic States should take firm and practical measures to counter the Zionist enemy's continued aggression and violations,

1. *Reaffirms* that the problem of the Middle East and the Palestine Cause cannot be solved unless the following principles and conditions are implemented concurrently, without any exception and also reaffirms its commitment to these principles and conditions,
    - a.. The cause of Palestine is the core of the Middle East problem and the crux of the Arab-Israeli struggle;
    - b. The Palestine Cause and the Middle East problem form an indivisible whole when dealing with the problem, or seeking a solution thereto hence any solution may not be a partial solution, concern some parties to the exclusion of others; or relate to some of the causes and not to others; nor can any partial peace be attained, for peace should be comprehensive and include all parties to the dispute, and should moreover, eliminate all the causes that led to it, in addition to being a just one;
    - c. A just peace in the region can only be achieved on the basis of total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, and on the recovery by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights including:
      - i. their right to their homeland, Palestine;
      - ii. their right to return to their homeland and recover their property in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolutions;
      - iii. their right to self-Determination without any foreign interference;
      - iv. their right to freely exercise sovereignty over their land and natural resources;
      - v. their right to establish their national independent State in Palestine under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
  2. That Al-Quds is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory, and Israel must unconditionally and totally withdraw from it, and it should be restored to Arab sovereignty;
  3. That the PLO. is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and it, above all, is fully entitled to represent that people and to participate independently and on an equal footing in all Conferences, activities and international fora connected with the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a view to achieving the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. No solution can be comprehensive, just and acceptable unless the PLO participates in its formulation and accepts it as an independent party and on an equal footing and parity with the rest of the parties concerned. No other party is entitled to claim the right to represent or negotiate on the question of Palestine, its people, its territory and its rights, otherwise it shall be considered null and void and by no means legally binding;
  4. That Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) is not in keeping with the Palestinian and Arab rights and does not constitute a sound basis for the solution of the Middle East problem and the Palestine Question;
  5. That no Arab party concerned should unilaterally seek a solution to the PALESTINE Question or to the Arab-Zionist conflict, that resistance to the Camp David Accords, should be pursued, their consequences, effects or any initiative emanating therefrom voided, moreover, material and moral assistance should be extended to the Arab Palestinian People in the occupied Palestinian territories, and their resistance against the autonomy conspiracy reinforced;
1. *Reaffirms* that any solution that is not founded on all those principles and conditions can never lead to a just peace but, on the contrary, can only exacerbate tensions in the region and pave the way for

the policies applied by the parties to the Camp David Accords to liquidate the question of Palestine and help Israel achieve its objectives and expansionist, colonialist and racist policies. It would, moreover, encourage bilateral and partial solutions while disregarding the essence of the problem;

2. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization to struggle militarily, politically and, by any other means, to liberate their occupied territories, secure the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and foil by all means possible any solution or settlement which is detrimental to such territories and rights;
3. *Reaffirms* that the support of Islamic States to the Arab States with a view to enabling the latter to liberate their territories, and their support to the Palestinian people to help them restore their inalienable national rights, are both a responsibility and an obligation dictated by the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Islamic Conference Organization. The Conference also affirms that such support should be clearly expressed in practical and effective measures and positions on the part of all Member States;
4. *Reaffirms* its full and effective support to the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their legitimate and sole representative inside and outside the occupied homeland, with a view to liberating it, restoring their inalienable national rights in Palestine. All Member States shall commit themselves to safeguarding Palestinian unity, the independent character of Palestine Liberation Organization and non-interference in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

*Affirms:*

- a. The commitment of Islamic States to liberate AL QUDS to become the capital of the independent Palestinian State, and to reject any situation which might infringe on the Arab right to full sovereignty over AL QUDS.
- b. The commitment of all Islamic States to use all their means to foil the Israeli decision to annex AL QUDS and make it the capital of the Israeli entity, and decides to apply a political and economic boycott against those States which recognize this Israeli decision or participate in its implementation or establish their Embassies in ALQUDS AL SHARIF:
  1. *Calls upon* all countries throughout the world to abide by the United Nations resolutions by refraining from dealing with the Israeli occupation authorities and from any kind of relations: that could be construed by Israel as a de facto recognition of its declaration that AL QUDS has been the eternal and unified capital of the Israeli entity. It particularly calls upon all countries to refrain from:
    - A. Signing any agreements in AL QUDS;
    - B. Making official visits to AL QUDS;
    - C. Conducting official talks in AL QUDS;
    - D. Presenting the Credentials of Heads of Diplomatic missions in AL QUDS:
  2. *Calls upon* member states to psychologically mobilize their people for JIHAD to liberate AL QUDS, through their official, non-official and otherwise mass media:
  3. *Emphasizes* that any infringement on the resolutions of the Islamic Conference Organization on the Middle East problem and the cause of Palestine and AL QUDS will weaken the struggle waged to liberate AL QUDS and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and secure the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, undermine the struggle of the Organization against colonialism, foreign occupation, racism and Zionism and will be a reneging by Member States on their determination to put an end to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories and assist the Palestinian people to achieve their inalienable national rights;
  4. *Reaffirms* its rejection and condemnation of the Camp David Accords signed on 17.9.1978, and the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty signed on 26.3.1979, and all the consequences and efforts ensuing therefrom and asks that they be resisted by all means and methods:
  5. *Strongly condemns* any partial or separate solution and any agreement detrimental to the rights of the Arab nation and, the Palestinian people that would violate the principles and resolutions of the Islamic Conference Organization and the UNO, or that could impede the

- liberation of AL QUDS and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories or prevent the Palestinian people, from securing and fully exercising their inalienable national rights;
6. *Condemns* the collusion between the Egyptian Regime, Israel and the United States in all fields and deems it a direct aggression against the right of the Palestinian people, their homeland and future, and a serious threat to the security and stability of Arab and Islamic States, and decides to support the suspension of its membership to the Non-aligned Movement;
  7. *Strongly condemns* the Egyptian government for proceeding to normalize relations with the Zionist entity and considers it a denial of the principles of JIHAD and a danger to Islamic principles, ideals, heritage, culture and civilization; and decides to suspend Egypt's membership in the Non-alignment Movement.
  8. *Strongly condemns* the USA's persistence in its inimical attitude towards the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, and total withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Al Quds, which constitutes a violation of the principles and objectives of the UN Charter and of the resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine and the Middle East, and impedes the establishment of a just peace in the region; the Conference also condemns the policies the United States of America seeks to impose on the region at the expense of the liberation of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including AL QUDS and at the expense of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. The Conference also condemns the continuous and increasing support of the United States to Israel in all fields, particularly the military and political fields; affirms that the UNITED STATES' persistence in these policies are detrimental to its relations with the interests in Muslim States;
  9. *Strongly condemns* Israel for pursuing its policies and practices in Al Quds and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, particularly its annexation policies and the establishment of Israeli settlements, bringing in alien settlers, demolishing houses, seizing and confiscating property and land, evicting the lawful inhabitants deporting, expelling, despoiling, exiling, transferring and rejecting them; in addition to their liquidation on a mass scale denying them the right to return, their massive detention and wholesale torture, the obliteration of national, archaeological, spiritual and cultural landmarks; violating the liberties and preventing the exercise of rights and religious rites; disregarding the laws relating to personal status, illegally exploiting the heritage and natural and human resources of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and their inhabitants; and considers such practices and measures, void and illegitimate;
  10. *Condemns israel* for refusing to abide by Security Council resolution 446 (1979), 452 (1979) and 465 (1980) in which the Council emphasized that all measures taken by Israel to change the characteristics of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including AL QUDS, are illegal, denounced Israel's policy and practice in establishing settlements, and stressed the need to cancel these measures and remove the existing settlements, and abstain from setting up others;
  11. *Declares* that such Israeli policies and practices constitute a dangerous violation of the UN Charter, in particular the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles and provisions of international law, UN resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in times of war. Such policies and practices constitute a major impediment to the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East;
  12. *Calls upon* all the States and Peoples of the world to refrain from extending military, manpower, material or moral support to Israel likely to encourage it in perpetuating its occupation of Al Quds and the Palestinian and Arab territories, and declares that such a continued support to Israel will compel Islamic States to take appropriate stands against them;
  13. *Deplores* the attitude of these states that provide assistance and arms to Israel and considers that the real purpose of flooding Israel with this great quantity of weapons of war and destruction, is to establish it as a colonialist and racist base in the third world, in general, and in Africa and Asia in particular;

14. *Condemns* the collusion between Israel and South Africa and their identical policies of aggression and racism, and condemns, as well, cooperation between them in all fields since it threatens the security and independence of Africa and Arab States;
15. *Invites* member states which had recognized Israel to withdraw such recognition and sever all kinds of diplomatic, consular, economic cultural sports and touristic relations, as well as all forms of communication with Israel at all levels official or otherwise, and requests the member states that have not yet severed such relations to do so;
16. *Calls upon* member states to take all measures within the United Nations to:
  - A. Request the UN. General Assembly to refuse the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly, as it represents an authority which aggressed against international legitimacy, and which made Al Quds its capital, and request the General Secretariat to take all necessary measures in this respect;
  - B. Request the member States of the United Nations and its specialized institutions to assume their responsibility and face up the continued rejection by Israel of United Nations' resolutions, by applying appropriate penalties against Israel, in implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN-Charter, and request the General Secretariat to take the necessary measures in this regard;
17. *Reaffirms* the right of the Palestinian people as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab states, whose territories are under Israeli occupation to total, permanent and actual sovereignty and full control over their natural and other resources, economic riches and activities. It also reaffirms their right to recover them and to receive full compensation for all damages incurred through exploitation, depletion or loss of such resources;
18. *Decides* to have recourse to all Islamic states economic, potential and natural resources in a studied and planned manner with a view to:
  - A. Weakening Israeli economy;
  - B. Stopping the political, economic and financial assistance received by Israel;
  - C. Bringing about political stands by countries in favor of the Palestinian Question with a view to enabling the Palestinian people recover their national inalienable rights;
  - D. Endeavoring to turn national stands at the international level into friendly ones, and antagonistic or inimical stands into neutral or friendly ones;
19. *Calls upon* the Member States of the European Economic Community to fulfill their undertakings to the effect that their bilateral and multilateral agreements with Israel shall not be applied in the Palestinian and Arab occupied territories and endeavor to secure such a stand from other states that have similar agreements with Israel;
20. *Invites* states to pay up the capital of Al Quds Fund, and its Waqf in order to enhance the struggle and resistance of the Palestinian people;
21. *Calls upon* member states not to tolerate legislations enacted by the United States of America and other countries with a view to countering the Arab boycott, and to secure a strict implementation of the boycott against Israel; stress its legitimacy and urge other states to adopt similar regulations.



**SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV, POSITION ON PEACE, ADDRESS BEFORE  
THE 26<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MOSCOW, 23 FEBRUARY 1981  
[EXCERPTS]**

Now about the Middle East problem. In its bid for dominance in the Middle East, the United States has taken the path of the Camp David policy, dividing the Arab world and organizing a separate deal between Israel and Egypt. US diplomacy has failed to turn this separate anti-Arab deal into a broader agreement of capitulationist type. But it has succeeded in another way: A new deterioration of the situation has occurred in the region. A Middle East settlement was cast back.

What now? As we see it, it is high time to get matters off the ground. It is time to go back to an honest collective search for an all-embracing just and realistic settlement. In the circumstances, this could be done, say, in the framework of a specially convened international conference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to participate in such work in a constructive spirit and with good will. We are prepared to do so jointly with the other interested parties - the Arabs (naturally including the Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel. We are prepared for such a search jointly with the United States - and I may remind you that we had some experience in this regard some years ago. We are prepared to cooperate with the European countries and with all those who are showing a sincere striving to secure a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The UN, too, could evidently continue to play a useful role in all this. - As for the substance of the matter, we are still convinced that if there is to be real peace in the Middle East, the Israeli occupation of all Arab territories captured in 1967 must be ended. The inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be secured, up to and including the establishment of their own state. It is essential to ensure the security and sovereignty of all the states of the region, including those of Israel. Those are the basic principles. As for the details, they could naturally be considered at the negotiations.



#### **PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, POLITICAL STATEMENT, 15<sup>TH</sup> SESSION, DAMASCUS, 21 APRIL 1981**

The Palestine National Council [PNC] held its 15th session in Damascus, the capital of the Arab Republic of Syria, from 11-16 April 1981. His Excellency President Hafiz al-Assad, the president of the Syrian Republic, inaugurated the session with a speech in which he affirmed the cohesion of the Arab Syrian people with the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine and Syria's commitment to wage a struggle to liberate Palestine. President al-Assad pointed out the uniqueness of the Palestinian revolution in the Arab struggle movement and expressed Syria's intention to continue its support for the PLO in its confrontation with the Zionist-imperialist aggression and the Camp David designs and its signatories.

Ninety-two delegations representing Arab fraternal countries as well as friendly countries participated in the conference. Also attending were delegations from national liberation movements and from political organizations of a number of countries. These delegations delivered speeches expressing their countries' support for the Arab Palestinian people's struggle and its just cause. Also attending were a large number of observers representing the Palestinian people from various areas of their residence who are contributing to various spheres of the struggle; those observers interacted with the activities of the conference.

This session was convened at a time when the Palestinian struggle was waging an escalating struggle under the leadership of the PLO in various arenas inside and outside Palestine's soil in order to confront the imperialist-colonialist-Zionist aggression and to pursue its march along the path of liberation and return [to the homeland].

This aggression has been embodied by many forms represented by daily attacks that are being carried out by the Zionist enemy forces by land, sea and air against southern Lebanon and in which these forces are using the most deadly U.S. arms. This aggression is also embodied in the policies of persecution, despotism and settlement being practiced by the Zionist occupation in the Palestinian people's homeland. Another form of this aggression is represented by U.S. attempts to impose its domination and control over the Arab nation and the areas surrounding it by various means, foremost among which is the establishment of military bases and the call to sign pacts while brandishing the so-called Soviet threat.

The PNC conducted its activities in a democratic atmosphere, an atmosphere which the Palestinian people are very keen on and which the PLO adheres to and which the Palestinian revolution takes pride in.

The council debated the political and financial reports that were submitted by the Executive Committee and studied, by means of its committee, the various dimensions of the current situation in the Palestinian, Arab and international arenas. The PNC committee adopted the necessary organizational, military, political and financial resolutions with regard to various issues.

The PNC affirmed the organizational and political programs adopted on its previous session, the democratic bases and the collective leadership in various levels related to the PLO's activities and its bodies. The PNC also affirmed the need to have the PLO's offices and organizations exercise their full powers and establish specialized supreme councils on factional bases in order to draw up plans for the PLO's institutions in the military, information and financial spheres and to supervise their implementation.

The council expressed the need to work for completing national unity through the participation of the revolutionary squads and all the Palestinian national forces in all the institutions and in the various popular national organizations - inasmuch as this will constitute the basis for unifying the people's efforts. The council also called for developing the unified military activities under the responsibility of the Supreme Military Council and the Executive Committee in order to ensure the proper confrontation of the current perilous circumstances and as a step along the road to full military union.

The council stressed the importance of establishing consultative committees which will interact with the organization's offices wherever they may be and wherever Palestinian communities and aggregations exist.

The PNC also approved the proposal to declare a general military mobilization that will include the various sectors of our people in their places of congregation outside the occupied homeland. The council also called on the Arab and friendly countries to facilitate the implementation of the above and to enable the Palestinians residing in their countries to join the Palestinian revolutionary forces.

The council affirmed that the only alternative for resolving the Palestinian problem is the Palestinian alternative. The council rejected and denounced those alternative solutions proposed for solving the Palestinian problem by the imperialist-Zionist and those worked out by agents.

The PNC also affirmed that no country has the right to allege that it represents the Palestinian people or to negotiate the Palestinian problems - whether this refers to the Palestinian soil, people or rights. Anyone who violates this is taking a decision that is null and void and has no legal standing. The PLO alone has the right to choose the just and overall solution that will fully ensure the Palestinian people's firm national rights.

The council affirmed that the occupied city of Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine and the council regards the Zionist occupation of Jerusalem as a violation of the Palestinian people's rights and a defiance of international laws as well as a provocation of all the believers in the world. The council called on all the world countries and organizations to refuse to carry out anything that will entail an implicit recognition of the Zionist aggression against Jerusalem or its actions therein.

In its debates and resolutions the council expressed its deep admiration for the standard of struggle which has been attained by our people's uprising in the occupied homeland, as well as their solid unity and their complete cohesion with the PLO. The council saluted the heroic struggle of our people in the Galilee, the triangle and the Negev as well as in Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip against the Zionist designs that aim at expanding the settlements, Judaization and the destruction of the national economy and education and the holy places.

The council also expressed its admiration for the steadfastness of those who are interned in the enemy's prisons and who are setting an example in their sacrifices in defending their people's right to liberate and return to their homeland. The council affirmed the exceeding importance of building the PNC inside the occupied homeland, considering that the PNC is a vital arm of various popular bodies and organizations in their national struggle against occupation and its designs.

The council stressed the importance of supporting the organizations encompassing students, unions and women as well as various vocational unions and municipal councils to enable them to carry out their tasks in enhancing the steadfastness of our people on their own soil and in bolstering their unity in the face of the Zionist enemy's practices and its expansionist policies.

The council considers the development and escalation of the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy as being the cardinal task that rests on the shoulders of the Palestinian revolution inside and outside [Palestine]. The council reiterated the importance of opening the various Arab fronts to the heroic fighters of our revolution.

The council debated social, economic, educational and health issues related to our people in their places of residence and the appropriate solutions for these issues. In this respect the council affirmed the importance of supporting the role of the institutions working within the framework of the organization which are dealing with the aforementioned problems.

The council also considered the continuation of UNRWA an international responsibility until the times comes for our refugees to practice their unshaken right in returning to their houses and taking over their properties. The council called for putting an end to the political blackmail being practiced by some Western countries, particularly the United States, which is embodied by threats of curbing the UNRWA services. The council affirmed the Arab League's resolution to work for integrating UNRWA's budget with the UN's regular budget.

The council also affirmed the importance of enhancing Arab solidarity by pledging enmity toward imperialism, Zionism and by rejecting the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli pact and by implementing the Palestinian people's firm national rights, including their right to return to their homeland, their right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state on their national soil under the leadership of the PLO.

The PNC also denounced Somalia, Oman and Sudan, which deviated from the Arab summit resolutions in Baghdad and Tunis. The council stressed the importance of the alliance between Syria and the PLO considering them the basic foundation of the Arab nation's struggle and its confrontation against its enemies. The council emphasized the importance of enhancing these fateful relations and providing the means what will achieve the joint national struggle.

The PNC stressed the importance of the deep-rooted struggle in the relations between the Palestinian and Jordanian fraternal people and the PNC's support for the Jordanian national movement in various spheres, particularly in its national struggle against any attempt to make Jordan deviate from the Arab and Islamic summit resolutions with regard to the Palestinian problem and the rejection of the Camp David agreements and the autonomy conspiracy. The council declared the PLO's adherence to the Arab summit resolutions in Algeria, Rabat, Baghdad and Tunis. The council regards the Jordanian regime's adherence to these resolutions-such as enabling the PLO to assume its popular responsibilities of struggle in the Jordanian arena- as the basis governing bilateral relations. The council also placed the blame on the Jordanian regime for not attaining positive results [with the PLO] that would particularly enhance the PLO's role as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people in their various places of residence.

The PNC also discussed the joint coordination committee's activities in bolstering steadfastness and stressed the need to work on the Arab level to let the PLO assume its full responsibility in this respect. The council also stressed the role of the Palestinian side in the committee and the need to draw a comprehensive plan, in accordance with predetermined priorities, in order to bolster the steadfastness of our people and their national institutions with the participation of the revolutionary squads as well as with national gatherings inside and outside the homeland.

Considering the fateful cohesion between the Lebanese and Palestinian people, the National Council stressed the importance of a unified political and military stance between the Palestinian revolution

and the Lebanese National Movement and various other Lebanese forces as well as the importance of the joint struggle to thwart all the attempts that aim at sapping the strength of the Palestinian revolution in the Lebanese arena, at fragmenting Lebanon, and at endangering its security and Arab character.

The PNC saluted the Lebanese and Palestinian masses and the joint forces, which are standing fast in southern Lebanon, for their sacrifices and acts of heroism in their confrontation against the Zionist enemy and the separatist forces, which are armed to the teeth by the most modern U.S. weapons of destruction. The PNC also considers the Arab summit resolutions and the bases of national accord that were announced by President Ilyas Sarkis as the starting points for ensuring Lebanon's stability and for preserving the Palestinian revolution. The council also affirmed the continuation of the struggle, side by side with the heroic Lebanese people, under the leadership of their national movement and the various other national forces for the sake of the unity of Lebanon's territory, and their people's Arab character and democratic development.

The PNC affirmed its support for the Lebanese National Movement, which rejects all forms of outside intervention and the internationalization projects that aim at harming the Palestinian revolution's steadfastness, the Lebanese National Movement and Syria.

The PNC praised the efforts to unify the forces that are opposed to the separatist-Zionist designs into a broad Lebanese national front. The council affirmed the importance of the national role being played by the Arab Deterrent Forces in order to preserve Lebanon's security, Arab character, territorial safety and unity and in order to foil the partition plans. The council also expressed its rejection of all the resettlement plans and affirmed its full adherence to our people's right to return to their homeland - Palestine.

The PNC has also highly praised the patriotic and progressive forces in Arab Egypt for their heroic struggle waged to abort the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The PNC emphasized its support for the patriotic forces and its belief in the inevitable triumph of the will of our Arab people in Egypt so that Egypt would resume its role of leading the Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism and for the sake of liberating Palestine.

Regarding the Iraqi-Iranian war, the PNC called for the need to halt this war forthwith. The PNC blessed the efforts that the PLO command has exerted, and which it is still exerting, to halt this war so that the full potential of the two countries could be channeled toward buttressing the struggle that is being waged against the imperialist-Zionist aggression against our area and to liberate Palestine and holy Jerusalem. The reason is that the continuation of this war harms our cause and serves the enemies of our Arab nation and the Muslim people.

The PNC emphasized the importance of boosting the efficacy of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and the need to develop the existing relations among the members of this front in a way that would facilitate achieving its objectives to check all the imperialist conspiracies which are facing this area-first and foremost the Camp David designs and the parties to these designs. The PNC also stressed the basic role of the PLO and Syria, within the framework of the National Front for Steadfastness and confrontation, in seeking to discharge the national and pan-Arab objectives of the struggle prescribed by the resolutions passed by the steadfastness and confrontation summit conference.

The PNC expressed the importance it attaches to the Arab people's conference and the need to work to develop the formula for this conference so that this conference can constitute the framework for a popular Arab front dedicated to the achievement of the objectives of our Arab people and nation—liberation, unity and advancement.

The PNC affirmed that imperialist military provocations that are being made in the Arab Gulf and Red Sea areas are an integral part of the imperialist strategy geared to striking the national liberation movements, controlling the destinies and resources of the area and imposing political, military and economic mobilization against it.

The PNC also emphasized that it is imperative to use the Arab homeland's oil resources to ensure the prosperity and progress of the Arab nation and to serve this nation's present causes, particularly the Palestine cause.

The PNC delineated the importance of a strong alliance among world's revolutionary forces. It expressed its desire to consolidate the relations of friendship and solidarity with the socialist countries - with the friendly Soviet Union in the forefront - with the national liberation movements and with the democratic and progressive forces hostile to imperialism and Zionism in the capitalist countries.

The PNC welcomed the announcement made by President Brezhnev at the 26<sup>th</sup> CPSU Congress on the Middle East crisis. In this announcement President Brezhnev emphasized the basic role the PLO is playing in the achievement of a just solution to the crises, the need to put into practice the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, including their right to set up their independent national state as confirmed by the UN resolutions passed on the Palestine question and the UN role in the resolution of this issue.

The council expressed its appreciation of the political and moral support extended by the socialist countries to the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian people's struggle.

The PNC emphasized its interest in the unity of the Non-aligned, Movement on the basis of the movement's principles opposed to imperialism, Zionism and racism. It expressed its appreciation of the non-aligned states' solidarity with our people's struggle for their inalienable national rights and their confrontation with aggression. The council lauded the resolutions adopted by the non-aligned sixth summit conference in Havana and the recent resolutions of the foreign ministers in New Delhi on the Palestine and Middle East questions.

The council commended Arab-African solidarity in the struggle against the enemy and its ally the racist regime in South Africa. It also expressed its appreciation of the African states'; solidarity with our people's struggle and it saluted the triumph scored by the people of Zimbabwe against racism and the emergence of the Zimbabwe nationalist state. The PNC expressed its full support for the struggle of the people of Namibia against the racist regime in South Africa and for freedom and independence.

The council underscored its firm support for the struggle of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean region. It condemned the aggressive practices of the U.S. Government in that region.

The council emphasized the importance of widening the circle of recognition for the PLO. It discussed the moves carried out by the EC states. It expressed its conviction that it is the right and the duty of the Palestinian revolution to continue its political and diplomatic Europe.

The PNC decided that the soundness of any initiative is measured by its nonrecognition of the Camp David accords and agreements as a basis of a settlement and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people as well as our people's right to repatriation, self-determination and to their independence state on their national soil.

The PNC called on the Arab and Islamic States, especially the oil states among them, to use their capabilities and resources to make the industrial and capitalist states recognize the PLO and all the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

The council saluted all the democratic and progressive forces opposed to imperialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, and fascism in the states of Western Europe as well as all the capitalist states.

The PNC strongly condemned terrorism and international terrorism, especially the Zionist official and organized terrorism against the Palestinian people, the PLO and the people of Lebanon, as well as American imperialist terrorism against the world liberation movements.

The council affirmed its adherence to the UN Charter and international legitimacy which has recognized the Palestinian people's national rights which are non-negotiable.

At the end of its meetings the PNC accepted the resignation of the Executive Committee in accordance with the basic laws. It elected a new Executive committee manifesting national unity. The Executive Committee unanimously elected Brother Yasser Arafat as its chairman.

The council extended the term of the present National Council until the meeting of the 16<sup>th</sup> National Council and specified the way in which it is to be formed.



**FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA, EIGHT-POINT  
PEACE PLAN (“FAHD PLAN”), 6 AUGUST 1981**

*[Prince Fahd, who later became King, presented his plan at the UNGA on 5 Oct. 1981 to express his criticism of the Camp David process as a basis for Mideast peace. Since Iraq, Syria and some other states renounced the plan as recognition of Israel it was never approved by the Arab League.]*

1. Israeli evacuation of all Arab territories seized during the 1967 Middle East war, including the Arab Jerusalem.
2. Dismantling the settlements set up by Israel on the occupied lands after the 1967 war.
3. Guaranteeing freedom of worship and religious rights for all religions in the holy places.
4. Asserting the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and compensating those who do not wish to do so.
5. Commencing a transitional period in the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision for a duration not exceeding a few months.
6. Establishing an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace.
8. Guaranteeing the implementation of these principles by the United Nations or some of its member states.



**ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN, STATEMENT ON EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT'S ASSASSINATION, JERUSALEM, 6 OCTOBER 1981**

President Sadat fell victim to a criminal assassination. The people of Israel share in the mourning of the people of Egypt. We send our deepest condolences to Mrs. Sadat and the children. President Sadat was murdered by the enemies of peace. His decision to come to Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the people, the Knesset and the Government of Israel will be remembered as one of the great events of our time. President Sadat did not pay attention to abuse and hostility, and went ahead with endeavors to abolish the state of war with Israel and to make peace with our nation. It was a difficult road.

The President of the United States, Mr. Carter, the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Sadat, and myself as Prime Minister of Israel and our colleagues resolved to do our utmost to reach the noble goal of establishing peace in our region. Unforgettable are the days of Camp David, and so is the hour in which the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel signed a treaty of peace between our two countries, and the President of the United States attached his signature as a witness to that historic act. Millions of peace-loving people throughout the world rejoiced. During our many meetings, personal friendship was established between us. I therefore lost today not only a partner to the peace process, but also a friend. The hearts of my wife and myself go out to Mrs. Sadat and to all the bereaved family. May God console them in their grief. We hope that the peace process, despite the cruel act of his enemies, will continue, as we know President Sadat would wish with all his heart.



**ISRAEL MILITARY ORDER NO. 947 CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, 8 NOVEMBER 1981**

By virtue of my authority as Israel Defence Force Area Commander, and since I believe that this is required to preserve orderly administration and the public order, and in order to ensure the well-being and the good of the population and to supply and implement public services, I herewith order as follows:

- *Definitions*
- 1. In this order - 'Head of the Civilian Administration' - whoever is appointed by me to be the Head of the Civilian Administration in the region.
- *Establishment of a Civilian Administration*
- 2. A Civilian Administration is hereby established in the region. The Civilian Administration will administer the civilian affairs in the region, in accordance with the directives of this order, for the well-being and good of the population and in order to supply and implement the public services, and taking into consideration the need to maintain an orderly administration and public order in the region.
- *Powers of the Head of the Civilian Administration*
- 3.
  - (a) The Head of the Civilian Administration shall be accorded powers as detailed below:
    - 1. All the powers set forth in the law, except for powers set forth in acts of Registration that are detailed in the first schedule.
    - 2. All the powers set forth in the security legislation detailed in the second schedule.
  - (b) With respect to this article, acts of legislation that were issued by virtue of the law after the determining date shall be regarded as part of the law and not as security legislation.
- *Subsidiary Legislation*
- 4. The Head of the Civilian Administration is authorized to proclaim subsidiary legislation by virtue of the law and of the security legislation according to which he is empowered to act.
- *Appointments and Powers*
- 5. The Head of the Civilian Administration may, within the framework of the powers that have been accorded him:
  - (a) appoint office-holders in the Civilian Administration;
  - (b) authorize any person to act according to the law and to the security provisions;
  - (c) authorize any person as noted in subsection (b) to proclaim subsidiary legislation by virtue of the law and the security provisions.
- *Preservations of Powers*
- 6.
  - (a) Nothing in this order shall be detrimental to any appointment made or authority granted by virtue of the law and the security legislation before this order took effect, unless the Head of the Civilian Administration, within the framework of the powers granted him, shall assume them himself or grant them to someone else (amended by Military Order No. 950).
  - (b) In order to remove any doubt, nothing in the provisions of this order restricts or abrogates any privilege or power vested in the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces in the area or in whoever was appointed by him or his agents.
- *Commencement Date*
- 7. This order should come into effect as of the date when it is signed.
- *Name*
- 8. This order shall be entitled 'Order regarding the establishment of a Civilian Administration (Judea and Samaria) (Order No. 947) 5742-1981.

(Signed) Baruch Hollander, Lt.-Col., Legal Advisor



**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL,  
30 NOVEMBER 1981**

**PREAMBLE**

This memorandum of understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region. Noting the longstanding and fruitful cooperation for mutual security that has developed between the two countries, the parties have decided to establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security by deterring such threats to the whole region. The parties have reached the following agreements in order to achieve the above aims.

**ARTICLE I**

United States-Israel strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region. It has the following broad purposes:

- A. To enable the parties to act cooperatively and in a timely manner to deal with the above-mentioned threat.
- B. To provide each other with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area that may be required to cope with this threat.
- C. The strategic cooperation between the parties is not directed at any state or group of states within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above-mentioned threat.

**ARTICLE II**

1. The fields in which strategic cooperation will be carried out to prevent the above-mentioned threat from endangering the security of the region include:
  - A. Military cooperation between the parties, as may be agreed by the parties.
  - B. Joint military exercise, including naval and air exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, as agreed upon by the parties.
  - C. Cooperation for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities, as agreed upon by the parties.
  - D. Other areas within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly agreed.
2. Details of activities within these fields of cooperation shall be worked out by the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III below. The cooperation will include, as appropriate, planning, preparations, and exercises.

**ARTICLE III**

1. The Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defence shall establish a coordinating council to further the purpose of this memorandum.
  - A. To coordinate and provide guidance to joint working groups.
  - B. To monitor the implementation of cooperation in the fields agreed upon by the parties within the scope of this agreement.
  - C. To hold periodic meetings, in Israel and the United States, for the purposes of discussing and resolving outstanding issues and to further the objectives set forth in this memorandum. Special meetings can be held at the request of either party. The Secretary of Defense and Minister of Defence will chair these meetings whenever possible.
2. Joint working groups will address the following issues:
  - A. Military cooperation between the parties, including joint U.S.-Israel exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
  - B. Cooperation for the establishment of joint readiness activities including access to maintenance facilities and other infrastructure, consistent with the basic purposes of this agreement.
  - C. Cooperation in research and development, building on past cooperation in this area.

D. Cooperation in defence trade.

E. Other fields within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, such as questions of pre-positioning, as agreed by the coordinating council.

3. The future agenda for the work of the joint working groups, their composition and procedures for reporting to the coordinating council shall be agreed upon by the parties.

#### ARTICLE IV

This memorandum shall enter into force upon exchange of notification that required procedures have been completed by each party. If either party considers it necessary to terminate this memorandum of understanding, it may do so by notifying the other party six months in advance of the effective date of termination.

#### ARTICLE V

Nothing in the memorandum shall be considered as derogating from previous agreements and understandings between the parties.

#### ARTICLE VI

The parties share the understanding that nothing in this memorandum is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve or may devolve upon either government under the charter of the United Nations or under international law. The parties reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their aspiration to live in peace with all countries in the region.



### UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 36/70 REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, NEW YORK, 4 DECEMBER 1981

The General Assembly

*Recalling* its resolutions 33/147 of 20 December 1978, 34/133 of 14 December 1979 and 35/111 of 5 December 1980,

*Recalling* also its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974.

Noting Economic and Social Council decision 1981/171 of 22 July 1981 and recalling the relevant resolutions of the Council,

*Taking note* with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to the Palestinian people.

*Taking note* also of the report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program on its twenty-eighth session,

1. *Notes* with satisfaction the action taken by the Administrator and the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program in response to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
2. *Urges* the relevant agencies, organizations, organs and programs of the United Nations system to take the necessary steps, in consultation and co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, for the full implementation of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on assistance to the Palestinian people;
3. *Strongly urges* all parties concerned to facilitate the full implementation of all the projects approved by the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Program at its twenty-sixth session;
4. *Requests* the United Nations Development Program to undertake direct execution of the projects in the occupied Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, in coordination with the relevant local Palestinian organizations and bodies;

5. *Also requests* that United Nations assistance to the Palestinian people in the Arab host countries should be rendered through the specialized agencies, programs, organs and other bodies of the United Nations system in consultation with the parties concerned and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, through the Economic and Social Council, on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 36/120 ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,  
NEW YORK, 10 DECEMBER 1981**

A

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolutions 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40A and B of 2 December 1977, 33/28A to C of 7 December 1978, 34/65A and B of 29 November 1979, 34/65C and D of 12 December 1979, ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 and 35/169 A to E of 15 December 1980,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. *Expresses* his appreciation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;
2. *Requests* the Committee to keep the situation relating to the question of Palestine under review and to report and make suggestions to the General Assembly or the Security Council, as appropriate;
3. *Authorizes* the Committee to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session and therefore;
4. *Requests* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, as well as other United Nations bodies associated with the question of Palestine, to co-operate fully with the Committee and to make available to it, at its request, the relevant information and documentation which they had at their disposal;
5. *Decides* to circulate the report of the Committee to all the component bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take the necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks.

B

The General Assembly

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

*Taking note* in particular of the information contained in paragraphs 39 to 48 of that report,

*Recalling* its resolutions 32/40B of 2 December 1977, 33/28C of 7 December 1978 34/65D of 12 December 1979 and 35/169D of 15 December 1980,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the action taken by the Secretary-General in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/169D;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat continues to discharge the tasks detailed in paragraph I of the General Assembly resolution 32/40B and paragraph 2(b) of Assembly resolution 34/65D, in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and under its guidance;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights with the necessary additional resources to accomplish its tasks and to expand its work program *inter alia* through:
  - a. The organization annually of a seminar in North America in addition to the regional seminars;
  - b. More widespread dissemination of its publications in all the official languages;

- c. The translation of those publications into languages other than the official languages of the United Nations;
4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to take necessary action on the re-designation of the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, as requested in paragraph I of resolution 34/65D, in keeping with the political importance of its work and its expanded work program;
5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the continued co-operation of the Department of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks, *inter alia* through the production, in consultation with the Committee, of a film on Palestinian rights and through the provision of copies of the photograph exhibit on Palestinian rights installed at United Nations Headquarters and of other visual material for use by the Special Unit and United Nations information centers;
6. *Invites* all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the performance of their tasks;
7. *Takes note* with appreciation of the action taken by Member States to observe annually on 29 November the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people and the issuance by them of special postage stamps for the occasion.

## C

The General Assembly

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions, particularly resolutions 31/20 of 24 November 1976 and ES-7/2 of 29 July 1986,

*Gravely concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Convinced* that wider international recognition of the facts underlying the question of Palestine will lead to a just solution of the problem,

*Recognizing* that a lasting peace in the Middle East requires a just solution of the problem of Palestine through the attainment and exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights,

*Emphasizing* the need for a comprehensive effort to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and to exercise these rights,

1. *Decides* to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine not later than 1984, on the basis of General Assembly resolution ES-7/2;
2. *Authorizes* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to act as the Preparatory Committee for the Conference and to take all the necessary steps for its organization, to hold sessions particularly for this purpose and to make recommendations regarding *inter alia*, the site, scheduling of and participation in the Conference, and the provisional agenda of the Conference;
3. *Invites* all appropriate United Nations bodies, the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to co-operate with the Committee in the implementation of the present resolution;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Secretary-General of the Conference, and to provide all the necessary assistance to the Committee in the organization of the Conference.

## D

The General Assembly

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the recommendations contained therein,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

*Expressing* its extreme concern that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* that a just and comprehensive lasting peace in the Middle east requires a just solution to the problem of Palestine through the attainment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights,

Resolutely emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its previous relevant resolutions, particularly resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 3236(XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property in Palestine, from which they have been displaced or uprooted, and calls for their early return;
2. *Reaffirms* also the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including:
  - a. The right to self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty;
  - b. The right to establish its own independent sovereign State;
3. *Reaffirms*, in particular, that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
4. *Expresses* its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their homeland;
5. *Demands* that Israel should withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact;
6. *Further demands* that Israel should fully comply with all the resolutions of the United Nations relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolutions 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 and 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 and rejects the enactment of a "Basic Law" by the Israel Knesset proclaiming Jerusalem the capital of Israel;
7. *Demands* that Israel should fully comply with the provisions, in particular, of Security Council resolution 465 (1980) adopted unanimously on 1 March 1980;
8. *Reaffirms* the basic principle that the future of the Palestinian people can only be considered with its participation and calls for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, in all efforts, deliberations, and conferences on the question of Palestine and on the situation in the Middle East to be held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing and on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
9. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. contained in paragraphs 49 to 53 of its report 2/ and draws the attention of the Security Council to the fact that action on the Committee's recommendations, as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, is long overdue.
10. *Requests* the Security Council to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures to implement the recommendations of the Committee as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/20;
11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Question of Palestine".

#### E

The General Assembly,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, 35/169E of 15 December 1980 and 36/15 of 28 October 1981,

*Recalling* the resolutions of the Security Council relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 and 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

*Bearing in mind* the specific status of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Deploring* the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, the demographic composition, the institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

1. *Determines* once again that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the so-called "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
2. *Affirms* that such actions constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and a threat to international peace and security;
3. *Reaffirms* its resolution not to recognize that "Basic Law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all States, specialized agencies and other international organizations to comply with the present resolution and other relevant resolutions and urges them not to conduct any business which is not in conformity with the provisions of the present resolution and the other relevant resolutions;
4. *Demands* that Israel should fully comply with all the resolution of the United Nations relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolution 476 (1980) and 478 (1980);
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of those resolutions within six months.

#### F

The General Assembly,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its resolutions 34/65A and B of 29 November 1979, 34/65C and D of 12 December 1979 and 35/169B of 15 December 1980,

*Taking note* of paragraphs 26, 27, and 52 of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. *Strongly reaffirms* its rejection of those provisions of the accords which ignore, infringe, violate or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, the right of self-determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, and which envisage and condone continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Expresses* its strong opposition to all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the Charter and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue, as well as the principles of international law, and declare that all agreements separate treaties have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
3. *Declares* that no State has the right to undertake any actions, measures or negotiations that could affect the future of the Palestinian people, its inalienable rights and the occupied Palestinian territories without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, rejects all such actions, measures, and negotiations, and considers all such actions, measures and negotiations as a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
4. *Decides* that all actions, measures and negotiations to implement or execute such accords and agreements, or any part thereof, are null and void in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 497, NEW YORK, 17 DECEMBER 1981**

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the letter of 14 December 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic contained in document S/14791,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, and relevant Security Council resolutions,

1. *Decides* that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect;
2. *Demands* that Israel, the occupying Power, should rescind forthwith its decision;
3. *Determines* that all the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since June 1967;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution within two weeks and decides that in the event of non-compliance by Israel, the Security Council would meet urgently, and not later than 5 January 1982, to consider taking appropriate measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 36/226 ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE NEAR EAST, NEW YORK, 17 DECEMBER 1981**

*[This annual resolution was harsher in 1981 than previous ones, as it was adopted four days after the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Law, which made it difficult for the US to support Israel.]*

A

The General Assembly,

*Having discussed* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General dated 11 November 1981,

*Welcoming* the world-wide support extended to the just cause of the Palestinian people and the other Arab countries in their struggle against Israel aggression and occupation in order to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as affirmed by previous resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East,

*Gravely concerned* that the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, still remain under Israeli occupation, that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations have not been implemented and that the Palestinian people is still denied the restoration of its land and the exercise of its inalienable national rights in conformity with international law, as reaffirmed by resolutions of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem,

*Reiterating* all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasize that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, and that Israel must withdraw unconditionally from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem,

*Reaffirming* further the imperative necessity of establishing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the Charter and the principles of international law,

*Gravely concerned* also at recent Israeli actions involving the escalation and expansion of the conflict in the region, which further violate the principles of international law and endanger international peace and security,

1. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law, and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and demands the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all these occupied territories.
2. *Reaffirms* its conviction that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights;
3. *Reaffirms* further that a just and comprehensive settlement of the situation in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the participation on an equal footing of all the parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the representative of the Palestinian people;
4. *Declares* once more that peace in the Middle East is indivisible and must be based on a comprehensive, just and lasting solution of the Middle East problem, under the auspices of the United Nations, which ensures the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and which enables the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to exercise its inalienable rights, including the right to return and the right to self-determination, national independence and the establishment of its independent sovereign state in Palestine, in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations relevant to the question of Palestine, in particular General Assembly resolutions ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980 and 36/120 A to F of 10 December 1981.
5. *Rejects* all partial agreements and separate treaties in so far as they violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradict the principles of a just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem to ensure the establishment of a just peace in the area;
6. *Deplores* Israel's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 and 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 and General Assembly resolution 35/207 of 16 December 1980, determines that Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem and to declare it its "capital", as well as the measures to alter its physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and status are null and void and demands that they be rescinded immediately, and calls upon all member states, the specialized agencies and all other international organizations to abide by the present resolution and all other relevant resolutions, including Assembly resolution 36/120E;
7. *Condemns* Israel's aggression and practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and outside these territories, particularly in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, including the expropriation and annexation of territory, the establishment of settlements, assassination attempts and other terrorist, aggressive and repressive measures, which are violations of the Charter and the principles of international law and the pertinent international conventions;
8. *Strongly condemns* Israel's annexationist policies and practices in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the establishment of settlements, the confiscation of lands, the diversion of water resources, the intensification of repressive measures against the Syrian citizens therein and the forcible imposition of Israeli citizenship on Syrian nationals, and declares all these measures as null and void as they constitute violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;
9. *Strongly condemns* the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the continuous bombardment and destruction of its cities and villages and all acts that constitute a violation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the security of its people and prevent the full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, including the full deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon up to the internationally recognized borders;
10. *Calls for strict respect* of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and supports the efforts of the Government of Lebanon, with regional and international endorsement, to restore the exclusive authority of the Lebanese state over all of its territory up to the internationally recognized boundaries;
11. *Deplores* Israeli violations of the airspace of various Arab countries and demands their immediate cessation;
12. *Considers* that the agreements on strategic cooperation between the United States of America and Israel signed on 30 November 1981 would encourage Israel to pursue its aggressive and expan-

sionist policies and practices in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and would have adverse effects on efforts for the establishment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and would threaten the security of the region;

13. *Calls upon* all States to put an end to the flow to Israel of any military, economic and financial resources which would encourage it to pursue its aggressive policies against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people;
14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session a comprehensive report covering the developments in the Middle East in all their aspects.

B

The General Assembly

*Gravely alarmed* by Israel's decision of 14 December 1981 to apply Israeli law to the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions,

*Reaffirming* once more the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Syrian territory,

*Recalling* its resolutions 35/122 A to F of 11 December 1980.

1. *Declares* that Israel's decision to apply Israeli law to the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights is null and void and has no legal validity whatsoever;
2. *Determines* that the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967;
3. *Strongly depleores* the persistence of the Israeli policy of annexation, which escalates tension in the region;
4. *Demands* that Israel, the occupying power, rescind forthwith its decision and all administrative and other measures relating to it, which constitute a flagrant violation of all relevant principles of international law;
5. *Calls upon* all States, specialized agencies and other international institutions not to recognize that decision,
6. *Requests* the Security Council, in the event of Israel's failure to implement the present resolution, to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution not later than 21 December 1981.



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, PROPOSALS FOR THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY  
IN THE TERRITORIES (“AUTONOMY PLAN”), 31 JANUARY 1982**

*[In the 1978 Camp David Accords agreement was reached on solving the Palestine problem, incl. Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, to be negotiated by Egypt and Israel. Talks began in 1979 and intensified in mid-1981, with Israel proposing a self-governing authority (administrative council), the main points of which follow:]*

A: In the Camp David Agreement, signed on 17 September 1978 between Egypt and Israel, with the United States signing as a witness, agreement was reached on a plan for the solution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs, that includes a proposal for full autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The manner of establishing this autonomy, as well as its powers, were to be determined in negotiations between the signatories (Jordan was invited to participate, but did not respond). It was Israel that first raised the idea of autonomy that was later to serve as the basis of

the Camp David Agreement. For the first time in the history of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, they were offered an opportunity of this kind to conduct their own affairs by themselves. Since 1979, talks have been held for the implementation of this agreement. There were intermissions in the negotiations, but talks were resumed intensively in the summer of 1981, leading to a thoroughgoing clarification of the positions of the parties. At these talks, Israel put forward its proposals with regard to the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council), its powers, responsibilities and structure as well as other related issues.

B: The main points of Israel's proposals, as submitted in the course of the negotiations, were as follows:

Scope, Jurisdiction and Structure of the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council):

1. The Camp David accords set forth the establishment of a self-governing authority (administrative council) that will comprise one body representing the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, who will choose this body in free elections, and it will assume those functional powers that will be transferred to it. Thus the Palestinian Arabs will for the first time have an elected and representative body, in accordance with their own wishes and free choice, that will be able to carry out the functions assigned to it as an administrative council.
2. The members of the administrative council will be able, as a group, to discuss all subjects within the council's competence, apportioning among themselves the spheres of responsibility for the various functions. Within the domain of its assigned powers and responsibilities, the council will be responsible for planning and carrying out its activities.

Powers of the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council):

1. a. Under the terms of the Camp David agreement, the parties have to reach an agreement on the powers and responsibilities of the authority. Israel's detailed proposals include a list of powers that will be given to the authority and that, by any reasonable and objective criterion, represent a wide and comprehensive range of fields of operation. Without any doubt, the transferring of these powers constitutes the bestowal of full autonomy - in the full meaning of that term.
- b. The powers to be granted the authority, under these proposals, are in the following domains:
  1. *Administration of Justice*: Supervision of the administrative system of the courts in the areas; dealing with matters connected with the prosecution system and with the registration of companies, partnerships, patents, trademarks, etc.
  2. *Agriculture*: All branches of agriculture and fisheries, nature reserves and parks.
  3. *Finance*: Budget of the administrative council and allocations among its various divisions; taxation.
  4. *Civil Service*: Appointment and working conditions of the Council's employees. (Today, the civil service of the inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, within the framework of the Military Government's Civilian Administration, numbers about 12,000 persons.)
  5. *Education and Culture*: Operation of the network of schools in the areas, from kindergarten to higher education; supervision of cultural, artistic and sporting activities.
  6. *Health*: Supervision of hospitals and clinics; operation of sanitary and other services related to public health.
  7. *Housing and Public Works*: Construction, housing for the inhabitants and public works projects.
  8. *Transportation and Communications*: Maintenance and coordination of transport, road traffic, meteorology; local postal and communications services.
  9. *Labour and Social Welfare*: Welfare, labour and employment services, including the operation of labour exchanges.
  10. *Municipal Affairs*: Matters concerning municipalities and their effective operation.
  11. *Local Police*: Operation of a strong local police force, as provided for in the Camp David agreement, and maintenance of prisons for criminal offenders sentenced by the courts in the areas.
  12. *Religious Affairs*: Provision and maintenance of religious facilities for all religious communities among the Arab inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district.

*13. Industry, Commerce and Tourism:* Development of industry, commerce, workshops and tourist services.

2. The council will have full powers in its spheres of competence to determine its budget, to enter into contractual obligations, to sue and be sued and to engage manpower. It will, moreover, have wide powers to promulgate regulations, as required by a body of this kind. In the nature of things, in view of the free movement that will prevail between Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district and Israel and for the general welfare of the inhabitants, arrangements will be agreed upon in the negotiations, in a number of domains, for cooperation and coordination with Israel. The administrative council will, hence, have full scope to exercise its wide-ranging powers under the terms of the autonomy agreement. These powers embrace all walks of life, and will enable the inhabitants of the areas concerned to enjoy full autonomy.
3. Size: The size of the administrative council must reflect its functions and its essential purpose: it is an administrative council, whose representative character finds expression in its establishment through free elections, by the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Clearly, the criterion for determining the number of its members must be the functions that the council is empowered to perform. We propose, therefore, that the number of members will conform with the functions listed above.
4. Free Elections: Elections to the administrative council, under Israel's proposals, will be absolutely free, as stipulated in the Camp David agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the parties will agree upon the modalities of the elections; as a matter of fact, in past negotiations a long list of principles and guidelines has already been prepared in this matter. In these free elections, all the rights pertaining to a peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and secret balloting will be preserved and assured, and all necessary steps will be taken to prevent any interference with the election process. The holding of an absolutely free and unhampered election process will thus be assured in full, under the law, and in keeping with the tradition of free elections practiced in democratic societies. These elections will, in many respects, constitute a new departure in the region around us which in most of its parts is not too close to the ways of democracy, and in which free elections are a rare phenomenon. It is of some interest, therefore, to note that Judea-Samaria and Gaza, under Israel's Military Government since 1967, have exemplified the practical possibility of totally free elections in these areas. In 1972, and again in 1976, Israel organized free elections in these areas based on the tradition and model of its own democratic and liberal tradition and custom; voters and elected officials alike concede that these were free elections in the fullest sense. The elections in the administrative council will be organized and supervised by a central elections committee whose composition has been agreed upon by the parties.
5. Time of elections and establishment of the self-governing authority (administrative council): The elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement will have been reached on the autonomy. This was set forth in the joint letter of the late President Sadat and of Prime Minister Begin to President Carter, dated 26 March 1979, setting for the manner in which the self-governing authority (administrative council) is to be established, under the terms of the Camp David agreement.
6. Within one month following the elections, the self-governing authority (administrative council) is to be established and inaugurated, and at that time the transitional period of five years will begin - again, in conformity with the Camp David agreement and the joint letter.
7. Hence, every effort will be made to hold elections without delay, once an agreement is reached, to be followed by the establishment of the self-governing authority (administrative council).
8. Following the elections and the establishment of the self-governing authority (administrative council) the military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place, and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations, in full conformity with the Camp David agreement. Israel will present to the other parties in the negotiations the map of the specified security locations of the redeployment. It goes without saying that all this will be done for the purpose of safeguarding the security of Israel as well as of the Arab inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza and of the Israeli citizens residing in these areas.
9. All of the above indicates Israel's readiness to observe the Camp David agreement fully and in every detail, in letter and spirit, while safeguarding the interests of all concerned.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION ES-9/1 REGARDING THE SITUATION IN  
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 5 FEBRUARY 1982**

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the item entitled "The situation in the occupied Arab territories" at its ninth emergency special session, in accordance with Security Council resolution 500 (1982) of 28 January 1982,

*Noting* with regret and concern that the Security Council, at its 2329th meeting on 20 January 1982, failed to take appropriate measures against Israel, as requested by the Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981, as a result of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council,

*Recalling* Security Council Resolution 497 (19,81),

*Recalling* its resolution 35/112 E of 11 December 1980,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 36/226 B of 17 December 1981,

*Having considered* the reports of the Secretary-General of 21 December 1981 and 31 December 1981,

*Recalling* its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, in which it defined an act of aggression as, inter alia, "the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of, the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such an invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof," and provided that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as justification for aggression",

*Stressing* once again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions,

*Reaffirming* once more the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the occupied Syrian territory,

*Noting* that Israel's record and actions establish conclusively that it is not a peace-loving Member State and that it has not carried out its obligations under the Charter,

*Noting further* that Israel has refused, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the numerous relevant decisions of the Security Council, the latest being resolution 497 (1981),

1. *Strongly condemns* Israel for its failure to comply with Security Council resolution 497 (1981) and General Assembly resolution 36 / 226 B;
2. *Declares* that Israel's decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights constitutes an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX);
3. *Declares* once more that Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and has no legal validity and/or effect whatsoever;
4. *Determines* that all actions taken by Israel to give effect to its decision relating to the occupied Syrian Golan Heights are illegal and invalid and shall not be recognized;
5. *Reaffirms* its determination that all the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1907, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967, and calls upon all parties thereto to respect and ensure respect of their obligations under these instruments in all circumstances;
6. *Determines* that the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights since 1967 and its effective annexation by Israel on 14 December 1981, following Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on that territory, constitute a continuing threat to international peace and security;
7. *Strongly deplotes* the negative vote by a permanent member of the Security Council which prevented the Council from adopting against Israel, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the "appropriate measures" referred to in resolution 497 (1981) unanimously adopted by the Council;
8. *Further deplotes* any political, economic, military and technological support to Israel that encourages Israel to commit acts of aggression and to consolidate and perpetuate its occupation and annexation of occupied Arab territories;

9. *Firmly emphasizes* its demands that Israel, the occupying Power, rescind forthwith its decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Syrian Golan Heights, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that territory;
10. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity of the total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, which is a primary requirement for the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East,
11. *Declares* that Israel's record and actions confirm that it is not a peace-loving Member State and that it has carried out neither its obligations under the Charter nor its commitment under General Assembly resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949;
12. *Calls upon* all Member States to apply the following measures:
  - (a) To refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and related equipment and to suspend any military assistance which Israel receives from them;
  - (b) To refrain from acquiring any weapons or military equipment from Israel;
  - (c) To suspend economic, financial and technological assistance to and cooperation with Israel;
  - (d) To sever diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel;
13. *Also calls upon* all Members States to cease forthwith, individually and collectively, all dealings with Israel in order to totally isolate it in all fields;
14. *Urges* non-member states to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;
15. *Calls upon* all specialized agencies of the United Nations system and international institutions to conform their relations with Israel to the terms of the present resolution;
16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon at intervals of two months to Member States, as well as to the Security Council and to submit a comprehensive report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East."



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 508 REGARDING HOSTILITIES  
IN LEBANON, NEW YORK, 5 JUNE 1982**

*[On 4 June, the Lebanese govt. lodged a complaint with the UNSC demanding an end to hostile actions on its territory. The same day, the UN Sec.-Gen. had also called on Israel and the PLO to cease fire. The following resolution was adopted unanimously the next day.]*

The Security Council

*Recalling* Security Council's resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and the ensuing resolutions, and more particularly, Security Council resolution 501 (1982),

*Taking note of* the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982 (S/15161 and S/15162),

*Deeply concerned* at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region,

*Gravely concerned* at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon,

*Reaffirming* and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 4 June 1982 (S/15163), as well as the urgent appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1982,

*Taking note of* the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and not later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982;
2. *Requests* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of this resolution.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 509 REGARDING ISRAEL'S  
ADVANCE INTO LEBANON, NEW YORK, 6 JUNE 1982**

*[See also Map 2 in the Annex]*

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its resolutions 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982,

*Gravely concerned* at the situation as described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council,

*Reaffirming* the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

1. *Demands* that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;
2. *Demands* that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph I of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;
3. *Calls on* all parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their acceptance of the present resolution within 24 hours;
4. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 512 ON THE SITUATION  
IN LEBANON, NEW YORK, 19 JUNE 1982**

The Security Council,

*Deeply concerned* at the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations,

*Referring* to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian populations, to refrain from all acts of violence against those populations and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by conflict, in particular, by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
2. *Appeals* to Member States to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible;
3. *Stresses* the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations and its agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), towards civilian populations and calls upon all the parties to the conflict not to hamper the exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts;
4. *Takes note* of the measures taken by the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the activities of the international agencies in this field and requests him to make every effort to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report on these efforts to the Council as soon as possible.



### THE PARIS DECLARATION, 2 JULY 1982

*[Document signed by three international personalities, calling for an end to Israel's siege of Beirut and negotiation with the PLO to ensure regional peace and security.]*

Peace need not be made between friends, but between enemies who have struggled and suffered. Our sense of Jewish history and the moral imperatives of this moment require us to insist that the time is urgent for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian people. There must be a stop to the sterile debate, whereby the Arab world challenges the existence of Israel and Jews challenge the political legitimacy of the Palestinian fight for independence.

The real issue is not whether the Palestinians are entitled to their rights, but how to bring this about while ensuring Israel's security and regional stability. Ambiguous concepts such as "autonomy" are no longer sufficient, for they too often are used to confuse rather than to clarify. Needed now is the determination to reach a political accommodation between Israeli and Palestinian nationalism.

The war in Lebanon must stop. Israel must lift its siege of Beirut in order to facilitate negotiations with the PLO, leading to a political settlement. Mutual recognition must be vigorously pursued. And there should be negotiations with the aim of achieving coexistence between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples based on self-determination.

*Dr. Nahum Goldman (Former President, World Zionist Organization; Founder-President of the World Jewish Congress)*

*Philip M. Klutznick (Former US Secretary of Commerce; President Emeritus of World Jewish Congress; Honorary President of B'nai B'rith International.)*

*Pierre Mendes-France (Former Prime Minister of France)*



### UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 518 REGARDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON, NEW YORK, 12 AUGUST 1982

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982), 516 (1982), and 517 (1982),

*Expressing* its most serious concern about continued military activities in Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut,

1. *Demands* that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut;
2. *Demands* the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in Beirut;
3. *Requests* the United Nations observers in and in the vicinity of Beirut to report on the situation;
4. *Demands* that Israel co-operate fully in the effort to secure the effective deployment of the United Nations observers, as requested by the Government of Lebanon, and in such a manner as to ensure their safety;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report soonest to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution;
6. *Decides* to meet if necessary in order to consider the situation upon receipt of the report of the Secretary-General.



**ISRAELI ARMY SPOKESMAN, STATEMENT ON THE EXPULSION OF THE PLO AND SYRIAN ARMY FROM BEIRUT, 1 SEPTEMBER 1982**

From 21 August until 1 September (1600 hours), a total of 14,398 terrorists, Palestine Liberation Army members under Syrian control and Syrian forces left west Beirut. Also, 664 women and children have left the city. Some of the women were active in the ranks of the P.L.O.

A total of 8,144 P.L.O. and Palestine Liberation Army (P.L.A.) members were expelled via the sea. A total of 6,254 P.L.A. and Syrian forces were expelled via the land route.\*<sup>1</sup>

Of those expelled, 8,144 terrorists left for Jordan, Iraq, North Yemen, South Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria and Algeria (and the wounded went to Athens).

Syrian forces (3,603 soldiers) went to Syria and 2,651 P.L.A. members (under Syrian control) left for Syria.

It is important to note that the I.D.F. kept its promise and no military confrontations were registered with those who were expelled.

Date of Expulsion	Route	Time	Number Expelled	Destination
21.8.82	sea	15:13	397 PLA and PLO	Jordan, Iraq
22.8.82	sea	21:35	962 PLA and PLO	South Yemen
23.8.82	sea	17:10	505 PLO	South Yemen
24.8.82	sea	13:05	539 PLO	North Yemen
25.8.89	sea	14:30	538 PLO	Syria
25.8.82	sea	16:45	456 PLO	Sudan
26.8.82	sea	18:06	177 PLO	Athens
26.8.82	sea	15:00	637 PLO	Syria
27.8.82	sea	14:07	727 PLO	Syria
27.8.82	land	15:48	1351 PLA	Syria
28.8.82	sea	11:52	698 PLO	Syria
29.8.82	sea	11:30	393 PLO	Syria
29.8.82	land	11:44	1300 PLA	Syria
30.8.82	sea	11:58	61 PLO	Athens
30.8.82	land	12:45	2029 Syrian forces	Syria
30.8.82	sea	16:35	560 PLO	Algeria
31.8.82	land	07:40	1574 Syrian forces on 293 vehicles	Syria
31.8.82	sea	12:35	415 PLO	South Yemen
31.8.82	sea	16:29	359 PLO	Syria
1.9.82	sea	13:30	720 PLO	Syria

Note: In several cases, when the number of expelled refers to the P.L.O., the P.L.A. members not under Syrian command are also included.



<sup>1</sup> \* Note: The P.L.A. members departing to Syria are under Syrian command, while the P.L.A. members expelled via the sea are not.

**US PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON  
US POLICY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (“REAGAN PEACE PLAN”), BUR-  
BANK, CALIFORNIA, 1 SEPTEMBER 1982**

*[Reagan’s speech – broadcasted nationwide from the from the studios of KNBC - TV in Burbank - called for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank, and Jordanian admin. of the territories in return for peace and recognition of Israel by the Arab states. It was rejected by all sides.]*

My fellow Americans:

Today has been a day that should make us proud. It marked the end of the successful evacuation of PLO from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices of the United States and especially the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, Ambassador Philip Habib.

Thanks to his efforts, I’m happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission. Our young men should be out of Lebanon within 2 weeks. They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction, and we can all be very proud of them.

But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall problem of conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past 2 weeks, while events in Beirut dominated the front page, America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region. For once there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic missions traveled to Mideast capitals, and I met here at home with a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initiative for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East - Arab and Israeli alike.

It seemed to me that with the agreement in Lebanon we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region, and I was determined to seize that moment. In the words of the scripture, the time had come to “follow after the things which make for peace.” Tonight I want to report to you the steps we’ve taken and the prospects they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

America has long been committed to bringing peace to this troubled region. For more than a generation, successive United States administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace.

Our involvement in the search for Mideast peace is not a matter of preference; it’s a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region to the United States is well known, but our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world’s economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, our traditional humanitarian concerns dictated a continuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts.

When our administration assumed office in January of 1981, I decided that the general framework for our Middle East policy should follow the broad guidelines laid down by my predecessors. There were two basic issues we had to address. First, there was the strategic threat to the region posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the brutal war in Afghanistan, and, second, the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

With regard to the Soviet threat, we have strengthened our efforts to develop with our friends and allies a joint policy to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion in the region and, if necessary, to defend against it.

With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we’ve embraced the Camp David framework as the only way to proceed. We have also recognized, however, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict in and of itself cannot assure peace throughout a region as vast and troubled as the Middle East.

Our first objective under the Camp David process was to ensure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This was achieved with the peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt in April 1982. To accomplish this, we worked hard with our Egyptian and Israeli friends and, eventually, with other friendly countries to create the multinational force which now operates in the Sinai. Throughout this period of difficult and time-consuming negotiations, we never lost sight of the next step of Camp David - autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights. However, owing to the tragic assassination of President Sadat and other crises in the area, it was not until January 1982 that we were able to make a major effort to renew these talks.

Secretary of State Haig and Ambassador Fairbanks made three visits to Israel and Egypt early this year to pursue the autonomy talks. Considerable progress was made in developing the basic outline of an American approach which was to be presented to Egypt and Israel after April.

The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak in living up to their agreements convinced me the time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel on the autonomy process. So, in May I called for specific measures and a timetable for consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the peace process. However, before this effort could be launched, the conflict in Lebanon preempted our efforts.

The autonomy talks were basically put on hold while we sought to untangle the parties in Lebanon and still the guns of war. The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time. It was with this strong conviction that over a month ago, before the present negotiations in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary of State Shultz to again review our policy and to consult a wide range of outstanding Americans on the best ways to strengthen chances for peace in the Middle East.

We have consulted with many of the officials who were historically involved in the process, with Members of the Congress, and with individuals from the private sector. And I have held extensive consultations with my own advisers on the principles that I will outline to you tonight.

The evacuation of the PLO from Beirut is now complete, and we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves and to posterity to move quickly to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope. But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are key to the peace process. First, the military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and, second, while Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.

So, tonight I'm calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved - or lend their support - to a workable basis for peace. The Camp David agreement remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides all parties with the leeway they need for successful negotiations.

I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision, and courage.

I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.

And I call on the Arab States to accept the reality of Israel - and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.

In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.

The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries and has been denied by every Arab State except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders; and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts.

I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for survival, ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree. The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

For peace to endure it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process, most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians, will Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure peace.

These, then, are our general goals. What are the specific new American positions, and why are we taking them? In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably their views have differed on many points. The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator. We have avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized and continue to recognize that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it's become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. The purpose of the 5-year period of transition which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position well understood. The purpose of this transitional period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories, nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza. So, the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give and take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace. We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace.

This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort. It is the United States position that, in return for peace, the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza. When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization, and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiation.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal from any party and at any point in the negotiating process that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad, and, I might add, so is mine.

During the past few days, our Ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments the proposals, in full detail, that I have outlined here today. Now I'm convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security, and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace. The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians.

We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity.

Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has taken its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat to all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself. It's time for us all - in the Middle East and around the world - to call a halt to conflict, hatred, and prejudice. It's time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, peace, and progress.

It has often been said - and, regrettably, too often been true - that the story of the search for peace and justice in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed. In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon, we now face an opportunity for a broader peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with a fairness and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves - and to posterity - to do no less. For if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that failure cost us all.

These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they will

come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair, achievable, and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East.

Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope for the people of the troubled Middle East - and for all the world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future - I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this great undertaking.

Thank you, and God bless you.



**US PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, TALKING POINTS SENT TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN, WASHINGTON, DC, 1 SEPTEMBER 1982**

*General Principles*

We will maintain our commitment to Camp David.

We will maintain our commitment to the conditions we require for recognition of and negotiation with the PLO.

We can offer guarantees on the position we will adopt in negotiations. We will not be able, however, to guarantee in advance the result of these negotiations.

*Transitional Measures*

Our position is that the objective of the transitional period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants.

We will support:

- The decision to full autonomy as giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards on water.
- Economic, commercial, social and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan.
- Participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election of the West Bank-Gaza authority.
- Real settlement freeze.
- Progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capability and performance.

We will oppose:

- Dismantlement of the existing settlements.
- Provisions which represent a legitimate threat to Israel's security, reasonably defined.
- Isolation of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel.
- Measures which accord either the Palestinians or the Israelis generally recognized sovereign rights with the exception of external security, which must remain in Israel's hands during the transitional period.

*Final Status Issues*

*UNSC. Resolution 242*

It is our position that Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank and Gaza and requires Israeli withdrawal in return for peace. Negotiations must determine the borders. The US position in these negotiations on the extent of the withdrawal will be significantly influenced by the extent and nature of the peace and security arrangements offered in return.

*Israeli Sovereignty*

It is our belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved [through] Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza. Accordingly, we will not support such a solution.

*Palestinian State*

The preference we will pursue in the final status negotiations is association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. We will not support the formation of a Palestinian state in those negotiations. There is not foundation of political support in Israel or the United States for such a solution. The outcome, however, must be determined by negotiations.

*Self-Determination*

In the Middle East context the term self-determination has been identified exclusively with the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this definition of self-determination. We believe that the Palestinians must take the leading role in determining their own future and fully support the provision in Camp David providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provision of their agreement in the final status negotiations.

*Jerusalem*

We will fully support the position that the status of Jerusalem must be determined through negotiations.

*Settlements*

The status of Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts.

*Additional Talking Points**Approach to Hussein*

The President has approached Hussein to determine the extent to which he may be interested in participating.

King Hussein has received the same US positions as you.

Hussein considers our proposals serious and gives them serious attention.

Hussein understands that Camps David is the only base that we will accept for negotiations.

We are also discussing these proposals with the Saudis.

*Public Commitment*

Whatever the support from these or other Arab States, this is what the President has concluded must be done. The President is convinced his positions are fair and balanced and fully protective of Israel's security. Beyond that they offer the practical opportunity of eventually achieving the peace treaties Israel must have with its neighbors.

He will be making a speech announcing these positions, probably within a week.

*Next Procedural Steps*

Should the response to the President's proposal be positive, the US would take immediate steps to re-launch the autonomy negotiations with the broadest possible participation as envisaged under the Camp David agreements.

We also contemplate an early visit by Secretary Shultz in the area.

Should there not be positive response, the President, as he has said in his letter to you, will nonetheless stand by his position with proper dedication.



**ISRAELI CABINET, RESOLUTION ON THE REAGAN PLAN,  
JERUSALEM, 2 SEPTEMBER 1982**

The Cabinet met in special session today and adopted the following resolution:

The positions conveyed to the Prime Minister of Israel on behalf of the President of the United States consist of partial quotations from the Camp David agreements, or are nowhere mentioned in that agreement or contradict it entirely. The following are the major positions of the Government of the United States:

1. Jerusalem

"Participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election for the West Bank-Gaza authority."

No mention whatsoever is made in the Camp David agreement of such a voting right. The single meaning of such a vote is the repartition of Jerusalem into two authorities, the one - of the State of Israel, and the other - of the Administrative Council of the autonomy. Jerusalem is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David agreement. With respect to the capital of Israel, letters were forwarded and

attached to that agreement. In his letter to the President of the United States, Mr. Jimmy Carter, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin, stated that "Jerusalem is one city, indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel." Thus shall it remain for all generations to come.

## 2. Security

"Progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capability and performance." In the Camp David agreement it is stated: "A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external order and security and public order." It is, therefore, clear that in the Camp David agreement no distinction is made between internal security and external security. There can be no doubt that were internal security not to be the responsibility of Israel, the terrorist organization called P.L.O. - even after its defeat by the I.D.F. in Lebanon - would act to perpetrate constant bloodshed, shedding the blood of Jews and Arabs alike. For the citizens of Israel this is a question of life and death.

## 3. "A Real Settlement Freeze"

In the Camp David agreement no mention whatsoever is made of such a freeze. At Camp David the Prime Minister agreed that new settlements could not be established (though population would be added to existing ones) during the period of the negotiations for the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (three months being explicitly stated). This commitment was carried out in full. That three month period terminated on December 1978. Since then many settlements have been established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, without evicting a single person from his land, village or town. Such settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of our national security. Therefore, there shall be no settlement freeze. We shall continue to establish them in accordance with our natural right. President Reagan announced at the time that the "settlements are not illegal." A double negative makes a positive meaning that the settlements are legal. We shall act, therefore, in accordance with our natural right and the law, and we shall not deviate from the principle that these vital settlements will not lead to any evictions.

## 4. The Definition of Full Autonomy

"The definition of full autonomy as giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards on water." Such a definition is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David agreement, which states: "In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants (our emphasis), etc." In the lengthy discussion at Camp David, it was made absolutely clear that the autonomy applies not to the territory but to the inhabitants.

## 5. Ties with Jordan

"Economic, commercial and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan." In all the clauses of the Camp David agreement there is no reference whatsoever to such ties.

## 6. Israeli Sovereignty

There is nothing in the Camp David agreement that precludes the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District following the transitional period which begins with the establishment and inauguration of the self-government authority (Administrative Council). This was also stated by an official spokesman of the government of the United States.

## 7. Palestinian State

The Government of the United States commits itself not to support establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Regrettably, the visible reality proves this to be an illusion. Were the American plan to be implemented, there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his new-found friend, Yasser Arafat to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him. Thus would come into being a Palestinian state which would conclude a pact with Soviet Russia and arm itself with every kind of modern weaponry. If the P.L.O. could do this in Lebanon, establishing a

state-within-a-state, how much more so will the terrorists do ruling over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Then a joint front would be established of that "Palestinian State" with Jordan and Iraq behind her, Saudi Arabia to the south and Syria to the north. All these countries, together with other Arab states, would, after a while, launch an onslaught against Israel to destroy her. It is inconceivable that Israel will ever agree to such an "arrangement" whose consequences are inevitable.

Since the positions of the Government of the United States seriously deviate from the Camp David agreements, contradict it, and could create a serious danger to Israel, its security and its future, the Government of Israel has resolved that on the basis of these positions it will not enter into any negotiations with any party.

The Government of Israel is ready to renew the autonomy negotiations forthwith with the governments of the United States and Egypt, signatories to the Camp David agreements, and with other states and elements invited at Camp David to participate in the negotiations, with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment of full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, in total conformity with the Camp David Accords.



### **LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, FINAL DECLARATION, OF THE 12<sup>TH</sup> ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE ("FEZ PLAN"), FEZ, 9 SEPTEMBER 1982**

*[The eight points listed under "I. The Arab-Israeli Conflict" below, roughly based on the Fahd-Plan of 1981, were drafted as an Arab 'peace plan' in reaction to the Reagan Plan (1 Sept. 1982)].*

The Twelfth Arab Summit Conference was convened in the city of Fez on 27 Muharram 1402 A.H., corresponding to 25 November 1981 A.D.

After suspension, it resumed for the period from 17 to 20 Zu'lga'dah 1402 A.H., corresponding to 6 to 9 September 1982 A.D., under the presidency of His Majesty King Hassan II, King of the Kingdom of Morocco.

All the Arab States participated in the work of the Conference, with the exception of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

In view of the grave and delicate circumstances through which the Arab nation is passing and inspired by awareness of historic national responsibility, Their Majesties, Their Excellencies and Their Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs of the Arab States examined the important questions before the Conference and took the following decisions.

#### **I. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**

The Conference paid a tribute to the resistance of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and the Syrian Arab armed forces, and declared its support for the Palestinian people in their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable national rights.

Convinced of the ability of the Arab nation to achieve its legitimate objectives and to put an end to the aggression, on the basis of the fundamental principles laid down by the Arab Summit Conferences, in view of the desire of the Arab States to continue to strive by every means for the achievement of peace based on justice in the Middle East region, taking account of the plan of His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba, which holds international legality to be the basis for the solution of the Palestinian question, and of the plan of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz for peace in the Middle East and in the light of the discussions and observations of Their Majesties, Their Excellencies and Their Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs, the Conference adopted the following principles:

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by it in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;
2. The dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories since 1967;

3. The guaranteeing of freedom of worship and performance of religious rites for all religions in the Holy Places;
4. The reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the exercise of their inalienable and imprescriptible national rights, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of those who do not desire to return;
5. The placing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months;
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital;
7. The establishment by the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State;
8. The guaranteeing by the Security Council of the implementation of these principles.

## II. THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON

1. The Conference declares its strong condemnation of the Israeli aggression against the people and territory of Lebanon and against the Palestinian people and draws the attention of international public opinion to the seriousness of this aggression and its consequences for the stability and security of the region.
2. The Conference decides to support Lebanon in everything that will lead to the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, particularly resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), which demand the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory back to the internationally recognized frontiers.
3. The Conference reaffirms the solidarity of the Arab States with Lebanon in its tragedy and its readiness to provide any assistance requested by Lebanon for dealing with this tragedy and putting an end to it.

The Conference has been informed of the decision of the Lebanese Government to terminate the functions of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon, on the condition that negotiations are to be conducted between the Lebanese Government and the Syrian Government for the adoption of measures in the light of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

## III. THE GULF WAR AND THE ARAB POSITION THEREON

The Conference, having studied the situation in the Gulf and having noted with great affliction and regret the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, despite repeated attempts to reach a cease-fire and despite offers of mediation and good offices on the part of international organizations, appreciating Iraq's positive initiative of withdrawing its military forces back to the international frontiers;

On the basis of the principle of solidarity and the unity of Arab ranks and out of concern to see an atmosphere of serenity, harmony and good-neighbourliness prevail between the Arab countries and their neighbours, has decided to proclaim its commitment to the defence of all Arab territories and to consider any aggression against any Arab country as being aggression against all Arab countries;

To call upon the two parties to the conflict to comply fully with Security Council resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982) and to endeavour to implement them;

To ask all States to refrain from taking any measure likely to encourage directly or indirectly the continuation of the war.

## IV. The Horn of Africa

The Conference took note of the submission of the Somali Democratic Republic concerning the incursion of Ethiopia into Somali territory and decided:

1. To support the Somali Democratic Republic in facing the exigencies of safeguarding its sovereignty over its territory and expelling the Ethiopian force from Somali territory;
2. That the two countries, Ethiopia and the Somali Democratic Republic, respect the sovereignty of each over its territory and the independence of each after the withdrawal of Ethiopia from Somali territory;
3. To support peaceful efforts to resolve the problems between the two parties on these bases.

The Conference decided to establish, a committee to undertake contacts with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in order to follow up the decisions of the Conference relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to become informed of their positions and of the recently stated position of the United States of America concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. The committee is to submit the results of its contacts and efforts to the Kings and Heads of State on a regular basis.



**SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV, SPEECH AT A DINNER IN HONOR OF A. N. MOHAMMED, PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN, MOSCOW, 15 SEPTEMBER 1982 [EXCERPTS]**

*[The speech – especially the six points mentioned below which became known as the “Brezhnev Plan,” - was transmitted with a letter dated 17 Sept. 1982 by the Acting Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, R. Ovinnikov, to the UN Sec.-Gen. with the request to circulate it as an official document of the UNGA and UNSC]*

First of all, may I express the warm feelings which the people of the Soviet Union have for the friendly people of Democratic Yemen, its leadership, and for you, dear Comrade Mohammed.

I think we can say with satisfaction that the relationship between our countries, between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Yemen Socialist Party, is one of true friendship and fraternal solidarity, of broad co-operation and effective interaction. And the latest talks have again firmly underlined how similar and close our opinions and assessments are regarding both questions of bilateral relations and basic foreign policy issues.

Naturally, the extremely dangerous situation in the Middle East was central to our discussions. The Israeli aggressor has finally revealed its predatory nature for all the world to see. Never before has an invader acted so cynically, violating the integrity of a sovereign country, methodically committing mass murder of Palestinians and Lebanese, and brazenly flouting the generally accepted norms of international law and the decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

During the bloody war, the essence of United States policy in the Middle East was also revealed in the clearest of terms. Not only did the United States make no attempt to restrain the Israeli aggressor, it actually delivered Lebanon into the hands of Israel. As a result, the Israelis have occupied a considerable portion of Lebanon, killing tens of thousands of people and leaving hundreds of thousands of peaceful inhabitants homeless.

And all this time in Washington, where they are so fond of all sorts of sanctions and punishments, there was not a single word of condemnation addressed to the aggressor, much less any concrete measures to curtail its actions.

It is still too early to say the final word about the tragedy which is taking place in Lebanon. Even today, however, we can with confidence conclude that, at the walls of Beirut and in the hills of Lebanon, Israel and its American sponsors have, as a result of the bravery and steadfastness of the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians, suffered a resounding political and moral defeat.

They did not succeed, either by fire or sword, in erasing the Palestinian question, in making it no longer an issue. On the contrary, the heroism of the Palestinians in the struggle against an enemy which far surpassed them in strength has immeasurably increased the authority and the political influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Washington is now in a hurry to consign this bloody tragedy to oblivion and to pretend that it is endeavouring to find a solution to the Middle East problem. But the very basis of the United States

proposals is faulty. They deny the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and to the establishment of their own state and reduce the whole 'solution' to promises of 'administrative autonomy' for the Palestinians under the full control of Israel. They do not include a single mention of PLO, the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

In this regard, in opposing the creation by the Palestinians of their own state, the Washington administration also brings into question the legal basis for the existence of Israel. The United Nations decision adopted in 1947 provided for the creation of two sovereign States - Arab and Jewish - in the former mandated Territory of Palestine. No one revoked or can revoke that decision. It would be rash to consider that only that part of the decision which relates to the establishment of a Jewish State can be implemented and that the part dealing with the establishment of a Palestinian Arab State can be ignored forever.

If one seriously speaks about some sort of movement towards a settlement in the Middle East, it is necessary first of all to force the aggressors to leave Lebanon, renounce their acts of banditry and cease their provocation against Syria. We would advise Israel to come to its senses and stop playing with fire. The patience of the world community is not unlimited.

It is our firm belief that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can and should be based on the following principles, which are in accordance with both the general norms of international law and the concrete decisions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on this question.

*First*, the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of foreign territories by aggression must be strictly observed. This means that all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 - the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Lebanese territories - must be returned to the Arabs. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours must be declared inviolable.

*Secondly*, the inalienable right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent State in the Palestinian territories which will be freed from Israeli occupation - the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip - must be guaranteed in practice. Palestinian refugees must be granted the opportunity, provided for in United Nations decisions, to return to their homes or receive compensation for properties which they left.

*Thirdly*, the Eastern part of Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israel in 1967 and where one of the main Moslem Holy Places is situated, must be returned to the Arabs and become an integral part of the Palestinian State. The freedom of access of the faithful to the Holy Places of the three religions must be guaranteed throughout Jerusalem.

*Fourthly*, the right of all States in the region to security, independent existence and development must, of course, be guaranteed on a basis of complete reciprocity, because one cannot guarantee the security of some while disregarding that of others.

*Fifthly*, the state of war must be ended and peace must be established between the Arab States and Israel. This means that all parties to the conflict, including Israel and the Palestinian State, must undertake to respect each others sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and to settle any disputes which may arise by peaceful means, through negotiations.

*Sixthly*, international guarantees for the settlement must be worked out and adopted, for example, the permanent members of the Security Council or the Council as a whole could assume the role of guarantors.

Such a comprehensive, truly just and lasting settlement can be worked out and implemented only through collective efforts, with the participation of all interested parties - among which, of course, must certainly be PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

Our proposal for convening an international conference on the Middle East, which has received widespread support, including the support of Democratic Yemen, makes provision for just such a means of settlement.

I should particularly like to say that, under the present circumstances, the unity of all Arab States in the struggle against the Israeli invaders is more important than ever. This unity is as essential to the Arabs as the air they breathe and the water they drink. The stronger and more dependable this unity the quicker the schemes of the imperialists in the Middle East will be foiled.

The Conference of Arab Heads of State and Government ended recently. The declaration which was issued summarizing its work reflected legitimate concern and indignation at Israel's aggression in Lebanon and its continuing occupation of Arab lands. We view as positive the principles adopted by the Conference for resolving the Palestinian problem and bringing about a general Middle East settlement. They do not differ in any way from what the Soviet Union has been struggling for many years, as I have briefly described it. [...]



**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE ENTRY OF THE  
ISRAELI ARMY INTO WEST BEIRUT, 16 SEPTEMBER 1982**

*[The US Marines who had supervised the departure of the PLO had left Beirut on 10 Sept. On 12 Sept., DM Sharon met with Pres.-elect Bashir Gemayel agreeing that Lebanese units would start clearing the Palestinian fedayeen concentrations. On 14 Sept., Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in a bomb explosion at his Phalange HQ, prompting the Israeli PM, DM and army Chief of Staff to order the army into West Beirut. A day later the Cabinet approved that Israeli troops besiege the Palestinian refugee camps in that part of Beirut.]*

Following the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the I.D.F. took positions in west Beirut in order to prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and anarchy, while about 2,000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons remained in west Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement. This danger was indeed averted.

The Israeli government will instruct the Israel Defense Forces to evacuate these positions when the Lebanese army will be ready to assume control over them in coordination with the I.D.F., in order to insure public order and security.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 520 REGARDING THE  
SITUATION IN BEIRUT, NEW YORK, 17 SEPTEMBER 1982**

The Security Council

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1982 (S/ 15382/ Add. 1),  
*Condemning* the murder of Bashir Gemayel, Lebanon's constitutionally selected President-elect, and every effort to disrupt by violence the restoration of a strong, stable, government in Lebanon,  
*Having listened* to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon,  
*Taking note* of Lebanon's determination to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), and 516 (1982) in all their components;
2. *Condemns* the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions;

3. *Demands* an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982, as a first step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolutions;
4. *Calls again* for the strict respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence under the sole and exclusive authority of the Lebanese government through the Lebanese army throughout Lebanon;
5. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;
6. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 516 (1982) concerning the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor in and around Beirut and requests all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in the application of that resolution.
7. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and asks the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on developments as soon as possible and not later than twenty-four hours.



**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE MASSACRE AT  
SABRA AND SHATILLA REFUGEE CAMPS, JERUSALEM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1982**

*[On 16 Sept., the Israeli army surrounded the Palestinian refugee camps in west Beirut to search for guerillas and confiscate weapons. Later that day, Phalangists – whose use was decided a day earlier - entered the camps and the massacres began, lasting till the night of 18 Sept. The next day, reporters entered the camps and confirmed the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians. The Israeli Cabinet met in an extraordinary session and issued the following communiqué:]*

On the New Year, a blood libel was levelled at the Jewish State and its Government, against the Israel Defense Forces.

In a place where there was no position of the Israeli army, a Lebanese unit entered a refugee center where terrorists were hiding, in order to apprehend them. This unit caused many casualties to innocent civilians. We state this fact with deep grief and regret. The I.D.F., as soon as it learned of the tragic events in the Shatila camp, put an end to the slaughter of the innocent civilian population and forced the Lebanese unit to evacuate the camp. The civilian population itself gave clear expression to its gratitude for the act of salvation by the I.D.F. All the direct or implicit accusations that the I.D.F. bear any blame whatsoever for this human tragedy in the Shatila Camp are entirely baseless and without any foundation. The Government of Israel rejects them with the contempt which they deserve.

The fact remains that without the intervention of the I.D.F., there would have been much greater loss of life. It is also necessary to note that for two days and nights the Israel Defense Forces carried out actions against terrorists in West Beirut and no complaints whatsoever were voiced concerning civilian casualties.

It has become evident that the terrorists grossly violated the evaluation agreement, not only by leaving two thousand of them in West Beirut, but also by hiding away immense quantities of weapons, including heavy arms, such as tanks, artillery, mortars, and huge amounts of ammunition. All this was done in order to continue with the bloody terror against Israel and other nations from west Beirut.

Despite the internal incitement, we call upon the people of Israel to unite around its democratically elected government in its struggle for security and peace for Israel and all its citizens. No one will preach to us ethics and respect for human life, values on which we have educated, and will continue to educate generations of Israeli fighters.



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 521 REGARDING THE MASSACRE OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN BEIRUT, NEW YORK, 19 SEPTEMBER 1982**

The Security Council,

*Appalled* at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,  
*Having heard* the report of the Secretary-General (S/15400),

*Noting* that the Government of Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations Observers to the sites of greatest human suffering and losses in and around that city,

1. *Condemns* the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut;
2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the rights of the civilian population without any discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against that population;
3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General as an immediate step to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50 and insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of those observers in order that they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate, to the effort to ensure full protection for the civilian population;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General as a matter of urgency to initiate appropriate consultations and in particular consultations with the Government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and around Beirut and requests him to report to the Council within forty-eight hours;
6. *Insists* that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge their mandate and in this connexion solemnly calls attention to the obligation on all Member State under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on an urgent and continuing basis.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION ES-7/9 CONDEMNING THE MASSACRE OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN BEIRUT, NEW YORK, 24 SEPTEMBER 1982**

The General Assembly,

*Having considered* the question of Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency special session,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

*Recalling and reaffirming*, in particular, its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

*Appalled* at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,

*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, 513 (1982) of 4 July 1982, 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982 and 521 (1982) of 19 September 1982,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General relevant to the situation, particularly his report of 18 September 1982,

*Noting with regret* that the Security Council has so far not taken effective and practical measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure implementation of its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

*Referring* to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907,

*Deeply concerned* at the sufferings of the Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations,

*Noting* the homelessness of the Palestinian people,

*Reaffirming* the imperative need to permit the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights.

1. *Condemns* the criminal massacre of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 17 September 1982;
2. *Urges* the Security Council to investigate, through the means available to it, the circumstances and extent of the massacre of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 17 September 1982, and to make public the report on its findings as soon as possible;
3. *Decides* to support fully the provisions of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), in which the Council, *inter alia*, demanded that:
  - (a) Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;
  - (b) All parties to the conflict cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;
4. *Demands* that all Member States and other parties observe strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
5. *Reaffirms* the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
6. *Resolves* that, in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant resolutions, the Palestinian refugees should be enabled to return to their homes and property from which they have been uprooted and displaced, and demands that Israel comply unconditionally and immediately with the present resolution;
7. *Urges* the Security Council, in the event of continued failure by Israel to comply with the demands contained in resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and the present resolution, to meet in order to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
8. *Calls upon* all States and international agencies and organizations to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a photographic exhibit of the massacre of 17 September 1982 and to display it in the United Nations visitors' hall;
10. *Decides* to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meeting upon request from Member States.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 37/88 - REPORT OF A  
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING ISRAELI PRACTICES IN THE TERRITORIES,  
NEW YORK, 10 DECEMBER 1982**

A.

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3525 B (XXX) of 15 December 1975, 31/106 B of 16 December 1976, 32/91 A of 13 December 1977, 33/113 A of 18 December 1978, 34/90 B of 12 December 1979, 35/112 of 11 December 1980 and 36/147 A of 16 December 1981.

*Recalling* also Security Council resolution 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 in which, *inter alia*, the Council affirmed that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

*Considering* that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention,

*Noting that* Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

*Taking into account* that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect, but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to Palestinian and other territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Condemns* once again the failure of Israel as the occupying power to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
3. *Strongly demands* that Israel acknowledge and comply with the provisions of that Convention in Palestinian and other Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
4. *Urgently calls upon* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

#### B.

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolutions 32/5 of 28 October 1977, 33/113 B of 18 December 1978, 34/90 C of 12 December 1979, 35/122 B of 11 December 1980 and 36/147 B of 16 December 1981,

*Recalling* also Security Council resolution 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,

*Expressing* grave anxiety and concern at the present serious situation in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and the measures and actions taken by the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories,

*Considering* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, including Jerusalem.

1. *Determines* that all such measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, are in violation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and therefore have no legal validity;
2. *Strongly deplors* the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.
3. *Demands* that Israel comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention;
4. *Demands* once more that the Government of Israel, the occupying Power, desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature of demographic composition of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. *Urgently calls upon* all States parties to the Geneva Convention to respect and to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in all Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

#### C.

The General Assembly,

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

*Recalling* all its resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977, 33/113 C of 18 December 1978, 34/90 A of 12 December 1979, 35/122 C of 11 December 1980 and 36/147 C of 16 December 1981, and also those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations organs concerned and by the specialized agencies,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which contains, inter alia, public statements made by the leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly and for its thoroughness and impartiality;
2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
3. *Demands* that Israel allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
4. *Reaffirms* the fact that occupation itself constitutes a grave violation of the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied Arab territories;
5. *Condemns* the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as "grave breaches" thereof;
6. *Declares* once more that Israel's grave breaches of that Convention are war crimes and an affront to humanity;
7. *Strongly condemns* the following Israeli policies and practices:
  - (a) Annexation of parts of the occupied territories, including Jerusalem;
  - (b) Imposition of Israeli laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Syrian Golan Heights, which has resulted in the effective annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights;
  - (c) Establishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private and public Arab lands, and transfer of an alien population thereto;
  - (d) Evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and denial of their right to return;
  - (e) Confiscation and expropriation of private and public Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
  - (f) Excavations and transformations of the landscape and the historical, cultural and religious sites, especially at Jerusalem;
  - (g) Destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
  - (h) Collective punishment, mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
  - (i) Ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
  - (j) Pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
  - (k) Interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
  - (l) Interference with the system of education and with the social and economic development of the population in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
  - (m) Interference with the freedom of movement of individuals within the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
  - (n) Illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
8. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention and of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
9. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above;
10. *Urges* the international organizations and the specialized agencies, in particular the International Labour Organisation, to examine the conditions of Arab workers in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem;
11. *Reiterates* its calls upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention, in accordance with article I of that Convention, and upon international organizations and the specialized agencies, not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Is-

- rael in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
12. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
  13. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
  14. *Condemns* Israel's refusal to permit persons from the occupied territories to appear as witnesses before the Special Committee;
  15. *Requests* the Secretary-General:
    - (a) To provide all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating the Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
    - (b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
    - (c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee that are no longer available;
    - (d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;
  16. *Requests* the Security Council to ensure Israel's respect and compliance with all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to initiate measures to halt Israeli policies and practices in those territories;
  17. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

## D.

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* Security Council resolutions 468 (1980) of 8 May 1980, 469 (1980) of 20 May 1980, 484 (1980) of 19 December 1980 and General Assembly resolution 36/147 D of 16 December 1981,

*Deeply concerned* at the expulsion by the Israeli military occupation authorities of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>1</sup> and in particular article I and the first paragraph of article 49, which read as follows:

*Article 1:* "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."

*Article 49:* "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive ...",

*Reaffirming* the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. *Demands once more* that the Government of Israel, the occupying power, rescind the illegal measures taken by the Israeli military occupation authorities in expelling and imprisoning the Mayors of Hebron and Halhul and in expelling the Sharia Judge of Hebron and that it facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders so that they can resume the functions for which they were elected and appointed;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible on the implementation of the present resolution.

E.

The General Assembly,

*Deeply concerned* that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have been under continued Israeli military occupation,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981 and General Assembly resolutions 36/226 B of 17 December 1981 and ES-9/1 of 5 February 1982,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, in particular 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975, 31/51 of 9 December 1976, 32/20 of 25 November 1977, 33/28 and 33/29 of 7 December 1978, 34/70 of 6 December 1979 and 35/112 E of 11 December 1980, in which it, *inter alia* called upon Israel to put an end to its occupation of the Arab territories and to withdraw from all those territories,

*Reaffirming once more* the illegality of Israel's decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that territory,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and that all territories thus occupied by Israel must be returned,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

1. *Strongly condemns* Israel, the occupying power, for its refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly Council resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council, *inter alia*, decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was null and void and without international legal effect and demanded that Israel, the occupying power, should rescind forthwith its decision;
2. *Condemns* the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights;
3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that purport to alter the character and legal status of the Syrian Arab Golan Heights are null and void and constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and have no legal effect.
4. *Strongly condemns* Israel for its attempts and measures to impose forcibly Israeli citizenship and Israeli identity cards on the Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights and calls upon it to desist from its repressive measures against the population of the Syrian Arab Golan Heights;
5. *Calls upon* Member states not to recognize any of the legislative or administrative measures and actions referred to above;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

F.

The General Assembly,

*Bearing in mind* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Deeply shocked* by the most recent atrocities committed by Israel, the occupying power, against educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories,

1. *Reaffirms* the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Condemns* Israeli policies and practices against Palestinian students and faculty in schools, universities and other educational institutions in the occupied Palestinian territories, especially the policy of opening fire on defenceless students, causing many casualties;
3. *Condemns* the systematic Israeli campaign of repression against and closing of universities in the occupied Palestinian territories, restricting and impeding academic activities of Palestinian uni-

versities by subjecting the selection of courses, textbooks and educational programmes, the admission of students and the appointment of faculty members to the control and supervision of the military occupation authorities, in clear contravention of the Geneva Convention;

4. *Demands* that Israel, the occupying power, comply with the provisions of that Convention, rescind all actions and measures against all educational institutions, ensure the freedom of these institutions and refrain forthwith from hindering the effective operation of the universities and other educational institutions;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution before the end of 1983.

#### G.

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 471 (1980) of 5 June 1980, in which the Council condemned the assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh and called for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of those crimes,

*Recalling also* General Assembly resolution 36/147 G of 16 December 1981,

*Recalling once again* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in particular article 27, which states, inter alia:

"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons... They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof...".

*Reaffirming* the applicability of that Convention to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. *Expresses deep concern* that Israel, the occupying power, has failed for two years to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators of the assassination attempts;
2. *Demands once more* that Israel, the occupying power, inform the Secretary-General of the results of the investigations relevant to the assassination attempts;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.



### **JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THEIR MEETINGS, AMMAN, 14 DECEMBER 1982**

The joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee ended a round of talks at noon today. Committee talks were conducted over the past two days. The committee issued the following communiqué to the press after the meetings:

The Jordanian and Palestinian sides met with an understanding of the requirements of the current stage and for the effects that this stage will have on the Palestinian cause. The two sides met with a commitment to save the occupied territories and to restore the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The two sides met with an understanding of the historic and national dimensions which places the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples in a position which is directly affected by the continuous Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people and their national homeland.

Joint continuous meetings have taken place since the historic meeting between the PLO chairman Arafat and Hussein on October 9, 1982. The Jordanian side was headed by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and the Palestinian side was headed by the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat.

As a result of intensive deliberations the two sides agreed in the spirit of common understanding to develop a special and distinguished relationship between Jordan and Liberated Palestine.

The two sides agreed to continue joint political moves on all levels and in conformity with the Fez Summit resolutions and within the framework of joint Arab moves which will guarantee the mobilization of Arab potentials to restore Arab and Palestinian rights.

The two sides also agreed that the joint committee will continue further discussion on the question of bilateral relations and new political developments.



## **REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS AT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT (KAHAN COMMISSION), 8 FEBRUARY 1983**

The Commission determined that the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla was carried out by a Phalangist unit, acting on its own but its entry was known to Israel. No Israeli was directly responsible for the events which occurred in the camps. But the Commission asserted that Israel had indirect responsibility for the massacre since the I.D.F. held the area, Mr. Begin was found responsible for not exercising greater involvement and awareness in the matter of introducing the Phalangists into the camps. Mr. Sharon was found responsible for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge when he approved the entry of the Phalangists into the camps as well as not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed. Mr. Shamir erred by not taking action after being alerted by communications Minister Zippori. Chief of Staff Eitan did not give the appropriate orders to prevent the massacre. The Commission recommended that the Defense Minister resign, that the Director of Military Intelligence not continue in his post and other senior officers be removed. Full text follows:

### INTRODUCTION

At a meeting of the Cabinet on 28 September 1982, the Government of Israel resolved to establish a commission of inquiry in accordance with the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968. The Cabinet charged the commission as follows:

"The matter which will be subjected to inquiry is: all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese Forces against the civilian population in the Shatilla and Sabra camps."

In the wake of this resolution, the President of the Supreme Court, by virtue of the authority vested in him under Section 4 of the aforementioned law, appointed a commission of inquiry comprised as follows: Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Supreme Court commission chairman; Aharon Barak, Justice of the Supreme Court; Yona Efrat, Major General (Res.).

The commission held 60 sessions, hearing 58 witnesses. As per the commission's requests of the Cabinet Secretary, the Office of the Minister of Defense, the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (henceforth, the I.D.F.), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and other public and governmental institutions, the commission was provided with many documents, some of which were, in the course of the deliberations, submitted to the commission as exhibits. The commission decided, in accordance with section 13(A) of the law, that there was a need to collect data necessary for its investigation. Appointed as staff investigators were:

Ms. Dorit. Beinisch, Deputy State Attorney, and Ms. Edna Arbel, Senior Assistant to the District Attorney (Central District), who were seconded to the commission by the Attorney General; and Assistant Police Commander Alex Ish-Shalom, who was seconded to the commission by the Inspector General of the Israel Police. Judge David Bartov was appointed commission coordinator. The staff investigators collected, by virtue of the authority vested in them under Sections 13(C), 180 statements from 163 witnesses. Before the commission began its deliberations, it visited Beirut, but it was not allowed to enter the area of the events. The commission also viewed television footage filmed near the time of the events at the camps and their surroundings.

The commission published notices to the public in the press and other media, inviting all who wish to testify or submit a document or bring any information to the commission's attention to submit to the commission in writing details of the material he possessed or wished to bring to the commission's attention. There

was not much response to these appeals. The commission made an effort to collect testimony also from people who live outside the juridical boundaries of the State of Israel; and all necessary steps were taken to bring witnesses from outside of Israel, when this was possible. The commission's requests in this matter were not always honored. For example, the "New York Times" correspondent Mr Thomas Friedman, who published in the aforementioned newspaper a famous article on what transpired during the period under deliberation here, refused to appear before the commission, claiming that this was contrary to his paper's editorial policy. We did not receive a satisfactory answer as to why the paper's publisher prevented its reporter from appearing before the commission and thus helping it uncover all the important facts.

Some of the commission's hearings were held in open session, but most of the sessions were in camera.

In this matter we acted in accordance with the instructions of Section 18(A) of the law, according to which a commission of inquiry is required to deliberate in open session but is entitled to deliberate in camera if it is convinced that "it is necessary to do so in the interest of protecting the security of the State... the foreign relations of the State..." and for other reasons stipulated in that section. It became clear to the commission that with regard to certain matters about which witnesses testified before it, open hearings would be liable to affect adversely the nation's security or foreign relations; and therefore it heard most of its testimony in camera. It should be noted that during sessions held in camera, witnesses also said things whose publication would not cause any harm; however, because of the difficulty in separating those things whose publication would be permissible from those whose publication would be forbidden, it was imperative in a substantial number of cases to hear the entire testimony in camera. In accordance, with Section 20(A) of the law, this report is being published together with an appendix that will be called Appendix A. In the event that we will need recourse in this report to testimony whose publication would not be damaging to the nation's security or foreign relations, we shall present it in a section of the report that will be published. On the other hand, in accordance with Section 20(A) of the law, a portion of this report, to be called Appendix B, will not be published, since, in our opinion, non-publication of this material is essential in the interest of protecting the nation's security or foreign relations.

As we have said, the commission's task, as stipulated by the Cabinet's resolution, is "to investigate all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity which was carried out by a unit of the Lebanese Forces against the civilian population of the Shatilla and Sabra camps." These acts were perpetrated between Thursday, 16 September 1982, and Saturday, 18 September 1982. The establishment of the facts and the conclusions in this report relate only to the facts and factors connected with the acts perpetrated in the aforementioned time frame, and the commission did not deliberate or investigate matters whose connection with the aforementioned acts is indirect or remote. The commission refrained, therefore, from drawing conclusions with regard to various issues connected with activities during the war that took place in Lebanon from 6 June 1982 onward or with regard to policy decisions taken by the Government before or during the war, unless these activities or decisions were directly related to the events that are the subject of this investigation. Descriptions of facts presented in this report that deviate from the framework of the commission's authority (as defined above) have been cited only as background material, in order to better understand and illustrate the chain of events.

In one area we have found it necessary to deviate somewhat from the stipulation of the Cabinet's resolution, which represents the commission's terms of reference. The resolution speaks of atrocities carried out by "a unit of the Lebanese Forces." The expression "Lebanese Forces" refers to an armed force known by the name "Phalangists" or "Ketaib" (henceforth, Phalangists). It is our opinion that we would not be properly fulfilling our task if we did not look into the question of whether the atrocities spoken of in the Cabinet's resolution were indeed perpetrated by the Phalangists, and this question will indeed be treated in the course of this report.

The commission's deliberations can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the commission heard witnesses who had been summoned by it, as well as witnesses who had expressed the desire to appear before it. The commission asked questions of these witnesses, and they were given the opportunity of bringing before the commission everything known to them of the matters that constitute the subject of the investigation. When this stage terminated, the commission issued a resolution in accordance with

Section 15(A) of the aforementioned law, concerning the harm that might be caused certain people as a result of the investigation or its results; this was done in order to enable these people to study the material, to appear before the commission and to testify (for the text of the resolution, see section I of appendix A). In accordance with this resolution, the chairman of the commission sent notices to nine people; the notices detailed how each one of them might be harmed. The material in the commission's possession was placed at the disposal of those receiving the notices and of the attorneys appointed to represent them. During the second stage of the deliberations, we heard witnesses who had been summoned at the request of the lawyers, and thus some of the witnesses who had testified during the first stage were cross-examined.

Afterwards, written summations were submitted, and the opportunity to supplement these summations by presenting oral arguments was given. We should already note that involving the lawyers in the commission's deliberations did not in any way make the commission's work more difficult; it even helped us in fulfilling our task. The lawyers who appeared before us were able to clarify properly, though not at excessive length, the various points that were the subject of controversy; and thus they rendered valuable assistance to the commission's task, without in any way prejudicing their professional obligation to properly represent and defend their clients.

When we resolved to issue, in accordance with Section 15(A) of the law, notices about harm to the nine people, we were not oblivious to the fact that, during the course of the investigation, facts were uncovered that could be the *prima facie* basis for results that might cause harm to other persons as well. Our consideration in limiting the notices about possible harm to only nine persons was based on [the conception] that it is our duty, as a public judicial commission dealing with an extremely important issue - one which had raised a furor among the general public in Israel and other nations - to deliberate and reach findings and conclusions with regard to the major and important things connected with the aforementioned events, and to the question of the responsibility of those persons whose decisions and actions could have decisively influenced the course of events. We felt that with regard to the other people who were involved in one way or another in the events we are investigating, but whose role was secondary, it would be better that the clarification or investigation, if deemed necessary, be carried out in another manner, and not before this commission, *viz.*, before the military authorities, in accordance with the relevant stipulations of the military legal code and other legislation. We chose this path so that the matters under investigation would not expand and become overly-complicated and so that we could complete our task in not too long a time.

In the course of the investigation, not a few contradictions came out regarding various facts about which we had heard testimony. In those cases where the contradictions referred to facts important for establishing findings and drawing subsequent conclusions, we shall decide between the variant versions in accordance with the usual criteria in judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. Our procedures are not those of a criminal court; and therefore the criterion of criminal courts that stipulates that in order to convict someone his guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, does not apply in this case. Nevertheless, since we are aware that our findings and conclusions are liable to be of significant influence from a social and ethical standpoint, and to harm also in other ways persons involved in our deliberations, no finding of significant harm was established with regard to any one of those to whom notices were sent, unless convincing evidence on which to base such a finding was found, and we shall not be satisfied with evidence that leaves room for real doubt. We shall not pretend to find a solution to all the contradictions in testimony. In many instances, these contradictions relate to the content of conversations that took place between various people without the presence of witnesses, or when the witnesses' attention was not focused on the content of the conversation, and there are no exact notes on these conversations. In such cases, it is only natural that there exist several versions with regard to what was said, and the differences between them do not necessarily derive from a desire to conceal the truth but rather are sometimes the natural result of a failure of the human memory. We do not see the need to rule about those contradictions which surround unimportant details that do not influence the decision about points in controversy.

We shall conclude this part of the report by expressing appreciation and gratitude to all those who helped us in fulfilling our task. It is only fitting that we note that all the institutions and various functionaries in the Government, the I.D.F., and other authorities whose help we needed rendered us all

the necessary assistance and placed at our disposal all the relevant material, without reservation. Our special thanks go to the coordinator of the commission, Judge David Bartov, who showed great capability in handling the administrative aspects of the commission's work and without whose enterprise and devoted and efficient work it is very doubtful whether we would have succeeded in properly carrying out our task. Our appreciation and gratitude go also to the staff investigators, Dorit Beinish, Edna Arbel and Alex Ish-Shalom, who, by virtue of their expertise, initiative and dedication, succeeded in placing at our disposal much material which served as the basis of the commission's deliberations and findings. Similarly, our thanks go to the entire staff of commission employees, whose loyalty and faithfulness enabled us to carry out and complete our task.

### A DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS

#### The Period Before the Events in Beirut

In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon. This war began with clashes in Sidon between the Christians and Palestinian terrorists and subsequently widened in a manner to encompass many diverse armed forces - under the auspices of ethnic groups, political parties, and various organizations - that were active in Lebanon. In its early stages, this war was waged primarily between the Christian organizations on the one hand, and Palestinian terrorists, Lebanese leftist organizations, and Muslim and Druze organizations of various factions on the other. In the course of the civil war, Syrian army forces entered Lebanon and took part in the war, for a certain period of time on the side of the Christian forces, and subsequently on the side of the terrorists and the Lebanese leftist organizations. During the early years of the war, massacres on a large scale were perpetrated by the fighting forces against the civilian population. The Christian city of Damour was captured and destroyed by Palestinian terrorists in January 1976. The Christian residents fled the city, and the conquering forces carried out acts of slaughter that cost the lives of many Christians. In August 1976, the Christian forces captured the Tel Zaatar refugee camp in Beirut, where Palestinian terrorists had dug in, and thousands of Palestinian refugees were massacred. Each massacre brought in its wake acts of revenge of a similar nature. The number of victims of the civil war has been estimated at close to 100,000 killed, including a large number of civilians, among them women and children.

The Palestinians' armed forces organized and entrenched themselves in camps inhabited by refugees who had arrived in Lebanon in various waves, beginning in 1948. There are various estimates as to the number of Palestinian refugees who were living in Lebanon in 1982. According to the figures of U.N.R.W.A. (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), the Palestinian refugees numbered approximately 270,000. On the other hand, the leaders of the Christian armed forces estimated the number of Palestinian refugees at approximately 500,000 or more. This estimate is most probably exaggerated, and the more realistic estimate is the one that puts the number of Palestinian refugees at approximately 300,000 - and in any case, not more than 400,000.

The main Christian armed force that took part in the civil war consisted mainly of Maronite Christians, though a small number of Shiites joined them. This force comprised several armed Christian organizations, the largest among them being the organizations under the leadership of the Chamoun family and of the Jemayel family. The head of the Jemayel family, Mr. Pierre Jemayel, founded the Phalangist organization; and the leader of this organization in recent years was Pierre's son, Bashir Jemayel. In the course of time, the Phalangist organization became the central element in the Christian forces; in 1982, the Phalangists ruled the Christian armed forces. Even though the "Lebanese Forces" formally comprised several Christian organizations, the dominant and primary force in this organization, at the time under our scrutiny, was the Phalangists, led by the Jemayel family.

When the war broke out in Lebanon in June 1982, the Phalangist force included a nucleus of approximately 2,000 full-time recruited soldiers. In addition, the Phalangists had a reserve armed force - that is, men who served part-time in their free hours or when they were called up for special service. When fully mobilized, the number of Phalangist soldiers reached 5,000. Similarly, the Phalangists had militias in the villages. There were no ranks in this military force, but it was organized along military lines, with Bashir Jemayel as the military and political leader who enjoyed unimpeachable

authority. The Phalangists had a general staff comprised of several commanders. At the head of this general staff was a commander named Fadi Frem; at the head of the Phalangists' intelligence division was a commander by the name of Elie Hobeika.

The link between the Christian forces and the State of Israel was formed shortly after the start of the civil war. In the course of time, this link grew stronger, from both political and military standpoints. The Christian forces were promised that if their existence were to become endangered, Israel would come to their aid. Israel extended significant aid to the Christian armed forces, supplying arms, uniforms, etc., and also training and instruction. Over the course of time, a considerable number of meetings were held between leaders of the Phalangists and representatives of the Government of Israel and the I.D.F. In the course of these meetings, the ties between the leaders of the two sides grew stronger. The Institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments (henceforth, the Mossad) was made responsible for the link with the Phalangists; and representatives of the Mossad maintained - at various times, and in various ways - a rather close connection with the Phalangist leadership. In the course of these meetings, the Phalangist leaders brought up various plans for strengthening the Christian forces' position, as well as various ways of bringing about the end of the civil war in Lebanon and restoring the independence of that nation, while [simultaneously] buttressing the status of the Phalangists and those allied with them in a regime that would be established in Lebanon. Israel's representatives expressed various reservations with regard to these plans and Israel's involvement in their realization.

A separate armed force is the military force in South Lebanon - the "Army of Free Lebanon" under the command of Major Haddad. This force comprises several hundred full-time soldiers. In addition, there is in South Lebanon a National Guard, which, under the command of local officers, does guard duty in the villages. Relations between the Phalangists and Haddad's men are not particularly close, for various reasons, and there were points of tension between these two forces. In 1982, soldiers of both Major Haddad and the Phalangists wore uniforms provided by Israel - and similar to those worn by the I.D.F. The Phalangists' uniforms bore an emblem consisting of the inscription "Ketaib Lubnaniyeh" and the drawing of the cedar, embroidered over the shirt pocket. Major Haddad's soldiers had an emblem on the epaulet inscribed with the words "Army of Free Lebanon" in Arabic and the drawing of a cedar. During the war, Haddad's force advanced and reached the Awali River. Pursuant to I.D.F. orders, Haddad's army did not proceed north of the Awali River.

The subject of the Palestinian population in Lebanon, from among whom the terrorist organizations sprang up and in the midst of whom their military infrastructure was entrenched, came up more than once in meetings between phalangist leaders and Israeli representatives. The position of the Phalangist leaders, as reflected in various pronouncements of these leaders, was, in general, that no unified and independent Lebanese state could be established without a solution being found to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, who, according to the Phalangists' estimates, numbered half a million people. In the opinion of the Phalangists, that number of refugees, for the most part Muslims, endangered [both] the demographic balance between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and (from other standpoints as well) the stability of the State of Lebanon and the status of the Christians in that country. Therefore, the Phalangist leaders proposed removing a large portion of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanese soil, whether by methods of persuasion or other means of pressure. They did not conceal their opinion that it would be necessary to resort to acts of violence in order to cause the exodus of many Palestinian refugees from Lebanon.

As we have said, the Mossad was the organization that actually handled the relations between the Phalangists and Israel, and its representatives maintained close contacts with the Phalangist leadership. In addition, the Intelligence branch of the I.D.F. (henceforth Military Intelligence) participated, albeit in a more limited capacity, in the contacts with the Phalangists; and it, by virtue of its job, was to issue a not insignificant number of evaluation papers on the Phalangists, their leaders, their aims, their fighting ability, etc. The division of labor between the Mossad and Military Intelligence with regard to the Phalangists, was spelled out in a document (exhibit 189). While this division of duties left room for misunderstandings and also duplication in various areas, there is no room for doubt that both the Mossad and Military Intelligence specifically dealt with drawing up evaluations on the Phalangists, and each one of them was obligated to

bring these evaluations to the attention of all interested parties. Neither the head of the Mossad nor the director of Military Intelligence disagreed with this in his testimony before us.

From the documents submitted to us and the testimony we heard, it emerges that there were differences of opinion between the Mossad and Military Intelligence with regard to the relations with the Phalangists. The Mossad, to a not inconsiderable extent under the influence of constant and close contact with the Phalangist elite, felt positively about strengthening relations with that organization, though not ignoring its faults and weaknesses. This approach of the Mossad came out clearly in the testimony we heard from the person who was in charge of the Mossad's contacts with the Phalangists. The head of the Mossad, in his testimony before us on 27.12.82, said, inter alia (p. 1437), that "the Mossad tried, to the best of its ability, throughout this period, to present and approach the subject as objectively as possible; but since it was in charge of the contacts, I accept as an assumption that subjective, and not only objective, relations also emerged. I must accept that in contacts, when you talk to people, relationships are formed." In contrast, Military Intelligence was to emphasize in its evaluations the danger in the link with the Phalangists, primarily because of this organization's lack of reliability, its military weakness, and other reasons we need not specify here. A characteristic expression of the difference in approach between these two agencies, whose responsibility it was to provide evaluations on the Phalangists and the desirability of relations with them, can be found in the exchange of documents when one of the intelligence officers (henceforth intelligence officer A, whose full name appears in the list of names in section I of Appendix B) who served as a liaison officer on behalf of Military Intelligence in the Mossad's representation at Phalangist headquarters at the beginning of the war submitted an assessment (exhibit 171) on cooperation with the Phalangists. This Military Intelligence officer rendered a negative evaluation, from Israel's standpoint, of the Phalangists' policy during the war and their aims for the future. This criticism was vigorously rejected by the Mossad (exhibit 172).

The "Peace for the Galilee" war (henceforth the war) began on 6.6.82. On 12-14 June, J.D.F. forces took over the suburbs of Beirut and linked up with the Christian forces who controlled East Beirut. On 25 June the encirclement of West Beirut was completed and I.D.F. forces were in control of the Beirut-Damascus road. There followed a period of approximately one and a half months of negotiations on the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces from West Beirut, and during this time various targets in West Beirut were occasionally shelled and bombed by the I.D.F.'s, Air Force and artillery. On 19.8.82 the negotiations on the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces from West Beirut were completed. On 23.8.82 Bashir Jemayel was elected president of Lebanon. His term of office was supposed to begin on 23 September 1982.

On 21-26 August, a multi-national force arrived in Beirut, and the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces began. The evacuation was completed on 1 September; however, according to information from various sources, the terrorists did not fulfill their obligation to evacuate all their forces from West Beirut and hand their weapons over to the Lebanese army but left in West Beirut, according to various estimates, approximately 2,000 fighters, as well as many arms caches, some of which were handed over by the terrorists to the Lebanese leftist militia "Mourabitoun." This militia numbered approximately 7,000 men in West Beirut, and it cooperated with the terrorists. After the evacuation was completed, the multi-national force left Lebanon (10-12 September 1982; cf. section 2 of Appendix A for dates of stages of the war).

At the beginning of the war, the Chief of Staff [Lt.-Gen. Rafael Eitan] told the Phalangists that they should refrain from all fighting. This order was issued because of the fear that if the Phalangists' force got into trouble while fighting, the I.D.F. would be forced to come to its aid, thereby disrupting the I.D.F.'s plan of action. Even after I.D.F. forces reached the Damour-Shouf line, the I.D.F.'s orders were that the Phalangists would not participate in fighting (testimony of the Chief of Staff, pp. 195-6). After I.D.F. forces reached the area under Christian control, the Phalangist commanders suggested that a company of theirs of approximately 300 men set up a training base at a place called Beit Ad-Din, a site of historical importance in Lebanon. The Chief of Staff agreed to this, but made his agreement conditional on the Phalangist forces' exercising restraint and discipline, as the area was Druze. At first, this condition was honored; afterwards, there were outbursts of hostilities between the Phalangists and the Druze in

Beit Ad Din. The Druze committed some murders, and the Phalangists took revenge; a small I.D.F. force was stationed in the area in order to prevent such actions. In the early stages of the war there were also some acts of revenge and looting on the part of the Christians in Sidon; these were stopped by the I.D.F.

When I.D.F. forces were fighting in the suburbs of Beirut and along the Beirut-Damascus road, the Phalangists were asked to cooperate with the I.D.F.'s actions by identifying terrorists, a task at which the Phalangists' expertise was greater than that of the Israeli security forces. During these actions there were generally no acts of vengeance or violence against the Palestinian civilian population by the Phalangists who were operating with the I.D.F. Another action of the Phalangists' military force was the capture of the technical college in Reihan, a large building in Beirut not located in a built-up area. The Phalangists captured this place from the armed Shiite organization "Amal." One day after the place was taken, the Phalangists turned the building over to the I.D.F. and left the site (testimony of the Chief of Staff, pp. 198-200).

The fighting actions of the Phalangists during that time were few, and in effect the fighting was all done by I.D.F. forces alone. This state of affairs aroused criticism and negative reactions from the Israeli public, and among I.D.F. soldiers as well. This dissatisfaction was expressed in various ways; and in the political echelon, as well as in the media, there was amazement that the Phalangists were not participating in the fighting, even though the war was their battle as well, and it was only right that they should be taking part in it. The feeling among the Israeli public was that the I.D.F. was "pulling the chestnuts out of the fire" for the Phalangists. As the number of I.D.F. casualties mounted, public pressure for the Phalangists to participate in real fighting increased. The plan formulated in mid-June 1982, when it was still uncertain whether the terrorists would agree to leave West Beirut, was that the Christian forces would fight to take control of West Beirut; the I.D.F. would not take part in that operation; and only in the event that it became necessary would the I.D.F. help out the Phalangists with long-range artillery fire. This plan was discussed in the Cabinet meeting of 15.6.82, where it was proposed by the Prime Minister, and his proposal was adopted by the Cabinet, namely, that I.D.F. forces would not enter West Beirut, and this job was to be done by other forces (meaning the Phalangists) with help they would be given by the I.D.F. (transcript of the Cabinet meeting of 15.6.82, exhibit 53). Even after this resolution, no real fighting was done by the Phalangists for the purpose of extending control over West Beirut; and, as we have said, eventually the terrorists were evacuated as the result of a political agreement, after the I.D.F. had shelled various targets in West Beirut.

In all the testimony we have heard, there has been unanimity regarding [the fact] that the battle ethics of the Phalangists, from the standpoint of their attitude to non-combatants, differ greatly from those of the I.D.F. It has already been noted above that in the course of the civil war in Lebanon, many massacres had been perpetrated by the various forces that had taken part in the fighting. When the war began in June 1982, the prevailing opinion among the Mossad agents who had maintained contacts with the Phalangist leadership was that the atrocities and massacres were a thing of the past, and that the Phalangist forces had reached a stage of political and organizational maturity that would ensure that such actions would not repeat themselves. This opinion was based both on personal impressions of the character of the Phalangist leadership, as well as on the recognition that the interest of the Phalangist elite to eventually rule an independent Lebanese nation, half or more of whose population is Muslim and would be interested in maintaining relations with the Arab world, requires moderations of actions against Palestinians and restraint as to modes of operation. At the same time, there were various facts that were not compatible with this outlook. During the meetings that the heads of the Mossad held with Bashir Jemayel, they heard things from him that left no room for doubt that the intention of this Phalangist leader was to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon when he came to power - even if that meant resorting to aberrant methods against the Palestinians in Lebanon (testimony on pps. 16, 17, and 168 of the transcripts; exhibit 85 of 30 June 1982, clause 14 - section 2 of Appendix B). Similar remarks were heard from other Phalangist leaders. Furthermore, certain actions of the Phalangists during the war indicated that there had been no fundamental change in their attitude toward different segments of the Lebanese population, such as Druze and Palestinians, whom the Phalangists considered enemies. There were reports of Phalangist massacres of women and children in Druze villages, as well as the liquidation of Palestinians carried out by the intelligence unit of Elie Hobeika (testimony no. 105 of intelligence officer B before the staff investigators, part of which ap-

pears in section 3 of Appendix B; also, a document which mentions the Phalangist attitude toward terrorists they had taken prisoner - section 4 of Appendix B, exhibit 39). These reports reinforced the feeling among certain people - and especially among experienced intelligence officers - that in the event that the Phalangists had an opportunity to massacre Palestinians, they would take advantage of it.

#### The Assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut

On Tuesday afternoon, 14.9.82, a large bomb exploded in a building in Ashrafiyeh, Beirut, where Bashir Gemayel was [meeting] with a group of commanders and other Phalangists. For the first few hours after the explosion, it was not clear what had happened to Bashir, and there were rumors that he had only been slightly wounded. Word of the attempt on his life reached the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff, the director of Military Intelligence [Major General Yehoshua Saguy] and others in the early hours of the evening. During the evening, before it became clear what had befallen Bashir, the Defense Minister spoke with the Chief of Staff, the director of Military Intelligence, the head of the Mossad, and the head of the General Security Services about possible developments. He also spoke a number of times with the Prime Minister.

Moreover, there were a number of conversations that evening between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff. Word of Bashir's death reached Israel at about 11.00 p.m., and it was then that the decision was taken in conversations between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense and between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff - that the I.D.F. would enter West Beirut. In one of the consultations between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, there was mention of including the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut. The question of including the Phalangists was not mentioned at that stage in conversations with the Prime Minister. Once the decision was made to have the I.D.F. enter West Beirut, the appropriate operational orders were issued. Order Number 1 was issued at 12.20 a.m. on the night between 14.9.82 and 15.9.82, Orders Number 2 and 3 were issued on Wednesday, 15.9.82, and Order Number 4 was issued that same day at 2.00 p.m.; Order Number 5 was issued at 3.00 a.m. on 16.9.82; and Order number 6 was issued on the morning of 16.9.82. The first five orders said nothing about entering the refugee camps, and only in Order Number 6 were the following things stated (clause 2, document no. 6, exhibit 14):

"The refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists/ Lebanese Army." Clause 7 of the same order also states that the Lebanese Army "is entitled to enter any place in Beirut, according to its request."

Execution of the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut began during the early morning hours of 15.9.82.

On the night between 14.9.82 and 15.9.82, the Chief of Staff flew to Beirut with a number of people and met there with the G.O.C. Northern Command [Major General Amir Drori] and with the commander of the division (henceforth the division). Afterwards, the Chief of Staff, together with the people accompanying him, went to the Phalangists' headquarters, where, according to his testimony (p. 210), he ordered the Phalangist commanders to effect a general mobilization of all their forces, impose a general curfew on all the areas under their control, and be ready to take part in the fighting. The response of the Phalangist commanders who took part in that meeting was that they needed 24 hours to organize. The Chief of Staff requested that a Phalangist liaison officer come to the place where the division's forward command post was located (henceforth forward command post) under the command of Brigadier-General Amos Yaron. At that meeting, the Phalangist commanders were told by the Chief of Staff that the I.D.F. would not enter the refugee camps in West Beirut but that the fighting this entails would be undertaken by the Phalangists (Chief of Staff's testimony, p. 211). The Chief of Staff testified that the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was agreed upon between the Minister of Defense and himself at 8.30 p.m. on the previous evening. The camps in question were Sabra and Shatilla. After the meeting in the Phalangists' camps, the Chief of Staff went to the forward command post.

The forward command post was located on the roof of a five-storey building about 200 meters southwest of the Shatilla camp. The borders of the two camps were not defined exactly. The Sabra camp extended over an area of some 300 x 200 meters and Shatilla over an area of about 500 x 500 meters (testimony of the deputy assistant to the director of Military Intelligence, p. 29). The two

camps were essentially residential neighborhoods containing, in the area entered by the Phalangists, as will be stated below, low permanent structures along narrow alleys and streets. From the roof of the forward command post it was possible to see the area of the camps generally but - as all the witnesses who visited the roof of the command post stated, and these were a good number of witnesses whose word we consider reliable - it was impossible to see what was happening within the alleys in the camp from the roof of the command post, not even with the aid of the 20 x 120 binoculars that were on the command post roof. Appended to this report are an aerial photograph and map of the area of the camps, as well as a general map of Beirut (sections 3, 4, and 5 of Appendix A).

It was not possible to obtain exact details on the civilian population in the refugee camps in Beirut. An estimate of the number of refugees in the four refugee camps in west Beirut (Burj el-Barajneh, Fakahni, Sabra and Shatilla) is about 85,000 people. The war led to the flight of the population, but when the fighting subsided, a movement back to the camps began. According to an inexact estimate, in mid-September 1982 there were about 56,000 people in the Sabra camp (protocol, p. 29), but there is no assurance that this number reflects reality.

The Chief of Staff was in the forward command post from the early morning hours of Wednesday, 15.9.82. The I.D.F. began to enter west Beirut shortly after 6:00 a.m. During the first hours of the I.D.F. entry, there was not armed resistance to the I.D.F. forces, evidently because the armed forces that were in West Beirut were taken by surprise. Within a few hours, the I.D.F. forces encountered fire from armed forces that remained in a number of places in west Beirut, and combat operations began. The resistance caused delays in the I.D.F.'s taking over a number of points in the city and caused a change in the route of advance. In the course of this fighting three I.D.F. soldiers were killed and more than 100 were wounded. Heavy fire coming out of Shatilla was directed at one I.D.F. battalion (henceforth the battalion) advancing east of Shatilla. One of the battalion's soldiers was killed, 20 were injured, and the advance of the battalion in this direction was halted. Throughout Wednesday and to a lesser degree on Thursday and Friday (16-17.9.82), R.P.G. and light-weapons fire from the Sabra and Shatilla camps was directed at the forward command post and the battalion's forces nearby, and fire was returned by the I.D.F. forces.

On Wednesday, 15.9.82, the Minister of Defense arrived at the forward command post between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. He met with the Chief of Staff there, and the latter reported on what had been agreed upon with the Phalangists, namely, a general mobilization, curfew, and the entry of the Phalangists into the camps. The Minister of Defense approved this agreement. From the roof of the command post, the Minister of Defense phoned the Prime Minister and informed him that there was no resistance in Beirut and that all the operations were going along well.

During the aforementioned meeting between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, present on the roof of the forward command post were the Defense Minister's aide, Mr. Avi Dudai; the director of Military Intelligence, who came to this meeting together with the Minister of Defense; representative A of the Mossad (his full name appears in the list of names, section 1, Appendix B); Major-General Drori; Brigadier-General Yaron; Intelligence officer B; the head of the General Security Services; Deputy Chief of Staff Major-General Moshe Levi; and other I.D.F. officers who were accompanying the Minister of Defense. Dudai recorded in his notebook what was said and agreed upon at that meeting. According to Dudai's testimony, he later copied these notes into another notebook, pages of which were presented before us (exhibit 103). These notes stated, inter alia, that the Phalangists were to be sent into the camps. The Minister of Defense spoke with the Prime Minister twice from the roof of the command post. According to the record of these conversations (exhibits 100 and 101), in one of them the wording of the I.D.F. Spokesman's announcement was agreed upon as follows:

"Following the murder of President-elect Bashir Jemayel, I.D.F. forces entered West Beirut tonight to prevent possible grave occurrences and to ensure quiet."

"The entry of the I.D.F. forces was executed without resistance."

From the forward command post the Minister of Defense went to the Phalangist headquarters. A record was made of this meeting, which was attended by a number of Phalangist commanders as well as the Minister of Defense, the director of Military Intelligence, the head of the General Security Services and representatives of the Mossad (exhibit 79). At that meeting, the Minister of Defense stated, *inter alia*, that the I.D.F. would take over focal points and junctions in West Beirut, but that the Phalangist army would also have to enter West Beirut after the I.D.F. and that the Phalangist commanders should maintain contact with Major-General Drori, G.O.C. Northern Command, regarding the modes of operation. A record of this meeting was made by Intelligence officer B (exhibit 28). From there the Minister of Defense went to Bikfaya, to the Jemayel family home, to pay a condolence call.

From the meeting with the Jemayel family in Bikfaya, the Minister of Defense went to the airport, and on the way he met with Major-General Drori at a gas station. This meeting took place in the presence of a number of people, including the director of Military Intelligence, the head of the General Security Services, Mr. Duda'i, and the bureau chief of the director of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Hevroni. The situation of the forces was discussed at this meeting, and Major-General Drori reported on the course of events during the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut. From there the Minister of Defense went on to the airport and met there with the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff at about 2:00 p.m., after which the Minister of Defense returned to Israel.

That same day, 15.9.82, while the Minister of Defense was in Beirut, a meeting took place at 11:30 a.m. in the Prime Minister's Office between the Prime minister and others from the American embassy in Israel. During that meeting (protocol of the meeting, exhibit 120), the Prime Minister informed Mr. Draper that I. D.F. forces had entered West Beirut beginning in the morning hours, that there were no real clashes, that the I.D.F. action was undertaken in order to prevent certain possible events, and that we were concerned that there might be bloodshed even during the night. The Prime Minister also said that the Phalangists were behaving properly; their commander had not been injured in the assassination and was in control of his forces; he is a good man and we trust him not to cause any clashes, but there is no assurance regarding other forces. He added that the primary immediate task was to preserve quiet, for as long as quiet is maintained it will be possible to talk; otherwise there might have been pogroms, and the calm was preserved for the time being (exhibit 120).

At 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 15.9.82, a briefing took place at the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff with the participation of the I.D.F. branch heads, including the assistant for research to the director of Military Intelligence. The meeting began with a review by the assistant for research to the director of Military Intelligence of possible political developments in Lebanon following the death of Bashir Jemayel. He stated, *inter alia* (page 4 of the transcript of the discussion, exhibit 130), that the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut was perceived as vital not only by the Christians but also by the Muslims, who regarded the I.D.F. as the only factor that could prevent bloodshed in the area and protect the Sunni Muslims from the Phalangists. The Intelligence officer also stated that according to what was known to Military Intelligence, the attack on Bashir was carried out by the Mourabitoun, though that was not certain. During the meeting, the head of Operations Department announced that the Phalangists "are encouraging entry into the camps" (p. 7 of exhibit 130). The Deputy Chief of Staff reported his impressions of the meeting at Phalangist headquarters in Beirut that day and said that the intention was to send the Phalangists into the refugee camps and afterwards perhaps into the city as well. He added that this "might create an uproar," because the armed forces in West Beirut that were then quiet might stir up a commotion upon learning that Phalangists are coming in behind the I.D.F. (page 11, exhibit 130).

At 6:00 p.m. the Minister of Defense spoke with the Prime Minister from his home and reported (exhibit 99) that by evening the I.D.F. would be in all the places; that he had conveyed the Prime Minister's words to Pierre Jemayel; and that "everything is in order" and the decision made on the previous night to send the I.D.F. into Beirut had been most important and [indeed] should not have been delayed.

The Chief of Staff remained at the forward command post in Beirut and followed the development of the I.D.F. actions from there. On that day the Phalangist officers did not arrive at the forward command post to coordinate operations, but Major-General Drori met with them in the evening and told them generally

that their entry into the camps would be from the direction of Shatilla. Major-General Drori, who was not at ease with the plan to send the Phalangists into the camps, made an effort to persuade the commanders of the Lebanese Army that their forces should enter the camps and that they should prevail upon the Prime Minister of Lebanon to agree to this move. The reply of the Lebanese Army at the time was negative.

In the early morning hours of Thursday, 16.9.82, the Chief of Staff left the forward command post and returned to Tel Aviv. That same morning, in the wake of political pressure, an order was issued by the Minister of Defense to halt the I.D.F.'s combat operations; but after a short time the Minister of Defense rescinded the order. At 10:00 a.m. the Minister of Defense held a consultation in his office with the Chief of Staff; the director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier-General Y. Saguy; Lieutenant-Colonel Zecharin, the Chief of Staffs bureau chief; and Mr. Dudai (exhibit 27 is a record of what was said at that meeting). The meeting was opened by the Chief of Staff, who announced that "the whole city is in our hands, complete quiet prevails now, the camps are closed and surrounded; the Phalangists are to go in at 11:00-12:00. Yesterday we spoke to them... The situation now is that the entire city is in our hands, the camps are all closed." Later on in his statement, while pointing to a map, the Chief of Staff stated that the areas marked on the map were in the hands of the I. D. F. and that the Fakahani, Sabra, and Shatilla camps were surrounded. He also said that if the Phalangists came to a coordinating session and wanted to go in, it was agreed with them that they would go in and that the Lebanese Army could also enter the city wherever it chose. At this discussion, the Minister of Defense spoke of the heavy American pressure to have the I.D.F. leave West Beirut and of the political pressure from other sources. In the course of the meeting, the Chief of Staff repeated a number of times that at that moment everything was quiet in West Beirut. As for going into the camps, the Minister of Defense stated that he would send the Phalangists into the refugee camps (p. 5, exhibit 27). At the time of the consultation, the Minister of Defense informed the Prime Minister by phone that "the fighting has ended. The refugee camps are surrounded. The firing has stopped. We have not suffered any more casualties. Everything is calm and quiet. Sitting opposite me is the chief of Staff, who has just come from there. All the key points are in our hands. Everything's over. I am bringing the Chief of Staff to the Cabinet meeting. That's the situation as of now..." After this conversation, the Chief of Staff reported on the contacts during the night of 14.9.82 with the members of the Mourabitoun, in which the members of this militia said that they were unable to hide, that they were Lebanese, and that they would undoubtedly all be killed by the Phalangists, whether immediately or some time later. The Chief of Staff added that "there's such a dual kind of situation that they're confused. They're seething with a feeling of revenge, and there might have been rivers of blood there. We won't go into the refugee camps" (p. 7, exhibit 27). As stated, participating in this consultation was the director of Military Intelligence, who in the course of the discussion stated a number of things that appear in the aforementioned record.

The commanders of the Phalangists arrived for their first coordinating session regarding the entry of their forces into the camps at about 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, 16.9.82, and met with Major-General Drori at the headquarters of one of the divisions. It was agreed at that meeting that they would enter the camps and coordinate this action with Brigadier-General Yaron, commander of the division. This coordination between Brigadier-General Yaron and the Phalangist commanders would take place on Thursday afternoon at the forward command post. It was likewise agreed at that meeting that a company of 150 fighters from the Phalangist force would enter the camps and that they would do so from south to north and from west to east. Brigadier-General Yaron spoke with the Phalangists about the places where the terrorists were located in the camps and also warned them not to harm the civilian population. He had mentioned that, he stated, because he knew that the Phalangists' norms of conduct are not like those of the I.D.F. and he had had arguments with the Phalangists over this issue in the past, Brigadier-General Yaron set up lookout posts on the roof of the forward command post and on a nearby roof even though he knew that it was impossible to see very much of what was going on in the camps from these lookouts. An order was also issued regarding an additional precautionary measure whose purpose was to ascertain the actions of the Phalangist forces during their operation in the camps (this measure is cited in section 5, Appendix B). It was also agreed that a Phalangist liaison officer with a communications set would be present at all times on the roof of the forward command post - in addition to the Mossad liaison officer at the Phalangist headquarters. The Phalangist unit that was

supposed to enter the camps was an intelligence unit headed, as we have said, by Elie Hobeika. Hobeika did not go into the camps with his unit and was on the roof of the forward command post during the night (testimony of Brigadier-General Yaron, p. 726). This unit was assigned the task of entering the camps at that time for two reasons, first - since the ... Phalangists had difficulty recruiting another appropriate force till then; second - since the members of this unit were considered specially trained in discovering terrorists, who tried to hide among the civilian population.

On 16.9.82 a document was issued by the Defense Minister's office, signed by the personal aide to the Defense Minister, Mr. Avi Dudai, which contained "The Defense Minister's Summary of 15 September 1982." This document is (exhibit 34) a summary of the things which Mr. Dudai had recorded during his visit with the Defense Minister in Beirut on 15.9.82, as detailed above. In various paragraphs of the document there is mention of the Defense Minister's instructions regarding the entry into West Beirut. The instruction in paragraph F. is important to the matter at hand; it is stated there:

"F. Only one element, and that is the I.D.F., shall command the forces in the area. For the operation in the camps the Phalangists should be sent in."

The document is directed to the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the director of Military Intelligence. The document was received at the office of the director of Military Intelligence, according to the stamp appearing on the copy (exhibit 35), on 17.9.82.

In the testimonies we have heard, different interpretations were given to the instruction that only the I.D.F. command the forces in the area. According to one interpretation, and this is the interpretation given the document by the Chief of Staff (p. 257), the meaning of the instruction is that in contacts with external elements, and especially with the Phalangists, only the I.D.F., and not another Israeli element, such as the Mossad, will command the forces in the area - but this does not mean that the Phalangist force will be under the command of the I.D.F. On the other hand, according to the interpretation given the document by the director of Military Intelligence (pp. 127, 1523), the meaning is that all forces operating in the area, including the Phalangists, will be under the authority of the I.D.F. and will act according to its instructions.

The entry of the Phalangists into the camps began at about 18.00 on Thursday, 16.9.82. At that time there were armed terrorist forces in the camps. We cannot establish the extent of these forces, but they possessed various types of arms, which they used - even before the entry of the Phalangists - against I.D.F. forces that had approached the area, as well as against the I.D.F. headquarters at the forward command post. It is possible to determine that this armed terrorist force had not been evacuated during the general evacuation, but had stayed in the camps for two purposes, which were - renewal of underground terrorist activity at a later period, and to protect the civilian population which had remained in the camps, keeping in mind that given the hostility prevailing between the various sects and organizations, a population without armed protection was in danger of massacre. It should be added here that during the negotiations for evacuation, a guarantee for the safety of the Muslims in West Beirut was given by the representative of the United States who conducted the negotiations, following assurances received from the government of Israel and from Lebanon.

Meanwhile, as we have said, the multi-national force left Lebanon, and all the previous plans regarding the control of West Beirut by the Lebanese government were disrupted due to the assassination of President-elect Bashir Jemayel.

#### The Events from the Entry of the Phalangists into the Sabra and Shatilla Camps until their Departure

On Thursday, 16.9.82, at approximately 18:00 hours, members of the Phalangists entered the Shatilla camp from the west and south. They entered in two groups, and once they had passed the battery surrounding the camps their movements within the camps were not visible from the roof of the forward command post or from the observation sites on other roofs. The Divisional Intelligence Officer tried to follow their movements using binoculars which he shifted from place to place, but was unable to see

their movements or their actions. With the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, the firing which had been coming from the camps changed direction; the shooting which had previously been directed against the I.D.F. now shifted in the direction of the Phalangists' liaison officer on the roof of the forward command post. G. (his full name appears in the list of names, Section 1, Appendix B) requested the I.D.F. to provide illumination for the force which was moving in, since its entry was taking place after dark. Initially, the illumination was provided by a mortar company, and subsequently also by aircraft; but because the illumination from the planes interfered with the evacuation of casualties of an I.D.F. unit, this source of illumination was halted; mortar illumination continued intermittently throughout the night.

At approximately 8:00 p.m., the Phalangists' liaison officer, G., said that the Phalangists who had entered the camps had sustained casualties, and the casualties were evacuated from the camps. Major General Drori was at the forward command post from approximately 7:30 p.m. and followed the fighting as it was visible from the roof of the forward command post. He left the site after 8:00 p.m.

Several Intelligence Branch personnel, headed by the Division Intelligence Officer, were in the building on whose roof the forward command post was situated. The Intelligence officer, who wanted to obtain information on the Phalangists' activities, ordered that two actions be carried out to obtain that information (these actions are detailed in Section 5, Appendix B). No information was obtained in the wake of the first action. As a result of the second action the Intelligence Officer received a report according to which the Phalangists' liaison officer had heard via radio from one of the Phalangists inside the camps that he was holding 45 people. That person asked what he should do with the people, and the liaison officer's reply was "Do the will of God," or words to that effect. The Intelligence Officer received this report at approximately 20:00 hours from the person on the roof who heard the conversation. He did not convey the report to anyone else, because an officers' briefing was scheduled to take place at field headquarters shortly afterward.

At about the same time or slightly earlier, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Lieutenant Elul, who was then serving as Chief of Bureau of the Divisional Commander, overheard another conversation that took place over the Phalangists' transmitter. According to Lt. Elul's testimony, while he was on the roof of the forward command post, next to the Phalangists' communications set, he heard a Phalangist officer from the force that had entered the camps tell Elie Hobeika (in Arabic) that there were 50 women and children, and what should he do. Elie Hobeika's reply over the radio was: "This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that, you know exactly what to do;" and then raucous laughter broke out among the Phalangist personnel on the roof. Lieutenant Elul understood that what was involved was the murder of the women and children. According to his testimony, Brigadier General Yaron, who was also on the forward command post roof then, asked him what he had overheard on the radio; and after Lieutenant Elul told him the content of the conversation, Brigadier General Yaron went over to Hobeika and spoke with him in English for about five minutes (for Lt. Elul's testimony, see pp. 1209-1210a). Lt. Elul did not hear the conversation between Brigadier General Yaron and Hobeika.

Brigadier General Yaron, who was on the roof of the forward command post, received from Lt. Elul a report of what he had heard. According to Brigadier General Yaron's testimony, the report conveyed to him by Lt. Elul stated that one of the Phalangists had asked the commander what to do with 45 people, and the reply had been to do with them what God orders you to do (testimony of Brigadier General Yaron, pp. 696 and 730). According to Brigadier General Yaron, he understood from what he had heard that the reference was to 45 dead terrorists. In his testimony, Brigadier General Yaron linked this report with what he had heard in the update briefing that evening - which will be discussed below - from the Divisional Intelligence Officer. From Brigadier General Yaron's remarks in his testimony it emerges that he regarded the two reports - from Lt. Elul and from the Intelligence officer - as being one report from two different sources. We have no doubt that in this instance there were two different and separate reports. As noted the report which the Intelligence Officer obtained originated in a conversation held over the radio with Elie Hobeika. Although both reports referred to a group of 45-50 persons, and it is, not to be ruled out that the questions asked over the radios referred to the same group of persons, it is clear, both from the fact that the replies given were different in content - the reply of the liaison officer was to do with the group of people as God commands, while Hobeika's reply was different - that two different

conversations took place regarding the fate of the people who had fallen into the Phalangists' hands. As noted, Brigadier General Yaron did not deny in his testimony that Lt. Elul had translated for him and told him what he had heard when the two of them were on the roof of the forward command post. We have no reason to think that Lt. Elul did not inform Brigadier General Yaron of everything he had heard. It is noteworthy that Lt. Elul testified before us after Brigadier General Yaron had testified and before the notices were sent in accordance with section 15(A) of the law; and his statement to the Staff Investigators (no. 87) was also given after Brigadier General Yaron's testimony. Brigadier General Yaron did not testify again after the notice in accordance with section 15(A) had been sent, nor was there any request on his part to question Lt. Elul. We assert that Lt. Elul informed Brigadier General Yaron of the content of the conversation which took place with Elie Hobeika as specified above.

An additional report relating to the actions of the Phalangists in the camps vis-a-vis the civilians there came from liaison officer G. of the Phalangists. When he entered the dining room in the forward command post building at approximately 8:00 p.m., that liaison officer told various people that about 300 persons had been killed by the Phalangists, among them also civilians. He stated this in the presence of many I.D.F. officers who were there, including Brigadier General Yaron. We had different versions of the exact wording of this statement by Phalangist officer G., but from all the testimony we have heard it is clear that he said that as a result of the Phalangists' operations up to that time, 300 terrorists and civilians had been killed in the camps. Shortly thereafter, Phalangist officer G. returned to the dining room and amended his earlier report by reducing the number of casualties from 300 to 120.

At 20:40 hours that evening an update briefing was held in the forward command post building with the participation of various I.D.F. officers who were in the building at that time, headed by Brigadier General Yaron. The remarks made at that meeting were recorded by a Major from the History Section in the Operations Branch/ Training Section. We were given the tape recording and a transcript thereof (exhibit 155). At the meeting Brigadier General Yaron spoke of the I.D.F.'s progress and deployment, and about the Phalangists' entry into the camps and the combing operations they were carrying out. Following that briefing, the Divisional Intelligence Officer spoke. In the course of his intelligence survey regarding the terrorists and other armed forces in west Beirut, he said the following (pp. 4 and 5 of the transcript, exhibit 155):

"The Phalangists went in today. I do not know what level of combat they are showing. It is difficult to see it because it is dark... The impression is that their fighting is not too serious. They have casualties, as you know - two wounded, one in the leg and one in the hand. The casualties were evacuated in one of their ambulances. And they, it turns out, are pondering what to do with the population they are finding inside. On the one hand, it seems, there are no terrorists there, in the camp; Sabra camp is empty. On the other hand, they have amassed women, children and apparently also old people, with whom they don't exactly know what to do (Amos, this refers back to our talk), and evidently they had some sort of decision in principle that they would concentrate them together, and lead them to some place outside the camps. On the other hand, I also heard (from - the Phalangists' liaison officer G.)... that 'do what your heart tells you, because everything comes from God. That is, I do not -"

At this point Brigadier General Yaron interrupted the Intelligence Officer and the following dialogue ensued between them:

Brigadier General Yaron: "Nothing, no, no. I went to see him up top and they have no problems at all."

Intelligence Officer: "People remaining in the field? Without their lives being in any danger?"

Brigadier General Yaron: "It will not, will not harm them."

Following this exchange, the Intelligence Officer went on to another subject. The Phalangists' actions against the people in the camps were not mentioned again in this update briefing.

In his testimony, Brigadier General Yaron explained his remark about his visit "with him up top and they have no problems at all" by saying that he had spoken several times that evening with the Phalangist officers on the roof of the forward command post after he had heard the first report about 45 people and

also after the further report about 300 or 120 casualties; and even though he had been skeptical about the reliability of these reports and had not understood from them that children, women or civilians had been murdered in massacres perpetrated by the Phalangists, he had warned them several times not to harm civilians and had been assured that they would issue the appropriate orders to that effect. (pp. 731-732).

Between approximately 22:00 hours and 23:00 hours the Divisional Intelligence Officer contacted Northern Command, spoke with the Deputy Intelligence Officer there, asked if Northern Command had received any sort of report, was told in reply that there was no report, and told the Deputy Intelligence officer of Northern Command about the Phalangist officer's report concerning 300 terrorists and civilians who had been killed, and about the amendment to that report whereby the number of those killed was only 120. The divisional Intelligence Officer asked the Deputy Intelligence Officer of Northern Command to look into the matter more thoroughly. Intelligence Officer A. was in the room while that conversation took place, and when he heard about that report he phoned Intelligence Branch Research at the General Staff, spoke with two Intelligence Branch officers there and told them that Phalangist personnel had so far liquidated 300 terrorists and civilians (testimony of Intelligence Officer A., p. 576). He went on to add that he had a heavy feeling about the significance of this report, that he regarded it as an important and highly sensitive report which would interest the senior responsible levels, and that this was the kind of report that would prove of interest to the Director of Military Intelligence personally. In the wake of these remarks, the personnel in Intelligence Branch research of the General Staff Branch who had been given the report carried out certain telephone clarifications, and the report was conveyed to various persons. The manner in which the report was conveyed and the way it was handled are described in Section 6, Appendix B. Suffice it to note here that a telephone report about this information was conveyed to Lt. Col. Hevroni, Chief of Bureau of the director of Military Intelligence, on 17.9.82 at 5:30 a.m. The text of the report, which was distributed to various Intelligence units and, as noted, also reached the office of the director of Military Intelligence, appears in Appendix A of Exhibit 29 That document contained a marking, noting that its origin lay with the forward command post of Northern Command, that it was received on 16.9.82 at 23:20 hours, and that the content of the report was as follows:

"Preliminary information conveyed by the commander of the local Phalangist force in the Shatilla refugee camp states that so far his men have liquidated about 300 people. This number includes terrorists and civilians."

The action taken in the wake of this report in the office of the Director of Military Intelligence will be discussed in this report below.

On Thursday, 16.9.82, at 19:30 hours, the Cabinet convened for a session with the participation of - besides the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Ministers (except for 5 Ministers who were abroad) - a number of persons who are not Cabinet members, among them the Chief of Staff, the head of the Mossad and the director of Military Intelligence. The subject discussed at that meeting was the situation in Lebanon in the wake of the assassination of Bashir Jemayel. At the start of the session, the Prime Minister reported on the chain of events following the report about the attempt on Bashir's life. The Minister of Defense then gave a detailed survey. The Chief of Staff provided details about the I.D.F.'s operation in West Beirut and about his meetings with Phalangist personnel. He said, inter alia, that he had informed the Phalangist commanders that their men would have to take part in the operation and go in where they were told, that early that evening they would begin to fight and would enter the extremity of Sabra, that the I.D.F. would ensure that they did not fail in their operation but I.D.F. soldiers would not enter the camps and would not fight together with the Phalangists, rather the Phalangists would go in there "with their own methods" (p. 16 of the minutes of the meeting, Exhibit 122). In his remarks the Chief of Staff explained that the camps were surrounded "by us," that the Phalangists would begin to operate that night in the camps, that we could give them orders whereas it was impossible to give orders to the Lebanese Army, and that the I.D.F. would be assisted by the Phalangists and perhaps also the Lebanese Army in collecting weapons. With respect to the consequences of Bashir's assassination, the Chief of Staff said that in the situation which had been created, two things could happen. One was that the entire power structure of the Phalangists would collapse, though as yet this had not occurred. Regarding the second possibility, the Chief of Staff said as follows (pp. 21-22 of Exhibit 122):

"A second thing that will happen - and it makes no difference whether we are there or not - is an eruption of revenge which, I do not know, I can imagine how it will begin, but I do not know how it will end. It will be between all of them, and neither the Americans nor anyone else will be of any help. We can cut it down, but today they already killed Druze there. What difference does it make who or what? They have already killed them, and one dead Druze is enough so that tomorrow four Christian children will be killed; they will find them slaughtered, just like what happened a month ago; and that is how it will begin, if we are not there - it will be an eruption the likes of which has never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for.

"Yesterday afternoon a group of Phalangist officers came, they were stunned, still stunned, and they still cannot conceive to themselves how their hope was destroyed in one blow, a hope for which they built and sacrificed so much; and now they have just one thing left to do, and that is revenge; and it will be terrible."

At this point the Chief of Staff was asked "if there is any chance of knowing who did it, and to direct them at whoever perpetrated the deed," and he continued:

"There is no such thing there. Among the Arabs revenge means that if someone kills someone from the tribe, then the whole tribe is guilty. A hundred years will go by, and there will still be someone killing someone else from the tribe from which someone had killed a hundred years earlier..."

"I told Draper this today, and he said there is a Lebanese Army, and so on. I told him that it was enough that during Bashir's funeral Amin Jemayel, the brother, said 'revenge'; that is already enough. This is a war that no one will be able to stop. It might not happen tomorrow, but it will happen.

"It is enough that he uttered the word 'revenge' and the whole establishment is already sharpening knives..."

Toward the end of his remarks, the Chief of Staff referred to a map and explained that with the exception of one section everything was in the hands of the I.D.F., the I.D.F. was not entering the refugee camps, "and the Phalangists are this evening beginning to enter the area between Sabra and Fakhani" (p. 25). At that meeting the Head of the Mossad also gave a briefing on the situation after the assassination of Bashir, but made no reference to the Phalangists' entry into the camps. There was considerable discussion in that meeting about the danger of the United States at the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut, the general opinion being that the decision to go in was justified and correct. Toward the close of the meeting there was discussion regarding the wording of a resolution, and then Deputy Prime Minister D. Levy said that the problem was not the formulation of a resolution, but that the I.D.F.'s continued stay in Beirut was liable to generate an undesirable situation of massive pressure regarding its stay there. Minister Levy stated that he accepted the contention regarding the I.D.F.'s entry into Beirut, and he then continued (p. 91):

"We wanted to prevent chaos at a certain moment whose significance cannot be disregarded. When confusion exists which someone else could also have exploited, the situation can be explained in a convincing way. But that argument could be undercut and we could come out with no credibility when I hear that the Phalangists are already entering a certain neighborhood - and I know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaughter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and we will bear the blame. Therefore, I think that we are liable here to get into a situation in which we will be blamed, and our explanations will not stand up..."

No reaction was forthcoming from those present at the meeting to this part of Deputy Prime Minister D. Levy's remarks. Prior to the close of the session the Prime Minister put forward a draft resolution which, with certain changes, was accepted by all the Ministers. That resolution opens with the words:

"In the wake of the assassination of the President-elect Bashir Jemayel, the I.D.F. has seized positions in West Beirut in order to forestall the danger of violence, bloodshed and chaos, as some 2,000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons, have remained in Beirut, in flagrant violation of the evacuation agreement..."

Here we must note that the Director of Military Intelligence was present at the outset of the meeting but left, after having received permission to do so from the Minister of Defense, not long after the start of the session, and certainly a considerable time before Minister D. Levy made the remarks quoted above.

Brigadier-General Yaron did not inform Major-General Drori of the reports which had reached him on Thursday evening regarding the actions of the Phalangists vis-a-vis non-combatants in the camps, and reports about aberrations did not reach Major-General Drori until Friday, 17.9.82, in the morning hours. On Friday morning Major-General Drori contacted Brigadier-General Yaron, received from him a report about various matters relating to the war, and heard from him that the Phalangists had sustained a number of casualties, but heard nothing about casualties among the civilian population in the camps (testimony of Major-General Drori, p. 404). That same morning Major General Drori spoke with the Chief of Staff and heard from him that the Chief of Staff might come to Beirut that day.

In the early hours of that morning a note lay on a table in the Northern Command situation room in Aley. The note read as follows:

"During the night the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. Even though it was agreed that they would not harm civilians, they 'butchered.' They did not operate in orderly fashion but dispersed. They had casualties, including two killed. They will organize to operate in a more orderly manner - we will see to it that they are moved into the area."

Lieutenant-Colonel Idel, of the History Section in Operations Branch/Training Section, saw this note on the table and copied it into a notebook in which he recorded details about certain events, as required by his position. It has not been clarified who wrote the note or what the origin was of the information it contained, even though on this matter the staff investigators questioned many persons who held various positions where the note was found. The note itself was not found, and we know its content only because Lieutenant-Colonel Idel recorded it in his notebook.

The G.O.C. held a staff meeting at 8:00 a.m. in which nothing was said about the existence of reports regarding the Phalangists' actions in the camps.

Already during the night between Thursday and Friday, the report about excesses committed by the Phalangists in the camps circulated among I.D.F. officers who were at the forward command post. Two Phalangists were killed that night during their operation in the camps. When the report about their casualties reached the Phalangists' liaison officer, G., along with a complaint from one of the Phalangist commanders in the field that the I.D.F. was not supplying sufficient illumination, the liaison officer asked Lieutenant-Colonel Treiber, one of the Operations Branch officers at the forward command post, to increase the illumination for the Phalangists. Lieutenant-Colonel Treiber's response was that the Phalangists had killed 300 people and he was not willing to provide them with illumination (testimony of Lieutenant Elul, pp. 1212-1213). Lieutenant-Colonel Treiber subsequently ordered that limited illumination be provided for the Phalangists.

In the early hours of the morning, additional officers at the forward command post heard from the Phalangists' liaison officer, G., that acts of killing had been committed in the camps but had been halted (statements 22 and 167).

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on Friday, Brigadier General Yaron met with representatives of the Phalangists at the forward command post and discussed with them the entry of an additional force of Phalangists into the camps. Afterwards, according to the testimony of Major General Drori (p. 1600), he met with Brigadier General Yaron in the Cite of Beirut, where they discussed the activity of the

I.D.F. troops and other matters related to the war; but Brigadier General Yaron said nothing to him at that meeting about excesses committed by the Phalangists.

Brigadier General Yaron's testimony contains a different version of the talk between him and Major General Drori that morning. According to that testimony, Brigadier General Yaron received reports that morning about a woman who claimed that she had been struck in the face by Phalangists, [and] about a child who had been kidnapped and whose father had complained to the Divisional Operations Officer; and Brigadier General Yaron had seen liaison officer G. arguing with other Phalangists. From all this Brigadier General Yaron inferred that something was amiss, or as he put it, "something smelled fishy to me" (p. 700). He phoned Major General Drori and told him something did not look right to him, and as a result of this conversation, Major General Drori arrived at the forward command post at approximately 11:00 a.m. According to Major General Drori, he arrived at the forward command post without having heard any report that something was wrong in the camps, simply as part of a routine visit to various divisions. We see no need to decide between these two versions.

When Major General Drori arrived at the Divisional forward command post he spoke with Colonel Duvdevani and with Brigadier General Yaron. We also have differing versions regarding what Major General Drori heard on that occasion. In his statement (No. 2) Colonel Duvdevani related that he said he had a bad feeling about what was going on in the camps. According to his statement, this feeling was caused by the report of liaison officer G. about 100 dead and also because it was not known what the Phalangists were doing inside the camps. Colonel Duvdevani did not recall whether Major General Drori had asked him about the reasons for his bad feeling. Brigadier General Yaron testified (p. 701) that he had told Major General Drori everything he knew at that time, namely those matters detailed above which had caused his bad feeling. According to Major General Drori's testimony, he heard about three specific matters on that occasion. The first was the blow to the woman's head; the second - which was not directly related to the camps - was that in one neighbourhood, namely San Simon, Phalangists had beaten residents; and the third matter was that a feeling existed that the Phalangists were carrying out "an unclean mopping-up" - that is, their soldiers were not calling on the residents - as I.D.F. soldiers do - to come out before opening fire on a house which was to be "mopped up," but were "going into the house firing" (testimony of Major General Drori, pp. 408, 1593-1594). No evidence existed that, at that meeting or earlier, anyone had told Major General Drori about the reports of 45 people whose fate was sealed, or about the 300 killed; nor is there any clear evidence that he was told of a specific number of people who had been killed. After Major General Drori heard what he heard from Colonel Duvdevani and Brigadier General Yaron, he ordered Brigadier General Yaron to halt the operations of the Phalangists, meaning that the Phalangists should stop where they were in the camps and advance no further. Brigadier General Yaron testified that he suggested to Major General Drori to issue this order (p. 701). The order was conveyed to the Phalangist commanders. On that same occasion Major General Drori spoke with the Chief of Staff by phone about several matters relating to the situation in Beirut, told him that he thought the Phalangists had perhaps "gone too far" and that he had ordered their operation to be halted (p. 412). A similar version of this conversation appears in the Chief of Staff's testimony (pp. 232-233). The Chief of Staff testified that he had heard from Major General Drori that something was amiss in the Phalangists' actions. The Chief of Staff asked no questions, but told Major General Drori that he would come to Beirut that afternoon.

As mentioned above, the cable report (appendix exhibit 29) regarding 300 killed reached the office of the director of Military Intelligence on 17.9.82 at 5:30 a.m. The text of this cable was transmitted to the director of Military Intelligence at his home in a morning report at 6:15 a.m., as part of a routine update transmitted to the director of Military Intelligence every morning by telephone. From the content of the cable, the director of Military Intelligence understood that the source of the report is Operations and not Intelligence, and that its source is the Northern Command forward command post. According to the testimony of the director of Military Intelligence, the details of which we shall treat later, he did not know then that it had been decided to send the Phalangists into the camps and that they were operating there; therefore, when he heard the report, he asked what the Phalangists were doing - and he was told that they had been operating in the camps since the previous day (p. 120, 123). When the director of Military In-

telligence arrived at his office at 8:00 a.m., he asked his bureau chief where the report had originated, and he was told that it was an "Operations" report. He ordered that it be immediately ascertained what was happening in the Sabra and Shatilla camps. The clarifications continued in different ways (described in section 6 of appendix B) during Friday morning, but no confirmation of the report was obtained; and the intelligence personnel who dealt with the clarifications treated it as a report which for them is unreliable, is unconfirmed, and therefore it would not be proper to circulate it according to the standard procedure, by which important and urgent intelligence reports are circulated. The content of the cable was circulated to a number of intelligence personnel (whose positions were noted on the cable form) and was conveyed to the Mossad and the General Security Services. Since the source of the report seemed to those Intelligence Branch personnel who dealt with the matter to be Operations, it was not accorded the standard treatment given reports from Intelligence sources, but rather the assumption was that Operations personnel were dealing with the report in their own way. The answers received by the director of Military Intelligence to his demand for clarification were that there were no further details. The director of Military Intelligence did not know that the report had been transmitted by Intelligence Officer A. The report was transmitted verbally, incidentally, by the assistant to the bureau chief of the director of Military Intelligence to Lieutenant Colonel Gai of the Defense Ministry's situation room, when the latter arrived at about 7:30 a.m. at the office of the director of Military Intelligence. One of the disputed questions in this inquiry is whether Lieutenant Colonel Gai transmitted the report to Mr. Dudai; we shall discuss this matter separately. Suffice it to say here that we have no evidence that the report was transmitted to the Defense Minister or came to his knowledge in another way.

At 7:30 a.m. on Friday there was a special morning briefing at the [office of] the assistant for research to the director of Military Intelligence. At the meeting, in which various intelligence personnel participated, the aforementioned report was discussed, and it was said that it can not be verified. The assistant for research to the director of Military Intelligence gave an order to continue checking the report. He knew that the source of the report was Intelligence officer A. The assistant for research to the director of Military Intelligence also treated this report with skepticism, both because the number of killed seemed exaggerated to him and since there had been no additional confirmation of the report (pp. 1110-1113). The director of Military Intelligence took no action on his part regarding the aforementioned report, except for requesting the clarification, and did not speak about it with the Chief of Staff or the Minister of Defense, even though he met with them that morning.

As mentioned above, the reports of unusual things occurring in the camps circulated among the officers at the forward command post already during the night and in the morning hours of Friday, and they reached other I.D.F. officers and soldiers in the area. At approximately 8:00 a.m., the journalist Mr. Ze'ev Schiff received a report from the General Staff in Tel Aviv, from a man whose name he has refused to disclose, that there was a slaughter in the camps. The transmitter of the report used the Arabic expression *dab'h*. He was not told of the extent of the slaughter. He tried to check the report with Military Intelligence and Operations, and also with the Mossad, but received no confirmation, except the comment that "there's something." At 11:00 a.m. Mr. Schiff met with Minister Zipori at the minister's office and spoke with him about the report he had received. Minister Zipori tried to contact the director of Military Intelligence and the head of the General Security Services by phone, but did not reach them. At approximately 11:15 a.m., he called the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, and spoke with him about the report he had received from Mr. Schiff. According to the testimony of Minister Zipori, he said in that telephone conversation with Mr. Shamir that he had received reports that the Phalangists "are carrying out a slaughter" and asked that Minister Shamir check the matter with the people who would be with him momentarily and whose planned visit was known to Minister Zipori (Minister Zipori's testimony, p. 1097). According to Mr. Schiff's statement to the staff investigators (no. 83), Minister Zipori said in that conversation that "they are killing in the camps" and proposed that "it is worth checking the matter through your channels."

We heard a different version of the content of the conversation from Minister Shamir. Minister Shamir knew of the entry of the Phalangists into the camps from what he had heard at the aforementioned cabinet meeting of 16.9.82. According to him, Minister Zipori told him in the aforementioned telephone conversation that he knows that Minister Shamir was to meet soon with representatives of the United

States on the situation in West Beirut, and therefore he deems it appropriate to report what he had heard about what is occurring there. The situation in West Beirut is still not as quiet as it may seem from the media, and he had heard that three or four I.D.F. soldiers had been killed, and had also heard "about some rampage by the Phalangists" (p. 1232). Minister Shamir said in his testimony that as far as he could remember there was no mention in that conversation of the words massacre or slaughter. According to him, he was not asked by Minister Zipori to look into the matter, he did not think that he was talking about massacre, [rather] he got the impression from the conversation that its main aim was to inform him of the losses suffered by the I.D.F., and therefore he himself made no check and also did not instruct Foreign Ministry personnel to check the report, but asked someone in the Foreign Ministry whether new reports had arrived from Beirut and was satisfied with the answer that there is nothing new.

In addition, Minister Shamir thought, according to his testimony, that since a meeting would shortly be held at his office with Ambassador Draper, in which the Defense Minister, the director of Military Intelligence, the head of the General Security Services and their aides would be participating on the Israeli side, then he would hear from them about what is happening in West Beirut. This meeting was held at the Foreign Minister's office at 12:30, between Ambassador Draper and other representatives of the United States and a group of representatives of Israel, including the Minister of Defense, the director of Military Intelligence, and the head of the General Security Services (exhibit 124). The Foreign Minister did not tell any of those who came to the meeting about the report he had received from Minister Zipori regarding the actions of the Phalangists, and he explained this inaction of his by the fact that the matter did not bother him, since it was clear to him that everything going on is known to the persons sitting with him, and he did not hear from them any special report from Beirut (p. 1238). The meeting ended at 3:00 p.m., and then the Foreign Minister left for his home and took no additional action following the aforementioned conversation with Minister Zipori.

Let us return to what occurred on that Friday in West Beirut.

In the morning hours, Brigadier General Yaron met with Phalangist commanders for coordination, and agreed with them that a larger Phalangist force would organize at the airport, that this force would not be sent in to the camps until it receives approval from the Chief of Staff and after the Chief of Staff holds an additional meeting at Phalangist headquarters (pp. 705-706).

Already prior to the Chief of Staff's arrival, Major General Drori held a meeting with the commander of the Lebanese Army in which he again tried to persuade the commander, and through him the Prime Minister and Ambassador Draper, that the Lebanese Army enter the camps. Major General Drori told that commander, according to his testimony, the following (p. 1633):

"You know what the Lebanese are capable of doing to each other; when you go now to Waz-zan (the Prime Minister of Lebanon) tell him again, and you see what is out here, and the time has come that maybe you'll do something, and you're going to Draper, to meet with Draper... get good advice from him this time, he should give it to you this time, he should agree that you enter the camps, it's important, the time has come for you to do it, and get good advice this time from Draper, or permission from him to enter or do it."

Major General Drori explained in his testimony that he had approached the commander so that the latter would speak with Ambassador Draper, since he had heard that Ambassador Draper had told the commander of the Lebanese Army a day earlier that the Americans would get the Israelis out of Beirut, that they should not talk to them and not negotiate with them. The answer which Major General Drori later received to his request from the commander of the Lebanese Army was negative.

On Friday, 17.9.82, already from the morning hours, a number of I.D.F. soldiers detected killing and violent actions against people from the refugee camps. We heard testimony from Lieutenant Grabowsky, a deputy commander of a tank company, who was in charge of a few tanks which stood on an earth embankment - a ramp - and on the adjacent road, some 200 meters from the first buildings of the camps. In the early morning hours he saw Phalangist soldiers taking men, women and children out of the area of

the camps and leading them to the area of the stadium. Between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. he saw two Phalangist soldiers hitting two young men. The soldiers led the men back into the camp, after a short time he heard a few shots and saw the two Phalangist soldiers coming out. At a later hour he went up the embankment with the tank and then saw that Phalangist soldiers had killed a group of five women and children. Lieutenant Grabowsky wanted to report the event by communications set to his superiors, but the tank crew told him that they had already heard a communications report to the battalion commander that civilians were being killed, [and] the battalion commander had replied, "We know, it's not to our liking, and don't interfere." Lieutenant Grabowsky saw another case in which a Phalangist killed a civilian. In the afternoon hours his soldiers spoke with a Phalangist who had arrived at the spot, and at the request of Grabowsky, who does not speak Arabic, one of the soldiers asked why they were killing civilians. The answer he received was that the pregnant women will give birth to terrorists and children will grow up to be terrorists. Grabowsky left the place at 16:00 hours. Late in the afternoon he related what he had seen to his commander in the tank battalion and to other officers. At their suggestion he related this to his brigade commander at 20:00 hours (Grabowsky testimony, pp. 380-388). In various statements made to the staff investigators, soldiers and officers from Lieutenant Grabowsky's unit and from other units stationed nearby related that they saw on Friday various acts of maltreatment by the Phalangist soldiers against men, women and children who were taken out of the camp, and heard complaints and stories regarding acts of killing carried out by the Phalangists. One of those questioned heard a communications report to the battalion commander about the Phalangists "running wild."

The battalion commander did not confirm in his statements (no. 21 and no. 175) and testimony that he had received reports on Friday from any of his battalion's soldiers about acts of killing or violent actions by the Phalangists against the residents of the camps. According to him, he indeed heard on Thursday night, when he was in the forward command post, about 300 killed, a number which was later reduced to 120 killed; but on Friday the only report he received was about the escape of a few dozen beaten or wounded persons northward and eastward, and this was in the afternoon. At a later date, after the massacre in the camps was publicized, the battalion commander made special efforts to obtain a monitoring report of the battalion's radio frequency and he submitted this report to us (exhibit 1240). In this document no record was found of a report of acts of killing or maltreatment by the Phalangists on Friday.

We did not send a notice as per Section 15 to this battalion commander, and this for the reasons explained in the Introduction. We have not arrived at any findings or conclusions on the contradictory versions regarding the report to the battalion commander, and it appears to us that this subject can and should be investigated within the framework of the I.D.F., as we have proposed in the Introduction. For the purposes of the matters we are discussing, we determine that indeed I.D.F. soldiers who were near the embankment which surrounded the camp saw certain acts of killing and an attempt was made to report this to commanders of higher ranks; but this report did not reach Brigadier General Yaron or Major General Drori.

The Chief of Staff reached the airport at Khalde near Beirut at 15:30 hours with a number of I.D.F. officers. At the airport he met with Major General Drori and travelled with him to a meeting at Phalangist headquarters. Major General Drori testified that he had told the Chief of Staff on the way what he knew regarding the Phalangists' actions. The Chief of Staff was satisfied with what he had heard and did not ask about additional matters (Drori testimony, pp. 451, 416). Brigadier General Yaron joined those travelling to the meeting with the Phalangist commanders. The Chief of Staff testified in his first appearance that he had heard from Major General Drori and from Brigadier General Yaron only those things which he had heard on the telephone, and does not remember that he asked them how the improper behavior of the Phalangists had expressed itself. In that testimony he explained that he had refrained from asking additional questions since the discussion had dealt mainly with the situation in the city, that he generally does not like to talk while travelling, and that he thought the matter would be clarified at Phalangist headquarters, where they were headed (testimony of the Chief of Staff, pp. 243, 234). In his additional testimony before us, when the Chief of Staff was asked for his response to Major General Drori's testimony that the latter had told the Chief of Staff about the three things which he knew about (see above), the Chief of Staff said that he is prepared to accept that these were the things said to him, but emphasized

that the meaning of the things he had heard was not from his point of view that there had been acts of revenge and bloodshed by the Phalangists (p. 1663). In any case, according to his second testimony as well, the Chief of Staff was satisfied with hearing a short report from Major General Drori about the reasons for the halting of the Phalangists' actions, and did not pose questions regarding this.

At about 16:00 hours, the meeting between the Chief of Staff and the Phalangist staff was held. We have been presented with documents containing summaries from this meeting. In a summary made by Mossad representative A who was present at the meeting (exhibit 80 A) it was said that the Chief of Staff "expressed his positive impression received from the statement by the Phalangist forces and their behavior in the field" and concluded that they "continue action, mopping up the empty camps south of Fakahani until tomorrow at 5:00 a.m., at which time they must stop their action due to American pressure. There is a chance that the Lebanese Army will enter instead of them." Other matters in this summary do not relate to the matter of the two camps (a summary with identical contents appears in exhibit no. 37). We heard more precise details on the content of the meeting from witnesses who participated in it. The Chief of Staff testified that the Phalangists had reported that the operation had ended and that everything was alright that the Americans are pressuring them to leave and they would leave by 5:00 a.m., and that they had carried out all the objectives. His reaction was "O.K., alright, you did the job."

According to the Chief of Staff, the discussion was very relaxed, there was a very good impression that the Phalangists had carried out the mission they had been assigned or which they had taken upon themselves, and there was no feeling that something irregular had occurred or was about to occur in the camps. During the meeting they requested a tractor from the I.D.F. in order to demolish illegal structures; the Chief of Staff saw this as a positive action, since he had long heard of illegal Palestinian neighborhoods, and therefore he approved their request for tractors (pp. 234-239). In his second testimony, the Chief of Staff added that the commander of the Phalangists had said that there was almost no civilian population in the camps, and had reported on their killed and wounded (p. 1666). He did not ask them questions and did not debrief them about what had happened in the camps. They wanted to send more forces into the camps, but he did not approve this; and there was no discussion at that meeting of relieving forces (pp. 1667-1670). At the same meeting, the Chief of Staff approved the supply of certain arms to the Phalangists, but this has nothing to do with events in Beirut. Major General Drori testified during his first appearance that the commander of the Phalangist force, who was present at the meeting, gave details of where his forces were and reported heavy fighting - but did not make mention of any irregularities, and certainly not of a massacre. The Phalangist commanders spoke of American pressure [on them] to leave the camps. When Major General Drori was asked for additional details of that conversation he replied that he could not recall (pp. 415-420, 444-444). Brigadier General Yaron also testified that at that meeting the Phalangists commanders had said nothing about unusual actions in the camps, [that] the reason given for departure from the camps the next morning was American pressure, and that it seemed to him that the Chief of Staff even had had some good words to say, from a military standpoint, about their action. It was also agreed at that meeting that they would get tractors in order to raze illegal structures. At the end of the meeting it was clear to Brigadier General Yaron, as he testified, that the Phalangists could still enter the camps, bring in tractors, and do what they wanted - and that they would leave on Saturday morning (pp. 709-716).

In the matter of sending in additional Phalangist forces, Brigadier General Yaron testified that he did not think that limitations had been imposed on them with regard to bringing in an additional force, and he did not know whether they brought in an additional force after that meeting - but since they were supposed to leave at 5:00 a.m. on the following morning, there was no need for additional forces. On the same subject, Brigadier General Yaron also said that there was no restriction on the Phalangists' bringing in additional forces; it seemed to him that they had brought in a certain additional force - although the major force, at the airport, was not sent into the camps. He did not check whether they did or did not bring in additional forces, and from his point of view there was no impediment to their bringing in additional forces until Saturday morning (pp. 715-747).

Also present at that same meeting were the Deputy Chief of Staff, Mossad representative A, the divisional intelligence officer (who took the minutes of the meeting) and other Israeli officers; and there

is no need to go into details here of their testimony on this matter, since the things they said generally agree with what has already been detailed above. We would add only that in the matter of the tractors, the Mossad representative recommended to the Chief of Staff that tractors be given to the Phalangists; but at the conclusion of the meeting, an order was given to supply them with just one tractor and to remove I.D.F. markings from the tractor. The one tractor supplied later was not used and was returned immediately by the Phalangists, who had their own tractors which they used in the camps that same night and the following morning.

It is clear from all the testimony that no explicit question was posed to the Phalangist commanders concerning the rumors or reports which had arrived until then regarding treatment of the civilian population in the camps. The Phalangist commanders, for their part, didn't "volunteer" any reports of this type, and this matter was therefore not discussed at all at that meeting. The subject of the Phalangists' conduct toward those present in the camps did not come up at all at that meeting, nor was there any criticism or warning on this matter.

During the evening, between 18:00-20:00 hours, Foreign Ministry personnel in Beirut and in Israel began receiving various reports from U.S. representatives that the Phalangists had been seen in the camps and that their presence was liable to lead to undesirable results - as well as complaints about actions by I.D.F. soldiers in the hospital building in Beirut. The Foreign Ministry personnel saw to the clarification of the complaints, and the charges against I.D.F. soldiers turned out to be unfounded.

After the Chief of Staff returned to Israel, he called the Defense Minister between 20:00-21:00 hours and spoke with him about his visit to Beirut. According to the Defense Minister's testimony, the Chief of Staff told him in that conversation that he had just returned from Beirut and that "in the course of the Phalangists' actions in the camps, the Christians had harmed the civilian population more than was expected." According to the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff used the expression that the Lebanese Forces had "gone too far," and that therefore their activity had been stopped in the afternoon, the entry of additional forces had been prevented, and an order had been given to the Phalangists to remove their forces from the camps by 5:00 a.m. the following morning. The Defense Minister added that the Chief of Staff also mentioned that civilians had been killed (testimony of the Defense Minister, pp. 293-294). According to the Defense Minister's statements, this was the first report that reached him of irregular activity by the Phalangists in the refugee camps. The Chief of Staff did not confirm that he had told the Defense Minister all the above. According to him, he told the Defense Minister that the Phalangists had carried out their assignment, that they had stopped, and that they were under pressure from the Americans and would leave by 5:00 a.m. does not recall that he mentioned disorderly behaviour by the Phalangists, but he is sure he did not speak of a massacre, killing or the like. When the Chief of Staff was asked whether the Defense Minister had asked him questions in that same conversation, his reply was that he didn't remember (p. 242). In his second round of testimony, the Chief of Staff said that it was possible and also reasonable that he had told the Defense Minister the content of what he had heard from Major General Drori, although he reiterated that he didn't recall every word that was said in that same conversation (pp. 1687-1688). At the conclusion of his second round of testimony, the Chief of Staff denied that there had been discussion, in the telephone conversation with the Defense Minister, of killing beyond what had been expected (p. 1692).

This conversation was not recorded by anyone, and the two interlocutors testified about it from memory. It is our opinion that the Defense Minister's version of that same conversation is more accurate than the Chief of Staff's version. It is our determination that the Chief of Staff did tell the Defense Minister about the Phalangists' conduct, and that from his words the Defense Minister could have understood, and did understand, that the Phalangists had carried out killings of civilians in the camps. Our opinion finds confirmation in that, according to all the material which has been brought before us in evidence, the Defense Minister had not received any report of killings in the camps until that same telephone conversation; but after that conversation, the Defense Minister knew that killings had been carried out in the camps - as is clear from a later conversation between him and Mr. Ron Ben-Yishai, which we will discuss further on.

On Friday at approximately 4:00 p.m., when the television military correspondent Mr. Ron Ben-Yishai was at the airport in Beirut, he heard from several I.D.F. officers about killings in the camps.

These officers were not speaking from personal knowledge, but rather according to what they had heard from others. Likewise, he saw Phalangist forces comprising about 500-600 men deployed at the airport. The Phalangist officer with whom Mr. Ben-Yishai spoke at that time told him that the Phalangist forces were going to the camps to fight the terrorists, so as to remove the terrorists and the arms caches in the camps. Asked what explanation had been given to the soldiers, the officer replied that it had been explained to them that they must behave properly and that they would harm their image if they didn't behave in the war like soldiers in all respects. He heard members of the forces in the field shouting condemnations and making threatening motions toward Palestinians, but he attached no importance to this, since he had encountered this phenomenon many times, during the war. Mr Ben-Yishai went from the airport to Baabda; and there, at 8:30 p.m., he heard from various officers that they had heard about people being executed by the Phalangists. At 23:30 hours, Mr. Ben-Yishai called up the Defense Minister and told him that a story was circulating that the Phalangists were doing unacceptable things in the camps. To the Defense Minister's questions, Mr. Ben-Yishai replied that he had heard this story from people he knew who had heard about civilians being killed by the Phalangists. The Defense Minister did not react to these words (statement 10 by Mr. Ben-Yishai, and testimony by the Defense Minister, p. 298). According to the Defense Minister, what he heard from Mr. Ron Ben-Yishai was nothing new to him, since he had already heard earlier about killings from the Chief of Staff-, and he also knew that as a result of the report, entry by additional forces had been halted and an order had been given to the Phalangists to leave the camps (p. 298).

In concluding the description of the events of Thursday and Friday, it should be noted that no information on the reports which had arrived during those two days regarding the Phalangists' deeds, as these were detailed above, was given to the Prime Minister during those same two days. It should also be added that on Friday evening, there were several calls from U.S. representatives complaining about entry by Phalangist forces and about the consequences which might ensue, as well as about actions that had been taken in other parts of West Beirut. Foreign Ministry personnel handled these complaints, and a summary of them was also sent to the situation room at the Defense Ministry and was brought to the Defense Minister's attention at approximately 22:00 hours.

#### The Departure of the Phalangists and the Reports of the Massacre

The Phalangists did not leave by 5:00 a.m. on Saturday, 18.9.82. Between 6:30-7:00 a.m., a group of Phalangist soldiers entered the Gaza Hospital, which is located at the end of the Sabra camp and which is run by the Palestinian Red Crescent organization. These soldiers took a group of doctors and nurses, foreign nationals working in that same hospital, out of the hospital and led them under armed escort via Sabra St. We heard from three members of the group, Drs. Ang and Morris and the nurse Ellen Siegel, about what happened in that hospital from the time of Bashir's murder until Saturday morning. As this group passed along Sabra St., the witnesses saw several corpses on both sides of the street, and groups of people sitting on both sides of the street with armed soldiers guarding them. The members of the group also saw bulldozers moving along Sabra St. and entering the camp's alleyways. The group of doctors and nurses arrived, with those who were leading them, at a plaza at the end of Sabra St.; they passed by the Kuwaiti Embassy building and were brought into a former U.N. building by their guards. There several members of the group were interrogated by the Phalangists, but the interrogation was halted, their passports restored to them, and they were taken to a building where there were I.D.F. soldiers - that is, the forward command post. After a while, the members of the group were taken by I.D.F. soldiers to another part of Beirut, where they were released; and several of them, at their request, returned to the hospital after receiving from one of the I.D.F. officers a document which was meant to grant them passage as far as the hospital. We will return again later to the testimony of three of the members of this group.

When Brigadier General Yaron realized that the Phalangists had not left the camps by 06:30 hours, he gave the Phalangist commander on the scene an order that they must vacate the camps without delay. This order was obeyed, and the last of the Phalangist forces left the camps at approximately 8:00 a.m. Afterwards there was an "announcement" - that is, it was declared over loudspeakers that people located in the area must come out and assemble in a certain place, and all those who came out were led

to the stadium. There, refugees from the camps gathered, and the I.D.F. gave them food and water. In the meantime, reports circulated about the massacre in the camps, and many journalists and media personnel arrived in the area.

The Chief of Staff testified before us that on Saturday morning, the Prime Minister phoned him and told him that the Americans had called him and complained that the Phalangists had entered the Gaza Hospital and were killing patients, doctors, and staff workers there. The Chief of Staff's reply was that as far as he knew, there was no hospital called "Gaza" in the western part of the city, but he would look into the matter. At his order, an investigation was conducted in the Northern Command and also in the Operations Branch, and the reply he received was that there was indeed a hospital called "Gaza" but that no killings had been perpetrated, and he so informed the Prime Minister. According to the Chief of Staff's initial testimony, the Prime Minister called him on this matter at approximately 10:00 a.m. (p. 243). In his second round of testimony, when the Chief of Staff was presented with the fact that the Prime Minister was in synagogue at 8:00 a.m. on that same Saturday, the first day of the Rosh Hashana holiday, the Chief of Staff said that the first telephone conversation with the Prime Minister had apparently taken place at an earlier hour of the morning. The Prime Minister stated in his testimony that he had gone to synagogue at 8:15-8:30 hours, returning at 13:15-13:30 hours; that he had had no conversation with the Chief of Staff before going to synagogue; that there had been no American call to him regarding the Gaza Hospital; and therefore, the conversations regarding the Gaza Hospital about which the Chief of Staff testified (pp. 771-772) had not taken place. The Defense Minister testified that the Chief of Staff apparently spoke with him by phone between 9:00-10:00 on Saturday morning and told him that the Prime Minister had called his attention to some occurrence at the Gaza Hospital; but the Defense Minister was not sure that such a conversation had indeed taken place, and said that he things that there was such a conversation (p. 300). We see no need, for the purpose of determining the facts in this investigation, to decide between the two contradictory versions regarding the conversations about Gaza hospital. We assume that the contradictions are not deliberate, but stem from faulty memory, which is understandable in view of the dramatic turn of events taking place in those days.

On Saturday, the Defense Minister received additional reports about the acts of slaughter. He heard from the Director-General of the Foreign ministry, Mr Kimche, that Ambassador Draper had called him to say that I.D.F. soldiers had entered banks on the Street of Banks and that Palestinians had been massacred. It emerged that the report about the entry into the banks was incorrect. Regarding the report about the massacre, the Defense Minister's reply to the Foreign Ministry Director-General, which was given at about 13:00 hours, was that the Phalangists' operation had been stopped, the entry of additional forces blocked, and all the forces in the camps had been expelled. At 15:00 hours, Major General Drori spoke with the Defense Minister and told him about the reports concerning the massacre, adding that the Phalangists had already left the camps and that the Red Cross and the press were inside (testimony of Maj. Gen. Drori, pp. 428-429). At about 17:00 hours, Major General Drori met with a representative of the Lebanese army and appealed to him to have the Lebanese army enter the camps. The representative of the Lebanese army replied that he had to get approval for such a move. Between 21:30 and 22:00 hours the reply was received that the Lebanese army would enter the camps. Its entry into the camps was effected on Sunday, 19.9.82.

After the Phalangists had left the camps, Red Cross personnel, many journalists and other persons entered them, and it then became apparent that in the camps, and particularly in Shatilla, civilians - including women and children - had been massacred. It was clear from the spectacle that presented itself that a considerable number of the killed had not been cut down in combat but had been murdered, and that no few acts of barbarism had also been perpetrated. These sights shocked those who witnessed them; the reports were circulated by the media and spread throughout the world. Although for the most part the reports said that the massacre had been executed by members of the Phalangists, accusations were immediately hurled at the I.D.F. and at the State of Israel, since, according to the reports published at that time, the Phalangists' entry into the camps had been carried out with the aid and consent of the I.D.F. On Saturday and the days following, the I.D.F. refrained as far as possible from entering the camps, for fear that should any I.D.F. soldiers be seen there, accusations would be

forthcoming about their participation in the massacre. The burial of the dead was carried out under the supervision of the Red Cross, and the victims' families also engaged in their burial.

It is impossible to determine precisely the number of persons who were slaughtered. The numbers cited in this regard are to a large degree tendentious and are not based on an exact count by persons whose reliability can be counted on. The low estimate came from sources connected with the Government of Lebanon or with the Lebanese Forces. The letter (exhibit 153) of the head of the Red Cross delegation to the Minister of Defense stated that Red Cross representatives had counted 328 bodies. This figure, however, does not include all the bodies, since it is known that a number of families buried bodies on their own initiative without reporting their actions to the Red Cross. The forces who engaged in the operation removed bodies in trucks when they left Shatilla, and it is possible that more bodies are lying under the ruins in the camps or in the graves that were dug by the assailants near the camps. The letter noted that the Red Cross also had a list of 359 persons who had disappeared in West Beirut between 18 August and 20 September, with most of the missing having disappeared from Sabra and Shatilla in mid-September. According to a document which reached us (exhibit 151), the total number of victims whose bodies were found from 18.9.82 to 30.9.82 is 460. This figure includes the dead counted by the Lebanese Red Cross, the International Red Cross, the Lebanese Civil Defense, the medical corps of the Lebanese army, and by relatives of the victims. According to this count, the 460 victims included 109 Lebanese and 328 Palestinians, along with Iranians, Syrians and members of other nationalities. According to the itemization of the bodies in this list, the great majority of the dead were males; as for women and children, there were 8 Lebanese women and 12 Lebanese children, and 7 Palestinian women and 8 Palestinian children. Reports from Palestinian sources speak of a far greater number of persons killed, sometimes even of thousands. With respect to the number of victims, it appears that we can rely neither on the numbers appearing in the document from Lebanese sources, nor on the numbers originating in Palestinian sources. A further difficulty in determining the number of victims stems from the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between victims of combat operations and victims of acts of slaughter. We cannot rule out the possibility that various reports included also victims of combat operations from the period antedating the assassination of Bashir. Taking into account the fact that Red Cross personnel counted no more than 328 bodies, it would appear that the number of victims of the massacre was not as high as a thousand, and certainly not thousands.

According to I.D.F. intelligence sources, the number of victims of the massacre is between 700 and 800 (testimony of the director of Military Intelligence, pp. 139-140). This may well be the number most closely corresponding with reality. It is impossible to determine precisely when the acts of slaughter were perpetrated; evidently they commenced shortly after the Phalangists entered the camps and went on intermittently until close to their departure. According to the testimony we heard, no report of the slaughter in the camps was made to the Prime Minister on Saturday, with the possible exception of the events in the Gaza Hospital, regarding which we made no finding. The Prime Minister heard about the massacre on a B.B.C. radio broadcast towards evening on Saturday. He immediately contacted the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister, who informed him that the actions had been halted and that the Phalangists had been removed from the camps (p. 771).

When a public furor erupted in Israel and abroad in the wake of the reports about the massacre, and accusations were levelled that the I.D.F. and Haddad's men had taken part in the massacre, several communiqués were issued by the I.D.F. and the Foreign Ministry which contained incorrect and imprecise statements about the events. These communiqués asserted explicitly or implied that the Phalangists' entry into the camps had been carried out without the knowledge of - or coordination with - the I.D.F. The incorrect statements were subsequently amended, and it was stated publicly that the Phalangists' entry into the camps had been coordinated with the I.D.F. There is no doubt that the publication of incorrect and imprecise reports intensified the suspicions against Israel and caused it harm.

After the end of the Rosh Hashanah holy day, at 21:00 hours on Sunday, 19.9.82, a Cabinet meeting took place at the Prime Minister's residence with the participation of, in addition to the Cabinet members, the Chief of Staff, the head of the Mossad, the director of Military Intelligence, Major General Drori, and others. The subject discussed in that meeting was "the events in West Beirut - the murder

of civilians in the Shatilla camp" (minutes of the meeting, Exhibit 121). At that meeting the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and Major General Drori reported on the course of events. The Defense Minister stressed that the I.D.F. had not entered the camps, which were terrorist bastions, because it was our interest not to endanger even one soldier in the camps (p. 5, minutes of the meeting). He added that on the day following the entry, "when we learned what had taken place there, the I.D.F. intervened immediately and removed those forces" (p. 6). According to him (p. 7) no one had imagined that the Phalangists would commit such acts. In his remarks, the Chief of Staff stressed, among other points, that in previous Cabinet meetings various Ministers had asked why the Phalangists were not fighting - after all, this was their war. He, too, noted that no one could have known in advance how the Phalangists would behave, and in his view even the Phalangists' commanders did not know what would happen, but had lost control of their men. The Chief of Staff added that "the moment we learned how they were behaving there, we exerted all the pressure we could, we removed them from there and we expelled them from the entire sector" (pp. 9, 10). Major General Drori said that even before the Phalangists entered the camps, "we made them swear, not one oath but thousands, regarding their operation there. There was also their assurance that the kind of actions that were committed would not be committed. The moment it became clear to us what had happened, we halted the operation and demanded that they get out - and they got out." Major General Drori also told about the group of 15 persons, among them doctors, whom the I.D.F. had extricated from the hands of the Phalangists, thus preventing a major complication. He gave details of his appeal to the heads of the Lebanese army that they agree to enter the camps, and about the negative replies he had received (pp. 18-22). Afterward the Chief of Staff spoke again, and according to the recorded minutes (p. 25) he said as follows:

"On Friday, I met with them at around noon, at their command post. We did not yet know what had happened there. In the morning we knew that they had killed civilians, so we ordered them to get out and we did not allow others to enter. But they did not say they had killed civilians, and they did not say how many civilians they had killed; they did not say anything..."

In his second testimony the Chief of Staff explained that by his words, "in the morning we knew they had killed civilians," he was referring to reports that existed on Saturday morning and not to the reports that existed Friday morning, as might have perhaps been understood (p. 1665). The remarks quoted above are not unequivocal; they are ambivalent. We accept the Chief of Staff's explanation that he was not referring to the reports in his possession on Friday, but to the reports that reached him on Saturday morning. This interpretation of the Chief of Staff's remarks is consistent with his other statements in this section of his remarks.

Several remarks were made in that meeting by the Prime Minister, who opened the session with a general survey in which he complained about accusations - in his view unfounded - which had been levelled against Israel. Various ministers took part in the discussion. In response to the remark of Minister Modai that the Prime Minister had spoken of "protecting life" as one of the goals of the entry into West Beirut, the Prime Minister stated (p. 73, exhibit 121):

"That was our pure and genuine intention. That night I also spoke of this with the Chief of Staff. I told him that we must seize positions precisely to protect the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists. I could assume that after the assassination of Bashir, their beloved leader, they would take revenge on the Muslims."

To this, Minister Hammer commented that "if we suspected that they would commit murder, we should have thought before we let them enter." The Prime Minister's reply was, "In the meantime days have passed. What are you objecting to? At night I said that we must prevent this." When in the course of his testimony the Prime Minister's attention was drawn to these remarks of his - that on the night when the decision about the entry into West Beirut was taken, he had spoken with the Chief of Staff about the goal "to protect the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists" - he confirmed having said this, although he had not known at that time that the Phalangists would enter the camps (p. 764). In the Cabinet meeting of 19.9.82 the Chief of Staff did not react to these remarks by the Prime Minister, and did not deny them. In his second testimony the Chief of Staff said that in the conversation between him and the Prime Minister that night, the Prime Minister might have said "that

there must be no rioting... they must not cross over or flee or not do things like... crossing from side to side"; but the Prime Minister had not gone into any greater detail (p. 1690). Since that night conversation was not taken down and it is difficult to rely on the memory of the conversants regarding the accuracy of what was said, we cannot determine with certainty what the Prime Minister said at that time, except for the fact that he mentioned that one of the purposes of the entry was to prevent rioting. The meeting concluded with a resolution to issue a communique expressing deep regret and pain at the injuries to a civilian population done by a Lebanese unit which had entered a refugee camp "at a place distant from an I. D.F. position." The resolution added that "immediately after learning about what had happened in the Shatilla camp, the I.D.F. had put a stop to the murder of innocent civilians and had forced the Lebanese unit to leave the camp." It was stressed in the resolution that the accusations regarding I.D.F. responsibility for the human tragedy in the Shatilla camp were in the nature of "a blood libel against the Jewish state and its Government," were groundless, and "the Government rejects them with repugnance." The resolution also stated that had it not been for the intervention of the I.D.F., the number of losses would have been far greater, and that it had been found that the terrorists had violated the evacuation agreement by leaving 2,000 terrorists and vast stocks of weapons in West Beirut. The resolution concludes:

"No one will preach to us moral values or respect for human life, on whose basis we were educated and will continue to educate generations of fighters in Israel."

The furor that erupted in the wake of the massacre, and various accusations that were levelled, led those concerned to carry out debriefings and clarifications. A clarification of this kind was carried out on behalf of the General Staff (exhibit 239) and in the office of the director of Military Intelligence (exhibit 29 from October 1982). The summation of the Military Intelligence report states that "it emerges from a retrospective examination that the telephone report... had its source in a rumour/'gut feeling' that the (Intelligence Officer A) had happened to overhear, and that he himself was unable to verify that rumor in his on-site examinations, or in reaction to the briefings he had received..." The cable in question is Appendix A to Exhibit 29, which has already been quoted above; and from what has already been said above it is clear that it was not based on a "gut feeling." This investigative report contains other inaccuracies, which we shall note when we come to discuss the responsibility of Mr. A. Duda'i. A more detailed clarification was carried out in a Senior Command Meeting (SCM) with the participation of the Chief of Staff. The minutes of that meeting were submitted to us (exhibit 241). At that meeting, the Chief of Staff said, inter alia, that whereas prior to the I. D.F.'s entry into Lebanon atrocities had been perpetrated throughout that country, after the I.D.F.'s entry "the Phalangists did not commit any excesses officially and did nothing that could have indicated any danger from them," and they looked to him to be a regular, disciplined army. In his remarks the Chief of Staff also stressed the pressure from various elements for the Phalangists to take part in the combat operations. Major General Drori related the course of events from his point of view, which in general lines is consistent with what he related in his testimony before us. He said, inter alia, that he had originally wanted the I.D.F. or the Lebanese army to enter the camps, and that he did not concur in the considerations which had led to the decision regarding the entry of the Phalangists. Major General Drori was asked by one of the participants why a tractor had been needed, and he replied that there was a plan of the Lebanese administration, including the Phalangists and the Lebanese army, to destroy all the illegal structures, including the many structures in the camps. Brigadier General Yaron also related the course of events. He said, inter alia, that when he had been informed by the command that approval had come to let the Christians into the refugee camp he had expressed no opposition or reservation, but had been quite pleased because it was clear to him that this camp contained many terrorists and the battalion had come under quite heavy fire from it. Brigadier General Yaron stressed that he had warned the Phalangists not to harm civilians, women, children, old people or anyone raising his hands, but to clean out the terrorists from the camps, with the civilians to go to the area of the stadium. He said that until Saturday morning he did not know what was happening and when he saw the group of doctors and nurses, they had not told him about the acts of slaughter either. Following a quite lengthy debate, Brigadier General Yaron responded to the remarks of the participants by stating, inter alia (pp. 85 to 87, exhibit 241):

"The mistake, as I see it, the mistake is everyone's. The entire system showed insensitivity. I am speaking now of the military system. I am not speaking about the political system. The whole system manifested insensitivity..."

"On this point everyone showed insensitivity, pure and simple. Nothing else. So you start asking me, what exactly did you feel in your gut on Friday... I did badly, I admit it. I did badly. I cannot, how is it possible that a divisional commander - and I think this applies to the Division Commander and up - how is it possible that a Division Commander is in the field and does not know that 300, 400, 500 or a thousand, I don't know how many, are being murdered here? If he's like that, let him go. How can such a thing be"? But why didn't he know? Why was he oblivious? That's why he didn't know and that's why he didn't stop it... but I take myself to task...

"I admit here, from this rostrum, we were all insensitive, that's all."

At the conclusion of his remarks, the Chief of Staff stressed that if the I.D.F. had provided the Phalangists with the tank and artillery support they had requested, far more people would have been killed (p. 121).

On 28.9.82 a Senior Command Meeting was held with the Defense Minister, who related the course of events from his point of view. His remarks at that meeting are consistent with what we heard in his testimony. Several senior I.D.F. officers expressed their views at that meeting (exhibit 242).

#### THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MASSACRE

In this section of the report, we shall deal with the issue of the responsibility for the massacre from two standpoints: first from the standpoint of direct responsibility - i.e., who actually perpetrated the massacre - and then we shall examine the problem of indirect responsibility, to the extent that this applies to Israel or those who acted on its behalf.

##### The Direct Responsibility

According to the above description of events, all the evidence indicates that the massacre was perpetrated by the Phalangists between the time they entered the camps on Thursday, 16.9.82., at 18:00 hours, and their departure from the camps on Saturday, 18.9.82, at approximately 8:00 a.m. The victims were found in those areas where the Phalangists were in military control during the aforementioned time period. No other military force aside from the Phalangists was seen by any one of the witnesses in the area of the camps where the massacre was carried out, or at the time of the entrance into or exit from this area. The camps were surrounded on all sides: on three sides by I.D.F. forces, and on the fourth side was a city line (that divided between East and West Beirut) that was under Phalangist control. Near the point of entry to the camps a Lebanese army force was encamped, and their men did not see any military force besides the Phalangist one enter the camps. It can be stated with certainty that no organized military force entered the camps at the aforementioned time besides the Phalangist forces.

As we have said, we heard testimony from two doctors and a nurse who worked in the Gaza hospital, which was run by and for Palestinians. There is no cause to suspect that any of these witnesses have any special sympathy of Israel, and it is clear to us - both from their choosing that place of employment and from our impression of their appearance before us - that they sympathize with the Palestinians and desired to render service to Palestinians in need. From these witnesses' testimony as well it is clear that the armed military unit that took them out of the hospital on Saturday morning and brought them to the building that formerly belonged to the U.N. was a Phalangist unit. The witness Ms. Siegel did indeed tell of a visit to the hospital at 7:00 p.m. on Friday evening of two men dressed in civilian clothes who spoke to the staff in German, and she hinted at the possibility that perhaps they were Sephardic Jews; but this assumption has no basis in fact, and it can be explained by her tendentiousness. Ms. Siegel even said that these men looked like Arabs (pp. 499-500). It is clear that these men did not belong to an armed force that penetrated the camps at the time. The two doctors Ang and Morris did not see any other military force aside from the Phalangists, who presented themselves as soldiers of a Lebanese force. Dr. Ang also saw soldiers with a band with the letters M.P. in red on it. There is evidence that some of the Phalangist units who came to the camps wore tags with the letters M.P., and along the route the Phalangists travelled to the camps, road directions containing the letters

M.P. were drawn. To be sure, Dr. Morris did not say specifically that the armed men who came to the hospital were Phalangists, but he described their uniforms, which bore Arabic inscriptions, and also heard them talking among themselves in Arabic and with someone from the hospital staff in French. Dr. Morris does not read Arabic, but Ms. Siegel, who does read Arabic, testified that the Arabic inscription was the one that signifies Phalangists. Therefore, the testimony of these three witnesses also indicates that the only military force seen in the area was a Phalangist one. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the statement of Norwegian journalist John Harbo (no. 62).

In the course of the events and also thereafter, rumors spread that personnel of Major Haddad were perpetrating a massacre or participating in a massacre. No basis was found for these rumors. The I.D.F. liaison officer with Major Haddad's forces testified that no unit of that force had crossed the Awali River that week. We have no reason to doubt that testimony. As we have already noted, the relations between the Phalangists and the forces of Major Haddad were poor, and friction existed between those two forces. For this reason, too, it is inconceivable that a force from Major Haddad's army took part in military operations of the Phalangists in the camps, nor was there any hint of such cooperation. Although three persons from southern Lebanon - two of them from the Civil Guard in southern Lebanon - were in West Beirut on Friday afternoon, and got caught in the exchanges of fire between an I.D.F. unit and Jumblatt's militia, with one of them being killed in those exchanges, this did not take place in the area of the camps; and the investigation that was carried out showed that the three of them had come to Beirut on a private visit. There is no indication in this event that Haddad's men were at the site where the massacre was perpetrated. We can therefore assert that no force under the command of Major Haddad took part in the Phalangists' operation in the camps, or took part in the massacre.

It cannot be ruled out that the rumors about the participation of Haddad's men in the massacre also had their origin in the fact that Major Haddad arrived at Beirut airport on Friday, 17.9.82. From the testimony of the I.D.F. liaison officer with Major Haddad's forces, and from Major Haddad's testimony, it is clear that this visit by Major Haddad to the suburbs of Beirut and the vicinity had no connection with the events that took place in the camps. Major Haddad arrived at Beirut airport in an air force helicopter at 8:30 a.m. on 17.9.82. The purpose of his visit was to pay a condolence call on the Jemayel family at Bikfaya. At the airport he was met by three vehicles with members of his escort party, who had arrived that morning from southern Lebanon. En route, they were joined by another jeep with three of Haddad's commanders, who also arrived to pay a condolence call. Major Haddad and his escorts paid their condolence visit at Bikfaya, and then for security reasons returned via a different route, arriving at the point where the road from Bikfaya meets the coastal road. From there, Major Haddad, along with about eight of his men, went to visit relatives of his in Jouniyeh. Following that visit to his relative, Major Haddad returned that same afternoon to his home in southern Lebanon, from where he phoned the aforementioned liaison officer that evening.

Hints were made about the participation of Haddad's men in the massacre on the basis of a southern Lebanese accent which several of the survivors mentioned, and they also said that a few of the participants in the massacre had Moslem names. This, too, does not constitute concrete evidence, since among the Phalangist forces there were also Shiites - albeit not many - and they were joined also by persons who had fled from southern Lebanon.

We cannot rule out the possibility - although no evidence to this effect was found either - that one of the men from Major Haddad's forces who was visiting in Beirut during the period infiltrated into the camps, particularly in the interim period between the departure of the Phalangists and the entry of the Lebanese army, committed illegal acts there; but if this did happen, no responsibility, either direct or indirect, is to be imputed to the commanders of Major Haddad's forces.

Here and there, hints, and even accusations, were thrown out to the effect that I.D.F. soldiers were in the camps at the time the massacre was perpetrated. We have no doubt that these notions are completely groundless and constitute a baseless libel. One witness, Mr. Franklin Pierce Lamb, of the United States, informed us of the fact that on 22.9.82 a civilian I.D. card and a military dogtag belonging to a soldier named Benny Haim Ben Yosef, born on 9.7.61, were found in the Sabra camp.

Following that testimony, these details were investigated and it was found that a soldier bearing that name was in hospital after having undergone operations for wounds he sustained during the entry into West Beirut. A statement was taken from this soldier in Tel Hashomer Hospital. It emerged from his remarks that he is a soldier in the battalion, he arrived in Beirut on Wednesday, 15.9.82, his unit was moving not far from the Shatilla camp and was fired on; he was hit and the protective vest he was wearing began to burn. A medic cut the vest with scissors and threw it to the side of the road, as it contained grenades which were liable to explode. Personal documents belonging to the soldier were in the pocket of the vest. He was evacuated on a stretcher and taken by helicopter to Rambam Hospital. Already in the initial medical treatment his left arm was amputated; he was also wounded in the legs and in his upper left hip. It is clear that he was not in the camps at all. This testimony is confirmed by the statement of the medic Amir Hasharoni (statement 117). Evidently, someone who found the documents on the side of the road brought them to the camp, where they were discovered. The discovery of these documents belonging to an I.D.F. soldier in the camp does not indicate that any I.D.F. soldiers were in the camp while the massacre was being perpetrated.

Mr. Lamb also testified - not from personal knowledge but based on what he had heard from others - that cluster bombs were placed under bodies found in the camps, apparently as booby-traps. According to the witness, the I.D.F. used cluster bombs when the camps were shelled; these bombs exploded easily and considerable caution is required in handling them, with only specially trained people having the technical knowledge to make use of these bombs as booby-traps. He raised the question whether the Phalangists, or the forces of Major Haddad - if any of them were in the camps - possessed the requisite technical skills to make use of these bombs as booby-traps. This question implies that the bombs were placed beneath the bodies by I.D.F. personnel. That implication is totally without foundation. As noted, Mr. Lamb had no personal knowledge regarding the use of such bombs as booby-traps, and it would be extremely far-fetched to view this section of Mr. Lamb's testimony as containing anything concrete pointing to direct involvement of anyone from the I.D.F. in the massacre that was perpetrated in the camps.

Following the massacre, the Phalangist commanders denied, in various interviews in the media, that they had perpetrated the massacre. On Sunday, 19.9.82, the Chief of Staff and Major General Drori met with the Phalangist commanders. Notes of that meeting were taken by a representative of the Mossad who was present (exhibit 199). The Chief of Staff told the Phalangist commanders that he had come from the camps, it was said that a massacre had taken place there, and that for the sake of their future they must admit to having perpetrated the acts and explain the matter, otherwise they would have no future in Lebanon. Their reaction was that if the Chief of Staff says they must do so, they would. The Chief of Staff formed the impression that they were bewildered, that it was possible that they did not know what had happened in the camps and had no control over their people there (testimony of the Chief of Staff, p. 251). Even after that meeting the Phalangist heads continued in their public appearances to deny any connection with the massacre. That denial is patently incorrect.

Contentions and accusations were advanced that even if I.D.F. personnel had not shed the blood of the massacred, the entry of the Phalangists into the camps had been carried out with the prior knowledge that a massacre would be perpetrated there and with the intention that this should indeed take place; and therefore all those who had enabled the entry of the Phalangists into the camps should be regarded as accomplices to the acts of slaughter and sharing in direct responsibility. These accusations too are unfounded. We have no doubt that no conspiracy or plot was entered into between anyone from the Israeli political echelon or from the military echelon in the I.D.F. and the Phalangists, with the aim of perpetrating atrocities in the camps. The decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps was taken with the aim of preventing further losses in the war in Lebanon; to accede to the pressure of public opinion in Israel, which was angry that the Phalangists, who were reaping the fruits of the war, were taking no part in it; and to take advantage of the Phalangists' professional service and their skills in identifying terrorists and in discovering arms caches. No intention existed on the part of any Israeli element to harm the non-combatant population in the camps. It is true that in the war in Lebanon, and particularly during the siege of West Beirut, the civilian population sustained losses, with old people, women and children among the casualties, but this was the result of belliger-

ent actions which claim victims even among those who do not fight. Before they entered the camps and also afterward, the Phalangists requested I.D.F. support in the form of artillery fire and tanks, but this request was rejected by the Chief of Staff in order to prevent injuries to civilians. It is true that I.D.F. tank fire was directed at sources of fire within the camps, but this was in reaction to fire directed at the I.D.F. from inside the camps. We assert that in having the Phalangists enter the camps, no intention existed on the part of anyone who acted on behalf of Israel to harm the non-combatant population, and that the events that followed did not have the concurrence or assent of anyone from the political or civilian echelon who was active regarding the Phalangists' entry into the camps.

It was alleged that the atrocities being perpetrated in the camps were visible from the roof of the forward command post, that the fact that they were being committed was also discernible from the sounds emanating from the camps, and that the senior I.D.F. commanders who were on the roof of the forward command post for two days certainly saw or heard what was going on in the camps. We have already determined above that events in the camps, in the area where the Phalangists entered, were not visible from the roof of the forward command post. It has also been made clear that no sounds from which it could be inferred that a massacre was being perpetrated in the camps reached that place. It is true that certain reports did reach officers at the forward command post - and we shall discuss these in another section of this report - but from the roof of the forward command post they neither saw the actions of the Phalangists nor heard any sounds indicating that a massacre was in progress.

Here we must add that when the group of doctors and nurses met I.D.F. officers on Saturday morning, at a time when it was already clear to them that they were out of danger, they made no complaint that a massacre had been perpetrated in the camps. When we asked the witnesses from the group why they had not informed the I. D. F. officers about the massacre, they replied that they had not known about it. The fact that the doctors and nurses who were in the Gaza Hospital - which is proximate to the site of the event and where persons wounded in combative action and frightened persons from the camps arrived - did not know about the massacre, but only about isolated instances of injury which they had seen for themselves, also shows that those who were nearby but not actually inside the camps did not form the impression, from what they saw and heard, that a massacre of hundreds of people was taking place. Nor did members of a unit of the Lebanese army who were stationed near the places of entry into the camps know anything about the massacre until after the Phalangists had departed.

Our conclusion is therefore that the direct responsibility for the perpetration of the acts of slaughter rests on the Phalangist forces. No evidence was brought before us that Phalangist personnel received explicit orders from their command to perpetrate acts of slaughter, but it is evident that the forces who entered the area were steeped in hatred for the Palestinians, in the wake of the atrocities and severe injuries done to the Christians during the civil war in Lebanon by the Palestinians and those who fought alongside them; and these feelings of hatred were compounded by a longing for revenge in the wake of the assassination of the Phalangists' admired leader Bashir and the killing of several dozen Phalangists two days before their entry into the camps. The execution of acts of slaughter was approved for the Phalangists on the site by the remarks of the two commanders to whom questions were addressed over the radios, as was related above.

### The Indirect Responsibility

Before we discuss the essence of the problem of the indirect responsibility of Israel, or of those who operated at its behest, we perceive it to be necessary to deal with objections that have been voiced on various occasions, according to which if Israel's direct responsibility for the atrocities is negated - i.e., if it is determined that the blood of those killed was not shed by I.D.F. soldiers and I.D.F. forces, or that others operating at the behest of the state were not parties to the atrocities - then there is no place for further discussion of the problem of indirect responsibility. The argument is that no responsibility should be laid on Israel for deeds perpetrated outside of its borders by members of the Christian community against Palestinians in that same country, or against Muslims located within the area of the camps. A certain echo of this approach may be found in statements made in the cabinet meeting of 19.9.82, and in statements released to the public by various sources.

We cannot accept this position. If it indeed becomes clear that those who decided on the entry of the Phalangists into the camps should have foreseen - from the information at their disposal and from things which were common knowledge - that there was danger of a massacre, and no steps were taken which might have prevented this danger or at least greatly reduced the possibility that deeds of this type might be done, then those who made the decisions and those who implemented them are indirectly responsible for what ultimately occurred, even if they did not intend this to happen and merely disregarded the anticipated danger. A similar indirect responsibility also falls on those who knew of the decision; it was their duty, by virtue of their position and their office, to warn of the danger, and they did not fulfill this duty. It is also not possible to absolve of such indirect responsibility those persons who, when they received the first reports of what was happening in the camps, did not rush to prevent the continuation of the Phalangists' actions and did not do everything within their power to stop them. It is not our function as a commission of inquiry to lay a precise legal foundation for such indirect responsibility. It may be that from a legal perspective, the issue of responsibility is not unequivocal, in view of the lack of clarity regarding the status of the State of Israel and its forces in Lebanese territory. If the territory of West Beirut may be viewed at the time of the events as occupied territory - and we do not determine that such indeed is the case from a legal perspective - then it is the duty of the occupier, according to the rules of usual and customary international law, to do all it can to ensure the public's well-being and security. Even if these legal norms are invalid regarding the situation in which the Israeli government and the forces operating at its instructions found themselves at the time of the events, still, as far as the obligations applying to every civilized nation and the ethical rules accepted by civilized peoples go, the problem of indirect responsibility cannot be disregarded. A basis for such responsibility may be found in the outlook of our ancestors, which was expressed in things that were said about the moral significance of the biblical portion concerning the "beheaded heifer" (in the Book of Deuteronomy, chapter 21). It is said in Deuteronomy (21:6-7) that the elders of the city who were near the slain victim who has been found (and it is not known who struck him down) "will wash their hands over the beheaded heifer in the valley and reply: our hands did not shed this blood and our eyes did not see." Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says of this verse (Talmud, Tractate Sota 38b):

"The necessity for the heifer whose neck is to be broken only arises on account of the nig-gardliness of spirit, as it is said, 'Our hands have not shed this blood.' But can it enter our minds that the elders of a Court of Justice are shedders of blood! The meaning is, [the man found dead] did not come to us for help and we dismissed him, we did not see him and let him go - i.e., he did not come to us for help and we dismissed him without supplying him with food, we did not see him and let him go without escort." (Rashi explains that escort means a group that would accompany them; Sforno, a commentator from a later period, says in his commentary on Deuteronomy, "that there should not be spectators at the place, for if there were spectators there, they would protest and speak out.")

When we are dealing with the issue of indirect responsibility, it should also not be forgotten that the Jews in various lands of exile, and also in the Land of Israel when it was under foreign rule, suffered greatly from pogroms perpetrated by various hooligans; and the danger of disturbances against Jews in various lands, it seems evident, has not yet passed. The Jewish public's stand has always been that the responsibility for such deeds falls not only on those who rioted and committed the atrocities, but also on those who were responsible for safety and public order, who could have prevented the disturbances and did not fulfill their obligations in this respect. It is true that the regimes of various countries, among them even enlightened countries, have side-stepped such responsibility on more than one occasion and have not established inquiry commissions to investigate the issue of indirect responsibility, such as that about which we are speaking; but the development of ethical norms in the world public requires that the approach to this issue be universally shared, and that the responsibility be placed not just on the perpetrators, but also on those who could and should have prevented the commission of those deeds which must be condemned.

We would like to note here that we will not enter at all into the question of indirect responsibility of other elements besides the State of Israel. One might argue that such indirect responsibility falls, inter

alia, on the Lebanese army, or on the Lebanese government to whose orders this army was subject, since despite Major General Drori's urgings in his talks with the heads of the Lebanese army, they did not grant Israel's request to enter the camps before the Phalangists or instead of the Phalangists, until 19.9.82. It should also be noted that in meetings with U.S. representatives during the critical days, Israel's spokesmen repeatedly requested that the U.S. use its influence to get the Lebanese Army to fulfill the function of maintaining public peace and order in West Beirut, but it does not seem that these requests had any result. One might also make charges concerning the hasty evacuation of the multi-national force by the countries whose troops were in place until after the evacuation of the terrorists. We will also not discuss the question of when other elements besides Israeli elements first learned of the massacre, and whether they did all they could to stop it or at least to immediately bring the reports in their possession to Israeli and other elements. We do not view it as our function to discuss these issues, which perhaps should be clarified in another framework; we will only discuss the issue of Israel's indirect responsibility, knowing that if this responsibility is determined, it is not an exclusive responsibility laid on Israel alone.

Here it is appropriate to discuss the question whether blame may be attached regarding the atrocities done in the camps to those who decided on the entry into West Beirut and on including the Phalangists in actions linked to this entry.

As has already been said above, the decision to enter West Beirut was adopted in conversations held between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister on the night between 14-15 September 1982. No claim may be made that this decision was adopted by these two alone without convening a cabinet session. On that same night, an extraordinary emergency situation was created which justified immediate and concerted action to prevent a situation which appeared undesirable and even dangerous from Israel's perspective. There is great sense in the supposition that had I.D.F. troops not entered West Beirut, a situation of total chaos and battles between various combat forces would have developed, and the number of victims among the civilian population would have been far greater than it ultimately was. The Israeli military force was the only real force nearby which could take control over West Beirut so as to maintain the peace and prevent a resumption of hostile actions between various militias and communities. The Lebanese army could have performed a function in the refugee camps, but it did not then have the power to enforce order in all of West Beirut. Under these circumstances it could be assumed that were I.D.F. forces not to enter West Beirut, various atrocities would be perpetrated there in the absence of any real authority; and it may be that world public opinion might then have placed responsibility on Israel for having refrained from action.

Both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister based the participation of the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut on the Cabinet resolution adopted at the session of 15.6.82. We are unable to accept this reasoning. Although there was much talk in the meeting of 15.6.82 (Exhibit 53) about the plan that the I.D.F. would not enter West Beirut, and that the entry would be effected by the Phalangists with support from the I.D.F. - but the situation then was wholly different from the one that emerged subsequently. During the discussion of 15.6.82 the terrorists and Syrian forces had not yet been evacuated from West Beirut, and the entire military picture was different from the one that developed after the evacuation was executed and after Bashir's assassination. However, even if the Phalangists' participation was not based on a formal Cabinet resolution of 15.6.82, we found no cause to raise objections to that participation in the circumstances that were created after Bashir's assassination. We wish to stress that we are speaking now only of the Phalangists' participation in connection with the entry into West Beirut, and not about the role they were to play in the camps.

The demand made in Israel to have the Phalangists take part in the fighting was a general and understandable one; and political, and to some extent military, reasons existed for such participation. The general question of relations with the Phalangists and cooperation with them is a saliently political one, regarding which there may be legitimate differences of opinion and outlook. We do not find it justified to assert that the decision on this participation was unwarranted or that it should not have been made.

It is a different question whether the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps was justified in the circumstances that were created. From the description of events cited above and from the testi-

mony before us, it is clear that this decision was taken by the Minister of Defense with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff and that the Prime Minister did not know of it until the Cabinet session in the evening hours of 16.9.82. We shall leave to another section of this report - which will deal with the personal responsibility of all those to whom notices were sent under Section 15(A) of the law - the discussion of whether personal responsibility devolves upon the Defense Minister or the Chief of Staff for what happened afterward in the camps in the wake of the decision to have the Phalangists enter them. Here we shall discuss only the question of whether it was possible or necessary to foresee that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, with them in control of the area where the Palestinian population was to be found, was liable to eventuate in a massacre, as in fact finally happened.

The heads of Government in Israel and the heads of the I.D.F. who testified before us were for the most part firm in their view that what happened in the camps was an unexpected occurrence, in the nature of a disaster which no one had of hostile actions between various militias and communities. The Lebanese army could have performed a function in the refugee camps, but it did not then have the power to enforce order in all of West Beirut. Under these circumstances it could be assumed that were I.D.F. forces not to enter West Beirut, various atrocities would be perpetrated there in the absence of any real authority; and it may be that world public opinion might then have placed responsibility on Israel for having refrained from action.

Both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister based the participation of the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut on the Cabinet resolution adopted at the session of 15.6.82. We are unable to accept this reasoning. Although there was much talk in the meeting of 15.6.82 (Exhibit 53) about the plan that the I.D.F. would not enter West Beirut, and that the entry would be effected by the Phalangists with support from the I.D.F. - but the situation then was wholly different from the one that emerged subsequently. During the discussion of 15.6.82 the terrorists and Syrian forces had not yet been evacuated from West Beirut, and the entire military picture was different from the one that developed after the evacuation was executed and after Bashir's assassination. However, even if the Phalangists' participation was not based on a formal Cabinet resolution of 15.6.82, we found no cause to raise objections to that participation in the circumstances that were created after Bashir's assassination. We wish to stress that we are speaking now only of the Phalangists' participation in connection with the entry into West Beirut, and not about the role they were to play in the camps.

The demand made in Israel to have the Phalangists take part in the fighting was a general and understandable one; and political, and to some extent military, reasons existed for such participation. The general question of relations with the Phalangists and cooperation with them is a saliently political one, regarding which there may be legitimate differences of opinion and outlook. We do not find it justified to assert that the decision on this participation was unwarranted or that it should not have been made.

It is a different question whether the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps was justified in the circumstances that were created. From the description of events cited above and from the testimony before us, it is clear that this decision was taken by the Minister of Defense with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff and that the Prime Minister did not know of it until the Cabinet session in the evening hours of 16.9.82. We shall leave to another section of this report - which will deal with the personal responsibility of all those to whom notices were sent under Section 15(A) of the law - the discussion of whether personal responsibility devolves upon the Defense Minister or the Chief of Staff for what happened afterward in the camps in the wake of the decision to have the Phalangists enter them. Here we shall discuss only the question of whether it was possible or necessary to foresee that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, with them in control of the area where the Palestinian population was to be found, was liable to eventuate in a massacre, as in fact finally happened.

The heads of Government in Israel and the heads of the I.D.F. who testified before us were for the most part firm in their view that what happened in the camps was an unexpected occurrence, in the nature of a disaster which no one had imagined and which could not have been - or, at all events, need not have been - foreseen. It was stressed in the remarks made in testimony and in the arguments advanced before us, that this matter should not be discussed in terms of hindsight, but that we must be

careful to judge without taking into account what actually happened. We concur that special caution is required so as not to fall into the hindsight trap, but that caution does not exempt us from the obligation to examine whether persons acting and thinking rationally were duty-bound, when the decision was taken to have the Phalangists enter the camps, to foresee, according to the information that each of them possessed and according to public knowledge, that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps held out the danger of a massacre and that no little probability existed that it would in fact occur. At this stage of the discussion we shall not pause to examine the particular information possessed by the persons to whom notices were sent under Section 15(A) of the law, but shall make do with an examination of the knowledge possessed by everyone who had some expertise on the subject of Lebanon.

In our view, everyone who had anything to do with events in Lebanon should have felt apprehension about a massacre in the camps, if armed Phalangist forces were to be moved into them without the I.D.F. exercising concrete and effective supervision and scrutiny of them. All those concerned were well aware that combat morality among the various combatant groups in Lebanon differs from the norm in the I.D.F. that the combatants in Lebanon belittle the value of human life far beyond what is necessary and accepted in wars between civilized peoples, and that various atrocities against the non-combatant population had been widespread in Lebanon since 1975. It was well known that the Phalangists harbor deep enmity for the Palestinians, viewing them as the source of all the troubles that afflicted Lebanon during the years of the civil war. The fact that in certain operations carried out under close I.D.F. supervision the Phalangists did not deviate from disciplined behavior could not serve as an indication that their attitude toward the Palestinian population had changed, or that changes had been effected in their plans - which they made no effort to hide - for the Palestinians. To this backdrop of the Phalangists' attitude toward the Palestinians were added the profound shock in the wake of Bashir's death along with a group of Phalangists in the explosion at Ashrafiya, and the feeling of revenge that event must arouse, even without the identity of the assailant being known.

The written and oral summations presented to us stressed that most of the experts whose remarks were brought before the commission - both Military Intelligence personnel and Mossad personnel - had expressed the view that given the state of affairs existing when the decision was taken to have the Phalangists enter the camps, it could not be foreseen that the Phalangists would perpetrate a massacre, or at all events the probability of that occurring was low; and had they been asked for their opinion at the time they would have raised no objections to the decision. We are not prepared to attach any importance to these statements, and not necessarily due to the fact that this evaluation was refuted by reality. It is our impression that the remarks of the experts on this matter were influenced to a certain extent by the desire of each of them to justify his action or lack thereof, the experts having failed to raise any objection to the entry of the Phalangists into the camps when they learned of it. In contrast to the approach of these experts, there were cases in which other personnel, both from Military Intelligence, from other I.D.F. branches, and from outside the governmental framework, warned - as soon as they learned of the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and on earlier occasion when the Phalangists' role in the war was discussed - that the danger of a massacre was great and that the Phalangists would take advantage of every opportunity offered them to wreak vengeance on the Palestinians. Thus, for example, Intelligence Officer G. (whose name appears in Section I of Appendix B), a branch head in Military Intelligence/ Research, stated that the subject of possible injury by the Phalangists to the Palestinian population had come up many times in internal discussions (statement no. 176). Similarly, when Intelligence Officer A. learned on Thursday, in a briefing of Intelligence officers, that the Phalangists had entered the camps, he said, even before the report arrived about the 300 killed, that he was convinced that the entry would lead to a massacre of the refugee camps' population. In a working meeting held at 7:00 p.m. between Major General Drori and the liaison officer with the Lebanese army at Northern Command [headquarters], the officer was told by Major General Drori that the Phalangists were about to enter the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps; his reaction was that this was a good solution, but care should be taken that they not commit acts of murder (statement No. 4 and testimony of Major General Drori, pp. 402-403). In his statement, Captain Nahum Menahem relates that in a meeting he had with the Defense Minister on 12.9.82, he informed the Defense Minister of his opinion, which was based on considerable experience and on a study he had made of the tensions

between the communities in Lebanon, that a "terrible" slaughter could ensue if Israel failed to assuage the inter-communal tensions in Lebanon (statement No. 161, p. 4). We shall mention here also articles in the press stating that excesses could be expected on the part of the Christian fighters (article in the journal *Bamahane* from 1.9.82, appended to the statement - No. 24 - of the article's author, the journal's military reporter Mr. Yinon Shenkar) and that the refugee camps in Beirut were liable to undergo events exceeding what had happened at El Tel Za'atar (article in a French paper in Beirut from 20.8.82 appended to the statement, No. 76, of the journalist M. Strauch). We do not know whether the content of these articles was made known to the decisionmakers regarding the operation of the Phalangists in West Beirut, or to those who executed the decision. We mention them solely as yet another indication that even before Bashir's assassination the possibility of the Phalangists perpetrating a massacre in the camps was not esoteric lore which need not and could not have been foreseen.

We do not say that the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps should under no circumstances have been made and was totally unwarranted. Serious considerations existed in favor of such a decision; and on this matter we shall repeat what has already been mentioned, that an understandable desire existed to prevent I.D. F. losses in hazardous combat in a built-up area, that it was justified to demand of the Phalangists to take part in combat which they regarded as a broad opening to assume power and for the restoration of Lebanese independence, and that the Phalangists were more expert than the I.D.F. in uncovering and identifying terrorists. These are weighty considerations; and had the decision-makers and executors been aware of the danger of harm to the civilian population on the part of the Phalangists but had nevertheless, having considered all the circumstances, decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps while taking all possible steps to prevent harm coming to the civilian population, it is possible that there would be no place to be critical of them, even if ultimately it had emerged that the decision had caused undesirable results and had caused damage. However, as it transpired no examination was made of all the considerations and their ramifications; hence the appropriate orders were not issued to the executors of the decisions and insufficient heed was taken to adopt the required measures. Herein lies the basis for imputing indirect responsibility to those persons who in our view did not fulfill the obligations placed on them.

To sum up this chapter, we assert that the atrocities in the refugee camps were perpetrated by members of the Phalangists, and that absolutely no direct responsibility devolves upon Israel or upon those who acted in its behalf. At the same time, it is clear from what we have said above that the decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger - which the makers and executors of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - that the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger. Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both reflects and exhausts Israel's indirect responsibility for what occurred in the refugee camps. We shall discuss the responsibility of those who acted in Israel's behalf and in its name in the following chapters.

#### The Responsibility of the Political Echelon

Among those who received notices sent by the committee in accordance with Section 15(A) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law were the Prime Minister and two ministers, and in this matter no distinction was made between Cabinet ministers and officeholders and other officials. We took this course because, in our opinion, in principle, in the matter of personal responsibility, no distinction should be made between Cabinet members and others charged with personal responsibility for actions or oversights. We wish to note to the credit of the lawyers who appeared before us that none of them raised any argument to the effect that in the investigation being conducted before us, the status of Cabinet members differed from that of others. In our view, any claim that calls for a distinction of this sort is wholly untenable. We shall discuss this argument below, although it was raised not in the deliberations of the commission but outside them.

In the report of the "Commission of Inquiry - the Yom Kippur War" (henceforth the Agranat Commission), the subject of "personal responsibility of the government echelon" was discussed in Clause 30 of the partial report. It is appropriate to cite what was stated there, since we believe that it reflects the essence of the correct approach, from a legal and public standpoint, to the problem of the personal responsibility of the political echelon. The partial report of the Agranat Commission states (Section 30):

"In discussing the responsibility of ministers for an act or failure to act in which they actually or personally took part, we are obligated to stress that we consider ourselves free to draw conclusions, on the basis of our findings, that relate only to direct responsibility, and we do not see it as our task to express an opinion on what is implied by parliamentary responsibility.

"Indeed, in Israel, as in England - whence it came to us - the principle prevails that a member of the Cabinet is responsible to the elected assembly for all the administrative actions of the apparatus within his ministry, even if he was not initially aware of them and was not a party to them. However, while it is clear that this principle obligates him to report to the members of the elected assembly on such actions, including errors and failures; to reply to parliamentary questions; to defend them or to report on what has been done to correct errors - even the English experience shows that the traditions have not determined anything regarding the question of which cases of this kind require him to resign from his ministerial office; this varies, according to circumstances, from one case to the next. The main reason for this is that the question of the possible resignation of a Cabinet member in cases of this kind is essentially a political question par excellence, and therefore we believe that we should not deal with it..."

Later on in the partial report, the Agranat Commission deals (in Section 31) with the "direct personal responsibility of the Minister of Defense" and arrives at the conclusion that "according to the criterion of reasonable behavior demanded of one who holds the office of Minister of Defense, the minister was not obligated to order additional or different precautionary measures..."

The Agranat Commission also dealt (in Section 32 of its partial report) with the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister and arrived at the conclusion that she was not to be charged with any responsibility for her actions at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War and afterwards.

From the above it is clear that the Agranat commission did not in any way avoid dealing with the question of the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister and other ministers, and regarding responsibility of this kind it did not distinguish between ministers and other people whose actions were investigated by the commission. The Agranat Commission did not discuss the question of a minister's responsibility for the shortcomings and failures of the apparatus he heads and for which he should not be charged with any personal responsibility. It is not necessary to deal in this report with the question of a minister's responsibility for the failures of his apparatus which occurred without any personal blame on his part, and we shall not express an opinion on it.

The claim has been made, albeit not in the framework of the commission's deliberations, that the matter of a minister's judgment cannot serve as the subject of investigation of a commission of inquiry according to the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 1968, because a minister's judgments are political judgments; there are no set norms regarding judgments of this kind; and therefore one cannot subject such judgments to scrutiny. We reject this view. It is unfounded from both a legal and a public point of view. From a legal standpoint, it is a well known rule, and attested by many rulings of the Supreme Court (sitting in its capacity as the High Court of Justice), that any judgment of a public authority, including that of ministers, is subject to scrutiny and examination in court. Decisions made on the basis of unwarranted, irrelevant, arbitrary, unreasonable, or immaterial considerations have more than once been disqualified by the courts.

In examining the considerations that served as the basis for decisions, the court never distinguished between the obligations of a minister and those of any other public authority. The fact that there exists no hard and fast law stating that a public authority must reach its decision on the basis of correct

and reasonable considerations after examining all matters brought before it in a proper manner, has not prevented the courts from imposing obligations of this sort on every public authority.

This has no bearing on the principle that the court does not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the public authority and usually does not intervene in the policy that the authority sets for itself.

This is all the more reason for rejecting the above-mentioned view when the matter under discussion is the deliberations of a commission of inquiry that is obligated to consider not necessarily the legal aspects of the subject but also, and occasionally primarily, its public and moral aspects. The absence of any hard and fast law regarding various matters does not exempt a man whose actions are subject to the scrutiny of a commission of inquiry from accountability, from a public standpoint, for his deeds or failures that indicate inefficiency on his part, lack of proper attention to his work, or actions executed hastily, negligently, unwisely, or shortsightedly when - considering the qualifications of the man who holds a certain office and the personal qualities demanded of him in fulfilling his duties -he should have acted perspicaciously. No commission of inquiry would fulfill its role properly if it did not exercise such scrutiny, in the framework of its competence, vis-a-vis any man whose actions and failures were under scrutiny, regardless of his position and public standing.

In conclusion, regarding personal responsibility, we will not draw a distinction between the political echelon and any other echelon.

#### Personal Responsibility

In accordance with a resolution adopted by the Commission on 24.11.82, notices were sent under Section 15(A) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 1968, to nine persons regarding the harm liable to be done to them by the inquiry and its results. We shall now consider the matter of each of those who received such a notice.

##### *The Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin*

The notice sent to the Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin, stated that he was liable to be harmed if the Commission were to determine "that the Prime Minister did not properly weigh the part to be played by the Lebanese Forces during and in the wake of the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut, and disregarded the danger of acts of revenge and bloodshed by these forces vis-a-vis the population in the refugee camps."

The Prime Minister's response to the notice stated that in the conversations between him and the Defense Minister in which the decision was taken to have I.D.F. units enter West Beirut, and in the conversations he had held with the Chief of Staff during the night between 14.9.82 and 15.9.82, nothing at all was said about a possible operation by the Lebanese Forces.

The Prime Minister testifies that only in the Cabinet session of 16.9.82 did he hear about the agreement with the Phalangists that they would operate in the camps, and that until then, in all the conversations he had held with the Defense Minister and with the Chief of Staff, nothing had been said about the role of the Phalangists or their participation in the operations in West Beirut. He added that since this matter had not come up in the reports he received from the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff, he had raised no questions about it. The Prime Minister's remarks in this regard are consistent with the testimony of the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff, and with the existing documents concerning the content of the conversations with the Prime Minister. We have described above the two conversations between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister from the roof of the forward command post on Wednesday, 15.9.82, in the morning hours. According to the testimony and the notes of those conversations, the matter of the Phalangists was not mentioned in them at all. In a further conversation between the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister, on Wednesday at 18:00 hours, nothing was said about the participation of the Phalangists in the entry into Beirut. Similarly, on Thursday, 16.9.82, when the Defense Minister spoke by phone with the Prime Minister during the discussion in the Defense Minister's office, the Defense Minister said nothing about the Phalangists. According to the content of the conversation (see Exhibit 27), his report to the Prime Minister was in

an optimistic vein: that the fighting had ended, the I.D.F. held all the key points, and it was all over. The only mention of the camps in that conversation was that they were encircled.

We may certainly wonder that the participation of the Phalangists in the entry to West Beirut and their being given the task of "mopping up" the camps seemed so unimportant that the Defense Minister did not inform the Prime Minister of it and did not get his assent for the decision; however, that question does not bear on the responsibility of the Prime Minister. What is clear is that the Prime Minister was not a party to the decision to have the Phalangists move into the camps, and that he received no report about that decision until the Cabinet session on the evening of 16.9.82.

We do not believe that we ought to be critical of the Prime Minister because he did not on his own initiative take an interest in the details of the operation of the entry into West Beirut, and did not discover, through his own questions, that the Phalangists were taking part in that operation of the entry into West Beirut. The tasks of the Prime Minister are many and diverse, and he was entitled to rely on the optimistic and calming report of the Defense Minister that the entire operation was proceeding without any hitches and in the most satisfactory manner.

We have cited above passages from remarks made at the Cabinet session of 16.9.82, during which the Prime Minister learned that the Phalangists had that evening begun to operate in the camps. Neither in that meeting nor afterward did the Prime Minister raise any opposition or objection to the entry of the Phalangists into the camps. Nor did he react to the remarks of Deputy Prime Minister Levy which contained a warning of the danger to be expected from the Phalangists' entry into the camps. According to the Prime Minister's testimony, "no one conceived that atrocities would be committed... simply, none of us, no Minister, none of the other participants supposed such a thing..." (p. 767). The Prime Minister attached no importance to Minister Levy's remarks because the latter did not ask for a discussion or a vote on this subject. When Minister Levy made his remarks, the Prime Minister was busy formulating the concluding resolution of the meeting, and for this reason as well, he did not pay heed to Minister Levy's remarks.

We have already said above, when we discussed the question of indirect responsibility, that in our view, because of things that were well known to all, it should have been foreseen that the danger of a massacre existed if the Phalangists were to enter the camps without measures being taken to prevent them from committing acts such as these. We are unable to accept the Prime Minister's remarks that he was absolutely unaware of such a danger. According to what he himself said, he told the Chief of Staff on the night between 14 and 15 September 1982, in explaining the decision to have the I.D.F. occupy positions in West Beirut, that this was being done "in order to protect the Moslems from the vengeance of the Phalangists," and he could well suppose that after the assassination of Bashir, the Phalangists' beloved leader, they would take revenge on the terrorists. The Prime Minister was aware of the mutual massacres committed in Lebanon during the civil war, and of the Phalangists' feelings of hate for the Palestinians, whom the Phalangists held responsible for all the calamities that befell their land. The purpose of the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut - in order to prevent bloodshed - was also stressed by the Prime Minister in his meeting with Ambassador Draper on 15.9.82. We are prepared to believe the Prime Minister that, being preoccupied at the Cabinet session with formulating the resolution, he did not pay heed to the remarks of Minister Levy, which were uttered following lengthy reviews and discussions. However, in view of what has already been noted above regarding foresight and probability of acts of slaughter, we are unable to accept the position of the Prime Minister that no one imagined that what happened was liable to happen, or what follows from his remarks: that this possibility did not have to be foreseen when the decision was taken to have the Phalangists move into the camps.

As noted, the Prime Minister first heard about the Phalangists' entry into the camps about 36 hours after the decision to that effect was taken, and did not learn of the decision until the Cabinet session. When he heard about the Phalangists' entry into the camps, it had already taken place. According to the "rosy" reports the Prime Minister received from the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister was entitled to assume at that time that all the operations in West Beirut had been performed in the best possible manner and had nearly been concluded. We believe that in these circumstances it was not in-

cumbent upon the Prime Minister to object to the Phalangists' entry into the camps or to order their removal. On the other hand, we find no reason to exempt the Prime Minister from responsibility for not having evinced, during or after the Cabinet session, any interest in the Phalangists' actions in the camps. It has already been noted above that no report about the Phalangists' operations reached the Prime Minister, except perhaps for the complaint regarding the Gaza Hospital, until he heard the BBC broadcast towards evening on Saturday. For two days after the Prime Minister heard about the Phalangists' entry, he showed absolutely no interest in their actions in the camps. This indifference would have been justifiable if we were to accept the Prime Minister's position that it was impossible and unnecessary to foresee the possibility that the Phalangists would commit acts of revenge; but we have already explained above that according to what the Prime Minister knew, according to what he heard in the Thursday cabinet session, and according to what he said about the purpose of the move into Beirut, such a possibility was not unknown to him. It may be assumed that a manifestation of interest by him in this matter, after he had learned of the Phalangists' entry, would have increased the alertness of the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff to the need to take appropriate measures to meet the expected danger. The Prime Minister's lack of involvement in the entire matter casts on him a certain degree of responsibility.

*The Minister of Defense, Mr. Ariel Sharon*

The notice sent to the Minister of Defense under Section 15(A) stated that the Minister of Defense might be harmed if the commission determined that he ignored or disregarded the danger of acts of revenge or bloodshed perpetrated by Lebanese forces against the population of the refugee camps in Beirut and did not order the adoption of the withdrawal of the Lebanese forces from the refugee camps as quickly as possible and the adoption of measures to protect the population in the camps when information reached him about the acts of killing or excesses that were perpetrated by the Lebanese forces.

In his testimony before us, and in statements he issued beforehand, the Minister of Defense also adopted the position that no one had imagined the Phalangists would carry out a massacre in the camps and that it was a tragedy that could not be foreseen. It was stressed by the Minister of Defense in his testimony, and argued in his behalf, that the director of Military Intelligence, who spent time with him and maintained contact with him on the days prior to the Phalangists' entry into the camps and at the time of their entry into the camps, did not indicate the danger of a massacre, and that no warning was received from the Mossad, which was responsible for the liaison with the Phalangists and also had special knowledge of the character of this force.

It is true that no clear warning was provided by military intelligence or the Mossad about what might happen if the Phalangist forces entered the camps, and we will relate to this matter when we discuss the responsibility of the director of Military Intelligence and the head of the Mossad. But in our view, even without such warning, it is impossible to justify the Minister of Defense's disregard of the danger of a massacre. We will not repeat here what we have already said above about the widespread knowledge regarding the Phalangists' combat ethics, their feelings of hatred toward the Palestinians, and their leaders' plans for the future of the Palestinians when said leaders would assume power. Besides this general knowledge, the Defense Minister also had special reports from his not inconsiderable [number of] meetings with the Phalangist heads before Bashir's assassination.

Giving the Phalangists the possibility of entering the refugee camps without taking measures for continuous and concrete supervision of their actions there could have created a grave danger for the civilian population in the camps even if they had been given such a possibility before Bashir's assassination; thus this danger was certainly to have been anticipated - and it was imperative to have foreseen it - after Bashir's assassination. The fact that it was not clear which organization had caused Bashir's death was of no importance at all, given the known frame of mind among the combatant camps in Lebanon. In the circumstances that prevailed after Bashir's assassination, no prophetic powers were required to know that concrete danger of acts of slaughter existed when the Phalangists were moved into the camps without the I.D.F.'s being with them in that operation and without the I.D.F. being able to maintain effective and ongoing supervision of their actions there. The sense of such a danger should have been in the consciousness of every knowledgeable person who was close to this subject, and certainly in the conscious-

ness of the Defense Minister, who took an active part in everything relating to the war. His involvement in the war was deep, and the connection with the Phalangists was under his constant care. If in fact the Defense Minister, when he decided that the Phalangists would enter the camps without the I.D.F. taking part in the operation, did not think that that decision could bring about the very disaster that in fact occurred, the only possible explanation for this is that he disregarded any apprehensions about what was to be expected because the advantages - which we have already noted - to be gained from the Phalangists' entry into the camps distracted him from the proper consideration in this instance.

As a politician responsible for Israel's security affairs, and as a Minister who took an active part in directing the political and military moves in the war in Lebanon, it was the duty of the Defense Minister to take into account all the reasonable considerations for and against having the Phalangists enter the camps, and not to disregard entirely the serious consideration mitigating against such an action, namely that the Phalangists were liable to commit atrocities and that it was necessary to forestall this possibility as a humanitarian obligation and also to prevent the political damage it would entail. From the Defense Minister himself we know that this consideration did not concern him in the least, and that this matter, with all its ramifications, was neither discussed nor examined in the meetings and discussion held by the Defense Minister. In our view, the Minister of Defense made a grave mistake when he ignored the danger of acts of revenge and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population in the refugee camps.

We have already said above that we do not assert that the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps should under no circumstances ever have been made. It appears to us that no complaints could be addressed to the Defense Minister in this matter if such a decision had been taken after all the relevant considerations had been examined; however, if the decision were taken with the awareness that the risk of harm to the inhabitants existed, the obligation existed to adopt measures which would ensure effective and ongoing supervision by the I.D.F. over the actions of the Phalangists at the site, in such a manner as to prevent the danger or at least reduce it considerably. The Defense Minister issued no order regarding the adoption of such measures. We shall not dwell here on what steps might have been taken; this we shall consider below. Regarding the responsibility of the Minister of Defense, it is sufficient to assert that he issued no order to the I.D.F. to adopt suitable measures. Similarly, in his meetings with the Phalangist commanders, the Defense Minister made no attempt to point out to them the gravity of the danger that their men would commit acts of slaughter. Although it is not certain that remarks to this effect by the Defense Minister would have prevented the acts of massacre, they might have had an effect on the Phalangist commanders who, out of concern for their political interests, would have imposed appropriate supervision over their people and seen to it that they did not exceed regular combat operations. It was related above that a few hours after the Phalangists entered the camps, soldiers at the site asked what to do with the people who had fallen into their hands, and the replies they were given not only did not bar them from harming those people, but even urged them to do so. It is a highly reasonable assumption that had the commanders who gave that reply heard from the Defense Minister or from higher Phalangist commanders a clear and explicit order barring harm to civilians and spelling out the damage this was liable to cause the Phalangists, their reply to these questions would have been different.

Had it become clear to the Defense Minister that no real supervision could be exercised over the Phalangist force that entered the camps with the I.D.F.'s assent, his duty would have been to prevent their entry. The usefulness of the Phalangists' entry into the camps was wholly disproportionate to the damage their entry could cause if it were uncontrolled. A good many people who heard about the Phalangists' entry into the camps were aware of this even before the first reports arrived about the massacre. The Chief of Staff in effect also held the same opinion, as emerges from his reply to a question whether he would have issued orders for additional measures to be taken or would have sufficed with the steps that were in fact taken, had it been expected that the Phalangists would commit excesses. He replied as follows (p. 1677):

"No, if I had expected that this was liable to happen, or if someone had warned me that this was liable to happen, they would not have entered the camps."

In reply to another question, whether he would have taken additional measures, the Chief of Staff said:

"They would not have entered the camps; I would not have allowed them to enter the camps."

Asked if he would not have allowed the Phalangists to enter the camps despite the aim of having them operate together with the I.D.F. and spare the I.D.F. losses, the Chief of Staff replied:

"Then maybe we should have acted differently, by closing the camps, by surrounding them, or bringing them to surrender in another week or in another few days, or shelling them with all our might from the air and with artillery. As for me, if I had anticipated that this is what would happen, or if such a warning had been given, they would not have entered the camps."

And the Chief of Staff added that if he had suspected or feared that what happened would happen, "they would not have entered the camps at all, they would not have come anywhere near the camps." We quote these remarks here in order to show that despite the usefulness of having the Phalangists enter the camps, that step should have been abandoned if a massacre could not have been prevented using the means in the I.D.F.'s hands.

We do not accept the contention that the Defense Minister did not need to fear that the Phalangists would commit acts of killing because in all outward aspects they looked like a disciplined and organized army. It could not be inferred from the Phalangists' orderly military organization that their attitude toward human life and to the non-combatant population had basically changed. It might perhaps be inferred from their military organization that the soldiers would heed the orders of their commanders and not break discipline; but at the very least, care should have been taken that the commanders were imbued with the awareness that no excesses were to be committed and that they give their men unequivocal orders to this effect. The routine warnings that I.D.F. commanders issued to the Phalangists, which were of the same kind as were routinely issued to I.D.F. troops, could not have had any concrete effect.

We shall remark here that it is ostensibly puzzling that the Defense Minister did not in any way make the Prime Minister privy to the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps.

It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.

We do not believe that responsibility is to be imputed to the Defense Minister for not ordering the removal of the Phalangists from the camps when the first reports reached him about the acts of killing being committed there. As was detailed above, such reports initially reached the Defense Minister on Friday evening; but at the same time, he had heard from the Chief of Staff that the Phalangists' operation had been halted, that they had been ordered to leave the camps and that their departure would be effected by 5:00 a.m. Saturday. These preventive steps might well have seemed sufficient to the Defense Minister at that time, and it was not his duty to order additional steps to be taken, or to have the departure time moved up, a step which was of doubtful feasibility.

#### *The Foreign Minister Mr. Yitzhak Shamir*

The Foreign Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, was sent a notice under Section 15(A) that he might be harmed if the commission determined that after he heard from Minister Zipori on 17.9.82 of the report regarding the Phalangists' actions in the refugee camps, he did not take the appropriate steps to clarify whether this information was based in fact and did not bring the information to the knowledge of the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense.

In the memorandum that the Foreign Minister submitted to us in response to the aforementioned notice, he explained that what he had heard from Minister Zipori about the "unruliness" of the Phalangists did not lead him to understand that it was a matter of a massacre; he thought, rather, that it was a matter of fighting against terrorists. Since he knew that many of them had remained in Beirut, together with their

weapons, he could have had the impression from Minister Zipori's statement that perhaps the Phalangists' combat operations were carried out in a manner that differed from the way a battle was conducted by the I.D.F., but he did not understand that a massacre of civilians, women and children, was taking place. The Foreign Minister also explained his attitude to Minister Zipori's statement by stating that he knew that Minister Zipori had been long and consistently opposed to cooperation with the Phalangists, and he was also known in the Cabinet as a constant critic of the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, and their actions. For these reasons the Foreign Minister restricted himself to asking a member of his ministry's staff whether there was any news from West Beirut and satisfied himself that there was no need for further investigation after the Minister of Defense and others responsible for security affairs came to his office and did not mention that anything extraordinary had occurred in Beirut.

It is not easy to decide between the conflicting versions of what Minister Zipori said to the Foreign Minister. We tend to the opinion that in the telephone conversation Minister Zipori spoke of a "slaughter" being perpetrated by the Phalangists, and it is possible that he also spoke of "unruliness." He had heard from the journalist Ze'ev Schiff of reports that a massacre was going on in the camps and had treated Schiff's information seriously; and it is difficult to find a reason why he would not have told the Foreign Minister what he had heard when the point of the telephone communication was to inform the Foreign Minister what he had learned from Schiff. Mr. Schiff, in a statement he has submitted, confirms Minister Zipori's version. Nevertheless, we are unable to rule out the possibility that the Foreign Minister did not catch or did not properly understand the significance of what he heard from Minister Zipori. The Foreign Minister likewise did not conceal that in relating to what Minister Zipori had told him, he was influenced by his knowledge that Minister Zipori was opposed to the policy of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff regarding the war in Lebanon, and particularly to cooperation with the Phalangists.

The phenomenon that came to light in this case - namely, that the statement of one minister to another did not receive the attention it deserved because of faulty relations between members of the Cabinet - is regrettable and worrisome. The impression we got is that the Foreign Minister did not make any real attempt to check whether there was anything in what he had heard from Minister Zipori on the Phalangists' operations in the camps because he had an a priori skeptical attitude toward the statements of the minister who reported this information to him. It is difficult to find a justification for such disdain for information that came from a member of the Cabinet, especially under the circumstances in which the information was reported. As stated, the conversation between the two ministers was preceded by a Cabinet meeting on 16.9.82 at which Minister Levy had expressed a warning of the danger involved in sending the Phalangists into the camps. That Friday was the end of a week in which dramatic events had occurred, and the situation as a whole was permeated with tension and dangers. In this state of affairs, it might have been expected that the Foreign Minister, by virtue of his position, would display sensitivity and alertness to what he had heard from another minister - even if we were to accept unconditionally his statement that the point under discussion was only the "unruliness" of the Phalangists. The Foreign Minister should at least have called the Defense Minister's attention to the information he had received and not contented himself with asking someone in his office whether any new information had come in from Beirut and with the expectation that those people coming to his office would know what was going on and would tell him if anything out of the ordinary had happened. In our view, the Foreign Minister erred in not taking any measures after the conversation with Minister Zipori in regard to what he had heard from Zipori about the Phalangist actions in the camps.

*The Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan*

The notice sent to the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, according to Section 15(A), detailed a number of findings or conclusions that might be harmful to the Chief of Staff if the commission established them.

The first point in the notice has to do with the Chief of Staff disregarding the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed being perpetrated by the Phalangists, against the population of the refugee camps and his failure to take the appropriate measures to prevent this danger. In this matter, the Chief of Staff took a position similar to that of the Minister of Defense which was discussed above and which we have re-

jected. The Chief of Staff stated in his testimony before us that it had never occurred to him that the Phalangists would perpetrate acts of revenge and bloodshed in the camps. He justified this lack of foresight by citing the experience of the past, whereby massacres were perpetrated by the Christians only before the "Peace for Galilee" War and only in response to the perpetration of a massacre by the Muslims against the Christian population, and by citing the disciplined conduct of the Phalangists while carrying out certain operations after the I.D.F.'s entry into Lebanon. The Chief of Staff also noted the development of the Phalangists from a militia into an organized and orderly military force, as well as the interest of the Phalangist leadership, and first and foremost of Bashir Jemayel, in behaving moderately toward the Muslim population so that the president-elect could be accepted by all the communities in Lebanon. Finally, the Chief of Staff also noted, in justifying his position, that none of the experts in the I.D.F. or in the Mossad had expressed any reservations about the planned operation in the camps

We are not prepared to accept these explanations. In our view, none of these reasons had the power to cancel out the serious concern that in going into the refugee camps, the Phalangist forces would perpetrate indiscriminate acts of killing. We rejected arguments of this kind in the part of this report that dealt with indirect responsibility, as well as in our discussion of the responsibility borne by the Minister of Defense, and the reasons we presented there likewise hold for the Chief of Staff's position. Here we will restrict ourselves to brief reasoning.

Past experience in no way justified the conclusion that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps posed no danger. The Chief of Staff was well aware that the Phalangists were full of feelings of hatred towards the Palestinians and that their feelings had not changed since the "Peace for Galilee" War. The isolated actions in which the Phalangists had participated during the war took place under conditions that were completely different from those which arose after the murder of Bashir Jemayel; and as one could see from the nature of [those] operations, in the past there had been no case in which an area populated by Palestinian refugees had been turned over to the exclusive control of the Phalangists. On a number of occasions, the Chief of Staff had harsh and clear-cut things to say about the manner of fighting between the factions and communities in Lebanon, and about the concept of vengeance rooted in them; and in this matter we need only refer to the detailed facts presented in this report. We have already said a number of times that the traumatic event of the murder of Bashir Jemayel and of a group of Phalangists was sufficient reason to whip up the Phalangists. It is difficult to understand how it was possible to justify ignoring the effect of this event on arousing a feeling of vengeance and hatred toward all those who were inimical to the Phalangists, and first and foremost the Palestinians. The consideration that the military organization of the Phalangists and their orderly and disciplined appearance attested to a change in their mode of fighting was specious, and we have already pointed this out.

The absence of a warning from experts cannot serve as an explanation for ignoring the danger of a massacre. The Chief of Staff should have known and foreseen - by virtue of common knowledge, as well as the special information at his disposal - that there was a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists. Even if the experts did not fulfill their obligation, this does not absolve the Chief of Staff of responsibility.

The decision to send the Phalangists into the camps was taken by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff must be viewed as a partner to this decision and as bearing responsibility both for its adoption and for its implementation. The Chief of Staff did not express any opposition to or reservation about the decision to the Minister of Defense, and no one disputed that it was taken with his consent. There is no reason to doubt that had the Chief of Staff expressed opposition or reservation, this fact would have borne serious weight in the consideration of the decision; and had there been a difference of opinion between him and the Minister of Defense, he could easily have brought the matter before the Prime Minister for his decision. It emerges quite clearly from the Chief of Staff's testimony, as cited above, that his opposition to sending the Phalangists into the camps would have meant that they would not have been sent in, and other means (which he detailed in the statement cited above) would have been adopted for taking control of the camps.

If the Chief of Staff did not imagine at all that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps posed a danger to the civilian population, his thinking on this matter constitutes a disregard of important considerations that he should have taken into account. Moreover, considering the Chief of Staff's own statements quoted above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chief of Staff ignored this danger out of an awareness that there were great advantages to sending the Phalangists into the camps, and perhaps also out of a hope that in the final analysis, the Phalangist excesses would not be on a large scale. This conclusion is likewise prompted by the Chief of Staff's behavior during later stages, once reports began to come in about the Phalangists' excesses in the camps.

It has been argued by the Chief of Staff, and in his behalf, that appropriate steps were taken to avoid the danger. A similar claim has been made by Major General Drori and Brigadier General Yaron. In our opinion, this claim is unfounded.

As stated, one of the precautions was a lookout posted on the roof of the forward command post and on another roof nearby. It may be that this lookout was of value in obtaining certain military information on combat operations, but it was worthless in terms of obtaining information on the Phalangists' operations within the camps. Another step was taken to obtain information on exchanges over the communications sets between the Phalangist forces in the field and their commanders. It is difficult to regard this step as an efficient way to discover what was going on in the camps, because it was based on the assumption that what was said over the communications network would provide an accurate picture not only of the combat operations but also of any atrocities, and this assumption was not sufficiently grounded. It is true that the first reports of the massacres came from this source of information, but that was merely fortuitous; and just as questions had been asked about the fate of 45 to 50 people, it could have happened that such questions would not have gone over the communications network. As stated, the fact of 300 dead was not discovered as a result of listening in on the communications set; and it is a fact that whatever was said over these sets did not reveal the fact that the massacre of hundreds of people was going on in the camps. The final means whereby it was hoped that the Phalangists' operations in the camps would be revealed was by placing a Phalangist liaison officer on the roof of the forward command post and a liaison officer from the Mossad in the Phalangist headquarters. The obtaining of information from these two sources was likewise based upon unfounded assumptions. As to the Phalangist officer, there was no reason to believe that on his own initiative, he would tell the I.D.F. officers about the Phalangist operations, for he knew that the I.D.F. would vigorously oppose them if word of such operations came to its attention. While Phalangist liaison officer G. did tell of 300 dead, this was evidently a slip of the tongue on his part, for he immediately tried to play down the assessment by decreasing the number of casualties to 120. No information was received from the Mossad liaison officer; and the hope that he would be able to supply information of this sort was based on the unrealistic expectation that the Phalangist commanders would let him in on all the information that came in about the Phalangists' actions, even if it was a report on an action they knew the I.D.F. would vigorously oppose.

We asked the witnesses why an I.D.F. liaison officer was not attached to the Phalangist force that entered the camps, and we received the reply that there were two reasons: first, the point was that the I.D.F. should not enter the refugee camps, and the presence of an I.D.F. liaison officer would contradict that point; second, there was fear for the life of any such liaison officer, for obvious reason. We are prepared to accept this explanation and have no criticism of the fact that this step was not adopted. On the other hand, no explanation was given for failing to provide special briefings to the I.D.F. units that were in the vicinity of the camps - something which should have been done, considering the importance of the matter.

The claim that every possible step was taken to obtain detailed information on the excesses of the Phalangists - in the event that such excesses would take place - is not congruent with the claim that such excesses were not foreseen at all. But we do not wish to go into this logical contradiction, as in any case it is clear that the steps which were adopted fell far short of satisfying the need to know what was going on in the camps; and in fact, the truth about what was happening there only came out after the Phalangists left the camps.

We find that the Chief of Staff did not consider the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed being perpetrated against the population of the refugee camps in Beirut; he did not order the adoption of the

appropriate steps to avoid this danger; and his failure to do so is tantamount to a breach of duty that was incumbent upon the Chief of Staff.

The other matter for which a notice was sent to the Chief of Staff under Section 15(A) was that when reports reached him about acts of killing or actions that deviated from usual combat operations, he did not check the veracity of these reports and the scope of these actions and did not order the cessation of the operations, the removal of the Phalangists from the camps as quickly as possible, and the adoption of steps to protect the population of the camps. In a meeting with the Phalangist commanders on the morning of 17.9.82, he approved the continuation of their operations until the morning of 18.9.82 and ordered that they be provided with assistance for that purpose.

As related in the description of the events in this report, the Chief of Staff first heard of the excesses perpetrated by the Phalangists when Major General Drori contacted him by phone on Friday morning. The Chief of Staff did not ask Major General Drori at that time what he knew about the excesses and what moved him to halt the Phalangist operation; and one should not take him to task for this, because he had decided to go to Beirut and preferred to clarify the matter during a personal visit, rather than try to clear it up in a phone conversation. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand or justify the Chief of Staff's actions after he reached Beirut, and especially during the meeting with the Phalangist commanders. Upon reaching Beirut, the Chief of Staff heard from Major General Drori what the latter knew about the Phalangist actions; he contented himself with this report and asked no question about this matter either of Major General Drori or of Brigadier General Yaron. If it is still possible to comprehend this reticence as stemming from the Chief of Staff's expectation that he would hear more exact details during his meeting with the Phalangist commanders, what took place at that meeting raises questions to which we have not found a reasonable answer. The Chief of Staff did not raise with the Phalangist commanders any question about the aberrant operations or the grave actions that might have been perpetrated in the camps. It is clear from his testimony that he thought that if any such actions had been perpetrated, the Phalangist commanders would have told him about them on their own initiative. There was no real basis for this naive belief. It is impossible to understand how the Chief of Staff concluded, from the fact that the Phalangist commanders told him nothing about the operations against the civilian population in the camps, that the suspicions that had arisen about those actions had no basis in reality.

The outstanding impression that emerges from the Chief of Staff's testimony is that his refraining from raising the issue of the Phalangists' excesses against the population in the camps stemmed from a fear of offending their honor; but this fear was out of place and should not have been a cause for the lack of any clarification of what had happened, when the Chief of Staff had gotten reports that should have served as a warning about the grave harm caused to the population in the camps and when, as a result of these reports, Major General Drori had issued an order to halt the advance of the Phalangists. Not only did the Chief of Staff not raise the subject of the Phalangists' behavior in the camps at the meeting which was called to clarify what was happening in the camps, but he expressed his satisfaction with the Phalangist operation and agreed to their request to provide them with tractors so they could complete their operations by Saturday morning. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this conduct on the Chief of Staff's part during the meeting at the Phalangists' headquarters stemmed from his disregard of the suspicions that the Phalangists were perpetrating act of slaughter, and this disregard went so deep that even the information that had arrived in the meanwhile and reached the Chief of Staff did not shake it.

It emerges from the Chief of Staff's testimony that after the meeting with the Phalangists, he felt assured that everything was proceeding properly, that nothing out of the ordinary had happened that would require the immediate removal of the Phalangists from the camps, and that there was nothing wrong with - and perhaps there was benefit to be derived from - their completing their operation through Saturday morning. It is impossible to reconcile what we heard from the Chief of Staff regarding this matter with what he told the Minister of Defense in a phone conversation when he returned to Israel. We have already established above that in this conversation, the Chief of Staff told the Minister of Defense things about the conduct of the Phalangists that could have led the Minister of Defense to understand that the Phalangists had perpetrated the murder of civilians in the camps. But even if we go by the Chief of Staff's version of that conversation, according to which he said only that the

Phalangists had "overdone it," it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the absence of all suspicion on his part regarding what had happened in the camps and the possibility of further similar actions.

Likewise, after the meeting, the Chief of Staff did not issue any order to Major General Drori or Brigadier General Yaron to prevent the entry of additional Phalangist forces or to send in or replace [Phalangist] forces, because he did not have the impression that there was any reason to stop them.

In our opinion, after the Chief of Staff received the information from Major General Drori in a telephone conversation that the Phalangists had "overdone it" and Major General Drori had halted their operation, this information should have alerted him to the danger that acts of slaughter were being perpetrated in the camps and made him aware of his obligation to take appropriate steps to clarify the matter and prevent the continuation of such actions if the information proved to be of substance. Toward that end, the Chief of Staff should have held a detailed clarification [session] with Major General Drori, Brigadier General Yaron, and other officers of the division, as well as with the Phalangist commanders, immediately upon his arrival in Beirut. If, as a result of this clarification, he was not satisfied that excesses had not been committed in the camps, he should have ordered the immediate removal of the Phalangist forces from the camp, admonished the Phalangist commanders about the aberrant actions, and demanded that they issue immediate orders to their forces to refrain from any act that would cause harm to civilians while they were still in the camp. None of these things were done by the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, the Phalangist commanders could have gotten the impression from the Chief of Staff's words and from his agreement to supply them with tractors that they could continue their operations in the camp without interference until Saturday morning and that no report of excesses had reached the I.D.F. - and if they had reached the I.D.F., they had not roused any sharp reaction.

We determine that the Chief of Staff's inaction, described above, and his order to provide the Phalangist forces with tractors, or a tractor, constitute a breach of duty and dereliction of the duty incumbent upon the Chief of Staff.

*Director of Military Intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy*

In the notice sent to the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, non-fulfillment of duty was ascribed to him because he did not give sufficient attention to the decision regarding sending the Phalangists into the camps and did not warn after the murder of Bashir Jemayel of the danger of acts of revenge and bloodshed by these forces against the Palestinian population in West Beirut, and especially in the refugee camps.

The Director of Military Intelligence testified that he did not know at all about the decision regarding the sending of the Phalangists into the camps and did not hear about the role assigned to the Phalangists in connection with the entry into Beirut until he discovered the matter in the cable regarding the 300 killed on Friday morning (17.9.82). We find it difficult to accept this claim. The decision regarding the sending of the Phalangists into the camps was discussed on the roof of the forward command post on Wednesday morning, 15.9.82, in conversations between the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and Major General Drori; and we find it hard to believe that a decision discussed in these conversations did not at all reach the Director of Military Intelligence, who was present on the roof of the forward command post. According to the description of the detailed discussions which were held that morning on the roof of the forward command post, the Director of Military Intelligence had ample opportunities to hear on that occasion about the plans regarding the participation of the Phalangists in the entry to Beirut and about the role assigned to them. If indeed the Director of Military Intelligence did not hear then about the plan to send the Phalangists into the camps, then the only reason that can be given for this is that he was completely indifferent to what was being said and what was happening at that time on the roof of the forward command post, and showed no interest in the subjects which by virtue of his position should have interested him.

From the forward command post the Director of Military Intelligence travelled together with the Defense Minister to the meeting at Phalangist headquarters; and there the Defense Minister said that the

Phalangist forces would enter West Beirut - though he apparently did not say explicitly that they would enter the camps. Regarding this meeting, Major General Saguy testified that it seems to him that it was said that the Phalangists should participate in something, but he does not remember exactly (p. 1561). After that meeting as well, the Director of Military Intelligence evinced no special interest in the question of what would be the role of the Phalangists in the entry into Beirut. He spent a considerable amount of time with the Defense Minister and did not find it necessary to pose any question to him regarding this matter. An additional meeting in which the Director of Military Intelligence could have, if he had wanted to, obtained information on the plans regarding the roles of the Phalangists in West Beirut took place at a gas station, after the condolence call in Bikfaya, when Major General Drori reported to the Defense Minister on the course of events during the I.D.F.'s entry into Beirut and showed him maps. This opportunity was also missed, for some reason, by the Director of Military Intelligence. An additional discussion in which the Director of Military Intelligence participated and in which the entry of the Phalangists into the camps was explicitly mentioned was in the meeting at the Defense Minister's office on Thursday, 16.9.82, at 10:00 a.m. According to Major General Saguy he did not pay attention to things said at that meeting on the sending of the Phalangists into the camps. The inattention [displayed] in this meeting as well is surprising and inexplicable. Major General Saguy was present at the beginning of the Cabinet meeting on Thursday evening and left the meeting a short time after it had begun. It has not been explained why Major General Saguy did not demonstrate sufficient interest in the role of the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut and left the place without even trying to ascertain from anyone present there who knew what was happening in Beirut what the plan was for involving the Phalangists. To all this it should be added that already on Wednesday, 15.9.82, the assistant for research to the Director of Military Intelligence heard at a meeting in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff about the plan that the Phalangists would enter the camps (p. 7 in exhibit 130).

We cannot believe that no information about the plan to send the Phalangists into the camps reached the Director of Military Intelligence until Friday morning, keeping in mind that he was present at a number of meetings in which this plan was mentioned and he had ample opportunities to ascertain the role given to the Phalangists. Even if we were to unreservedly accept Major Saguy's testimony in this matter, his statements would have been surprising. The Director of Military Intelligence, who is required to provide an intelligence assessment regarding the Phalangists, knows that the I.D.F. is entering Beirut, knows that in the past there had been complaints about the non-involvement of the Phalangists in the fighting, hears, at the latest on Wednesday morning during the meeting at Phalangist headquarters, that these forces will cooperate with the I.D.F. in the entry into West Beirut, he does not demonstrate any interest and does not raise any question as to the role assigned them and does not make any comment to the Defense Minister or the Chief of Staff on this matter in the meetings in which he participated. The picture received according to the testimony of Major General Saguy himself is of indifference and a conspicuous lack of concern, of shutting of eyes and ears to a matter regarding which it was incumbent on the director of the intelligence arm of the I.D.F. to open his eyes and listen well to all that was discussed and decided.

The only explanation which can be found for the aforementioned behavior of the Director of Military Intelligence apparently lies in the fact that the approach of the Director of Military Intelligence to the Phalangists and to cooperation between Israel and these forces was much more skeptical than the sympathetic approach of the Mossad, and that he knew that the Defense Minister, Chief of Staff and perhaps also the Prime Minister accept the Mossad's approach, and Military Intelligence's approach had been rejected in favor of the Mossad's approach. Therefore, the Director of Military Intelligence was satisfied with Intelligence reports compiled and sent on his behalf, in which, according to his claim, there is sufficient warning of the dangers to be expected from cooperation with the Phalangists.

In our opinion, the Director of Military Intelligence did not fulfill his duty by [providing only] these situation evaluations. The verbal warning following the murder of Bashir, about which the Defense Minister testified, was given rather weakly. According to Major General Saguy's testimony (pp. 105-106), he said in a telephone conversation with the Defense Minister on the night of 14.9.82, when it became clear that Bashir had been killed, that there were two possibilities: one, that there would be acts of revenge on the part of the Phalangists; and two, that they would fall apart. It is difficult to

view these vague statements as a substantial warning. On 15.9.82, at about 18:00 hours, Intelligence Branch prepared a document (exhibit 26) bearing the title, "Main Emphases for Situation Assessment," and the only thing said there regarding the danger of acts of revenge by the Phalangists is that the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut could "be received by some of the parties involved, and perhaps even among some of the Muslim elements, as a development which might contribute, at least temporarily, to stability in the city, and provide them with protection from possible acts of revenge by the Phalangists" (paragraph I-a in exhibit 26). This document cannot be considered a clear warning of the danger of involving the Phalangists in the I.D.F.'s entry into Beirut or an indication of the need to take special precaution in order not to enable the Phalangists to carry out acts of revenge against the Palestinians. In an additional Intelligence document which was issued on 15.9.82 and bears the title "The Murder of Bashir Jemayel - Main Implications," it was said that "the assassination creates conditions for heightening the polarization between the rival Lebanese power elements, for mutual settling of accounts, and for deterioration, which, in the absence of a stabilizing element, is liable to develop into a general civil war" (paragraph 4, exhibit 25). Neither can this be considered a substantial warning which draws attention to the dangers of acts of revenge by the Phalangists entering West Beirut with the I.D.F. or in its wake.

The director of Military Intelligence said in his testimony that for the issue of sending the Phalangists into the camps to have been discussed and clarified properly, situation-assessment discussions ought to have been held to examine the various topics (which he enumerated in his testimony, p. 1587) connected with the Phalangists' entry into the camps. In his opinion, such a clarification could have been made within a short time; and had it emerged in such a discussion that it were possible to ensure the coordination with - and the command by - the I.D.F. "all the way," he would have supported the entry of the Phalangists, and not the I.D.F., into the camps. We accept these statements of his; but it appears to us that the director of Military Intelligence should have demonstrated sufficient interest in the matter in order to ascertain the role assigned the Phalangists, if for some reason he had not heard about it in the meetings in which he had participated; and it was incumbent upon him to demand that a clarification or discussion be held regarding those topics which he raised in his testimony before us. The fact which the director of Military Intelligence and his representatives point out, namely that the combat morals of the Phalangists and the massacres carried out in the past during the civil war in Lebanon were known to everyone, did not exempt the director of Military Intelligence from the fulfillment of his duties, especially when the issue was cooperation with the Phalangists after the murder of Bashir Jemayel - and this, even if there had not been an organized discussion of this matter.

Less so is there any satisfactory explanation for the lack of substantial action by the director of Military Intelligence in connection with the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, after he had heard on Friday morning not only about the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, but also about the killing of 300 persons in this operation. All he did was give an order to check the veracity of this report, and nothing else. He made no attempt to contact the Chief of Staff or the Defense Minister, to make them aware of the danger in the very operation of the Phalangists in the camps, especially after receipt of the report of the killing of 300 persons. Indeed, this report was unconfirmed, and he thought that it was from an Operations and not Intelligence source; but it contained information which could have confirmed his fears regarding actions by the Phalangists. In his testimony, the director of Military Intelligence explained why he had made no attempt to warn at that stage of the danger in the situation which had been created. His remarks on this matter are as follows:

"I am labelled as one who has always opposed the Phalangists, not from today, [but] for four years already. In the morning, I read that the Phalangists were inside the camps; and I know that this is as per the Defense Minister's orders - since I have the Dudai document in hand - and that it is under the command of the I.D.F. So what could I say now? Why did you send it [sic] in without asking me? Or should I act insulted? No, I simply step aside in this matter. That's all. "

We believe that in these remarks Major General Saguy revealed the main reason why he "stepped aside" regarding the whole issue; and these remarks of his explain not only his inaction after receiving the report on Friday, but also his behavior at previous stages, as we have described. In our opinion, it was the duty of the director of Military Intelligence, as long as he occupies this post, to demonstrate alertness

regarding the role of the Phalangists in the entry into Beirut after Bashir's assassination, to demand an appropriate clarification, and to explicitly and expressly warn all those concerned of the expected danger even prior to receipt of the report on Friday, and certainly after receipt of the report. The fear that his words would not receive sufficient attention and be rejected does not justify total inaction. This inaction constitutes breach of the duty incumbent on the director of Military Intelligence in this capacity.

*Head of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Projects (Mossad)*

The head of the Mossad was sent a notice under Section 15(A) of the law in which it is stated that he is liable to be harmed if the commission determines that he did not pay appropriate attention to the decision taken regarding the roles to be played by the Phalangists during the I.D.F.'s entry into West Beirut, and did not warn after the murder of Bashir Jemayel of the danger of bloodshed by these forces against the Palestinian population.

The head of the Mossad testified that he first learned of the role given to Phalangists to enter the camps, only at the cabinet meeting on Thursday 16.9.82. On Friday, 15.9.82, he received cables from the Mossad representative in Beirut (exhibits 161 and 162) in which it was reported to him about the meetings of the Chief of Staff and Defense Minister with the Phalangist elite; but in neither of these documents is there any report of the role given the Phalangists in the camps, but rather there is general mention in them that the Phalangists will enter West Beirut after the I.D.F. and will assist the I.D.F. in its operations. In a third cable (exhibit 163), sent on Thursday at 12:00, it was stated that there had been a coordination meeting with the G.O.C. to prepare the Phalangists "for operations to clear the city of terrorists." In an additional cable sent at that time (exhibit 164) it was said that the Phalangists would start work at the Burj el-Barajneh camp.

Apparently, the Mossad was not explicitly informed of the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and the head of the Mossad did not know of the decision which had been made on this matter. The testimony of the head of the Mossad should therefore be accepted, that only at the cabinet meeting of Thursday evening did he hear of the decision regarding the role of the Phalangists and of their entry into the camps, which by then had already taken place.

In the aforementioned circumstances it does not appear to us that the head of the Mossad was obligated, before knowing of the decision regarding the role of the Phalangists, to offer at his initiative an assessment regarding the situation which was liable to develop, if the Phalangists would be given the opportunity to take revenge on the Palestinians and attempt to carry out their plans for them in West Beirut. The head of the Mossad was present at the cabinet meeting until its conclusion. He heard what was said there, but did not himself give a situation assessment regarding the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, and did not express any reservation about this entry. He spoke at that meeting about the Mossad's assessment regarding the situation created after the murder of Bashir, but his remarks did not explicitly deal with the issue of the Phalangists' entry into the camps or with the problems which could ensue therefrom. A certain hint of the danger of irregular actions by the Phalangists can be found in the following remarks made by the head of the Mossad at that meeting (p. 26 in exhibit 122):

"When we learned of the death of Bashir - and this was close to midnight – we thought that there could be two phenomena: one, that the whole forest would catch fire, and the Phalangist forces themselves, which were suddenly left without a commander, [and] with a desire for revenge, could also have taken uncontrolled action; and on the other hand, those Palestinians and Lebanese organizations which were in West Beirut, when they suddenly learned that the leader of the Phalangists is dead and possibly the Phalangists have been weakened following this, it was possible that they would start up - i.e., there was definitely the possibility that a situation of total conflagration would flare up in the city."

These remarks should not be considered an unequivocal warning of the danger entailed in the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, an entry about which the head of the Mossad made no comment in the situation assessment which he gave at the cabinet meeting. The head of the Mossad did not express any reservation about the entry of the Phalangists into the camps. In his first testimony he said that

had he been asked at that meeting about the entry of the Phalangists into the camps, he would have recommended this "with the warning that they not carry out a massacre" and with the belief that such a warning would be effective - and this, according to the Mossad's experience with certain operations carried out together with the Phalangists in the past (p. 173). In his additional testimony, the head of the Mossad said that the data which the Mossad had at the time of the cabinet meeting did not indicate and did not warn of the possibility of atrocities in the camps.

The data which he presented (p. 1428) were that according to the reports received, despite the murder of Bashir, the military commander of the Phalangists was in control of his forces; and in addition, according to the information which the Mossad had, the murder of Bashir was carried out not by the Palestinians but by the Mourabitoun. This last argument is far from convincing. It is not at all certain that the Phalangists knew at that time who carried out the assassination; and even if they had known this, it is most doubtful whether this would have moderated their actions against the Palestinians, whom they considered the source of all the tragedies which had befallen Lebanon, and who had co-operated with the Mourabitoun in the fighting against the Phalangists.

The question is whether this inaction by the head of the Mossad constitutes breach of a duty incumbent upon the head of the Mossad.

The answer to this question is not easy. As mentioned above, the view of the Mossad, which had been expressed for a fairly long period prior to the I.D.F.'s entry into Lebanon, as well as afterwards, was that there should be greater cooperation with the Phalangists. The view prevalent in the Mossad, as expressed in various documents, was that the Phalangists are a trustworthy element which can be relied upon, and this despite the Phalangists' past regarding their attitude to the Palestinians and their statements on the way to solve the Palestinian problem once they reach power. The head of the Mossad himself noted in part of his testimony mentioned above, that this approach of the Mossad was influenced by the development of subjective feelings by representatives of the Mossad, who were in constant contact with the leaders of the Phalangists. We do not believe that the head of the Mossad can be held responsible for the existence of such a "conception." He assumed the position of head of the Mossad only on 12.9.82 that is, two days before the murder of Bashir. He had previously been the deputy head of the Mossad and was acquainted with the Mossad's affairs; but the responsibility for the way in which the Mossad operated was not his. The entry of the Phalangists into the camps did not contradict the Mossad's situation assessment; and therefore it is difficult to expect that the head of the Mossad would have reservations about this decision when he heard about it at the Cabinet meeting on 16.9.82. In this matter as well, it should be taken into account that he had then been serving as head of the Mossad for only four days, and that this was the first Cabinet meeting in which he participated in this capacity.

It appears to us, that even in the situation described above, the head of the Mossad was obligated to express his opinion at the Cabinet meeting on the entry of the Phalangists and deal in this expression of opinion with the dangers involved in the Phalangists' operations - especially after he had heard Minister David Levy's remarks. In consideration of all the aforementioned circumstances, it is our opinion that this inaction of the head of the Mossad should not be considered serious.

#### *G.O.C. Northern Command Major General Amir Drori*

In the notification sent to G.O.C. Northern Command Amir Drori, it was stated that he is liable to be harmed if the commission determines that he did not take appropriate or sufficient steps to prevent the continuation of the Phalangists' actions in the refugee camps when he received reports of acts of killing or acts which deviate from regular combat operations which were carried out in the camps.

On Thursday night, the division intelligence officer transmitted the report of 300 killed to the Northern Command, but this report did not reach Major General Drori and he did not hear a thing about what was happening in the camps until Friday morning.

We have enumerated above the differences between the versions of Major General Drori and Brigadier General Yaron regarding the circumstances surrounding Major Drori's visit to the forward com-

mand post, the conversation which preceded this visit, and the conversation which took place during the visit. According to the testimony of Major General Drori, the visit was made at his initiative, without his knowing that any problem had arisen regarding the camps, while according to Brigadier General Yaron's version, Major General Drori's appearance was the result of a conversation in which Brigadier General Yaron reported his uneasy feelings regarding what was being done in the camps. We do not find that the differing versions on this subject are important in the matter before us.

Neither was there a uniform version regarding the reports transmitted to Major General Drori during his meeting at the forward command post. Colonel Duvdevani said in his statement that he had told Major General Drori about 100 killed in the Phalangists' operations; while according to Major General Drori's testimony, he did not hear in this visit about killing in the camps or about a specific number of killed. From Brigadier General Yaron's remarks it is apparent that he did not report to Major General Drori about the reports of the 300 killed and the 45 persons who had been captured by the Phalangists, since he had thought that these reports were unsubstantiated. Regarding the things Major General Drori heard from Brigadier General Yaron, Major General Drori's version differs only in unimportant details from Brigadier General Yaron's version. It appears to us that it is not possible to determine with sufficient certainty that clear reports were given to Major General Drori about killing in the camps. We believe, however, that in his testimony before us, Major General Drori belittled the importance and significance of the things about which he had heard in the meeting at the forward command post, as well as the impression these had made on him. It should be noted that Major General Drori was aware that the Phalangists were liable to act in an uncontrolled way, and this not necessarily from his conversation with an officer connected with the Lebanese Army on Thursday evening, but mainly from his knowledge of the Phalangists, based on his constant contact with them. There is therefore no room for doubt that after the conversations which he held on the roof of the forward command post on Friday morning, he was aware that the continuation of the Phalangists' actions in the refugee camps posed a danger. Three actions which he took are evidence of this. The first - the order he gave regarding cessation of the Phalangists' actions; the second - a telephone report to the Chief of Staff that the Phalangists "had overdone it" and that he had ordered their operation stopped; and the third - the continuation of his efforts to impress upon the commander of the Lebanese Army that this army enter the camps instead of the Phalangists. Here we should mention that in this persuasion effort, Major General Drori told the commander of the Lebanese Army, "You know what the Lebanese are capable of doing to each other." These remarks, in the context in which they were made, in a section of Major General Drori's testimony as cited above, show that Major General Drori had realized the gravity of the matter and the need to make efforts to terminate the Phalangists' operations in the camps.

Taking into consideration that it has not been proved that Major General Drori had [received] explicit reports about acts of killing and about their extent, it appears to us that he acted properly, wisely, and responsibly, with sufficient alertness at this stage. He heard from the Chief of Staff that the latter was to arrive in Beirut in the afternoon hours and could rely on the fact that this visit by the Chief of Staff, which was to take place within a few hours, would lead to positive results regarding the Phalangists' activity in the camps.

In the notification as per Section 15(A) of the law, Major General Drori was informed that he is liable to be harmed if it is determined that he did not warn the Chief of Staff when the latter arrived in Beirut on 17.9.82 of the danger posed to the population in the camps from the continued activity or continued presence of the Phalangists in the camps, and did not try - at a meeting with the Phalangist commanders, or shortly thereafter - to prevent the continuation of such activity.

According to the testimony of Major General Drori, it was clear that he was satisfied with an absolutely passive role regarding the issue of the Phalangists in the camps, from the time the Chief of Staff arrived in Beirut and later. Major General Drori did not emphasize to the Chief of Staff before the meeting with the Phalangist commanders that it was necessary to end the Phalangists' presence in the camps or take some kind of action which could ensure that the Phalangists' actions against the non-combatant populace would stop. This refraining from bringing the importance and seriousness of the matter to the attention of the Chief of Staff was explained by Major General Drori by the fact that

after the meeting on the roof of the forward command post with Brigadier General Yaron, the acuteness of his sense of imminent danger diminished, for two reasons. The first reason was that a few hours had gone by before the Chief of Staff arrived, and no additional reports had come in. The second reason which calmed Major General Drori was that at his meeting with the commander of the Lebanese Army, he had not heard anything about irregular occurrences in the camps, despite the fact that the Lebanese Army was deployed around the camps, including at the places where the Phalangists had entered, and Lebanese Army personnel should have known if something unusual had happened in the camps (Major General Drori's testimony, pp. 1611-1615).

These reasons for the diminished sense of the matter's importance are not convincing. It is difficult to consider the lack of additional reports a calming factor, when only few hours are involved and when Major General Drori made no special efforts, while on the roof of the forward command post and while speaking with the officers there, to investigate and testify the details of the reports reaching him, and did not give orders to conduct special checks on what was going on in the camps. He also did not speak during the meeting on the roof of the the forward command post with the Phalangists' liaison officer, who was present there. At the meeting with the commander of the Lebanese Army, Major General Drori did not ask whether the commander had any reports on events in the camps, but drew his conclusion which reduced his alertness solely from the fact that this commander did not "volunteer" any information.

We described above what happened at the meeting with the Phalangist commanders, in which the subject of the Phalangist forces' behavior in the camps did not come up at all. In our opinion, even though the Chief of Staff conducted the meeting for the Israeli side, it was Major General Drori's duty to at least make an attempt to raise the issue at this meeting. He also made no attempt to persuade the Chief of Staff to raise the matter at the meeting with the Phalangists, but was satisfied with sitting idly by. Major General Drori is a senior commander with a very important task, who bears heavy responsibility for events on a wide front. A commander at such a level and rank should be expected to take the initiative when he sees that the Chief of Staff does not intend to deal with the issue which was the main cause of his coming to Beirut and holding a meeting with the Phalangist staff. If this passive behavior by Major General Drori was the result of a significant decline in his alertness during the time which had gone by since ordering a halt to the Phalangists' operations, then we have already said above that this reduced alertness was not at all justified. Also, after the conclusion of the meeting with the Phalangist commanders, Major General Drori did nothing about the behavior of the Phalangists and did not raise the matter for discussion with the Chief of Staff. The Phalangists' request that the I.D.F. supply them with tractors should have increased the suspicion that actions which are difficult to describe as combat operations were being carried out in the camps; and apparently this suspicion arose, since the order was to provide the Phalangists with only one tractor and remove the I.D.F. markings from it. We cannot find justification for Major General Drori's disengagement from any treatment of the subject of Phalangist behavior, from the moment the Chief of Staff arrived in Beirut and until after the departure of the Phalangists from the camps.

We determine that it was the duty of the G.O.C. to warn the Chief of Staff when the latter arrived in Beirut on 17.9.82 and during the rest of the Chief of Staff's stay in Beirut, that the population in the camps is endangered by the continued presence of the Phalangist forces in the camps, and that they should be removed from there immediately -or that at least steps be taken to ensure the safety of the population in the camps or to reduce the danger they face to the barest possible minimum. Major General Drori's refraining from any action regarding the danger facing the civilian population from the Phalangist forces, from the time the Chief of Staff arrived in Beirut and until Saturday, 18.9.82, constitutes, in our opinion, a breach of the duty which was incumbent on Major General Drori.

#### *Division Commander Brigadier General Amos Yaron*

The first issue specified in the notice sent to Brigadier General Amos Yaron under section 15(A) of the law is that Brigadier General Yaron did not properly evaluate and did not check reports that reached him concerning acts of killing and other irregular actions of the Phalangists in the camps, did not pass on that information to the G.O.C. and to the Chief of Staff immediately after it had been

received on 16.9.82, and did not take the appropriate steps to stop the Phalangists' actions and to protect the population in the camps immediately upon receiving the reports.

We determined in the specification of the facts that Brigadier General Yaron received reports of acts of killing in the evening and night hours of 19.9.82. He received the first report from Lieutenant Elul, and from it it should have been clear to him that the Phalangists were killing women and children in the camps. Brigadier General Yaron heard an additional report that same evening from the division intelligence officer concerning the fate of the group of 45 people who were in the Phalangists' hands. A third report was delivered by the Phalangists liaison officer, G., about 300 killed, a number which was later reduced to 120. Even if we suppose that the first and second report were considered by Brigadier General Yaron to be about the same event, nevertheless, from all the reports, it became known to Brigadier General Yaron that the Phalangists were perpetrating acts of killing which went beyond combat operations, and were killing women and children as well. That evening he was satisfied with reiterating the warnings to the Phalangists' liaison officer and to Elie Hobeika not to kill women and children; but beyond that he did nothing to stop the killing. He did not pass on the information that he had received to Major General Drori that evening nor on the following day in the morning call, nor when they met before noon. When Brigadier General Yaron heard from the division intelligence officer, in the briefing on 16.9.82, about the report indicating the danger that women and children were being killed, he interrupted him - and it appears from the transcript of the conversation that took place then that Brigadier General Yaron wished to play down the importance of the matter and to cut off the clarification of the issue at that briefing. Brigadier General Yaron testified that he was, indeed, aware that the Phalangists' norms of behavior during wartime are different from those of the I.D.F. and that there is no sense in arguing with them to change their combat ethics; but since in previous Phalangist operations conducted jointly with the I.D.F. they had not behaved aberrantly, he trusted that his reiterated warnings not to kill women and children would suffice, the Phalangist commanders' promises would be kept, and the steps that he had taken in order to obtain information on the Phalangists' operations would enable him to follow their actions. We are not prepared to accept this explanation. We have already determined that the means of supervision over what the Phalangists were doing in the camps could not ensure the flow of real and immediate information on their actions. It is difficult to understand how Brigadier General Yaron relied on these warnings and assurances, when he knew about the Phalangists' combat ethics. He also did not take into account the influence of the assassination of Bashir on the fanning of the Phalangists' feelings of revenge. Already shortly after the Phalangists' entrance into the camps, he started receiving reports which should have clarified to him the gravity of the danger of a massacre being perpetrated in the camps and which should have spurred him to take immediate steps, whether on his own cognizance or by authorization from the G.O.C. or the Chief of Staff, to prevent the continuation of operations of these kinds. No action was taken by Brigadier General Yaron, and neither did he see to conveying the information in his possession to his superiors.

An additional explanation by which Brigadier General Yaron tried to justify his behavior was that in the situation which existed that night, the reports about 300, or fewer, killed did not seem to him sufficiently important to spur him to check whether they were true, since on that night, in his role as division commander, he had combat problems which were much more important than the matter of the Phalangists in the camps (testimony of Brigadier General Yaron on p. 699). We cannot accept this explanation either. If Brigadier General Yaron could find the time to hold a briefing, he could also have issued orders to pass on the reports and to take appropriate measures such as were called for by the information received.

Perhaps it is possible to find an explanation for Brigadier General Yaron's refraining from any substantial reaction to the serious information which had reached him Thursday evening in that he was interested that the Phalangists continue to operate in the camps so that I.D.F. soldiers would not have to engage in fighting in that area. Brigadier General Yaron had no reservations about admitting the Phalangists into the camps; he testified that he was happy with this decision and explained his position in that "we have been fighting here for four months already and there is a place where they can take part in the fighting, the fighting serves their purposes as well, so let them participate and not let the I.D.F. do everything" (p.

695). It is possible to show understanding for this feeling, but it does not justify a lack of any action on the part of Brigadier General Yaron, considering the reports that had reached him.

During Friday as well, Brigadier General Yaron did not act properly with regard to the Phalangist operation in the camps. When he met with Major General Drori, he was obligated to report all the information that had reached him, but he did not do so. As a result of this failure, Major General Drori was not apprised of all the information that had reached the division by that time. A number of times, Brigadier General Yaron approached the Phalangist officers who were at the forward command post, including Elie Hobeika and repeated the admonition not to do harm to women and children; but other than this he did not take any initiative and only suggested that the Phalangists be ordered not to advance - and an order to this effect was issued by Major General Drori. This order might have been regarded as enough of a precaution by Major General Drori, who had not heard about instances of killing; but Brigadier General Yaron should have known that halting the advance did not ensure an end to the killing.

The notice sent to Brigadier General Yaron under Section 15(A) also speaks of the failure to provide any warning to the Chief of Staff when the latter reached Beirut on 17.9.82, as well as of Brigadier General Yaron's granting the Phalangists permission to send a new force into the camps without taking any steps that would bring a stop to the excesses. When the Chief of Staff came to Beirut, Brigadier General Yaron did not tell him everything he had heard and did not make any suggestion to him about the continuation of the Phalangist operation in the camps. From the time he saw the Chief of Staff (after his arrival in Beirut) until the Chief of Staff left Beirut, no warning was heard from Brigadier General Yaron - not even a significant comment regarding the danger of a massacre. Brigadier General Yaron was not oblivious to this danger. We have evidence that on Friday he had spoken to the Phalangist liaison officer charging that his men were killing women and children (statement No. 23 by Colonel Agmon), but he did not express this awareness clearly in his meetings with Major General Drori and the Chief of Staff.

Brigadier General Yaron's inaction regarding the continuation of the Phalangist operation in the camps was epitomized by the fact that he did not issue, any order to prevent them from replacing forces on Friday and did not impose any supervision on the movement of the Phalangist forces to and from the camps, despite the fact that the order halting the operation was not rescinded.

We have already cited Brigadier General Yaron's statement at the Senior Command Meeting in which he admitted with laudible candor that this was an instance of "insensitivity" on his part and on the part of others concerned. As we have already stated above, Brigadier General Yaron's desire was to save I.D.F. soldiers from having to carry out the operation in the camps, and this appears to be the main reason for his insensitivity to the dangers of the massacre in the camps. This concern of a commander for the welfare of his men would be praiseworthy in other circumstances; but considering the state of affairs in this particular instance, it was a thoroughly mistaken judgment on the part of Brigadier General Yaron, and a grave error was committed by a high-ranking officer of an I.D.F. force in this sector.

We determine that by virtue of his failings and his actions, detailed above, Brigadier General Yaron committed a breach of the duties incumbent upon him by virtue of his position.

*Mr. Avi Dudai, Personal Aide to The Minister of Defense*

The sole issue regarding which the notice was sent to Mr. Dudai was "that on 17.9.82, during the morning hours or before noon, Mr. Dudai received a report about killings that had been perpetrated by the Lebanese Forces in the refugee camps, and did not pass this report on to the Minister of Defense."

In his testimony, Mr. Dudai denied that any report on what was happening in the camps was given him on 17.9.82. Yet Lieutenant Colonel Gai, an officer in the National Security Unit, testified before us that on Friday morning, 17.9.82, he was in the office of the director of Military Intelligence, where he met one of the officers who works in the office, Captain Moshe Sinai, who told him (according to Lt. Col. Gai) "as a piece of gossip" that about 300 persons had been killed in the camps in Beirut, and that, at around 11:00- 11:30 that same day, he - Lt. Col. Gai - in one of his telephone conversations with Dudai, told Dudai what he had heard from Captain Sinai (testimony by Gai, pp. 921-923). In his second round

of testimony, too, Gai stood by his story that he had passed this report on to Dudai; except that according to this testimony, the report was not given at about 11:00 but rather at a later hour, between 12:30 - when Dudai arrived at the Foreign Ministry, whence he spoke with Gai - and 15:00 hours.

Lieutenant Colonel Hevroni, bureau chief to the director of Military Intelligence, testified that he had been with Dudai at the Sde Dov airfield for a meeting that the Defense Minister had summoned there, [and] afterwards had come to Jerusalem with Dudai for a meeting at the Foreign Minister's office which had lasted until 15:00 hours; and during that same period of time, Dudai asked him what was happening regarding Gai's and Sinai's story - and the reply was that there was no verification of this report. It was clear to Hevroni from this conversation that Duda'i had gotten the report which Gai had received from Sinai (testimony of Hevroni, pp. 876-877). We also heard additional testimony which was intended to show that post factum, Dudai admitted, in the presence of Gai and the witness Colonel Kniazher (called Zizi), that Gai had told him about the report on Friday; but from Colonel Kniazher's testimony (pp. 1466-1468) it turns out that Gai wasn't present at the time he spoke with Dudai, and Duda'i wasn't present at the time that Kniazher spoke with Gai (p. 1466); and there is no evidence in Kniazher's testimony that Duda'i had heard about the report from Gai on 17.9.82.

As has been said, an investigation was held in the director of Military Intelligence's bureau after the event, as a result of which an investigative report was drawn up (exhibit 29). In Paragraph 6 of this report, it is stated that the visit by Lt. Col. Gai between the hours of 7:30-8:00 was intended to clarify what had happened to two Military Intelligence documents which had not yet reached the Defense Minister.

From the testimonies we have heard, it becomes apparent that Gai's visit in the morning hours was for the purpose of receiving reports from Military Intelligence about that attack on the tank which had occurred in West Beirut. Gai did pay two visits to the director of Military Intelligence's bureau that same day, but this second visit was at about 11:00 hours and was carried out on an order that Duda'i transmitted by phone from Sde Dov to Gai, so that the latter would clarify the matter of the documents. This inaccuracy would indeed appear tiny, but it has a certain significance in that it fits in with testimonies that on that same Friday morning, Dudai complained to those who work in his office, including Gai, that there were defects in the reporting of what was happening in Lebanon and that reports weren't reaching the Defense Ministry. Here it should be noted that on that same day, the Defense Minister's military adjutant was not in the office because he was on vacation, and Dudai was taking his place.

In paragraph 13 of exhibit 29, it is said "that in retrospect (in reconstruction) it turned out that Lt. Col. Gai - after receiving the report from the bureau chief of the director of Military Intelligence - looked into the matter on the morning of 17 September with Operations Branch, after he, too, had gotten the impression that an operations report/ occurrence was at issue; and in the investigation, he was told that Operations did not know about such an action by the Phalangists." In his testimony, Gai said that these statements were inaccurate, and that he had only inquired at Operations if there was anything new from Beirut and had received a negative reply. In paragraph 14 of exhibit 29, it is said that in a second update between minister's aide Avi Dudai and Lt. Col. Gai, Dudai reported that he had spoken with the bureau chief of the Director of Military Intelligence, who had told him that the report had not received verification from Military Intelligence personnel who had looked into the matter." What is said here was not confirmed by Lt. Col. Gai's testimony; and as mentioned, Dudai denied receiving any report. The rather obvious general trend of exhibit 29 regarding the report to Gai is: to show that report on the contents of the cable on the 300 killed was conveyed from the Director of Military Intelligence's bureau to the Defense Minister's bureau. According to Lt. Col. Gai's testimony, the conversation between him and Captain Sinai cannot be viewed as more than "an exchange of gossip," and it is difficult to treat such a conversation as a proper act of conveying an important report.

Captain Sinai gave a statement to the staff investigators (No. 112) in which he said that he had read the cable (Appendix A, exhibit 29) in front of Lt. Col. Gai, and that the latter had reacted to it with the words, "Listen, that's very interesting" - and, as far as Sinai recalls, he said, "I spoke with the minister during the night, and I'll go talk with him in a little while; the story is very interesting, and the minister will be very happy to bear the report." According to Sinai, this is more or less the version he heard from

Gai. We find it difficult to attribute importance to this statement. In his statement, Sinai gave exact details concerning a search for the two documents which preceded the conversation between Gai and himself, and at present it is already clear that he erred in this, because the search for the documents was not conducted in the early hours of the morning, but rather close to the noon hour. It is not reasonable [to suppose that ] if Gai did indeed receive Sinai's report as an interesting or important report, he would not immediately convey it to Dudai, who on that same morning complained several times about a lack of reporting on what was happening in Lebanon and inquired after such reports from time to time.

It is our opinion that it cannot be determined that Gai did indeed pass on the contents of the above report to Dudai on Friday. The doubt stems not only from contradictions revealed in the witnesses' statements, but also from [the fact] that the witnesses who told about the conveying of the report have an interest in showing that they fulfilled their obligation in transmitting the report from the director of Military Intelligence's bureau to the Defence Minister's aide. It is also difficult to treat Gai's testimony as testimony by someone who is a disinterested party in the matter, since it is in his interest to show, after all that happened, that he did not keep the contents of the report he'd heard from Sinai to himself. Gai also did not give a satisfactory explanation as to why, according to his version, he had told Dudai about this report only in the afternoon, despite the fact that Duda'i was constantly asking whether reports had come in from Lebanon and was complaining about a lack of reports. In view of the entire body of evidence, we do not determine that Dudai indeed received the report about the 300 people killed on Friday, 17.9.82, and it therefore cannot be determined that he refrained from fulfilling an obligation which was incumbent upon him, as was stated in the notice of (possible) harm which was sent to him.

#### THE FUNCTIONING OF ESTABLISHMENTS

Thus far we have dealt with the findings and conclusions regarding the course of events, and the responsibility for them of those persons whose actions had a decisive effect on the course of events. As we noted, we decided not to discuss the activities of other persons who were close to the course of events but who played a secondary role. All these persons, whether they had central or secondary roles, operated within organizational frameworks whose functioning was flawed.

In this section of the the report we wish to dwell briefly on the flaws in the functioning of these organizational establishments. We shall devote only a few comments to this important topic, with the aim of pointing to a number of flaws which seem to us worrisome, and to bring about a situation in which all the responsible authorities - civil and military - will take all the requisite measures so that the reasons and causes for these flaws will be examined and analyzed, the lessons therefrom learned, and so that what requires amending will indeed be amended. As in this entire report, we shall deal only with the functioning of the various establishments from the time the decision was taken on the entry of the Phalangists into the camps until their departure. Within this framework, too, we shall offer our opinion only regarding outstanding matters which are especially noteworthy. Unquestionably, there were many establishments that functioned properly, even excellently; but in the nature of things our attention is directed toward those establishments in which were revealed flaws that are relevant to the subject of the commission's scrutiny. Hence, the major part of our attention is directed to two key topics which concern us: one is the flaws in the course of decision-taking by the policy-making institutions; the other is the flaws in the manner of handling the information which was received.

The decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken on Wednesday (15.9.82) in the morning. The Prime Minister was not then informed of the decision. The Prime Minister heard about the decision, together with all the other ministers, in the course of a report made by the Chief of Staff at the Cabinet session on Thursday (16.9.82) when the Phalangists were already in the camps. Thereafter, no report was made to the Prime Minister regarding the excesses of the Phalangists in the camps, and the Prime Minister learned about the events in the camps from a BBC broadcast on Saturday (18.9.82) afternoon. This state of affairs is unsatisfactory on two planes: first, the importance of the decision on the entry of the Phalangists, against the backdrop of the Lebanese situation as it was known to those concerned, required that the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps be made with the prior approval of the Prime Minister. Moreover, once the decision

had been taken without the Prime Minister's participation, orderly processes of government required that the decision be made known to him at the earliest possible moment. It is not proper procedure for the Prime Minister to hear about this decision in an incidental manner along with the other Cabinet ministers during a Cabinet session, when the Phalangists were already in the camps.

Second, once the decision was taken, orderly processes of government required that the Prime Minister be informed of any excesses committed. What the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff and the General Command knew on Friday and on Saturday morning, the Prime Minister ought also to have known. It is inconceivable that the Prime Minister should receive his information about this from a foreign radio station.

As we have seen, the decision on the Phalangists' entry into the camps took final shape on Wednesday morning (15.9.82) on the roof of the divisional forward command post. When this decision was taken its ramifications were not examined, nor were its advantages and disadvantages weighed. This is explicable in that the decision was taken under pressure of time. Nonetheless, enough time existed before the Phalangists' entry on Thursday evening (16.9.82) to carry out a situation appraisal in which the decision, its manner of execution and its possible results could be examined. No such deliberation in fact took place. The discussion held by the Defense Minister on Thursday morning (exhibit 27), in which he said, "I would move the Phalangists into the camps," cannot be regarded as a situation appraisal in the usual sense of the term. The Chief of Staff told us that on Wednesday he ordered his deputy to hold a consultation among branch heads. Such a discussion did in fact take place in the late afternoon hours (exhibit 130), but it was a briefing and not a situation appraisal. The issue of the Phalangists' entry was mentioned in that discussion in a general manner, but the decision was not presented in detail, no examination was made of the security measures to be taken, and no evaluation was made of the possible ramifications of the decision.

The way in which decisions are to be taken and the appropriate bodies to that end have been laid down in the procedures. These formats ought to be exploited in order to enhance the prospect that when decisions are taken, all the information at hand, the various positions, the pros and cons, and the possible ramifications of the decision will be taken into account.

Experience and intuition are very valuable, but it is preferable that they not constitute the sole basis on which decisions are taken.

The absence of the required staff discussion regarding the entry of the Phalangists into the camps was accompanied by another inevitable flaw. The information about the decision was not transmitted in an orderly fashion to all the parties who should have known about it. We have already seen that the Prime Minister was unaware of the decision. The Foreign Minister, too, learned of the Phalangists' entry only in the Cabinet session. We have already cited the account of the director of Military Intelligence that he, too, did not learn about the decision until Friday morning. Although we have stated that we find it difficult to accept that account, this cannot justify the absence of an orderly report about the decision being made to all the various staff elements.

Thus, for example, it emerged that the Command Intelligence officers were first briefed by the Command Intelligence Officer about the fact that the Phalangists would enter the camps on Thursday, some two hours after the operation had already commenced. According to the testimony of the Military Intelligence/ Research officers whose task it is to prepare situation appraisals, they received no prior information about the decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps.

As a result, that department was unable to prepare its own appraisals, as would have been expected of it prior to the Phalangists' entry into the camps. This also had a certain effect on the manner in which that department functioned at the stage when it received the report about the 300 killed (Secion 6, Appendix B).

The head of the Mossad learned of the decision only at the Cabinet session. Despite the fact that Mossad personnel were in Beirut when the events occurred, and maintained ongoing contacts with

the Phalangist commanders, no report was received from them regarding the special role of the Phalangists in the camps prior to their entry, nor did they collect any data at all on events in the camps after the Phalangists had entered.

This is not a satisfactory state of affairs. Orderly processes require that the decision on the entry of the Phalangists be reported in an orderly and documented manner to the various bodies that should know about it, so that they can direct their activities and assessments accordingly.

The military establishments are based, *inter alia*, on diverse channels of reporting. An examination of the events on the dates relevant here indicates the existence of considerable flaws in these channels of reporting. Matters that should have been reported were not reported at all, or were reported late and in fragmentary fashion. For example, the report about the behavior of the Phalangists in the field was not transmitted to Divisional Intelligence. For its part, the latter did not relay the reports about the 45 civilians - which was brought to its attention already on Thursday evening - to Command Intelligence. As for Command Intelligence, despite the fact that it received a report from the Division regarding the 300 killed, it did not convey it to General Staff/Military Intelligence. The transmission of the report to Military Intelligence was the result of the fine initiative of Intelligence officer A.

We find a similar picture also in the Operations Branch channels. Operations Branch Command did not receive an orderly report of what was happening in the field. As we have seen, already on Thursday evening and Friday morning -and throughout Friday - reports were collected by a considerable number of soldiers and officers who were near the camps. Only some of those reports - and those in fragmentary fashion - were brought to the attention of the Divisional Operations elements. Divisional Operations for its part did not relay the information it had in an orderly fashion to Command Operations elements. Thus, for example, the reports in the possession of Divisional Operations about the 300 killed (or the 120 killed) were not transmitted at all to Command Operations. The latter did not report (not even on the actual entry of the Phalangists into the camps) to Operations Branch/ Operation. Thus, for example, the report about the 300 killed was received already on Thursday evening in Command Intelligence. For some reason that report was not conveyed (neither in its telephone form nor in the form of the subsequent cable) to the knowledge of the Command Intelligence Officer.

The report was not transmitted to Command Operations, and *ipso facto* was not brought to the knowledge of the G.O.C., either that evening or the following day. Similarly, no orderly report was made regarding the decision of the G.O.C. Northern Command about halting the operations of the Phalangists. These flaws in the reporting require examination and analysis, since in the absence of an orderly and proper report the decision-makers at the various levels lack the information required for their decisions.

The reports that were received via the various channels were also not always handled according to the standing procedures, the result being that the reports sometimes became worthless. Sometimes, reports received were not recorded in the designated log books; reports that were relayed were sometimes transmitted with important omissions, which prevented their being handled properly. Reports that were dealt with (such as the handling of the report about the 300 killed within the framework of Military Intelligence/ Research) were at times handled superficially, with a fruitless internal run-around and without exhausting the various possibilities for verification and examination. Other Intelligence means employed sometimes failed to produce the information that was expected of them (see Section 5 Appendix B). Reports that were received and which required a preliminary evaluation to determine their significance and possible implications were not dealt with properly and in the meantime were rendered worthless due to a protracted process of examining their authenticity.

In the course of the testimony we heard, we often came across conversations - whether face-to-face or over the telephone or radio - between highly responsible personnel. Contradictions were often evident in the testimony about these conversations - not out of any intention to conceal the truth, but as a natural result of flaws in human memory. There is no satisfactory explanation of why no notes were taken of these conversations. The Prime Minister held many conversations with the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff, including the conversations in which the decision was taken to seize key positions in West Beirut. It is not surprising, therefore, if a certain difference exists between the Prime Minister's version of a guideline issued by him, and that of the Chief of Staff regarding the guideline he received.

The Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff held a conversation on Tuesday evening in which a number of important decisions were taken. This conversation was not recorded in any form.

We believe that it is desirable to determine guidelines in this matter in order to prevent a situation in which important decisions are not documented. Precisely because human memory is often faulty, it is desirable to determine a proper method and procedure for recording those conversations which, according to criteria to be determined, it is important to keep on record.

## RECOMMENDATIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS

### Recommendations

With regard to the following recommendations concerning a group of men who hold senior positions in the Government and the Israel Defense Forces, we have taken into account [the fact] that each one of these men has to his credit [the performance of] many public or military services rendered with sacrifice and devotion on behalf of the State of Israel. If nevertheless we have reached the conclusion that it is incumbent upon us to recommend certain measures against some of these men, it is out of the recognition that the gravity of the matter and its implications for the underpinnings of public morality in the State of Israel call for such measures.

#### *The Prime Minister, The Foreign Minister, and the Head of the Mossad*

We have heretofore established the facts and conclusions with regard to the responsibility of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the head of the Mossad. In view of what we have determined with regard to the extent of the responsibility of each of them, we are of the opinion that it is sufficient to determine responsibility and there is no need for any further recommendations.

#### *G.O.C. Northern Command Major General Amir Drori*

We have detailed above our conclusions with regard to the responsibility of G.O.C. Northern Command Major General Amir Drori. Major General Drori was charged with many difficult and complicated tasks during the week the I.D.F. entered West Beirut, missions which he had to accomplish after a long period of difficult warfare. He took certain measures for terminating the Phalangists' actions, and his guilt lies in that he did not continue with these actions. Taking into account these circumstances, it appears to us that it is sufficient to determine the responsibility of Major General Drori without recourse to any further recommendation.

#### *The Minister of Defense, Mr. Ariel Sharon*

We have found, as has been detailed in this report, that the Minister of Defense bears personal responsibility. In our opinion, it is fitting that the Minister of Defense draw the appropriate personal conclusions arising out of the defects revealed with regard to the manner in which he discharged the duties of his office - and if necessary, that the Prime Minister consider whether he should exercise his authority under Section 21-A(a) of the Basic Law: the Government, according to which "the Prime Minister may, after informing the Cabinet of his intention to do so, remove a minister from office."

#### *The Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Rafael Eitan*

We have arrived at grave conclusions with regard to the acts and omissions of the Chief of Staff, Lt-Gen. Rafael Eitan. The Chief of Staff is about to complete his term of service in April, 1983. Taking into account the fact that an extension of his term is not under consideration, there is no [practical] significance to a recommendation with regard to his continuing in office as Chief of Staff, and therefore we have resolved that it is sufficient to determine responsibility without making any further recommendation.

#### *The Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy*

We have detailed the various extremely serious omissions of the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, in discharging the duties of his office. We recommend that Major General Yehoshua Saguy not continue as Director of Military Intelligence.

#### *Division Commander Brigadier General, Amos Yaron*

We have detailed above the extent of the responsibility of Brigadier General Amos Yaron. Taking into account all the circumstances, we recommend that Brigadier General Amos Yaron not serve in

the capacity of a field commander in the Israel Defense Forces, and that this recommendation not be reconsidered before three years have passed.

In the course of this inquiry, shortcomings in the functioning of [several] establishments have been revealed, as described in the chapter dealing with this issue. One must learn the appropriate lessons from these shortcomings, and we recommend that, in addition to internal control in this matter, an investigation into the shortcomings and the manner of correcting them be undertaken by an expert or experts, to be appointed by a Ministerial Defense Committee. It in the course of this investigation it be found that certain persons bear responsibility for these shortcomings, it is fitting that the appropriate conclusions be drawn in their regard, whether in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the military legal code, or in some other manner.

### Closing Remarks

In the witnesses' testimony and in various documents, stress is laid on the difference between the usual battle ethics of the I.D.F. and the battle ethics of the bloody clashes and combat actions among the various ethnic groups, militias, and fighting forces in Lebanon. The difference is considerable. In the war the I.D.F. waged in Lebanon, many civilians were injured and much loss of life was caused, despite the effort the I.D.F. and its soldiers made not to harm civilians. On more than one occasion, this effort caused I.D.F. troops additional casualties. During the months of the war, I.D.F. soldiers witnessed many sights of killing, destruction, and ruin. From their reactions (about which we have heard) to acts of brutality against civilians, it would appear that despite the terrible sights and experiences of the war and despite the soldier's obligation to behave as a fighter with a certain degree of callousness, I.D.F. soldiers did not lose their sensitivity to atrocities that were perpetrated on non-combatants either out of cruelty or to give vent to vengeful feelings. It is regrettable that the reaction by I.D.F. soldiers to such deeds was not always forceful enough to bring a halt to the despicable acts. It seems to us that the I.D.F. should continue to foster the [consciousness of] basic moral obligations which must be kept even in war conditions, without prejudicing the I.D.F.'s combat ability. The circumstances of combat require the combatants to be tough - which means to give priority to sticking to the objective and being willing to make sacrifices - in order to attain the objectives assigned to them, even under the most difficult conditions. But the end never justifies the means, and basic ethical and human values must be maintained in the use of arms.

Among the responses to the commission from the public, there were those who expressed dissatisfaction with the holding of an inquiry on a subject not directly related to Israel's responsibility. The argument was advanced that in previous instances of massacre in Lebanon, when the lives of many more people were taken than those of the victims who fell in Sabra and Shatilla, world opinion was not shocked and no inquiry commissions were established. We cannot justify this approach to the issue of holding an inquiry, and not only for the formal reason that it was not we who decided to hold the inquiry, but rather the Israeli Government resolved thereon. The main purpose of the inquiry was to bring to light all the important facts relating to the perpetration of the atrocities; it therefore has importance from the perspective of Israel's moral fortitude and its functioning as a democratic state that scrupulously maintains the fundamental principles of the civilized world.

We do not deceive ourselves that the results of this inquiry will convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consciences, but this inquiry was not intended for such people. We have striven and have spared no effort to arrive at the truth, and we hope that all persons of good will who will examine the issue without prejudice will be convinced that the inquiry was conducted without any bias.

### Publication of the Report

In accordance with Section 20(a) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, this report and the attached Appendix A will be published after the report is submitted to the Government. Appendix B to this report will not be published, since we are convinced that this is necessary to protect the security of the state and its foreign relations.

Transcripts from the commission hearings which were conducted in open session have already been made public. In accordance with regulation 8(b) of the Commission of Inquiry Regulations (Rules of Procedure) 1969, we resolve that the right to examine the transcripts from those sessions which were held in camera, as well as Appendix B to the report, will be given to all members of the cabinet, all members of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, and any person or class of persons which may be determined by the Ministerial Defense Committee. Similarly, the right to examine Appendix B is given to those persons who received a notice in accordance with section 15(a) of the law, and to their representatives who appeared before the commission.

This report was signed on 7 February 1983.

Yitzhak Kahan Commission Chairman  
Aharon Barak Commission Member  
Yona Efrat Commission Member



**PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS,  
ALGIERS, 22 FEBRUARY 1983**

ON THE PALESTINIAN FRONT

1. *Palestinian National Unity:*

The steadfast and heroic battle in Lebanon and Beirut embodied Palestinian national unity at its best. From the vantage point of the experience of struggle, the PNC affirms the strengthening of national unity between the factions of the revolution within the PLO and affirms the work to advance the structure of organizational relations in all PLO institutions and bodies on the basis of united front work and collective leadership and on the basis of the political and organizational programme approved by the fourteenth session of the PNC.

(A) The Independent National Decision:

The PNC affirms the continued adherence to and protection of independent Palestinian decisions and resistance to all pressures from any side, aimed at influencing this independence.

(B) Armed Palestinian Struggle:

The PNC affirms the need to develop and intensify armed struggle against the Zionist enemy. It also affirms the right of the Palestinian revolutionary forces to carry out military actions against the Zionist enemy from all Arab fronts. It also affirms the need to unite the Palestinian revolutionary forces within the framework of a united Palestinian national liberation army.

2. *The Occupied Homeland:*

(A) The PNC salutes our masses, steadfast in the occupied territories in the face of occupation, settlement and uprooting. It salutes their total national consensus and adherence to the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, inside and outside (the country).

(B) The PNC denounces and condemns all suspicious American and Israeli attempts to strike at the Palestinian national consensus and calls on the masses to resist and confront them.

(C) The PNC affirms the strengthening of the unity of popular, social and national institutions and unions and affirms the need to work to build and develop a national front inside.

(D) The PNC affirms the need to double efforts to strengthen the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied homeland and to offer all the requisites for this steadfastness. Thus, to put and end to enforced emigration and to preserve the land and develop the national economy.

(E) The PNC salutes the steadfastness of our people inside the areas occupied in 1948 and is proud of their struggle and stand, in the face of Zionist racism, to confirm their national identity as an inseparable part of the Palestinian people. The PNC also affirms the need to provide them with all means of support and to strengthen their unity and the unity of their national forces and institutions.

(F) The council sends greetings of esteem and pride to prisoners and detainees in enemy prisons inside the occupied homeland and in South Lebanon.

### 3. Our People in the Diaspora:

The PNC affirms the need to mobilize the energies of our people in all places outside our occupied land and to strengthen their adherence to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our Palestinian people. The council charges the executive committee to work to safeguard their (the Palestinian people's) economic and social interests and to defend their acquired rights and their basic freedom and safety.

### 4. Relations and Jewish Forces

Affirming resolution 14 of the political declaration issued by the PNC at its thirteenth session held on December 3, 1977, the PNC calls on the executive committee to study action in this framework, insofar as it is in keeping with and in the interest of the Palestinian cause and the national Palestinian struggle.

## ON THE ARAB FRONT

### 1. Arab Relations:

- (a) Deepening the cohesion between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement in the whole Arab nation, in order to actively confront Zionist and imperialist conspiracies and plans of annihilation, especially the Camp David accords and the Reagan plan, and in order to end the Zionist occupation of Arab lands.
- (b) Relations between the PLO and the Arab States to be built on the following basis:
  - (i) Commitment to the cause of Arab Struggle, headed by the Palestinian cause and struggle for its sake;
  - (ii) Adherence to the right of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, of self-determination and to establish an independent state under the leadership of the PLO. These are the rights endorsed by Arab summits' resolutions.
  - (iii) Determination on the unity of representation and national unity and respects for independent Palestinian national decision.
  - (iv) Rejection of all plans aimed at encroaching upon the right of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any form such as power-of-attorney or agent or participant in the right of representation.
  - (v) The PNC calls for the strengthening of Arab solidarity on the basis of Arab summit conferences' resolutions and in the light of the above-mentioned principles.

### 2. Resolutions of the Fez Summit: "the Arab Peace Plan"

The PNC considers the resolutions of the Fez Summit as the minimum for political action by the Arab States which must be complimented by military action in all that it entails, in order to redress the balance of power in favour of the struggle and Arab and Palestinian rights.

The council affirms that its understanding of these resolutions does not contradict commitment to the political programme of the PNC resolutions.

### 3. Jordan

- (i) Affirmation of the special and distinctive relations linking the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples. Affirmation of the need to work to develop this harmony and the national interest of the two peoples and the Arab nation to attain the firm national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return, self-determination and the establishment of an independence Palestinian State.
- (ii) Adherence to the resolutions of the PNC concerning relations with Jordan, starting with the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, inside and outside the occupied territories. The PNC sees the future relations with Jordan developing on the basis of a confederation between two independence states.

### 4. Lebanon

- (i) Strengthening relations with the Lebanese people and their national forces and offering support to their brave struggle in resisting Zionist occupation and its tools.

- (ii) At the forefront of current tasks facing the Palestinian revolution is participation with the Lebanese masses and their democratic national forces in fighting and ending the Zionist occupation.
- (iii) The PNC calls on the executive council to work for holding talks between the PLO and the Lebanese government to achieve safety and security for Palestinian residents living in Lebanon and to ensure their rights to residency, freedom and movement, work opportunity and freedom of social and political activity.
- (iv) Work to stop the random collective and individual arrests on political bases and the release of detainees from prisons of the Lebanese authorities.

#### 5. Relations with Syria

Relations with Syria are based on the PNC resolutions, in successive sessions, which affirm the importance of strategic relations between the PLO and Syria, in the service of patriotic and national goals of struggle in confronting the Zionist-imperialist enemy, and regarding the PLO and Syria—the front line before the common danger.

#### 6. Steadfastness and Confrontation Front

The PNC empowers the executive committee of the PLO to hold talks with all parties of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to discuss its revival on actual, clear and sound bases, considering that the front did not meet the tasks required from it during the Zionist invasion of Lebanon.

#### 7. Egypt

The PNC affirms its rejection of the Camp David accords and related plans for autonomy and civil administration. From its deep-rooted belief in the role of Egypt and its great people in the Arab struggle, the council affirms its stand alongside the struggle of the Egyptian people and their national forces to end the policy of Camp David, so that Egypt can return to its position of struggle at the heart of the Arab nation. The council calls on the executive committee to develop the PLO's relations with the Egyptian popular democratic national forces struggling against the normalization of relations with the Zionist enemy in various forms. It regards this (struggle) as expressing the basic interests of the Arab nation and supporting the struggle of our Palestinian people for their national rights. The council calls on the executive committee to define relations with the Egyptian regimes on the basis of the latter's abandoning the Camp David policy.

#### 8. The Iraq-Iran War

The PNC holds in esteem the efforts of the PLO executive committee to end the Iraq-Iran war through the committees of the non-aligned countries and the Islamic countries. The council calls on the executive committee to continue its efforts to end this war, after Iraq declares the withdrawal of its forces from Iranian territory in response to the call of the Palestinian revolution, to mobilize all forces in the battle for the liberation of Palestine.

### ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT

#### 1. The Brezhnev Plan

The PNC expresses its esteem and support for the proposals contained in the plan of President Brezhnev published on September 16, 1980 and which affirm the inalienable national rights of our Palestinian people, including those of return, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The council also expresses its esteem for the stand of the socialist bloc countries on the just cause of our people as affirmed by the Prague declaration on the Middle East situation, published on January 3, 1983.

#### 2. The Reagan Plan

The Reagan plan, in form and content, does not fulfill the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people because it denies the right of return, self-determination, the establishment of an independent Palestinian State and that the PLO is sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and it contradicts international law. For these reasons, the PNC declares its refusal to consider the plan as a proper basis for a lasting and just solution to the Palestinian cause and the Zionist-Arab conflict.

### *3. International Relations*

- (i) Deepening and developing relations of the alliance and friendship between the PLO and the socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, and various international progressive and liberation forces opposed to racism, colonialism, Zionist and imperialism;
- (ii) Deepening relations with non-aligned countries and Islamic and African countries for the sake of Palestinian cause and other national liberation causes;
- (iii) Strengthening relations with friendly countries in Latin America and working to widen the sphere of friendship there;
- (iv) Activating political work with the courtiers of Western European and Japan, with the aim of developing their stand and widening the recognition of the PLO and the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent Palestinian State.  
The PNC salutes all progressive and democratic forces hostile to racial discrimination, Zionism and imperialism in Western Europe countries and various capitalist countries, considering them a basic ally in these countries. (The council) calls on the executive committee to work jointly with these forces for their countries to recognize the firm national rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO.
- (v) Continuing the struggle to achieve the isolation of the Zionist entity in the United Nations in various fields;
- (vi) Confronting American imperialism and its policy, regarding it as standing at the head of the camp hostile to our just cause and the causes of struggle peoples.
- (vii) The council affirms the importance of continuing the struggle against racial discrimination which remains the prevailing practice in a number of regimes, especially South Africa, which has established the firmest relations with the Zionist enemy. The council salutes the struggle of the developing people, led by the SWAPO organization, for freedom and independence. The council also salutes the struggle of the people of South Africa against racial discrimination and oppression.
- (viii) The PNC strongly condemns terrorism and international terrorism, particularly the organized and official terrorism of Israel and the US, against the Palestinian people, the PLO, the Lebanese people, the Arab nation and various national liberation movements.
- (ix) The PNC affirms its adherence to the principles, charter and resolutions of the United Nations, which confirm the non-negotiable, inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people to establish a lasting and just peace in the Middle East and the right of all peoples subjected by occupation to practice all forms of struggle for national independence and liberation. The council also affirms its decisive condemnation of all Zionist and imperialist practices which violate international law and the International Declaration of the Human Rights and the principles and resolutions of the United Nation Charter.
- (x) The PNC values the activities and achievements of the special UN committee in enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights in Palestine. (The council) salutes the efforts of its members, especially the decision of the UN General Assembly to organize an international conference in the summer of 1983 to support the Palestinian people in achieving their inalienable rights.

The council likewise values the achievements of the secretariat of the international conference of the United Nations in preparing for the success of this conference. The council calls on all brother Arab countries and friendly countries to participate effectively in the work of the conference and likewise, in preparatory and regional meetings, to secure the success of the work of the international conference.

There is no doubt that the people's victory will come. The solidarity of peace-loving peoples is a solidarity we cherish and adhere to. The PNC sends salutations to all the heroic masses of our people, inside and outside (the occupied territories) and to our brave fighters who have preserved the honor of their revolution, arms and nation. (The council also salutes) the souls of the martyrs and fighters of our Palestinian people and of the Lebanese people who irrigated the national soil and blood and who affirmed that the cause of freedom will not die in our country.

The PNC also salutes our brothers in the Syrian forces who participated in the heroic battle in Beirut and other areas, and their martyrs. The PNC also values all the Arab and Muslim Volunteers and friends who came to participate with the joint forces in the battles of Beirut and Lebanon. We salute their heroic martyrs.

The PNC values all countries and friendly forces who offered the support of weapons, money and military effort through equipment and training, particularly the Arab and Islamic States, the non-aligned countries, the African countries and the socialist countries.

- Long live the victorious Palestinian revolution.
- Long live the PLO, the unified framework of our people and leader of their struggle.
- Long live the unity of the struggle of our Arab peoples and the peoples of the world for the sake of freedom and national independence the defeat of Zionist, racism and imperialism.
- Honor and eternal glory to our martyrs.

Revolution until Victory.

In conclusion, the council warmly thanks and deeply appreciates the people, party, government and president of Algeria for hosting the council and its guests and for its great care for the success of (the council's) work. (We also thank them) for their effort to ensure the coverage of (the council's) activities in the mass media and in providing a suitable atmosphere for the progress of its discussions and ensuring the safety and comfort for its members and guests. The council especially thanks our brother, President Chadli Ben Jadid, president of the republic and general secretary of the party, for his officially declared stand concerning the independence of Palestinian decision, and Algeria's readiness to support and further this decision by supporting the Palestinian struggle until it achieves victory and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

The council sends thanks and esteem to all popular and official delegations who participated in the work of our council and who declared their support for the PLO and the cause of the Palestinian people.

This international support of our revolution is, without doubt, one of the basic elements in the success of our march, in which the free peoples prove their solidarity in face of the joint enemy of Zionism and imperialism for the sake of the progress, independence and freedom of peoples.

As for our brother Arab delegations who have participated with our council, while thanking and saluting them for their presence and support, we also thank them in particular for their role and action in the Arab arena in creating more favorable conditions for supporting our struggle and for confronting Israeli plans.

The PNC, at the conclusion of its work, promises the Arab and Palestinian masses and all international forces for freedom and struggle, to continue the struggle in all political and military forms and to pursue them towards our people's goals. It considers this international, Arab and Palestinian cohesion to be one of the effective weapons of support and solidarity between people whose certain result must be the attainment of praiseworthy goals.



### **GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO, AMMAN, JORDAN, 10 APRIL 1983**

Since the Israeli aggression of June, 1967 and through our awareness of the dangers and repercussions of the occupation, Jordan has accepted the political option as one of the basic options that may lead to the recovery of Arab territories occupied through military aggression. Consequently, Jordan accepted Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. When the October 1973 war happened, it underlined the importance of continuing work on the political option while at the same time building our intrinsic strength. This war brought about Security Council Resolution 338 which put a stop to military operations and implicitly reemphasized Security Council Resolution 242.

Based on Security Council Resolution 338, disengagement agreements were concluded between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other.

This process completed the Arab circle immediately concerned itself with the recovery of the occupied lands through political means. On this basis, Jordan, in cooperation with the Arab States, developed and adopted the concept of forming a United Arab delegation that would attend an international conference for the purpose of achieving a just and comprehensive peace settlement to the Middle East problem.

In 1974, the Rabat Arab summit conference designated the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan went along with the Arab consensus, and has been committed to that decision ever since.

The ensuing period saw the disjointment of Arab unity as evidenced by the Camp David accords. Further disintegration in the overall Arab position followed, even between those directly affected by the Israeli occupation. All the while, Jordan kept sounding the alarm on the one hand, persevering in its course of action on the other. Jordan warned repeatedly of the dangers inherent in the continuation of the no-war and no-peace situation, and of the exploitation by Israel of this situation to perpetuate the status quo by creating new facts in the occupied Arab territories, to realize its declared ambitions, aided by Arab disunity and by its military superiority.

Jordan has also cautioned against letting time pass by without concluding a just and comprehensive peace settlement because was, and still is, essential to Israel's aim of creating new facts and bringing about a *fait accompli*. Sixteen years have passed since the occupation, during which Israel established 146 colonies in the West Bank alone and has illegally expropriated more than 50 percent of that land.

Even today, Israel forges ahead, in defiance of all international conventions and of United Nations resolutions, with a systemic policy of evacuating the inhabitants of the West Bank to change the demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, thus realizing its designs to establish the Zionist state in the whole of Palestine.

From the early days of the occupation, and through awareness of the Zionist aims, Jordan issued all these warnings and undertook the task of implementing all policies that may support the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and help them stay in their national soil.

With this objective in mind, we worked incessantly on all levels. Domestically, Jordan provides markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the West Bank and Gaza, and continues to extend support to the existing institutions in the West Bank. Also, we continue to attach great importance to building our intrinsic defense capability in cooperation with other Arab States, through the conviction held by all our nation of the danger posed by Zionist ambitions which threaten the Arab world and its future generations. Within this context, Jordan paid particular attention to building its Armed Forces, looked for new sources of arms within the available financial means, and enacted the military service law to mobilize all its national resources for self-defense and for the defense of the Arab world, because Jordan remains, by virtue of its geographic location, a constant target for Israeli aggression, and the first line of defense on the east flank of the Arab world.

On the Arab level, Jordan sought to provide financial support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, and formed a joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee which continues to implement the policy of supporting our people in the occupied lands.

On the international level, Jordan worked to mobilize world opinion to bring pressure to bear on Israel, and in the United Nations, through cooperation with Arab and friendly countries, Jordan succeeded in passing resolutions condemning, isolating, and putting pressure on Israel. All the while, Israel continued with its expansionist colonization program, evicting the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and replacing them by Jewish immigrants. We strive to confront this program which stands to affect Jordan more than any other country, which threatens Jordan's identity and national security.

In June 1982, Israel launched its aggression on Lebanon, which resulted in that country joining the list of occupied Arab territories. Lebanon was not excluded from the ambitions of Israel, which had already annexed de facto the West Bank and Gaza.

Last September, United States President Ronald Reagan declared his peace initiative to solve the Middle East crisis, and shortly after the Fez Arab summit conference resumed its proceedings where the Arab peace plan was formulated. It was evident that both peace proposals were inspired by the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 and by the United Nations resolutions that followed. Jordan, as well as other Arab and friendly countries, found that the Reagan plan lacked some of the principles of the Fez peace plan but at the same time, it contained a number of positive elements. Given the realities of the international situation, on the other hand, the Arab peace plan lacked the mechanism that would enable it to make effective progress. The Reagan peace plan presented the vehicle that could propel the Fez peace plan forward, and Jordan proceeded to explore this possibility.

We believe, and continue to believe, that this aim can be achieved through an agreement between Jordan and the PLO, on the establishment of a confederal relationship that would govern and regulate the future of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. This relationship would express itself, from the moment of its inception, through joint Jordanian-Palestinian action based on the Fez peace plan, Security Council Resolution 242, and the principles of the Reagan initiative. In addition, such a confederal relationship would be sought if only through the faith Arabs have in the joint Arab destiny, and in recognition of the bonds that have linked the peoples of Jordan and Palestine throughout history.

These concepts, and the ideas and assessments that follow from them, formed the subject of intensive discussions held over several meetings between His Majesty King Hussein and the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, as well as between the Government of Jordan and a number of senior members of the PLO, within the framework of a higher committee which was formed for this purpose and which held its deliberations over 5 months between October 1982 and the recent PNC convention in 1982 [as heard]. In addition, a number of prominent Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories took part in the discussions.

These deliberations resulted in the irrefutable conclusion that Jordan and Palestine are joined by undeniable objective considerations reflected by the common threat against them which united their interests and their goals. There also resulted a joint conviction in the soundness of our approach, and we agreed to form a joint stand capable of pursuing political action which, with Arab support, can take advantage of the available opportunity to liberate our people, land, and foremost of all, Arab Jerusalem.

Then, upon request of Mr. Yasser Arafat, we waited to see the results of the PNC meeting, where Mr. Arafat assured us he would act to secure the support of the council for the envisaged joint political action, on whose basic elements we agreed, pending their development in the PNC by declaring a confederate-union relationship between Jordan and Palestine,

In our latest meeting with Mr. Arafat, held in Amman between March 31 and April 5, we conducted a joint assessment of the realities of the Palestine problem in general, and in particular of the dilemma facing the Palestinian people under occupation. We also discussed political action in accordance with the Arab and international peace plans, including President Reagan's peace initiative, bearing in mind the resolutions of the PNC. We held intensive talks on the on the principles and the methods, and reemphasized the importance of a confederal relationship between Jordan and Palestine as being a practical conceptualization from which to work for the implementation of this initiative.

We agreed to work together in this delicate and crucial time to form a united Arab stand that would enable us to deal with the practical aspects of these initiatives, in the hope of achieving a just, permanent, and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem, especially the Palestinian problem.

We also agreed to start immediately joint political action on the Arab level to secure Arab support that would contribute enormously to the realization of the common goal of liberating the lands and

people under occupation, thus fulfilling our duty to work in all possible ways and to take advantage of every possible opportunity to achieve our aims.

Together with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat we laid the final draft of our agreement, which required us and Mr. Arafat to make immediate contacts with Arab leaders to inform them of its contents, seeking their blessing of and support for the agreement.

The PLO Executive Committee deliberated on this issue in the course of several meetings, and finally Mr. Arafat decided to discuss the agreement with other PLO leaders outside Jordan, and return to Amman after 2 days to conclude the joint steps necessary for the implementation of the agreement.

Five days later, a delegate was sent by the PLO Executive Committee Chairman to Amman, to convey to us new ideas and to propose a new course of action that differed from our agreement and that did not give priority to saving the land, thus sending us back to where we were in October 1982.

In the light of this, it became evident that we cannot proceed with the course of political action which we had planned together, and to which we had agreed in principle and in detail, in answer to our historic responsibility to take the opportunities made available by Arab and international initiatives, and save our land and people.

In view of the results of the efforts we made with the PLO, and in compliance with the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, and through the strict observance of the independence of the Palestinian decision, we respect the decision of the PLO, it being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, we leave it to the PLO and to the Palestinian people to choose the ways and means for the salvation of themselves and their land, and for the realization of their declared aims in the manner they see fit.

We in Jordan, having refused from the beginning to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, will neither act separately nor in lieu of anybody in any Middle East peace negotiations. Jordan will work as a member of the Arab League, in compliance with its resolutions, to support the PLO within our capabilities, and in compliance with the requirements of our national security.

Being consistent with ourselves, and faithful to our principles, Arab Jerusalem, and the holy shrines, we shall continue to provide support for our brothers in the occupied Palestinian territories, and make our pledge to them before the Almighty that we shall remain their faithful brother, and side with them in their ordeal.

As for us in Jordan, we are directly affected by the results of the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through the accelerating colonization program and though the economic pressures systematically being brought on the Palestinian people to force them out of their land.

In the light of these facts, and in the no-war and no-peace situation that prevails, we find ourselves more concerned than anybody else to confront the de facto annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which forces us to take all steps necessary to safeguard our national security in all its dimensions.

Both Jordanians and Palestinians shall remain one family that cares for its national unity to the same extent that it cares to stay on this beloved Arab land.

May God assist us in our aspirations.



**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON, 17 MAY 1983**

*[Following the Israeli invasion into Lebanon, the two sides held over 35 sessions to discuss a treaty between them, which was finally signed on 17 May following high-level US involvement, but was never ratified by the Lebanese govt. due to strong Syrian opposition].*

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon:

*Bearing in mind* the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights;

*Reaffirming* their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states within secure and recognized boundaries;

*Having agreed* to declare the termination of the state of war between them;

*Desiring* to ensure lasting security for both their States and to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

*Desiring* to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this Agreement;

*Having delegated* their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries provided with full powers in order to sign in the presence of the representative of the United States of America this Agreement;

*Have agreed* to the following provisions:

**ARTICLE 1**

1. The Parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty political independence and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon inviolable.
2. The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists.
3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 Israel undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the Annex of the present Agreement.

**ARTICLE 2**

The Parties being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as to promote international peace and security and justice.

**ARTICLE 3**

In order to provide maximum security for Israel and Lebanon the Parties agree to establish and implement security arrangements including the creation of a Security Region as provided for in the Annex of the present Agreement.

**ARTICLE 4**

1. The territory of each Party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other Party its territory or its people.
2. Each Party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces armed bands organizations bases offices or infrastructure the aims and purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other Party or any other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other Party and safety of its people. To this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and functioning on the territory of either Party of elements hostile to the other Party are null and void.
3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with international law each Party will refrain:

- a. from organizing instigating assisting or participating in threats or acts of belligerency subversion or incitement or any aggression directed against the other Party its population or property both within its territory and originating therefrom or in the territory of the other Party.
  - b. from using the territory of the other Party for conducting a military attack against the territory of a third state.
  - c. from intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other Party.
4. Each Party undertakes to ensure that preventive action and due proceedings will be taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in violation of this Article.

#### ARTICLE 5

Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of their constitutional provisions the Parties will abstain from any form of hostile propaganda against each other.

#### ARTICLE 6

Each Party will prevent entry into deployment in or passage through its territory its air space and subject to the right of innocent passage in accordance with international law its territorial sea by military forces armament or military equipment of any state hostile to the other Party.

#### ARTICLE 7

Except as provided in the present Agreement nothing will preclude the deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the Government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. New contributors to such forces shall be selected from among states having diplomatic relations with both Parties to the present Agreement.

#### ARTICLE 8

1. a. Upon entry into force of the present Agreement a Joint Liaison Committee will be established by the Parties in which the United States of America will be a participant and will commence its functions. This Committee will be entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of all areas covered by the present Agreement. In matters involving security arrangements it will deal with unresolved problems referred to it by the Security Arrangements Committee established in subparagraph c. below. Decisions of this Committee will be taken unanimously.
  - b. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis to the development of mutual relations between Israel and Lebanon inter alia the regulation of the movement of goods products and persons communications etc.
  - c. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee there will be a Security Arrangements Committee whose composition and functions are defined in the Annex of the present Agreement.
  - d. Subcommittees of the Joint Liaison Committee may be established as the need arises.
  - e. The Joint Liaison Committee will meet in Israel and Lebanon alternately.
  - f. Each Party if it so desires and unless there is an agreed change of status may maintain a liaison office on the territory of the other Party in order to carry out the above-mentioned functions within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee and to assist in the implementation of the present Agreement.
  - g. The members of the Joint Liaison Committee from each of the Parties will be headed by a senior government official.
  - h. All other matters relating to these liaison offices their personnel and the personnel of each Party present in the territory of the other Party in connection with the implementation of the present Agreement will be the subject of a protocol to be concluded between the Parties in the Joint Liaison Committee. Pending the conclusion of this protocol the liaison offices and the above-mentioned personnel will be treated in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention on Special Missions of December 8 1969 including those provisions concerning privileges and immunities. The foregoing is without prejudice to the positions of the Parties concerning that Convention.
2. During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present Agreement and the simultaneous restoration of Lebanese governmental authority along the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon and in the

light of the termination of the state of war the Parties shall initiate within the Joint Liaison Committee bona fide negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis.

#### ARTICLE 9

1. Each of the two Parties will take within a time limit of one year as of entry into force of the present Agreement all measures necessary for the abrogation of treaties laws and regulations deemed in conflict with the present Agreement subject to and in conformity with its constitutional procedures.
2. The Parties undertake not to apply existing obligations enter into any obligations or adopt laws or regulations in conflict with the present Agreement.

#### ARTICLE 10

1. The present Agreement shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall supersede the previous agreements between Israel and Lebanon.
2. The Annex the Appendix and the Map attached thereto and the Agreed Minutes to the present Agreement shall be considered integral parts thereof.
3. The present Agreement may be modified amended or superseded by mutual agreement of the Parties.

#### ARTICLE 11

1. Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement will be settled by negotiation in the Joint Liaison Committee. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall be submitted to conciliation and if unresolved thereafter to an agreed procedure for a definitive resolution.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Annex shall be resolved in the framework of the Security Arrangements Committee and if unresolved shall thereafter at the request of either Party be referred to the Joint Liaison Committee for resolution through negotiation.

#### ARTICLE 12

The present Agreement shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration in conformity with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Kiryat Shmona and Khaldeh this seventeenth day of May 1983 in triplicate in four authentic texts in the Hebrew Arabic English and French languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation the English and French texts will be equally authoritative.

*David Kimche*  
For the Government of the State of Israel

*Antoine Fattal*  
For the Government of the Republic of Lebanon

Witnessed by: *Morris Draper*  
For the Government of the United States of America

#### ANNEX: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

##### *1. Security Region*

- a. A Security Region in which the Government of Lebanon undertakes to implement the security arrangements agreed upon in this Annex is hereby established.
- b. The Security Region is bounded as delineated on the Map attached to this Annex in the north by a line constituting "Line A" and in the south and east by the Lebanese international boundary.

##### *2. Security Arrangements*

The Lebanese authorities will enforce special security measures aimed at detecting and preventing hostile activities as well as the introduction into or movement through the Security Region of

unauthorized armed men or military equipment. The following security arrangements will apply equally throughout the Security Region except as noted:

- a. The Lebanese Army Lebanese Police Lebanese Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese auxiliary forces (ANSAR) organized under the full authority of the Government of Lebanon are the only organized armed forces and elements permitted in the Security Region except as designated elsewhere in this Annex. The Security Arrangements Committee may approve the stationing in the Security Region of other official Lebanese armed elements similar to ANSAR.
- b. Lebanese Police Lebanese Internal Security Forces and ANSAR may be stationed in the Security Region without restrictions as to their numbers. These forces and elements will be equipped only with personal and light automatic weapons and for the Internal Security Forces armored scout or commando cars as listed in the Appendix.
- c. Two Lebanese Army brigades may be stationed in the Security Region. One will be the Lebanese Army Territorial Brigade stationed in the area extending from the Israeli-Lebanese boundary to "Line B" delineated on the attached Map. The other will be a regular Lebanese Army brigade stationed in the area extending from "Line B" to "Line A". These brigades may carry their organic weapons and equipment listed in the Appendix. Additional units equipped in accordance with the Appendix may be deployed in the Security Region for training purposes including the training of conscripts or in the case of operational emergency situations following coordination in accordance with procedures to be established by the Security Arrangements Committee.
- d. The existing local units will be integrated as such into the Lebanese Army in conformity with Lebanese Army regulations. The existing local civil guard shall be integrated into ANSAR and accorded a proper status under Lebanese law to enable it to continue guarding the villages in the Security Region. The process of extending Lebanese authority over these units and civil guard under the supervision of the Security Arrangements Committee shall start immediately after the entry into force of the present Agreement and shall terminate prior to the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
- e. Within the Security Region Lebanese Army units may maintain their organic anti-aircraft weapons as specified in the Appendix. Outside the Security Region Lebanon may deploy personal low and medium altitude air defense missiles. After a period of three years from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement the provision concerning the area outside the Security Region may be reviewed by the Security Arrangements Committee at the request of either Party.
- f. Military electronic equipment in the Security Region will be as specified in the Appendix. Deployment of ground radars within ten kilometers of the Israeli-Lebanese boundary should be approved by the Security Arrangements Committee. Ground radars throughout the Security Region will be deployed so that their sector of search does not cross the Israeli-Lebanese boundary. This provision does not apply to civil aviation or air traffic control radars.
- g. The provision mentioned in paragraph e. applies also to anti-aircraft missiles on Lebanese Navy vessels. In the Security Region Lebanon may deploy naval elements and establish and maintain naval bases or other shore installations required to accomplish the naval mission. The coastal installations in the Security Region will be as specified in the Appendix.
- h. In order to avoid accidents due to misidentification the Lebanese military authorities will give advance notice of all flights of any kind over the Security Region according to procedures to be determined by the Security Arrangements Committee. Approval of these flights is not required.
- i. (1) The forces weapons and military equipment which may be stationed stocked introduced into or transported through the Security Region are only those mentioned in this Annex and its Appendix.
  - (2) No infrastructure auxiliary installations or equipment capable of assisting the activation of weapons that are not permitted by this Annex or its Appendix shall be maintained or established in the Security Region.
  - (3) These provisions also apply whenever a clause of this Annex relates to areas outside the Security Region.

### 3. Security Arrangements Committee

- (a) Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee a Security Arrangements Committee will be established.

- (b) The Security Arrangements Committee will be composed of an equal number of Israeli and Lebanese representatives headed by senior officers. A representative of the United States of America will participate in meetings of the Committee at the request of either Party. Decisions of the Security Arrangements Committee will be reached by agreement of the Parties.
  - (c) The Security Arrangements Committee shall supervise the implementation of the security arrangements in the present Agreement and this Annex and the timetable and modalities as well as all other aspects relating to withdrawals described in the present Agreement and this Annex. To this end and by agreement of the Parties it will:
    - (1) Supervise the implementation of the undertakings of the Parties under the present Agreement and this Annex.
    - (2) Establish and operate Joint Supervisory Teams as detailed below.
    - (3) Address and seek to resolve any problems arising out of the implementation of the security arrangements in the present Agreement and this Annex and discuss any violation reported by the Joint Supervisory Teams or any complaint concerning a violation submitted by one of the Parties.
  - (d) The Security Arrangements Committee shall deal with any complaint submitted to it not later than 24 hours after submission.
  - (e) Meetings of the Security Arrangements Committee shall be held at least once every two weeks in Israel and in Lebanon alternately. In the event that either Party requests a special meeting it will be convened within 2 hours. The first meeting will be held within 48 hours after the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.
  - (f) Joint Supervisory Teams
    - (1) The Security Arrangements Committee will establish Joint Supervisory Teams (Israel-Lebanon) subordinate to it and composed of an equal number of representatives from each Party.
    - (2) The teams will conduct regular verification of the implementation of the provisions of the security arrangement in the Agreement and this Annex. The teams shall report immediately any confirmed violations to the Security Arrangements Committee and ascertain that violations have been rectified.
    - (3) The Security Arrangements Committee shall assign a Joint Supervisory Team when requested to check border security arrangements on the Israeli side of the international boundary in accord with Article 4 of the present Agreement.
    - (4) The teams will enjoy freedom of movement in the air sea and land as necessary for the performance of their tasks within the Security Region.
    - (5) The Security Arrangements Committee will determine all administrative and technical arrangements concerning the functioning of the teams including their working procedures their number their manning their armament and their equipment.
    - (6) Upon submission of a report to the Security Arrangements Committee or upon confirmation of a complaint of either Party by the teams the respective Party shall immediately and in any case not later than 24 hours from the report or the confirmation rectify the violation. The Party shall immediately notify the Security Arrangements Committee of the rectification. Upon receiving the notification the teams will ascertain that the violation has been rectified.
    - (7) The Joint Supervisory Teams shall be subject to termination upon 90 days notice by either Party given at any time after two years from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement. Alternative verification arrangements shall be established in advance of such termination through the Joint Liaison Committee. Notwithstanding the foregoing the Joint Liaison Committee may determine at any time that there is no further need for such arrangements.
  - (g) The Security Arrangements Committee will ensure that practical and rapid contacts between the two Parties are established along the boundary to prevent incidents and facilitate coordination between the forces on the terrain.
4. It is understood that the Government of Lebanon may request appropriate action in the United Nations Security Council for one unit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to be stationed in the Sidon area. The presence of this unit will lend support to the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in asserting governmental authority and protection in the Palestinian refugee

camp areas. For a period of 12 months the unit in the Sidon area may send teams to the Palestinian refugee camp areas in the vicinity of Sidon and Tyre to survey and observe if requested by the Government of Lebanon following notification to the Security Arrangements Committee. Police and security functions shall remain the sole responsibility of the Government of Lebanon which shall ensure that the provisions of the present Agreement shall be fully implemented in these areas.

5. Three months after completion of the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon the Security Arrangements Committee will conduct a full-scale review of the adequacy of the security arrangements delineated in this Annex in order to improve them.

6. *Withdrawal of Israeli Forces*

- a. Within 8 to 12 weeks of the entry into force of the present Agreement all Israeli forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon. This is consistent with the objective of Lebanon that all external forces withdraw from Lebanon.
- b. The Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces will maintain continuous liaison during the withdrawal and will exchange all necessary information through the Security Arrangements Committee. The Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces will cooperate during the withdrawal in order to facilitate the reassertion of the authority of the Government of Lebanon as the Israeli armed forces withdraw.



**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, RESOLUTIONS AHG/RES. 109-109 (XII), 19<sup>TH</sup> ORDINARY SESSION, ADDIS ABEBA, 6-12 JUNE 1983 [EXCERPTS]**

[...] RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Nineteenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 12 June, 1983,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the Middle East and the Palestinian Question, Document - AHG/111 (XXX);

*Having listened* to the statements of the various delegations and of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization on the Middle East Question,

*Guided by* the principles and purposes of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations and by the common destiny of African and Arab peoples and their struggle for freedom, progress and peace,

*Recalling* the successive resolutions adopted by the previous Sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Middle East and the Palestinian Questions,

*Further recalling* the earlier recommendations and decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries on the Middle East and Palestinian Questions,

*Seriously concerned* about the explosive situation prevailing in the region following the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and its refusal to recognize the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their country, to exercise their right to self-determination and to establish an independent State in their territory, as well as Israel's refusal to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Security Council and its disregard for international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through its continued aggression against the Palestinian people, and the Arab territories particularly against Lebanon and Palestinian Refugee Camps, while adopting a policy of genocide and total destruction against the Palestinian people. This policy was illustrated in the most tragic manner during the brutal aggression perpetrated by Israel against Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and the indiscriminate massacres of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples,

*Reaffirming* its full support for the just struggle being pursued by the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO for the recovery of all their legitimate and inalienable rights,

*Noting* with grave concern that the collusion between Israel and racist South Africa would continue to aggravate the policy of terrorism and genocide against the Palestinians and Africans in Palestine and South Africa respectively:

1. *Reaffirms* all the previous resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers as well as its full and unflinching support for the struggle of the Arab and Palestinian peoples under the leadership of its only legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO);
2. *Reaffirms* its support for the Arab Frontline States and the Palestinian People in their just struggle to recover their occupied territories and their usurped rights;
3. *Strongly condemns* Israel's scheme, its expansionist and racist policy as well as its disregard for the United Nations resolutions, and attitude which constitutes, in the final analysis, a serious threat to peace in the Middle East region and in the world as a whole;
4. *Strongly condemns* the establishment by Israel, of settlement in Palestine and in other occupied Arab territories and further *condemns* the Judaization of the City of Jerusalem and its proclamation as the Capital of Israel;
5. *Strongly condemns* Israel, the occupying power, for not giving adequate protection to the civilian persons in the occupied Arab territories, in conformity with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (17 August, 1949);
6. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to end the continued occupation of Arab territories and to accelerate Israel's withdrawal from these territories including Jerusalem which has been occupied since 1967;
7. *Strongly condemns* the aggression perpetuated against Lebanon and the continued occupation of its territory and *urgently calls* for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces in compliance with the relevant Security Council Resolution 508 and 509 (1982);
8. *Strongly condemns* all acts of Israel violating the provisions of the terms of reference and violence perpetrated by Israel to prevent the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force from safeguarding peace in Lebanon and from accomplishing its peace keeping task fully, including the control of territories up to the recognized international borders;
9. *Condemns* the aggressive collusion between the racist Zionist regime of Israel and the racist regime of South Africa directed against African and Arab peoples, and *calls upon* all Member States to close their ranks in the common struggle so as to face the growing dangers of this collusion, especially in the nuclear field;
10. *Strongly recommends* that Israel and South Africa do not benefit from any co-operation in the field of nuclear technology so long as they do not become parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty and they do not accept an international inspection under the aegis of the IAEA of their nuclear research facilities;
11. *Affirms* that the armed struggle against the racists in South Africa and Palestine is legitimate and constitutes the most effective way of putting an end to the policy of expansion and domination over Arab and African peoples;
12. *Recommends* to Member States to renew their firm undertaking to maintain severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, the natural and unconditional accomplice of South Africa;
13. *Strongly condemns further* all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the right of the Palestinian people, the principles of the OAU and UN Charters and the resolution adopted in various international fora on the Palestine Issue, and which prevent the realization of the Palestinian people's aspiration to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to exercise full sovereignty on their territories;
14. *Affirms* that any attempt to solve the question of Palestine which is the core of the Middle East problem, will not lead to peace without the effective participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and without the recognition of the national inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people;
15. *Firmly* supports the Arab Peace Plan adopted at the Twelfth Arab summit at Fez (Morocco) on 9 September 1982 as an important contribution to the search for a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. In this connection, makes a solemn appeal to the

Arab sister countries to strengthen their concerted action for the realization of the objectives of this Plan. It also emphasizes the need to consolidate Afro-Arab solidarity in the interest of the peoples of the two regions;

16. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab Frontline States and of the Palestinian people to have total and permanent sovereign power over their territories, their wealth and natural resources and *considers* all measures adopted by Israel, violating this sovereignty, null and illegal, particularly those concerning Jerusalem;
17. *Appeals* to the International Community to exert pressure on Israel in all fields so as to compel it to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations, and *requests* the Security Council of the United Nations to take the necessary steps to compel Israel to put an end to its occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories and to allow the Palestinian people to exercise their national rights according to the recommendations adopted by the Special Committee of the United Nations on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
18. *Appeals* to the Security Council to take effective steps to guarantee the national inalienable rights of the Palestinian people recognized by the United Nations General Assembly, and *considers* that the Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 does not guarantee the future of the Palestinian people and their inalienable rights, and does not constitute a sufficient basis for an acceptable solution to the Palestinian question which is at the core of the Middle East problem;
19. *Requests* the OAU Secretary-General to follow up the Palestinian and the Middle East Questions and to report to the next Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the organization of African Unity.

#### RESOLUTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Nineteenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 12 June, 1983,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the Middle East and the Palestinian Questions, Document AHG/111 (XIX);

*Having heard* the statements of various delegations and, in particular, that of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Recalling the resolutions adopted by the sessions of the Council of Ministers on the Problem of the Middle East and on the Palestinian Question;

*Further recalling* the report of the United Nations Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine (Document A/34/35) which reaffirms the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine to their homeland including their rights to return to it, to self-determination, to sovereignty as well as to the establishment of an independent state on their soil,

*Guided by* the principles and purposes of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations and by the common struggle against Zionism and racism for the cause of freedom, independence and peace,

*Recalling* that the Palestine Question constitutes the very core of the Middle East conflict, and the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the people of Palestine,

*Reiterating* the relevant decisions of the OAU making the Palestinian Question an Arab and African issue,

*Conscious of* the seriousness of the present situation resulting from the continued occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories by Israel, its refusal to respect the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its firm determination to establish settlements, in the occupied Arab territories, especially in Jerusalem, thus altering the geographical, demographical, cultural and social characteristics of Palestine,

*Reaffirming* the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to recover their land and exercise their national rights,

*Further reaffirming* that a just and lasting peace can only be achieved when the people of Palestine exercise their inalienable rights, particularly their right to return to their homeland, the recovery of national sovereignty, their right to self-determination without any foreign interference whatsoever and their right to create an independent state on their territory;

*Considering* that partial agreement and separate treaty are greatly prejudicial to the people of Palestine and constitute a violation of the principle of the right of people to self-determination and independence,

*Taking into account* the Resolution adopted at the Special Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Palestinian Question;

*Taking into account* the Recommendations of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the People of Palestine;

*Taking into account* the conclusions of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 29 March to 1 April 1983;

*Noting* with grave concern that the alliance between the Zionist regime of Israel and the racist regime of South Africa aims at intensifying acts of terrorism and genocide against the people of Palestine and South Africa:

1. *Reaffirms* all previous resolutions on the Palestinian Question and reiterates its unwavering support for the people of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), their sole legitimate representative, and *reaffirms* the right of the People of Palestine to continue their struggle under all political and military forms as well as the use of all means to liberate their occupied territory and to recover their inalienable national rights, particularly the right to return to their homeland, the exercise of their right to self-determination and to establish an independent state in their territory;
2. *Strongly condemns* all manoeuvres and formulae aimed at preventing the People of Palestine from exercising their rights to self-determination, to achieve their national aspirations to return to their homeland and exercise their freedom and complete sovereignty;
3. *Strongly condemns* any initiatives, measures or agreements which do not take into account the aspirations of the People of Palestine and of their sole legitimate representative the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO);  
*Considers* null and void any agreement on the Palestinian Question without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization;
4. *Strongly condemns* the expansionist policies pursued by Israel and aimed at imposing a fair accompi territories, also *condemns* the policy of expansion, establishment of settlements, expropriation of lands and the massive or individual extermination of people with a view to forcing them to emigrate, to modify the demographic characteristics of the territory, and expel the leaders of the People of Palestine thinkers and citizens as well as other Arab Peoples especially the Lebanese People;
5. *Strongly condemns* Israel's expansionist, colonialist racist and terrorist actions against the Palestinian people, in particular the massacres in Sabra and Shatila as well as against the Lebanese people;
6. *Further condemns* the collusion between the Zionist regime of Israel and the racist regime of South Africa and *calls upon* all Member States to intensify their efforts to face the danger and to strengthen the struggle against Zionism, racism and imperialism. To this end, *calls upon* the African States, and Members of the League of Arab States to include in the Agenda of all sessions the following item "Collusion between South African and Israel";
7. *Calls upon* the International Community to exert more pressure on Israel in all fields so as to compel it to conform to the Charter of the United Nations and with the resolution adopted on the Palestinian Question, *emphasizes* the efforts deployed by the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the People of Palestine and *calls upon* the Security Council to implement the recommendation of this Committee adopted by the General Assembly;
8. *Calls upon* the Security Council to take effective measures to guarantee the exercise by the people of Palestine of their national and inalienable rights recognized by the United Nations General Assembly and *considers* that Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 does not guarantee the future of the Palestinian People and their inalienable rights nor does it provide a basis for a just solution to the Palestinian Question;
9. *Firmly supports* the Arab Peace Plan adopted at the Twelfth Arab Summit held at Fez (Morocco) on 9 September 1962, as an important contribution to the search for a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict;

10. *Endorses* the recommendations of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 29 March to 1 April, 1983;
11. *Urgently calls upon* all the Member States to participate actively and massively, at the highest level, in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine scheduled for 1983,
12. *Commends* the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the People of Palestine for its efforts aimed at restoring the inalienable rights of the People of Palestine,
13. *Urges* the international community to exert more pressure on Israel in all fields so as to compel it to release the Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners mainly those who are in the ANSAR concentration camp;
14. *Requests* the OAU Secretary-General to follow the development of the Palestinian Question and to report to the next Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity.



**WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, SIXTH ASSEMBLY STATEMENT ON  
THE MIDDLE EAST, VANCOUVER, CANADA, JULY/AUGUST 1983**

1. The increasingly dangerous situation in the Middle East threatens the peace of the whole world and places heavy demands on all those striving for justice and freedom. The Middle East is a region of special interest as the birthplace of three monotheistic religions. The churches in the area have their roots from apostolic times. Their continued presence and active participation in the life of the whole area, despite suffering at various periods, is a remarkable witness to the faith. They are facing new challenges and attempting to respond through new forms of witness. While only the churches of the Middle East can determine the nature and forms of their witness, it behoves all churches to strengthen their presence and support their ministry of reconciliation and witness for peace. Historical factors and certain theological interpretations have often confused Christians outside in evaluating the religious and political developments in the Middle East.
2. Recent developments in the region have further pushed back prospects for peace. The agony of the Lebanese war is not yet over. The integrity and independence of Lebanon are in greater danger than ever. The Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank has resulted in a de facto annexation giving final touches to a discriminatory policy of development of peoples that flagrantly violates the basic rights of the Palestinian people. There are fears of relocation of the inhabitants on the West Bank and their expulsion. A large number of Palestinians are under detention in the prisons on the West Bank and in camps in Lebanon. There is escalation of tension in the Occupied Territories. The consensus among the Arab nations appears to have been lost. External and internal pressures have caused a serious rift within the Palestinian movement. In many situations there are increasing violations of human rights, especially of minorities and religious fanaticism is a bane of many communities. The Iran-Iraq war continues to claim an increasing toll of lives and complicates inter-Arab relations. Tension is increasing in relation to Cyprus.
3. *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*
  - 3.1 We reaffirm the principles previously enunciated by the WCC as the basis on which a peaceful settlement can be reached. The UN Security Council Resolution 242 and all other relevant UN resolutions need to be revised and implemented taking into account changes that have occurred since 1967 and that such revisions should express the following principles in a manner that would ensure:
    - 3.1.1 the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all territories occupied in 1967;
    - 3.1.2 the right of all states, including Israel and Arab states, to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries;
    - 3.1.3 implementation of the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination including the right of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state.
  - 3.2 We reaffirm that the Middle East conflict cannot be resolved through the use of force but only through peaceful means. Negotiations for a comprehensive settlement on the Middle East

should include all those parties most intimately involved: the state of Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and neighboring Arab states. The interests of the world at large are best represented through the United Nations and the USA and the USSR have a special responsibility in this matter.

- 3.3 Churches should undertake the following with a view to facilitating processes towards negotiations:
  - 3.3.1 to build greater awareness among the churches about the urgency and justice of the Palestinian cause. In this connection active support should be extended to the UN International Conference on the Question of Palestine to be held at the end of August 1983 in Geneva. The churches should bring to bear their influence on states to participate in it;
  - 3.3.2 to encourage the dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis with a view to furthering mutual understanding and enabling recognition;
  - 3.3.3. to remind Christians in the Western world to recognize that their guilt over the fate of Jews in their countries may have influenced their views of the conflict in the Middle East and has often led to uncritical support of the policies of the state of Israel, thereby ignoring the plight of the Palestinian people and their rights. In this context we welcome the more open and critical stance adopted by Christian churches in the traditional Jewish-Christian dialogue, but we also urge the broadening of the dialogue to include larger segments of both Christian and Jewish communities;
  - 3.3.4 to support movements within Israel, which are working for peace and reconciliation.

#### 4. *Lebanon*

The ecumenical community shares the agony of the peoples in Lebanon who have been tragically suffering over the last nine years and who have been carrying too large a burden of the problems of the region.

- 4.1 We reiterate that the recovery of Lebanese territorial integrity and sovereignty is a key to peace and justice in the region and that for this to be realized all foreign forces must be withdrawn from Lebanese territory.
- 4.2. We appeal to the ecumenical community:
  - 4.2.1 to support the efforts of the Lebanese government to reassert the effective exercise of its sovereignty over all Lebanese territory and to support full independence and unity of the Lebanese people;
  - 4.2.2 to assist the churches within Lebanon in their attempts with leaders of the religious communities for reconciliation with a view to achieving harmony and unity among all communities in the country;
  - 4.2.3 to continue to support generously the Middle East Council of Churches and the churches in Lebanon in their humanitarian and social programmes of relief for all in Lebanon;
  - 4.2.4 to collaborate with the churches in the area in their contribution to the promotion of justice, dignity, freedom and human rights for all in Lebanon.

#### 5. *Jerusalem*

- 5.1 We reaffirm that "Jerusalem is a Holy City for three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The tendency to minimize Jerusalem's importance for any of these three religions should be avoided" (Vth Assembly, Nairobi 1975). The WCC should implement the proposal of the WCC Central Committee (August 1980) that dialogue be initiated with Jews and Muslims so that members of the three religions can understand each other's deep religious attachment to Jerusalem and so that together they can contribute towards political processes that would lead to a mutually acceptable agreement for sharing the city. The churches should give priority to this while continuing efforts to secure a general settlement of the Middle East conflicts. The special legislation known as the Status Quo of the Holy Places must be safeguarded and confirmed in any agreement concerning Jerusalem.
- 5.2 We call the attention of the churches to the need for:
  - 5.2.1 actions which will ensure a continuing indigenous Christian presence and witness in Jerusalem;
    - 5.2.1.1. wider ecumenical awareness of the plight of the indigenous Muslim and Christian communities suffering from the repressive actions of the occupying power in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories.

We call upon the churches to express their common concern that although Israeli law guarantees free access for members of all religious traditions rooted in Jerusalem to their holy places, the state of war between Israel and Arab states, the political reality created by the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and continuing occupation of the West Bank means that Arab Muslims and Christians continue to experience serious difficulties and are often prevented from visiting the Holy City.

6. We uphold the churches in the Middle East in our intercessions as they respond to the new challenges in the difficult circumstances through their witness in the service of Christ. We assure them the solidarity of the community of faith around the world as we have gathered together here in the name of Jesus Christ, the Life of the World. We pray for the healing of the wounds in the nations of that region. We stand together with other religious communities in a spirit of servanthood seeking to be faithful in our common calling to be peace-makers and reconcilers and to bring hope for all.



### INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, GENEVA DECLARATION, 7 SEPTEMBER 1983

In pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 36/120 C of 10 December 1981, ES-7/7 of 19 August 1982 and 37/86 C of 10 December 1982, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine was convened at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983 to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and to exercise their inalienable rights. The conference was opened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar and presided over by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Mustapha Niassé.

1. The Conference, having thoroughly considered the question of Palestine in all its aspects, expresses the grave concern of all nations and peoples regarding the international tension that has persisted for several decades in the Middle East, the principal cause of which is the denial by Israel, and those supporting its expansionist policies, of the inalienable legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Conference reaffirms and stresses that a just solution of the question of Palestine, the core of the problem, is the crucial element in a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement in the Middle East.
2. The Conference recognizes that, as one of the most acute and complex problems of our time, the question of Palestine - inherited by the United Nations at the time of its establishment - requires a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement. This settlement must be based on the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and the attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the right to the establishment of its own independent State in Palestine and should also be based on the provision by the Security Council of guarantees for peace and security among all States in the region, including the independent Palestinian State, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries. The Conference is convinced that the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, as defined by General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, will contribute substantially to the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.
3. The Conference considers the role of the United Nations in the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East to be essential and paramount. It emphasized the need for respect for, and application of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the United Nations relevant to the question of Palestine and the observance of the principles of international law.
4. The Conference considers that the various proposals, consistent with the principles of international law, which have been presented on this question, such as the Arab peace plan adopted unanimously at the twelfth Arab Summit Conference held at Fez, Morocco, in September 1982, should serve as guidelines for concerted international effort to resolve the question of Palestine. These guidelines include the following:
  - (a) The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;

- (b) The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
  - (c) The need to put an end to Israel's occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
  - (d) The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any *de facto* situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;
  - (e) The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
  - (f) The right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as stated in paragraph (a) above.
5. In order to give effect to these guidelines, the Conference considers it essential that an international peace conference on the Middle East be convened on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an essential element of which would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in Palestine. This peace conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and other concerned States, on an equal footing. In this context the Security Council has a primary responsibility to create appropriate institutional arrangements on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions in order to guarantee and to carry out the accords of the international peace conference.
  6. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine emphasizes the importance of the time factor in achieving a just solution to the problems of Palestine. The Conference is convinced that partial solutions are inadequate and delays in seeking a comprehensive solution do not eliminate tensions in the region.



**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 38/58 ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE,  
NEW YORK, 13 DECEMBER 1983 [EXCERPTS]**

C

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolution 36/120 C of 10 December 1981, in which it decided to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine on the basis of its resolution ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980.

*Recalling* also its resolution 37/86 C of 10 December 1982, in which it, *inter alia*, reiterated the responsibility of the United Nations to strive for a lasting peace in the Middle East through a just solution of the problem of Palestine,

*Having considered* the report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine 102 held at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983,

*Convinced* that the Conference, in adopting by acclamation the Geneva Declaration on Palestine 103 and the Program of Action for the achievement of Palestinian Rights, 104 made an important and positive contribution to the attainment of a comprehensive, just and durable peace in the Middle East through a just solution of the problem of Palestine, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

*Conscious* of the importance of the time factor in achieving a just solution of the problem of Palestine,

1. *Takes note* with satisfaction of the report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine;
2. *Endorses* the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted by acclamation on 7 Sept. 83;
3. *Welcomes* and endorses the call for convening an International Conference on the Middle East in conformity with the following guidelines:
  - (a) The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;
  - (b) The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
  - (c) The need to put an end to Israel's occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
  - (d) The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied Territories, including Jerusalem, and any *de facto* situations created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;
  - (e) The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
  - (f) The right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all people, the "sine qua non" of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as stated in subparagraph (a) above;
4. *Invites* all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other concerned states, to participate in the International Peace Conference on the Middle East on an equal footing and with equal rights;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, urgently to undertake preparatory measures to convene the Conference;
6. *Invites* the Security Council to facilitate the organization of the Conference;
7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on his efforts no later than 15/3/84.
8. *Decides* to consider at its thirty-ninth session the report of the Secretary-General on the Conference.



#### UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 38/144, NEW YORK, 19 DECEMBER 1983

The General Assembly,

*Recalling* its resolution 37/135 of 17 December 1982,

*Recalling also* its previous resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources,

*Bearing in mind* the relevant principles of international law and the provisions of the international conventions and regulations, in particular Convention IV of The Hague of 1907, and the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the occupying Power,

*Bearing in mind also* the pertinent provisions of its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
2. *Commends* the report of the Secretary-General on the implications, under international law, of the United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories and on the obligations of Israel concerning its conduct in these territories;
3. *Condemns* Israel for its exploitation of the national resources of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
4. *Reaffirms* that Convention IV of The Hague of 1907 and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 are applicable to the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
5. *Emphasizes* the right of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities;
6. *Also reaffirms* that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories are illegal, and calls upon Israel to desist immediately from such measures;
7. *Further reaffirms* the right of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion and loss of and damages to their natural, human and all other resources, wealth and economic activities, and calls upon Israel to meet their just claims;
8. *Calls upon* all States to support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in the exercise of their above-mentioned rights;
9. *Calls upon* all States, international organizations, specialized agencies, business corporations and all other institutions not to recognize, or co-operate with or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the national resources of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition, the character and form of use of their natural resources or the institutional structure of those territories;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to elaborate on his report *4/* in order to cover also, in detail, the resources exploited by the Israeli settlements and the Israeli-imposed regulations and policies hampering the economic development of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including a comparison between the practices of Israel and its obligations under international law;
11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit the detailed report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session through the Economic and Social Council.



**FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ AND RESOLUTIONS, FOURTH ISLAMIC SUMMIT  
CONFERENCE, CASABLANCA, MOROCCO, 16-19 JANUARY 1984 [EXCERPTS]**

In response to the kind invitation extended by his Majesty King Hassan II, Sovereign of the Kingdom of Morocco, and pursuant to the decision adopted by the Third Islamic Summit Conference held in Makkah Al-Mukarramah from 19 to 22 Rabiul Thani 1401H (25-28 January 1981).

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference met in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13 to 16 Rabiul Thani 1404H (16-19 January 1984). [...]

1. His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdelaziz, Chairman of the Third Islamic Summit Conference, inaugurated the Conference with an important speech in which he expressed his thanks to His Majesty King Hassan II for his warm welcome and generous hospitality and commended the successful efforts of His Majesty in his capacity as Chairman of the Al Quds Committee and of the Arab Committee of the Seven. His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdelaziz reviewed the progress achieved during the past three years with a view to strengthening joint Islamic action in accordance with the historic Declaration of Makkah.
2. His Majesty declared that the world was closely following Islamic action, and that the Islamic Ummah, by virtue of its solidarity, constituted a force to be reckoned with on the international

level. He pointed out that, at this meeting, the responsibility of the Islamic States was to review their work and seek to translate their resolutions into concrete action.

3. On the proposal of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdelaziz, the Chairmanship of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference was assigned to His Majesty King Hassan II.
4. Upon assuming the Chairmanship of the conference, His Majesty King Hassan II delivered an address in which he indicated that the word "Islam" is derived from the words "Peace" and "Security", hence Islamic States are havens of peace, the spirit of brotherhood and sympathetic understanding. Although in the Quran and Sunnah such terms as Jihad and in Martyrdom occur, we also find the terms of unity, love, faithfulness, solidarity and community spirit. His Majesty quoted the following verse of the Holy Quran:
 

"Respond (to evil) by what is better, and he for whom between thee was enmity, will become thy friend and intimate" (Verily is the Word of Allah Truth).
5. Speaking next, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, pointed out that the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which is inspired by the religion of Islam, advocates the search for solutions to international problems by peaceful means. He dealt with the United Nations efforts in respect of the issues and problems of interest to the States of the Islamic world.
6. Mr. Habib Chatty, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, delivered an address in which he referred to the fateful issues submitted to the Summit Conference, pointing out that hopes were entertained that this Conference would usher in a new era in the history of the Islamic Ummah.
7. The Chairman of the Conference announced agreement on the election of three Vice-Chairmen, namely His Excellency President Kenan Evren, President of the Republic of Turkey; His Excellency President Abdou Diouf, President of the Republic of Senegal; and the Mujahid Yasser Arafat, Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
8. During the Conference a number of heads of delegations, spoke on issues and problems of interest to the Islamic world. They clarified the points of view of their countries on those matters. Suggestions were also made by the conference for tackling some of the most important Islamic issues.
9. The Conference listened with great interest to the statement made by Borhan Uddin Rabbani, the representative of the Afghan Mujahideen, in which he explained the conditions of the Afghan resistance and its just struggle for the liberation of its occupied homeland, and commended the Islamic countries for their support to the Mujahideen.
10. The Conference listened with fraternal sentiments to the statement of President Rauf Denktas, who voiced the rightful cause of the Turkish People of Cyprus. The Conference reiterated its past resolutions on the Question of Cyprus and expressed its sympathy and support for the efforts of the Turkish Cypriots to achieve equal status with the Greek Cypriots, and secure their just rights.
11. The Conference approved the Agenda, together with the General Report of the Preparatory Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
12. The Conference examined the Report of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz, Chairman of the Third Islamic Summit Conference, the Report of His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of Al-Quds Committee, the Report of His Excellency President Ahmed Sekou Toure, Chairman of the Islamic Peace Committee, the Report of His Excellency President Moharninad Zia-Ul Haq, Chairman of the Permanent Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the Report of His Excellency President Abdou Diouf, Chairman of the Permanent Committee on Information and Cultural Affairs, and the report of His Excellency Chairman of the Committee of Islamic solidarity with the Peoples of the Sahel.
13. As regards the report of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz, Chairman of the Third Islamic summit:
  - a) The Conference expressed its warmest thanks and deepest gratitude to His Majesty for his efforts and for the achievements made in furtherance of joint Islamic action, Islamic solidarity and the unity of the Islamic Ummah during the term of office of His Majesty as Chairman of the Conference.

- b) As regards the report of His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of Al-Quds Committee, the Conference expressed its warmest thanks and deepest gratitude to His Majesty for his efforts and initiatives in defending the cause of Palestine, as well as publicizing them at international forums and levels. The Conference decided to extend the term of office of His Majesty as Chairman of Al-Quds Committee for three years.
- c) As regards the Report of His Excellency President Ahmed Sekou Toure, Chairman of the Islamic Peace Committee, the Conference commended the efforts made by His Excellency and the Members of the Committee for stopping the fighting and establishing peace between the two Islamic countries, Iraq and Iran. The Conference expressed its sincere thanks to the Committee for its good offices and invited it to pursue its noble mission in order to spare Muslim blood.
- d) As regards the Report of His Excellency president Mohammed Zia-ul Haq, Chairman of the Permanent Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the Conference expressed its profound thanks and gratitude to His Excellency for the progress achieved and the efforts exerted towards the consolidation of scientific and technological cooperation among member States.
- e) With respect to the Report of His Excellency President Abdou Diouf, Chairman of the Permanent Committee on Information and Cultural Affairs, the Conference expressed its profound thanks and gratitude to His Excellency for his constant concern for the propagation of Islamic culture and thought.
- f) As regards the Report of His Excellency Mr. Taha Mohieddin Ma 'rouf, Chairman of the Committee of Islamic Solidarity with the Peoples of the Sahel, the Conference commended the efforts made by the Committee to alleviate the acuteness of the crisis facing the States and peoples of the region as a result of the drought.

14. *The Casablanca Charter.*

Having heard the important presentation made by His Majesty King Hassan II to the Conference on the Casablanca Charter and having heard the interventions of His Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz, Sovereign of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and of several Heads of Delegation on the philosophy, goals and perspectives of the said Charter, the Conference unanimously approved the Casablanca Charter. The Conference mandated the Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, scheduled to meet in Sana, to appoint the members of the regional Reconciliation and Arbitration Commissions provided for in the Casablanca Charter.

The Conference also approved the following political Resolutions:

15. *The Cause of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East*

- (a) The Conference reaffirmed its commitment to the principles on which the solution of the issue of Palestine and the Middle East should be based in the forefront of which are the withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including its rights to return to its homeland, to self-determination and to establish its own State in Palestine.
- (b) The Conference endorsed the Arab Peace plan adopted by the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Fez, which calls for action by every means to clarify this plan, explain its scope and secure international approval for its implementation.

16. The Conference adopted a resolution on the application of certain Israeli laws in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and considered them null and void pursuant to International Law. The Conference also approved the drawing up of a cultural strategy for the coordination of the cultural activities and the strengthening of programs in the fields of Islamic education and culture it also supported the establishment of a coherent and integrated information Islamic Order proper to the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

17. With regard to the Al-Quds Fund and its Endowment, the Conference urged Member States to make generous donations to cover the capital of the Fund and that of its Endowment.

18. *The Cause of "AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF"*

The Conference reaffirmed its total commitment to abide by Islamic program of action and all the resolutions adopted by the Al-Quds Committee and reiterated the attachment of the Islamic Ummah to the Islamic Arab character of this Holy City and its commitment to spare no effort to return it to Arab sovereignty.

19. The Conference expressed its earnest concern to safeguard the independence of Lebanon, its territorial integrity and its absolute sovereignty over all its territories, and to support all efforts to bring about national reconciliation among the Lebanese. It also expressed deep concern over the continuing occupation by Israel of large parts of Lebanon, the ensuing and repressive acts. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Lebanese territories and the withdrawal of the Non-Lebanese forces whose presence is not agreed to by the Lebanese Government. [...]

[...]

RESOLUTION No. 1 / 4-P (IS) ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13 - 16 Rabiul Thani, 1404H (16 - 19 January 1984);

*Proceeding* from the objectives and principles of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Inspired by* the Rabat Declaration, the Lahore Declaration, the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Declaration, the Proclamation of Holy Jihad and the Islamic Action Programs to confront the Zionist enemy;

*Guided by* the principles and objectives of the United Nation Charter;

*Reaffirming* that Islamic States share a common destiny and are committed to fulfil the objectives of joint struggle to bring about freedom, peace, justice and progress, and repel colonialism, occupation, racism and Zionism,

*Deeply concerned* over the further deterioration of the situation in Palestine and the Middle East as a result of wars and the aggressive practices of the Zionist enemy against the peoples and countries of the area that pose serious dangers to international peace and security;

*Considering* that the maintenance of any form of political, economic, cultural and other relations of cooperation - at any level - with the Zionist enemy helps it to persist in its usurpation of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the national inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and its continued occupation of other Arab territories:

*Reaffirming* that the racist Zionist entity in Palestine and the racist regime of Pretoria in South Africa are linked by their policies and racist practices aimed at repressing liberties and demeaning human dignity as well as imposing their domination and hegemony, and denying the national inalienable rights of both peoples and liquidating them;

*Convinced* that the time has come to adopt all measures stipulated in Article 7 of the United Nations Charter and to immediately enforce such measures against the Zionist entity;

*Convinced* of the necessity to adopt such practical measures as would counter the persistence of the Zionist enemy in its policies, its continued aggression and violations and its escalation of organized terrorism against the inhabitants of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories;

1. *Reaffirms* its commitment and adherence to the following principles and bases that are imperative for the solution of the question of Palestine and the Middle East.

- a) The cause of Palestine is the core of the Middle East problem and the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
- b) The Palestine Cause and the Middle East question are one and indivisible when dealing with the problem or seeking a solution thereto; hence any solution cannot be fragmented, applied to some parties to the exclusion of others, or limited to some of the causes and not to others, nor can partial peace be established because peace should be comprehensive, include all parties to the dispute, and eliminate all the causes underlying the dispute, in addition to being a just solution.
- c) A just peace in the region can only be achieved on the basis of complete and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, and on the recovery by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights including:
  - their right to their homeland, Palestine;
  - their right to return to their homeland and recover their property as guaranteed by the UN Resolutions.
  - their right to self-determination without any foreign interference.

- their right to freely exercise sovereignty over their land and natural resources;
  - their right to establish their national independent State in Palestine with the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- d) Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the capital of Palestine, is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel must unconditionally and totally withdraw from it, and it should be restored to Arab sovereignty;
  - e) The Palestine Liberation Organization is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people and has, alone, the full right to represent that people and to participate independently and on an equal footing in all Conferences, activities and international fora concerned with the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a view to securing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;  
No solution can be considered comprehensive just and acceptable unless the PLO participates in its formulation and accepts it as an independent party on equal footing with the other parties concerned. No other party is entitled to claim the right to represent the Palestinians or negotiate the issues of Palestine, its people, its territory right. Any deviation thereto shall be considered null and void and shall in no way be legally binding;
  - f) Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is not consistent with the Palestinian and Arab rights and does not constitute a sufficient basis of solution of the Middle East Problem and the Palestine issue;
  - g) No solution to the Palestine issue and the Arab Zionist conflict may be provided by any of the Arab parties alone, and there must be continued opposition to the Camp David approach and agreements, as well as to their consequences and effects until they have been completely removed and to any initiative proceeding therefrom, and moreover material and moral support should be provided to the Arab Palestinian people in its occupied homeland, in addition to reinforcing their resistance to the self administration plot.
2. *Calls upon* Member States to work collectively for the adoption of a new security Council resolution which provides explicitly for the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and safeguarding the inalienable national right of the Palestinian people, including their right to return to their homeland, to self-determination in accordance with UN resolutions, in particular resolution No. 3236, and the recommendations of the committee on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.
  3. *Reaffirms* the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and considers that all settlements which have been set up, or will be set up, by the Zionist enemy, in all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories including the City of Al-Quds, are illegal measures and practices to be considered null and void and must be removed in accordance with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations;
  4. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab people and States whose territories fall under Israeli occupation to permanent, full and effective sovereignty over their natural and other resources as well as over their wealth and economic activities. It also reaffirms its condemnation of all measures taken by the Zionist enemy to pillage these resources and wealth, considering such activities as illegal measures. These resources must be restored, and compensation paid for their depletion, loss or damage.
  5. *Strongly condemns*:
    - (a) The persistence of the United States in their hostile attitude towards the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, their opposition to a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories including Al-Quds, and their refusal to recognize the PLO as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people;
    - (b) The policies which the United States is trying to impose on the countries and peoples of the region in an attempt to place them within the sphere of American influence, domination and hegemony;
    - (c) The continuous and growing support extended by the United States to the Zionist enemy in all fields, in particular military, political and economic, under the agreement of strategic co-operation between them;
    - (d) The continued use by the USA of its right to veto against Security Council resolutions on Al-Quds, Palestine and the Middle East, to protect the Zionist entity in its continued aggressions,

occupation and efforts to exterminate the Palestinian people and to annex the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif.

6.
  - (a) *Condemns* Israeli schemes to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip which are contrary to U.N. General Assembly resolution 194 of 1948.
  - (b) *Calls upon* the international community to effectively counter this Israeli scheme, and to refrain from contributing in any manner to its implementation.
  - (c) *Warns* the International Community against the dangers of Israeli schemes to establish settlements, evict populations and dismantle refugee camps, calls upon it to support Jordanian efforts to counter these schemes threatening the national security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and likewise requests it to support Palestinian endeavors to resist such schemes which constitute a violation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to its national soil.
7. *Strongly condemns* the crime of genocide perpetrated by the Zionist enemy in the camps of Sabra and Chatila, claiming as victims thousands of defenseless old people, women and children, and recalling once more the Nazi crimes during World War II; a crime committed with the support and protection of the United States which thus ignored its obligations as a major power responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.
8. *Invite again* the Member States to act, in cooperation with the other nations of the world, in particular Third World, non-aligned, as well as African and friendly countries, so that the United Nations apply to Israel the sanctions stipulated in its Charter, in view of the constant refusal by Israel to implement UN resolutions and its violation of the UN Charter.
9. *Requests* the Islamic Six-Member Committee to work during the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in cooperation and coordination with the United Nations Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people to ensure and implement the following:
 

*First:* Taking of effective measures on the widest possible international scale at the United Nations, its specialized agencies and at all the different international organizations, conferences, and institutions, for the implementation of paragraph 8 of the present resolution.

*Second:* The reinforcing and supporting of efforts exerted within the United Nations with the aim of incorporating the budget of UNRWA into the United Nations regular budget.
10. *Calls upon* Member States to join their efforts at the United Nations to ensure that the International organization shall undertake a survey of the losses in life and property which were sustained as a result of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon and the Palestinian people, and require the Zionist enemy to pay compensation for these losses and for the consequences of its continued and persistent occupation of Lebanese town and villages and its destruction of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
11. *Calls upon* all Member States to establish; further contacts and exert more efforts with all the countries that allow Jewish emigration from or across their territories in order to halt such emigration to occupied Palestine; in view of the Zionist illegal policy of settlement in Palestine. It further calls upon Member States to exert efforts to encourage the return of Jews from occupied Palestine to their countries of origin.
12. *Reaffirms* its complete concern over the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and territorial integrity as well as the unity of its people, and supports all efforts exerted to bring about the national reconciliation of the Lebanese. It further affirms that Israeli forces should withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all the Lebanese territories. It also stresses the need to ensure total and absolute sovereignty of Lebanon over all its territories and over all its national concerns.
13.
  - a) *Strongly condemns* the Israeli entity for its failure to comply with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights; and reaffirms that the decision of the Zionist entity to annex these Heights is an act of aggression, according to the provisions of the UN Charter and UN Resolutions and that this decision is null and void.
  - b) *Strongly condemns* the terrorist, repressive measures taken by the Zionist entity against Syrian Arab citizens in the occupied Golan Heights to deny them their basic rights and freedoms thereby violating the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Universal Decla-

- ration of Human Rights. It pays tribute to the resistance of these citizens against occupation and annexation, and expresses its support for their just struggle in defense of their freedom, their territorial integrity, and their national identity.
- c) *Rejects and condemns* Israeli threats against the Syrian Arab Republic, its territorial integrity, its regional security, and its armed forces, and expresses its firm and total support to and solidarity with the just struggle of the government and people of the Syrian Arab Republic against Zionist occupation and aggression in order to liberate their occupied territories.
14. *Calls upon* the Members of the European Community to refrain from extending the effect of their bilateral and multilateral agreements with the Israeli enemy to the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, while taking action to reach similar results with other countries that have similar agreements with Israel.
15. *Again calls upon* all Islamic States to adopt a firm stand as regards legislation enacted in some to counteract the Arab and Islamic boycott of Israel emphasizing, the need to implement the boycott of the Israeli enemy, while stressing the legitimacy of such a boycott as well as dissuading other friendly States from adopting such legislation.
17. *Stresses* the need to open up offices for the Palestine Liberation Organization in the remaining capitals of the Member States where such offices are not established, considering that the Organization is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian People, and to grant these offices full diplomatic rights privileges and immunities.
18. a) *Endorses* the Arab Peace Plan which was approved by the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Fez, Kingdom of Morocco, for the solution of the issue of Palestine and the Middle East.  
b) *Undertakes* all possible actions to clarify this plan, explain its dimensions and secure international support for its implementation.
19. *Considers* the initiative of President Reagan for the solution of the Palestinian and Middle East issue, denies the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people including the right to return to its homeland, to self-determination and to the establishment of its independent Palestinian State on its national soil with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, and does not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people.
20. *Endorses* the declaration and program of action adopted by the International Conference on the question of Palestine sponsored by the United Nations, held In Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983 and attended by 137 countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
21. *Strongly condemns* the presence of United States fleets, aircraft carriers and Marines along Arab coasts and in the East Mediterranean. It considers that the continued American military influx in the Middle East with the attendant aggressions and threats of war, constitutes a threat to security and peace in the region and a flagrant aggression on the peoples and States in this region as well as an encouragement and a protection to the Zionist entity. It also views the presence of these forces as a preliminary step towards the stationing of rapid deployment forces and an all too obvious move towards the return of colonial forces to the region, which denies the role of the United Nations as the responsible international Organization for peace and security in the whole world. It recommends avoidance of whatever is likely to lead to polarization and the transfer of the international conflict to the Middle East region.
22. *Hails* the heroic Palestinian people for their steadfastness and preserving and their unwavering stand against the Zionist enemy, their resistance to occupation in all forms and their continued unity behind their leadership represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. All Islamic States renew their commitment to preserve Palestinian Unity, the independence of the Palestine Liberation Organization and non-intervention in its internal affairs.
23. *Decides* to adopt an educational curriculum of the history and geography of Palestine in all Schools in Islamic States, in conformity with the resolutions adopted in this respect, with a view to keeping Islamic generations informed about Palestine, its land, its people, its national rights and its religious heritage, while strongly opposing the continuous distortion of historical facts pertaining to the Arab and Islamic character of the land and Holy Shrines of Palestine and the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the national rights of the Palestinian people to their territory and homeland.

RESOLUTION NO. 2/4-P (IS): ON THE CITY OF AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13-16 Rabiul Thani, 1404H (16-19 January 1984),

*Proceeding* from the provisions of the Charter of the Islamic Conference and all its previous resolutions on Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the question of Palestine;

*Considering* the situation of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, Al-Aqsa Mosque and all other Holy Places under Zionist Israeli occupation, the annexation, judaization and desecration measures to which this Holy City has been subjected and the threats and damages inflicted upon its Palestinian population; the continued threat to its future as an Arab city in which the Muslims have safeguarded total freedom for the divine religions over fourteen centuries and the real dangers threatening world peace and security as a result of the continuation of this situation;

*Reaffirming* that the city of Al-Quds constitutes an integral part of the usurped Palestinian Nation and that it is the capital of the independent Palestinian State under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people and that its return to Arab Palestinian sovereignty is the only guarantee to preserve its holiness in Islam and other divine religions; safeguard its Islamic character and ensure the right to practice the divine religions there;

*Expressing* strong condemnation at the continued Zionist racist aggressions against the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Holy Ibrahim Mosque, the Holy Sepulchre and other holy places and archaeological sites in the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and Palestine aimed at altering their character; confiscating, plundering and judaizing them and obliterating their features with the Zionist racist spirit prejudiced against these holy and ancient places, which have preserved the civilization and heritage of the Arab and Islamic nation over thousands of years in Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

*Considering* the close relationship between the Palestinian question and the conflict with racial Zionism since the usurpation of Palestine, including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, constitutes the basis of this conflict and, consequently, the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif should not be subjected to negotiations or concessions;

*Reaffirms:*

1. Its full commitment to implement the "Islamic Program of Action to combat the Zionist Enemy" adopted by the Third Islamic Summit Conference held in Makkah Al-Mukarramah/Taif (Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif Session) as well as all the resolutions and recommendations issued by the Al-Quds Committee under the Chairmanship of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco.
2. Its determination to maintain the Arab and Islamic character of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and to undertake serious action for its liberation and restoration to Arab Palestinian sovereignty - being the capital of the independent Palestinian State - under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people.
3. Its full commitment to make use of all available possibilities in the Islamic States in order to counter act the decision of Israel to annex Al-Quds Al-Sharif City and make it the eternal capital of the Zionist entity, including political, economic and cultural boycott and the interdiction of all forms of cooperation with the Zionist enemy at all levels.

*Also reaffirms:*

4. The implementation of the Information Plan approved within the Information Strategy and the convening of the scheduled seminars to shed light on the Question of Palestine and Al-Quds, in the capitals of the world popular circles and world public opinion groups particularly, in the U.S.A. and Western Europe.
5. The need to maintain contacts with the Vatican City and other Christian religious circles with a view to reaching a common Christian Islamic stand that will preserve the historical and sacred religious character of Al-Quds Al-Sharif.
6. The continued commitment of Islamic States to pursue their action individually and collectively in order to follow up the implementation of all international resolutions issued by the U.N and its specialized institutions, such as UNESCO, on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and to refrain from recognizing the aggressive measures and practices which the Israeli enemy is still taking with regard to this Holy City, the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque and other sacred places, as well as to the Arab

Palestinian population. The Conference strongly condemns all these aggressive measures and racist Zionist practices, does not recognize them and considers them null, void and illegal and must not be applied on the grounds of the fait accompli and recommends continued resistance to them until they are completely defeated and their consequences and effects removed.

7. The need for all capitals, major and historical cities of Islamic States to announce their twinning with the City of Al- Quds Al-Sharif the capital of Palestine, as a symbol of solidarity with the people of Palestine, particularly the Palestinian citizens living in the city Al-Quds Al-Sharif, as tribute to their steadfastness, firmness and resistance to the abhorrent Zionist occupation.
8. *Urges* to all countries of the world to refrain from dealing with the Israeli occupation authorities in any way that could be exploited by these authorities as a recognition and acceptance of the fait accompli imposed by its declaration of Al-Quds as "the unified eternal capital" of the Zionist entity.
9. *Praises* the valuable efforts exerted by His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of Al-Quds Committee in following up the implementation of Islamic resolutions pertaining to Al-Quds and Palestine.
10. *Requests* the General Secretariat to follow up the implementation of this resolution and the twinning measures within the next six months, with full cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization and to submit a report thereon to Al-Quds Committee and the next Islamic Conference.

#### RESOLUTION NO. 3/4-P (IS): ON AL-QUDS FUND & ITS ENDOWMENT

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco from 13 to 16 Rabiul Thani, 1404H (16-19 January 1984).

*Proceeding* from the provisions of the Charter of the Islamic Conference;

*In compliance* with all previous Islamic resolution on the AL-QUDS Fund and its endowment;

*Mindful* of the important role played by the AL-QUDS Fund in support of the resistance and struggle of the Palestinian people and the importance of the role to be played by the Endowment in ensuring regular financial resources for the Fund;

*Commending* the Member States which have continued to make their annual contributions to the AL-QUDS Fund and its endowment foremost among them being the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

1. *Appeals* to Member States to make generous donations to cover the capital of the Al-Quds Fund and its Endowment and to make regular annual contributions whose rates shall not be less than their contributions to the annual budget of the General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in order to enable the Board of Directors to extend the necessary or previously determined assistance in support of the resistance and struggle of the Palestinian people;
2. *Appeals* to Member States which have pledged voluntary contributions to the AL-QUDS Fund, or its Endowment and have not yet transferred the amounts involved, to do so as soon as possible;
3. *Decides* to accelerate the measures and arrangements necessary to enable the delegation of the Board of Directors of the AL-QUDS Fund to pay its scheduled visits to some Islamic States within the next six months for the collection of voluntary contributions or those already pledged and not yet transferred to the Fund's account in the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.
4. *Instructs* the General secretariat to follow up the implementation of this resolution in complete coordination with the Administration of AL-QUDS Fund and to submit a progress report to the AL-QUDS Committee and the forthcoming Islamic Conference.

#### RESOLUTION NO. 4/4-P(IS): ON THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN ISRAELI LEGISLATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13 to 16 Rabiul Thani 1404H, ( 16 -19 January 1984),

*Recalling* the resolutions of the Islamic Summit Conferences of Rabat, Lahore and Makkah Al-Mukarramah and the Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers on Palestine and the Middle East;

*Bearing In Mind* that the Israeli schemes to alter the status quo and legal status of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories have reached an advanced and serious stage, particularly after the

endorsement by the Israeli Knesset on 2nd January, 1984 of the arrangements made for applying Israeli legislation in respect of the occupied West Bank and GAZA Strip;

1. *Strongly condemns* the recent Israeli measures designed to apply Israeli legislation in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and considers these a new and extremely serious chapter in Israel schemes for annexing and judaizing the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in 1967.
2. *Stresses* the fact that these measures constitute a flagrant and serious violation of the United Nations Charter, the provisions of international law on armed conflicts, relevant U.N resolutions, and in particular the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians in time of war, and hence considers these as null and void according to international law.
3. *Decides* that Member States should exert immediate and intensive efforts at all levels to draw the attention of the international community to this Israeli scheme and calls upon the international community to take practical and effective steps for their prevention. [...]

RESOLUTION NO. 6/4-P (IS): ON THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ISRAEL

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13 to 16 Rabiul Thani, 1404h (16-19 January 1984),

*Having considered* the item entitled Strategic Alliance between the United States of America and Israel;

*Guided by* the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter;

*Referring to* Resolution (1/14-P) of the Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Dhaka, from 2-7 Rabiul Awal 1404 H (6 - 11 December 1983);

*Drawing attention* to the grave dangers which may ensue from the strategic alliance between the United States of America and Israel, and the agreements concluded as a result of the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Israel to Washington, which reflect the gravest dangers to the region.

*Referring to* resolution 108/38 (E) of the General Assembly dated 18/12/1983 which includes, inter alia, a request addressed to all countries and particularly to the United States of America to refrain from taking any measures that would strengthen the military potentials of Israel and hence promote its aggressive attacks launched on occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories since 1967 and against countries of the region.

1. *Condemns* the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States of America which is considered to be factor which escalates the tension and aggravates the situation in the Middle East and threatens international peace and security.
2. *Considers* that this alliance not only boosts the aggressive potential of Israel against the States of the region and consolidates its expansionist and settlements policy but also brings the United States of America into a position of enmity towards the Palestinian people and the Arab countries thus giving rise to doubts over the credibility of the current orientations of the United States of America in its dealings with the Palestinian issue and the ensuing situation in the Middle East
3. *Condemns* the United States of America for the assistance and support it extends in the military, political and economic fields with the aim of turning occupied Palestine into a huge arsenal of sophisticated strategic weapons, which endangers the security of the region as well as international peace and security.

RESOLUTION NO. 7/4-P (IS): ON THE OCCUPIED GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE ISRAELI DECISION ON ITS ANNEXATION AND TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST SYRIAN ARAB CITIZENS.

The Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, meeting in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco, from 13-16 Rabiul Than, (16-19 January, 1984).

*Having examined* the item entitled Occupied Syrian Golan Heights and Israel's decision on its annexation and terrorist action against Syrian Arab citizens;

*Guided by the principles of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.*

Referring to Resolution 1/14-P of the Fourteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Dhaka, from 2 to 7 Rabiul Awal 1404H (6-11 December, 1983);

*Recalling the Security Council Resolution 497(1981) of 17 December 1981, and General Assembly Resolution 226/36(B) of 17 December 1981, the Emergency Session of 5 February 1981, 123/37/(A) of 16 December 1982, 180/38 (A) of 12 December 1983 and 79/38 (B) of 15 December 1983;*

*Referring to the Security Council Resolution 465 of 1 March 1980 affirming *inter alia*, that the Geneva Convention on the protection of civil persons in time of war, of 12 August 1949 applies to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Al-Quds;*

1. *Reaffirms* that the decision of Israel to enforce its laws, tutelage and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is an act of aggression, pursuant to the provisions of Article 39 of the UN Charter and resolution 3314 (D-29) of the General Assembly (XX Ix) and that this decision is null and void, devoid of any legal validity and effects whatsoever.
2. *Strongly condemns* the repressive and terrorist measures applied by Zionist entity against Syrian citizens in the occupied Golan Heights, aimed at their eviction and the confiscation of their land and property to establish settlements for the Zionist colonialists;
3. *Reaffirms* that all the provisions of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, and the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of civilians in time of war of 12 August 1949 continue to apply to the Syrian Golan Heights occupied by Israel since 1967 and requests all parties to respect their commitment by virtue of these agreements.
4. *Calls upon* the International Community to take effective measures to ensure the implementation of the provision of the two agreements and impel Israel to abrogate its decision of 14 December 1981 on the annexation of the Golan Heights.
5. *Strongly condemns* Israel for its failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 497(1981) and UN General Assembly Resolution 226/36 (B) of 17 December 1981, Emergency Session Resolution 1/9 of 5 February 1982, and 123/37 (A) of 16 December 1982.
6. *Strongly condemns* Israel's persistent measures aimed at changing the national identity of the Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan Heights and at changing the physical character, demographic constitution and legal status of the region.
7. *Instructs* the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to contact the countries party to the above-mentioned agreements to ensure the applicability of its provisions to the Syrian Golan Heights and submit a report on the results of his efforts to the Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.



**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 17<sup>TH</sup> ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING,  
JAKARTA, 9-10 JULY 1984 [EXCERPTS]**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The Seventeenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held at the ASEAN Secretariat building in Jakarta from 9-10 July 1984. The Meeting was formally opened by His Excellency President Soeharto of the Republic of Indonesia. [...]

**WEST ASIA**

72. The Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern with the continuing denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. They urged that these rights be speedily restored in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. They were also deeply concerned with the Iran-Iraq war and expressed the hope that it would end as soon as possible in order to promote peace and stability in that region. [...]



**DEPUTY PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE PLO TO THE UN, RIYAD MANSOUR,  
LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 6 AUGUST 1984**

I am asked by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to bring the following to your attention.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization met on 31 July 1984 to discuss the latest propositions announced by the Soviet Union on 29 July 1984 related to the solution of the Middle East problem which came as a reconfirmation of the proposal presented by the late President Brezhnev in September 1982.

The Executive Committee studied in particular the basic principles of these propositions, mainly:

The principle of the appropriation of the people's land by aggression and the necessity of the return of all lands occupied since 1967 to the Arabs, and the need to eliminate all settlements established by Israel in these territories;

The principle of the right of the Palestinian people to return, to self-determination, and to the establishment of their independent State on the Palestinian land which will be liberated from the Israeli occupation and the guarantee of the practice of these rights to the Palestinian people represented by their sole legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization,

The right of the Palestinian State to define, after its establishment, the nature of its relations with the neighbouring countries, including the possibility of establishing a confederation,

The principle of considering Eastern Jerusalem as a basic part of the Palestinian State.

The Executive Committee studied in detail the means of achieving the proposed solution which is based on collective efforts and within the framework of an International Conference on the Middle East which will convene for this purpose. The objective of the conference is the fulfilment of a global solution.

The Executive Committee expressed its approval and appreciation of these proposals based on the Palestine National Council resolution, in its sixteenth session and which had highly valued the plan of the late President Brezhnev and approved it, as well as based on the resolutions of the previous Palestine National Council sessions as related to this matter.

*(Signed)* Riyad MANSOUR  
Deputy Permanent Observer



**SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, STATEMENT TO THE UN  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 39<sup>TH</sup> SESSION, NEW YORK, 28 SEPTEMBER 1984 [EXCERPTS]**

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

[...]

Mr. President:

The prestige of the United Nations which embodies the hopes and aspirations of nations and peoples for peace, as well as the confidence entrusted to it by the international community, and its capacity to carry out its responsibilities, depends on its ability to find effective solutions for the problems that confront member states on the one hand, and for the problems that threaten international peace and security on the other.

Some of the problems with which the United Nations is concerned now, and which it has been addressing for a long time, and for which it has been unable to find basic solutions, are becoming increasingly serious and dangerous. This is but the result of a fundamental disregard of the basic rea-

sons underlying these problems. The problem of Palestine, Jerusalem, and the Middle East, which confront us and are under our consideration here, are the most prominent examples of such approaches.

Mr. President:

The problem of Palestine constitutes the most serious example of international political injustice and reflects a clear reality of the extent of Israel's recklessness toward high human principles and norms as well as its flagrant defiance of the resolutions adopted by the international community as represented in the United Nations, together with its determination in applying aggressive policies and racist practices.

Undoubtedly, Israel is exerting every effort to create the impression that the problem of Palestine has reached such a zenith of complexity that finding a solution for it has been rendered impossible. It moreover tries to create the impression that the Middle East is predicated by crises and conflicts, aiming by all such claims to consecrate instability in the area and incite disputes and trouble, spreading fear and despair in the hearts of people. It thereby seeks to frustrate efforts aimed at securing a stable peace in the region so that it may carry out its aggressive, expansionist designs without restraint or control.

The logic and the reality of the situation refute these Israeli claims. The Zionist presence in the region is the reason why this region suffers from crises and conflicts. The claim that the Palestine problem has become so complicated that it is incapable of solution is therefore a false, baseless and refutable claim. The truth at the core of this problem is clear, and is not shrouded with any ambiguity whatsoever. The numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations which condemn the aggressive acts of Israel and confirm the rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland, as well as the Arab character of Jerusalem, do not need further reiteration here.

In actuality, the real entanglement and basic obstacle lies in the recklessness of Israel towards all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, its stand as an impediment to efforts by the United Nations to deal with these problems, its total rejection of any genuine and real momentum toward peace based upon right and justice, as well as its lack of seriousness toward all initiatives aimed at establishing peace in the region. While the irrelevance of the Camp David Accords as a framework for a just and complete peace in the Middle East has been proven, Israel claims that signature of these Accords as well as withdrawal from Sinai prove its inclination toward peace. In reality, however, its ratification of the Accords was a pretext for it to be able to annex the West Bank and Gaza, Jerusalem and the Golan; to expel the legitimate population of these areas and to allow Israelis to occupy and establish settlements there. It considers these agreements to be an alternative for any other peaceful solution to the problem of the Arab lands that it still occupies, and therein practices the ugliest forms of oppression and terror, denying not only the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people but also the Palestinian existence as a totality. Consequently, the Zionist aggression against the Arab States is still continuing, despite the false claim that Israel will respond to the just demands if it deems that the security it asks for has been realized. The reality of the situation testifies differently. Israel still demonstrates through both its conduct of affairs and its aggressive practices that it is seeking land and not peace. That is why we are witness to the full-scale Israeli effort to stockpile its arsenals with the most destructive and devastating weaponry. The extended interpretation of its security claim beyond the Arab fold proves furthermore that it is the Arabs and not Israel who are in need of security. Israel has been the aggressor all the time and has possessed all the devastating weapons not possessed by any Arab State, while Israel's security is being assured by East and West alike.

Mr. President:

On their part, the Arabs have proven that they are seekers of a peace based on justice, not a peace imposed by force and oppression. The Twelfth Arab Summit Conference at Fez has demonstrated the definitive Arab momentum toward peace. The Arab States have articulated their understanding of the peace process in the Fez resolutions, which are based on international legitimacy and conform, furthermore, to the international will reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations. This deep conviction of the Arabs in the necessity of establishing a just and permanent peace in the region should not become a reason for their paying a high price for believing in justice, right and peace.

The Arab States have carried out their historic responsibility and have given all that they can to establish peace and stability in the region, affirming thereby their genuine belief in peace as a stance. The Fez resolutions once again demonstrate the Arab consensus for a peace based on justice. These resolutions have taken into account the present situational reality in the region and contain the basic principles that can act as an objective point of departure for the establishment of a just and durable peace. Foremost among those principles is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent state on their land, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative.

Mr. President:

The land of Palestine lies in the midst of a great ocean of hundreds of millions of people, deep in the geographical heartland of a vast Arab and Muslim world, facts which Israel continues to defy by its aggression. Nobody has ventured so far in imposing such a heavy burden upon the international community, in breaking international laws and conventions and in defying international will, as the Israelis have done. As a matter of fact, Israel constitutes a political, economic and moral burden on the states which back and support it.

We believe that what we need now is to make a determined effort towards taking the necessary effective actions and measures for applying and carrying out what has already been adopted by resolutions, as well as to make a definitive formulation on the way in which the initiative for peace can be launched.

Consequently, it is imperative to address the basic components of a just solution for the problem of Palestine, foremost amongst which is the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, a people tyrannized in their own country, displaced from their homeland, and deprived of their natural rights, rights which all nations of the world enjoy: as well as the withdrawal by Israel from all occupied lands, especially Jerusalem.

In this connection, I should like to reiterate the warning given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by all Muslim countries, and by all peace-loving states in the world, against the gravity of Israel's schemes to alter the physical character of Jerusalem, and to violate the security of sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as of other Muslim and Christian shrines in Palestine. There exists a definitive momentum toward peace in the Arab and Muslim world. The great fear is that the failure of this Organization in handling this permanent problem as well as the persistence of Israeli extremism, and its perseverance in violating the sanctity of the holy shrines in Palestine, will force the Arab and Islamic nations to mobilize all their capabilities to confront this Israeli extremism resulting in a high price, the effects of which will not be limited to the Middle East.[...]



### JOINT PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN ACCORDS, 11 FEBRUARY 1985

*Emanating* from the spirit of the Fez summit resolution, approved by Arab states, and from United Nations resolutions relating to the Palestinian question, in Accordance with international legitimacy, and

*Deriving from* a common understanding on the establishment of a special relations between the Jordan and Palestinian peoples,

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization have agreed to move together toward the achievement of a peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East crisis and the termination of Israeli occupation of the Occupied Arab Territories, including Jerusalem, on the basis of the following principles:

1. Total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 for comprehensive peace as established in United Nations and Security Council resolutions.
2. Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people:

3. Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination when Jordanians and Palestinians will be able to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab States of Jordan and Palestine.
4. Resolution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with UN resolutions.
5. Resolution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects.
6. And on these bases, peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an International Conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties to the conflict will participate, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint delegation (joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation).



**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 18<sup>TH</sup> ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING,  
KUALA LUMPUR, 9 JULY 1985 [EXCERPTS]**

INTRODUCTION

1. The Eighteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur from 8 to 9 July 1985. The Meeting was formally opened by the Honourable Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia. [...]

MIDDLE EAST

69. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their principled stand that a just and lasting peace in West Asia could only be achieved through the restitution of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. They urged the convening of an International Conference on Palestine and the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Achievements of Palestinian Rights issued in Geneva in 1983. The Foreign Ministers expressed concern at the undiminished tragedy in Lebanon and urged all parties concerned to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Foreign Ministers viewed with deep concern the continuing war between Iran and Iraq, and called on both countries to end their hostilities and accept peaceful solution in the interest of regional and international peace. [...]



**KING FAHD BIN ABDULAZIZ AL-SAUD OF SAUDI ARABIA, STATEMENT DELIVERED  
ON HIS BEHALF BY PRINCE SULTAN BIN ABDULAZIZ, COMMEMORATIVE 40<sup>TH</sup>  
SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, 1 OCTOBER 1985 [EXCERPTS]**

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:  
Prayer and Peace on His most honorable messenger.

[...] Mr. President:

We also express our satisfaction for the stand that the Soviet Union has taken in supporting the Palestinian people in their right for self-determination. Nevertheless the support of the Soviet Union for the Arab cause and their support for the Arab right in Palestine does not justify a free hand in Afghanistan, its occupation militarily and the deprivation of the Afghani people from their independence and dignity. Similarly, the opposition of the United States of America to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its call to grant the right of self-determination to the Afghani people does not justify its unlimited and unconditional support for Israel, and its lack of support for the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny, by themselves, and to establish their own state on their own land. The United States should support right, justice and international legitimacy.

Mr. President:

If the main objective of the United Nations and the principle on which the philosophy of the Charter was established is to realize international security and stability, the fact is that since 1947 Israel has been

working actively to destroy that objective in the Middle East, where peace has not prevailed and security has not taken root. Israel was created in the Middle East by an act of aggression against Palestine and the Palestinian people. His late Majesty King [then Prince] Faisal bin Abdulaziz made an appeal to the representatives of the states that gathered on the 26th of November 1947, three days before the partition resolution, in which he declared this platform: "In your hands falls the responsibility of realizing peace and security in the Middle East and in your hands lies also the capacity to fuel conflict and bloodshed."

This message with all the elements of perception and responsibility that it contains is the basis on which the policy of His Majesty King Fahd bin Abdulaziz and his government is conducted, as a course that never changes for the rights of the Palestinian people. And until the aspirations of these people are realized, His Majesty King Fahd bin Abdulaziz will continue to call for justice and fairness and work towards realizing this, since in the consideration of His Majesty, the problem of the Palestinian people constitutes one of the most dangerous problems for international peace and security. It is truly regrettable that the United Nations Organization did not heed the warnings of His Majesty King Abdulaziz, and its attempts over thirty-eight years of searching for a just solution to the Palestinian problem has resulted in nothing. This Organization has adopted tens of resolutions which deal with flagrant Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people, some of which have been adopted by the Security Council and by the General Assembly since the 11th of December 1948, when the resolution was taken for the return of the displaced people of Palestine to their homeland, if they wished to do so, or to compensate those who did not wish to return. That was followed by tens of resolutions taken by this Organization on this matter that are so numerous that it would be unnecessary to cite them. But as long as these resolutions are devoid of penalties, Israel will continue to ignore them and even to declare its determination to challenge them. Israel has been encouraged in its excesses and disregard for United Nations resolutions by the failure of the Security Council to adopt any resolution deterring Israel due to the exercise of the veto. Thus any resolution taken by the General Assembly condemning Israeli practices will find no positive response or heeding from Israel, which was brought into existence by this Organization; indeed it has even started to attack the United Nations itself and to accuse it of bias.

The credibility of this Organization is liable to be shaken should it continue to be satisfied with adopting resolutions and recommendations. The United Nations has urged and condemned sufficiently enough and yet a comprehensive and just settlement of this problem has not been realized. We should ask ourselves hereafter what choice is left to the United Nations except to move this consensus ahead from the level of condemnation to the level of concrete action to attain that settlement? This Organization has no alternative but to regain its credibility and to affirm that credibility by giving its resolutions a character of seriousness, for there is no seriousness without implementation.

Mr. President:

The problems that our region is facing and the complications that appear on its ground are in reality, and in the last analysis, but repercussions of the Zionist aggression against Palestine, and an actual result of the accumulative developments of the Palestine problem. The wars, political and military conflicts through which the area has lived during the last thirty-eight years, are but one effect of the non-solution of the basic problem and a result of Israeli aggression in the area. The perpetration of Israeli occupation of Arab territories is but a living proof of its designs for expansion, its flagrant defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations, its continuous disregard of World public opinion, and of every law and convention.

What Lebanon suffers today of painful circumstances and sad situations is in reality but one of the serious complications of this problem.

Mr. President:

From all of this, it is clearly evident that establishment of peace in the Middle East requires the solution of the main problem, which is the problem of Palestine, by the recognition of the inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, on their territory, and in their

homeland. This requires the pursuit of firm and resolute steps in order to avoid the complications that are created by reluctance and hesitation which hinder the efforts being exerted to realize peace.

Israel's defiance and its continuous attempts to hinder peace efforts to gain time in order to realize its objectives and designs, cannot but provide the opportunity for increased disturbances and cannot but lead to complications that will increase the difficulties of solving the problem, as well as multiply the factors that lead to inflammations and explosions in the area.

Thus, we call upon the big powers, to whom the Zionist entity owes the means of its existence and the continuation of its viability to refrain from giving economic, political and military assistance which enables Israel to continue its aggressive policy in the Middle East, and to play a role that complies with the principles of right and justice and the rights of peoples to self-determination, or otherwise they will lose their credibility and effectiveness in influencing events in the Middle East. It is needless for me to reiterate the obvious fact that no solution will succeed unless it includes the principal and genuine party to the conflict.

On this basis, the proposition of any means or the taking of any step for solving the problem of Palestine necessitates that the Palestine Liberation Organization - being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people - should be one of the parties in the discussion and one of the participants in the dialogue. If peace is to be permanent, it should emanate from the area of the conflict, and it should be based on a justice that will recover the rights of its legitimate owners. The Arab states have shouldered their historic responsibilities, and contributed all that is within their capabilities for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in the region, and have defined their understanding of the peace process in the 'Fez' resolutions, which reflect the Arab consensus on peace based on justice and international legitimacy, and conforms to the international will represented by the resolutions of the United Nations. But peace according to the creed of our people does not mean surrender and acceptance of the status quo, for we are a people that seeks justice and upholds rights while rejecting oppression and refusing submission.

Mr. President:

There is no alternative to Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, because occupation is against all international laws, principles and the objectives of the United Nations, as well as against peace and security in the area and in the world at large. It is called for as a primary step on the path to solving the basic problem with whose solution peace in the area is tied; it is also a necessary approach from the overall perspective that requires a clear insight into the problem and into the elements of a solution.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia together with the great majority of the world community demands withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and considers Al-Quds Al-Sharif foremost amongst these. [...]



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 573 ON THE ISRAEL RAID  
ON THE PLO BASE IN TUNIS, NEW YORK, 4 OCTOBER 1985**

*[Following the air strike on Tunis, Tunisia complained to the UNSC,  
which passed the following resolution by a vote of 14:0 with the US abstaining.]*

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the letter dated 1 October 1985 (S/17509) in which Tunisia made a complaint against Israel following the act of aggression which the latter committed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia,

*Having heard* the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia,

*Having noted* with concern that the Israeli attack has caused heavy loss of human life and extensive material damage,

*Considering* that, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

*Gravely concerned* at the threat to peace and security in the Mediterranean region posed by the air raid perpetrated on 1 October 1985 by Israel in the area of Hamman-Plage, situated in the southern suburb of Tunis,

*Drawing attention* to the serious effect which the aggression carried out by Israel and all acts contrary to the Charter cannot but have on any initiative designed to establish an overall, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Considering* that the Israeli Government claimed responsibility for the attack as soon as it had been carried out,

1. *Condemns vigorously* the act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct;
2. *Demands* that Israel refrain from perpetrating such acts of aggression or from the threat to do so;
3. *Urgently requests* the States Members of the United Nations to take measures to dissuade Israel from resorting to such acts against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States;
4. *Considers* that Tunisia has the right to appropriate reparations as a result of the loss of human life and material damage which it has suffered and for which Israel has claimed responsibility;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of this resolution by 30 November 1985 at the latest;
6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



**PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, STATEMENT ON TERRORISM  
("THE CAIRO DECLARATION"), CAIRO, 7 NOVEMBER 1985**

The Palestinian people has and continues to struggle to liberate its occupied land, to exercise its right to self-determination, and to establish a state as a necessary condition for achieving a just and lasting peace in the region in which all peoples would coexist, free from acts of terrorism or subjugation.

Despite the political and military changes which the region has witnessed, especially in the last few years, beginning with the Israeli aggression against the PLO in Beirut, Lebanon in 1982 and the Israeli raid on Tunis against the PLO headquarters in 1985, the Palestinian people has continued to struggle and to cling to peace in pursuit of preparing the climate in the region and internationally for a just and peaceful solution.

The PLO has made good progress along this path in very important stages:

- The Arab summit in Fez which was held in 1982 and in which all the Arab parties, including the PLO, chose the peace option with Security Council guarantees and under the auspices of international legitimacy. These decisions were reaffirmed in Casablanca in 1985.
- The Geneva declaration regarding the international conference on Palestine in 1983, which reaffirmed the right of all states in the region to exist within safe and internationally recognized borders, including the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on its land and to establish a Palestinian state.
- The Palestinian-Jordanian agreement of 11 February, 1985, which dealt with the specifics of the special relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and which set down their adherence to a single line and a shared vision of goals and means.

- Continued adherence to the framework of an international conference on peace in the Middle East, to be attended by the USSR, the US, and the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the other concerned parties in the region, including the PLO.

And, in the framework of pursuing a just and peaceful solution, and given the PLO's struggle by all legitimate means to regain the established national rights of the Palestinians as well as their political freedom, the PLO condemns all violations of human rights, especially the right to life and security without discrimination on the basis of creed, gender, or color.

As an impetus to the efforts which have been exerted to convene an international peace conference, the PLO announces its criticism and condemnation of all acts of terrorism, whether they be those in which states become involved or those committed by individuals or groups against the innocent and defenseless, wherever they may be.

The PLO reaffirms its declaration issued in 1974 which condemned all operations outside [Palestine] and all forms of terrorism. And it restates the adherence of all its groups and institutions to that declaration. Beginning today, the PLO will take all measures to deter violators.

In view of the fact that this adherence cannot be achieved unilaterally, it is up to the international community to force Israel to stop all of its acts of terrorism both inside and outside [Palestine].

In this context, the PLO stresses its insistence upon the right of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation of its land by all available means, with the goal of achieving withdrawal from its land. For the right to resist foreign occupation is a legitimate right, not abrogated by the UN Charter, which calls for disavowing the use of force or threatening to use it to settle conflicts, and which considers the resort to force a violation of its principles and goals. The right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation in the occupied territories has been stressed in numerous UN resolutions and in the rules of the Geneva Convention.

Events underline the certainty that terrorist operations committed outside [Palestine] hurt the cause of the Palestinian people and distort its legitimate struggle for freedom. From another perspective, these events deepen our conviction that terminating the occupation and putting limits on its policies is the one way to achieve peace and security in the region. The PLO implores all peace-loving powers in all parts of the world to stand beside it as it takes this step to participate in ridding the world of the phenomenon of terrorism and in freeing the individual from fear and protecting him from danger. For in the end, our goal is achieving a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace which will safeguard the affirmation of the enduring national rights of the Palestinian people in order to establish a safe society everywhere.



**RESOLUTIONS OF THE TENTH SESSION OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE,  
MARRAKECH, MOROCCO, 22 JANUARY 1986 [EXCEPTS]**

The Jerusalem Committee held its tenth session in Marrakech in the Kingdom of Morocco on 21-22 January 1986 at the invitation of His Majesty King Hasan II, King of Morocco, chairman of the fourth session of the Islamic summit and chairman of the Jerusalem committee at the request submitted by Yasir Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. The Purpose of this session was to discuss the dangers facing the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque following its invasion by a group of Israeli Knesset members under the protection of the Israeli police with the aim of allocating a piece of the mosque for Jewish workshop.

The committee approved a proposal by His Majesty King Hasan II to hold its next session in April 1986 to see which of its recommendations has been implemented. The committee confirmed the importance of following up the implementation of the resolutions of previous Islamic conferences on Jerusalem, primarily the resolution of the third Islamic summits, the Palestinian and Jerusalem ses-

sion concerning Jihad in all its forms and the implementation of the Islamic action program for confronting the Zionist enemy. The committee discussed two action papers submitted by the delegations of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine, and exchanged views on them. Then a small drafting committee was formed from the meeting which drew up the draft recommendations which have been approved by the committee which read as follows:

1. To consolidate the principle of Islamic solidarity with the people of Palestine. This requires the ending of differences and conflicts between Islamic States and the direction of all Islamic efforts and capabilities to the liberation of the first of two qiblas and the third holy mosque [Jerusalem].
2. To devote the 31 January sermon in all mosques to exposing the Zionist plans and practices that are aimed at the destruction of the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque the Judaization of the holy city, and the changing of its Arab and Islamic nature.
3. To stop work for a definite period throughout the Islamic world on 3 February, in protest against the Zionist violations of the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and the noble al-Haram al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and as an expression of the Islamic nations solidarity with the heroic resistance waged by the Palestinian masses in occupied Palestine in defense of their homeland and holy places.
4. His Majesty Hasan II agreed to the committee's proposal to contact his Holiness the Pope, the Orthodox Church and the other Christian churches in order to adopt an effective attitude to confront the Zionist violations in holy Jerusalem and occupied Palestine.
5. To address messages from His Majesty King Hasan, chairman of the Jerusalem Committee to the heads of the state of the permanent members of the Security Council the presidency of the OAU, and the presidency of the EEC in order to inform them about what is happening in holy Jerusalem, Hebron, and the rest of the occupied cities and territories in Palestine, in the form of continuing Zionist aggression against the holy places; to draw their attention to the seriousness of this deterioration situation which exposes world peace and security to grave danger and to urge these states to put pressure on the Israeli authorities in order to stop these aggressions and to obey international resolutions issued in this respect.
6. To entrust the ICO secretary-general with the task of contacting the UN secretary-general the OAU secretary-general and the secretary-general of the UNESCO in order to make effective efforts to halt the Israeli practices and violations of the sanctity of the holy places in occupied Palestine, and in Jerusalem in particular.
7. On the basis of the proposal of his Majesty King Hasan II, chairman of the Jerusalem Committee and chairman of the ICO, the meeting sends an appeal signed by the Islamic states to the permanent members of the Security Council His Holiness the Pope, the Christian churches, and the international organizations, strongly warning against the consequences of the continued Zionist violation of the Islamic and Christian places in Palestine, especially in holy Jerusalem and the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque, and the lack of recognition of the firm national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people- a challenge to the feeling of believers all over the world – warning against the hatred and hostility among believers in the heavenly religions which would threaten world security and peace the consequence of such aggressive policies.
8. The information organizations of the Islamic countries, in coordination with the permanent Islamic committee for information and cultural affairs should launch a broad information campaign in Islamic countries and among international public opinion circles to expose the Zionist schemes and practices which are aimed at desecrating and demolishing the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and Judaizing the honorable shrine of Ibrahim and the rest of the holy places in Palestine, and stressing the firm Islamic stance to the effect that the issue of Palestine and Jerusalem is the first cause of the Muslims, and moreover that a just peace in the Middle East will be achieved only by the withdrawal of the Israeli enemy from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the fulfillment of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state in Palestine, with its capital in Jerusalem, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
9. To continue to support the struggle of the Palestinian people at all political, military, economic, and information levels, in order to enable them to consolidate effectively their steadfastness on the soil of their homeland and their resistance to the Zionist occupation and its racial, arbitrary, and colonialist measures in occupied Palestine, especially Jerusalem.

10. To demand that the Islamic countries hasten to cover the capital of the Jerusalem Fund and its trust in implementation of the resolutions issued in this concern, in order to enable the fund to give the agreed aid for consolidating the steadfastness and struggle of the Palestinian people.
11. To open the door to mass donations for the Muslims in general in order to consolidate the struggle of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and to demand that the capitals of the Islamic countries allocate financial aid to Jerusalem the capital of Palestine.
12. To support the joint efforts of the PLO and the Jordanian government toward preserving the Islamic shrines in occupied Palestine, especially in Jerusalem, maintaining the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque, and to praise the efforts of the Ministry of Islamic Affaires, Holy places and Religious Trusts in this concern.
13. To intensify the application of the Islamic boycott against the Israeli enemy in all the Islamic countries.
14. The participation of a number of foreign ministers who are members of the Jerusalem Committee and the ICO secretary-general in the discussion of the UN Security Council about the Israeli Violations of the holy Jerusalem mosque and the holy Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron, in order to express the united Islamic stance on this matter.
15. To form a subcommittee from the Jerusalem committee which would visit the Islamic countries in order to draw up the practical programs necessary for the implementation of all Islamic resolutions concerning the issue of Jerusalem and Palestine. This subcommittee should present a report about the results of its work to the Jerusalem Committee.
16. The Secretariat General is required to inform the member countries about the resolutions of the committee especially Articles 2, 3, 10 and 11 and to submit a report to the next session of the Jerusalem Committee.

At the end of its work the committee expressed its sincere gratitude and high appreciation for the continuous efforts exerted by his Majesty King Hasan II in defending the Palestinian cause and toward the liberation of Jerusalem. The members of the committee also expressed their gratitude and appreciation to the Moroccan people for their warm hospitality. Peace is our master.



**PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THREE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED  
TO AMERICAN AND JORDANIAN NEGOTIATORS, CLARIFYING THE PLO'S  
POSITIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AMMAN, 5 FEBRUARY 1986**

I.

In the event of the Palestine Liberation Organization is extended an invitation to attend an international conference with effective authority to devise a peaceful solution for the Palestine question and to settle the Middle East conflict, and in which the permanent members of the UN Security Council and concerned Arab parties would participate, then the PLO would agree to participate in this conference on an equal footing within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and on the basis of securing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination within a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as stipulated in the Jordanian-Palestinian accord signed in February 1985 and on the basis of implementing UN and Security Council resolutions pertinent to the Palestine question, including Resolutions 242 and 338.

In this context, the PLO reaffirms its condemnation and rejection of terrorism as confirmed in the Cairo Declaration.

II.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, affirms its steadfast belief that the peace process must lead to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East and guarantee the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination, within a Jordanian-Palestinian confirmation.

In light of its sincere desire for peace, the PLO expresses its readiness to negotiate within the framework of an international conference attended by the permanent members of the Security Council with all the concerned parties, including Israel, on the basis of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord ratified on 11 February 1985 and on the basis of UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestine question, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

In this context the PLO reaffirms its condemnation and rejection of terrorism, which was confirmed in the Cairo Declaration of November 1985.

### III.

The call for convening an international conference to settle the Middle East conflict and solve Palestine question must be sponsored by the United Nations in its capacity at the international institution established after World War II to put an end to the suffering of peoples, to prevent aggression, and to safeguard justice and respect for human rights. The Preamble to the UN Charter issued in 1945 stipulates the realization of international cooperation to settle international disputes and to secure fundamental human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.

Since the Palestine question is the core of our Middle East problems, the call to convene an international conference to resolve the conflict and establish peace in the region and to ensure the implementation of adopted resolutions and measures, the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and concerned Arab parties including the PLO on an equal footing within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation must be assured.

On the basis of the UN Charter, which affirms and determines respect for fundamental human rights and the right to self-determination of peoples, and on the basis of UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestine question and the Arab region, including Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO shall participate in the international peace conference in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people which is recognized (as such) on the Arab and international levels, and which has enjoyed observer status at the UN since 1974.

The participation of the PLO in the international conference shall be on the basis of securing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to the self-determination within a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as stipulated in the Jordanian-Palestinian accord signed in February 1985.

In this context the PLO reaffirms its condemnation in the Cairo Declaration of November 1985.



### **KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, ADDRESS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE, AMMAN, 19 FEBRUARY 1986**

*[This speech was made following the breakdown of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian peace initiative.]*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Fellow citizens, Palestinian brothers everywhere, Arab brothers:

I extend my greetings to you all. It is from you, from your public awareness, from my belonging to you, and from my loyalty to your aims and aspirations that I derive my ability to outline the salient features, as we perceive them here in Amman, of our primary cause, only some miles from Jerusalem. I seek guidance and assistance from the Almighty.

In the past few days, Amman has been the center of attention for much of the world, drawing media people and journalists from all quarters. News coming out of Amman was reported on the front pages

of world newspapers and occupied a prominent place in agency reports and news bulletins. But the content of these reports reflected mere speculation or expectations on the possible outcome of discussions held with us and with leading officials of our government by the Palestinian leadership while in Amman. Amman, along with concerned world circles, went through a period of expectation, but we preferred not to issue any declarations or communiqués until matters under intensive discussion, whether between us and the Palestinian leadership or among its own members, became clearer.

Now that measure of clarity has become apparent, I consider it my duty as well as my responsibility towards you, being in the thick of events and in the eye of the hurricane, to appraise you of the most recent phase of political endeavor with regard to our foremost cause: Palestine, its land, its holy places, its people, and their identity.

Dear brothers, before I turn to the details, and in light of obstacles and surprises which lay in store for us, exceeding our expectation when we first embarked on this chapter of political action, it would be well to remind ourselves that this was not the first round of political efforts on our part since the war of 1967. There were several previous endeavors to this end. These were:

1. Jordan's role in formulating Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967.
2. Cooperation with the United Nations secretary-general's special envoy, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, in his attempt to implement this resolution. This effort, which was coordinated with Egypt, produced no results.
3. Participation with Egypt in accepting the Rogers Plan of 1970 and attempting to secure its implementation. This attempt failed.
4. Participation in the international peace conference in Geneva in December 1973 and in subsequent efforts in 1974 and 1975 with the then U.S. secretary of state, leading to the disengagement agreements, first between Egypt and Israel, then between Israel and Syria. On our front, however, we were unable to arrive at a similar agreement.
5. Coordination with Egypt, Syria, and the PLO in 1976 and 1977 with a view to resuming the international conference with PLO participation. The attempt failed, as a result of President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.
6. A first attempt at coordination with the PLO, between October 1982 and April 1983, to arrive at an incipient bilateral formula which would form the basis of a larger Arab formula. This was conducted in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the PLO exodus from Beirut. The results fell short of our expectations.
7. A second attempt at coordination with the PLO, between the summer of 1984 and February 1986, on which I shall elaborate later.

This brief summary, brothers and sisters, shows that Jordan was either a party to various attempts to reach a just, peaceful, permanent, and comprehensive settlement or an initiator of political action toward this end.

The only initiative from which Jordan excluded itself was that leading to the Camp David accords, which it refused to join for reasons known to all. It is also evident that failure at any particular stage did not deter Jordan from joining or initiating subsequent action which held the promise of seriousness or sincerity. There were two reasons for Jordan's determination and consistent policy:

First, because Jordan believes in peace. As a member of the United Nations, it believes in resolving international conflicts through peaceful means and subscribes to peaceful coexistence among states on the basis of rights, justice, and equity as stipulated in the UN Charter and international law.

Second, Because of its immediate historical and geographical links with Palestine and the Palestinian cause; its observation of developments in the occupied territories, particularly in Jerusalem; its informed understanding of Zionist thinking as well as of Israeli plans seeking, on the one hand, to take advantage of current Arab disarray, weakness, and paralysis and, on the other, of Israeli military superiority based on long-range planning, persistent efforts, and vast, uninterrupted and stable material assistance.

Jordan recognizes the gravity of the danger inherent in the state of no war-no peace first and foremost to the Palestinian people and to Jerusalem, then to Jordan's own national security and, ultimately, to the Arab nation at large.

Brothers and sisters, if we are to remain content with slogans and generalization, the danger currently posed by continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories - as a Physical manifestation of Israeli expansionism supported by military might - can only become more menacing. The danger must be examined and analyzed in order to ascertain its extent and its various components. Only in this manner can it be removed from the sphere emotional speculation and be transformed into a tangible reality giving rise to a rational and serious will to thwart it.

For a variety of reasons, there is a need for a thorough airing of this question. The shared destiny of Jordan and Palestine requires it. So does the time factor, in view of the fact that the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights have been occupied for close to nineteen years. The situation is further aggravated by prolonged failure to find a solution and by the growing threat to the Palestinian's true identity resulting from the gradual displacement of the Palestinian people. One also has to consider ramifications with regard to Jordan, the region, and the world. In the final analysis, a people without its land is nothing more than a disjointed community.

Identity without a homeland is but a reservoir of sad memories. Our aim should be the land itself. Now, as at the turn of the century, the Palestinian cause is inseparable from the Palestinian land, which today is the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. This being the case, the Palestinian people steadfast on Palestinian territory are our primary concern. For a different reason, they are also the primary concern of the enemy. They are the major obstacle to the advancement of expansionist Zionist programs. Their legitimate resistance poses an overt challenge to claims by Israel and its friends and supporters, be they states or communities, that Israel is a free and democratic society, and places it as an open test for the world to hear and see.

Brothers and sisters, if most of us have so far failed to grasp these rudimentary facts, the enemy has not. It is on the basis of these facts that Israel's aim and policies were formulated from the very beginning:

to occupy the land of Palestine and expand the territory of Israel. The Israeli leadership's motives were twofold. Expanding Israeli territory through occupation of Palestinian and other neighboring Arab Lands would fulfill one of Zionism's cherished aims, while at the same time achieving, from their point of view, a security need arising more from psychological considerations than from those of space, distance, and topography, which Israel attempts to highlight whenever the security issue is raised.

The objective circumstances of its creation, in terms of time and place, lie behind Israel's psychological preoccupation with security. Unlike most of the third states in Asia and Africa which gained their independence in the wake of World War II, Israel was not a colony of an occupying state because it simply did not exist. Had this been the case, the battle for coexistence would never have arisen, since it would have been a foregone conclusion.

But because Israel was planted on lands expropriated from Arab's at a time when they were fighting for freedom, independence, and territorial integrity, the problem of Israel's acceptance by the large Arab body - and hence of coexistence - has loomed large.

Recognizing this, Israel tried to impose itself by force, thus embarking on vicious circle. The more force it used to impose itself, the greater the Arab qualms and rejection, which in turn served to fuel Israeli fears growing from an awareness of its recent imposed creation in the midst of a vast sea of Arab's and, consequently, to trigger security concerns. Had security been a purely military matter, the Arab's would have had greater need to seek security guarantees in the context of peace discussions, given Israel's vast arsenal of sophisticated weapon and its strategic alliance with the United States.

This fact was brought home in the wake of the aggression of 1967, when, through acceptance of Resolution 242 in 1967 and 338 in 1973, neighboring Arab countries also accepted Israel's existence. Instead of reciprocating this major concession, Israel procrastinated in order to gain time to create new facts in occupied territories as a prelude to annexing them.

The Israeli leadership has persisted in its claim that it was not convinced either by Arab assurances regarding its borders - assurances growing out of Arab acceptance of international resolution pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict - or by the fact that the Arabs were prepared to arrive at a just and durable peace with Israel. In order to impose its will by force, Israel continues to hold on to the concept of security based on territorial expansion and military strength.

The crux of the problem lies in the fact that while claiming not to be convinced by Arab assurances as to its security, Israel insists on rejecting the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights.

On the question of territorial expansion, Israel has had to face two problems.

First, that of perpetuating the occupation, with intent to expropriate and gradually absorb territory. Military strength was the obvious means of dealing with this problem.

Second, that of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories who succeeded, through their steadfastness, to press their cause on the agenda of international bodies, headed by the United Nations, where the affirmation of Palestinian national rights and their restoration was the subject of a large number of resolutions. The Palestinian issue has remained the subject of debate at every successive UN session, as well as in various international conferences and regional organizations, gaining or losing importance depending on global circumstances and concerns.

Given a state of affairs which enabled it to prolong its occupation of Palestinian territory through military strength, notwithstanding the will of the international community and Palestinian resistance, Israel proceeded to define its next goal of separating Palestinians from their land. For this purpose, Israel perceives the Palestinians as two peoples: a people on the outside with little weight, as far as Israeli designs on Palestinian territory are concerned, because they have already been separated from their land; and a people on the inside who constitute the real dilemma and are the primary enemy, precisely because of their physical presence on the land.

The question for Israel is how to effect a separation between the land and those Palestinians. For this purpose, Israel has adopted an integrated approach along two parallel lines: first, to expropriate the land gradually by settlement and other means; second, to exert pressure on the Palestinians in order to uproot them from their land.

These two lines of approach are the backbone of Israel's policy on the Palestinian issue. However, it has become clear to Israel, after nearly nineteen years of occupation, that while it has made some progress on the first issue, it has met with little success on the second, mainly because of the steadfast attachment of the Palestinians to their national soil and the measures and policies we have implemented in Jordan to foil Israeli objectives - administrative measures as well as economic, financial, educational, and informational policies.

The result of it all has been a major political dilemma currently dominating the political scene in Israel, preoccupying all political forces there. What should Israel do with the Palestinians, especially since their continued existence on their land, coupled with resistance to occupation, has created new tensions in addition to those already prevailing between Israel and the Arab states? These new tensions, which are a product of occupation - cum settlement, transcend the conventional occupation and directly affect the occupying state by bringing it face to face with the issues of human rights and democracy.

They touch upon Israel's international image and its very future. This poses the following question for the Israeli leadership: How is Israel to behave toward the Palestinian people in the occupied territo-

ries at a time when it has almost completed the annexation of (that) territory? Does it allow them to remain there or does it throw them out? If it allows them to stay, does it offer them the right of Israeli citizenship? Or does it adopt the apartheid model of South Africa?

If it is to evict them, how is that to be accomplished or justified? If it is to grant them citizenship, what is to happen to the concept of a pure Jewish state as envisaged by the founders of Zionism? Will world Jewry continue its support for Israel if it becomes a binational state? If Israel treats the Palestinians along the lines of apartheid, how will it handle the democratic image vaunted by its supporters? How is it to reconcile its stance as the protector of persecuted Jewry while persecuting others who, despite all Israeli attempts at concealment, are in fact the legitimate owners of the land?

These are the vital questions currently under discussion in the corridors of Israeli politics at party and government levels. As we see it, they lead to three Israeli options.

The first argues for the annexation of the greater and less densely populated part of occupied Palestinian territory and the return to Jordan of the remaining and more densely populated segment. It is referred to as the Jordanian Option, which we have rejected. The second option calls for annexing all the territories and granting autonomy to the Palestinian inhabitants, without sovereignty over their land, on the grounds that they are large foreign community living on Israeli territory. This is an attempt to separate the Palestinians from their land as a prelude to their eviction when conditions may permit. The Palestinians have rejected this option and so have we. The third option demands the annexation of territory and the eviction of the inhabitants to the east by military force. This prospect, however, does not lend itself to mere rejection but requires much preparation on our part to ensure that it does not happen.

It is important to note, first, that each of these options is rooted in two considerations: the inescapable shared destiny of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and the separation of the Palestinians from their land: and second, that the third option, dependent on military force, is of a more recent nature than the other two. It surfaced during the last Israeli elections, and its proponents have seats in the Knesset today. It is gaining momentum, coloring current Israeli politics with an extreme right-wing hue. It has recently found an enthusiastic ally in the American Right, which believes that the Israeli Right is capable of protecting its interests and acting as a potent force in an Arab region torn by division and intellectual strife and plagued with inaction. The growth or decline of this movement in Israel depends on several factors, of which we, the Arabs, are perhaps the most important - depending on our level of awareness, the positions we take, and the course of action we adopt.

It is not time we, and particularly our Palestinian brothers outside the occupied territories, whatever their affiliation, drew the proper conclusions and directed our attention to the land itself and the people living on it? It is not time we identified the real issue and agreed to define the most immediate threat? Should we not come to a proper realization of the importance of steadfastness of the Palestinians in the occupied territories in their battle for survival? Is it not the Palestinians who, through their stubborn steadfastness, are carrying out the historic task of preserving Palestinian identity and embodying national Palestinian rights on Palestinian soil?

What should we do for a people who, despite all organized pressure to uproot them, persist in tilling the soil, reaping harvests, and raising their children as best they can? If we are sincere in claiming that they are our foremost concern, what should we do for them? How do we reciprocate their marvelous steadfastness, they whose splendid resistance has proved day after day and year after year that a persecuted person who resists in his homeland is far better than a displaced one who threatens and postures? How should we support a people who, through their continued, distinctive existence on their land, endow their cause with vitality and justice?

What should we do for Jerusalem and the holy places which we mourn night and day? Will our earnest supplications lead to their rescue? Will they be protected by our constant glorification of their history and architecture? What are we really doing for Jerusalem and the holy mosque, or for the land and peo-

ple there, other than supplying some material help, which is decreasing every year, or ringing slogans after meetings or conferences, or well-turned phrases in communiqués, or the gist of argument and disagreements between conflicting groups, or messages of despair emanating from Arab disarray?

You may well share with me the question of where the Palestine issue would have been today, or of what could have happened to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, if we in Jordan had chosen to sever our connections with them or relinquish our obligations toward them as individuals or institutions, or set up barriers to their produce or commodities. What would lie in store for us all if we were to step aside and content ourselves with mere posturing?

Brothers and sisters, because the third danger or third option, like the first and second, aims at resolving the Israeli dilemma at the expense of both the Palestinians and Jordan, Jordan has a special role to play, quite distinct from those of the other Arab countries.

While it is true that Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt share a geographical contiguity with Israel, Jordan is the prime target of Israel's step-by-step policy. Thus, the distinctive relationship between Jordan and Palestine is not a question we take lightly. We bring it up in order to draw attention to objective facts and conditions which the enemy attempts to exploit for the purpose of implementing its expansionist policy at the expense of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. The common links between the two peoples are not only a matter of shared history, experience, culture, economy, and social structure, but also a question of destiny. They represent a confluence of interest as well as of harm.

If Israel seeks to utilize it to its own benefit at our expense, then we too should resort to all national means, emanating from our responsibility to the nation and future generations, of bending our shared destiny to our benefit while we are facing these clear Israeli plans. I do not believe we need to elaborate on the true intent of the special Jordanian-Palestinian relationship to our Arab brothers. It is not a condition we created in order to set up an axis of forge a means for separate action. It is a fact recognized and taken into account by the entire world, just as it is by the enemy. We hope that our Arab brothers will heed it too and take it into their own account in the process of formulating positions or planning their actions.

Joint Jordanian-Palestinian action growing from this special relationship should be construed as initial movement in the service of common Arab action. In the final analysis, any progress represents progress on the joint Arab level, which cannot be achieved without complementary between Jordanian-Palestinian action on the one hand and common Arab endeavors on the other.

The Palestinian people in the occupied territories are weak without the PLO. No the same token, the Palestinian people and the PLO, which represents its aspirations, hopes, and interests, are weaker without Jordan, and all three are weaker without the Arab nation as a whole. This has been our vision in all our endeavors. The components are as clear as the sun; and the position we occupy vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue on the one hand and the Arab world on the other provides us with no alternative vision. In Jordan we stand in two circles at once: one representing the Palestinian tragedy and the other residing in national commitment. This has dictated our position on direct confrontation with Israel on military and political levels.

One facet of our conflict with Israel perhaps lies in the fact that Israel is attempting to dislodge us from the circle of national commitment into the sphere of tragedy. On our part, we are resisting this with all our might, attempting in the process to endow the circle commitment with content which is both practical and effective. National commitment is not a one-way street, nor is it a passive or negative stance. Armed with true content, it leads to proper preparation and action. If national commitment is taken to mean a state of inaction in regard to declared positions and is characterized by fatalism, dependence, or expectancy of what lies in store, this would mean only one thing to us: acquiescence in the fait accompli, as well as willing acceptance of the loss of what remains of Palestinian land of the resulting destructive consequences allowing greater room for expansionist Zionist designs.

It is for this reason, dear brothers, that Jordan had to act and must continue to act. We cannot possibly close down borders and deal with the issue as separate from us. Experience has shown that inaction leads to erosion in positions, as well as on the ground. The state of no war-no peace which has been imposed on us is a salient manifestation of this inaction. We must break out of its grasp. We must absolutely assert that the suffocation resulting from giving in to the state of no war-no peace is as reprehensible as the suicide arising from action leading to the relinquishing of rights. As we move towards peace, we reject the latter proposition as strongly as we do the former.

Fellow citizens, Palestinian brothers, Arab brothers,

This, then, is the way we view the Palestinian issue, its ramifications, and probable developments. Our understanding is rooted in a sense of realism but is also committed to our goals and is informed by the requirements of Jordanian and Arab security in equal measure.

Our obligations to Palestine, our policies, positions, and our actions are all based on this view. As I indicated earlier, it was natural and reasonable, in light of the conflict and its possible ramifications, to direct our efforts along two parallel approaches in order to achieve the objectives defined at the Jordanian and Arab levels: restoring the occupied territories and the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people within a framework of a comprehensive, just, and permanent peace.

The two approach were: a defensive approach, comprising a build-up of internal military strength and a promotion of development to the limits of available resources and capabilities; and an interactive approach, comprising political movement in all areas and at all levels.

At the level of building up our internal strength, our planning and implementation emanated from the following principles:

1. Optimal utilization of our capabilities as well as of our human and natural resources.
2. Integration of these capabilities with those of other Arab countries.
3. Strengthening the national fabric, rallying our people around two courses of defensive and interactive action, and deepening their commitment to a defined and united goal.

In line with these principles, we have completed three development plans since the June war of 1967, and we are about to embark on the fourth. The plans have achieved a number of objectives deemed essential to the strength of the state. These included: a revitalization of the economy, badly damaged by the June war; building up infrastructure, such as roads, dams, canals, and housing complexes, as well as energy, water, and communications networks; utilization of natural resources; expanding education and training; setting up specialized cadres at all levels; and providing the facilities required for food security.

Side by side with the implementation of successive development plans, we moved to strengthen our armed forces, which are the basic cornerstone in the defense of our nation and state. We modernized the forces and provided them with arms and equipment, keeping abreast, to the extent possible, of rapid technological development. We established new military divisions and absorbed an increasing number of officers and men, raising the numbers to over a hundred thousand - one of the highest in the world as compared to the size of the population. In short, although shouldering major and clear responsibilities toward our own well as well as Arab security, we did more than our human resources would permit. We have always looked to our Arab brothers for assistance in securing our needs for advanced weapons in order to bring our armed forces to the highest level of preparedness, our people having provided the regular army with the largest possible number of recruits.

In addition, we are training as many citizens as we can to act as a supportive reserve for the armed forces. To this end, we enacted the National Service Law, which has been applied with the utmost precision to all our young men who fall under its provisions, providing us with considerable reserves. We have also begun to set up the People's Army, which will eventually encompass all the kingdom's

regions, cities, and villages. Our objective is to achieve the highest level of defense capability leading to a fusion in Jordan - the prime target of Israeli expansionism - of army and people into one.

In brief, this what we have accomplished at the level of the defensive approach, out of the conviction that we should build up our strength in order to foil attempts at separating the Palestinian people from their land and to protect Jordan and the Arab East.

It is our hope that our brothers who contributed in the past to arming our armed forces will renew their commitment to providing us with the weapons we need from international sources. Their contribution would be sincere embodiment of the integration of Arab efforts and capabilities. It would also be a fitting translation of the slogans raised by all with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict into action.

I might take this opportunity to make a quick comparison between the amount of military assistance received by Israel in the form of grants and loans from the United States during period 1979-85 and that received by us in the face of clearly perceived danger and well-known pressures. Out of the allocations for arms purchases approved at the Baghdad summit over seven years ago, Jordan has received a total of \$2.5 billion, compared to \$12.5 billion received by Israel during the same period, in addition to its own production of military equipment.

As for the second, or interactive, approach, which comprises political action at all levels, we have moved, and are still moving, along three fronts: the Palestinian front; the Arab front; and the international front.

As I have already noted, the Palestinian front represents the cornerstone of Jordan's external, internal, and Arab policies. This is both axiomatic and irrefutable. For in addition to our national, religious, and moral commitment to Jerusalem, to the holy places, and to the Palestinian people and their homeland, we have a responsibility towards our own national security.

Over the past nineteen years, we have pursued action on this front in four distinct phases, each yielding a basis for movement, thus, we now have four bases which, taken together, constitute the framework of our political movement towards our defined objective: achieving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and restoring the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in return for a permanent, just, and comprehensive peace in the region. These bases are:

1. Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which affirmed the principle of Israeli withdrawal in return for peace. This resolution is now the basic cornerstone, enjoying international unanimity, for achieving a just and peaceful settlement. It emphasizes the principle of balance in any projected settlement. For the settlement to be permanent. It must be generally acceptable, and to be that, it must be equitable. History, particularly modern European history, is replete with examples of inequitable settlements which proved to be no more than time bombs triggering further conflict between states and nations. And the element of equitability, or balance, in Resolution 242 resides in the principle of withdrawal in return for peace. Jordan not only participated in securing this resolution but has supported it since its adoption.
2. Security Council Resolution 338 in 1973, which reaffirmed Resolution 242 and introduced a new principle, namely that of negotiations between the parties concerned aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement, but under appropriate auspices. As we understand it, appropriate auspices means an international peace conference in which all parties involved in the conflict would participate, including the PLO, in addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The international community affirmed that appropriate auspices meant an international conference, by setting up the precedent of the Geneva Conference of 1973. We do not believe that that event was a mere coincidence, since the balance of negotiations between the conflicting parties was in favor of Israel, which is the occupying power with a vast arsenal of advanced weapons at its disposal. This gave it an undue advantage over the Arab parties, and by extension, the ability to persist in its occupation and impose its will. This is particularly relevant; since Israel's declared opinion is

at sharp variance with the concept of an equitable settlement. Given this situation, it was imperative that a new framework be sought to rectify the existing inequality and enable the conflicting parties to embark on negotiations on an equitable basis. The framework is none other than an international conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council would participate, since it was from the Security Council that Resolutions 242 and 338 emanated, enunciating the principles of an equitable settlement, and since the Security Council is the international body responsible for interpreting the various resolutions and guaranteeing their implementation. Thus, Resolution 338 established the second basis: that of negotiating under the auspices of an international conference. Again, Jordan has supported this resolution since its issuance in 1973.

3. The Rabat Summit Resolution of 1974, which considered the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This resolution was adopted twenty-seven years after the partition resolution, ten years after the establishment of the PLO, and seven years after the occupation by Israel of the remaining Palestinian territories and the adoption of Resolution 242. We accepted this resolution and we remain committed to it. In this respect, it constitutes the third basis of our political movement towards our defined objective. We believe it is especially important to emphasize this point before we proceed to shed some light on the important past and present implications of the resolution related to the course that the Palestinian issue has taken, on the one hand, and its present states on the other. Twenty-seven years before the Rabat resolution, at the time of the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Palestine partition resolution, the Arab governments had taken a position stipulating, first that the Palestinian issue was an Arab issue, and second, that the Arab governments rejected the partition resolution because it was rejected the partition resolution because it was unjust inequitable and injurious to the Palestinian Arabs.

It was due to these considerations that the Arab states went to war against Israel when its creation was declared in 1948. Since that time, the Arabs, both those who were then independent and those who have since gained independence, have held fast to this position, namely that they assumed the responsibility with regard to the Palestinian issue on the behalf of the Palestinians. The West Bank then entered into a union with Jordan as a result of declaration by the majority of Palestinians there. In April 1950 the union was supported and ratified by an elected parliament with equal representation from the East and West Banks. The Gaza Strip continued under Egyptian administration until Israel occupied it and the West Bank in 1967. It is appropriate here, I believe, to call to mind that the unity declaration by the elected Jordanian parliament emphasized that all Arab rights in Palestine be protected and that those rights be defended by all legitimate means to the fullest extent without prejudice to the final settlement of Palestine's just cause. The PLO was established in 1964 for the political purpose of regulating the Palestinian voice under one organization which would speak for it with the purpose of keeping the Palestinian issue alive in the world arena and for the declared purpose of liberating Palestine. The Palestine to be liberated ranged from the whole of Palestine to Palestine as delineated by the partition resolution. The matter was left to the deduction and interpretation of Arab speakers and listeners alike. The significance of setting up the PLO as a way station was that the Arab government at the time wished to reaffirm that the Palestinian issue was an Arab issue while the Palestinian people had a say and a role to play in the struggle for liberation.

This decision represented the first turning point in the Arab position between 1947 and 1964. In other words, the PLO was established not with the purpose of giving the Palestinians an exclusive say, but to include the PLO, in its capacity as a representative of the Palestinian people, in Arab positions and action vis-à-vis the Palestine issue, as a means of keeping it alive. This was confirmed in the years immediately following the establishment of the PLO, when it had no significant weight in matters pertaining to the Palestine issue, since the Arab states continued to hold the reins and make decisions at will. The PLO itself was a tool issued by this or that Arab state on the basis of its political positions, whether at the Arab or international levels. When the June war erupted the PLO was still a form almost devoid of any real content.

But in the wake of the June war, Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation experienced rapid growth, with the result that form and content became one and the PLO came to embody the resistance to occupation and the struggle for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Thus the PLO rejected

Security Council Resolution 242 because it dealt only with occupied Palestinian territory and not with the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. Because of our keen awareness of Israel's expansionist aims, it was natural that we should accord priority to restoring the territories occupied by Israel through war. Likewise, because of our sincere commitment to the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, we tried, along with Egypt, to persuade the PLO to separate the two objectives of our political action in the international arena. This separation would call for an attempt by the Arab states whose territories had been occupied through war and were the subject of Resolution 242, to ensure Israeli withdrawal from these territories, while the PLO would continue to fulfill its role of representing the Palestinian people in their struggle for legitimate national rights above and beyond the mere withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories.

The PLO, however, rejected this line of thinking, as it had rejected Resolution 242, and proceeded to make this dual rejection a basis for its political stand on the Arab and world scenes. It also became the basis of its dealings with Jordan in particular, on the grounds of the following suspicions: first, there was the probability that Jordan might succeed in restoring the West Bank by virtue of its good relations with the West, which had influence over Israel; second, Jordan had territorial ambitions in the West Bank; third, as long as the possibility of Jordan's restoration of the west bank existed, who would guarantee that Jordan would relinquish the territory thus restored to the PLO?

It is to be noted from this position, which is based on suspicion, that, at the time, the PLO was not fully aware of a basic fact emphasized by us and borne out by events, namely that Israel gave the utmost priority to territorial gain. It was also evident that the PLO based its dealings with Jordan on suspicion rather than trust.

In order to dispel PLO suspicions, we proposed in 1972 the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom which would lay the foundation for the future relationship between Jordan and Palestine. That proposal was nipped in the bud, as it was rejected by the PLO, by Israel, and by President Anwar al-Sadat, who served diplomatic relations with Jordan in support of the PLO position. I should add that under President al-Sadat, Egypt had changed its policy of coordination with Jordan pursued by his predecessor, the late President 'Abd al-Nasir, since the June war of 1967.

The PLO persisted in rejecting any separation between the role of the Arab states in attempting to restore the occupied territories, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, and its own role of representing the struggle of the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights. And in 1974 at the Rabat summit, the Arab states was unanimous in confirming this rejection, by deciding to regard the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In view of Arab insistence shown at Rabat, we gave our approval despite a detailed presentation on our part of the negative repercussions on joint Arab action that would result from such a decision. Regardless of the manner with which the decision was received in Palestinian and Arab circles at the time, or of the resulting position achieved by the PLO on the international scene, or of our own commitment and adherence to it, a probing look at the decision in the context of the Palestinian issue, reveals the following:

- a) The question of the restoration of the occupied territories and the national rights of the Palestinian people came to be merged into one whole as a result. In other words, the Rabat decision came to reflect the unanimous view of the Arab nation that the Palestinian issue should be resolved in toto. Mere termination of the effects of aggression was no longer an issue. As a result, the role of the PLO was to represent the Palestinian side in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Eight years later the Arabs emphasized this by adopting what is now known as the Arab Peace Plan at the Fez summit in 1982.
- b) The Arabs who had assumed responsibility for the Palestine issue in 1947 changed their position in 1974 by regulation a major part of this responsibility to the PLO.
- c) The merger of the question of rights with the issue of withdrawal from the occupied territories and the involvement of the PLO in the manner I have outlined did not simplify the problem as anticipated. On the contrary, the process led to a further complication as Israel proceeded to add the PLO question to the other complicated questions surrounding the Palestine issue. It raised questions on the PLO Charter, On PLO actions outside the occupied territories, and on degree to

which the PLO was a true representative of the Palestinian people. The net result was the defense of the PLO gradually replaced the basic issue which was the liberation of occupied Palestinian territories. Perhaps the most salient evidence of this was that since 1974, no joint communiqué to which the PLO or an Arab state was a party, no speech or declaration by a Palestinian or Arab official, no resolution on the Palestinian issue by a regional or international organization in whose work there was Palestinian or Arab participation, was enunciated or adopted without an express assurance that the PLO was the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Things got to the point where the PLO, legitimate rights, and territory became one, or came to be regarded as synonyms of the Palestine issue. Some Palestinians went as far as regarding the PLO to be the land and the rights, and considered themselves at one with the PLO. There was an ensuring confusion of priorities- the land no longer enjoying the highest priority or being regarded as the key to the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

- d) The PLO did not in fact achieve the independence of action intended by the Rabat decision. Because its composition was based on a coalition of several organizations, most of which had connections with and loyalties to Arab and non-Arab states, it remained open to outside interference. It is imperative that we keep these facts in mind as we speak of the Rabat resolution- the third basis of our political action.
4. The fourth basis emanated from the Arab Peace Plan adopted at the Fez summit in 1982. Its importance derives from several considerations. For the first time, the Arabs had unanimously chosen the peace option. The PLO which participated in the summit as a representative of the Palestinian people, agreed to the plan. The plan itself reflected a responsible and serious Arab position aimed at achieving a peaceful and equitable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The question for all Arabs was no longer one of terminating the effects of aggression but of resolving the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital within the framework of a peaceful and comprehensive settlement. More important still, the Fez resolutions accepted the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, through without making an explicit reference to it. As is well known, I headed the seven-member committee set up by the summit, which traveled to Paris, Moscow, Beijing and London in 1982 and 1983. During our discussions with leaders and officials there I stressed the need for an international peace conference. World capitals welcomed the Arab Peace Plan because it demonstrated Arab sincerity in the search for peace. But the countries concerned perceived it as only a general framework, lacking a plan of action which would help give it the dynamism required for progress toward desired objectives, especially since the plan had allocated a distinctive role to the PLO. As I indicated in my speech to the Casablanca summit on 7 August 1985, there is no problem regarding the participation of Jordan and Syria in the peace process. The problem resides in paving the way for participation in that process by the PLO with the other parties as a representative of the Palestinian people in order to give the Fez resolutions the practicality of a workable plan. These, then, are the bases constituting our position with regard to the concept of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue, namely: Security Council Resolution 242, Security Council Resolution 338, the Rabat summit resolution of 1974, and the Arab Peace Plan, which embodies in one form or another the other three bases, with some additions pertaining to the national rights of the Palestinian people.

Sisters and brothers,

As you know, the Arabs unanimously adopted the Fez plan on 9 September 1982, only days after the departure of the PLO from Beirut in the wake of Israel's savage invasion of Lebanon, during which Israelis used many of the most advanced lethal weapons at their disposal. The invasion and its aftermath triggered a wave of international sympathy for the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. Growing even stronger after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, it produced an international feeling of urgency about the need to resolve the Palestine issue and put an end to the plight of the Palestinian people. Concomitantly there surfaced albeit diffidently, an international, political insinuation in tune with the undeclared objections of the then Israeli government. The insinuation was that the PLO was weak, hence not indispensable to any peace process pertaining to the Palestinians. We recognized this as the next to the last link in the chain of Israeli plans to control the Palestinian will and impose a

settlement along the lines of declared Likud policies. We launched an immediate drive at Arab and international levels to warn against this, while reaffirming our support for the PLO. On 3 September 1982, we dispatched the chief of our royal court and our foreign minister to meet Mr. Yasir Arafat, who had left Beirut for Athens to reaffirm our support for the PLO, as well as our concern for its well-being, so that it could continue to fulfill its role towards its people and homeland.

In October 1982, we followed this with a political undertaking which engaged us in extensive talks with the PLO leadership aimed at reaching an incipient formula which could, with Arab support, become an Arab proposal incorporating the Reagan peace initiative and other international initiatives in accordance with the principles and purpose of the Arab Peace Plane adopted at the Fez summit on 9 September 1982. Those talks concentrated in particular on reaching a Jordanian-Palestinian formula defining the future relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. I reached a final agreement with Mr. Arafat on the text defining our joint future political moves within an Arab framework. However, the PLO Executive committee, which led its meeting in Kuwait in early April 1983, did not endorse that text, thus putting an end to our first joint attempt to initiate a comprehensive Arab political drive based on Arab consensus for a just and lasting peace.

On 10 May 1983, the Jordanian government issued an official communiqué concerning the subject in which it said:

In view of the results of the efforts we made with the PLO, and in compliance with the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, and through the strict observance of the independence of the Palestinian decision, we respect the decision of the PLO, being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, we leave it to the PLO and the Palestinian people to choose the ways and means for salvaging themselves and their land, and for the realization of their declared aims in the manner they see fit.

We in Jordan, having refused from the beginning to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, we neither act separately nor in lieu of anybody in Middle East peace negotiations.

Jordan will work as a member of the Arab League, in compliance with its resolutions, to support the PLO within our capabilities, and in compliance with the requirements of our national security for the sake of Palestine and the Arab East.

Further contacts between Jordan and the PLO ceased except within the framework of the Joint Committee for the Steadfastness of the Occupied Territories. The PLO became consumed by its internal differences, which resulted in the departure of the Palestinian leadership led by Arafat from Tripoli, Lebanon on 20 January 1983. This was followed by attempts at reconciliation between the parties of the Palestinian coalition within the PLO, and between the PLO and other Arab states. It was then that the problem of convening the seventeenth PNC appeared particularly the question of where to hold that meeting.

In early September 1984, a member of the Palestinian leadership met with me and conveyed to me that the PLO hoped to convene the PNC in Amman. I welcomed their request.

On 27 September 1984, I received Mr. Arafat, accompanied by other members of the PLO leadership at al-Nadwah Palace in Amman. During our meeting, Mr. Arafat expressed to wish of the Palestinian leadership to convene the PNC in Amman. We officially notified him that Jordan welcomed such a convening.

On 22 November 1984, I opened the seventeenth session of the PNC by delivering a speech which contained our assessment of prevailing Palestinian conditions and our conclusion that we needed to move politically outside the status quo of no peace-no war, which only helped to advance expansionist Zionist designs and posed serious dangers to the Palestinian issue, the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian land, as well as a consequent threat to Jordan's national security. We proposed to the PNC members our view of future cooperation, should the PLO decide to work with Jordan to reach a joint Jordanian-Palestinian formula, and I said the following:

Let us be frank about your scared. It holds the same interest for us as it does for you and its repercussions affect us as they affect you. The international position at large is one that perceives the possibility of restoring the occupied territories through a Jordanian-Palestinian formula. This requires commitments from both parties, which the world deems necessary for the achievement of a just, balanced, and peaceful settlement. If you find this option convincing- recommended further by our ties as two families linked together by a united destiny and common goals - we are prepared to go with along this path and present the world with a joint initiative for which we marshal support. If, on the other hand, you believe that the PLO is capable of going it alone, then we say to you: Godspeed, you have our support. In the final analysis the decision is yours. Whatever it is, we will respect it because it emanates from your esteemed council, which is the representative of the Palestinian people.

I also pointed out in that speech the general guidelines which would constitute the framework for our proposed initiative. These were:

1. Security Council Resolution 242, of which I said:

The existing facts in the Palestinian, Arab, and international arenas require us to adhere to Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for a just and peaceful settlement. The principle of territory for peace is the landmark which should guide us in any initiative we present to the world. This principle is not a precondition but a framework within which negotiations will be carried out. As such, it is nonnegotiable. Negotiations we deem necessary within the framework of an international peace conference should revolve around the means, methods, and commitments which would guarantee the achievements of the principle of territory for peace.

2. The international conference, of which I said:

The international conference would be held under the auspices of the United Nations and would be attended by the permanent members of the Security Council and by all the parties involved in the conflict. The PLO would attend on an equal footing with the other parties, since it is the party empowered to address the most important and momentous aspect of the Middle East crisis, namely, the Palestinian dimension.

3. A formula defining the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, of which I said:

Organizing the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is a basic responsibility of the Jordanian and Palestinian people. No other party has the right to interfere or decide for them.

Brothers and sisters,

The PNC ended its meetings in Amman having provided an opportunity for our brothers in the occupied territories to view its deliberations on issue which bore directly on their existence and future. Their hopes were revived, and delegations representing them began to arrive in Amman, urging us and the Palestinian leadership to reach a common formula which could rally Arab and international support behind it. We left the Palestinian leadership to choose the path it wished to follow.

In January 1985, we received the reply that the PLO Executive Committee had chosen to work with us on our proposal for joint political action. We started our consultations with Arafat's envoys on the third general outline - the Jordanian-Palestinian formula - since this formula constituted the base from which we were to move on the Arab and international arenas to convene an international peace conference.

In February 1985, Arafat, accompanied by other members of the Palestinian leadership, arrived in Amman. An expanded meeting was held in al-Nadwah Palace, which was concluded by the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, known as the 11 February Accord. This accord incorporated the following principles:

1. Territory in return for peace, as established in UN and Security Council resolutions;
2. The right of self-determination for the Palestinian people: Palestinians will exercise their inalienable rights of self-determination when it becomes possible to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine;
3. Resolution of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with UN resolutions;
4. Resolution of all aspects of the Palestine question;
5. On this basic, peace negotiations will be conducted under the auspices of an international conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties involved in the conflict will participate, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint delegation- a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation

Our assessment, which was also shared by the PLO, was that the accord constituted the beginning of collective Arab action to be followed by rallying the international community, which had become a mere spectator since the signing of the Camp David accords and which had only paid polite lip service since the initiation of the Arab Fez Peace Plan.

We envisaged the Jordanian-Palestinian accord as one of the links in the chain of collective Arab efforts, providing a mechanism for the Arab peace plan while paving the path for facilitating the PLO to engage itself in the international effort aimed at establishing a just, permanent, and comprehensive peace.

As soon as the accord was announced the wide international interest in the cause of peace in the Middle East reemerged after a period of dormancy. More light was shed on the Arab peace principles, which became a central theme of discussion. The accord became the focal point of discussion both regionally and internationally. In other words, life was again breathed into the peace efforts after they were nearly buried in the grave of no peace-no war. The Palestinian people's hopes of salvation, particularly those under occupation, were revived.

The accord became a mover for the peace process because of the principles it contained. These were:

1. The accord's affirmation of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in accordance with the UN charter;
2. The accord's conformity with the principles of the Arab Peace Plan, derived from United Nations resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian problem in particular;
3. The agreement between Jordan and the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to form a confederation between Jordan and Palestine.

This last item, while it reflects the objective considerations which require close institutional links between Jordan and a free Palestine to the mutual benefit of their peoples and the Arab nation at large, provides the key, or mechanism, to the peace process for two main reasons.

First, it justifies PLO participation in the proposed international conference within joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Since confederation is the ultimate objective, why not have the two parties concerned assume one of the confederation's functions before it is established as a reality on the ground, particularly since this function allows for the participation of the PLO in the international peace conference, which in the past decade has posed one of the most difficult obstacles in convening an international peace conference?

Second, it lays the foundations for a responsible role for the PLO in realizing and safeguarding a just settlement through its links with Jordan, the sovereign state which enjoys credible international standing due to its serious and sincere efforts to achieve peace.

Dear brethren, after signing the 11 February accord and the agreement of the PLO Executive Committee, which was empowered by the PNC to arrive at a joint formula with Jordan, we embarked with the Palestinian leadership upon drawing up a plan for our proposed action. Two objectives were defined for this purpose:

1. To rally international support for the convening of an international peace conference, to be attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties involved in the conflict. This conference would be convened under the auspices of the United Nations and called for by the UN secretary-general;
2. To ensure that an invitation will be extended to the PLO, representing the Palestinian people to attend the conference within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Before embarking on our joint action, we needed to ascertain the position of the states concerned regarding the above-mentioned objectives. Our inquiries indicated the need for us to move on four fronts:

1. The Arab world, so that Arab position could be shifted from making public statements to marshaling, coordinating, and organizing the elements of the Arab potential to serve this cause through continuous and conscientious efforts. Our dialogue and our Arab brothers was conducted through bilateral contacts as well as collectively when Arafat and I jointly explained the dimensions, motives, foundations, and objectives of the 11 February Accord at the Casablanca Arab summit conference in August 1985.
2. On the international front, in order to stimulate the interest of peace in the Middle East by reiterating the seriousness of our undertaking and the credibility of its expected results. Except for the two superpowers, which had their own calculations, our joint efforts on the international arena was well received and encouraged, whether the UN secretary-general, regional organizations like the EEC, or the other three permanent members of the Security Council. Our dialogue with many states was achieved through bilateral contacts, either separately by the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the PLO, or through joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations which visited Beijing, Paris, the Vatican and Rome when Italy was the president of the European community. We had also planned for a joint delegation to visit London in October 1985.
3. The Soviet Union in an attempt to change its position regarding the international conference, since it held the position that only the two superpowers should participate in the conference and not all the five permanent members of the Security Council. There was also the issue of Palestinian representation at the conference in accordance with the Jordanian-Palestinian accord, to which the Soviet Union objected. Several contacts were made with Soviet officials aimed at explaining how the Jordanian-Palestinian accord could be employed to revitalize the peace process and requesting the Soviet Union to receive a joint-Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in Moscow. However the Soviet Union did not change its position despite our repeated attempts. On 9 November 1985, in a meeting held at al-Nadwah Palace we reiterated our firm position to hold an international conference.
4. The United States, which is close to the Israeli position. A special effort was therefore needed with the U.S. side since, without the participation of Israel, the party in occupation of Arab territories, there could be no international conference. And since there were no direct channels of communications between the United States and the PLO, Jordan undertook the responsibility of dialogue with the United States, but in consultation with the Palestinian leadership. When we first briefed U.S. officials on the accord and explained it to them, it became evident that we were facing a problem with the Americans on two points: the principle of convening an international conference, and the PLO's participation in this conference as a representative of the Palestinian people. It also became evident that the U.S. position on these two objectives to a large degree reflected the Israeli position. It was clear that our dialogue with the United States would require a major and concerted effort. In the fact of these realities and facts, we began our difficult endeavor, which lasted one year and to which I referred earlier in my speech as the second phase of our coordination with the PLO leadership. This was the last chapter of our diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive, just, and permanent peace.

Brothers and sisters,

In this last part in this last part of my speech I shall describe to you the important features of every phase of our efforts during this last year. In order to clarify the picture for you, a reference to three facts must first be made.

1. Every round of talks between us and the U.S. administration was always preceded by consultation with the Palestinian leadership followed by further briefing and reassessment with that leadership.
2. Our discussion with the U.S. administration in every round of talks dealt with two separate issues, the issue of the international peace conference, and the issue of Palestinian representation through the PLO.
3. When we started these discussions with the U.S. administration in February 1985, there was already another topic under discussion relating to Jordan's request to purchase U.S. arms. This issue was started at the end of the Carter presidency, and continued through the Reagan presidency. Jordan adopted a very definite policy regarding this when we started our dialogue to revive the peace process. This position stipulated that there should be no linkage between the U.S. arms deal to Jordan- a bilateral issue- and the peace efforts, which has an international dimension.

Throughout all our meetings with the U.S. officials, we focused on two issues, as I mentioned earlier. However, during the period between the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord and September 1985, we concentrated our attention on the issue of Palestinian representation and the means to ensure the participation of the PLO in an international conference. I shall now review chronologically the stages pertaining to this issue.

We had agreed with the PLO leadership from the outset on the need to emphasize the concept of Jordanian-Palestinian partnership while dealing with the Palestinian dimension on the background of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. On this basis joint delegations visited world capitals, as I mentioned earlier. They also planned to visit Moscow and Washington. Moscow declined to receive the joint delegation, in keeping with the Soviet Union's position vis-à-vis the 11 February Accord. Washington, however, while not refusing the accord, did not endorse all its principles. Therefore, the need to concentrate on the United States became apparent to us, just as the need to concentrate on the Soviet Union became apparent.

We agreed with the Palestinian leadership on the following procedures for joint action:

1. We asked the U.S. administration to start a dialogue with a joint Jordanian Palestinian delegation composed of Jordanian government officials and members chosen by the PLO.
2. After this dialogue, the PLO would declare its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
3. If this took place, the United States would no longer be bound by its previous position not to conduct any talks with the PLO before the latter's acceptance of the two pertinent Security Council resolutions. Thus, the United States would recognize the PLO, a meeting between U.S. officials and members of the PLO could be held in Washington to discuss the issue of a peaceful settlement, and relations between them would be normalized.
4. As a result of the normalization of U.S.-Palestinian relations, a major political obstacle blocking the Arab Peace Plan, which gave an important role to the PLO, would have been removed. Arab efforts could then be channeled to pursue the efforts with the United States and other countries to convene an international peace conference.

After agreeing on this procedure with the Palestinian leadership, we accordingly contracted officials in the U.S. administration at the end of March 1985 and presented them with the idea of meeting a joint delegation in preparation for the next two steps which would follow as a result of the meeting.

In early April 1985, we received the U.S. reply which, in principle, accepted this proposal, provided that the Palestinian members of the joint delegation were not leading members of the PLO or any fida'iyyin organization.

We consulted with the Palestinian leadership which provided us with the names of three candidates. The Americans refused them because they did not meet their criteria and asked that we provide them with the names of others who did.

In May 1985, we met with the U.S. secretary of state in Qaba, who reiterated the administration's position regarding the subject of the names. However, he did not exclude those who were members of the PNC.

The U.S. side expressed its government's doubt about the PLO's intentions and its government's fears that if the suggested meeting were to take place between a U.S. official and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, a meeting after that would not be followed by the PLO's acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the PLO would obtain a political weapon as a result of its member's meeting with the American official. The U.S. government would then be left to face criticism and political troubles resulting from this in the U.S. arena. Thus, the serious political efforts would end at that point.

Our prime minister conveyed this recent U.S. stand to Yasir Arafat in a meeting held at the Prime Ministry on 18 May 1985. At that time, we were preparing for a visit to Washington. In order to remove the U.S. fears, the prime minister agreed with Yasir Arafat on the text of a press statement which we would make at the end of our talks with the U.S. president.

The statement which I made at the White House garden on 29 May 1985 says: I also asserted to President Reagan that, on the basis of the Jordanian agreement with the PLO signed on 11 February, as a result of the talks which I recently held with the PLO, and in view of our sincere desire to achieve peace, we are determined to negotiate to achieve a peaceful settlement within the framework of an international conference on the basis of the related UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The U.S. officials affirmed during my talks in Washington, their position regarding Palestinian participation in the joint delegation. They limited the number to four: two from the occupied territories and two from the outside. They requested that we provide them with these names in advance and as soon as possible so that the U.S. administration could make its decision at the appropriate time.

Upon our return to Amman in June 1985, we conveyed to the Palestinian leadership our discussions in Washington. They, in turn, accepted this proposal and promised to provide us with the names of the candidates as soon as possible. We waited until 11 July 1985, when some names were provided to us. We were then told that a meeting of the PLO Executive Committee and the Fateh Central Committee had discussed this subject and had agreed upon the names of the candidates.

On 12 July 1985, we relayed a list of seven names to the US administration and waited for the administration to inform us of its approval of four of the names on that list. We agreed that no public announcements should be made on this issue. But a few days later we were surprised when the world press began to discuss those names. Suddenly the issue turned into a U.S. political issue. The press began to discuss it and the Zionist lobby activated influential political institutions in opposition to it, culminating in pressure on the U.S. administration to justify, defend, and finally retract its position. As a result, we received American approval of only two names from the list, instead of four: one from the West Bank and the other from the Gaza Strip. After inquiries, we were told by the U.S. officials that the administration was still not sure that the PLO would fulfill the second phase of the agreed scenario, namely, to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

On 15 August 1985, a meeting was held at our prime minister's residence in Amman attended by the prime minister, the chief of the Royal Hashimite Court, the minister of the court, and the foreign minister from the Jordanian side, and Yasir Arafat, accompanied by Khalil al Wazir, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and Muhammad Milham from the Palestinian side. During that meeting, the prime minister again asked Arafat whether he was clear on the method of proceeding, particularly with regard to the second phase- PLO readiness to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Arafat reaffirmed his acceptance of all steps and arrangements agreed upon between us, including the PLO's readiness to accept the above mentioned resolutions.

In light of Arafat's reply, we informed the U.S. administration that the suspicions it had on this subject were not justified and that we were awaiting their positive reply concerning the date of the meeting between U.S. officials and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

On 7 September 1985, we received the U.S. reply, which said that it was not possible to hold the meeting, thus terminating this scenario before the first step, originally expected in June, was taken. This came at the time we were preparing for a visit to New York, to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, and Washington, to discuss bilateral issue and the peace process with the U.S. administration.

Assessment of the situation prior to the visit led to believe that we could pursue our dialogue with the United States by concentrating this time on the second phase of the process, the international conference, since not much progress had been achieved on the issue of Palestinian representation. Our reading of the U.S. position led us to believe that further discussions could take place on that other issue, which was last discussed in May 1985. I mentioned earlier that from the beginning, our dialogue with the Americans had dealt with two issues separately: Palestinian representation and the international conference, with emphasis on the subject of Palestinian representation.

I will now turn to our efforts on the second issue, the convening of an international conference. In May 1985, in our discussion with the U.S. administration in Washington, we raised the issue of convening such a conference because we considered it to be the venue for all parties concerned to meet, including the PLO. The U.S. position was a flat rejection on an international conference. Instead, the United States proposed that after the PLO was brought into the peace talks, a meeting should be set up between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, under the auspices of the United States, to be held in a U.S. city. Upon learning this, we decided to cut our visit short and reaffirmed to them our definite and unequivocal rejection of seeking a unilateral approach similar to that of Camp David in the negotiations.

The U.S. administration then changed its position and proposed that the talks could be held in the United Nations in Geneva. Once again, we informed the U.S. administration that we rejected this proposal, like the one before it, as we did not see that the problem was one of where the talks should be held. We reiterated that Jordan's unwavering position was that it sought to reach a comprehensive settlement through the convening of an international conference attended by all the parties to the conflict, including the permanent members of the Security Council. As a result, the U.S. administration reconsidered its proposal and promised to ponder seriously the issue of convening an international conference. We accepted this and continued our discussions concerning the issue of Palestinian representation.

During talks in Washington in October 1985, we again raised the issue of an international conference after having proposed it to the administration prior to our departure for the United States. Meetings were held between Jordanian and U.S. officials in Washington. The United States submitted a proposal concerning the international conference, which, after careful examination seemed to suggest a conference in name only. We, on the other hand, insisted that the conference should have clear powers.

Among the various U.S. suggestions was the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the conference only after it restored diplomatic relations with Israel, because this was an Israeli condition. We argued for the rejection of this approach for the following reasons:

1. An international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union would be a flawed conference.
2. If the reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the conference was that it had no diplomatic relations with Israel, which is a party to the conflict, the United States on its part does not recognize the PLO, which is equally a party to the conflict. Thus, in this regard, the Soviet Union and the United States were in the same Position.
3. It would be futile to plan seriously to convene an international peace conference if any party had the right to place conditions on who could attend. This applies to the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as the parties involved in the conflict. Therefore, it was imperative that an invitation be extended to Syria, the PLO, and the Soviet Union to attend the conference if the peace process was to continue and the efforts for a just and comprehensive peace were to produce fruitful results.

After the extensive discussions lasting three days, the United States accepted the following points which we proposed:

1. The UN secretary-general would issue invitations to an international conference under UN auspices.
2. Invitations to attend the conference would be issued to the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, in addition to the parties involved in the conflict.
3. Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 would form the basis for the international conference.
4. The Americans held the position of requiring acceptance by the PLO of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, since these formed the basis for the convening of the international conference. We agreed to this understanding on the basis that Arafat had himself agreed to this last August.

We continued our intensive discussions with the U.S. administration concerning the powers of the conference and we insisted that it should be a conference in name only but rather that it should be one that was effective and had a clear mandate. Despite prolonged discussions, we did not reach a final understanding with the U.S. administration regarding this issue. We agreed to continue our discussions on this central point, and considered that what we had agreed upon constituted a basis from which to proceed. While we were still in Washington, the cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism began with the Lamaca incident, followed by Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis. This had a negative effect were once again jeopardized by fears and suspicions.

Upon our return to Amman in October 1985, we informed the Palestinian leadership of what we had accomplished during our talks in Washington. We informed them that the PLO would be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in order to be invited to the international conference, to accept the principle of participating in negotiations with the government of Israel as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation within the context of the international conference which would be convened to establish a comprehensive settlement, and to renounce terrorism. We also informed the Palestinian leadership that our discussions with the U.S. administration regarding the question of the mandate of the conference were still inconclusive, and that further discussions would follow. We made it clear to the Palestinian leadership that a written statement of acceptance was needed for them while leaving them to choose the appropriate time to announce that approval. The written acceptance was needed so that we could encourage the U.S. administration to proceed earnestly to convene an international conference and to reassure them that the PLO was anxious to participate in the peace process. We had already made clear to the U.S. administration that Jordan would not attend the conference unless invitations were extended to the PLO, sister Syria, and all other parties involved in the conflict because we are after a comprehensive peace.

We also promised the Palestinian leadership that their acceptance would be kept confidential and shown only to the concerned U.S. officials until they themselves decided to announce it.

On 7 November 1985, after talks with the President Husni Mubarak, Yasir Arafat issued a statement in Cairo denouncing terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of its source. The PLO Executive Committee then held a meeting in Baghdad, and as we were not officially notified of its decisions, we awaited Arafat's visit to Amman to hear from him, once again, the final position of the PLO on Security Council Resolution 242.

Meanwhile, I made a private visit to London on 7 January 1986 for medical reasons. While I was there, the [U.S.] assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs [Richard Murphy] arrived in London with a U.S. delegation. He requested to see me to continue our decisions regarding the issue of the international conference. We held two rounds of talks in London, the first attended by the prime minister and the chief of the Royal Court on 18 January, and the second on 20 January, attended by the chief of the Royal Court. Throughout both meetings the discussion focused on defining the mandate of the international conference and the participation of the PLO, as both issues had become interwoven as a result of progress achieved in the peace process. The American position had developed to the extent of greenening to the right of the concerned parties to submit any disagreements between them to the conference. However, we could not reach full agreement regarding the role of the conference in settling disputes among the negotiating parties.

Concerning the issue of the PLO participation in the conference, the American delegation reiterated its previous position requiring that the PLO should first accept Security Council Resolution 242 in order for the United States to start a dialogue with it. The United States did not commit itself to accepting the inviting of the PLO to the conference. Our reply was that we wanted the United States to agree to have the PLO invited to participate in the conference if it accepted Security Council Resolution 242. This point became the subject of extensive discussions, during which I asked for a clear American position to relay to the PLO. The American delegation agreed to take this up at the highest level on its return to Washington.

On 21 January 1986, I returned to Amman having achieved these results on the issues of an international conference and the PLO participation. On 25 January 1986, our efforts bore fruit when I received a final reply from the U.S. administration concerning PLO participation in the international conference. Their reply came in a written commitment which said:

When it is clear on the public record that the PLO has accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism, the United States accepts the fact that an invitation will be used to the PLO to attend an international Conference.

The United States would then start contacts with the Soviet Union with the purpose of having them participate, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in the international conference, which would be convened by the secretary-general of the United Nations.

On the same day, Arafat arrived in Amman with a Palestinian leadership delegation. We held four extensive meetings in four days. I presided over three of these meetings. The discussion concentrated on the subject of American assurances and the PLO's position regarding those assurances. We assumed that the PLO would accept these since:

1. The assurances met the PLO's requirements;
2. They reflected a significant change in the U.S. positions in favor of the PLO. The U.S. position regarding the PLO when we first started our intensive years-long dialogue had been that the United States would only enter into talks with the PLO after the latter's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242. Now, by comparison, the present U.S. position was that it was willing to go one step beyond talking to the PLO by agreeing to have the PLO invited to the international conference.

But our brothers in the Palestinian leadership surprised us by refusing to accept Security Council Resolution 242 within this context, while acknowledging what they described as our "extraordinary effort," which had caused a significant change in the U.S. position and which would not have been possible had it not been for the respect, credibility and trust which our country, Jordan, enjoyed in this world.

In spite of this, we continued our discussion with the PLO leadership in the hope of convincing them that their acceptance would cement a very important link in peace efforts leading to an international conference, which in the unanimous view of the Arabs and all peace-loving peoples constitutes the major venue for the establishment of a comprehensive, permanent and just peace. It is towards the objective of convening such a conference that we have worked tirelessly for the past nine years, but to no avail. Now that the opportunity presented itself, we hoped that it would not be wasted like other missed opportunities if we were to remain faithful to our goals of saving our people and liberating our land and holy places.

The answer of the brothers in the Palestinian leadership was that they wanted an amendment to the proposed text in return for acceptance of Resolution 242. The amendment would require the addition of a statement indicating the agreement of the United States to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination within the context of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine, as stated in the 11 February Accord. We reminded the Palestinian leadership that the subject of self-determination within the context of a confederation was a matter for Jordanians and Palestinians and that no other party had anything to do with it. Nothing was to be gained from the

support of this or that state as long as we ourselves were committed to this text. The important thing was to achieve withdrawal first, then to proceed with what we had agreed upon. We reminded them that this had always been our position and that it had been clear all along, starting from my opening address in Amman at the seventeenth PNC session, in which I referred to the proposed Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, and continuing through all our discussions to date.

We also said to them that involving the United States, or others, in this matter meant that we were voluntarily opening the door to others to interfere in our common concerns and those of a people who had sovereign rights to their land and their own decision making-unless they were dealing with us on a basis of lack of confidence. But despite this, our brothers in the Palestinian leadership insisted on their position. And despite the fact that the most recent American position had satisfied PLO demands, we agreed to resume contracts with officials in Washington through the American embassy in Amman on the evening of 27 January 1986.

The American response was as follows:

1. The 11 February Accord is a Jordanian-Palestinian accord which does not involve the United States.
2. The United States supports the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as stated in the Reagan peace initiative.
3. The PLO, like any other party, has the right to propose anything it wishes, including the right of self-determination, at the international conferences.
4. For all these reasons, the United States adheres to its position.

We relayed the American response to Yasir Arafat during an enlarged meeting at al-Nadwah Palace on 28 January 1986, but he insisted that we try again. We indicated to him that we had gone as far as we could with the U.S. administration at that stage but he insisted. Thus, we got in touch once again, and the reply was still that the United States adhered to its position.

On the morning of 29 January 1986, an enlarged meeting we held at the Prime Ministry and I headed the Jordanian side. I informed Yasir Arafat and his party of the American position as reaffirmed to us once again. The meeting ended with a statement by Yasir Arafat saying that he needed to consult the Palestinian leadership. We asked him to give us the final answer on the PLO position with regard to Resolution 242 while he was still in Amman, although we had ascertained, only then, that the PLO's decision to reject Resolution 242 had been made during the meeting of the PLO leadership in Baghdad on 24 November 1985. We had not, however, officially been notified of that.

On the same evening, 29 January 1986, we received a suggestion from the U.S. administration to the effect that the United States felt that since the PLO could not presently decide to accept Resolution 242, the PLO could wait till a time it considered appropriate. The United States felt that the peace process could still proceed with Palestinian participation from the occupied territories. The opportunity would remain available for the PLO to take part in the international conference the moment it accepted Resolution 242.

In our reply to the United States, we rejected this suggestion indicating that this time the suggestions concerned not only the PLO but Jordan as well, since our unwavering position was: no separate settlement.

President Reagan wrote to me on 31 January 1986 explaining his inability to proceed in his efforts with Congress for the sale of sophisticated U.S. arms to Jordan.

We had sought to acquire the arms since 1979 in the face of fierce Zionist opposition. I had received assurances from the president that our requirements would be met.

On the evening of the same day, the minister of the court informed Yasir Arafat of the latest American suggestion to proceed with the peace process without the PLO until it met the set conditions. He also informed him of our categorical refusal of this suggestion and apprised him of President Reagan's letter explaining his inability to meet Jordan's requirements.

On 5 February 1986, the American side presented a new text containing United States approval to convene an international conference on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, including the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We met with Yasir Arafat on the same evening at al-Nadwah Palace and we handed him the new American text. He promised to study it and at the same time gave us three differently worded texts which were the same in substance, reaffirming the same PLO position which we had heard from the start of this round of meetings.

On 6 February, Yasir Arafat had a meeting with our prime minister at his residence. The meeting was attended by the chief of the Royal Court, and by ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahia and Hani al-Hasan from the Palestinian side. Arafat informed the prime minister that despite the positive development of the American position, recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people did not encompass the right to self-determination to which, the PLO insisted the United States ought to give its prior approval.

On 7 February, Yasir Arafat left Amman still insisting on his position and on the reasons why the PLO was unable to accept Resolutions 242. Hinging on this agreement, of course, was an immediate opening of an U.S.-Palestinian dialogue on the basis of which we would have continued our efforts to convene an international peace conference in which the PLO would be invited to participate as a representative of the Palestinian people.

Thus, another chapter came to an end in the search for peace. Another extremely important and significant round of Jordanian-Palestinian action was terminated- after a full year of a serious and persistent efforts to transform the PLO role, referred to in the Arab Peace Plan into a significant reality that would go beyond a mere statement of positions. It would have led to the presence and participation by the PLO in an international conference at the invitation of the UN secretary-general to represent its people and speak on their behalf with their adversary, under the eyes of the world, side by side with the other parties concerned and the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Yes, brothers and sisters, we have gone through a grueling year of intensive efforts and have faced a host of obstacles, in many instances exceeding the limits of our endurance. But we succeeded in achieving what had been felt to be impossible. We opened up avenues that had been considered closed to us and our Arab and Palestinian brothers. We were able to carry the Fez resolution to a point just preceding the international peace conference, for which it was called. Buoyed on the one hand by progress achieved in providing a real opportunity for peace and pained on the other, by impediments when we were so close to the finishing line, we have felt it imperative to give a full public account of the situation and once again turn the matter over to the Palestinian forums in the occupied territories and the diaspora, as well as Arab capitals and organizations.

Fellow citizens, Palestinian brothers, Arab brothers, this is the way in which we view the present status of the Palestinian issue within and outside the occupied territories. It is our analysis of developments in the context of the state of no war-no peace and their effect on the future of the Palestinian people, who are threatened with separation from their land. It is also an account of our joint action with the PLO leadership over a year of continuous effort aimed at moving the peace process, before it is too late, out of the debilitating sphere of inaction into the revitalizing realm of positive action. It was undoubtedly a precious opportunity to achieve our objectives and thwart enemy plans which are clear for all to see.

But if this phase of political action with the PLO has ended differently from what we had hoped for, the principles and tents of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord will continue to embody the foundations governing relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples with regard to equality of rights and obligations in facing our joint destiny.

Brothers, it has been my destiny to experience the various phases of the Palestine tragedy, as well as the results of the implementation of Zionist plans drawn up by forces which know that they want and carry out what they have planned, stage by stage. I have not seen or observed any emergence of the long-awaited Arab plan which would be capable of defending the most just cause of a brotherly and dear people who surely deserve better than their continued plight currently holds for them.

It has also been my destiny to carry out my responsibilities in an Arab county contiguous to the land of Palestine, which contains the remains of my ancestor Hashim in Gaza and which was blessed by the sojourn of my ancestor Prophet Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah- may God's prayers and blessings be upon him- whom the Almighty selected to inspire mankind and whom He sent to the first Qibla and Third Holy Place in Jerusalem, where my great-grandfather is buried - a great grandfather who sacrificed all in defense of the rights of the Palestinian people on their national soil and asked to be buried within the confines of the Holy Mosque - and also my grandfather, who moved to the defense of al-Aqsa Mosque in 1948 in the face of the most difficult circumstances which could confront a leader at the time. With me at his side, he felt, a martyr in the mosque which he had rescued.

As I see what goes on in Jerusalem, Gaza, Nablus, Hebron and other cities, villages, and camps in the west bank and at the same time observe what goes on outside, my heart turns heavy. I have no alternative but to apprise you of the facts. No one can expect anything but rejection on my part of the prevailing state of fumbling which I see all around us. No one can expect anything but frank disclosure from me. I will not be a party to concealment at to concealment at a most critical juncture in your lives. I am one of you, I belong to you all; I experience deeply every detail of our cause, the cause of all Arabs.

Next to my faith in God Almighty, I have faith in you and in your ability to direct the course to its proper path.

Brothers and sisters, after two long attempts, I and the government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan hereby announce that we are unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy. On our part, we know of no other way of fostering confidence than by truthfulness or of strengthening it than by clarity. For confidence is paramount in constructive cooperation.

As for you, brothers and sister, who stand tall under occupation, who remain steadfast in your ancestral homeland, who are the keepers of al-Aqsa, the site of the Prophet's ascension, who are the defenders of Jerusalem and the holy places, living symbols of the long history of the land of prophets and holy men and preservers of an identity which-God willing- will never be blurred or eased, to you, our Palestinian brethren in the occupied territories, I send my greetings, love, and appreciation. To you I renew my pledge that here in Jordan we will remain as we have been: brothers committed to your cause and supports in all you have to face. We will continue to support you, within our capabilities, with every available means. We look forward to the day when you will be free people on your own soil, secure and confident of your present and future, safe in your homes, and proud of the fruits of the your struggle and steadfastness.

God be my witness, I have conveyed the message.

God be my witness, I have conveyed the message.

God be my witness, I have conveyed the message.

From the Almighty, we draw support. Peace be with you and God's mercy and blessing.



**PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, STATEMENT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION,  
TUNIS, 7 MARCH 1986**

*[Official PLO response to King Hussein's speech (see previous document)].*

The PLO Executive Committee, with the participation of the Fateh Central Committee, has studied the current political situation from all its angles and dimensions. It has examined the new events and developments witnessed in the Palestinian and Arab arenas and the region. The most prominent aspect has been the U.S.-Israeli onslaught against the Palestinian people and their national rights and the PLO, and the confiscation of the national achievements realized by the Palestinian Arab people through their struggle and the scarifies.

The Executive Committee in particular reviewed the developments of the situation in the occupied territory. It examined with pride the unified, comprehensive, and strong popular position which has firmly resisted the Zionist occupation and Zionist schemes and conspiracies, and which standing up in principled and firm manner in the battle to defend its existence, fate, and freedom, stressing its complete rallying around the PLO - the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people - and stressing its adherence to national constant factors which have been approved by PNC sessions and to which the Palestinian leadership has become committed.

The Executive committee has also reviewed the course of the unification efforts which the PLO is undertaking with all Palestinian groups. It has studied the state of affairs in our Palestinian camps in Lebanon and the great popular steadfastness in the face of the deportation conspiracy, the fraternal and militant relationship with the heroic Lebanese people, and the escalation of resistance against Zionist occupation in southern Lebanon. The Executive Committee also viewed the reports submitted to it on all political activities by the PLO and its chairman in the Palestinian, Arab, and international fields.

In the Arab field, the Executive Committee followed with great interest the developments and the course of the Iraqi-Iranian war in light of the recent attack by the Iranian forces against the soil of fraternal Iraq, and the Iraqi Army's heroic steadfastness and its courageous confrontation of the recent attack. It viewed with great satisfaction the decisive results recorded by this steadfastness in protecting Iraqi Arab territory, the positive effects this would have for the entire region, and the objective opportunities it provides to put an end to the war and settle the dispute with peaceful means in a way that safeguards the interests of the Iraqi and Iranian people, the Arab and Islamic nations, and the Palestinian cause.

Reviewing the results of the Palestinian-Jordanian talks and the state of affairs and new developments in the region, the leadership examined the speech by His Majesty King Hussein on 19 February 1986 and the opinions contained in this speech. The Palestinian leadership sees that it is necessary to clarify the facts to our people and nation out of the PLO's keen desire to project the truth of its stand and to remove elements of distortion and ambiguity concerning a number of questions that were raised.

The PLO affirms the following:

1. The PLO at this time and this level does not see a need to return to the conditions which accompanied the representation of the Palestinian people during the stage which preceded the rise of the PLO in shouldering this national responsibility. In this connection, the basic definition of the right of the Palestinian people to choose their representative must be stressed. No one else is entitled to argue or debate this question.

The shouldering by the PLO of this national responsibility is manifested in its complete, firm, and strong from through the cohesion of the armed Palestinian resistance and the political organizational framework of the Palestinian people-the framework of the PLO. The PLO, as a result of this, and thanks to the struggle of the heroic Palestinian people and their supreme sacrifices, has become a dynamic embodiment of resistance against occupation and of the struggle to achieve the national inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, who have wrested this representation in the Arab and international arenas under the PLO.

The Rabat summit in 1974 came to reinforce this military reality, which was confirmed in resolutions by the United Nations and all its institutions and the resolutions of nonaligned, African, Asian, Islamic, and socialist countries and other friendly countries which recognized the PLO as the Palestinian people's sole, legitimate representative.

From the beginning, this representation would not have become a recognized political fact had it not been for the fact that the organization was an embodiment of the Palestinian national identity in all its dimensions and forms and an expression of the Palestinian national aspirations and aims, and because the Palestinian people have always affirmed in every way that the PLO is the national militant identity of every Palestinian. This fact has never contradicted, and will not contradict, the national dimension or framework of the Palestinian people, their cause, struggle, and destiny.

2. The Palestinian people's struggle, which is led by the PLO, is the achievement of all the sons of our Palestinian people inside and outside our occupied Palestinian land. Here, we should remember that the Zionist enemy would not have sent off all of its army to Lebanon to strike at the PLO bases, or its planes across the Mediterranean to Tunis to strike at the PLO bases there, had it not realized that the source of danger exists here just as does there, and everywhere the PLO and its militant people are present. Just as the Palestinian people's struggle and achievements are an indivisible whole, they cannot be transferred to others. This does not, of course, mean that our Palestinian people do not fully appreciate or are not fully grateful for all the Arab friendly contributions toward bolstering their just struggle to achieve their inalienable national objectives.
  
3. The attempts to separate the organization from the people, or the organization from its leadership and institutions, constitutes a futile attempt in the face of our great Palestinian people, who have gained experience in confronting challenges and conspiracies and who have affirmed with deep nationalist awareness their adherence to the PLO and its leadership, thus foiling all attempts to create alternative leaderships. In this our people recall the Algerian experience, in which the militant Algerian people succeeded in foiling the conspiracy aimed at isolating them from the Algerian Liberation Front at the height of the comprehensive national struggle against French colonialism. And just as the Algerian people raised the slogan "The people are the FLN and the FLN is the people," the Palestinian people today raise the same slogan: "The people are the PLO and the PLO is the people." This is the most convincing and deepest embodiment of the relation of the people with their cause, rights, leadership, and their national, independent Palestinian decision-making. This relation emanates from the commitment to liberate the land and the people, which are physically linked. On the great path toward this commitment, the blood of martyred leaders in various positions and battles mixed with the blood of the strugglers, men and women, from the sons of these great sacrificing people during the march of the people with their leadership, cadres, and bases. This march was conducted by waves of martyrs and blood streams on the road to liberation, victory, and return.
  
4. The unity of the struggle of the Palestinian people is an image of the unity of the people and cause. As a matter of elementary rule and principle, no one has the right to divide our Palestinian people into those who are inside and those who are outside, or into land and people, or people and organization, or organization and leadership, or into any other classification. The Palestinian cause is the cause of all the Palestinian people: it is their national cause and political right. Moreover, it is a cause of the relation between the people to the homeland and man to land, whether the Palestinian is in his homeland and on his soil, or exiled from his homeland and land.

Any partitioning of the Palestinian people or renunciation of their cause automatically means entering into the idea of an alternative homeland or homelands, an idea that carries with it a threat to the Palestinian question and the Palestinian people, and a threat to the lands and peoples of the proposed alternative homelands. Our brothers in Jordan realize that the danger of this conspiracy threatens them just as it threatens us. In this regard, the PLO is eager to point out that the idea of fragmenting the Palestinian people and their cause has been from the start a Zionist idea proposed by the enemy, from the beginning of Jewish immigration to Palestine and until the Camp David conspiracy with its Palestinian clause. Moreover, the idea of an alternative homeland is also an old Zionist idea which the Zionist leaders reiterate. The idea of an alternative leadership for part of the Palestinian people, especially in the West Bank and Gaza, is also a Zionist idea, which preceded the Village Leagues and will be proposed after these leagues. This remains a Zionist call and design.

Our people have stubbornly struggled and offered costly sacrifices in order to eliminate the conspiracy of settlement and alternative homelands. Historic testimony to this is still alive and decisive, facts about this are still there, and our people have been able to foil the conspiracy of settlement in Sinai, Jordan, the Syrian island (al-Jazirah), and the southern Lebanon. They are now rejecting with the same insistence and determination, the conspiracy of an alternative homeland once again, in fraternal Jordan, raising high their eternal emblem: Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinians; there is no

homeland other than it; and it is the land of the Arabs. From these premises which are considered of extreme importance and of delicate nature of the Palestinian people, the PLO is interested in clarifying its stand on the other issue being submitted concerning the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship, in its foundations and current line; the Palestinian- Jordanian joint move; the stand on Resolutions 242 and 338; and on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in the framework of the endeavor for a just and comprehensive settlement.

1. The PLO proceeds from its faith in the special relationship between Palestinian and Jordanian people, with all the precision that this expression contains. Hence the organization's eagerness to overcome any negative aspects in its relations with Jordan. The current line of Palestinian-Jordanian relations was renewed in the second half of the seventies by the visit of Brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir Arafat] and Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi to Jordan, by the joint committee stemming from the Baghdad summit, and the continuous meetings between the two sides.

The PLO has always been the one to initiate this, and its motivation for such initiatives has been a fundamental conception of the fateful and special relationship between Jordan and Palestine. The PLO wanted to deepen this concept by working for a new framework that would imbue the relationship with realistic substance and the necessary positiveness to face up to challenges and lay down steps for joint action.

The PLO's motivation was also the manifestation of a Zionist line openly calling for setting the Palestinian cause east of the River Jordan, the call for an alternative homeland. It was also motivated by the appearance of a second line: the effect that the settlement of the Palestinian issue must take place to the west of the river, in accordance with Israeli formulas that would be fulfilled at the Palestinian people's expense. This was expressed through conspiracies and attempts at imposing administrative self-rule.

The PLO saw that both calls represented a danger to Palestine and Jordan at the same time, and that the corrected solution must come through concerted Palestinian-Jordanian efforts within balanced relationships that would be able to constitute the core of a unified and effective Arab move. As a matter of fact, this foundational stage initiated by the PLO - with all its contacts, talks, debates or agreements - constituted the platform for all subsequent development of the relationship between the PLO and the Jordanian government. The concept - adopted by the PNC in its sixteenth session in 1983 and reaffirmed at the seventeenth session - of this special relationship and its future confederation-type framework was based on that serious Palestinian initiative. Furthermore, the political framework of this relationship has been based on the resolutions of the Arab summits beginning with the 1974 Rabat summit.

2. From this fundamental stage, the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship progressed during the period that followed the Zionist invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Everyone recalls that this stage witnessed the appearance of Reagan's plan, which the PLO rejected. A positive strategic transformation also took place at this stage on the Arab level, embodied in the Arab peace plan adopted by the Fez summit, through which a comprehensive Arab concept of the question of a just peace was submitted. The PLO viewed this Arab peace plan as containing an important political dimension, particularly since it enjoyed widespread world support.

The PLO at the time focused on the importance of establishing a relationship with Jordan on the basis of common destiny, to be solidified by an agreement on principles that would define the formula of the joint move based on the Arab peace plan, particularly following the suspension of work by the seven-member committee entrusted with carrying out efforts to implement the Fez summit resolutions. However the dissimilarity and the PLO on the Reagan plan - to which the Jordanian government responded positively - brought about differences of opinion on the objectives of the joint move. Thus, the stage ended without reaching any agreement.

3. Late in 1984 and at the beginning of 1985, a new stage was initiated which began with King Hussein's initiative of accepting to hold the PNC session in Amman. The results of the talks and the dialogue which took place between the two sides at the time were contained in the 11 February 1985 agreement, known as the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Action Plan, on the basis of this agreement, and within the limits of its provisions, a joint political plan of action was formulated to be carried out on the international level to create suitable conditions for the convocation of an international

peace conference in accordance with the Palestinian and Arab concept of the framework and prerogatives of this conference. The Jordanian side promised that it and its Arab brothers would exert their efforts with the United States to have it accept the formula of a just and comprehensive international solution. While the PLO was aware of the realities of the U.S. stand, and the U.S. intransigence toward it and toward the Palestinian people's national rights, it believed that this did not conflict with a Jordanian attempt to influence the U.S. stand.

For its part, Jordan carried out attempts in this direction lasting several months. The results of these attempts, as Jordan told the PLO, were that the U.S. stand continued to refuse to recognize the PLO and the Palestinian people's inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination; that it continued to insist on advance recognition by the PLO of Resolutions 242 and 338 and of the Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries; and that the PLO must announce the suspension of armed struggle in exchange for U.S. agreement to the PLO's participation in the international conference within a joint delegation. The United States also left the door open to Israel to reject all that it believed to be inappropriate or all that it saw as being in conflict with its interests.

4. The PLO has reiterated its public stand toward Resolution 242, which it rejected from the beginning because it ignores the core of the Palestinian problem, whether on the level of the land, people, rights or representation. The PLO explained that if it agreed to the resolution unaccomplished by the right to self-determination as the basis for an international conference to achieve a settlement in the Middle East, it would be agreeing to the striking of the Palestinian cause from the agenda of the international conference. The conference then would only deal with border issues. This resolution, which deals with the Palestinian cause as being a refugee problem, was explained in the Vance-Dayan statement in October 1977 as meaning that it deals with Palestinian and Jewish refugees.

The PLO stated that what is required, in accordance with international legitimacy, UN resolutions, Arab resolutions and the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement, is to solve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects. Such a solution cannot be achieved except through guaranteeing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in an explicit and clear manner, as has been the case with other peoples on earth.

The right to self-determination is a sacred right which is guaranteed by international conventions, particularly the UN Charter and has been acknowledged as a right of the Palestinian people by all the resolutions and statements issued by the United Nations, the Arab and Islamic summits, the nonaligned countries. The EEC also expressed support for this right in the Venice Declaration in 1980. The highest Christian authorities also supported it, as well as the European Parliament, and Warsaw Pact statements. From this premise the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and their exercise of this right are not merely an internal and bilateral issue between Jordan and the PLO but a firm, natural and sacred right which is being attained and entrenched through the huge sacrifices our people and making and through Arab world support for it.

The commitment of the Palestinian people and their leadership, the PLO, to the right of self-determination does not stop with the recognition of this right but extends to practicing it on the land liberated from occupation. The Israeli enemy, backed by the United States, is preventing the Palestinian people from exercising this right, not Jordan. Any Palestinian choice of the form of the relationship between the Palestinian state which emerges as a result of liberation and Jordan, or any other Arab country, will become an established fact when the right of self-determination is exercised on the land following the evacuation of the occupiers from it.

That is why the PLO insists that the right to self-determination must be one of the basic principles on whose basis the international conference would convene. This right must not be subject to disavowal, cancellation or bargaining. This basis on which the PLO insists is the only factor that guarantees a just and comprehensive settlement that will not bring about any injustice or prejudice to the Palestinian people in the diaspora or under occupation.

5. PLO rejects the U.S. understanding of the international conference, which contradicts the Palestinian and Arab understanding with regard to its framework and suggested prerogatives. The U.S. stand has remained confined to regarding it as a mere international umbrella for direct negotiations between the concerned parties. The PLO had rejected and continues to reject this, while affirming its stand on the need to adhere to the framework and prerogatives endorsed by the Casablanca summit for the international conference.

6. The PLO believes that the overall U.S. stand has sought to ignore the main points that the PLO is eager to establish, and which Jordan said it was eager to establish, to achieve a permanent, just settlement. More specifically, Washington has sought to ignore the Palestinian representation through the PLO, by refusing to recognize the Palestinian people's inalienable rights - foremost of which is the right to self-determination - and by refusing to provide an international guarantee for the justice and durability of any settlement that can be achieved. A careful reading of the contents of King Hussein's speech confirms that the United States had intended to delude the Palestinian people into believing that an opportunity for peace existed in return for the PLO's response to its demand to give fundamental concessions. This was the point of difference which is essentially a difference with the United States. On this basis, the PLO concentrated and planned that further steadfastness in the face of US prevarications and pressure was the sound course to obtain the necessary guarantees for achieving positive conditions for the settlement. But these positive conditions were not made available. The PLO expresses deep regret that King Hussein's speech, which concentrated on directing blame at the PLO, justified, in return, the U.S. stand. Instead of blaming the U.S. stand for foiling the move, the PLO was held responsible – a repetition of the stand which was previously announced regarding the joint delegation's visit to Britain. In fact, the PLO sees no reason to defend itself in this regard. However, it would be useful in this respect to refer to what was explained in the speech regarding the failure of all the meetings and initiatives in which Jordan took part and to which the PLO was not a party, starting with Jordan's acceptance of Resolution 242 in November 1967, the Rogers initiative, the Geneva conference, the disengagement of forces, and the Reagan plan. In all these cases, and others, the failure was due to the absence of U.S. credibility and Washington's permanent bias towards the Zionist enemy.
7. With regard to what has been said about the PLO's course and credibility and the allegation that it accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 in August 1985, it should be noted that the resolutions of the emergency Arab summit in Casablanca which was held at that time, affirmed the need to adhere to the Fez summit resolutions and regarded these resolutions the basis of the Arab and the Palestinian-Jordanian moves. They also affirmed the Palestinian people's inalienable rights. This contradicts that allegation, which fundamentally conflicts with the resolutions to which we adhered at Casablanca - which mentioned the Jordanian-Palestinian efforts conducted through the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement signed on 11 February 1985 - and which provided that this move be based on the Fez summit resolution and be within the framework of seeking to convene an effective international conference with the participation of the U.S.S.R., the United States, the permanent Security Council members, and the parties to the conflict in the region including the PLO, to achieve a just, permanent, and comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict and the Palestine question. According to the agreement at the time following the Casablanca summit, a meeting was supposed to take place between meetings was supposed to take place between a Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation and [U.S Assistant Secretary of State Richard] Murphy. Agreement was reached with the Jordanian government to draft and integrated program that included U.S. recognition of the PLO and the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, including their right to self-determination, as well as other political guarantees for the PLO, in order to convene the international conference in return for the PLO's acceptance of international resolutions including 242 and 338. However, as is known to everyone, the joint delegation's meeting with Murphy did not take place because the United States retreated from its promises to Jordan. How can our organization alone be asked to recognize Resolutions 242 and 338 while the United States refuses to recognize in return the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and refuses to provide all the political guarantees for the PLO which formed the crux of the talks with Jordan regarding the arrangement of the joint delegations meeting with the U.S envoy? Moreover, how can the PLO be held responsible for the retreat while the PLO has never accepted Resolution 242 without its being linked to all the UN resolutions and to the right to self-determinations, starting with what it agreed upon with Jordan on 11 February and ending with its current firm stand on this issue? There is no doubt that the responsibility for the failure rests with the US retreat and that it is the U.S. credibility that has always been doubtful. The PLO has fulfilled its promise to its people and its Arab nation. It has never retreated from struggle to achieve the Palestinian people's rights and has spared no sacrifice for the continuation of armed struggle and for seeking and political move that might achieve a just and lasting solution. Therefore, the real criterion for its credibility is its firm commitment to its people's right and its struggle for the sake of these rights.

8. What is being said about the mechanism of a solution and that the PLO does not care for priorities or for the restoration of the land is baseless. The PLO believes that its first and foremost goal is to achieve the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights. The restoration of the land is not merely a tactical option subject to priority calculations but a national goal to be achieved by the PLO side by side with its people and its Arab nation. The PLO also exerts every effort to mobilize all Palestinian, Arab, and international energies to achieve it.

It has been the destiny of the Palestinian people and the PLO to inherit a great and accumulated burden (for which others were responsible). The PLO also spares no effort to seek its brother's participation and to work with them to regain the land and holy places. If there is somebody who needs militant proof, we can say that the Palestinian national struggle, recorded with Palestinian and Arab martyrs' blood, is decisive proof that the land is the base. Although that land was lost at cheap price, our Palestinian people and our Arab nation are ready to liberate it at high price, namely, at the cost of many martyrs.

9. Regarding talk about the suffering of the people under occupation and about the issue of ending the sufferings by accepting the *fait accompli* and the time factor, as well as what is being described as the need to exploit the current opportunity, the PLO is concerned about clarifying matters that should be very clear. The foremost of these is the fact that the suffering of the Palestinian people should be viewed deeply, comprehensively, and objectively. It is suffering in which the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied land are unified. Those who are under occupation are suffering from the ferocity of repression, coercion, settlement, confiscation of land, and usurpation of the national identity. Those who are outside the land are suffering the pain of homeless, persecution, and siege.

The PLO will never allow and nobody has the right to agree to, partition [sic.] of the suffering of the Palestinian people, or to deal with this suffering far from its essence and cause - the Zionist usurpation of the Palestinian homeland and its complicated consequences on all levels. In light of this, the PLO, as well as the entire Palestinian people and the entire Arab nation are aware that ending the suffering of the Palestinian people will take place only by recognizing their inalienable national rights, foremost of which is the right to self-determination. Without this, what is being proposed will only be a soothing and partial solution that will increase, deepen, and double the suffering and give license to those responsible for it continue to impose that suffering in new contexts and under new titles, at the expense of the Palestinian people and their unity, destiny, land, holy places, and future.

10. Any hint that a settlement is ready, that there is real chance, or that all the complications of the crisis are resolved and that the PLO position is the last thing needed will be viewed in accordance with our information - including the Zionist and U.S. positions - as a distortion of facts and a simplification of matters, far from political logic and from accurate and correct calculations of the overall complicated situation in the Middle East crises. The United States, despite some people's efforts to stress a positive development in its stand, continuous to insist on granting Israel the right to oppose any peace proposals that do not suit it. It also insists that it will not exert pressure on Israel to accept even a minimally balanced solution. Instead, it continues to put pressure on the Palestinian, Jordanian, and Arab sides to submit to Israel's conditions, based on power calculations and arrogance.

The PLO is interested in clarifying that logically and particularly the issue of peace in the Middle East should not be subject to transitory opportunities or vague hints that are not based on clear-cut, firm foundations, especially since repeated experience with the United States, tangible facts, and King Hussein's speech prove that peace efforts have always reached a stalemate. Retreat from the U.S. pledges has become a U.S. characteristic. Hence, the PLO's insistence on providing firm bases for a just solution does not mean any haphazard intransigence, but - in essence and goal - it epitomizes a responsible move to crystallize just, real peace in which the Palestinian people's rights will be guaranteed, safe from changes, maneuvers and conspiracies.

Proceeding from this, the PLO, during the recent talks in Amman, submitted three formulas for giving momentum to talks on bringing about a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace for the Palestinian question and the Middle East crisis, but these formulas were rejected by the U.S. administration, as we were informed by Jordan.

From the premise of its national and pan-Arab stance, and in accordance with the PNC resolutions and basic Palestinian principles, the PLO strongly affirms its desire to realize a positive course for the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship because this relationship, with its background, horizons, and distinctive, should be kept away from fluctuations and transient changes. This rela-

tionship should be first and foremost in the interest of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples against the pressures and plots to which both peoples are subject. This is the basis of our view of this fateful, strategic relationship between the two peoples.

It is on its understanding of this fact that the PLO drew up its policy on its relations with Jordan and other Arab and non-Arab countries. It is on the basis of this understanding that the PLO is adopting stands and policies on all affaires pertaining to the Palestine question and the Palestinian people's rights. Many forms of suffering to which the PLO was exposed resulted from the PLO's adherence to its national decision making, on the basis of pan-Arab commitment. It had previously rejected, and continues to reject, all attempts to undermine this independence with the aim of ignoring our inalienable national rights.

In light of the above-mentioned facts, the PLO emphasizes the following:

1. From the position of its national and pan-Arab responsibility, the PLO continues its difficult and resolute struggle in all its forms, foremost being armed struggle, in order to achieve the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, including their right to establish their national, independent state whose capital is Jerusalem as a solid for a just and lasting peace in our region.
2. Taking pride in the solidity of the deep-rooted popular stance inside and outside the occupied territory - a stance which very strongly expresses the Palestinian people's adherence to their national rights and their full support for the PLO - the PLO promises the Palestinian masses and the Arab nation that it will continue to struggle in all arenas. U.S.-Zionist plotting and the forces and tools of pressure behind it will not prevent the PLO from keeping the national trust. The PLO's stance is in essence and strength derived from the Palestinian masses' stance, great steadfastness, and conscious insistence on continuing until the just national objective is attained.
3. The PLO, along with all Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory, calls on the Arab nation to assume its national and pan-Arab responsibilities toward the central issue of Palestine by providing all forms of material and moral backing for the Palestinian people's struggle under the PLO's leadership and for the Palestinian people's national rights as this is an Arab commitment.
4. While continuing its national struggle on all levels, the PLO takes pride in its firmly established alliances with the camp of friends as embodied in the stands of backing, support, and commitment expressed by international groupings such as socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and the nonaligned, Islamic, and African countries. It also realizes the importance of the positive development of the stands of several European countries. Therefore, the PLO will perseveringly continue to work to entrench these alliances and promote their scope and positive outcome on the level of our rights and national struggle.

The PLO, while taking pride and having confidence in the firmly established national unity of our great people wherever they are, reiterates its call to all Palestinian factions to meet within the framework of the PLO to enhance unity and close all doors through which our people's enemies are trying to enter and tamper with our firmly established national edifice and our unified and glorious national march.

Long live the Palestinian people's struggle! Long live Palestine, both free and Arab! Glory and immortality to our righteous martyrs! Revolution until victory!



**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 19<sup>TH</sup> ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING,  
MANILA, 23-28 JUNE 1986 [EXCERPTS]**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The Nineteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Manila from 23-24 June 1986, was formally opened by Her Excellency Corazon C. Aquino President of the Republic of the Philippines. [...]

WEST ASIA

78. The Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern over the deteriorating situation in West Asia. They reiterated their full support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination, independence and sovereign statehood, and the restoration of Arab sovereignty over their occupied territories. They continue to believe that the convening of an international conference on Palestine would offer the inappropriate avenue towards a just and comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and durable peace in West Asia. The Foreign Ministers renewed their appeal for an end to the tragic war between Iran and Iraq and for a just and honourable resolution of their conflict. [...]



**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND MOROCCO, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ,  
RABAT AND JERUSALEM, 24 JULY 1986**

*[The communiqué was issued in the wake of PM Peres' two-day visit to Morocco, during which he stayed at a royal guest house in Ifran and met the king three times. Arab states reacted negatively to the meeting. See also next document]*

His Majesty King Hassan II has, on July 22 and 23 of 1986, received at his palace in Ifran, Mr. Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of Israel. During the talks marked by frankness and devoted essentially to the study of the Fez Plan, the Moroccan Sovereign and the Israeli Prime Minister analyzed, in depth, the situation in the Middle East and the conditions, in form and in substance, likely to contribute efficiently to the establishment of peace in this region.

His Majesty King Hassan II gave a presentation of the Fez Plan, explaining his views concerning the merits of each of its elements and suggesting that this plan has the double merit of, on the one hand, constituting the sole document which is objectively valid as to serve as a basis for a just and durable peace and, on the other hand, being the object of an Arab consensus, in contrast with any other plan or peace proposal.

In his turn, Mr. Shimon Peres clarified his observations on the Fez Plan, putting forth propositions pertaining to conditions he deems necessary for the installation of peace.

As the meeting was of a purely exploratory nature, aiming at no moment at engaging in negotiations, His Majesty Hassan II will inform the Arab leaders, and Prime Minister Peres his Government, of the points of view developed during the talks.



**KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO, ADDRESS TO THE MOROCCAN PEOPLE, 24 JULY 1986**

*[In his televised address, the king explained the reasons for his meeting with Israeli PM Peres, arguing that contacts with Israel were not forbidden by the Fez Plan. See also previous document.]*

In the name of God. Blessings and greetings upon the messenger of God, his family and his companions.

Dear People,

As you know, we have just met for two days in Ifrane with the prime minister of the Israeli government. As soon as the news was known, the international news agencies informed us of the reactions, some of which were favourable and others hostile. Some of approved of our initiative and other criticized, even castigated it.

Before beginning my remarks, dear people, I want to emphasize how little I care about the criticism and the condemnation of some and the approval and blessings of others, because what interests me firstly, is your approval and your criticisms as well as the clearness of my conscience. It's only when my conscience is tranquil and I see, as always happens, that my people have understood me, that they approve of my line of conduct and approve of my steps, that I can apply myself to analysing the world reactions in a correct manner. Now you know that my conscience is yours and that my tranquility draws from your satisfaction.

So that you yourselves may judge if this was a good or a bad initiative, we are going to describe the history of the event, whose importance concern the present as well as the future.

I will not go looking into the distant past, dear people, at least not now - for this will be the object of the final part of my address.

There are two essential parts:

First of all, why this encounter?

Secondly, why did it take place at this moment?

For weeks and for months, I have been beset with thoughts. Until now, two important events have marked the recent history of the Arabs, since the grave setback undergone in 1967, this tragedy which made us lose the Sinai, the Golan, Gaza and the West Bank and - the summit of the disaster - holy Jerusalem. After that, the Arab unceasingly let forth groans, cries and lamentations until the day when, by the will of the Most High (Ramadan 1973) they, on the field of battle, demonstrated to the entire world and to their enemy that they are capable of striking blows, of awakening defiance, of struggling heroically, of dying a martyrs' death. God have mercy on our dead and our martyrs. After this event, the Arabs held two important meetings at Rabat and Fez.

In 1974, at Rabat, the conference of the Arab sovereigns and heads of state met and unanimously recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Among the Arabs, there were those who considered the consequences of this decision deplorable and others that greeted it gladly. Be that as it may, henceforth the Palestinian cause had a point of support, instead of remaining suspended between those in favour and those opposed, between fear and hope. The Palestinian people after that no longer had to wander in search of a representative a spokesman who would give voice to its claims and aspirations. Since that day, in effect, the Palestinian people has had a respected leadership recognized by most states of the world, with the status of observer at the United Nations, and a member of three large organizations: The League of Arab States the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned group.

With modesty, but not without a legitimate sense of pride - as it is recorded in the reports and the recordings of the meetings - I had already assumed, myself, your servant and your king, the primary role in bringing about the proclamation of the PLO as the responsible spokesman, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Then were the two "Fez summits," first in 1981; there, because of the lack of representation of Arab states at the highest levels, we convinced our partners to adjourn the summit until 1982, hoping that a quorum would be reached not only in the number of states represented but in the quality of their representation. The All-Powerful wanted all the Arabs united at the highest level, constitutionally binding the states that were to adopt the Fez plan.

*"...From a legal point of view, everything that is not expressly forbidden is permitted. Now, no one can say that the Fez resolutions forbid contacts with Israel, within the framework of the plan."*

For the first time, thanks to the resolutions adopted at Fez, there is an elaborated Arab plan, studied and applicable, a plan free of demagoguery, of phraseology and of overstatement. For the first time,

equally, there was an Arab consensus on a plan, which we successfully began to apply in the months after the conference.

The conference held in Fez in 1982, decided to form a committee, the Committee of Seven, and charged its members - Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the PLO - to undertake contacts with the great powers to convince them of the validity of the Fez plan and of the possibilities that it offered for a political analysis aimed at finding a definitive solution to the Arab-Israel conflict.

Your servant had the honour of presiding over this committee. Under my direction, this committee went to Washington, and my brother, His Majesty the King Hussein, took the delegation of the "Seven" to London, Paris, Moscow and Peking.

The paragraph in the Fez resolutions had indicated the countries which we were to visit or contact in order to learn about their positions and explain ours. But as you know, dear people, from the legal point of view, everything that is not expressly forbidden, is permitted. Now, one can say that the Fez resolutions forbid contacts with Israel, within the framework of the plan. The committee made its contacts as assigned by the conference. The conference, at no moment, excluded our contact with any state, provided that they were within the framework of the Fez propositions.

I do not hide from you, dear people, that the Committee of Seven did positive work. But some obstacles, I won't describe their origins, prevented us not only from pursuing our task, but also from drawing up our final account of the mission and presenting it to the Arab sovereigns and heads of states. This still causes sorrow, and I as the president of the committee tell you, that until now, certain circumstances and maneuvers have prevented the Committee of Seven from even drawing up a summary report to the Arab states summit, which would enable it to know which countries are sympathetic to our cause and which countries are not.

Since then, dear People, I no longer have a clear conscience: even though our country is situated 6,000 kilometres from the battlefield. Morocco is, first and foremost, an integral part of its Arab homeland and of its Arab family. Every time one of the refugee camps in Lebanon suffered, we felt their affliction in Morocco. Every time an attack was launched on Lebanese sovereignty, the Moroccans showed their disapproval.

I never stop asking myself, shall we sit idly by? Have we no mission and responsibility within the framework of the Fez decisions to work for peace in the region and break the impasse?

I believe that you, my dear people, know me as I know you, and you know that for four years I never stopped making these allusive declarations. In the beginning, I said that if a senior Israeli official wants to come and meet with me, then a visit to Morocco for tourism and vacation is forbidden, just as I am forbidden to take such a trip in Israel. The journalist asked me a second time, and I answered him that I am prepared to meet the Israeli prime minister if he brings a reasonable plan with him that conform with the Fez summit resolutions.

The third time was before the emergency Arab summit in Casablanca, when I was asked if I would be prepared to meet the Israeli prime minister I answered: Before the meeting it is preferable that he send me a letter through the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The last sign and hint from me was during an interview I gave in Marrakesh with Jean Daniel of *Le Nouvel Observateur*. I said that I am surprised that, until now, no Arab leader has met with an Israeli official, because we are not fighting a phantom or an illusory enemy, but rather we are fighting a real enemy who is occupying our territories and whose arrogance is constantly increasing, and who pretends to ignore that it is living on occupied territory, and that it is building on that land as if it had inherited it from its ancestors.

I said: hasn't the time come for an Arab leader to meet an Israeli leader in order to learn about his position directly and not through mediators with all due respect and appreciation for mediators, be they North Americans, Europeans, Latin Americans or Soviets. After all, I believe there is nothing

better than direct dialogue. I had hoped that following this declaration there would be some reaction from some Arab states, at least. But I have neither seen nor heard any criticism or reaction.

I believed four years ago, when I told you this and clarified all of these fine points, that you had knowledge and understanding, and indeed you did understand since you are intelligent people, while certain people did not understand anything of the first hints nor understand anything of the first hints nor the second, nor even the third ones.

Perhaps, I can say to myself, they would finally have understood after taking note of the fourth declaration. Whether or not they did understand, it seems that their sentiment was: "Wait, let's leave that aside."

What is important is that Mr. Shimon Peres asked me that we meet, and my answer was that we would only be able to meet on the basis of legitimacy, a framework taking into account two considerations: the general and the particular.

In what concerns the general, I can only hold discussions with you within the framework of the Fez plan. Concerning the particular, I believe that I have authority without receiving a mandate from anyone to discuss this subject with you, because I am still serving as chairman of the Arab summit conference sessions.

His answer was: "I will talk to you within the framework of the Fez plan, but this will not prevent me from submitting my proposals to you." I said: good. As long as I would talk with him in the framework of the Fez resolutions, and as long as I believe that I have the authority, then the conversation can commence.

Then he said to me, "I would prefer that we meet in America during your visit there." My answer was that the meeting must have a Moroccan character, and not be subordinated to the influence of anyone. I don't want any umbrella of a great power. This meeting must take place freely and be an expression of full and complete sovereignty.

Because of the importance of the matter, and also for reasons of health, I preferred to pass up the trip to America. This meeting, essentially exploratory, would be much more important for the destiny of the Arab nation than my trip, despite the fact that Morocco must defend her particular interests, and the duty of the King of Morocco must be to assume that defence.

Initially, my conscience told me that I must first of all go out and defend my nation's interests. But I said to myself, if I would go (to America) and then meet him (Peres), people would say, "You went to receive instructions before you met him in Morocco."

I thus resolved to take a few days of rest prescribed by my doctors before taking action and would thus be able to bear my responsibility 100 per cent before history today, before history near and far, and bear it personally.

I did not notify a single Arab head of state about this, and you should know my dear People, that I told you what my late father told me: "Remember this essential point in your political education. Never lie to your people, because this is a very intelligent people, which will discover your lies immediately, and will not forgive you, and your credibility will be affected."

I say to you, dear people, that I did not share my intentions with any of the states which form the Arab League, nor, with any state, be it European, African, Asiatic, North American or Latin American. Even more, I received a message from President Reagan, saying in substance. "I have learned (I understand the "leak" came from the other side) that you are going to meet Prime Minister Peres, I suggest that your meetings take place here, so that I can give the meeting the full support of the United States of America."

My reaction to this offer, you already know. I did not go to the United States, because I thought that if I were to succeed, it would be the gain of the entire world, but in case of failure, I alone would bear the burden and responsibility.

Dear people, I met Mr. Shimon Peres, we conferred with the framework of the Fez plan. I met him because no decision of the League of Arab States, since it has existed, has forbidden an Arab leader from meeting with an Israeli leader. As for myself, I did not choose the formula of secret negotiations which some are fond of - those who now raise their voices in criticism while forgetting how much they had rejoiced at the mere idea of receiving Shimon Peres, while he had not wanted to be hosted by them. As for them, they indeed were afraid of meeting him publicly.

For two days, Peres visited Morocco without being followed by police or by escorts. The reasonableness of Moroccans, their serenity, their sense of responsibility, the education that they received over 14 centuries - I am proud to say it - meant that no one took the smallest opportunity to make light of the visit of Shimon Peres, because Moroccans know that, in certain affairs, the results are what count. My people you wanted to know what would come of this encounter.

Well, here is the report. By speaking to you, I also speak to all those who wanted to impress us by their sectarianism. Perhaps you will say: but why didn't we commit ourselves to such talks some months earlier, or for some other reason, delay meeting until later?

Well, there are two reasons: the Arab position at this juncture, and Israel's circumstances. Let's look into the past. When we were in exile, when the martyrs fell and the patrols suffered in prisons, we remained with our ears cocked, day and night, for information about the probable (French government). We calculated the potential votes which would bring victory to Edgar Faure, or keep Joseph Laniel in power.

We asked questions about whether Guy Mollet would lose. We were certainly better informed than the French regarding the names of their senators and deputies.

Dear People, this was the education we received from the period of our colonial trial. We are not the type of people who know nothing and learning nothing from events and their causes...

Putting the subject in the Israeli context, I think that we must expect, in the next four months, profound changes. Shimon Peres will be replaced in power by the Likud, and extreme right-wing group. Now the alert individual must take into account both his situation and that of his adversary.

Having said this in the Israeli context, there is, dear people, another grave and inescapable fact: for approximately the last two years, we have heard nothing about the Palestinian plight. Instead, all of our worries and our energies had been poured into the inter-Arab disputes, into the Iraq-Irani war. I say to myself. We Arabs have arrived at a rare degree of irresponsibility. Marginal problems are the subject of conversation: such as the Iraqi-Syrian split, the Iraqi-Libyan split, Syro-Jordanian dissension and the PLO's differences with a number of countries - Syria, Libya and, now, Jordan. The Arabs and the Moslems fall victim to this dissension. Certain Arab states, forgetting the inter-Arab defence pact, support the Iranians. Marginal problems have made us lose our vision of the essential problem. I believe that in taking my initiative, I will have moved this problem to the forefront.

In any case, the Arabs, one more time, are going to meet to debate it. Perhaps, this time they will put aside their differences and concentrate their forces to face the adversary. It's not so much the soil, even occupied, that preoccupies me. It is the man who must suffer occupation who is the object of my worries.

There is some inconsistency in our continuing to launch invectives at one another, while we would do better to think of the plight of the aged, the adults and the children who suffer servitude and oppression in the occupied territories. Territory is unchangeable, but man's essential character can be altered. If we recover the territory with its human inhabitants, what kind of individuals will we recover? What Arab, Moslem or Christian will we find on this shared soil?

They are all Arabs. The Arabs first of all were an ethnic group. And they, each in their turn, embraced Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They still are Arabs, Jews and Christian Arabs. An Arab is not necessarily a Moslem. Thus my question: in recovering the territories, in what state will we find its inhabitants, these Arabs of various confessions?

Arabs, enough "intoxication." Among you, there are those who have committed treason. They have betrayed the sacred cause in taking up arms against an Arab brother to defend a non-Arab.

I come to the third part of my address. You are waiting for news of my meeting with the Israeli prime minister. First of all, dear people, you know, but the others don't know and it's worth noting, that someone who doesn't own a piece of property cannot offer it. I met Mr. Peres, certainly, but suppose that I had convinced him to return Gaza, the Golan, the West Bank of Jordan or Jerusalem, this could neither bind him nor me, since one cannot offer a property which one does not own. Secondly, I have no need to prove any Arabism and my attachment to the Arab cause.

Finally, it's known that the conversation could not take place except within the framework of the Fez plan. Oh, if only those who have set themselves up as our judges had had the patience to wait for this address before pronouncing their sentence!

Alas, their lack of restraint, their frivolity and their tendentious behaviour dictated otherwise. We have thus been judged and condemned. But gentlemen, to them I say: you are not well-placed to dictate the law. My roof is of steel and my home is of stone.

I asked Mr. Shimon Peres: What do you have to say about the PLO?

I don't recognize it (he said).

What? What are you going to do then? With whom are you going to initiate a dialogue, since you say that you want to resolve the Palestinian problem?

I ask you (Peres replied), with whom can we have a dialogue? Are they in Syria, in Jordan, in Tunisia.

Have you something to tell us regarding the occupied territories? You must withdraw completely. I have no such intention, Peres stated.

Well then, I had nothing more to say to him but:

Goodbye, I am not here with you to negotiate on these territories or to find out to what extent you are willing to withdraw and when you envision such a withdrawal. I am here to tell you: you must evacuate these territories.

Here are the Fez resolutions. You must talk with the PLO - the obligatory channel. Since you don't accept these two conditions, it is useless for us to continue this conversation. I can only say to you:

Goodbye. You are going to report to your government. And for my part, as an Arab leader, when the moment comes and they desire it, I will do the same regarding my brothers.

From the moment you make us aware of your refusal to evacuate the occupied territories, it is clear that all remarks regarding Jerusalem would be superfluous. I have nothing more to say.

Nothing more to say to a man who rejects the PLO as the sole, legitimate partner in dialogue, and refuses to withdraw from the territories, except "Goodbye".

Let everything revert to its previous state.

My brothers will be the judges of what is proper to do, now that they have grasped the tenor of the conversation.

I did not accept this meeting in order to negotiate or to decide on anything. In my mind, this was an exploratory effort. I personally think it cowardly to not want to listen to an adversary, an enemy. We have, dear people, been educated in courage. The newspapers have written: "The courageous action of Hassan II". This is true, of course, if one considers the sword more effective than the club. But my action, essentially, was not courageous, it merely was the fruit of our common civic education, of the

training received from Mohammed V (Hassan's father) and our political leaders, the happy consequence of years of difficult trials. We have learned that it is necessary sometimes to sit at the negotiating table rather than demonstrate in the streets.

Dear people, I ask you to draw a lesson from the event. It is not cowardly, quite the contrary, to seek to meet the adversary and to know his intentions. However, it is cowardly, shameful and treasonous to lay down arms. For the past 25 years, since I have been sovereign of this country, I saw in this affair, like each one of you, a state of "neither war no peace".

I am going to speak to you about the summit of 1965, held in Casablanca. The figures attending the verbal proceedings of the meeting included Abdel Nasser, Aref, the King Saud, Sallal of Yemen, Sadok Mokaddem of Tunisia, if my memory serves me true. This could best be corroborated by Mr. Amin Al-Hafez who was at the time president of the Syrian Republic. He, too, was a Baathist and has now taken refuge in Lebanon. Also with us was Hassan Reda, who represented the late (King) Idriss of Libya. Algeria was represented by Bouteflika or Boumedienne himself, I no longer remember. The meeting took place following the events of June 19, 1965, as a matter of fact.

Someone solicited my opinion, and I said, provoking an indescribable outcry among those present:

You don't have a choice: either you make war now even with clubs, you are 25 million and they (I was speaking of Israel) are only 2.5 million, at best...

Someone said to me: No, we cannot do it.

This was prior to the war in which they took the Sinai, Gaza, the West bank, the Golan and Jerusalem.

I continued: Well then, take another route: recognize Israel, accept it into the League of Arab States and it will be assimilated among 25 million souls.

My proposal was greeted with a tumultuous reaction. What was preventing the recognition of Israel which, at the time only constituted a minuscule territory?

The Israelis would have accepted such recognition with joy. Instead of such a measure, they had only the inflammatory proposals of a Shukeiry ("Throw them into the sea'). But finally, it is we who have been thrown out of our land, and who have been left to wander.

After this, some men dare to attack us. But they are so fickle, so irresponsible.

We plan to address a message to each one of the Arab sovereigns and presidents to explain to them the reasons which prompted us to receive Shimon Peres, and to provide them with an account of his double negative response.

Before concluding, I would like to remind those who have forgotten that Morocco is a sovereign country which has the ability, and even the duty, to exercise its sovereignty freely, so that no one thinks her weak. The only limit to the free exercise of her sovereignty is her commitments. When one state subscribes to a commitment, it relinquishes, as a consequence, a portion of its sovereignty but only in the framework of that precise commitment. No one can dictate to me my associations. Even when I was young, my father, despite his sternness, left me free to meet whom I wanted. Likewise, for Morocco, I will not accept any sort of dictate.

I am firmly committed to the League of Arab States. Now, no decision of the League prohibits me from contacting whom I want. This is extremely important and must be taken into consideration.

Someone will say, perhaps: He did what Sadat did.

The situation, however, are not comparable. Sadat, whose territories were occupied, went with the goal to liberate them, which was accomplished.

Whether he was right or wrong, may divine mercy be on him, he concluded an accord and recovered territory. Thanks to God, in this incident, I do not have a territory to liberate. If that was the case, I would not have waited until now to liberate it.

In 1967, we experienced a setback. What man of courage accepts 20 years of occupation without liberating occupied territories? Such an attitude is conceivable only to the Mashreq (the Arab countries to the east of North Africa). I have often said to the Arabs of the east: You are listless. The Moroccans are courageous: They would not have been able to abandon their occupied territory for 20 years. If you want to receive lessons in patriotism and ethics, come to us. I don't accept, in return, that the people of the Mashreq give us lessons in patriotism.

What is important to me, dear people, is your critique of my actions or your satisfaction. If your conscience is at peace, mine will be fully at rest as well. As the Prophet said: One who struggles and succeeds is doubly rewarded by God. God will remunerate him only once if he struggles and is mistaken.

I beg the Most High to allow me the favour of the double reward, but if God only finds me worthy of one reward, I will accept it in all humility.

God says in the Koran: "Act. God, his messenger and the believers will see your deeds."

May Divine peace and mercy be upon you.



**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ BY ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES AND  
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK, ALEXANDRIA, 12 SEPTEMBER 1986**

*[A day earlier, Israel and Egypt had signed the Taba compromise kickstarting the international arbitration process (which began in Geneva on 10 Dec.). In the communiqué, both leaders indicated their support for an international conference, but differed on the PLO's role and the Palestinian issue.]*

The meeting between President Hosni Mubarak and Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Alexandria on the 11 and 12 of September 1986 marks a new era in the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel as well as in the search for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The signing of the 'compromis' on the Taba arbitration reaffirms the importance of dialogue and negotiations as a means for settling international disputes away from the spirit of confrontation and violence. It constitutes a compromise model to be followed and built upon.

The "Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty reflects their shared commitment to proceed jointly and simultaneously towards reinforcing the structure of peace between the two peoples and achieving a comprehensive peace in the region that would bring about a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the resolution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects.

President Mubarak and Prime Minister Peres firmly believe that having referred the Taba issue to arbitration, the two countries should now concentrate their efforts on reviving the comprehensive peace process. They view with great concern the prospects of a stalemate in that process. They declare 1987 as a year of negotiations for peace.

We call upon all parties concerned to dedicate this year to an intensive effort to achieve the common and noble objective, lasting and comprehensive peace.

President Mubarak and Prime Minister Peres, together with other concerned parties, will continue their efforts towards the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region."



**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION 592, NEW YORK, 8 DECEMBER 1986**

The Security Council,

*Having considered* the letter dated 4 December 1986 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, contained in document S/18501,

*Recalling* the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

*Seriously concerned* about the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

*Bearing in mind* the specific status of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. *Strongly deplores* the opening of fire by the Israeli army resulting in the death and the wounding of defenceless students;
3. *Calls upon* Israel to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;
4. *Further calls upon* Israel to release any person or persons detained as a result of the recent events at Bir Zeit University in violation of the above-mentioned Geneva Convention;
5. *Also calls* on all concerned parties to exercise maximum restraint, to avoid violent acts, and to contribute towards the establishment of peace;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution not later than 20 December 1986.



**FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ AND RESOLUTIONS, FIFTH ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE,  
KUWAIT, 26-29 JANUARY 1987 [EXCERPTS]**

[...] At the gracious invitation extended by His Highness Sheikh Jabir Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah., the Amir of Kuwait and pursuant to the decision adopted by the Fourth-Islamic Summit Conference held in Casablanca Kingdom of Morocco in 1984, the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, The Session of Islamic Solidarity, was held in Kuwait, The State of Kuwait from. 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H, corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987. [...]

**POLITICAL ISSUES:**

29. The summit adopted a resolution pertaining to Palestine and the Middle East which reaffirmed that the Palestine Question is the core of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and that a just and comprehensive peace in the region can only be established on the basis of complete and unconditional. withdrawal of the Zionist enemy from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories the restoration of the Palestinian people's inalienable rights including its right to return, to self-determination and to establish an independent Palestinian State on its' national soil, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, and under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative. The Summit stressed that any solution to this conflict must be sought with the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organizations: on an equal and, equitable footing with the other parties, in all international conferences., activities and deliberations relating to the Palestine Question and the Arab-Zionist Conflict.

The resolution firmly rejected all separate agreements and initiatives and considered that Security Council resolution 242 of 1967 does not constitute an adequate basis tot the solution of the Palestine and Middle East Question. It called for resolute and continued action to implement the Arab Peace Plan and reaffirmed the need for the early convening of an International Conference on Peace in the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of all parties concerned including the PLO on an equal footing, and the participation of the permanent

members of the Security Council to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Palestine Question and the Middle East Conflict. The resolution also called for the formation of a preparatory committee to facilitate the holding of the International Conference.

The Conference condemned the US policy of continued and unlimited support to the Zionist enemy in the political, military, economic and all other fields.

The Summit called upon Member States to intensify their contacts with the European Economic Committee (EEC) with a view to inducing it to take more positive stands based on respect for international law, the UN Charter and resolutions which guarantee the inalienable national right of the Palestinian people.

The Conference reiterated that all Zionist Legislations in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the other occupied Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights are null and void.

It also considered that all the settlements set up or to be set up by the Zionist enemy in all occupied territories including Al-Quds are illegal and have no validity.

It hailed the steadfastness of the Lebanese people, and affirmed its strong resolve for the preservation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the land and people of Lebanon and its institutions, and demanded the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon.

The Summit called on Member States to abide by the principle of not establishing any form of direct or indirect relations with the Zionist enemy, and requested them to extend all forms of support and assistance to the Palestinian people so as to reinforce their steadfastness and enable them to attain their inalienable national rights. It called for continued issuance of the Palestine Stamp, the application of the provisions of Islamic boycott of the Zionist enemy, and to start teaching the course on the history and geography of Palestine on the basis of a unified syllabus and as a compulsory subject at all levels of school education. It expressed support for the efforts of the Islamic Bureau for Military Coordination with Palestine, and the efforts of the Committee for Monitoring the moves of the Zionist Enemy, and the Islamic Expert committee on the Zionist settlements in Palestine. It called on Member States to redouble their efforts to stamp out racial discrimination and Zionism.

The Summit hailed 'the peoples of Namibia and South Africa and the friendly third world countries which advocate peace and equality, especially members of the non- Aligned Movement and the Organization or African Unity.

30. The Summit adopted a resolution on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, reaffirming total adherence to the provisions of the Islamic Programme of Action' and all the resolutions adopted by Al-Quds Committee, regarding the Islamic Ummah's insistence on preserving the Arab-Islamic character or that holy city, and its commitment to work for liberating it.. It called for effecting the twinning or Al-Quds Al-Sharif with all Islamic Capitals and Cities.

The Conference took note of the project for the establishment of an Arab hospital in Al-Quds to serve as a substitute for the Hospice Charity Hospital which has been closed down, without any justification, by the Israeli occupation authorities with a view to judaizing Al-Quds. The Summit supported this humanitarian project and urged Member States to participate in its realization.

31. The Conference adapted a resolution on the Syrian Golan Heights declaring Israel's occupation of the area and its decision to impose its laws and administration on the occupied Golan Heights as an act of aggression. It condemned the Zionist enemy's oppressive, terroristic measures against the Syrian citizens in that region.
32. The Conference adopted a resolution on the Strategic Alliance between the United States and Israel, declaring this alliance at contributing to the rising tension in the region, and called on Member States to take effective measures to counter the dangers arising from it.
33. The Conference adopted a resolution on establishment or diplomatic relations with the Zionist enemy, condemning the resumption by some states of their diplomatic relations with the Zionist enemy and appealed to those States which intend to establish diplomatic relations with the enemy to desist from doing so, in pursuance of the resolutions of the Islamic Conference.
34. The Summit reaffirmed that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination as stated in the UN General Assembly resolution 3370 (S-30) of 1975 and declared the Islamic states resolve to co-ordinate their efforts in the United Nations to counter the U.S.-Israeli campaign for rescinding that resolution.

35. The Summit adopted a resolution regarding the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf which stressed the importance of the vital and effective role played by the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf in supporting the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories. It called upon Member States to fulfil their pledge to pay up the capitals or the, Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf amounting to one hundred million dollars each.
36. The Summit adopted a resolution on the situation of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, calling for immediate cease-fire and cessation of attacks on the Camps, lifting of the siege laid to the camps and the return thereto of the displaced persons. It called for the support and follow up of the efforts of the League of Arab States, in this regard.
37. The Summit, in a resolution on the Lebanese question and Israel's Occupation of Lebanese territory, condemned Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon, demanded its immediate withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, reaffirmed all resolutions and statements of Islamic and international conferences relating to southern Lebanon, reiterated its commitment to Lebanon's independence sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and reiterated the demand for implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978 and resolutions 508 and 509 of 1982. The Summit urged economic support and financial assistance to Lebanon. [...]
44. The Summit discussed the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and its serious consequences which threaten the security of the Middle East region and increases the danger or proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Summit called upon all states, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other Organizations stop all forms of scientific cooperation with Israel which may contribute to its nuclear capabilities. [...]
46. The Conference expressed serious concern and alarm at the emergence and aggravation of the phenomenon of international terrorism in all its forms in various parts of the world. It rejected the biased efforts by anti-Islam forces to link terrorism and its escalation to Muslims. The Conference categorically condemned all acts of criminal international terrorism and declared the readiness of Islamic states to cooperate among themselves and with the community to eliminate international terrorism.
47. In another resolution the Conference denounced attempts to eliminate the distinction between terrorism and legitimate liberation struggle of peoples and supported the convening of an International Conference under the sponsorship of the United Nations to define international terrorism. [...]
52. The Summit adopted a resolution reiterating condemnation of the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations, Israel's refusal to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and the international Atomic Energy Agency and Israel's persistent threat to repeat its aggression against Iraq and to attack peaceful nuclear installations in other Islamic states. The Conference called upon Member States to work for the adoption of international legal steps aimed at prohibiting armed attack against nuclear installations with a view to promoting and guaranteeing the development and safety of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. [...]

#### RESOLUTIONS ON POLITICAL AND INFORMATION AFFAIRS [EXCERPTS]

#### RESOLUTION No. 1 / 5-P (IS): ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, the Session of Islamic Solidarity, held in Kuwait, the State of Kuwait, from 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987,

*Proceeding* from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Reaffirming*, the principle of strengthening Islamic Solidarity with the Palestinian people and the unswerving commitment of the Islamic States to adopt a unified stand in favour of the just struggle waged by the Palestinian people to recover their inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative;

*Reaffirming* that the question of Palestine including that of the Al-Quds Al-Sharif, is the core of the Middle East conflict and that the continued occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories by the Zionist enemy, its refusal to withdraw its annexation of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, its declaration of Al-Quds as its eternal and unified capital, depriving the Palestinians of their inalienable national rights

constitute a flagrant violation of the principles of International Law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the resolutions of the United Nations and international legitimacy;

*Expressing* grave concern at the increasingly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, in particular in Occupied Palestine, as a result of unceasing wars and continued attacks by the Zionist enemy against the countries and peoples of the region, mainly the Palestinian people, with the total and unlimited support of the United States, thus posing a most serious threat to world peace and security;

*Convinced* of the need to adopt practical measures to counter the continuous acts of aggression of the Zionist enemy and its gangs, the deliberate desecration of the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque, the escalation of their organized state terrorism, and their daily -practice of the scorched earth policy against the Arab and Palestinian citizens, their properties and holy Places, particularly in Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

*Convinced* that the time has come to apply the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and their immediate imposition on the Zionist enemy;

*Considering* that the maintenance of any form of political, economic; cultural, Scientific and other relations, at any level, with the Zionist enemy encourages and enables it to perpetuate its occupation of the Arab and Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds A-Sharif, and persistently disregard the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, thereby posing serious threats to the Islamic principles, values, heritage, culture and civilization, and flagrantly violating the Charter and various resolutions of the OIC;

*Guided* by all the U.N. resolutions on the Palestine and Middle East question;

*Proceeding* from all the other Islamic resolutions adopted on the question of Palestine and the Middle East;

1. *Reaffirms* its adherence and total commitment to the following principles on which the solution of the question of Palestine and the Middle East should be based:

- a) The Palestine question - the foremost cause of the Muslims - is the core of the Middle East problem and the Arab-Zionist conflict.
- b) The Palestine question and the Middle East problem must be dealt with and solved as an indivisible whole. Therefore, there can be no partial solution, or a solution that involves only some of the parties to the conflict, or cover only some of the causes of the conflict, to the exclusion of others, nor is it possible to establish a partial peace, for peace must be comprehensive for all parties
- c) A just peace in the region can only be based on the Complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist enemy from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the recovery of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, which include:
  - I. Their right to their homeland, Palestine;
  - II. Their right to return to their homeland, and to recover their Possessions as guaranteed in the U.N. resolutions;
  - III. Their right to Self-determination without any external interference;
  - IV. Their right to freely exercise their Sovereignty Over their national land and its natural resources;
  - V. Their right to establish their national independent Sovereign state in Palestine, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- d) The City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif - the capital of Palestine is an integral part of the Occupied land of Palestine. The Zionist enemy must, therefore, withdraw totally and unconditionally from it and to restore it to Palestinian sovereignty.
- e) The Palestine Liberation Organisation is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It alone is fully entitled to represent this people, and to participate independently and on an equal footing in all international Conferences, activities and fort dealing with the Palestine Question and the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to recover the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

No solution can be comprehensive, just and acceptable, unless the Palestine Liberation Organisation participates, as an equal and independent party, with other, parties concerned, in its establishment. No other party is entitled to claim the right to represent or negotiate, on behalf of the Palestinian people, their land or their rights - Anything in contradiction with this rule is null and void, and has no legal consequence

- f) Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 is not consistent with the Arab and Palestinian rights and, is not a sufficient basis for a solution to the Palestine and Middle East problem.

- g) To reject all unilateral agreements and initiatives which violate the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to repatriation, self-determination and establishment of their independent State on their own national soil, and which are in contravention of the principles of seeking a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestine Question and Middle East problem, so as to secure a just and comprehensive peace in the region.
  - h) The necessity of extending full and effective moral and material support to the Palestinian people in their occupied national homeland and to reinforce their steadfastness and resistance to the conspiracy of "autonomy".
2. *Reaffirms* that any solution not founded on all these principles and basis and on their application without exception cannot lead to a just peace but, on the contrary, will render the situation in the region more explosive and help the Zionist enemy to achieve its objectives and its expansionist, colonialist and racist settlement policies as well as encourage bilateral or partial solutions in disregard of the essence of the Palestinian Question, and pave the way for the hostile policies and designs, whatever their sources, aimed at liquidating the Palestinian Question.
  3. *Reaffirms* the commitment of Member States to the convening of an International Conference for Peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations, with the participation of all the parties concerned in - the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing with them, as well as all the permanent members of the Security Council, with a view to implementing the relevant U.N. Resolutions, and the convening of a meeting of a preparatory committee to be attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council.
  4. *Reaffirms* the need for collective action by Member States to ensure the adoption of a new resolution by the Security Council guaranteeing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return to their homeland, Palestine; their right to self-determination - and their right to establish their independent Palestinian State on their national soil, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, their legitimate and sole representative, in accordance with the relevant international resolutions.
  5. *Reaffirms* its strong condemnation of the policy of the United States, persisting in:
    - Its hostile attitude towards the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, its continued support of the occupation by the Zionist enemy of the Palestinian and Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and its non-recognition of the P.L.O. as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,
    - its continued and growing support to the Zionist enemy in all fields, particularly in the military, political and economic fields in pursuance of the Strategic Cooperation Agreement concluded between them, and the endeavours to turn the Zionist entity into an arsenal of strategic weapons and a depot of ammunition to be used against the peoples and States in the region,
    - the use of the right of veto to prevent the adoption of resolutions by the U.N. Security Council on the question of Al-Quds, Palestine and the Middle East, which affords total support to the Zionist enemy and its continued acts of aggression, occupation and attempts to annihilate the Palestinian people and annex the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, thereby reneging on its obligations as a major power responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
    - launching diplomatic and propaganda campaign-throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe, against the P.L.O. with a view to bringing about the closing of PLO offices there, withdrawal of recognition of the Organization and the elimination of the political presence of the Palestinian people in such countries.
  6. *Calls for* intensifying contacts with the E.E.C. with a view to inducing it to adopt more progressive positions to implement its own previous resolutions on the question of Palestine and the Middle East, and to develop such positions on the basis of observance of international law and the U.N. Charter and resolutions, and to urge it to widen the scope of its relations with the PLO, so that the Palestinian people may realize their inalienable national rights, in accordance with the UN resolutions.
  7. *Calls for* continuous action by Member States with all ways and means to clarify "the Arab Peace Plan" adopted by the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference held in Fez, for the solution of the question of Palestine and the Middle East which was endorsed by the Fourth Islamic

Summit Conference held in Casablanca and to explain the dimensions of this Plan and to enlist international support for its implementation.

8. *Reaffirms* its obligation and commitment to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and considers that all settlements that have been, or will be established, by the Zionist enemy in any of the Occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, are measures and practices that are illegal and null and void. These settlements must be dismantled and no more established, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and its numerous resolutions.
9. *Declares* its full and sustained support to the Palestinian people in their constant confrontation and courageous resistance to the organized state terrorism practiced by the Zionist enemy in Occupied Palestine, namely, the dismantling of their camps, eviction of their inhabitants, demolition of houses and whole districts, confiscation of lands and property, establishment and expansion of Zionist settlements, detention, torture and deportation of citizens with a view to vacating the territories of their rightful owners, the closing down of universities and scientific institutes and applying Zionist legislations, enacted by the Israeli Knesset, in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza strip and consider that such highly dangerous measures illustrate the persistence of the Zionist enemy in its attempts at annexing and judaizing the Occupied Arab and Palestinian territories' in violation of the will of the international community, the United Nations resolutions, the universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in the time of War.
10.
  - a) *Strongly condemns* the Zionist enemy for its failure to comply with the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions regarding its annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan heights and the enforcement of its laws and jurisdiction over the occupied Golan Heights, and reaffirms that this annexation is illegal, null and void and has no legal validity, whatsoever. It is an act of aggression according to the provisions of the Charter and resolutions of the United-Nations.
  - b) *Strongly condemns* the coercive terrorist measures taken by the Zionist enemy against Syrian Arab citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, depriving them of their basic rights and freedom in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Universal Declaration of Human rights and pays tribute to the resistance launched by these citizens against occupation and annexation and reaffirms its total support to their just struggle in defence of their freedom, territorial integrity and national identity.
  - c) *Rejects and condemns* the threats of the Zionist enemy against the Syrian Arab Republic, its territorial integrity, its regional security, and its armed forces, and expresses its full and active support for and solidarity with its just struggle against the Zionist aggression and occupation for the liberation of their occupied territories.
11. *Reaffirms* its strong determination to maintain the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, the unity of its people and institutions and its territorial and institutional integrity. It reaffirms that the Israeli forces must withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all Lebanese territories and emphasizes the need to safeguard the total and absolute sovereignty of Lebanon over all its territories and in all national affairs. It also hails the steadfastness and firmness of 'the heroic people of Lebanon in their sustained resistance to the Zionist occupation forces and lauds the courageous national resistance to the Israeli invasion troops in South Lebanon.
12. *Calls upon* Member States and their peoples not to establish political, economic, cultural, or military relations, directly or indirectly, with the Zionist enemy, and calls upon Member States which still maintain any form of relations, at any level, with the Zionist entity, to sever such relations forthwith and without delay, in implementation of the provisions of the Charter and the resolutions of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
13. *Reaffirms* the commitment of Member States to act as a single front in order to coordinate their stands and intensify their efforts at all international fora so as to eliminate all forms of racism, racial discrimination and Zionism, and rid mankind, international communities and Arab, African and Islamic peoples of their evils and their manifestations clearly evidenced at present by the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine and the Pretoria racist regime in South Africa; and invites Member States to use all their economic and financial capabilities as an effective weapon against Zionism and racism. It further reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the

just struggle of the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, and the struggle of the South African people, led by its national movements.

14. *Calls upon* all countries that allow Jewish emigration from or across their territories to occupied Palestine to stop such illegal emigration to Palestine. It urges them to facilitate formalities for their return to their countries of origin. It also calls upon Member States to adopt, in accordance with their national laws and legislations, such measures that would encourage Jewish immigrants, to emigrate from occupied Palestine.
15. *Reaffirms* the importance of establishing offices of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the capitals of Member States where such offices have not yet been established, considering that the PLO is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. It requests that full diplomatic rights, privileges and immunities be granted to these offices.
16. *Reiterates* Member States' commitment to the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of the, Palestine Liberation Organisation, and to supporting it. It reaffirms the right of the PLO to pursue the struggle in all its military, political and economic forms and by all other possible means.
17. *Calls upon* all Member States once more to extend immediate and effective aid to the Palestine Liberation Organisation so that it may reconstruct the Palestinian refugee camps and houses destroyed in Lebanon in the war and to compensate the inhabitants of these camps for their vast human and material losses.
18. *Hails* friendly Third World countries which cherish peace, justice and equality, particularly the Non-Aligned Countries and OAU -Member States, for their principled and firm support to the question of Palestine and their consistent backing of the just struggle waged by the Palestinian people against the Zionist enemy.  
*Also hails* the firm stand of the friendly African countries in the face of the Zionist enemy's attempts to infiltrate them in order to achieve its designs aimed at restoring relations with them and putting an end to its diplomatic isolation from them.  
*Reiterates* its stand that the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Zionist entity (twin of the South African racist regime) is a factor that activates the racist Israeli-Pretorian policy, in Africa and in the Arab Countries, and stands against the interests and rights of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Palestine. The policy of the two regimes cannot be disassociated from one another because the enemy is the same in so far as both -parties share identical objectives, use the same tactics, and pose similar dangers.
19. *Calls upon*:
  - a) The Member States to continue to issue the Palestine Stamp on a permanent and uninterrupted basis as long as the question of Palestine and Al-Quds al-Sharif remains unsolved.
  - b) The Member States that have not yet issued the Palestine Stamp, or have not yet remitted its proceeds to do so as soon as possible.
  - c) *Requests* Member States to remit the proceeds of the issue of the Palestine Stamp, regularly and periodically, to the Palestine Welfare Society/PLO.
20.
  - (a) *Supports* the efforts exerted by the Expert Committee entrusted with the preparation of the syllabus and material for the course on the History and Geography of Palestine
  - (b) *Calls upon* Member States to begin the teaching of the course on the history and geography of Palestine according to a unified syllabus as a compulsory subject at all levels of school education in all their schools with effect from the academic year 1987-1988.
  - (c) *Calls upon* Member States, and their relevant institutions, benevolent bodies, universities and the Islamic Development Bank to make generous financial contributions towards the cost of printing the said textbooks in the various languages of such Islamic States as may be determined by the Expert Committee.
21.
  - a) *Reaffirms* the need of implementing the provisions of the Islamic Boycott of the Zionist enemy all Member States and of adopting the general principles of boycott and the unified Islamic law, as well as the internal regulations of the offices and the scheduled periodic meetings, and considering; them part of their national legislation.

- b) *Calls upon* Member States which have not yet established Islamic Office for the Boycott to do so and to appoint directors for these offices to serve as Liaison Officers with the Main Islamic Boycott Office.
- 22.
- a) *Supports* the efforts of the Islamic Bureau for Military Coordination with Palestine (PLO).
- b) *Calls for* continued fraternal cooperation and joint coordination between the competent military commands in Member States and the military command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in order to support and consolidate the just liberation struggle of the Palestinian people against the Zionist enemy.
- c) *Reaffirms* the need for the Member States' continued provision of additional support and assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization meeting its ever increasing requirements in military material equipment, know-how and experience, allocating the scholarships and training courses which it requires; and bolstering bilateral contacts with it to achieve these objectives.
23. *Supports* the efforts exerted, by the Islamic Committee for monitoring the moves of the Zionist enemy.
24. *Supports* the efforts exerted by the Islamic Expert Committee on countering the dangers of Zionist Colonialist Settlements in Palestine".

**RESOLUTION NO. 2/5-P(IS): ON THE CITY OF AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF**

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, the Session of Islamic Solidarity, held in Kuwait, the State of Kuwait, from 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987,

*Guided* by the principles and objectives, of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Confirming* continued Islamic solidarity with the people of Palestine and the unwavering commitment of Islamic States to the declaration of Jihad for the liberation of the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the deliverance of Al- Aqsa Mosque and the restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;

*Taking into account* the current situation in the holy City under the odious Israeli occupation the acts of annexation Judaization and sacrilege the obliteration of disfiguration of the Arab and Islamic features of the City, the continued implementation of Zionist settlement schemes designed to change the city's demographical structure so as to declare it a unified and eternal capital of its alien entity;

*Having considered* the heavy material, moral and human losses sustained by the Arab-Palestinian inhabitants of Al-Quds Al-Sharif as a result of the official systematic, and terrorist policies and the 'scorched earth' polity pursued by the Zionist occupation authorities, and the Zionist vengeful gangs, which continue to expel them from the City, inflicting collective punishments and illiciting daily encroachments on their property and shrines;

*In view of* the extremely grave situation of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque as a result of continued Zionist violations and attempts to destroy it and to erect the so-called Third Temple on its ruins which poses an incessant challenge to the sentiments of the Islamic Ummah and the international public opinion, and constitutes a blatant defiance and violation of international law and the relevant resolutions adopted by the U.N. and other international forums;

*With a view* to preserving the gains of the Palestinian people in their struggle, both inside their occupied homeland and at the international level, through the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative and, therefore, the need to continue joint Islamic action in order to give concrete form to such gains.

*Having considered* the fundamental relationship between the Palestine cause and the conflict with racist Zionism and the fact that the usurpation of Palestine, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, is the root cause of their conflict, which means that no party may render; that City a subject for bargaining, negotiations or concessions.

*Guided* by all U.N. Resolutions on Al-Quds Al-Sharif; and Pursuant to all Islamic resolutions in this regard:

1. *Reiterates* Member States' total commitment to the implementation of the provisions of the Islamic Programme of Action for the confrontation of the Zionist enemy adapted by the Third Islamic Summit Conference, as well as all other Islamic resolutions and the recommendations issued by Al-Quds Committee, in all spheres, particularly the economic, military and political.

2. *Reiterates* that the cause of Palestine and Al- Quds Al-Sharif takes priority over all other questions for all Muslims, that Jihad for the liberation of Al-Quds, the deliverance of Al-Aqsa Mosque and victory of the Palestinian people is an individual religious obligation on all Muslims, so that each should contribute what he can in fulfilling it, seeking Allah's satisfaction, and a duty imposed by Islamic Fraternity, for the vindication of right and the removal of evil.
3. *Also reiterates* that the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif is an indivisible part of the usurped Palestinian homeland, that it is the capital of Palestine, the sovereign, independent State, that its return to Arab-Palestinian sovereignty constitutes the only guarantee of preserving its Arab-Islamic character, its continued sanctity, and the freedom of worship therein for all followers of the other revealed religions - a freedom preserved by the Arabs and the Muslims through the past fourteen centuries.
4. *Reiterates* Member States commitment to employ all their capabilities in confronting the decision taken by the Israeli enemy to annex the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and declare it the eternal, unified capital of the Zionist entity, including breaking political, diplomatic and Consular relations and putting an end to all forms of cooperation - economic, cultural, scientific, technical, or other and regardless of its level with any state which recognizes that aggressive decision.
5. *Calls upon* all countries, especially the U.S.A., to refrain from dealing with the Israeli occupation authorities in any manner that may suggest an implicit recognition or that may be invoked by those authorities as an indication of such recognition or as an acceptance of the fait accompli arising from the declaration of Al-Quds as the eternal and unified capital of the Zionist entity.
6. *Calls for* maintaining collective and individual, contacts with the Vatican, the Orthodox Church, and other Christian religious circles, so as to establish a unified Islamic-Christian stand which would help preserve the Arab Islamic and sacred religious character of Al-Quds Al-Sharif.
7. *Reiterates* Member States' commitment to continue work and coordination with international groups which support Arab and Islamic rights and the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people for the implementation of the international resolutions, adopted by the U.N. and the U.N. Specialized Agencies such as UNESCO, concerning the cessation of aggressive measures and practices in that Holy City, especially the deliberate violations of the sanctity of the blessed AQSA Mosque and other Holy Places as well as the persecution of the City's Arab Palestinian inhabitants.
8. *Calls Upon* all countries of the world not to recognize the legitimacy of the incessant aggressive Zionist measures and practices designed to change the Arab-Islamic features of Al-Quds Al-Sharif disturb its population balance and introduce demographic changes in it; and to condemn all such aggressive measures and practices as null and void and illegal, and to work for resisting them and the elimination of all their legal effects and consequences.
9. *Calls upon* Member States to work for the implementation of the Information Programme included in the approved Information Plan concerning the cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif; and to hold Solidarity Symposia and Festivals in world Capitals in popular intellectual and international public opinion circles especially in the USA, countries of Western Europe, Japan and Latin America, seeking cooperation - to this end -with the Muslim Ambassadors' Councils and the Palestine Support Committees.
10. *Calls for* holding official and popular festivals on the "Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian peoples" which occurs on 21 August each year. The purpose is to recall the criminal attempt to burn the blessed Aqsa Mosque, the solidarity of Muslim Countries in defence of the cause of Palestine, Al-Quds Al-Sharif and other causes of the Islamic World, and the establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference as a framework for joint Islamic action.
11. *Calls for* twinning of the Capitals of all Muslim States with Al-Quds Al-Sharif the Capital of Palestine, as a move to promote Islamic Solidarity with the people of Palestine, and to signify the Muslim Ummah's tribute to their heroic defence of the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque - the first Qiblah and the Third Holy Shrine - as well as other holy places; and for their steadfast stand and heroic and resolute resistance against the Israeli occupation, and their valiant stand against Zionist designs to judaize their Holy City.

RESOLUTION NO. 3/5-P (IS): ON THE OCCUPIED SYRIAN ARAB GOLAN HEIGHTS [...]

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, the Session of Islamic Solidarity, held in Kuwait, the State of Kuwait, from 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987,

*Having considered* the item entitled "The Occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the Israeli decision to annex that region, and the suppressive measures to which the Syrian Arab citizens there are subjected.

*Referring to* Resolution No. 7/5-P(IS) of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Resolution No. 11/15-P of the Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, and Resolution No. 10/16-P of the Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers;

*Also referring to* Security Council Resolution Nos. 497(1981) of 17/12/1981, the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 36/226-B of 17/12/1981, E.S. 9/1 of 5/2/1982, 37/123-B of 16/12/1982, 38/180-A of 19/12/1983, 38/79-B of 15/12/1983, 39/146-B of 14/12/1984, 40/168-B of 16/12/1985 and 41/162-B of 4/12/1986;

*Recalling* Security Council Resolution 465 of 1/3/1980 which affirms inter alia, that the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the protection of civilians in times of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 including Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

1. *Reaffirms* that Israel's decision of 14 December, 1981 to annex the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and to impose Israel's laws, jurisdiction and administration on them is an act of aggression; illegal, null and void, with no legal effect whatsoever and constitutes a flagrant violation of the OIC Charter and resolutions, the UN' Charter and relevant resolutions, and the norms of International Law, especially the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force.
2. *Strongly condemns* Israel for failing to abide by the IN resolutions and for persisting in its measures aiming at changing the physical character of the Syrian Golan Heights, as well as its demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status, and forcing the Syrian citizens to assume Israeli citizenship and identity cards.
3. *Reaffirms* its condemnation of the United States' policy of continued and unlimited support for the Zionist enemy, its defense of Zionists policies and the signing of a strategic cooperation treaty with it, thus encouraging it to pursue its policy of, annexing the Golan, Al-Quds Al-Sharif and South Lebanon, as well as the imposition of a de facto situation in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories with the ultimate goal of annexing them.
4. *Reaffirms* the necessity to apply the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the protection of civilians in times of war to the Syrian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and calls on the states, parties to the Convention to ensure that its provisions are applied, and that the obligations arising therefrom are respected under all circumstances.
5. *Calls upon* all states to break off diplomatic, Military, trade and cultural relations with Israel, to stop the assistance given to it, and to take all the measures needed to force its rescind both its decision to annex, the Syrian Golan Heights and its consequences.
6. *Commends* the resistance of the Syrian Arab citizens in the Golan heights against Occupation and annexation and affirms its full support' for their just struggle in defence of their freedom, territorial integrity, national identity, and the liberation of their land.
7. *Requests* the Secretary General to submit a report to the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the measures taken by Member States in implementation of this Resolution.

[...]

RESOLUTION 5/5-P (IS) ON THE RESUMPTION OR ESTABLISHMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ZIONIST ENEMY BY SOME COUNTRIES.

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, the Session of Islamic Solidarity held in Kuwait, the State of - Kuwait from 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987;

*Inspired by* the principles and goals of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Recalling* the resolutions adopted by the previous Islamic Conferences emphasizing the obligation of Member States to break all political, economic, military, cultural and other forms of direct and indirect relations with the Zionist enemy;

*Recalling once again* that to maintain or resume political, economic, military, cultural and other forms of relations with the Zionist enemy would help the continued usurpation of Palestine and the violation of the national and inalienable rights of its people;

*Referring to* the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No.3379 (XXX) of 10 November, 1975 declaring Zionism as a form of racism;

*Recalling* Resolution No.1057 (1986) adopted by the Twenty Second Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Resolution No.21, adopted by OAU Council of Ministers at its Second Extraordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, 19-21 November 1973, which urge Member States to maintain severance of relations with the Zionist enemy, the natural and full partner of the racist regime of South Africa;

*Pursuant to* Resolution No. 8/15-P of the Fifteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers calling for resistance to efforts of the Zionist entity to break its isolation and resolution No.15/6-P of the Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers calling on Member States not to resume and to sever relations with the Zionist entity;

*Having discussed* recent developments in respect of the resumption of relations by some governments of Member States with the Zionist enemy, which would help Zionist enemy to end its isolation and strengthen its ability to continue its practices and policies of repression, settlement and expansion;

1. *Condemns* the resumption of diplomatic relations by some states with the Zionist enemy, since it constitutes a violation of resolutions of the OIC, and the OAU Council of Ministers and a hostile act against the Arab and Islamic Ummah.
2. *Requests* those States which have resumed diplomatic relations with the Zionist enemy to reconsider their decision.
3. *Appeals* to States intending to either resume or establish diplomatic relations with the Zionist enemy to reconsider their position in order to avoid any negative repercussions on their relations with Arab and Islamic States.
4. *Urges* Member States which maintain diplomatic and other relations with the Zionist enemy to abide by the relevant resolutions of the Islamic Conferences.
5. *Requests* the Secretary General to follow up the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Seventeenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

**RESOLUTION NO. 6/5-P (IS): TO ENSURE CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 3379 (XXX) OF 1975 [...]**

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, [...];

*Inspired* by the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference which call for the elimination of racism;

*Referring* to the U.N. Declaration on eliminating all forms of racial discrimination;

*Referring*, also to the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No.3379 (XXX) of October 10, 1975, which states that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination;

*Recalling* the final statements of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah in Moharram 1390H (March, 1970); in Karachi in Shawwal, 1390H (December 1970), and in Jeddah in Moharram 1392H (March, 1972) which denounce and condemn the Zionist movement as a racist aggressive and expansionist movement, opposed to all human ideals, and a permanent threat to world peace;

*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Istanbul, the Republic of Turkey, in Jumad al Oula 1396H (May, 1976) which condemned Zionist as a colonialist, expansionist, racist and imperialist doctrine regarding it as a direct threat to international peace and security;

*Noting* that the Zionist racist regime in Occupied Palestine and the apartheid regime in South Africa are organically linked, both in practice and objective, thus constituting a single racist structure that threatens international peace and security and violates human dignity and sanctities;

1. *Reaffirms* that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution No.3379 (XXX) of 1975.
2. *Calls upon* Member States to act within the U.N. to foil attempts to rescind the said resolution.
3. *Requests* the Secretary General to follow up this question and to report thereon to the Islamic Conference.

**RESOLUTION 7/5-P(IS): ON AL-QUDS FUND AND ITS WAQF**

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, [...]

*Guided* by the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Affirming* the continued consolidation of Islamic solidarity with the people of Palestine and the commitment of Member States to pay up the capital of the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf through steady financial Contributions;

*Appreciating* the importance of the active and vital role of Al-Quds Fund in boosting the steadfastness and struggle of the Palestinian people in all the occupied Arab territories, Particularly the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

*Noting* the significance of the role of the Waqf in ensuring steady financial resources for the Fund;

*Commending* Member States which continue to provide annual Contributions to Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf, notably the kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

*Referring* to all relevant resolutions of Islamic Conferences;

1. Reiterates Member States commitment to pay up the capital of Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf, each amounting to US\$ 100 million. (One hundred million US dollars)
2. Calls upon the General Secretariat to take necessary measures and make necessary arrangements for the implementation of this resolution.

#### RESOLUTION 8/5-P(IS): ON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN LEBANON

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, the Session of Islamic Solidarity, held in Kuwait, The State of Kuwait from 26-29 Jumada Al Oula, 1407H corresponding to 26-29 January, 1987;

*Pursuant* to the principles and objectives stipulated in the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

*Emphasizing* the continued consolidation of Islamic solidarity with the Palestinian people and the unwavering commitment of Member States to support the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their rights and liberate their territories;

*Gravely concerned* about the tragic events perpetrated against the Palestinian Camps in Lebanon, for the purpose of annihilating those Camps and displacing their inhabitants and forcing them to abandon their camps, pursuant to conspiratorial schemes of alternative repatriation and settlement against the Palestinian people and their just cause and legitimate leadership represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization;

*Strongly denouncing* the continued siege and bombardment of the camps; their continued bombardment with all -types of destructive weapons: the killing and wounding of thousands of camp inhabitants, including children, women and the old people; obstructing the delivery of medical and food supplies, and the stoppage of water and electricity supplies to them, in addition to indiscriminate kidnapping, assault and killing while the Israeli enemy is carrying out continuous air and naval raids against the Camps, thus bringing about a heinous systematic massacre that has been going on for years under the very eyes of the whole world;

*Guided* by the relevant United Nations resolutions on the protection and housing of Palestinian refugees in host Arab countries and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

*Pursuant* to all the Islamic resolutions on Palestinian camps in Lebanon, in particular, the appeal of the Coordinating Meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers of 2 October, 1986 contained in the Statement No.A/41/740;

*Calls for:*

1. An immediate ceasefire and an immediate cessation of all forms of attacks on Palestinian camps.
2. The complete lifting of the siege imposed on the Palestinian camps and ensuring access of medical and food supplies to their inhabitants.
3. The return of the evacuated and abducted Palestinians to their camps, their rehabilitation in the camps and the payment of compensations for all the losses and damages suffered by the inhabitants.
4. To support and follow-up the efforts being exerted by Committee established by the League of Arab States at the recent extraordinary meeting of its Council, with a view to implementing the resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on the situation of Palestinian camps in Lebanon.



**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE  
TWELVE MEMBER STATES, BRUSSELS, 23 FEBRUARY 1987**

The Member States of the European Community have particularly important political, historical, geographical, economic, religious, cultural and human links with the countries and peoples of the Middle East. They cannot therefore adopt a passive attitude towards a region which is so close to them nor remain indifferent to the grave problems besetting it. The repercussions of these problems affect the Twelve in many ways.

At the present time, tension and conflict in the Near and Middle East are continuing and worsening. The civilian population is suffering more and more without any prospect of peace. The Twelve would like to reiterate their profound conviction that the search for peace in the Near and Middle East remains a fundamental objective. They are profoundly concerned at the absence of progress in finding a solution to the Israel-Arab conflict.

Consequently, they have a direct interest in the search for negotiated solution to bring just, global and lasting peace to the region and good relations between neighbours, and to allow the economic, social and cultural development which has been too long neglected. They have stated the principles on which solutions should be based on several occasions, in particular in their Venice Declaration.

Accordingly, the Twelve would like to state that they are in favour of an International Peace Conference to be held under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the Parties concerned and of any party able to make a direct and positive contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace and to the region's economic and social development. The Twelve believe this conference should provide a suitable framework for the necessary negotiations between the parties concerned.

For their part, the Twelve would be prepared to play their part with respect to such a Conference and will endeavour to make an active contribution, both through the President-in-Office and individually to bringing the positions of the parties concerned closer to one another with a view to such a Conference being convened. In the meantime, the Twelve request the parties concerned to avoid any action likely to worsen the situation or complicate and delay the search for peace.

Without prejudging future political solutions, the Twelve wish to see an improvement in the living conditions of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories, particularly regarding their economic, social, cultural and administrative affairs. The Community has already decided to grant aid to the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories and to allow certain products from these territories preferential access to the Community Market.



**THREE-PART UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL (THE "LONDON  
DOCUMENT"), 11 APRIL 1987**

*[This document was published on 1 Jan. 1988 in the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv, stating that it was concluded between King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli FM Peres.]*

**THREE-PART UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL**

• *Invitation by the UN Secretary-General:*

The UN secretary general will send invitations to the five permanent members of the Security Council and to the parties involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict to negotiate an agreement by peaceful means based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 with the purpose of attaining comprehensive peace in the region and security for the countries in the area, and granting the Palestinian people their legitimate rights.

- *Decisions of the international conference:*

The participants in the conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations is to attain by peaceful means an agreement about all aspects of the Palestinian problem. The conference invites the sides to set up regional bilateral committees to negotiate bilateral issues.

- *Nature of the agreement between Jordan and Israel:*

Israel and Jordan agree that:

- 1) the international conference will not impose a solution and will not veto any agreement reached by the sides;
- 2) the negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees in a direct manner;
- 3) the Palestinian issue will be discussed in a meeting of the Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli delegations;
- 4) the representatives of the Palestinians will be included in Jordanian-Palestinian delegation;
- 5) participation in the conference will be based on acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338 by the sides and the renunciation of violence and terror;
- 6) each committee will conduct negotiations independently;
- 7) other issues will be resolved through mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

*This document of understanding is pending approval of the incumbent governments of Israel and Jordan. The content of this document will be presented and proposed to the United States.*



**SOVIET PRESIDENT MICHAEL GORBACHEV, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST,  
MOSCOW, 24 APRIL 1987 [EXCERPTS]**

*[Gorbachev made his comments at a state gathering in honor of Syrian Pres. Assad, emphasizing the major role Syria could play in promoting a political settlement in the region.]*

The reliance on military force has completely lost its credibility as a way of solving the Middle East conflict. There is more than enough proof of this.

The main reason for the conflict being prolonged is the expansionist policy of the Israeli leadership, which is backed by Washington. The U.S. treats the Middle East as a testing ground for its imperialist policies.

We express solidarity with the Arabs who refuse to recognize the conquest of their lands. We harshly condemn the discrimination against the Palestinian people who have been deprived of their right to self-determination and their right to a homeland.

In the future, as in the past, we shall oppose any separate deal because such deals only impede and frustrate the search for a genuine solution.

Israeli leaders cling stubbornly to a hopeless policy. They try to build the security of their state by imposing terror on their neighbours, using every available method, including political terror, for that purpose.

This is a short-sighted and defective policy, all the more so since it is aimed at 200 million Arabs. There is a different way - one that is correct, and credible - to ensure a safe future for the State of Israel. This is the way of a just peace and the final establishment of good neighbourly relations with the Arabs.

Much has been said recently about relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, many lies have been spread. Allow me to clarify: The absence of relations cannot be considered normal, but the reason they were severed, first and foremost, was Israel's aggression against the Arab countries.

We recognize without reservation - as with all other states - Israel's right to peace and to a secure existence. At the same time, the Soviet Union strongly opposes a policy of force and annexation.

It should be clear that changes in relations with Israel are only possible within the framework of a Middle East settlement. We will not allow this matter to be taken out of this context. This interdependence has been dictated by the course of events, by the policy of Israel.

We are certain that the preparations for an international conference on the Middle East involving all the parties concerned must be the central element in the joint efforts to reach a settlement.

This concept, as you know, has been ill-fated, it was not immediately accepted. But the years that have passed show that such a conference is the only way to break the impasse. Today, it is not an exaggeration to say that a major part of the international community supports such a conference.

Even the U.S. and Israel cannot openly maintain a negative attitude.

It is time to start careful and deliberate preparatory work. The permanent members of the Security Council can take the initiative in this matter.

Allow me to stress that the Soviet Union is prepared for constructive and genuine efforts on a mutual, bilateral basis.

During the course of our discussions we have dealt with these matters in great detail. I cannot but express satisfaction at the fact that the Syrian leadership is resolute in following the road towards a political settlement.

It is clear in this context that much depends on the diplomatic activities and perseverance of the Arab states, on coordination between them. We are saddened by the lack of unity, differences of opinion and conflicts in the Arab world...

Now that the preparatory work for the international conference has been put on the agenda, a joint Arab stand is especially important. In this regard, we believe that the actions of our Syrian friends can play a crucial role.



**JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER ZAID AR-RIFAI, STATEMENT REGARDING  
AN INTERNATIONAL MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE, AMMAN, 3 MAY 1987**

In the last two years, King Hussein has made intensive efforts to gain the agreement and support of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on an international conference to be called by the UN secretary general and attended by all interested parties in the conflict, including the PLO.

The results of these efforts was the agreement by the parties concerned on the necessity of holding such a conference after they became convinced that no peaceful settlement in the Middle East could be achieved except through an international conference for peace in the Middle East, whose participants would agree to attend it with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and to find a settlement to the Palestinian question, in all its aspects, including the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people - and they should renounce any acts of violence and terror.

It is known that Jordan insists on the necessity of extending an invitation to the PLO to take part in such a conference and that Jordan has worked to enable this organization to take part in a peace conference within a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in the light of the Amman agreement of February 11, 1985.

As for the press reports on agreements and contacts, these are all baseless. In fact the world is still waiting for the agreement of the Israeli government on the convening of an international peace conference, and its participation on the above-mentioned basis. As a step necessary in convening such a conference, it is not useful to go ahead in preparing the conference while Israel in principle rejects its being convened, and also refuses to take part in its work when it is convened.



**JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 20<sup>TH</sup> ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING,  
SINGAPORE, 15-16 JUNE 1987 [EXCERPTS]**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The 20th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Singapore from 15-16 June 1987, was formally opened by His Excellency Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore. [...]

**WEST ASIA**

68. The Foreign Ministers viewed with concern the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. They reiterated their full support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination, and the resolution of Arab sovereignty over their occupied territories. The Foreign Ministers called for renewed efforts to achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement by negotiations. Towards this end, they expressed support for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations. As regard the Iran-Iraq War, the Foreign Ministers renewed their appeal for an end to the war and called for an honourable solution of the conflict. [...]



**SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, STATEMENT TO THE UN  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 42<sup>ND</sup> SESSION, NEW YORK, 28 SEPTEMBER 1987 [EXCERPTS]**

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

[...]

Mr. President:

We face this year, as we have faced for the past forty years, the question of Palestine and the Middle East problem, and the core of that conflict, the question of Al-Quds Al-Shareef, which emanates from Israeli aggressions upon Arab lands, upon the Arab inhabitants in Palestine and other peoples in the neighboring Arab countries, and aggression upon the Islamic nations and the Islamic Umma, especially in Al-Quds Al-Shareef, the first Kibla and the third holiest shrine. We do not think that there is a problem or a question that has become clearer and more evident in all its aspects to the whole world, than the problem of Palestine. There is no problem where wrong challenges right every day that the problem of Palestine. The United Nations has never before witnessed a challenge to its will or an assault upon its Charter, as it has witnessed, and still continues to witness, in the perpetuation of Zionist aggression upon the Arab people inside and outside Palestine. The tragic circumstances and sad situation that Lebanon is suffering from is in reality one of the acute consequences of this problem. Peace is the demand of all humanity today, a peace based on justice, and justice is the foundation of stability and the basis for its continuation. But the objective of peace has become a victim of those who reject it. Israel has spared no effort in order to thwart peace initiatives. It has persisted with aggression and its concerted efforts in disrupting possibilities for peace. It has become clear and evident that the establishment of peace in our region will not be realized except through the recognition of the inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Israel's obstinacy and its persistent attempts to disrupt peace initiatives in order to gain time to achieve its objectives and designs will only lead to more troubles and to consequences which will increase the difficulties of solving the problem, with all the risks and dangers that may result from that. There is no clearer proof of this than Israel's deliberate acts to put obstacles and difficulties in the path of the efforts aimed at convening an international conference.

Perhaps there is no need here for me to reaffirm the fact that no solution could meet success unless it includes the Palestine Liberation Organization - being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people - as a party and a factor in negotiations and dialogue. The Arab countries have risen up to their historic responsibility toward peace and offered what they can for the establishment of peace and stability in the region, when they proclaimed their framework for the peace process in the historic decisions issued in Fez in 1982, which emphasized the Arab consensus on a peace based upon justice in accordance with international legitimacy, and in compliance with the international will as it is represented by United Nations resolutions. [...]

Mr. President:

The problem of Namibia and the racist policy adopted by South Africa are amongst the issues that we greatly care for, and it falls within the realm of responsibilities that we share with the African nations. On this basis, we call upon the international community of the United Nations to intensify its efforts to end the era of apartheid and colonialism in that part of the world. The cooperation and alliance between the Zionist regime in Palestine and the Pretoria regime in South Africa, which are united by similar designs and common means and ideas, puts a double responsibility on the shoulder of the United Nations to implement the requirements of its Charter, as well as on the shoulder of member states to be committed to their obligation to end the era of oppression, apartheid, violation of international conventions, and the use of brute force against peaceful peoples. The attacks of South Africa on neighboring African states will only increase the isolation of this racist regime, and will not save it, for the final reckoning which is the ultimate fate of all oppressors. [...]



**MOSHE AMIRAV, "OUTLINE FOR ADVANCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN  
THE LIKUD AND THE PLO," JERUSALEM, SEPTEMBER 1987 [EXCERPTS]**

*[A member of the Likud Central Committee at the time of his proposal, Amirav broke with his party's line by initiating a political dialogue with Palestinian intellectual and Birzeit University Prof. of Islamic Philosophy Sari Nusseibeh. Both were harshly criticized by their sides for the dialogue.]*

1. The right of both peoples to the land is indivisible. It is equal. The injustice done to both people in our terrible and bloodstained history requires redress via the following equation: security and peace for the Jewish people, self-determination on part of the land and regress of the injustice done the refugees of the Palestinian people.
2. Attempts over the past hundred years to solve this conflict by force have failed. The Palestinians will not leave the country and will not surrender their right to it. The Jews will not dismantle the state they established within the 1948 borders and will not halt their buildup for maintenance of their security.
3. Attempts to reach a settlement that do not include the Palestinians as a major partner to the negotiations or whose outcome is not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state are doomed to failure.
4. The sole official representative of the Palestinian people in any settlement is the PLO without whose participation there is no point in reaching any settlement. Likewise, in Israel there is no point in reaching any settlement without the Likud.

5. The present political situation does not permit an Alignment diplomatic initiative to be taken without the Likud. Thus the international conference cannot be held. However, a Likud counter-initiative vis-à-vis the Palestinians would be feasible, should the latter prove amenable. Such a move would not be rejected by either the Alignment or the Israeli left. Our assessment is that at the end of the Knesset's summer recess (i.e., around September) the Alignment will leave the government and a Likud government with a narrow Knesset majority (61 out of 120 seats) will be formed. In either case - with the Alignment in the government, or even more so if the Alignment goes into opposition - the Likud has a vested interest in embarking on a diplomatic initiative.
6. Several top Likud members have now been presented with a proposed diplomatic settlement, based on the establishment of a region of Palestinian self-administration in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (the West Bank and the Strip). The Palestinian self-administration will cover this area - which encompasses some 5,000 sq. km. - and its capital will be in East Jerusalem. Such an interim arrangement would guarantee Israel's security and enable it to maintain its settlements in Judea and Samaria at a fixed and unchanging level.
7. It is proposed, under the plan for this interim arrangement, to advance within a year to the establishment of the Palestinian self-administration, which would wield powers approaching those of a state. (The plan is enclosed herewith). Such an interim arrangement has clear advantages for both sides and also leaves open the option of halting negotiations and leaving the situation as it stands.
8. Conditions for entering negotiations:
  - a. Mutual recognition.
  - b. Cessation of hostile actions.

This means, as far as Israel is concerned:

- Recognition of the right of the Palestinian people-not as refugees, but as a people-to its own state.
- Recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
- Cessation of hostile actions toward Palestinians in the territories and cessation of any further Israeli settlement there.

The meaning, as far as the PLO is concerned, is as follows:

- Recognition of Israel's existence within the 1948 borders and of its right to exist within said borders in peace and security (i.e., 242 or amendment of the Palestinian Covenant).
  - Cessation of all hostile or terrorist actions everywhere.
9. The negotiations will be held over a period of four years: the first year to deliberate the interim arrangement, and the ensuing three years to deliberate the final settlement. A "cease-fire" will be declared throughout this period, as is customary under international law.
  10. Egypt will be requested to host the negotiations for their entire duration. The delegates of both sides will consequently reside in Cairo.
  11. The initial contacts will be kept secret and will be held between unauthorized delegates until an understanding on this document has been concluded by both sides. [...]



Map 1

The Camp David Accords, 1978-1979



Map 2

Israeli Invasion into Lebanon, 1982

