The Foreign Policies of Arab States
Seminar 1996

The Foreign Policies of Arab States
PASSIA is a non-profit Palestinian institution in Jerusalem. It has a financially and legally independent status and is not affiliated with any government, political party or organization.

PASSIA seeks to present the Palestine Question in its national, Arab and international contexts through academic research, dialogue and publication.

With its Education and Training in International Affairs program, PASSIA has pioneered educational seminars for Palestinian graduates. This seminar program provides a much needed focus inside Palestine for training Palestinian graduates and mid-carrier professionals in the field of international affairs with lecturers and workshops held by the highest quality Palestinian and foreign specialists. Where possible, fellowships or study visits abroad are awarded to the most outstanding seminar participants.

The PASSIA Seminar 1996 on The Foreign Policies of Arab States is kindly supported by the Ford Foundation.

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April 1997
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PASSIA's seminar on the Foreign Policies of Arab States was part of PASSIA's annual "Training and Education in International Affairs" program.

The Seminar 1996 aimed to train Palestinian graduates about the Foreign Policies of Arab States and to apply this knowledge to regional and international affairs. It is part of PASSIA's endeavor to meet the needs of the Palestinian community for formal education, training and practical experience in an area that is receiving increasing attention as Palestinians define and address their own political and economic needs.

The first part of this report contains the lectures, or outlines of them, given during the seminar as well as a summary of the subsequent discussions. The second part includes profiles (basic statistical and other background data) of selected Arab states. In the appendices, one can find information about the lecture program, the lecturers, the Palestinian participants, and a list of relevant reading material.

PASSIA would like to take this opportunity to express its deep appreciation to the Ford Foundation, Cairo, due to whose kind support this program could be realized.

We also thank most warmly the guest lecturers from Europe and Canada, and all the local and regional scholars whose lectures and expertise contributed greatly to the success of the seminar.

Last but not least, the PASSIA team would like to thank the Palestinian participants for their commitment and enthusiasm to learn about Arab states' foreign policies.

Jerusalem, April 1997
The PASSIA Academic Committee
Preparation

PASSIA consulted with Palestinian and European scholars in order to plan and implement the seminar. Consultation began in June and PASSIA advertised the proposed seminar in the local press, *Al Quds*, *An-Nahar* and *Al-Ayyam* during the months of August and September 1996. Notification was also given to national institutions such as universities, research centers, and institutions of the Palestinian National Authority. No travel, accommodation, food or other expenses were required from participants, nor any fees for undertaking the course. The seminar was supported financially by the Ford Foundation.

Participant Selection Procedure

PASSIA formed a Committee specifically for the preparatory stage of the seminar. Its members were: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Rosemary Hollis and Deniz Altayli. PASSIA received applications from all over the Palestinian Territories, and all applicants were invited for interviews. The Program Coordinator, Dr. Rosemary Hollis, came from London specifically in order to conduct the interviews, which took place over the period 23-29 October 1996 in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. The Committee selected 15 of the interviewees to participate in the seminar plus seven reserves.

Reading Period

The lecturers provided each a list of reference material covering the topics addressed in their respective lectures. Required reading material was photocopied and distributed to the participants in November in order that they could familiarize themselves with the concepts of the seminar beforehand. Each participant received a reading package including assorted articles and essays amounting to approximately 300 pages.
subjects and additional material recommended by the lecturers was available for the participants at the PASSIA library. The reading period included the preparation of a country-position paper, whereby each of the 15 participants was assigned one Arab state on which to collect the required information. PASSIA researcher Awad Mansour was at the participants' disposal for whatever help they needed regarding their research work and, as Seminar Assistant, was available for further questions as they arose.

**Lecture Program**

From 9-20 December 1996 a series of workshops and other educational exercises was given by the Palestinian scholars and foreign experts. In addition, European and US diplomats gave presentations on certain topics. The participants themselves presented their research findings on country-related issues that they prepared as part of the one-month preparatory reading period.

**Social Activities**

During the two-week seminar beverages and luncheon for all participants and lecturers were provided by PASSIA. At one point during the seminar, PASSIA hosted an evening reception for all involved in the seminar, as well as for representatives of Palestinian institutions, the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem/Jericho and friends of PASSIA.

**Writing Assignments**

Participants were required to write two essays, one in Arabic and one in English. The first one, a position paper in English on one of the selected Arab states, had to be submitted at the beginning of the actual seminar. It had to cover basic data on the respective country or information on the country's foreign policy and its position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The participants presented these country-related topics during the seminar.

The second essay, in Arabic on topics studied during the seminar was required for submission by the end of January 1997. Seminar lecturers compiled a list of suggested titles for these essays and participants selected one each for analysis.

**Certificate**

Participants who performed all required tasks were given a certificate confirming their successful participation in the seminar program.
The Arabs - being united in their history, heritage, culture, language, and aspirations, as well as in their common destiny - comprise one nation, established in one great homeland. The leaders of the Arab National Movement in the early years of the nineteenth century attempted to lead their people to freedom, independence and Arab sovereignty on Arab soil, and Arab progressive thoughts can be traced back through the writings of Mahmoud Sami Baroudy, Mohammed Abdo, Abdallah Nadim, Ahmad Rida, Abdul Al-Rahman Kaqakiby, and Rashid Azoury. The latter published a book titled *The Awakening of Arab Nations* in 1904 in Paris. He said: “Those who became aware that they form one united Arab nation, united in their history and national aspirations, wish to separate from the Turks and demand to establish an independent Arab state on Arab territory governed by a ruler who is, at the same time, to be the Caliph of Muslims. By this we would achieve the separation between religion and state as well as freeing Arabs from Turkish rule.”

The major challenges that faced the Arabs in their struggle for freedom, independence and unity were the following:

- The conflict between Ottomanization, which was overwhelmed by the Islamic dimension, and Arabization.
- The conflict between Arabs and their allies, who were committed to three different parties as seen in three historical documents: The McMahon Paper of 1915, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
- The rapid deterioration of relations between the Arab nationalists (kawmeen) who supported the idea of one Arab nation and the local nationalists who wished to see separate entities in the independent Arab states, as a result of the above.

Having said that, the question of Arab leadership is another element to be discussed and studied in order to understand the unfolding history of the Arab National Movement and its struggle for independence and unity. There are several important questions that need to be dealt with. For example, what makes a leader in an Arab society? For how long can a leader maintain his role? How do regional, international and local elements affect leaders? Is there a special category that people can refer to in order to identify leaders? So many other questions could also be raised in this context.

I believe that in an Arab Islamic society, traditionally, i.e., between 1900 and the 1950s, five major conditions emerged which all leaders were required to fulfill. If one or more of these elements apply to a certain individual, then we are in the process of reading the makings of a leader.
The second element is **wealth**. In the old days, wealth stood for land ownership, property, and generosity. Today, wealth is interpreted differently; people are considered as well to do if they do not need to lose face for financial reasons, or are not obliged to do favors for the sake of money.

The third element in traditional society was **family**. Carrying the name of a well-known and widely respected family was generally enough to provide a social status recognized in society. In recent years, the advantage of family ties has been replaced by institutional affiliation. A person holding a certain post - in a municipality, organization, society, council, etc. - that gives him/her some authority can build on this and develop relationships within the society. If his/her performance is convincing, such relationships with his/her associates or others who are affiliated with the institution (colleagues, employees, partners, followers) can constitute the foundation of a constituency.

The fourth element is the matter of **connections**, either regarding members of government or those who are influencing decision-makers, irrespective of their own professional background. People who have established good connections are often well-informed, knowledgeable, and able to judge and assess issues from an objective perspective, which can strengthen their social status since connections lead to information on which individuals base their judgment.

The fifth element is **credibility**, implying that a leader is able to deliver according to people’s needs and that he has not misused any of the previous four elements for his own personal gain, nor failed in his judgment. Such a person must behave in the manner that is expected of him, and clean hands and a soft heart are vital.

Several if not all of the above-mentioned elements might be found in one person, making him a potential, though not *de facto*, leader in an Arab Islamic context. At the time of the British mandate in Palestine, the Grand Mufti, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini and King Abdullah of Jordan both possessed the five attributes mentioned above, only to lose them during certain confrontations with each other or with their common ally (Great Britain); the general performance of the two leaders, according to some historians, was indeed a clear indication that they had gradually ceased to fulfill the accepted requirements of a leader. In spite of their performance, however, they succeeded in maintaining their authority and leadership.

This analysis was applicable from 1900 until the early 50s, when a new interpretation of the five elements evolved.

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**The State in the International System - Alternative Theoretical Frameworks**

Dr. Rosemary Hollis

Almost by definition, “foreign policy” is an attribute or characteristic of a state. The term is used to describe both the statements (in effect preferences) of policy-makers/statesmen, and the behavior of states in relation to others.

Clearly there is a distinction here between what statesmen say they are doing or intend to do and what they are actually doing, as judged by the outcome of their actions in the international setting. Was, for example, US policy in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis intended to
uphold international law or to guarantee control over access to Gulf oil resources? US statesmen said the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was a violation of international law. Yet, to conclude that the US-led military action that liberated Kuwait is proof that the US policy was to uphold international law does not demonstrate the entire truth.

Any analysis of the foreign policies of states must involve an evaluation of outcomes as well as statements of intent. Similarly, anyone involved in foreign policy formation must weigh up what is possible as well as what is desirable. The two major goals that we need to consider are: to define some tools with which to analyze the foreign policies of Arab states, and to define guidelines for effective foreign policy making.

The study of politics, whether at the domestic, state, regional or global level is essentially the study of power. What are the sources of power (natural resources, skilled manpower, guns, money, etc.)? Where or with whom does power reside (e.g., Washington, London, the military, multinational corporations, etc.)? How is power being used (to coerce, to liberate, to develop/create jobs, etc.)?

Another question is what it is that makes a person, institution or state more or less powerful? Does it depend on the context and issues in question? In addition, how can one compare the power of a bank with that of an armored division?

Of principal importance is the role of power in the international world economy, as defined by international political economist Professor Susan Strange. Here, power has the following four basic facets: security, knowledge, production, and finance/credit. All states possess some or all of the aforementioned attributes, but so too do other actors in the international system. This can be seen clearly in the case of finance/credit: states cannot develop without borrowing and investment. Thus, they must turn to sources of foreign capital, which gives great power to those states with the ability to grant or deny credit.

The case of the US-Iran relationship is a good example. The US does not want its allies to re-negotiate Iran’s debts, and it demands that Iran pay now. Iran, therefore, does not have the money to buy arms, while, at the same time, its standard of living deteriorates and the government is subjected to additional pressure. The use of sanctions against companies that invest in Iran despite the existence of legislation prohibiting trade is another unique tool of US foreign policy.

Knowledge can be another form of power. Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of Powers*, for example, points out how the US maintains its power due to its knowledge and experience in areas such as high-technology.

Worthy of consideration is the fact that the nature of power is changing. There are many other actors in the international arena with key roles, such as multinational companies. In the future, governments and states will have less control as modern means of communication, such as the Internet, will be used to a far greater extent.

When attempting to understand international relations, three major theories are applied: Marxism-Leninism, Liberalism, and Nationalism/Mercantilism.

Marxism focuses not on actors, but on means such as productivity. The Marxist theory is based on the fundamental notion that states are merely temporary arrangements that will eventually be succeeded by historical materialism. The underlying evolutionary or revolutionary process follows a given pattern that leads from a new synthesis to dialectic feudalism (dynamic and conflicting), then to industrial revolution and capitalism and, finally, to Communism. In particular, Marxism also helps to lay the ground for the understanding of imperialism, neo-imperialism and the constraints within which states (especially developing states) operate. For example, life in the Gulf states has been dictated by, and shaped by, the oil consumption patterns of the industrial world.
Accordingly, the interests of the state are put above the needs of individuals. The significance of national security and power is emphasized and it is the state’s military force that dictates global politics. International competition is for wealth and power, and conflicts are more likely to emerge than cooperation. With regard to the actions of the US during the Gulf War, this approach would have anticipated the US’s objective to control the access to Gulf oil.

The liberalist model is based on the following assumptions:

- There is a need to separate politics and economics.
- The economy is based on the logic of the market, which is scientific and neutral.
- Human existence is all about meeting individual needs.
- Individuals behave rationally - they aim to maximize benefits and minimize costs and they relate means to ends.
- Progress is linear, gradual and continuous towards the greater good of all individuals.
- There is a need to reduce state intervention and remove economic barriers.

According to this model, the US did not need to liberate Kuwait because market forces would have limited Iraq’s control. The market would have determined the demand for oil and limited the amount of power Iraq ultimately stood to gain. The US intervened ostensibly to prevent an Iraqi monopoly, i.e., in the name of the market, but it was ultimately trying to safeguard its interests, which is more in line with the nationalist or mercantilist approach.

The Realist Theory is perhaps the most American of the approaches to international relations. It combines elements of the liberal and mercantilist approaches and has the following main aspects:

- Anarchy predominates at the systemic level, since there is no international body capable of enforcing law on all states.
- States are the most important actors in the international arena.
- States are unitary, rational actors, engaged in a struggle for power, which dictates foreign policy accordingly.
- Security exists only within the state.
- It is assumed that the units (usually states) in the system act rationally and calculate forces.
- The power of force is one of the most decisive powers.
- National ambitions and threats to survival are permanent.
- The imperative factor is the balance of power.
- It is impossible to operate on the basis of ethics or “peace of law.”
- Power is used rationally, not morally.
- The goals of states are based on national interests.
- Geopolitical factors play a key role in the definition of states’ goals.
- The “personified state” is what international relations is all about - not class, ideology, law, or the bureaucratic process.

Discussion:

Participant: We should also include the Dependency Theory by Samir Amin.

Dr. Hollis: Korany, who is one of the neo-realists, considers realists very sloppy in their neglect of economic forces. Neo-realists try to use a methodological structure. Such approaches are very successful in Europe and Western countries, where bureaucracy works, but not in Palestine.

Participant: What do we need states for?

Dr. Hollis: Here we come to the question of symbolism versus material facts on the ground, i.e., perceptions inside the country.
In studying the Middle East, one can use two levels of analysis, namely macro or micro. The most effective kind of analysis would be a combination of the two, but we should be aware of the disadvantages of each.

**Arab System 1945-1996**

The Arab system, from 1945-1996, has been plagued by two ambiguities, which have not yet been dealt with. They are:

1) The conflict between the *raison d'état*, and the *raison de la nation*: the leaders speak in the name of an Arab nation but act in a territorial context, i.e., in the name of a state.

2) The debate over the Arab World versus the Middle East, i.e., two notions, one from inside and one from outside. The term 'Middle East' is used to describe a geographical entity, one that was intended to withstand a possible Soviet threat and that included both Arab and non-Arab countries (Iran and Turkey). The term 'Arab World' describes a solid entity - one nation with a common culture and heritage and with common interests and priorities. This debate reflects the fact that the question of how to define the region still exists.

Events have shown that, in the Arab World, history is cyclical rather than progressive. The Arab system is also characterized by the phenomena of Arabization and Islamization. Arabization came with colonization, and was based on the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Started by Christians, it protected their Arab identity against the system of the Turkish Caliphate.

While Islamization and Arabization are two different trends, they do, in fact, have the following common components:

- both are grass roots oriented;
- both are easy to assimilate;
- both have deep-rooted respect for authority and they both push one towards obedience;
- both are group-oriented and stress the community, rather than the individual;
- both clarify each other and glorify one's own group;
- both have the same goals, namely an autonomous region and protecting the regional identity.

**Evolution of the Arab Regional System: Arab Dynamics 1945-1996**

To understand the foreign policy of Arab states - or any states for that matter - it is necessary to specify beforehand the regional and international contexts (environment or system) within which a particular policy is implemented. We have thus to deal first with the evolution of the Arab/Middle East regional system. We will do this very briefly in order to know the general "forest" or main features before dealing with the individual "trees" (components or countries of the region and their foreign policies).

In order to help you understand this evolution I will divide this period (1945-1996) into nine periods or phases:

1) Dynastic statehood and its limits (1945-48)
2) Rise of a new governing elite and the militarization of the political system (1949-54)
3) Pan-Nationalist populism and its limits (1955-61)
Dynastic Statehood and Its Limits (1945-48)

This period is characterized by three main events: the end of the British Mandate; the establishment of the Arab League; and the UN Partition Plan and the establishment of the state of Israel.

The establishment of the Arab League was a British idea, introduced in 1941 by Anthony Eden. Britain supported the establishment of a system that would regroup the Arabs for two main reasons: to establish a united front against the Germans, and to put an end to the dilemmas and inter-dynastic fighting amongst the Arabs. The Arab system inherited two influences from Europe: the structure of the state and the idea of the nation.

The idea of the Arab League was then adopted by Iraq’s Nour Essa’id, who saw it as a way to control Syria. He believed that Egypt would refuse to join, thus leaving a regional system with Iraq in the lead. Yet, Egypt did join and even took on the leadership. A protocol was established and formalized in 1944 with five signatories: Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Syria. The following year, Saudi Arabia and Yemen joined the League.

The goal of the Arab League was basically to deepen cooperation among the Arab countries. Yet, while the League aimed at strengthening inter-Arab relations and was thought to be a step towards unity, the member countries were divided between unity and protecting individual territories and goals. For example, in Article 22, the word ‘state’ (i.e., territorial state) is mentioned 48 times. Article 2 states the aim “To protect the independence and sovereignty of each state,” and Article 8 calls upon members “To respect the existing regimes of each state.” Thus, the organization was not aimed at changing the status quo. It reflected, in reality, the politics of notables, rather than any expression of a popular mass movement.

The first period of the Arab League proved to be a failure. In order to meet the call for unity, the governments ignored their differences, and this produced a system that was weak from the start. Impotent and lacking credibility, the system failed in its first test: the 1948 war. In fact, the League came out of the war in a far worse condition than before, with inter-state tension and much less mutual trust than had previously existed. The Arab states went to the war in a state of fragmentation and improvisation. The result was a bitter defeat, usually codified by Arab historians and even political commentators as the first nakba.

Decision-Making Theory: Three Approaches

Dr. Rosemary Hollis

The “Realist” approach has some uses - particularly in the calculation of restraints on states and of the forces at work - but it does not allow for evolutionary forces at the global level, such as the globalization of the world economy. Furthermore, it does not take account of the fact that the decision-making ability of states has declined. There is now more decision-making at the global level. The idea that the state is pointless if it does not provide security is an old idea. Nowadays, the state does not have the power to deliver things such as jobs or a strong economy.

Realism also assumes rationality on the part of states and disallows (incorrectly) the impact of politics at the domestic level on foreign policy. At the state/domestic level, not only are there interacting and sometimes conflicting interests and groups, but there are
decision-makers whose rationales may have more to do with their personal ambitions than "raison d'État," or indeed with their positions within bureaucracies.

The following are three models of how decision-making takes place:

1) **Rational Policy Model:**
- Assumes that the state or the government is a unitary, rational actor. State action is thus seen as a rational choice in which:
  - goals and objectives are identified (national security etc.);
  - available options are discerned in the context of the international marketplace;
  - consequences are assessed in terms of outcomes, costs, and benefits;
  - choices are made on the basis of net evaluation.

2) **Organizational Process Model:**
- The organizational process model assumes an ethos of behavior, an operational program.
- Government actions are not choices but the product of organizational functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.
- Organizations (foreign ministry, transport ministry, armed forces, etc.) operate according to their own standards regarding operating procedures and programs, e.g., training to automatically take orders in armed forces, the profit factor/accountant's bottom line in business.
- Government options are dictated by available organizational resources, including the armed forces and how they operate, e.g., mobilization procedures.

Some factors involved in the process are:
- corporatism (competing for budget allocations);
- each organization has its own agenda behind foreign policy;
- sequential attention to problems/goals;
- feeding information upwards as part of the standard operating procedure, which is resistant to speedy action/change;
- an existing repertoire of programs to call upon;
- uncertainty avoidance - all new information is fitted into a form of knowledge;
- a range of decentralization vs. control between government leaders and organizations;
- different arrangements for the interaction between the various bodies.

In conclusion, leading decision-makers receive only such information and assistance as an organization is capable of providing, given its role in the picture.

3) **Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm:**
- Policy is an outcome of political bargaining between those in the government hierarchy.
- Government officials have separate and unequal powers over different aspects of the whole situation, as well as separable objectives in various sub-games.
- Individuals involved in decision-making have their own constituencies, personalities, background and "baggage."

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**The Arab States in the Regional and International System:**

**II. Rise of New Governing Elite and the Militarization of the Political System (Evolution)**

Dr. Bahgat Korany

**Rise of New Governing Elite and the Militarization of the Political System (1949-54)**

The period from 1949 until 1954 was characterized by two factors: a feeling of general instability throughout the Arab world, and the rise of Egypt.
Declaration, which limited the export of arms to the region, mainly to the Arab countries. This agreement confirmed the feeling of weakness and defeat and did not prevent the coups that took place, the most important being in Egypt.

The year 1952 represented the most important event in this period: the Free Officers Movement and the rise of Abdul Nasser. It was the traumatization that followed the 1948 war that led the leaders of the Egyptian coup to believe that, in order to change the Palestinian-Israel situation, they had to change the situation at home. The movement was led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, a nationalist who had just returned from the battlefield in Palestine and who wanted to keep the Middle East Arab and out of Western hands.

Pan-Nationalist Populism and its Limits (1955-61)

This stage was characterized by three major events:

1) The Baghdad Pact: This was a defense pact against the non-real enemies of the Arab World, i.e., the Soviet Union but not Israel, that included both Arab and non-Arab countries. According to Arab nationalists the pact prolonged colonial relations because the British were still involved. It collapsed in 1958 when Iraq withdrew from the agreement.

2) The founding of the Non-Aligned Movement: The non-aligned stance represented a foreign policy whose principles were independence and freedom in decision-making and not to be aligned to anyone, neither in the West nor the East. The movement was initiated with the creation of the Non-Alignment Pact, which represented the interests of the Third World, at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Abdul Nasser, Nehru, and Tito were the architects of this pact. The Bandung Conference is considered the birthplace of the Third World.

3) Success in the Arab Nationalist Movement: This period witnessed several major successes, such as the 1958 union between Egypt and Syria (UAR). Nadim Al-Bitar believed that culture and language were key factors for nationalism and unity, but stressed that two other elements were also needed: a base/center (e.g., Prussia was the base for Germany, while Egypt became the Arab base), and a charismatic leader, i.e., one who would take the people beyond the concentration on territory. With Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt had one such leader.

There were various remarkable events during this period, such as the construction of the high dam in Egypt, the withdrawal of World Bank funds, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal, but, with the demise of the UAR in 1961, the Arab nationalist dream went into decline.

The Arab Cold War and the All Liability Situation (1962-67)

The Arab “Cold War” era witnessed the following major events:

1) The Arab civil war over Yemen: Yemen was considered Egypt’s Vietnam; Egypt overstretched itself and its resources during the war, leaving it unprepared for the June War of 1967.

2) The 1967 Six Day War: This was the second nakba (catastrophe), which proved the failure of Pan-Arabism.

3) The Khartoum Conference in 1967: The conference indicated that Abdul Nasser was accommodating himself to the rise of oil-producing countries and was preparing for a temporary settlement with Israel, provided Arab land was returned.
Grouping after the Second Nakba (1968-72)

With the decline of Pan-Arabism, this period represents the beginning of the calls for Pan-Islamism. Following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, the role of the Arab governments with regard to the Palestine Question declined. It was during this time that a non-state actor, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), entered the scene with the Karameh Battle. Also during this period, Gamal Abdul Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat who strengthened Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and initiated an entirely new ball game in the Middle East.

The Arabs in Power...but Short-Lived (1973-77)

This era in Arab politics is represented by four events:

1) The October 1973 War: The war rehabilitated the Arab world at the psychological and military levels, and led to a regrouping of the Arab countries.

2) The oil embargo: The embargo represented a move towards Arab unity through economic tools. With some Arab countries becoming rich due to their wealth in natural resources, mainly oil, an exchange of labor and remittances between countries was created, generating a new link between the Gulf and the poorer Arab states. Through this economic bond, the mutual benefits of oil increased.

3) Kissinger and the lifting of the oil embargo (Arab re-fragmentation): The US was concerned that such a regional power might hinder its own policy. Kissinger’s activities and policies succeeded in ending the embargo and breaking up this new economic form of Arab unity.

4) Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem: Sadat had his own goals and decided to make a separate peace with Israel. His main aim was to secure US aid and he knew that this could not be accomplished without peace with Israel. This event sharply indicated the Arab decline, as the center of the system had now defected.

Lebanonization of the Arab System (1978-86)

This period saw a total change in both moods and ideologies. People concentrated more on economic issues and were mainly concerned with day-to-day issues and survival. The Arab core state that had rallied the different members of the system together was missing; instead, there were many factions fighting for unclear reasons. There was no clear vision but a tendency to focus on national politics. This became evident with the Lebanese War of 1982, when the only demonstrations that took place to protest the occupation of the Arab capital occurred in Israel. At the same time, Camp David gave the region a vision of a more permanent regional order: a Middle East, not an Arab world.

During this period, the Islamic movement became increasingly popular, representing an Islam that had gradually become more politicized and radical. The phenomenon of Islamization was reinforced by the fall of the Shah and the coming to power of the Islamists in Iran.

Competition for Focus (1987-90)

The Palestine Question had become a marginalized issue as the Iran-Iraq War took center stage. The Arab focus also centered on the Iranian threat, as the Gulf states directed their aid and resources towards the Iraqi troops. It was the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987 that ended the marginalization of the Palestinian cause and redirected the focus towards the Palestinians.

Arab Balance of Weakness and the New Regional Restructuring (1991-96)
new role as guardian of the Middle East for the West. Iran saw a defeated Iraq and Israel gained the Madrid Conference. It heralded a new game for the Middle East: one of economics and cooperation among all Arab and non-Arab countries. As noted by Shimon Peres, peace led to a re-organization of the Middle East into a regional community, and one modeled on the EU rather than focused on an Arab core.

The Arab States in the Regional and International System: III. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Academic View

Dr. Bahgat Korany

Dealing with foreign policy and decision-making, we are changing levels of analysis. We are shifting to the micro or country level, the level of the tree (as opposed to the forest, as in dealing with the regional system). The way decisions are made in a certain country is very revealing. Indeed, the decision-making process can be likened to the microcosm of the whole political world with its different participants and influences - domestic and foreign or external. The analysis of a country’s decision-making in this respect is like opening a box and seeing what is inside.

Unfortunately, we do not have time to deal with all the complexities of decision-making analysis, because this would require contributions from psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists and even medical doctors, biologists, system analysts and engineers. We must limit ourselves to our topic: decision-making in the realm of foreign policy. In this respect, I need to emphasize two important points.

Decisions, although important, are only one part of a country’s foreign policy. There are many other aspects, for instance, a country’s foreign policy orientation or general strategy. A country may decide - as a principle - to reject alliances and stay non-aligned (e.g., India, Abdul Nasser’s Egypt) or to be pro- or anti-American. Britain, for instance, has traditionally collaborated with the US, forming an Anglo-Saxon front, even against some European political positions.

Another aspect of a country’s foreign policy is its specific behavior in its relation with others: it can be diplomatic or commercial, and depends on the partner and the subject in question (e.g., recognition/non-recognition of a new government, trade with other countries).

These overall policy orientations comprise the basis for a country’s decision-making; they direct a country in its decisions as to whether to launch a war or sign a peace treaty. Examples are Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977, and the PLO’s decision to sign the Oslo Accords and recognize Israel in 1993.

In social science theory and methodology, these aspects are known as dependent variables, i.e., the factors that need to be explained and that are themselves determined by other factors, known as independent variables. These independent variables are the sources of foreign policy, the determinants - economic, military, geographic, historical, etc. - that shape decisions and foreign policy in general.

The second important point to be emphasized is that there are two main schools of thought as to what shapes foreign policy decisions. Analysts are divided about whether decisions are individual or group acts. Many people who analyze decision-making in Third World countries think of these countries as dominated by strong individuals who monopolize the decision-making process and its outcome. Although this is not wrong, the role of individuals should not be exaggerated as one may easily fall victim to a ‘great
man theory of history.' Leaders do count in Third World countries but neither they nor their countries are completely free agents. They suffer from constraints and pressures, both domestic (e.g., factions and pressure groups) and external (e.g., international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other funding organizations, and superpowers such as the US with an influence in some Latin American countries, or France in French-speaking Africa). As a result, in many Third World countries, especially the poor and small ones, the decision-making process is much more akin to decision-taking.

Other important questions concern exactly how rational decisions are and even if they are always rational. Although most leaders would claim otherwise, decisions are not and cannot always be completely rational. Rationality pre-supposes complete and objective information beforehand. A leader cannot know everything about the international system, its countries and their interims before making decisions. As a result, analysts agree in general that decisions are based on and restricted by limited rationality, and that decision-makers should try to obtain as much basic information as possible before deciding to prevent a decision from being a failure or leading to a catastrophe.

The Second Track - The Multilateral Talks in the Middle East Peace Process

Dr. Joel Peters

Multilateral Talks

The multilateral talks are part of the Madrid Conference, initiated to complement and proceed simultaneously with the bilateral talks. The multilaterals cover a range of regional issues and involve both regional parties and the international community in an effort to deal with areas of cooperation. There is no uniform element to the multilaterals and each area of the talks is very different from the other.

History:
Unlike the first meeting of the talks in Moscow, which were very disorganized and lacked any concrete ideas or conclusions regarding its aims, the multilaterals have developed their own framework and structure over time. Each group has met in plenary at least six or seven times, and there have been many different inter-sessional meetings. The multilaterals have been conducted with quiet diplomacy, in an attempt to depoliticize the agenda. The talks deal primarily with long-term issues, and have not seen any substantial breakthroughs. Many of the issues, furthermore, tend to be technical and complex, rather than political in nature.

Participation:
The multilaterals were structured in a way to include the involvement of the international community (US, Japan, and the EEC). Every Arab country is a participant, with the exception of Syria and Lebanon: both these countries boycotted the talks, arguing that they were a form of normalization and a reward to Israel, despite the absence of any political achievements. Recently, however, they have taken a quiet interest in the meetings. Although many of the issues under discussion affect these countries, their non-participation has not stopped any progress in the talks. Iraq and Libya were excluded from the negotiations on account of the international sanctions imposed on them.

Essentially, the multilaterals are really made up of the core parties, or two circles - the inner (Arab) and the outer (the international community). Overtime, there has been increased participation by the countries involved, and after 1993, the Arab countries began hosting the various talks and sessions.
to gain from these talks, and it was only recently that the PNA temporarily suspended participation in response to the lack of progress in the bilaterals.

**Structure:**
The multilaterals cover five main topics. Each of the five working groups has its own agenda and is headed by a gavel holder. The groups and their respective gavel holders are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Gavel Holder</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control/Regional Security (ACRS)</td>
<td>US and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources</td>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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The talks are coordinated by a steering committee, consisting of the four main parties - Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel - as well as others, including Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. The agendas are as follows:

**Arms control/regional security (ACRS):**
The ACRS talks were created due to recognition of the fact that any bilateral peace agreement had to be accompanied by a framework for comprehensive regional security. ACRS started at the ground level, discussing the basic rules and issues of concern, such as the need for arms control. The problem was where to begin and how to address issues such as nuclear weapons. The group’s work can be divided into the following:

- **operational basket:** small steps of confidence-building measures, e.g., maritime issues;
- **conceptual basket:** long-term issues;
- **a declaration of principles:** almost reached in the summer of 1994, but left unsigned due to recognition of the slow pace of the bilateral talks and the fact that the timing was not appropriate.

**Water resources:**
This working group was established because many of the water problems can only be dealt with on a regional level. Its agenda focuses on issues of availability, management, and development of resources. Some problems arose because of the absence of Syria and Lebanon. Much debate has focused on the issue of rights versus supply, but some projects have already been planned, such as a desalination plant in Jordan.

**Environment:**
The environmental working group discusses issues such as maritime and resource pollution and management. A code of conduct was signed in Bahrain, and many of the region’s environmental issues are addressed in the Declaration of Principles (DoP).

**Refugees:**
Set up at the request of the Palestinians, the refugee working group operates on the understanding that any comprehensive resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs to solve the problem of the refugees. The problem has to be dealt with regionally, and on the basis of UN Resolution 149, which morally affirms the right of return. The group addresses various issues concerning the refugees, such as resettlement and their aggregate rights in other countries (especially Lebanon). It is aware that its solutions will not necessarily be translated into the peace process.
Regional development (REDWG):
REDWG is often described as the group that most reflects the multilateral process. It deals with issues of long-term economic development, and has led to the creation of various regional institutions. REDWG has dealt with the redefining of economic relations in the region, addressing the position of Israel and Palestine in the regional economy. The group realizes that the Palestinian economy must develop in a framework of liberalization, privatization, and private secure development, and that it can grow within a thriving regional economy.

REDWG is divided into four subcommittees, each chaired by a different country and all headed by a monitoring committee/secretariat in Amman. The subcommittees are as follows: finance (Egypt), tourism (Palestine), infrastructure (Jordan), and trade (Israel).

Discussion:

Participant: Have the multilaterals led to any specific results? If there are none, why are the Arabs participating? What results do they anticipate?

Dr. Peters: There are very few concrete results. It is more of a process of defusion, noromalization, and socialization. There are however specific spin-offs, for example, REDWG: the World Bank did a study concerning the development of the West Bank and consequently a redevelopment plan was implemented. Joint Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian-Egyptian development plans brought a need for a development bank. The Arab countries concerned, however, are still a long way off from defining their relationship with Israel. The Palestinians and the Israelis have been scoring political points.

Participant: After the Israeli elections of May 1996, the multilaterals fell apart because essential issues, such as Hebron, refugees, settlements and water issues, had not been resolved. How do all these things fit in with the new Israeli government?

Dr. Peters: Some multilateral working groups have not met since May. The plenary meetings, in addition to the meetings which take place once a year, have not taken place. Many inter-sessional meetings have also not taken place, such as the environment meeting, which was to be held in Gaza but was postponed until December. The stagnation in the bilaterals will affect the future of the multilaterals. The latter cannot go faster than the former.

Participant: Is the current Israeli government interested in the regional dimension?

Dr. Peters: It is very difficult to read this government. One has to separate the government from bureaucracies because there are institutional forces dealing with the multilateral framework. There is institutional learning occurring: the peace process is a learning process from which bureaucracies can derive their own agendas. In addition to the ideology of the government, sometimes one looks at the dynamics that affect functional areas.

Participant: What if Israel engages in multilaterals with Syria?

Dr. Peters: Tourism, for example, is an industry that can be created in a relatively short period of time (two to three years). Syria found itself not involved in the talks on tourism, a sector in which Japan is putting a large amount of money. The problem is the water issue.

Participant: What is the aim of the multilaterals? How can Syria, as part of the Barcelona process, not participate in the bilaterals?

Dr. Peters: Syria attended the Barcelona Conference. In Casablanca, Syria wanted to be a part of the business deals that were being made, but was prevented because of Syria.
peace between Arabs and Israelis presents the notion of peace as a very sophisticated endeavor. Not everyone is prepared for this: there are different perceptions and notions of peace which may block the way.

Participant: Will the conflict between the US and Europe lead to progress?

Dr. Peters: There is a vacuum of leadership in the framework of peace - there is an absence of a center of power. We have seen, in the past two days, how Egypt may be the key. The problem with the Middle East is that one cannot predict what will happen more than six hours into the future.

Participant: Why should Palestinians be interested in arms control?

Dr. Peters: Regional frameworks are important for international cooperation, particularly when talking about the arms control process. For example, the transfer of arms and nuclear proliferation are important when talking about a comprehensive regional crisis prevention center or any form of long-term solution. Palestinians insisted on participating, despite the fact that they were not initially involved.

The Arab League and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Historical Background

After World War II, the political environment in the Arab countries was dominated by the following issues:

1) the notion of Arab unity, recalling the first Pan-Arab awakening, the roots of which went back to the establishment of secret societies under the Ottomans, such as Al-Ahad (1909) and the Arab Fateh (1913), and the Arab revolt of 1916;
2) the Palestine Question, recalling the Palestinian revolts and uprising under British Mandate, the culmination of which was the Great Revolt of 1936 that ended with the St. James’ Conference in London and the British White Paper of 1939.

In the early 1940s, the Arab capitals witnessed a series of political consultations, followed by public statements, concerning Arab unity on the one hand and the Palestine Question on the other. Against this background, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden declared the British government’s support for the Arab countries’ desire for unity and for their right to strengthen their cultural, economic and political ties. Eden stressed that his government intended to support any agreement the Arabs would reach in this regard.

Eden’s declaration met with a mixed reaction in the Arab capitals: the Jordanians welcomed the British position as it supported Prince Abdallah’s plans for the unity of Greater Syria; the Saudis were doubtful and cautious; the Yemenis ignored it; Iraq, Syria and Lebanon expressed no enthusiasm; and Egypt called for Egyptian-Sudanese unity (the unity of the Nile Valley).

Two Arab prime ministers, Nuri Sa’id of Iraq and Mustafa Nahhas Pasha of Egypt, though for different reasons, made intensive efforts to draft the framework for a unity plan on which the various Arab governments would agree. Both men were in direct contact with London.

Nuri Sa’id’s ambition was driven by his vision of a united fertile crescent, as outlined in his Blue Book of 1943. He discussed his ideas with British government officials and introduced the term ‘Arab League’, which then related to the unity of Iraq with Greater Syria, while it
left the door open for any other Arab country that wished to join. Nuri Sa’id drafted a specific plan that foresaw the formation of a permanent council of the League to be responsible for the spheres of defense, foreign policy, finance, currency, taxation, and transportation, as well as for the protection of the minorities. He also recommended that Syria and Lebanon, if reluctant to join such a body, should be forced to do so.

Nahhas Pasha invited Nuri Sa’id to Cairo in July 1943 to officially discuss the issue of Arab unity. Although the two leaders agreed, in principle, on the need for Arab unity, they differed in their priorities and on leadership issues. While Nuri Sa’id opted for Syrian-Iraqi unity first, Nahhas Pasha sought a role for Egypt in any form of unification.

In September 1943, Nahhas Pasha also invited Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda, the Prime Minister of Jordan, and discussed with him the possibility of an immediate unification between Syria and Jordan, with the option to invite, at a later stage, Lebanon and Palestine to join. As a political system for such a future unity a monarchy was envisioned. In October 1943, Sa’adallah Al-Jabari, the Prime Minister of Syria, accepted an invitation by Nahhas Pasha for the same reason, but Damascus insisted on a republican system rather than a monarchy.

The Saudis informed Nahhas Pasha about their objection to the proposed unification and expressed their concern about the Hashemite plans and intentions. They clearly limited their support to economic cooperation. In January 1944, the Lebanese President Bishara Khoury notified Nahhas Pasha that Lebanon preferred independence and secure borders for all Arab countries.

The Egyptian-Iraqi attempts to create a unity/unification plan did not succeed but rather led to a political storm in most Arab countries. It became clear that there was a dire need to deliver something in order to meet the people’s expectations and aspirations. Having realized this, Egypt called for an Arab conference, which was held in Alexandria in October 1944. The conference resulted in the Alexandria Protocol, which led to the Cairo Conference and the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945.

According to Arab historians, the Arab League was not intended to serve as a federal union but as an institution that would bring independent states together to discuss issues of common interest and possibly agree on collective action, while recognizing their independence and guaranteeing their sovereignty. It should be mentioned that throughout all the political consultation that took place between Nahhas Pasha and Nuri Sa’id, the Palestine Question was a core issue on which an Arab consensus was easy to reach. It served as a precedent for the London Conference of 1939, Arab leaders experienced for the first time how to commonly deal with a major cause. The London Conference exposed their differences in terms of ambitions and interests, and revealed how much input each was able and ready to designate in support of the Palestinians.

The Alexandria Conference of 1944 was attended by a Palestinian scholar, Musa Al-Alami, who was chosen to represent all the Palestinian parties since the Arab leaders were against the participation of the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini. Al-Alami worked closely with the Egyptians and the Iraqis, succeeded in easing the British government’s initial reservations about the participation of Palestine as a full member, and delivered a political statement about the Palestinian cause, which gained the support and sympathy of all member states.

Some historians refer to the historical background of the establishment of the Arab League as a British initiative, while others tend to give the credit to Nahhas Pasha. Nuri Sa’id is the least mentioned as the Iraqi priority was to have its own vision of Arab unity - basically confined to the Fertile Crescent - realized. I personally have reached the conclusion that because of the awareness of the public and the common call for Arab unity, as well as for the defense of Palestine, all the parties involved were able to offer varying degrees of input
The special resolution on Palestine in the protocol called for the ending of all Jewish immigration to Palestine and the preservation of Arab land. The independence of Palestine was considered a basic Arab right, and the resolution called for the establishment of an ‘Arab Fund’, which would be used to save Arab lands in Palestine.

**The Arab League: Challenges and Achievements**

As a result of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947 the Arab League held a series of meetings, which concluded with the decision to invite Arab armies to enter Palestine in order to defend its territory and people. This led to the first Arab-Jewish war of 1948, as a result of which Palestine became divided: a major part became Israel, while the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip was ruled by Egypt.

The Arab League’s political committee supported the Palestinians’ decision to establish a government in Gaza and invited its representative to attend all meetings of the League (1949/50). At the same time, the committee expressed its reservations about Jordan’s plan to annex or forcibly unite with the West Bank, stressing that Jordanian rule was only temporary, i.e., pending the ability of the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination.

In 1960, another issue the Arab League dealt with was the deterioration of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations due to the territorial claims of the former. The Arab League defended Kuwait and succeeded in forcing the Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qassem to stop all plans of annexing or invading its neighbor. However, regarding the border dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the Arab League failed in achieving a settlement. At the time, the Arab League was led by Egypt, which, although having no objection to interfering in the first issue, was far less keen to interfere in the second, being constrained by the fact that its own military forces were in Yemen to support the Yemeni revolt and to fight alongside the new Republican regime against Saudi interference. These two examples show that in order to understand and judge the achievements and failures of the Arab League, one should read carefully into inter-Arab politics and disputes.

The first Arab League summit in Cairo in 1964 was called for by President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. The two challenges facing the Arab World at that time were the Israeli intention to divert the flow of the Jordan River and the fate of the Palestinians. During the deliberations, the Arab League decided to establish a military umbrella, headed by an Egyptian general (Ali Ali Amr), with the task to reorganize and enforce the Arab armies to defend Arab territories and to counter Israeli threats. Regarding the Palestine Question, the Arab League decided to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), then headed by Ahmad Shuqeiri, with the goal to mobilize and unite Palestinians in the struggle for their land and rights.

Following the June War of 1967, Egypt and Jordan caused a division in the Arab League by accepting UN Resolution 242, which was strongly rejected by Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO. It took these countries more than a decade to realize the importance of utilizing UN resolutions in order to confront Israeli deception. In 1969, the Arab League held its famous summit in Khartoum where the Arab consensus was not to accept the defeat of the June War. The resolution passed at the summit stated the participants agreement "...to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands, which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab
states abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

At the Rabat Summit in 1974, despite Jordan’s refusal, the PLO was recognized by the Arab League as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Also during the 1970’s, inspired by Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Arab League succeeded in putting an end to the bloody military confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanians, and, at a later stage, helped in achieving a series of agreements between the PLO and Lebanon. This time, it was Saudi Arabia that took the responsibility for inviting all parties involved in the Lebanese Civil War to Ta’if in 1975 in order to conclude an agreement.

A major crisis within the Arab League occurred when Egypt went alone and signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in Camp David in 1979. As a consequence, during the course of the Arab League Summit in Baghdad it was decided to suspend Egypt’s membership and to move the League headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia. For the very first time, a non-Egyptian was appointed as the General Secretary of the League: Shazili Qulaibi of Tunisia succeeded former Egyptian Foreign Minster Mahmoud Riad (whose predecessors were Mahmoud Fawzi and Abdul Rahman Azzam, both also former Egyptian foreign ministers).

In the 1980’s, especially with regard to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the forced departure of the PLO, which sought refuge in Tunisia, neither a single Arab country nor the Arab League intervened. Although, at the most, they released political statements in solidarity with the PLO and the Lebanese people, they did nothing to defend Lebanese territory or preserve its unity.

In February 1985, the PLO and Jordan signed the famous accord that stated their intention to work together towards the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. The Arab reaction ranged between Syrian rejection, Saudi Arabian reservation, and silence on the part of the others.

In November 1987, an Arab League summit was held in Amman. It called for economic cooperation, reconciliation between Iraq and Syria, and inviting Egypt to return to the League; unexpectedly, and for the first time ever, it totally ignored the PLO and the Palestinian agenda.

A month later, however, with the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, all Arab countries with no exceptions expressed their strong support for and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The following year, Arab leaders encouraged Jordan to declare its disengagement from the West Bank. However, the position of the Arab countries with regard to the peace initiatives of the PLO and their interest to enter political negotiations with Israel was rather disapproving.

Another major Arab League crisis emerged during the Gulf War in 1990. The division among Arab counties was obvious: while some condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and joined the foreign allied forces to stop the Iraqi aggression, others called for the formation of a united Arab force to maintain security and stability and to preserve the borders of all the countries in the region. The Arab League decided to condemn the invasion and called on Iraq to withdraw its army. At a later stage, the weight of the Arab League’s position became weaker as it became obvious that each Arab country would eventually decide alone and in accordance with its own interests on what stand to take vis-à-vis the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. This was also the case with regard to the level of normalization with Israel some time later, following the commencement of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference.

The role of the Arab League was also less effective when the US invited various Arab leaders to join the PLO at the Madrid conference. At the same time, the PLO’s demands had significantly increased. The demands of the PLO were the basis of the Madrid conference and the negotiations that followed.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Arab League played more of a side role but it re-emerged to the foreground and is today as viable as it was half a century ago. With the weak process of political negotiations between Israel, Palestinians and other regional countries, the Arab League served as a necessary tool to maintain linguistic and cultural links, to preserve the common interests of its member states, and to cope with the changes in the international arena and their repercussions on the Arab World.

Today, Arab leaders are talking about the need to strengthen the Arab economy and develop a common market, as well as to reinforce inter-Arab peace, to safeguard Arab interests, and to fight security and ‘terror’ threats. The Arab League is now led by another distinguished Egyptian foreign minister, Esmat Abdul Majid, whose task, among others, is to lead it into the 21st century.

Egypt's Regional Role and Foreign Policy Imperatives

HE Ahmad Kamal

Egypt, as an Arab country in the Middle East, has a foreign policy that is concerned particularly with other Arab countries. This foreign policy is based on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, seeking peaceful solutions to conflicts, and encouraging the strengthening of Arab amity.

The Challenges Facing the Arab World

Since the Gulf War, a general atmosphere of disappointment has characterized the region. Economic, political and geopolitical weaknesses have emerged in the Arab World, due, in the main, to bad management concerning the distribution of Arab wealth. The GDP of Arab countries is nearly 25% of the GNP of Japan, 9% of that of the US, and 4% of that of Europe. Moreover, two-thirds of the cultivated areas are found in only five countries, while 85% of the oil production stems from another five countries.

This division among the Arab countries has coincided with a call for a new Middle East, which has given Israel an opportunity to ruin the Arab Common Market and to end Pan-Arabism. Israeli claims that its industry is directed towards European markets are false as the quality levels are below European standards and the competition for markets is high. Deprived of regional markets, the Israeli economy cannot develop. Israel imports 75% of its raw materials and 98% of its energy resources, so the only market that Israel can work within is that of the Middle East.

Egypt's Policies Concerning Regional Issues:

• The achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace is an Egyptian priority. Egypt is a partner in the peace process and believes that stability in the Middle East will lead to economic prosperity.
• Egypt supports the Palestinian right to an independent state and self-determination and calls upon Israel to fulfill its obligations towards its partners. Egypt is against settlements in the Occupied Territories, and against any change in the demographic situation in Jerusalem.
• Egypt provides the Palestinian negotiating team with advice and know-how, utilizing its experience in negotiating with the Israelis.
• In 1996, Egypt hosted the Sharm Al-Sheikh Summit as well as the Arab Summit in August following Netanyahu's rise to power. The decisions of the summit were all in favor of the Palestine Question.
Egypt's Policies Concerning States in the Region:

- **Syria and Lebanon**: Egypt refused the ‘Lebanon First’ proposal, supports Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, and demands Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese occupied territory.
- **Iraq**: Egypt supports the Iraqi people and asks that the sanctions imposed on the country be lifted. Egypt opposes measures directed at harming Iraqi sovereignty.
- **Sudan**: Egypt supports the Sudanese people.
- **Libya**: Egypt believes that the Lockerbie case must be solved according to Scottish law. Libya has accepted this.
- **Iran**: Egypt seeks normal relations with Iran but does not support its role in the Arabian Gulf nor the attempts to export its ‘Islamic revolution.’
- **Turkey**: The Egyptian-Turkish relations are normal. Egypt, however, disapproves of Turkey’s military alliances with Israel.

Egypt is at war with terrorist movements and fights their recruitment activities, their training, and their sources of funds.

Egypt’s Position towards Europe and the US:

- Egyptian-US relations are currently tense due to the halt in the peace process.
- As for the Russian Federation, Egypt encourages it to fulfill the role of a sponsor of the peace process.
- Egypt acknowledges the European role, particularly after the visits of French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind to the region. Egypt has refused Rifkind’s proposal to establish a regional cooperation organization since such a body already exists in the form of the Arab League. Europe is suffering from internal divisions and its differences with the US.

Egypt is putting maximum effort into establishing a Middle East free from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This raises the level of tension between Egypt and Israel. As a result, Egypt is trying to stimulate the Multilateral Working Group on Disarmament and demands that the Israeli nuclear sites be inspected.

Discussion:

Participant: How would Egypt react in the event of Israeli aggression against Syria?

Ahmad Kamal: Egypt’s position is clear. It will not stand still, neither on the political level nor with regard to Arab coordination. We support Syria.

Participant: What would Egypt’s position be if Israel re-occupied Palestinian towns?

Ahmad Kamal: We support Palestinian control over the land, we refuse the principle of ‘hot pursuit,’ and we refuse the principle of inequality between the parties involved, i.e., Israel and the PNA.

Syria: National Security and State-Building

Dr. Volker Perthes

Syria, as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has enhanced and maintained its security. Its emergence as a strong, secure state is directly related to the militarization of the country in preparation for war.

Citizens are incorporated into institutions. Syria can withstand external interference because of internal autonomy (unlike in the 50s). It has, however, attempted to manipulate Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinians and Jordanians.
The militarization of the state has entailed directing resources to military purposes, and this has had a clear influence on economic trends within Syria, where discourse is focused on being fit for the *maarakah* (battle) against Israel. The military buildup is quite clear. In 1970, Syria had 80,000 troops and 13 Syrians out of every 1,000 worked for the security apparatus. In 1990, it had 430,000 troops while 35 Syrians out of every 1,000 worked for the security apparatus. The buildup was a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Between 1979-82, Syria came close to a civil war. Following the battle of Hammah, which ended in 1982, the Syrian army was de-ideologized; it no longer has an ideological project that contradicts the state, but has become a state institution, controlled by the political leadership. The unification of the military command took place in preparation for the coming *maarakah*.

The system is totally authoritative - a form of dictatorship - and the army has wide control. The Ba’ath Party is organized in a military structure (from the top to the base). The party is related to security functions such as examining the security profiles of citizens.

Syria’s social structure is built on the fact that almost half of all state employees work in the security forces: 15% of the Syrian labor force work for the security establishment. The militarization is legitimate, in as much as there is a credible external threat.

Syria has devoted much of its economy to the military system and consequently has a standing debt of US$11 million to Russia. Arab states have donated a huge amount of money to building the civilian infrastructure and Syria has accumulated ‘military dividends’ by being a confrontation state: after 1979, Syria became the sole dependent confrontation state.

If a state is preparing for war, it will eventually be dragged into war, but Syria has been able to postpone the real battle. Technologically and economically, Syria is not ready to face Israel in war. Syria’s preparation for war was not directed towards a battle but rather to strengthening the state and trying to avoid a confrontation with Israel. The Syrian force is built to defend the country and not to launch attacks. The tanks are in defense positions, and the air defense system is well-maintained when compared to the armed vehicles force. Syria’s chemical weapons capability is intended to be a deterrent.

One can see the connection between external security and the regime’s internal security. The regime’s stability is secure for as long as Syrian territory is occupied and the state territorial integrity is not respected. Syria’s economy cannot support warfare, and defense industries are weak. The majority of Syria’s finished goods come off assembly lines where machines do most of the work. The economy would collapse in the event of an embargo.

The Syrian government was convinced that the international initiatives would not be productive due to the deep mistrust between the Palestinians and Israelis. The Syrians, nonetheless, were enthusiastic about the peace conference held during the Bush Administration, and they were the first to respond to the invitation to the Madrid Conference, although they were sure it would fail because of Israel’s position. They decided to go because the alternative - war - was worse. For Syria, an indefinite continuation of the no war-no peace situation would be harmful as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lost interest in financing the country following the Gulf War.
**No-War No-Peace**
The no war-no peace stalemate gave legitimization to the Syrian regime. The world was interested in Syria as a major power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Full peace with Israel poses a real threat as it would lead to economic and political competition.

**Regional Peace**
For Syria, peace with Israel would change much of its domestic structure. Syria risks losing its importance and weight through peace. Everybody links Syria’s move towards peace with domestic reform. Once the confrontation stance has ended, the regime will have to bargain with the society. Economic reform could speed up in the absence of external threats, therefore peace with Israel could bring some economic benefits.

**Post-Assad**
The next leader of Syria will be weaker than Assad. He will have to rely on a coalition and will have to bargain with his constituents. This weaker regime would have to take into consideration the different interests and demands of the society. The Syrian army has no tradition of inter-fighting, despite the fact that there have been some attempted coups by the military. Moreover, Syria’s internal factions have no interest in disrupting its stability or the slow economic development of the past 25 years.

**Discussion: The Arab States, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process: Some Comparisons and Contrasts**

**Moderator:** What are the expectations?

**Ahmad Kamal:** The expectations include comprehensive all-party talks.

**Moderator:** What are the ways to lobby Cairo?

**Ahmad Kamal:** One does not need to lobby. We have been accused by the Israelis of influencing the Palestinians. We support what has been agreed upon regionally and internationally. The Oslo Accords were not agreed upon by only one country. The Palestinians have lost a great deal since Camp David. Let’s get what we can from the peace process. The essential step is for Palestinians to have their state.

**Participant:** Why doesn’t Egypt threaten Israel militarily?

**Ahmad Kamal:** Egypt is not ready to enter a military conflict with Israel under any circumstances. Egypt’s current infrastructure is barely being maintained, and a war would cause the whole system to collapse. We are striving to sustain the country; we cannot go on just borrowing. The existence of Israel is a fact. I do not agree with radical solutions. There are other ways, for example, Israel went to the last economic conference and gained nothing. The point in politics is to proceed in a very rational way in order not to reach the point of no return.

What has Europe done? The Germans have a point of view as do others within Europe. The Palestinian position should be strengthened. Egypt can play a role in this, even though we still blame the Palestinians for agreeing to Oslo without Syrian participation.

**Moderator:** Do Palestinians have any expectations of Syria?

**Dr. Perthes:** Whenever one speaks of a Syrian position one needs to be aware that at times Syria may be a victim of its own propaganda. Also, Syria is quite convinced of the rights of the Palestinian refugees, particularly those in the camps in Lebanon.

**Moderator:** Why are the Palestinians expecting more from Egypt than from Syria?
Dr. Perthes: No Arab country could or would want to.

Participant: What are the roles of Egypt and Syria in the Middle East economy?

Ahmad Kamal: Although a new Middle East order is being proposed, we believe that Israel can neither dominate the economy of the region nor become a G7 country. It is importing money, labor, and power. Israel cannot go to Europe because of its inability to compete with lower-priced suppliers, which leave it at a great disadvantage.

The area’s resources can be used to build a new Middle East but we cannot speak of regional cooperation unless there is a clear view of what the peace settlement means. The problem is not the lack of a body to organize, as we already have the Arab League. Yes, we can bring Israel into the Middle East, but the Palestinians have to keep up the pressure. The conflict is economic, not military.

Syrian Interests and Role in Lebanon

Lebanon is an important part of the Syrian policy. The Syrian hegemony in Lebanon is due, in the main, to the Arab-Israeli conflict and is a security issue.

Military-Political Relations

In 1976 Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war. (Syria introduced Al-Sa’iqa forces in 1975.) The Syrian army engaged Israeli forces in 1978, and was dragged into confrontation with them in 1982. The Syrians opposed the 17 May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Syria put pressure on the Lebanese government and was able to influence its position. In 1987 Syrian troops re-entered West Beirut at the request of different factions and managed to control the situation between the warring factions, namely Amal against Hizballah, and Amal against the Palestinians. Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia intervened in 1989. The Ta’if Accord was signed with Syria’s consent. Syria opposed Colonel Aun’s forces, and the Syrian forces managed to throw him out. The withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Beirut to the Al-Biqa’a Valley must coincide with Israel’s withdrawal from its self-proclaimed security zone.

There was a partial Syrian redeployment in August and September of 1996, which was considered by the Israelis as an offensive move. Lebanon interpreted this redeployment as part of the Ta’ef agreement. The actual strategic reason for Syria’s redeployment was to move more expensive equipment to the Syrian side of the Syrian-Lebanese borders. The Lebanese government showed that it could handle the situation as the results of the elections were pro-Syrian, since anti-Syrian members had been thrown out of Parliament.

In April 1996 Israel attacked Lebanon in ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath.’ Syria participated in the formation of the ILMG and in monitoring the rules of the April agreement, leaving no doubt that Damascus remains the reference point of Lebanese officials. Syria is not in a position of trying to annex Lebanon as indicated in its response to ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath.’ Lebanon is vital to Syria’s security as it provides air space over Al-Biqa’a.

Syria opposed the ‘Lebanon First’ proposal because of its motto of “one people in two states.” Even though there has been a declaration of cooperation and brotherhood between Lebanon and Syria, the relationship remains unequal. Syria will maintain Lebanon’s security, while Lebanon ensures that it will not become a flank of attack against Syria. Syria interferes mainly in Lebanon’s domestic policy.
Syria and Lebanon have signed several agreements such as the Free Trade Agreement. This is in the interest of Lebanon because its industry is far stronger than that of Syria, which still protects its markets from an influx of Lebanese merchandise. The special relationship continues for several reasons: some analysts overlook the fact that special relations have their dynamics and do not remain stagnant. Factors affecting the relationship include the Arab-Israeli conflict and the domestic situation, both in Lebanon and Syria.

The primary focus should be to get Syria to deliver; Lebanon is secondary. If Israel pulls out of Lebanon, pressure from the US and France will force Syria out of Lebanon for the following reasons:

- Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon will decrease the need for Syrian troops as Hizballah will be disarmed. Consequently, Lebanon’s internal stability will diminish the threat to Syria.
- Development in Lebanon will bring domestic stability, which will give Syria more reasons to evacuate its forces from Lebanon.
- Internal developments in Syria in the post-Assad era will require the Syrian leadership to keep its elite units around Damascus rather than Beirut. Economic concerns will take precedence over the military in Syria. Consequently Syrian control over Lebanon would be reduced.

Lebanon has a vital interest in maintaining good relations with Syria. Lebanon will play a very important role in the reconstruction and liberalization of the Syrian economy, and the Lebanese banks will be at the forefront of the Arab banking sector in Syria.

The Maghreb States: Foreign Policy Priorities

Dr. Claire Spencer

The Maghreb

When discussing the Maghreb, the areas of interest are Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and to some extent Libya, Mauritania and the Western Sahara.

Identity:
Residents of the Maghreb share a common identity, reinforced by their common colonial history - the presence of France. Most North Africans see themselves as Arab, members of the Arab world and the Arab League, and only linguistically different.

Population:
The population level of the Maghreb is quite high, with Morocco having the bulk of the population (26 million). The region also has a high demographic growth rate, although measures have been taken to reduce this. The problem is not the size of the population, but the high level of unemployment. The greater part of the population is under 25, with 50% being under the age of 15. This presents a serious economic problem for the region and its development. There are many North Africans in France and Europe, which provides the domestic economy with significant remittances.

Political position:
The political stance of the Maghreb states has been increasingly dominated by economic priorities. The key to their future is development, and success lies in their relationship with Europe, with which most of their trade is carried out. For example, 66% of Morocco’s trade is with Europe. Trade relations run North-South, rather than East-West, and they are highly dependent upon Europe. Moreover, trade relations are extremely limited because of inadequate transportation and communications systems.
from 1954-1962. The war, won through FLN-led guerrilla battles, has since become a national myth. The French tried to make Algerians French citizens, but without giving them the same rights. The colonialization also created an identity crisis in Algeria, the French presence being culturally disruptive. Language - specifically, the issue of Arabic versus French - became the center of the cultural debate. From 1965-79, President Boumedien attempted to Arabize the educational system, but was met with resistance because many of the employees were French educated. Moreover, the use of Berber in the language has made it difficult to establish a clear national language.

Algeria is said to face the problem of “illiteracy in two languages.” Socially, Algeria is a very egalitarian, but fictionalized, society. There was no legal transition of authority, and thus real respect for authority does not exist. The main cities are more controllable than the rural areas. Since its independence, the country has been run primarily by the military, which was behind the cancellation of the 1990 elections. There have been attempts at increased democratization, but it appears that the government is trying to create a limited and controlled political arena.

In the case of the Islamic movement, it is hard to ascertain the degree of popular support. This is because firstly, there is no uniform Islamic movement, and secondly, there have been no elections. With the recent events, Algeria has become like the Wild West; there has been a breakdown in civil order. The government and authorities have been unable to safeguard and are of controlling the people, and are incapable of controlling local disputes. Bandits have infiltrated the Islamic groups, massacring large numbers of people, and local militias have grown in response.

Morocco

Linguistically, Morocco faces an enormous problem. There are many dialects in the language, and they also vary regionally, with a Spanish influence in the north. The problem is intensified by the limited development and links between different areas of the country, which have made it harder to unify or create a uniform language.

Socially, Morocco is very structured, with a clear hierarchy, and everyone “knows his place.” The King is at the top of the pyramid, and political power evolves downwards. Moreover, there is an increasing division between the rural and urban areas. Politically, Morocco has only recently become liberalized and open. In the 60s and 70s there were many political prisoners: unlike today, there were no democratic institutions. In recent years, the National Assembly has been granted more powers and a more important role in political life. Morocco has seen a process of decentralization, i.e., power evolving from the center outwards. The political parties and the press have been allowed much more freedom. More funds have been allocated to local governments and invested in the various regions. There are many regional differences in Morocco, which the government has been trying to keep at the local level.

Morocco also enjoys close relations with France, and serves as a target for a large amount of French investment.

Tunisia

Tunis is unable to maintain complete control of the country, due to the large range of mountains dividing its regions. Politically, it is less open than the other Maghreb countries and drifting more towards a Singapore-style political system.
Regional Relations

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which excludes Mauritania and Libya, represents an attempt at regional integration. The regional connection focuses mainly on relations between Morocco and Algeria, which have constantly been strained.

Various issues of regional common interest exist, such as the desire to contain the rise of Islamism. The countries are superficially united in the belief that the trend must be stopped and they have agreed to cooperate on this issue.

The country most affected by Islamism is Algeria, which is currently facing a severe crisis. The FIS won the elections in 1990-91 and were going to assume leadership, but they were then banned. They have since waged a war against the government. There are various Islamic groups, such as the GIA and MIA, and nobody really knows what is happening in Algeria. The approach of the government to the Islamists went from one of cooperation and democracy to truncation of movement. Tunisia also faced a problem in the 80s but the government nipped the movement in its bud and arrested everyone involved. President Ben Ali installed a policy of containment and control.

Regional Divergence

Economics:
A great deal of economic competition exists between the Maghreb nations. For economic reasons, Europe is interested in seeing more regional cooperation, and the UMA has begun to advocate this goal.

Economic agreements have been under discussion, such as those instigated during the course of the Barcelona Conference. Negotiated accords have already resulted in the opening of Europe's markets, the lowering of customs barriers in the Maghreb and an overall increase in cash flow.

The Maghreb is looking to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), but at the same time the countries fear the effect of this on their domestic industries and the possible dependency on European markets. Moreover, trade with Europe may lead to more inter-Maghrebi competition rather than integration.

Western Sahara:
The conflict with the Western Sahara has been ongoing since 1975, and involves Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. Algeria has never accepted the Moroccan take-over and demands a referendum on self-determination. Talks have been proceeding, but there is a continuous debate over the issue of defining the electorate. The fact that UN supervision has been withdrawn, due to lack of funds, also poses a major problem. The crisis has been a festering sore between Algeria and Morocco, and has made regional integration difficult.

Foreign policy:
Several of the countries have their main ties with Europe, although they do have relations with other states. Tunisia has put most of its eggs in the European basket, and is strengthening its links with Italy and Spain: it is said that Tunisia will become more European than Europe.

Morocco enjoys good relations with Europe and especially France, but it also has a key relationship with the US, which backs its military in the Sahara. Some believe that the North Africans trust Europe more than they trust each other.
The presence - a long presence - of France in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In comparison there is no such history of a European presence in Egypt. In North Africa, they also have a vision of their presence in Europe: there are three million Algerians in France. The importance of the presence is not cultural, but economic - the labor remittances of about US$2 million a year.

During the elections in Algeria, the Islamic movement was elected. What is the role of Europe in this issue? Why didn’t it act when Algeria canceled the elections as it did in Niger?

The Europeans often say one thing and do the other. They promoted democratic elections, but they feared the Islamic movement and its undemocratic practices. They are also ambivalent about intervening in the affairs of another state. For example, France said it supported Algeria, but did not condemn the events because they were emergency measures.

Europe would rather emphasize stability over human rights - why promote democracy when it will lead to anarchy? Europe also fears an Islamization of the Muslims in Europe and it has still not decided how to react to Islamism.

What is the role of Morocco in terms of the Arab-Israeli peace process?

Morocco has always, historically, had relations with Israel because of its Jewish population. In 1950, there was a lot of Jewish immigration to Israel, encouraged by both sides. Moroccan Jews in Israel are still entitled to Moroccan citizenship. Raff Edri has acted as a go-between, and King Hassan has many Jewish advisors and financial backers. It was Morocco that started the MENA Summit process. Recently, David Levi was supposed to go to Morocco to prove that King Hassan does not have a problem with Israel, but rather with the Netanyahu government. Morocco is interested in strong economic bilateral relations with Israel, and this is the bottom line.

In general, the people of the Maghreb have good access to the Arab World. They are very informed and even expressed solidarity with the Iraqi people during the Gulf War. Public opinion was against the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The people of the region were insulted by the actions of the Gulf states, and due to their strong sense of dignity, they viewed the war as a kind of revenge on Kuwait.

What would Morocco do if Spain took control of Babal Tareq (Gibraltar)?

Their response would be diplomatic - they would not attack Spain.

How do the people feel?

There isn’t really any popular demand for keeping the territory.

What is King Hassan’s role in region? Has he been able to play the role of a good Muslim and please Europe at the same time?

King Hassan is very clever. He is aware of the tension within the European camp - the ambivalence of the states, each with its own policy, but at the same time not saying anything contrary to the US position. While Chiraq has its own style, Rifkind came to the Middle East, and specifically to the UAE, for a joint US arms deal. The Germans have relations with Iran.
The Maghreb States, the Arab Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process

Dr. Claire Spencer

The Maghreb’s Role in the Peace Process

The role of the Maghrebi states has stagnated due to the current impasse in the peace process. Previously, the states were active in the process, especially in the multilateral talks. There has also been much engagement on the bilateral level, although progress has been slow. Morocco has been taking a hard stance recently, but whilst always keeping its doors open.

The most interesting development in the roles is the establishment of business links. Normalization has been seen as essential because of the economic benefits of peace, namely open markets and increased integration. Such integration will not continue if the bilateral process fails, but Morocco and Tunisia already have representatives in Tel Aviv and Mauritania is opening a bureau.

Tunisia is more in the Palestinian camp. It was Tunisia that housed the PLO after its exodus from Beirut: remember, the PLO was attacked by Israel whilst in Tunisia.

Barcelona Process

The Barcelona process represents the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, which involves 12 countries. Several countries have been invited to join the Union, such as Mauritania, Jordan (because of the peace process), Syria and Lebanon, and each has been offered different levels of integration. The PNA is involved, but not on a state level (Barcelona did not give the Palestinian issue any priority). The overall aim is a regional trade area, which could receive more financial assistance (from North Europe). The region would see more cultural and social exchange, as well as a common agricultural policy.

A lack of progress in the peace process would greatly damage the Barcelona process. In the case of the Maghrebi states, many fear that if they go too far in their normalization with Israel, they will face popular resentment. In the case of the European countries, while they want this economic process, they are also concerned about migration from North Africa to Europe.

Discussion:

Question: What is the Palestinian position on the Barcelona process?

Answer: The Palestinians are not equal partners. The Palestinians have no state, and, this being the case, do not expect much. They cannot talk about free trade when their exports are being held up in Gaza.

Question: What is the French link?

Answer: While France has an influence on the Maghreb, it is driven by its interests. The French have to take into account Europe, the US, and the Arabs states. In the case of the Algerians, they are interested in an improved European relationship, as opposed to one with Iran, Hamas, or any other Islamist organization.
Pre-1967

Jerusalem was the capital or the main city in the Ottoman period and it had an extremely special status. Following the partition in 1917, Jerusalem was made the administrative capital of Palestine, which catered to the sensitivities of the British, the Palestinians and the Jews. The Jerusalemites developed Jerusalem’s qualities and characteristics as a capital.

In 1948, many of Jerusalem’s villages and the surrounding areas were occupied, and Amman became the new administrative capital. With the reduction of services, emigration from the city occurred as administrative jobs became available elsewhere. Jerusalem, nevertheless, was able to maintain its character and grew into an economic and social center in spite of the first nakba.

Post 1967

After 1967, Jerusalem lost both its role and its population and witnessed three catastrophes: the first and second were Israel’s occupation and subsequent annexation of the city. The third disaster was that the Jerusalemites who had been abroad at the time of the June War were no longer able to return. Matters had been worsened by the fact that the occupation began in July and not in August, when people used to return from outside. Israel annexed the land and not the people, and Jerusalem’s Palestinians have the status of residents rather than citizens.

Israeli general policies on Jerusalem limited the growth of the Palestinian population as far as possible but while attempting to maintain the status quo so as not to harm relations with the Arab states, particularly Jordan. Today, Israel is enforcing policies to reduce the number of Jerusalemites by setting up new criteria for obtaining or maintaining residency status, which apply only to the Palestinian population of the city. Accordingly, a Palestinian can allegedly forfeit his right to residency in Jerusalem if he acquires citizenship of another country other than Jordan, or/and if he has been abroad for more than seven years without establishing contact with the Israeli authorities.

Israeli Strategies

Israel applied three main strategies to separate the Palestinian Jerusalem population from the city:

1) Isolation:
   - With the closure, Israel isolates Jerusalem and threatens the Palestinians with the prospect of life without Jerusalem.
   - The closure has drastically hampered the functioning of Palestinian institutions: many of their employees are prevented from entering Jerusalem, while the institutions themselves are constantly threatened with closure.
   - By preventing political meetings with international delegations, Israel has tried to isolate East Jerusalem from the international community.

2) Expulsion:
   - Physical expulsion: The Israelis have attempted to expel Palestinians from the city by devising pretexts such as the concept of the center of life. Israel is now confiscating the identity cards of Palestinian Jerusalemites under such racist pretexts.
   - Economic expulsion: The closure has caused Palestinian economic activity to shift away from Jerusalem.
3) Occupation:
- Israel is changing the demographic character of Jerusalem by surrounding it with settlements.
- It is creating Jewish geographic continuity by constructing and linking the settlements.
- Such policies have reduced the Palestinian population areas to islands.

Palestinian Responses

After 1967 the Palestinians took steps, including the following, to protect Jerusalem's character and to administer the city:

- The Higher Islamic Council was formed to administer Palestinians in the West Bank.
- The Husni Al-Ashhab schools were established to counter Israel's decision to establish municipal schools to enforce the Israeli curriculum.
- The charitable societies refused to apply for licenses from the Israeli authorities. These societies functioned more as a governing body than as private institutions.
- Current efforts to save the Maqassed Hospital are part of the attempt to maintain an Arab health care system in Jerusalem.

Even during the Intifada, Jerusalem was able to maintain its Palestinian character: the Chamber of Commerce, for example, remained totally independent from its Israeli counterpart. A new political situation arose in which the Palestinians emphasized that meetings would be held in East Jerusalem (the National Palace Hotel). After the Madrid Conference the Orient House became the place to meet, under the Palestinian flag, and unofficial diplomatic immunity was enforced on the premises. In 1993 the Palestinians were able to establish a diluted variant of autonomy by having uniformed Palestinian guards at the Orient House.

Approaching the Arab World

The Palestinians have clear goals but lack the means to realize them. In 1986 a committee was established to save Jerusalem. One of the accomplishments of this committee was to establish the Burj Al-Laqlaq Community Center. The health sector is also a vital area, but one that requires US$15 million to allow hospitals to provide specialized services. The PNA is paying the salaries of teachers in Jerusalem. Approximately US$30 million are needed to allow Jerusalem to maintain the status quo. A telethon could be organized under the theme of buying time for Jerusalem.

Jerusalem was put at the top of the Arab ministers' agenda and is an issue that can be dealt with regardless of Arab differences. However, the Jerusalem Committee, which emerged from the Islamic Conference, achieved nothing.

What is needed is a united Arab effort in the name of Jerusalem. Jerusalem can be a means whereby the Palestinian factions in Syria and Lebanon as well as Syria itself remain the center of attention. Jordan also need to focus on Jerusalem.

Approaching the International Community

There are three predicaments:

1) The Jews are the smallest gathering in the world but hold the greatest power in the Middle East.
2) The Muslims are the largest gathering in the region but are the weakest power in the world.
3) The Christians are the largest power in the world but are the smallest gathering in the region.

We must convince the European states and particularly the Christian communities that, unlike in earlier Islamic history, Islamic-Christian relations are stronger and more honor
While the US involvement in the Middle East goes back to pre-1948, it has assumed a central role since 1967. The period between 1967-1973 was a sterile one, even though Sadat had sent out signals that he wanted an international settlement. Unfortunately, these signals were either ignored or misunderstood by Israel. Israel, after the 1967 war, and until 1973, had been intoxicated by its victory. As a result, it underestimated the Arab capitals, not believing that they would start a war. The US only began to receive panic signals from Israel just before the 1973 crisis. Israel was stunned by the Egyptian advances in the Sinai and the Syrian near-success in breaking through the Israeli lines in the Golan. The result was a high state of Israeli insecurity.

The 1973 war also proved to be a watershed event in the region, breaking the diplomatic deadlock between the Arab states and Israel. Moreover, many of today’s issues were prevalent in 1973 as well: for example, both the US and USSR sponsored peace talks in Geneva between Israel, Egypt and Lebanon - the Syrians were invited but did not attend. The first disengagement agreement for the Golan was reached in 1974, and the US was looking at the idea of a similar disengagement agreement, which would include a limited withdrawal, for the West Bank. However, such concepts were too early then.

The problem was the talks - Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO or the Palestinians. In addition, the issues then had also been colored by the superpower conflict. During the 1973 war, when the Israeli army had withdrawn its troops according to the Geneva Conference, the two superpowers had been in conflict. American policy consequently focused on managing the Arabs and the Israelis in a way so as not to shift the balance of power between the US and the USSR, and not to allow any conflict to escalate into a superpower crisis. It is US policy, which is based on continuity and a building-block approach, that eventually made the idea of disengagement a reality with the 1994 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Hence, the ideas that the US deals with today have their roots in the past. The US has continued to build on the following:

- a balance of power with a desire for peace through international negotiations;
- support for Israeli security;
- a clear US position that a shift in the balance of power should not occur to the advantage of the USSR or the Arab states.

The Current Phase

The current phase began with the Madrid Conference in 1991, with the participation of the Soviet Union, the UN, and the EU. Madrid represented the first time that Israel and the Arab states sat down with an agreed format for negotiations. The conference also launched the current peace process, which has two parts: the bilateral negotiations and the multilateral track. The latter, which is divided into working groups, aims to draw in a large number of Arab states to break down barriers and develop interaction between Arabs and Israel. The focus here is on technical, transnational issues and on the building of a web of relations. The multilaterals have had only limited success, as they have been affected by a slowdown of the peace process, particularly on the Palestinian-Israeli track.

As the Palestinian-Israeli track matured, the US took an active role in the following areas:

- International assistance to the Palestinian Authority on an international dimension: The donor countries convened in 1993 and made a five-year pledge to the Palestinian Authority. The money was not intended to supplant the local economy, but rather to supply seed-money to activate it and assist with infrastructure and development. This is just one way in which the US supports the peace process.
The current US role, that of an intermediary to that of a leading player. For example, in the 1973 conflict, the US started off as an intermediary or go-between in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, and then subsequently acted as a facilitator as Israel and Egypt began to negotiate issues directly. The US has a road map to the peace process - the DoP, which is aimed at bringing the Arab Israeli conflict to an end. The ideas represented by the DoP have been on the table for the past 20 years. Thus, even with setbacks, there will always be a return to this road map. The American aim is to pursue a balanced role while encouraging the parties to participate in direct negotiations. The US is aware that the Palestinian-Israeli track requires careful monitoring and positive reinforcement during the current process, and is thus monitoring day-to-day issues, such as the closure. Moreover, the US role is not an exclusive one, as it has been working closely with external parties such as the EU, Russia and Egypt. In fact, the US welcomes international involvement.

The US has a uniquely close relationship with Israel, which has given the US the ability to guide the process. Progress to date has taken place Israel has grown to feel secure enough to take steps towards peace. This relationship has been a central and essential factor in moving the peace process forward.

External Powers and the Arab States: Positions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (II): The European Approach to the Palestine Problem and the Middle East

The role of the EU is one that compliments that of the US. The EU’s approach to the Palestine problem and the Middle East is based on the following points:

1) The Middle East is a vital region for the EU:
The Middle East issue has always been on the table, as Middle East stability and prosperity have a bearing on the EU as well. Europe is concerned about Middle East instability spilling over to Europe, as has been experienced with Algeria. The EU also has strategic relations with the region and wants to see prosperity in the Middle East (e.g., trade).

2) The need for a durable settlement:
The EU believes that a permanent solution based on rights affirmed in UN Resolution 242 is long overdue. Moreover, the EU is prepared to discuss a Palestinian state.

3) The existence of a road map: the Oslo Accords
Oslo gives an incremental approach (step by step) and, despite its handicaps, is the correct formula. The EU believes that the best way to achieve durable settlement is through negotiations.

The European Union: One that complements the US. The EU’s approach to the Palestine problem and the Middle East is on the following points:

1) Middle East is a vital region for the EU:

2) The need for a durable settlement:

3) The existence of a road map: the Oslo Accords

HE Richard Dalton
5) **An active and involved EU:**
The EU is seeking to influence both sides, especially Israel, regarding the roadblocks to peace. The role of the EU has evolved in response to 1996 developments, and the EU is trying to establish a balance between its activities and its relationships. At the same time, it also has to coordinate its policy both internally and with the US. The aid program, to which the EU is the largest donor, is a crucial underpinning of the political process.

6) **The EU’s Middle East envoy:**
The envoy, who used to be the Ambassador to Israel, has the following basic priorities:

- to observe negotiations and provide good advice;
- to explore opportunities for rebuilding trust and to encourage the implementation, on both sides, of outstanding points;
- to improve economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

The EU wants to achieve specific results, such as an end to the closure. Oslo will only work if it benefits Palestinians - primarily through a rise in the standard of living and in the status quo. The trilateral relationship between Israel, the Palestinians and the donors must be built upon.

## Exercise on Lobbying the External Powers
**with Dr. Rosemary Hollis**

The aim of the exercise was for the participant to examine three scenarios describing how events in Palestine could develop. Participants were then required to prepare a presentation to be given to a senior diplomat of an external power (in this case the US) in a bid to lobby the power to become involved in Palestinian interests.

The lobbying exercise was divided into three parts or rounds in which the participants were divided into three working groups, i.e., groups A, B and C. The participants were instructed to encourage the US to do something as the main external power.

### Round 1
The task in this round was to examine three scenarios as to how events in Palestine could develop. The three scenarios were as follows:

1) **Collapse of the peace process:** degeneration into violence between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (and Gaza);

2) **Re-invigoration of the peace process:** serious resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria/Lebanon and implementation of Oslo II alongside negotiations on final status;

3) **No-war no-peace:** stalemate in the peace process though both sides say they want to continue; isolated clashes interspersed with inconclusive negotiations (i.e., continuation of present situation).

Following discussion of the three scenarios participants were asked to identify and list the key actors and dynamics driving/influencing developments.
Results:

Scenario 1: suicide bombing; clashes between settlers and Palestinians; announcements; Israeli and Palestinian police clash; IDF re-enters some cities; state of emergency; “total anarchy”; Arab countries recall ambassadors; tension in relations with Israel; Israeli stock market plummets; attacks on American targets; oil price rise; Arabs demonstrate in US; protests in Third World countries; military maneuvers.

Scenario 2: new Labor government; Arafat sends letter to re-deployment in Hebron; Israeli government removes closure (CBM); opening of West Bank/Gaza corridor; negotiate about final status; industrial zones; Gaza port; regional stability encourages investments; Hamas is integrated in the process.

Scenario 3: no trust between different sides; ideology commitments of government cannot be met; cannot contain growth of anti-peace; money being wasted; Arafat may not be around in few years so need to help him deliver; US citizens are at risk.

Round 2

The participants were divided into the three groups again. Each group was then instructed to work on one scenario. The scenarios were divided as follows:

- Group A to work on Scenario 1;
- Group B to work on Scenario 2;
- Group C to work on Scenario 3.

The separate groups were required to create a story in the form of newspaper headlines, following each other in logical sequence over a period of six months, that described how each group’s scenario would come about. The groups were asked to focus on the key actors and dynamics discussed earlier in Round 1.

Round 3

A spokesperson from each of the three groups then told the story (with news bulletins/headlines) of how their scenario would take shape in the following six months. Participants were asked to compare the others’ stories with their own.

Round 4

Each group had to prepare a presentation to give to a senior diplomat representing the external power (in this case the US). The groups had to decide how they were going to explain the three scenarios in such a way as to capture the full attention of the US diplomat. They had to try to indicate how his or her country’s interests could be directly affected by what happens in Palestine.

Resources Scarcity as the New Regional Imperative

Dr. Rosemary Hollis

The state system has carved the regional topography into shapes that are not in line with natural resources. The present borders do not consider natural resource use and cooperation.

Water

The above can be seen clearly in the issue of water resources and the Middle East. In many areas, the distribution of the river system is illogical, such as in the case of Egypt, where the fate of the Nile lies only in the hands of up-river states. Sudan, a country that should be extremely rich with its agricultural land, plentiful water supply and potential underground minerals, has consumed many of its resources in its civil war. The Jordan River, which is essential to the Arab-Israeli conflict, flows through Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Israel before it reaches the Dead Sea, which is less than four meters above sea level.
Region with enough water. In Yemen, some areas have plenty of water, while others suffer from a shortage, mainly in the cities where the population density has exploded. Saudi Arabia also faces a problem. While there is plenty of water now, the Saudis are relying to a great extent on their renewable water resources, which will leave them with a serious shortage in the future.

**Population distribution:**
The population of the Middle East is clustered around the water resources, with the highest densities found mainly in Israel, Turkey and the Nile Valley. The populations are as follows: Israel: 6 million; Syria: 17 million; Lebanon: 3 million; Yemen: 11 million; and Saudi Arabia: 7 million.

Despite the water supplies around them, many cities are in serious trouble. Their population densities are growing faster than the ability of water and the proper infrastructure to keep up. Furthermore, many states are inflating their population figures in order to justify their use of resources. For example, official government figures put the Saudi population at 12.3 million, while in reality the number is closer to 7 million (including expatriates).

**Case Example: Demographic Dilemmas for the Gulf States**
Saudi Arabia and the GCC states are not now, but they have demographic problems, and studies point to a possible demographic explosion. Most Gulf countries face high growth rates, indicated by the fact that the majority of their citizens are under 25. This poses a problem for the governments, which cannot create new jobs for this generation. This is clear in the example of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state, which provided jobs and privileges for the previous generations, can no longer afford to maintain this level of subsidy (which was based on oil revenues). Due to the increasing size of the population, the government faces a situation in which expectations will not be met. In order to avoid the possible political unrest that may result, consumption behavior must be changed.

In Egypt, where most of the population lives on 4% of the land, the government faces a serious demographic challenge. Moreover, a child is born every 39 seconds, giving Egypt a growth rate of one million every ten months.

**Education System**
The Middle East also faces inequality in its educational levels, as different literacy rates mark each state. The rates are as follows: Israel: 81-92% (not including Palestinian Territories); Yemen and Saudi Arabia: 38-62%; Jordan: 76-80%; and Kuwait and Iraq: 64-74%. The educational systems also face a problem, as many of them do not prepare students for a variety of possible professions.

**Economics**
The economies of many of the states in the Middle East can be described as rentier/patronage economies. Such economies are based on rents, or money that comes from the top down. That is, money does not come from domestic industry, such as manufacturing, but from government sources such as subsidies or oil revenues.

**Palestine:**
Some predict that the Palestinian economy will develop into such, where money is distributed from the top of the pyramid to its base. Currently, the Palestinian economy faces an internal battle between those interested in a monopoly and the entrepreneurs hoping to invest from the outside.

**Israel:**
Israel can also be described as a hybrid rentier state as US$2.3 billion comes annually in the form of civil and military aid, in addition to the millions Israel receives from the
Diaspora Jewish community. At the same time, Israel has a blooming “capitalist” economy.

*Syria:* Syria received outside aid during the Gulf War.

*Egypt:* In response to its political decisions, Egypt receives aid from both the US and Saudi Arabia, but only enough for it to get by, not to prosper.

The World Bank is advocating that many of these economies make radical changes, like those undertaken in Eastern Europe. Such changes would revolutionize the economies, especially in the Gulf, but could also spell upheaval.

**Gulf Oil Resources**

Sixty-six percent of the world reserves are concentrated in the Gulf states. Distribution is as follows: Saudi Arabia: 25.6%; Iran: 9.31%; Kuwait: 9.43%; Yemen: 1.4%; UAE: 9.84%; and Iraq: 10.05%.

The US has downgraded its dependency on oil from the region, and has turned to countries such as Nigeria and Mexico. At the same time, it maintains its control over Middle East oil. It is banning investment in Iranian oil and putting pressure on its European allies to invest instead in Saudi Arabia, where it can control the market.

Two possible scenarios face the Middle East. These are as follows:

1) **Disintegration of the state system:** There will be pockets of advanced communities with high technology surrounded by security barriers. This scenario could come about if states lose the capability to provide the country with resources.

2) **Some winners/some losers:** While some states will maintain stability, others will fall apart. The winners would face some dismantling of the state system as integration becomes the norm.

The states of the Middle East face the following problems:

- the need to create new sources of wealth;
- the need to preserve/find new sources of water;
- the need to change industrial policy;
- the need to change the rentier economies by producing money from the people and decreasing the services of the state;
- the need to undergo serious political changes.

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**War and Its Impact on Foreign Policy**

In order to understand how conflict and war preparations relate to foreign policy, the following points need to be understood:

**Understanding the State**

States are often seen as single, rational actors, as if embodied with human characteristics. Yet, in reality, states are an amorphous bundle of different practices and agencies, operating on many levels, including the domestic economy, social services, and domestic politics. States are two-faced, with external and internal (domestic) dimensions, both balancing and affecting each other. There are both high and low politics, and states are in constant internal conflict and through balancing between the two.
Within the states, there are many interest groups that affect and are in turn affected by foreign policy. Furthermore, many have the power to deny resources. There is always some sort of bargaining between the society and the state, and this bargaining continually redefines state interests. Thus, the notion of bargaining is crucial to understanding foreign policy.

**Capital and Capital Flows**

The conducting of foreign policy and war also have to be understood within the framework of capital - whose availability can either restrain or enhance state capability. All tasks undertaken by the state require capital - education, social services, etc. - and providing these services is what gives credibility to the state.

States face a three dimensional dilemma: they need to provide defense, development and stability, all of which require capital allocation. The dilemma is where to find the resources to provide them. According to Michael Barrett, there are three possible strategies for the state:

1) **Accommodation.** In trying to find more capital, the state makes small, incremental changes, so as to keep the system going.
2) **Restructuring.** To find or create resources, the state makes major changes in the social structure (e.g., high taxes, cut in subsidies).
3) **International resources.** The state turns to external sources of capital so as to maintain the social structure and avoid restructuring the domestic economy.

**Case Study: Egypt**

**Egypt after 1952:**

Abdul Nasser and the Free Officers Movement had been concerned mainly with fighting colonialism and striking at any local groups that would align themselves with the British, e.g., the landowners. The new government focused on land reform, i.e., destroying land as a power base and redistributing it to poor peasants. It shifted capital and resources to industry and businesses, focusing on a restructuring process to create internal resources. This period marked the beginning of an economic restructuring for domestic purposes - to provide stability and create a power base for the state.

**1956-57:**

The Cold War brought a new dynamic into the region and Abdul Nasser became the Arab hero, epitomizing Arab leadership and promoting the notion of Arab unity. A new economic burden arose at this time - arms purchases - while domestic capital sources died down. In 1957, the government took steps towards Egyptianizing banking and capital sources. It also targeted foreign capital because it was not being directed towards areas of its own choice.

This nationalization came late and was a direct result of domestic and foreign pressures. In Egypt, as was the case in many Third World countries, economic nationalization occurred not according to some economic blueprint, but because of domestic and foreign pressures.

**Early 60s:**

Contrary to government assumptions, the economy failed to attract domestic private sector investment and development plans were falling behind. Saudi Arabia became an important investor in the Egyptian economy and industrial sector. Egypt was also receiving aid from both the US (in wheat) and the USSR (financial), using its growing role as regional leader for leverage. In 1961 and 1962, the government issued socialist decrees, nationalizing all economic sectors - banking, financial services, import/export, industry, etc.
1963:
Egypt's involvement in the Yemeni civil war drained its already strained economic resources. This period also saw a deepening of ties with the USSR, a growing source of financial and military aid.

Mid 60s:
The overall situation surrounding Egypt was that of major economic changes in the midst of both an Arab-Israeli and Cold War conflict.

1966:
This year marked a turning point in regional dynamics. The US suspended wheat aid to Egypt, which it saw as a Soviet stooge, and established its strategic relationship with Israel. Egypt was affected by a climate of siege - on its regional, economic and international levels - as the Israelis were settling in the Negev and the Americans were trying to bring down Abdul Nasser.

1967:
The defeat in the war discredited the government and raised questions of the legitimacy of the state. Attention was now turned to reconstruction of the armed forces and regaining the Sinai. The government was faced with the challenge of raising capital for such expenditures while continuing its domestic economic investments and provisions. Such costs could not be imposed on the poor.

Consequences of 1967:
- Egypt's perception of the conflict became clear and it recognized that Israel was now a regional fact. It also recognized UN Resolutions 242 and 338 - coexistence with Israel.
- Egypt accepted that its adventures - i.e., the Yemen and 1967 wars - had proven costly and disastrous.
- Egypt now aimed to eliminate Arab rivalry and interference and establish good relations.

Post-67:
Egypt was led by a new Abdul Nasser, who established warm relations with King Hussein, and improved those with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In return, he began to receive aid for his war effort.

The importance of the connection between domestic resource availability and international policy now becomes clear. The more important a state's role internationally, the more it can attain international capital and aid. Here was an example of the notion of influence - the dynamics of the patron/client relationship. The question was - who relied on whom? The ongoing war with Israel, which was receiving huge amounts of US aid, was one of attrition, and Egypt needed resources. It realized that by improving relations with the USSR, it could obtain more aid. Abdul Nasser, using the excuse of an Israeli threat, forced the USSR to escalate its commitments and used Soviet foreign investment for his own purposes. He thus forced domestic economic costs upon an external/international source. At the same time, he relaxed state controls on the economy, making subtle changes in the political and economic structures.

1970:
Sadat took over following Abdul Nasser's death in 1970, bringing with him an entirely different perspective of how things should operate. He believed that development needed more money and a restructuring process.

1970s onwards:
Egypt embarked on a new domestic restructuring - a process of liberalization, which included the lifting of subsidies and increased privatization. Sadat wanted to change the domestic economy and social alliances, and he used foreign policy as the tool. Egypt adopted a pro-Western stance in its Cold War politics and turned to the US for aid.

1990 onwards:
The end of the Cold War marked a shift in Egypt's foreign policy situation, and the game came to an end. Egypt's opportunities and options changed. The Gulf War gave Egypt a special role, namely that of gathering the Arab coalition, and its loan debt was written off in return. To gain economic assistance (loans, debt rescheduling, aid, etc.), Egypt used the war to reassert its continued importance as a regional leader.

Egypt faces challenges in its foreign policy, as there is a limit to its role and its rewards. Moreover, Egypt is tied into a wider system and it has to take regional dynamics, such as increased economic integration, into consideration. Egypt still faces economic problems. It needs to raise capital to increase the number of development and infrastructure projects. It also needs to find a balance in its domestic economy, taking on less of the burden and liberalizing the economy.

Case Study: Iraq

Background:
Unlike Egypt, Iraq had been a country with massive oil wealth and did not need to produce a domestic economy. By using its oil revenues and taking out loans, the government was able to subsidize domestic industries, such as farming, so that the population did not have to carry the burden of the wars. Education, health care and other services were all free.

1988:
Iraq faced a debt of US$80 billion and a myriad of problems, including a bankrupt economy and the need for restructuring. The end of the Iran-Iraq War saw the return of half a million men, all of them seeking employment.

The government then tried to reestablish its strategic regional position in order to reduce its debt burden. It embarked on a massive privatization and economic restructuring program, which led to increased social tension.

1990:
Iraq entered the Gulf War in order to enhance its regional role.

A Palestinian-Israeli encounter on Prospects for Peace in the Middle East

On the evening of the ninth day of the seminar, PASSIA hosted an evening reception for all involved, as well as for representatives of Palestinian institutions, the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem/Jericho and friends of PASSIA. As part of the 1996 reception, PASSIA invited HE Afif Safieh, PLO Representative to the UK and to the Vatican, and Yael Dayan, Member of Knesset, for a Palestinian-Israeli encounter on Prospects for Peace in the Middle East. The event took place on Tuesday, 17 December 1996, at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem, prior to the reception, and was attended by some 120 guests.
Summary:

**Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi:**

Thank you for coming to this meeting, which comes as part of the PASSIA seminar on educating new graduates in the field of foreign affairs. This year’s seminar covers the foreign policies of Arab countries, and believe me, it comes at exactly the right time. Now is the perfect time to gather all of these Palestinian graduates from all over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to learn about the various foreign policies and the related Palestinian stand. In December 1992 we held a similar seminar titled Strategy and Security Studies, with an emphasis on security issues.

Afif Safieh’s first visit to the homeland in December 93 was a very joyful, wonderful occasion, and we were delighted to welcome him back to Jerusalem. His arrival coincided with that of President Arafat, but the happiness, the joy, and the hope was not complete. We realized that we needed to bring in a partner, but this partner in the peace process, as I see it, has now been lost. The partner was the Labor party, representing half of the Israeli population, prior to the assassination of Rabin. Today we need this partner; there is a real conflict in which we need to be able to talk to each other, share ideas, and think together about the current situation in Jerusalem and what will happen to the Palestinians during the transitional phase.

After Yael and Afif have spoken, the floor will be left open for discussion. This will be followed by a reception in honor of our young graduates, who, together, form a cadre of young Palestinian diplomats, which will work in the name of the future Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. We would love to share Jerusalem, and for it to be an open free city, with two peoples, two capitals, two flags, and mutual recognition. In addition to Jerusalem, the West Bank, also, should be open, so as to prevent the isolation of Palestine.

It is a great honor and pleasure to welcome Yael Dayan, a member of the Knesset, as well as my colleague Afif Safieh, a genuine Palestinian, who has returned to Jerusalem.

**MK Yael Dayan:**

*Shalom, masa’a al-kheir,* and good evening to all of you, and to those who are celebrating Christmas very soon, a merry Christmas and a happy new year.

I would like to begin by saying that my partner and I have a long history together, which began when it was still illegal and virtually impossible. Originally it was not very joyful, because the first meetings we had were held in the absence of real trust. I was not comfortable, but we had to go through this phase in order to talk as equals. Although we recognized the existence of problems and arguments, there was always the sense that we shared the same bottom line. Perhaps Afif Safieh most accurately described the stages of our relationship when he said that a long time ago he actually rather liked me, although it was easier at the beginning because he loved to hate me. Then it became very difficult because he hated to love me. Now I think we love each other, and we have had a long talk on hate-love relations. I would like to say, basically, that I don’t think you will hear or witness a real debate of the kind we had before. Hopefully you are not going to witness two failure stories.

We are not here to commiserate with my friend Afif Safieh or my host Dr. Abdul Hadi, because I think that for a while, after Rabin’s assassination, we were in a state of shock, and we are still in a state of mourning. We are also still in a state of great rage; we know exactly what this murder signifies, because it is not only connected to the peace process, but also to Israeli democracy. There is a lot of grief. It was not a question of new elections or a new prime minister; protecting the life of a man is difficult enough, but protecting the life of a president, as we see the way things are today, is going to prove even more difficult.
After the assassination, and according to the democratic process, Likud replaced Labor. I believe that what stands between us and the next war, and us and the impossible idea of not having a Palestinian state, is the very strong will of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the existence of which has been proven by polls. Even if we put the polls aside, (remember the elections are not a poll in which people choose between peace and war), I really believe that both people know very well what our future is as neighbors. We do not know where, exactly, the borders will be, and we have many things to negotiate and debate, but there is no question in the mind of the Palestinian majority, and in the mind of its Israeli counterpart, that at the end of the day we are going to have a Palestinian state, and we are going to find solutions to all the in-between things that are still being negotiated.

We are probably going through the worst ever period, because we were given hope, and we had given the Palestinian and Israeli (Labor) leaderships a good head start. Some Israelis ask, “Is this the peace we were promised?” and I answer, “No, we are still not there.” We are not there, but we know where we are going; it is a very clear road, but we cannot afford to stall.

What we have now is a situation in which Netanyahu is unable to break away from his commitment to the Oslo agreements, not at the end of the day as I see it, concerning a Palestinian state, nor a solution to the refugees problem, nor a division or an agreement on East and West Jerusalem as two capitals for two peoples, but on the whole notion of ending the occupation, separating Palestine from Israel and remaining committed to the Oslo Accords until reaching the final status negotiations. I really believe that Netanyahu has no way out of it. The problem is “the pace,” the insecurity of the person himself.

We had no problems - our voters were backing us. Netanyahu is - and this is not an excuse - having problems, but not with us, from whom he derives backing and support, in the parliament and in the streets; we will go and demonstrate for him and with him on every little step that he takes towards the implementation of Oslo. Netanyahu has problems with his own voters; he cannot simply stand up and say, “Forget Oslo,” because that would lead to a problem with the majority of Israelis, the US and North America, the European countries and the entire Arab World. He is stuck but his hands are not tied; he is an elected prime minister with the full authority to do everything he wants. He cannot say he does not want to do it, or that he is not committed to doing it. I am saying that there is something missing in his personality, let us call it leadership or integrity of leadership. He does not want war. He is afraid, he is moving and speaking, he is having his photo taken; for him, the entire world is some kind of a photo opportunity. We are not able to stop him because we certainly do not want him to withdraw his commitment to the Oslo agreement.

The existence of optimism amongst the Israelis will, I believe, help Netanyahu. It will help him to re-deploy in Hebron, which I believe he is going to do. He will, however, have to understand the meaning of settlements. I think he understands he can waste words, but he cannot waste our lives and dreams or intentions; he does not have the freedom to do so, nor does he have the right to change the prospect of peace and an improved world economy into the prospect of war. Yes, I think he understands, but the question is, how are we going to push him into acting? We are going to do what is within our power to remove the major obstacles. I believe the PNA is doing everything in its power to remove obstacles from the Palestinian side, for terror does to Israelis what settlements do to Palestinians. We cannot really move forward when a state of mistrust or disbelief exists. Neither side is really attempting to advance towards what was agreed upon. I believe
PASSIA Seminar 1996 on "The Foreign Policies of Arab States"
PASSIA Seminar 1996 "The Foreign Policies of Arab States": Participants
background, center: Dr. Claire Spencer, HE Faisal Husseini, Dr. Rosemary Hollis

PASSIA Seminar 1996 "The Foreign Policies of Arab States": Participants with Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
Participants and Lecturers, Roundtable Discussion
Yael Dayan, Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, and HE Afif Safieh

Guests
Lectures

there will be no additional settlements; and if there are, we are going to demonstrate and attempt to prevent their construction in every possible way.

I am not going to give advice; I have too much confidence in the business of peace. The Oslo agreements are stronger than their details. We have to go step by step. I question whether the current government is capable of reaching further agreements. The Prime Minister does not include Palestine in his vision. The problem is that the Prime Minister thinks that trust and confidence are the condition of peace and not its consequence: we need security first, and then, as a result confidence, and then, finally, also as a result, peace. We oppose this because it does not work this way. Our notion is to build security and confidence as the base and as a result peace. Netanyahu thinks differently. My hope is that Netanyahu's government will be replaced, so as to allow the realization of the peace that our two peoples deserve. My hope is that we will achieve the two-state solution.

HE Afif Safieh:

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Yael robbed me of my opening lines, of how when we first met I loved hating her, and then how I hated loving her. You know there is this popular saying, “With friends like that, who needs enemies?” Allow me, Yael, knowing that you support a two-state solution, to reverse the question and ask, “With enemies like that, who needs friends?”

I for one naively thought that the Washington Summit would lead to a kind of an agreement concerning the disputed issues. Why did I, Afif Safieh, think this was possible? The answer is because I thought that, for the very first time, all of the pieces of the puzzle were in the right place at exactly the right time.

The first piece in the puzzle was the fact that scientifically conducted Israeli polls had revealed that there was widespread disapproval of the newly elected Prime Minister's policies vis-a-vis the peace process, and especially the way in which he managed the crisis that erupted after the tunnel incident. Some leading commentators in Israel had questioned his ability to lead, and they were uncomfortable with his policies for working with issues connected to the Palestinian problem.

The second piece of the puzzle comes from inside the ruling coalition itself, where various members have shown discontent with the way Netanyahu has handled the recent crisis.

The third piece of the puzzle was the fact that he didn't listen to his security services, and that the fact that he was more aware of the regional policies of the US than those of his own country added to the mounting discontent.

The fourth component of the puzzle was the fact that among Jewish Diaspora communities, especially among the American Jewish community, scientifically conducted polls showed that 60% of Jews outside were uncomfortable, uneasy and unconvinced that the attitude of the newly elected government was wise, sage and all the rest. This means that if President Clinton, for once, had taken an assertive position against Israel, he would not have been faced with the opposition of the Jewish lobby and he would have been supported by many an ally within the pro-Israeli lobby.

The fifth component was the fact that Europe, which had been marginalized in 1991 when we were pre-negotiating the negotiating exercise, was no longer content to merely continue its role as a financier of the peace process and was demanding, with our encouragement, to have a say in the geopolitical geo-strategic equation. You all remember the Chiraq visit and Rifkind's speech and all the rest. The argument in Europe was that the US used to say, because of the bipolar system, that there was a price to pay for the protective American umbrella, and the Europeans have accepted a sort of junior status, i.e., the international arena. But there were voices in Europe that were saying: now...
The sixth component that was encouraging was the fact that the Arab world, especially after the Cairo Summit, has become more cohesive than it was after the Gulf crisis of 1990. This new cohesion of the Arab system was publicly and unanimously in favor of the peace process including its Oslo component, approved for the first time by Syria and Libya, although the Arabs were still emphasizing that they wanted a just peace based on UN resolutions.

The seventh factor was the fact that Clinton was a candidate in the presidential elections and had a comfortable lead vis-à-vis his opponent Bob Dole, who never posed a serious threat to the re-election of Clinton. Therefore, he could have played a more effective role during the Washington Summit. Unfortunately, another good opportunity was missed.

What I would like to say today, ladies and gentlemen, is that if we, the local regional actors, are left to ourselves, unfortunately we will never reach an acceptable compromise, for a variety of reasons, but mainly because the military forces will always have the upper hand. I believe there is a very decisive need for external forces: the role of third parties is indispensable if we hope to reach an acceptable compromise. Today we are living in an international system that is no longer bipolar, and this being the case, we need to win public opinion; until now, I confess, we have failed to win the support of the Israeli public for the two-state solution. I believe that we still need to wage a battle so as to win a larger segment of the Israeli public opinion.

There are two authors for whom I have great respect. The first one is Isaac Deutch, a Jewish Pole who became a British philosopher and historian. Deutch summarized the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as follows: “It is a conflict that resembles a dispute between a person who had to jump from a building on fire, and the person on whom he landed and whose back he broke. Each time the injured person gets up he receives another beating, out of fear that he might seek revenge or compensation.”

The other author whose work fascinates me is Nahum Goldman, who was the leader of the World Zionist Organization for 40 years. Goldman said three things that today would help us in our search for a possible solution regarding cohabitation: the first thing he said was that there should be a decisive American role, and that the Americans should use all of the leverage they have to affect the final status talks, not only vis-à-vis re-deployment here or disengagement there, but also with regard to more serious issues, such as preventing the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

During the 70s and in the wake of Kissinger’s work, Nahum Goldman defined diplomacy in the Middle East as the art of delaying the inevitable for as long as possible. In one of his books, he said: “I once talked with Moshe Dayan (Yael’s father) and told him, ‘Moshe, the Americans give you aid and advice, but you always take the aid and leave the advice. What would happen if the Americans were to tell you that you could have the aid only if you took the advice?’ Moshe answered that under such circumstances, he would have to take the advice.” I believe that this linking between American aid and advice is the key to the future salvation of the peace process and our visa to get out of where we have been.

There are two schools of thought concerning the analysis of the US-Israeli relationship. Some believe that we are facing an American Israel, while others believe that we are facing an Israeli America. Allow me to explain. The first school of thought thinks it is America that dictates to Israel what its regional policy should be in accordance with the needs of the US. The other school thinks the opposite, that is, that the US simply adopts and integrates the Israeli regional preferences into its global strategies. I personally believe that the two schools of thought are both correct, but depending on which period of history we are referring to, and depending on the president and his position in congress.
I believe that the battle should be waged in the US, and Yael, you should start a joint effort by the Israeli peace camp and the Palestinian National Movement. America's siding with one belligerent actor in recent conflicts has led to devastating domestic repercussions. Being an American Arab has been difficult during the last 50 years: Arab Americans believe that the country by which they were adopted is siding with the enemy of their country of origin. I believe that the US today, in the unipolar system, should adopt a policy of non-alignment: non-alignment should be the US foreign policy and not that of Third World countries. Why? Because America is a nation of nations and siding with one belligerent party in a regional conflict can have serious, negative effects on the social fabric. So Yael, I think that we should think seriously about a joint campaign in the US to win public and governmental support for our opinions, meaning the two-state solution as the desirable outcome of the peace process.

With regard to the Israeli domestic arena, I think that many of us were devastated by the discourse we heard during the last elections in which, unfortunately, Labor decided to run as hawks and not as doves, and the commentators asked, “With doves like that, who needs hawks?” and “With a Left like that, who needs a Right?” For us, the Palestinians, it was very disturbing to witness an attempt by Labor to outdo Likud, instead of presenting the dovish alternative.

Dr. Mahdi, allow me to conclude by saying that Yitzhak Shamir ended his speech in Madrid by referring to Israel’s hunger for peace, and I think I can say without the risk of being contradictory: “We can satisfy Israel’s hunger for peace, if Israel abandons its appetite for territory.”

The Evolution of Palestine

The term ‘entity’ is not used in political terms by historians in discussing the Palestinian history or the evolution of Palestine. We do not hear the term used in relation to Egypt, Iraq, or Algeria. Why then is it used for Palestine? Reading the history of the Arab awakening during the Ottoman period, we realize that Palestine and the Palestinians were an integral part of that history; in fact, Palestinian activists were nationalist pioneers in drafting and working for the first Arab national doctrine for freedom and independence.

The Arab countries were under Ottoman rule for a period of four centuries, and the Arab National Movement was an inevitable result of the Ottoman oppression, persecution and domination of the Arab people. The roots of the movement can be traced back to the Arab heritage, language and history: this is what made it genuine and gave it its originality and continuity.

The first organized political efforts - an expression of Arab identity - were as follows:

• The 1875 program of a secret society in Beirut: The society called for the recognition of the Arab language as the official language of the Arab countries, for an independent and united Syria and Lebanon and for employing outstanding Arab figures in the internal service of Arab countries.

• The establishment of the Literary Club (Al-Muntada Al-Adabi) in Istanbul in 1909: The club included in its membership Arab students from higher institutions, literary personalities, and members of parliament. It published a magazine, carrying its name, which dealt with the history, language and aspirations of the Arabs, thus making a significant contribution to the national awakening and to the revival of Arab glories. It placed an emphasis on the Arab identity, and was the first Arab organization to revive the Arab flag.
1913, and then moved again, in 1914, to Damascus. It was the first pro-independence group of Arabs and was responsible for planning the first general Arab conference in Paris, in 1913. The conference included delegations from various societies in and outside the Arab countries, and the topics discussed included national life, the struggle against occupation, Arab rights in the Ottoman state, the necessity for reform regarding centralization, and immigration from and to Syria.

- The founding of the secret Al-Ahd Society in Istanbul in 1913: Al-Ahd was founded by a number of Arab officers preparing plans for independence through revolt.

On 5 November 1914, when the Ottoman state entered the war at the side of Germany against the allies, the Arabs stood at a junction. Either their link with the Ottoman state would continue, or they were to drop the connection and turn their attention to their national liberation movement, in which case their aim would be to unify its leadership, adhere to its independence goals, carry it to a new phase, and seize the opportunity to look for allies to help them achieve their goals.

The concept of the ‘nation state’ reached maturity and became the moving force behind Arab political thought and action. The Arab struggle shifted from demands for Arab autonomy to the call for a nation state and the struggle for its translation into a legal political reality.

The Arab search for allies to support their movement manifested itself in the following actions:

- A delegation of Syrian notables paid a visit to Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, requesting that Britain annex Syria and Egypt on condition that Syria enjoy independent administration.
- Talib An-Naqib, the representative of Basra in Iraq, made a similar offer to British envoys in Egypt and India.
- A number of Arab officers in Istanbul paid a visit to the British Ambassador to inquire about the position Britain would take in case certain conditions emerged. (Aziz Ali Al-Masri had been imprisoned for resisting the Ottoman authority and was awaiting sentencing.)
- The British government was fully informed about Sharif Hussein’s (the Prince of Mecca) resentment towards the Turks. The resentment drove Sharif Hussein to seek independence using all possible means.
- Sharif Abdallah paid two visits to Cairo where he had secret talks with Jerusalem Governor Ronald Storrs about the possibility of taking action against the Turks to gain independence.

The mutual interest of the Arabs and Britain in working against the Turks was their motive for an alliance, despite the differences in their final goals. The Arab National Movement entered a new phase in which it moved in two parallel directions to achieve its independence goals. The two directions were as follows:

1) formulating and legalizing its relations with the allies (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence);
2) unifying its ranks under one leadership. (The secret societies in Syria and Iraq, Fateh and Al-Ahd, presented to Sharif Hussein a detailed proposal, the ‘Damascus Protocol,’ for a military revolt against the Turks and looked to him to assume leadership of the Arab National Movement.)
On 2 November 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, which promised a "homeland" for Jews in Palestine. Palestinians were confronted with three contradicting historical documents: the 1915 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence in which Britain pledged independence to the Arabs, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 providing for the colonization of the Arab World, and, finally, the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Palestinians had no other representative or leader but Sharif Hussein, and they were prevented from traveling to seek external help: moreover, they were never asked for their opinion vis-à-vis the governing and administering of their country.

On the major political scene, they supported the Sharif and his sons, Faisal and Abdallah, in their new chapter of confronting the allies. On the domestic scene, they started to establish the Muslim-Christian Society to lead their national movement: this, however, was inseparable from the Arab Movement embodied in Faisal's first government in Damascus.

It should be mentioned that one of the Jerusalemite leaders, Abdul Qader Al-Muzafar, called for Jihad in the early days of November 1914.

In 1918, the first Zionist delegation visited Palestine and created confusion among the people concerning the Zionist plans, of which the Palestinian media, i.e., Al-Karmel and Filastin, were already warning. The Muslim-Christian Society held its first convention in Jerusalem on 5 March 1919, when it elected the first Arab executive committee to lead the National Movement and endorsed the very first Palestinian National Covenant. The covenant, whilst calling for Syrian independence in the context of Arab unity, emphasized Palestine's status as an integral part of Syria. With regard to the British it condemned both the Balfour Declaration and British military tutelage. It also expressed total rejection of Jewish immigration.

The Muslim-Christian Society, since its establishment in 1918 up to 1922, was the center for political activities and local representatives, who addressed numerous issues. They were particularly active in sending statements to the League of Nations and the British Government as well as in forming the first Palestinian delegation to London.

The 1919 Versailles Peace Conference established the system of the League of Nations and a system of mandates. It was also responsible for the arrival of the first fact-finding mission (King-Crane) to the region and its attempts to assess peoples' political aspirations. The Palestinian position focused on the rejection of the division of Syrian territories in addition to Zionist immigration and the British mandate, and the call for total independence.

In April 1920, the first Palestinian uprising started in Jerusalem and eventually spread all over Palestine. Its message was Arab unity and independence as well as a clear "no" to Jewish immigration: it was a salute to Faisal, who became the first Arab king in Damascus.

With the enforcement of the British mandate in Palestine and the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel as the first British High Commissioner to Palestine, the Palestinian National Movement entered a new chapter. During the period of the British mandate, 1923-1947, Palestinians held over seven major national conferences, elected an Arab executive committee, formed various political parties, revolted in 1921, 1929, 1933, 1936, and sent many delegations to London and the Arab capitals, as well as to India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. However, in February/March 1939, they were back to square number one: the Palestinian revolt of 1936 was ended by Arab decision.

The Palestinians attended the St. James Conference with the other Arab representatives and received the famous British 'White Paper' restricting Jewish immigration and landbuying. Meanwhile, the Zionist movement, with the assistance of the British government, rushed to create facts on the ground by building settlements, establishing a military army, forming the Jewish Agency to represent the Jewish community and to confront the
The period of the British mandate witnessed the emergence of Palestinian political elites as well as a class of professionals and technocrats, all of whom were loyal to the Arab Movement and worked towards achieving its goals. Their leadership was embodied in the Arab Higher Committee chaired by Hajj Amin Al-Husseini. Historic documents show exactly to what extent the Palestinian National Movement ‘copied’ the early days of the Arab awakening under the Ottomans. For example, Al-Muntada Al-Adabi was re-established in Jerusalem in January 1918, and An-Nadi Al-Arabi in 1919, with the very same goals of reviving the Arab heritage, history, language and achieving freedom.

Palestinian history, from the early 1920s up to 1948, is dominated by two major dimensions: Arabizing the Palestinian cause versus Palestinianizing it. The first trend had the upper hand, but unfortunately led to the first Palestinian catastrophe, an-nakba, in 1948, with the de facto partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in more than 56% of the Palestinian territory.

It should be emphasized here that some historians introduce the evolution of Palestine in connection with the evolution of Zionism, and they record in detail all the Zionist conferences, statements, leaders, contacts and achievements. I believe the evolution of Palestine should be recorded as an integral part of the Arab National Movement. Both, eventually, confronted the challenges of Zionism.

The Palestinian National Movement struggled against the British mandate, the Zionist movement and various Arab regimes to maintain its identity. But the Palestinian National Program was about to be forgotten geographically, demographically, and politically as a result of the potential disappearance of the Palestinians through the process of assimilation into the Jordanian state. The Arab countries, excluding Jordan, refused to absorb Palestinian refugees. They were assisted in this by the Arab League resolutions that banned its states from granting citizenship to Palestinians.

The Partition Plan of 29 November 1947 was an international recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent Palestinian national state in Palestine. The document also granted the Zionist movement a Jewish state in part of Palestine. The context of the international plan represented a major injustice for Palestinians.

On 10 July 1948 the political committee of the Arab League called for the establishment of a Palestinian temporary civil administration to govern the Palestinian territories controlled by the Arab armies following the 1948 war, but the plan never materialized because of the strong objection of Jordan. On 1 October 1948 the Arab Higher Committee called a national conference in Gaza. The council elected a government, established a national charter, and declared Palestinian independence in Gaza. All Arab League members recognized the Palestinian government in Gaza with the exception of Jordan.

Palestinian leaders in the West Bank held a series of conferences during which they called for unity with Jordan. At a later stage Jordan granted Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians in the West Bank and endorsed the conference resolutions regarding the unity of the two banks of the River Jordan.

The Arab League did not accept Jordan’s unification plans and up until the early fifties it could not change the de facto unity. It stated, however, that the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan was pending the final settlement of the Palestine Question and the realization of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

From the early 1950s, the Palestinians gradually became scattered as refugees and displaced persons in the neighboring host Arab countries. Other Palestinians became second-class residents/citizens under Israeli military occupation in the new Jewish state.
The Palestinians in Israel were cut off totally from their brothers in the West Bank and Gaza as well as from the Arab World, yet they struggled to maintain their identity, and continued to wait for a solution. Those who stayed in the West Bank including Jerusalem became Jordanian citizens and enjoyed full rights in a sovereign independent Arab state. Their political elite shared in the governing of Jordan, i.e., ministers, members of parliament, ambassadors. Meanwhile, those in Gaza maintained their Palestinian identity under Egyptian civil administration.

The famous story by Ghassan Kanafani, *People Under the Sun*, is a true story of how Palestinians struggled for survival, not only in their own homeland but also in neighboring host Arab countries. The story describes the plight of four people, hidden in an empty water tank, as they were driven across the desert between Jordan and Kuwait. They had no formal travel documents, and were attempting to smuggle themselves into Kuwait to find work. While they were dying under the heat of the sun, the four knocked continuously on the wall of the tank, crying, “We are here, we are dying, let us out, let us free.” This story reflects the dilemma of the majority of Palestinians during that era. Palestine, for the Palestinian Diaspora, became a story of a house, a shore, a mountain or other treasured memories.

In the early 1960’s Palestinians started again to re-organize and to mobilize enthusiastic popular support for the return to Palestine. This reawakening was on two tracks; the national and the Pan-Arab. With the first we witnessed a formation of Fateh organizations in Kuwait, and these later became the cornerstone of the national military resistance movement, whose leaders were received and supported by President Abdul Nasser of Egypt. The second track was an Arab summit decision to establish the PLO in 1964.

Internal Arab politics were unable to deliver a solution on either track, but the second Palestinian catastrophe in 1967 brought the answer. The defeat of Arab armies and the fall of the West Bank and Gaza brought Palestinians, geographically and demographically, under Israeli military control. From 1967 until the early 70’s the Palestinian military resistance against Israeli occupation was the major tool that united Palestinians throughout the world in their confrontation with Israel, with the backing and support of the Arab countries. Those under occupation called for steadfastness (*sumud*) and waiting for a solution to come through the PLO military resistance or Arab regimes, or the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967.

The PLO faced a struggle for power and authority on Jordanian soil and was defeated and forced out of Jordan in the early 1970’s. It re-established itself in Lebanon and succeeded in establishing a mini-state within the state of Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, led by Begin-Sharon, put an end to the PLO mini-state, and, with no state or military infrastructure, the PLO departed to Tunis. Meanwhile, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories moved from a stage of steadfastness to a new chapter known as the *Intifada*. The philosophy of the *Intifada* was to change the status quo and build a new society: “We cannot undo Israel, we have to co-exist with Israel, we cannot wait for a solution to come from outside, we cannot be anything but Palestinians and we have a future to build, based on what we have in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” The characteristics of the five stages of the *Intifada* were as follows:

*Stage one:* to Palestinianize the society, no fear, national pride, and challenging occupation with various tools such as stones, the burning of tires, leaflets and general strikes.

*Stage two:* to transfer the fear that governed the lives of the Palestinians for over 20 years to Israeli society, and to transfer the message of the *Intifada* to the PLO, which endorsed it in the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers in 1988.

*Stage three:* to begin talks and dialogue with all Israelis to build Israeli public opinion to accept the *Intifada*. The characteristics of this stage were as follows:

- **Fighting for the status quo:** The Palestinians agreed to the status quo and to work with the Israelis toward economic development, the rule of law, and the building of a common future.
- **Building a new society:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new society based on coexistence and mutual respect.
- **Building a new leadership:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new leadership based on mutual respect and trust.
- **Building a new economy:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new economy based on mutual respect and trust.
- **Building a new political system:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new political system based on mutual respect and trust.
- **Building a new social system:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new social system based on mutual respect and trust.
- **Building a new educational system:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new educational system based on mutual respect and trust.
- **Building a new cultural system:** The Palestinians agreed to the establishment of a new cultural system based on mutual respect and trust.

*Stage four:* to build the new society, to transfer the new society to the Palestinians, and to build the new society in the Occupied Territories.

*Stage five:* to build the new society in the Occupied Territories, to build the new society in Jordan, and to build the new society in all of Palestine.

In summary, the Palestinians have been fighting for the right to return to their homeland and to build a new society based on coexistence and mutual respect. The *Intifada* has been a major tool in this struggle, and the Palestinians have made significant progress in building a new society in the Occupied Territories. The future of the Palestinians is uncertain, but they remain committed to building a new society based on coexistence and mutual respect.
The rest of the story is well known. The secret negotiations in Oslo were a breakthrough that delivered Israeli and Zionist recognition of the Palestinian people, and acceptance of the Palestinians as negotiation partners, in order to reach a political settlement. Today, the Palestinian entity is crystallized in a recognized flag, leader, elected council, transitional phase peace process, and support by the donor countries and the Arab World. But the story is not yet complete. The ‘entity’ and its future are to face more challenges, not least of all the absence of an Israeli partner to bring a successful conclusion to the peace process.

The Foreign Policy of the PLO

Dr. Yezid Sayigh

In this case study, the PLO will be set in a cold war context, and we will be dealing with the opportunities and constraints facing the foreign policy of a non-state actor.

*Foreign Policy Orientation*

How did the PLO perceive foreign policy and international politics, and what kind of alignments did it have?

The PLO was based on the following key schools of thought:

1) *Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM)*:
   The ANM called for Pan-Arabism and Marxism (Habash and Hawatmeh) - it sought a big brother figure to aid the Palestinians. It was a strategy based on a wider alliance and held a strong normative view of policy.

2) *Fatah school*:
   This group has its roots in Islamic groups. Most of Fatah’s leaders started out with Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Most members of Fatah were middle-class Gazans, with a modern, professional education, and they reflected the highly intellectual oppressed. Many had worked in the Gulf, ending up marginal people in Gulf society as part of the *petite bourgeoisie*. They sought statehood to attain their own identity and political system. The main tenants of Fatah ideology are as follows:

   - **Strong state goals**: The followers of the Fatah school of thought wanted a state, an entity, with their own Palestinian political institution to represent them.
   - **Separate identity**: The followers had a pragmatic approach, and did not think of the Palestinian entity as part of the Muslim state.
   - **Dislike of political parties**: They absorbed the ideologies and assumptions of the Muslim Brotherhood, which did not favor political parties.
   - **Action-reaction theory**: They saw politics in three circles: Palestinian, Arab, and the international arena:
The three circles affected each other: the Palestinian affected the Arab and that, in turn, affected the international. As a result of the war situation in which the PLO was working, there was little in terms of a democratic process. There was no change in the leadership: those with control maintained it and thus had a high degree of influence on foreign policy decisions.

**Actual Foreign Policy**

The ultimate aim was the establishment and recognition of a Palestinian state, as elaborated in the *Palestiniuna* journal since 1954. The PLO was established in 1964, and when Fatah took over in 1969, it brought its own notions of statehood and guerrilla movements. The PLO thus had a combination of both legitimacy and armed strategy, and enjoyed the recognition of a state without actually being one.

**Early stages:**
The PLO was recognized by the Arab states, and began to lobby the external environment in order to serve its national aims. It was conscious of the fact that it had to interact within an international arena, and it attempted to gain an understanding of its position within this system, searching for a strategy that would have international effects and acceptance. After facing rejection from the Soviet Union, the PLO tried to widen its relations with other liberation movements and Third World countries. China offered the PLO material assistance and invited it to open an office, and in 1970, the USSR came to the PLO to establish contacts. The search for a strategy continued, especially after the events of September 1970.

**1970s:**
The PLO was greatly affected by events in the international arena. After Nixon launched his strategic consensus plan - to shift responsibility to local allies - the Soviet Union increased its interest in local allies and the PLO, whilst establishing ties with Iraq and Egypt. The détente and various regional events caused the PLO to fear it was being left out in the cold, and thus it began to carry out acts to avoid being ignored. With the shift in the balance of powers - in USSR-US relations and in the region (October War, Arab unity, the oil embargo) - the PLO perceived a new regional order. It also realized that there was no support for a total Palestinian state, and it accepted the fact that diplomatic forces limited its aim of a state in all of Palestine: international events suggested that a more moderate policy would be more acceptable to the international community.

**Strategy after 1973:**
In light of such pressures, the PLO adopted a new strategy: its aim was no longer the destruction of Israel, but the establishment of a state in the West Bank and Gaza. It returned to its notion of three circles to achieve its aims, which were as follows:

1) **Palestinian:** The West Bank and Gaza become more important in PLO thinking. Moreover, leaders from the West Bank and Gaza became members of the PLO Executive Committee, and the number of members in the overall organization increased. There was a concerted effort to promote a new awareness of the importance of mass social action in the West Bank and Gaza.

2) **Arab:** The PLO sought to solidify support from the oil countries.

3) **International:** The PLO looked for new, stronger international backers, in addition to closer ties with the USSR, China and the Third World. In 1974, Europe became more active and by 1980 had established ties with the PLO.

The PLO succeeding in putting the Palestine Question - the issue of a Palestinian state with the PLO as the official Palestinian representative - on the international agenda. It maintained its military role, but only as a tool of diplomacy.
train other forces. The PLO backed up "friendly" states, and succeeded in establishing a para-state position in the area, with its own offices in Western Europe. It worked on building and expanding its own institutions, social and otherwise, and was able to build an extensive, world-wide network. In 1979, the PLO received around US$4 billion in aid, and it seemed that everyone was on the PLO payroll. Everyone became part of the system, strengthening the social process of state-building. Meanwhile, the PLO, like a state, came under pressure from various angles, such as internal forces, Arab states, and the USSR, whenever it had to decide on important issues, such as the Camp David events.

**External relations:**
The Soviet Union became an important dimension in PLO policy and it was a key player in helping the PLO establish its international standing. However, Soviet influence and pressure on the PLO were limited; pressure was most effective only when alongside Arab pressure. In Soviet-PLO relations, the PLO was the key to the Soviet position in the region. Because of its ANM standing, the PLO could enhance or limit the Soviet position. Syria, at one time, had a stranglehold on the PLO because PLO forces were based in Syria - and its position vis-à-vis the PLO was thus much stronger than the Soviet Union's. The PLO sought continuously to maintain good relations with all Arab states.

**Second Cold War (1978-9):**
International and regional events during this period, such as the Afghanistan War, the Iranian revolution, and the international confidence building measures in Europe, combined to threaten the strategy of the PLO, which now had less influence on the US through its Soviet relations. The Arab World was also polarized and divided into varying positions: the PLO was thus obliged to choose sides in the conflicts. Pressure was also intensified when the internal Palestinian opposition aligned itself with an Arab or Soviet position.

**PLO factions:**
Like many other national liberation movements, the PLO was often fragmented into opposing factions. The major factions were as follows:

- **PFLP:** The Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had its roots in the old Arab Nationalist Movement and the nationalistic theories of Western Europe. The ANM had, in its beginnings, been very anti-Communist, and it was not until 1964 that it adopted a Marxist/Socialist style. The debate over its approach began in the 60s and a new school of thought emerged with the entrance of a new, young intellectual elite in 1967. The PFLP was not really Marxist, pro-Soviet or pro-Communist; rather, it was guerrilla-Marxist. Its decision was affected not only by the new generation, but by external events. It was a time of Third World revolutions and guerrilla wars - Che Guevara, Mao's China, etc. - and the PFLP was undoubtedly influenced by these events and the movements involved.

- **DFLP:** The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was even more leftist and Leninist than the PFLP. In 1970, after the defeat of the leftist movement, the DFLP came to see itself as pro-Soviet. It became the key Soviet ally within the PLO, bringing in material assistance to the organization.

In 1970, many leftist movements and their slogans were discredited and this allowed Fatah to assert its power over the PLO. Until this time, there had been many divisions within the Palestinian ranks, and there was no total Palestinian recognition of the PLO as a sole representative. With the 1970 defeat came Palestinian unification and Fatah dominance.
End of the Cold War (1985 onwards):
The end of the Cold War had significant strategic implications for the PLO, for it could no longer play the game. Its demise represented the end of not just an entire political generation, but a world order, institutions, and a certain logic. The PLO had emerged on the scene in the 60s, prepared to deal with an international system that was set in a Cold War context. This new period and system challenged the PLO’s ability to survive.

Sensing that a change in the system was imminent and hoping to secure Soviet and Eastern Europe recognition, Arafat hurried to declare statehood in 1988. The Palestinian National Council (PNC), meanwhile, recognized UN Resolution 242. The PLO faced implications from several events, including the loss of strategic Soviet support and the Gulf War. The war presented Arafat with a two-fold dilemma: that of choosing sides (when he needed both) and that of maintaining political legitimacy with the Palestinians while maintaining international PLO legitimacy. The PLO had to accept several realizations: a peace process with Palestinian, not just PLO participation (presenting Arafat with the threat of alternative leadership), and an interim, not final, arrangement with terms it did not want.

Discussion:

Question: Why is the PLO not establishing links with the Palestinians outside? Why is it not restructuring and getting them involved?

Answer: The PLO is realigning, restructuring and readapting, but with the same people. It is now adopting ways of relating to the Palestinians and dealing with the daily issues of self-rule. In addition, it is having to deal with many new constraints and possibilities.

Question: What new social alliances and patterns are emerging?

Answer: Ones that deal with national issues - domestic and internal. A new foreign policy, which aims at securing foreign aid is also emerging. The PLO is becoming irrelevant now, as the Palestinians have national institutions to serve them. The Palestinian leadership has emerged over the years from Hajj Amin’s Palestinian Congress to the PLO to the PNA, and each has had a greater role than the first.

Jordanian Foreign Policy

Dr. Yezid Sayigh

For Jordan, a small actor with poor resources, foreign policy is a matter of survival. Jordanian foreign policy is characterized by strong connections between the state’s internal and external dimensions, as well as by its political economy.

Domestic Composition

Jordan, a recent and artificial creation, has been balancing two populations since 1948: the Trans-Jordanians, i.e., East Bankers or native Jordanians, and the West Bankers, a mixture of Palestinian refugees from 1948, 1967 and 1991.

Jordanian society is represented by two main divisions and by various smaller divisions within its social strata. A balance, whether real or perceived, exists and is significant, both politically and socially. The divisions affect both social facts (e.g., inter-marriages) and political alliances and attitudes, and their importance varies according to the circumstances. Apart from the two main groups there is the Hashemite ruling elite.

Resources

Jordan is a resource-poor nation that has always depended upon international subsidies, capital flows and assistance. These have been relatively important in order to achieve a significant increase in GDP per capita in recent years.
employed; most of the native population depends upon the state sector for employment, while the Palestinians rely on the private sector and migration. This fact is significant because when state politics or economics change, it is predominately the natives who are affected.

**Economy**

Jordan’s foreign policy is very closely tied to its sources of capital. In 1957, much of the foreign aid to Jordan, including loans, was from the US. In 1967, by playing the role of a confrontation state, Jordan was able to secure Gulf money, and when this was cut in 1972, the US increased its aid. Jordan began to receive up to US$1.2 billion in Arab aid when a decision was made at the Baghdad Summit of 1978, which followed Camp David, to increase aid to Jordan to counter the loss of aid from the US.

Jordan’s state budget is centered around defense, development and subsidies. The labor opportunities presented through the oil boom greatly reduced the strain on the government, as the remittances helped to bolster the state economy. From 1982 onwards, and with the decline in oil revenues, the trend reversed. There was a reduction in Gulf employment, as a large number of laborers returned, a reduction in remittances and a decrease in official assistance. By the end of the 80s the Jordanian economy was overburdened with a US$6.5 billion debt. It faced several problems, including the following:

- increased consumer demand;
- PLO funds being channeled to the Palestinian Territories because of the Intifada;
- a devaluation of the Dinar from 1987-89;
- an external debt reaching over US$8 billion;
- an inability to pay its debt balance or interest;
- an end to Arab aid.

The crisis in the economy was evident in 1989, when a cut in subsidies led to riots and calls for parliamentary elections. The King used political liberalization as a means to diffuse the economic pressures. Needing new sources of aid - the World Bank and the IMF - the government knew that it had to make wide-ranging economic changes: privatization, liberalization, etc.

**Regional Relations**

Jordan’s economy is also tied to its Arab partners. Twenty percent of Jordan’s exports go to Iraq, which had originally provided oil at a cheap rate. Iraq had a trade debt in Jordan’s favor and had, until the Gulf War, re-rooted much of its trade through the Aqaba port, providing Jordan with much-needed port fees (US$300 million). Fifteen percent of Jordan’s exports (and 95% of its agricultural products) go to the Gulf states. The Gulf is vital to Jordan as a source of both employment and aid: the Gulf aid was especially important in the 70s, when it replaced that of the US. At various times, Jordan has been able to play upon its role as a “buffer state” to the Gulf: it even offered to send its troops to the Gulf to replace the US and European troops.

**West Bank Factor**

Since 1948, Jordan has had a special interest in the West Bank. The West Bank was perceived as an important economic unit. Jordan thus had a real interest in maintaining its claim to the area following the 1967 war. There are various other factors affecting its West Bank policy, including the following:

- The internal political dimension: To control the strong Palestinian community in Jordan, it has to appear as seriously advocating their interests.
- The religious dimension: Jordan wants to assert its religious legitimacy regarding the holy sites.


- **Political economy:** The West Bank allows Jordan to play the role of peace-maker in order to enhance its regional importance.
- **The burden of refugees:** The issue of Jordan’s Palestinian refugees gives it an additional legitimacy in its requests for international assistance.

**Foreign Policy**

Jordan has been playing a double role in its foreign policy. On the one hand, it is trying to be the region’s “key to peace,” thus a government that needs to be stable and strong. On the other, it has tried to be, for its Arab neighbors, a “confrontation state” always at the center of conflict. Both these roles allow it to ask for money and assistance, whether internationally for stability, or regionally for its confrontational military role.

Jordan’s foreign policy waviers between taking the initiative and waiting for the event to die down. In 1973, Jordan did not really get involved in the war, and consequently, did not reap its benefits. Instead, the PLO was recognized as the Palestinian representative. In 1979, it followed Iraq and Syria’s lead in rejecting Camp David. In 1983, in order to seal its own legitimacy in the peace process, Jordan tried to revive a deal with the PLO and get it to accept UN Resolution 242.

After 1982, with the Likud in power in Israel, the focus of Jordan’s foreign policy was on diplomacy. Jordan was afraid that Israel would try to destabilize the country through talks of a Jordanian-Palestinian solution: diplomacy thus became a means of “forward defense.”

In 1988, Jordan cuts its ties to the West Bank in order to establish that Jordan was not Palestine. It also wanted to prevent the entrance of West Bank deportees, whilst minimizing the consequences of a declining West Bank economy.

During the Gulf War, the government did not take an anti-Iraqi stance and insisted that the war was an “Arab issue.”

In 1991, with the Madrid peace initiative, Jordan claimed that it was going to the talks, with or without the PLO. It created a *fait accompli* and joined the bilateral and multilateral talks. It wanted to regenerate its relations with the West and succeeded in securing the re-establishment of US aid (to make up for the loss of Gulf money).

In the post Gulf War era, Jordan has been able to achieve a debt write-off and re-scheduling through its peace with Israel. It now provides a “strategic depth” to Israel, through a clause in the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement that states that no foreign air force can enter over Jordanian land, thus giving Israel an extra border. Through this new relationship, Jordan has been trying to demonstrate its importance in the US strategic umbrella.

**Economic Challenges**

Because there is a limit to how much aid money Jordan can receive, it has been forced to reach additional agreements with the World Bank and the IMF. To meet their requirements, Jordan has to cut its state budget and restructure the economy, causing widespread social implications. Any economic restructuring, such as budget cuts and privatization, would affect the native Jordanian population, which relies on subsidies and employment. The natives would interpret these changes as undermining the pact between the Hashemites and the Hijazi family. Moreover, they fear the Palestinian presence in Jordan, and see all policies as related to the Palestinian link.
Some people think that talking about political Islam implies that there is a separation between religion and state. An in-depth look at the way and spirit of Islam would show that this is not true. Islam is state, religion and a way of life - which includes all aspects of the daily life of the Muslim - combined. Islam defined the relationship of a Muslim with God. It also organized relations between the different sides within one Muslim state as well as relations between the Muslim state and other states, whether they are antagonist, peaceful, or involved in a mutual pact. Talk of separation of religion from state began in practice when Mustafa Kamal Ataturk canceled the Islamic Caliphate, separated Turkey from the Muslim World and directed Turkey towards the West in heart and matter. He was famous for his power and violence against anyone who stood in his way.

This procedure caused a shock throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, and resulted in the emergence of several groups that attempted to resume the Islamic way of life. The Arab Nation, meanwhile, was already busy combating colonialism in its attempt to gain independence.

The Islamic political groups considered the return to Islamic every-day living as obligatory, according to Islamic law (Sharia). While we cannot say that a particular group represents Islam or speaks on its behalf, all try to revitalize Islam according to their independent judgment and capabilities.

The current Islamic revival - the “awakening” - is the natural outcome of the efforts of a group of Muslim scholars to raise an entire generation according to its unique way of thinking. The group’s efforts have resulted from the failure of all Arab or Islamic parties to provide what the group regards as a suitable alternative.

Islam is completely different from other religions and ideas in that its followers are directly accountable to God, from whom it derives its legislation for the nation and the state: this applies to social, religious and international relations. The basis of Islamic legislation centers on the following three principles: the supremacy of God almighty, consultations (shura), and equality.

The desired Islamic state capable of spreading the Islamic concepts of justice, stability, security, and equality amongst the peoples of the Arab and Islamic World without distinction does not yet exist, although there have been attempts in Sudan and elsewhere.

The work of the Muslim political groups should not cause discontent or complaints from those with opposing views: they all strive to respect the opinions of others and are comfortable with the idea of a political pluralism that gives a chance to everyone to present and discuss their ideas in a civilized fashion. During the development of the Palestinian society, it is only natural that we should follow the path that aims to realize the aspirations of the Palestinian people whilst maintaining order and preventing chaos.

When we talk about the Ottoman state, we should not leave out any of the details of its wonderful history. It is true that it left a bad impression at the end of its rule and that its neglect of the Arab World had a negative impact on the intellectual, social, political and economic levels in the region. Yet this does not excuse the vicious criticism of the Ottoman state when we know very well that any weakness it suffered from at the end of its rule was the result of the attack from the West, and that only a few weak individuals within the state contributed to its demise; and then, of course, we have to consider the role played by the Jews.

The most important reason for the emergence of the Islamic groups after the cancellation of the Islamic Khalifa by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk was the feeling that the nation, without a Khalifa, no longer had a ruler to deal with its affairs. The Muslim
Brotherhood emerged in Egypt as a direct result of attempts by these groups to re-instate the *Khalifa* and to implement Islamic rule. Its founder, the martyr Hassan Al-Banna, adopted a detailed method of preparation in order to raise the Muslim individual and the society within which he or she lived according to Islamic concepts, as outlined in his letters which became known as the letters of the martyr, *Rasa el Al-Imam Al-Shahid*. Al-Banna was very successful in his attempts to ensure the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood movement throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds.

### Foreign Policy Imperatives of Saudi Arabia

*Dr. Rosemary Hollis*

#### Imperatives and Constraints

**Geopolitical constraints:**

Geopolitical constraints have played a major role in dictating Saudi Arabia’s future. Most of Saudi Arabia is desert, and what agriculture exists is rapidly using up future reserves of ground water.

The Saudi society is tribal. Moreover, there is a great contrast between the various geographic areas. Hijaz, for example, is the cosmopolitan part of the kingdom as it is visited throughout the year by pilgrims from all over the world. In contrast, the Najd area is more isolated. The rich minority and the Shi‘ite tend to concentrate in the eastern provinces.

Saudi Arabia is huge in relation to its population of seven million (12 million including foreigners). The Bedouins represent about a quarter to one third of the population. The manual labor is performed mainly by foreign workers work from Asia, and domestic chores are carried out almost entirely by Filipino servants. Any form of skilled work is usually carried out by workers from the rest of the Arab World and the West.

Although Saudi Arabia has a dwindling supply of water, there is a massive natural abundance of oil, which has led to the establishment of a huge petrochemical industry and the accompanying influx of foreign employees.

**Alliances:**

Sheikh Al-Saud is in alignment with Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Brunei, which has more oil than Saudi Arabia. The country also has alliances with the British.

There exist two basic sources of leadership legitimacy, namely, religion and oil.

1) *Oil is a gift.* Saudi Arabia has long borders with socialist Yemen, which has a population of approximately 16 million. The Saudis, due to their relatively low number, are constantly afraid that they might be obliged to share their wealth.

2) *The point of legitimacy of religion.* The Saudis’ puritanical religion (*wahhabi*) has come under constant criticism by the Shi‘ite and Iran since the Iranian revolution: the Iranians claim that theirs is the purer form of Islam. Iran, which is run according to the national interests of the revolution - which has an implicit ideological commitment - objects to the presence of a monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The latter, meanwhile, considers Iran ideologically hostile as proven during the 1987 Hajj riots.

**Regional threats:**

From the Saudi perspective, Iraq is not to be trusted. The long borders with Yemen are carefully guarded, and revolutionary Iran is still regarded with caution. After the end of the Gulf War in 1992, the US helped the Saudis prepare for a list of threats which
Saudis feel vulnerable and perceive their surroundings as hostile. Saudi Arabia was agitated by the unity of North and South Yemen which came about with the end of the Cold War. Now Saudi Arabia has relations with South Yemen, which has declared an end to hostility. From the Saudi point of view, two Yemens are better than one.

**Economic imperatives:**
Saudis feel a sense of panic from being surrounded. Also the sense of fear that everyone wants what they have made it difficult to diversify the Saudi economy. Foreigners are only allowed up to 49% of the joint venture companies, and they are not allowed to own land. Saudis will not accept portfolio investments and bankers are not able to get holders to own state economic assets.

The restrictions on opening the Saudi economy has caused the Saudis to borrow money to balance budget deficits. The Saudis originally took loans from Saudi banks, due to a fear of external interference. Eventually they were forced to seek external loans because of the royal family’s reluctance to clearly define between the family fortune and that of the state.

**Oil as a constraint:**
Saudi Arabia’s abundance of oil is also a constraint. While Saudis can influence oil prices they can not dictate them. When they decrease production in order to boost prices, consumer loyalty is affected and buyers seek alternate sources. Consequently, Saudi Arabia is pushed towards a balance of production in order to maintain a stable price.

The Saudis do not have the capacity to expand their production, only to increase it. Thus, they have successfully acquired the majority share in OPEC in order to monopolize the market and curtail Iraqi and Iranian production. Whereas in the 1980s Saudi Arabia produced three million barrels/day, in 1990 it produced six million to substitute for Iraq. However, Saudi Arabia’s influential role in the oil market is not a monopoly, and Iraq is returning to the market after signing a huge deal with the French.

**Critical Variables for Saudi Arabia (Internal)**

One of the classic questions asked in the West is, ‘How will the country look in the year 2005?’ The Western media wistfully predicts the demise of the Saudi royal family, but does not predict that the Saudis will be stopped from becoming wealthier.

The Saudis must change because they no longer have as much to give as they did before. They will not be able to meet the expectations of their youth, and the near future is likely to witness a quick turnover of kings.

Factors that will dictate what Saudi Arabia will be like in 2005 include the following:

- **Oil market and oil prices:** fluctuation with instability;
- **The question of succession:** predictions of turmoil with regard to succession but not of the destruction of the royal family;
- **Regional alliances:** possibility of hostile alliances formed by Saudi’s neighbors;
- **US-Saudi alliance:** where will it be?
- **Islamic threat:** will the internal and external threat continue?
- **System of distribution of wealth:** poor get poorer while rich get richer;
- **Political consultation:** establishment of a multiple party system.
Decision Making

Decision making poses problems in matters of foreign policy. The King cannot afford to lose the religious scholars and needs to be able to rely on religious ruling (fatwa). He has to consider his constituency, the tribal system, and the structure of the family. He also has to consider maintaining the oil interests, the defense relations with the US, and the implications of radicalism. The King cannot afford to make mistakes.

Key Foreign Policy Decisions and Relationships

The key decisions that Saudi Arabia must face concern the support of the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan, and whether the US forces are really needed or whether there are alternatives to the Western defense forces.

As with any of the Arab states, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces certain foreign policy imperatives, dictated by its basic characteristics - geography, demography, resources and so on - which together constitute both assets and constraints. These, together with the political system (which determines the decision-making process), constitute the parameters within which foreign policy is framed.

Basic Characteristics

Geography:
Saudi Arabia is a huge desert kingdom with two seaboards giving access to crucial sea lanes, but not an open sea. The country is estimated to possess 26% of the world's oil resources, yet there is a serious shortage of water. Saudi Arabia is depending far too much on its renewable water resources - in other words, it is using up its resources faster than they are being replenished.

Demography:
The population is small in comparison to the geographic size. According to official Saudi estimates the total population is around 18 million, including about five million expatriates. According to independent estimates, the total figure is probably nearer to 12 million. (The Saudi authorities have not revealed how they arrived at their higher figure.) In any case, the Saudi population is smaller than that of Iraq (at least 18 million), dwarfed by that of Iran (over 60 million) and probably less than that of Yemen.

Different traditions and history distinguish the different regional and provinces, within which the communities have had different levels of exposure to the outside world, historically speaking. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Muslim of the Wahhabi sect, but a Shi'ite minority is in the eastern province.

Economy:
A $12 billion windfall in unanticipated oil revenues (owing to higher than expected world prices) has given the Saudis their first current account surplus in 13 years. In 1996 the government budgeted for revenues of $30 billion but actually gleaned $42 billion.

The oil boom of the 70s and early 80s turned to a steep fall in prices and profits in the mid 80s. This continued to drain foreign reserves until 1990-91 when the kingdom faced the sudden and considerable costs of the second Gulf War. The war forced the kingdom to incur the first sovereign debt in its modern history.

Three years ago, under this mounting pressure, the Saudis introduced some economic restructuring measures, but commentators suspect that these do not go far enough to produce change that is significant enough to reduce the dependency on oil reserves.

The principal concern is how to generate enough jobs to meet the needs of the burgeoning number of young people entering the job market. Along with a high
The modern state or kingdom was established by conquest and was officially founded in 1932. The ulama exercise considerable influence and the King cannot act without their blessing. In addition, there is a hierarchical system or set of mechanisms for consultation within the Al-Saud monarchy and for access to senior princes, governors of the provinces, ministers and so on. The legitimacy of the monarchy rests on its defense of (Wahhabi) Islam, the protection of the Holy Places, patronage and welfare provision, and its Bedouin heritage and culture.

**Armed forces:**
Saudi Arabia simply does not have the manpower base for a large army. The Saudi National Guard, tasked with defending the kingdom’s borders from within, numbers around 60,000 men and the highest estimate for the army is 100,000, though it is probably no larger than the National Guard. Saudi has justified large acquisitions of expensive and sophisticated armaments by arguing that it needs to enhance the defensive capability of its relatively small forces.

The Saudis now have some 900 main battle tanks and 470 artillery pieces. The air force, numbering 18,000 men, has 295 combat aircraft. Unlike Iran, which has a similar number of aircraft, the kingdom possesses some of the latest designs available in the West. The US contribution to Saudi air defense makes it far more advanced than its rivals.

Against this backdrop of the basic characteristics of Saudi Arabia, the key imperatives and constraints facing the kingdom may be defined as follows:

- sources of legitimacy (Islam, holy places, provision of welfare/oil wealth, conquest, Bedouins, Bedouin heritage and culture);
- Iraq;
- Iran;
- Saudi fear of being surrounded (Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Iran);
- fear of foreign attempts to tap Saudi oil wealth;
- exposure to the vicissitudes of the international oil market

**Key foreign policy relationships and decisions:**
Saudi Arabia’s key foreign policy relationships and decisions, as discussed by Korany and Dessouki, have revolved around the following:

- oil (production, pricing, relations with consumers, etc.);
- Islam (e.g., Afghanistan, rivalry with Iran);
- defense (especially arms purchases);
- relations with US in the interests of defense/oil;
- fighting/confronting radicalism (from Nasser to Ba’athism).

**Critical variables determining the future of Saudi Arabia:**
The critical variables determining the future of Saudi Arabia are as follows:

- oil prices, the Saudi income/profit margin, and resulting pressure to implement changes;
- who succeeds (by 2005)?
- hostile regional alliances and Saudi perceptions of these;
- the Saudi-US alliance;
- Islamic radicalism;
- economic policy (restructuring, privatization, Saudization);
- levels/forms of political participation.
Exercise: Responding to a Regional Crisis as Policy Makers for the Arab States

with Dr. Rosemary Hollis

The following are sample instruction sheets distributed to each of the 13 Palestinian participants in the seminar:

The simulation is divided into four parts or rounds, each lasting 40 minutes, with 10 minute breaks in between for "press briefings."

The situation on the ground is as follows:

Netanyahu has announced:
- reinforcement of existing settlements (with tax breaks for settlers etc.);
- suspension of further Israeli troop deployments including in Hebron.

Mass demonstrations of Palestinians (and Peace Now) are planned at several sites in the West Bank and around Jerusalem to protest further settlement building. Settlers have vowed to go ahead with settlement expansion, with or without Netanyahu's support.

Task 1

Your position: Foreign Minister of Egypt

Your ultimate objective is: the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (at a minimum along the lines of the Abu Mazen-Beilin Plan). You would like to persuade the Israelis that this is the only real way to achieve peace.

At the same time you want to promote the interests of Egypt, which implies the following:
- preserving a role for Egypt in the process;
- being seen as a defender of Palestinian dignity and needs, at the same time as influencing Israel;
- avoiding making any threats that Egypt cannot realistically carry out.

Round 1

Go to the meeting in room A: The participants in this meeting are: senior Egyptian policy-makers including the President, Foreign Minister and Chief of Security Affairs.

Your task is:
- to define Arafat's choices of action;
- to decide what: (a) Arafat should do; (b) what Egypt will do to reinforce his position; then
- to draw up a press statement accordingly;
- at the end of this round deliver your statement to the press.

Round 2

Go to the meeting in room B: The participants in this meeting are: the foreign ministers (or equivalent) of Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.

Your task is:
- to discuss whether there are any economic inducements or penalties which can be devised by the Arabs to persuade Israel to desist from its policies of settlement expansion and halting re-deployment on the West Bank;
- to decide what combined diplomatic/economic action could be taken to: (a) threaten Israel; (b) reward Israel;
- to achieve a change of attitude on Israel's part, bearing in mind the costs/benefits for each of the Arab countries;
- to agree on what, if any, actions each of you is prepared to take and prepare a statement of your joint position.
• **Round 3**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room A: The participants in this meeting are: senior Egyptian policy-makers as in Round 1.

⇒ Your task is:
  - to share what you have learned in Round 2;
  - to discuss the implications for your situation;
  - to decide how you intend to proceed vis-à-vis the Israelis [an update on what they are doing will be supplied to you during the meeting];
  - to draw up (a) a press release; (b) an action plan for presentation by you in Round 4;
  - at the end of this round: (a) deliver your statement to the press; (b) keep your action plan to yourself.

• **Round 4**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room A: This is an Arab summit meeting of Arab leaders from around the region.

⇒ First: listen to the round-up of developments provided by the press.

⇒ Then: deliver your action plan to the group.

The simulation will then conclude with a discussion on which of the players best advanced their objectives.

• **Task 2**

⇒ Your position: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan

You hear that a high-ranking Israeli delegation wishes to hold consultations with the Jordanian leadership. They intend to propose a bargain - the Israeli military will control and contain the settlers on the West Bank and halt the expansion of settlements if Jordan will agree to enter secret negotiations to forge a confederate relationship between Palestinian areas on the West Bank and Jordan.

⇒ Your ultimate objective is: to find a resolution of the Palestine problem which does not threaten the Hashemite monarchy and general stability in Jordan, but rather, will bring calm to the West Bank and enable Jordan to thrive economically.

• **Round 1**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room B: The participants in this meeting are: the Jordanian leadership, including the King, the Foreign Minister and the Chief of Security Affairs.

⇒ Your task is:
  - to define your choices in the face of developments and decide how you propose to respond to the Israeli delegation;
  - to draw up a press statement accordingly - only reveal your talks with the Israelis if you want to;
  - at the end of this round deliver your statement to the press.

• **Round 2**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room B: The participants in this meeting are: the foreign ministers (or equivalent) of Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.

⇒ Your task is:
  - to discuss whether there are any economic inducements or penalties that can be devised by the Arabs to persuade Israel to desist from its policies of settlement expansion and halting re-deployment on the West Bank;
  - to decide what combined diplomatic/economic action could be taken to: (a) threaten Israel; (b) reward Israel, (c) achieve a change of attitude on Israel's part, bearing in mind the costs/benefits for each of the Arab countries;
• to agree on what, if any, actions each of you is prepared to take and prepare a press statement accordingly (either singly or jointly);
• at the end of this round deliver your statement to the press.

⇒ Keep in mind the interests of your own country/leadership. Use your own judgment as to how much you reveal about what happened in Round 1.

**Round 3**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room B: The participants in this meeting are: the Jordanian leadership as in Round 1.

⇒ Your task is:
• to share what you have learned in Round 2;
• to discuss the implications for your situation;
• to decide how you intend to proceed vis-à-vis the Israelis [an update on what they are doing will be supplied to you during the meeting];
• to draw up (a) a press release; (b) an action plan for presentation in Round 4;
• at the end of this round: (a) deliver your statement to the press; (b) keep your action plan to yourselves.

**Round 4**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room A: This is an Arab summit meeting of Arab leaders from around the region.

⇒ First: listen to the round-up of developments provided by the press.

⇒ Then: deliver your action plan to the group.

The simulation will then conclude with a discussion on which of the players best advanced their objectives.

**Task 3**

⇒ Your position: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria

You know that Hizbollah is planning to escalate attacks on Israelis in South Lebanon and possibly across the border. You know this could mean an escalated Israeli response.

⇒ Your ultimate objective is: the protection of Syria; maintaining a Syrian role in Lebanon; being seen to be tough in the face of Israeli aggression.

**Round 1**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room C: The participants in this meeting are: senior Syrian policy-makers and the President, Foreign Minister and Chief of Security Affairs.

⇒ Your task is:
• to define Syria’s choices of action in the face of developments, especially those in Lebanon and decide how Syria should act to: (a) prevent events from triggering a direct Israeli attack on Syria or Syrian forces in Lebanon; and to (b) exploit the situation to put pressure on Israel and show it in a bad light;
• when you have decided, to write a statement for the press telling them what you want them to report;
• at the end of this round deliver your statement to the press.

**Round 2**

⇒ Go to the meeting in room B: The participants in this meeting are: the foreign ministers (or equivalent) of Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.

⇒ Your task is:
• to discuss whether there are any economic inducements or penalties that can be devised by the Arabs to persuade Israel to desist from its policies of settlement expansion and halting re-deployment on the West Bank;
• to decide what combined diplomatic/economic action could be taken to: (a) threaten Israel; (b) reward Israel;
• **Round 3**

  ⇒ **Go to the meeting in room C:** The participants in this meeting are: senior Syrian policy-makers as in Round 1.
  ⇒ **Your task is:**
  - to share what you have learned in Round 2;
  - to discuss the implications for your situation;
  - to decide how you intend to proceed vis-à-vis the Israelis [an update on what they are doing will be supplied to you during the meeting];
  - to draw up (a) a press release; (b) an action plan for presentation in Round 4;
  - at the end of this round: (a) deliver your statement to the press; (b) keep your action plan to yourselves.

• **Round 4**

  ⇒ **Go to the meeting in room A:** This is an Arab summit meeting of Arab leaders from around the region.
  ⇒ **First:** Listen to the round-up of developments provided by the press.
  ⇒ **Then:** Deliver your action plan to the group.

  The simulation will then conclude with a discussion on which of the players best advanced their objectives.

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**Policy Imperatives for Palestine - View from the PNA**  
*Dr. Sami Musallam*

**Introduction**

Any policy on the Palestinian agenda is now an imperative. Palestine is still in the embryonic stage of development, and the general situation facing it is one of crisis.

**Present Crisis**

The peace process is in a crisis, and there is in no mutual confidence between the parties involved in the negotiations - the Palestinians and the Israelis. This lack of confidence is a result of the differences between the Israeli Labor-led government and Likud-led government.

**Labor government:** The general atmosphere was one of support for the peace process and for the efforts to arrive at a historic peace agreement. The government had a commitment to the peace process and to the transition to peace, despite the obstacles.

**Likud government:** There is no positive atmosphere regarding the peace process. The government is more intent on re-negotiating the agreements. There is a general negative attitude towards the process, the Palestinians, the Arab World and the international community. There is also a lack of governmental will to go ahead with what has been chartered in the accords.

**Palestinian Position**

For the first time, the Palestinian position is more readily understood and supported by the international community. We have kept our basic demand very simple, clear and to the point - to implement the signed agreements. This will lead to local, regional and
international peace, which is clearly understood by countries around the world. Moreover, we have signed agreements with a state, a country, not a party or person.

The Palestinians always make the mistake, when talking about the peace process, of assuming that we have signed a peace accord. We have not signed a peace accord with Israel, we have only signed a declaration of principles. If it is implemented, we will arrive, in five years, to a stage where we - like Egypt and Jordan - will sign a peace agreement or accord with Israel. Thus, one should not criticize the PNA for its peace accords because they are not peace, but a mechanism for achieving peace.

**Policy Imperatives for the Palestinians**

Of highest priority to the Palestinians is the implementation of all agreements (DoP of 13 September 1993; Cairo Agreement of 4 May 1994; Paris Economic Accords of September 1994; Oslo II Agreement of 28 September, 1995; and various technical agreements).

The PNA demands concerning implementation of the agreements revolve around the following issues:

- Hebron withdrawal: there has been no agreement until now because Israel is demanding to re-negotiate the agreement and is trying to expand its settlements. It wants control over one-third of the city and demands the right to carry out 'hot pursuit';
- the economic siege/blockage;
- non-implementation of the safe passage;
- bypass roads: Israel is still expropriating land to build roads;
- ports: the air and seaports in Gaza. We accepted to treat the ports officially like the current passages and allow for an Israeli presence;
- expropriation and confiscation of land;
- prisoners: the previous Israeli cabinet, justice minister and president signed for the release of 2,500 prisoners who are still in jail;
- further re-deployment: this is the litmus test and the plan of action for the interim agreements. The areas were divided into A, B and C - to facilitate re-deployment - and the process should have started in September 1996. Accordingly, area B becomes A, area C becomes B then A, until eventually all of the West Bank becomes area A, i.e., under Palestinian control.

**Final Status Issues**

The final status issues are the most important and the most difficult issues. They are all imperatives and will comprise the cornerstone of peace in the region. They include the following:

- Jerusalem: a central question for everyone;
- settlements;
- borders: the questions of sovereignty, statehood, etc.;
- water;
- refugees and displaced persons (the number is under dispute): our position on refugees is in accordance with UN Resolution 194; we will not accept any other basis. Israel does not recognize children of the original refugees. The year 1994 marked an important step towards Israeli acceptance of 194 but Israel has not attended the refugee working group meetings since then. There is currently a PLO committee in Gaza, led by Hassan Abdul Rahman, who is in charge of this issue.

**Security Situation**

Concerning the security of the Palestinians both in general and in regards to the Israelis, we want to establish a democratic state structure and the elections, which were to a
In terms of economic development, we want a normal, functioning economy, with low unemployment and a thriving private sector. Unfortunately, the PNA is faced with the following problems:

- **Lack of funds**: There was never any money to begin with and thus no foundations for the state. We are dealing on one side with an international agreement and donors, and on the other with Israel. The aid that the donors speak about is not always forthcoming, and only one-third of what has been promised has actually been allocated.

- **Failed agreements**: Israel is trying to block any economic agreements that do not meet the economic desires of Israel. They are allowing Israeli goods into the Palestinian market but do not allow for the free movement of Palestinian goods. The economic agreements are not in favor of the Palestinians, but they were the best we could succeed in reaching.

- **Closures**: The economic situation is further complicated by the closure, which is preventing normal economic activity and causing unemployment. We once had a boom of direct foreign investment, especially in Nablus and Ramallah, but many investment opportunities have diminished with the situation.

There are also various issues facing the society, including the following:

- **Institution building versus clans**: The rule of tribes has been a major factor in the social ties, and people prefer to solve social problems and political issues according to tribal (ashir) laws.

- **Ruled law versus tribal law**: Palestinian law is based on and influenced by seven laws - Israeli, Ottoman, Jordanian, British, Egyptian, PLO and PNA. There are different laws in all areas, and the laws in Gaza are different to those in the West Bank. The PNA is trying to codify them all into a single law.

- **The PNA image on the streets - apathy versus support versus resistance**: The PNA has been under criticism for its human rights violations and it recognizes that this is an issue. It has been trying to institutionalize the teaching of human rights values in the schools of the public security agencies and to hold seminars on human rights issues.

**Relations with the Arab World**

For the first time, there has been total Arab support for the PNA’s position with regards to the peace process and its demands. There is more solidarity with regard to the Palestine Question than previously, and all the Arab nations have supported the DoP and Oslo. Syria and Libya tried to abstain but they accepted the decision to support the PNA.

The region is also facing the conflict between Syria and Israel, which is quite complicated. It is a conflict of primos-inter-paris - the first among equals. There is also the question of Egypt versus Jordan and which one is the focal point of the Middle East. Israel, as part of the region, has to accept the primary role of Egypt as a social, political and cultural leader.

**International Relations**

The PNA’s relationship with the international community is extremely important. Over time, the PLO and the PNA have become accepted, and most countries accept the Palestinian point of view, which is the demand to implement the agreements. This relationship is reflected by the many mutual governmental visits: Chairman Arafat, in addition to other Palestinian officials, has visited many foreign countries. In return, various foreign heads of state have visited the PNA, such as Chiraq. In contrast to this relationship, Israel has been antagonizing its two main supporters, i.e., the US and the EU.
Discussion:

On the Paris Agreement:

Admittedly, the agreement has many faults, and it is not up to the Palestinians’ liking. But, it allows for renewal after three years, and the Palestinians intend to re-negotiate the agreement. We want to address various issues such as taxation and free movement. Moreover, our economic agreement with Jordan has not been implemented because Israel is refusing to allow for the free movement of people and goods. Thus, there is no opportunity for joint economic ventures.

On the state security courts:

The state security courts, which were established by presidential decree, are a result of the two legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza. One can look at Egypt for comparison. Egyptian law allows for these courts, which it regards as part of the democratic process. In addition, the Egyptian President has both total power and control over the courts.

On security obligations:

The PNA is obliged, by the agreement, to hand over to Israel any perpetrators who are not tried and punished according to normal legal procedure. We have to either convict them or turn them over. It is a political choice, and during the recent incident we were threatened with a continuation of the siege on Ramallah. Palestine is not an independent state, but a self-governing authority restricted by agreements. Moreover, many perpetrators often hand themselves over to avoid being either caught or killed by the Israelis. There is a clear link between what we can do domestically and our agreement with Israel. Israel prefers having a Palestinian dictatorship.

On the negotiations:

The relationship between domestic policy and negotiations with Israel is very important. We had to accept many things in order to gain some sovereignty, including the idea of joint ventures. The negotiating team is a continuation of the group established by the PLO. The Madrid group had been huge and the number has decreased for various reasons. The Communist Party left the negotiations, and many others could not handle the interference from the top. In addition, there was a need for change when the issues became more topical, and there was no longer an emphasis only on security and politics. It is a mistake to put the spotlight on Hebron: issues such as safe passage are more important. Israel has no intention of giving up control over the Holy Places and it does not accept Palestinian negotiations over these or Jerusalem as a whole.

On Syria:

Our relations with Syria have been bad for reasons related to politics, idiosyncrasies, security issues, mistrust, etc. The current relations between us are basically the culmination of a negative relationship that evolved during the 70s with the Syrian intervention in PLO affairs, which led to splits within the PLO and Fatah. Until the 90s, there were over 6,200 PLO/Palestinian prisoners in Syrian prisons: at least two of them have been there since 1966.

During the Gulf War, we were on two different fronts, with Syria backing the US and the PLO backing Iraq. The peace process is the bottom line in the conflict with Syria, and Syria rejects the Palestinian acceptance of the peace process. The Palestinians argue that there are two levels in the talks: the Palestinian level and the Arab level. The Palestinian side is on a lower level playing field than the Arab states, but Syria does not understand nor accept this. The Syrians felt antagonized and left out by the process, and believed that they had not been consulted in the matter. They were offended, and subsequently dropped out.
Syrian to support both Lebanon, over the years, has dealt with as without his intervention. He has a sound and legal position; moreover, he understands the relationship and idiosyncrasies between Arafat and Assad who share no mutual understanding. The Ba’athists will never forgive Fatah for taking away its mass support in the Arab World. Kaddoumi, Arafat and Minister of Finance Nashashibi were all Ba’athists.

The PLO objects to the Syrian aid given to PLO opposition groups. We do not expect more political support from Syria, but we support both Lebanon and Syria in their negotiations and regarding the implementation of UN Resolution 425. The PLO is trying to improve its relationship with the Lebanese regime, which is skeletal of the PLO’s role in Lebanon.

On Jordan:

Confederation with Jordan is one of the hypothetical outcomes of future negotiations. Legally we are obliged to implement the PNC decision of 1993, i.e., to establish two states. We may eventually have a confederated state, i.e., some kind of a Palestinian-Jordanian union, but we first need our own independent state. Many support the idea of a confederation, but in fact it is not practical because we have two different political systems - a monarchy and a democracy. How can we combine practically? Many issues have to be worked out and there are strong lobbies on both sides that are against the notion of confederation. Attempts at confederation have not worked out in the past, for example, the Iraqi-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, the US and the Arab nations may not allow it.

Palestinian-Jordanian relations are good, and we have even signed an economic agreement. King Hussein was the first Arab leader to be received on PNA territory. There are also extensive Palestinian-Jordanian social relations.

On the donors:

Two-thirds of the funds promised to the PNA have not been allocated. The World Bank may be squeezing the PNA politically and the EU countries have long implementation periods. European aid is more forthcoming through direct bilateral aid than through EU aid, and the EU countries prefer bilateral relations.

Lebanon’s Place in the Region

Lebanon, over the years, has been more of an issue than an actor. Similarly, for 30 years, Palestine was dealt with as “the Palestine issue”; only now has it become an actor. At the Madrid Peace Conference, Lebanon was a full partner, but its position as an actor is mostly a formality. There are several factors that impair Lebanon’s role as a distinct actor in foreign policy, and many of these are tied to the internal structure of the country, its history and its politics.

Background

Lebanon is an artificial construct in as much as its existence and composition are based on an historic gentlemen’s agreement. Lebanon emerged as a state in the early 1920s, when France proclaimed the creation of a “Greater Lebanon.” Lebanon’s creation was a result of the problems France faced in the region. France, which was extremely hostile towards Arab nationalism, adopted a policy of ‘divide and rule’ and placed severe limitations upon legitimate representation. Thus, Lebanon was created as a combination of 27 different religious communities. After Lebanon declared its independence in 1941,
a gentleman's agreement was established to bind the country together and balance relations. It was based on an agreement between the two largest communities - the Maronite Christians, led by Bishara Al-Khoury and the Sunni Muslims, led by Riyad Salah. This bilateral agreement between the two communities had two components:

1) **Domestic.** The political system was based on dividing the major posts between the various (17) communities, with five or six having the most influence. It was a system of institutionalized confessionalism - the distribution of posts according to religion. According to the system, the Head of State was always a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Head of Parliament a Shi'ite. Every governmental post was attributed to a community and not based on any qualifications.

2) **External.** The foreign policy component was based on an oral agreement, which demanded that both communities would give up their traditional, natural alliances to the outside environment. The Sunni community had to give up their dream of creating a large, national Arab state and the Maronites had to abandon their inclination to look to outside European and Christian powers for protection.

**Collapse of the System**

This system, which aimed to bring the different communities together, only worked until 1976. A primary cause for its collapse was the fact that the agreement did not allow Lebanon to go through a process of nation-building and the constituencies were thus never really integrated. Because confessionalism was an organized principle of the state, the communities remained largely autonomous. Civil laws and social life were organized by the communities themselves, each based on a different heritage and there was an autonomy of functioning for each community. The state could not emerge as a strong central apparatus. Instead, it became a place where different pressures converged; it became an arbiter. The state served as the order within which community representatives interacted. A state official reached his position through his community and thus, each official was more concerned about his popularity within his community than with the state. Furthermore, influence on the state by its communities depended on how dynamic the group was.

In addition to this vertical segmentation of Lebanese society and political structure, there existed a horizontal segmentation as well. Within each community existed a ruling elite whose interest lay in maintaining the system. A sense of solidarity developed amongst this elite, with the exception of one group - the Sharifs.

Another major reason for the collapse of the agreement lay with the Shi'ite, who were a minority at the time of its collapse, and who were not integrated into the state system. The Shi'ite were the poor man in the agreement - the weak “third pillar” - even through their population equaled that of the Christians and the Sunni. They were also economically poor, uneducated and less politically conscious. As their population grew at a rate higher than that of other communities, the Shi'ite found themselves marginalized from the political system. This changed over time, especially when many of the Shi'ite who had left in the early 40s and 50s to work in West Africa returned. More conscious and educated, they returned to build their community. Moreover, many rural Shi'ite began to emigrate to Beirut for work, gradually creating a poverty belt around the city. The Shi'ite community became more unified, especially under the leadership of Imam Mousa Sader and Iran. These changes and the entire Shi'ite factor provided a major component in the collapse of the gentleman’s agreement in the mid 70s.

**Lebanese Foreign Policy**

Lebanon has aimed to become a neutral country like Switzerland, and it has attempted to keep away from regional politics. Yet, without a strong army, a system of defense, and a well auspicious national identity and foreign policy, Lebanon could not

The Palestinian Factor

Lebanon housed a large Palestinian refugee population, and it was concerned about the prospect of having to assimilate them. Consequently, Lebanon treated the Palestinians as a people who had to fend for themselves. When the PLO gained in strength after 1967, Lebanon was asked to allow the Palestinians in Lebanon to organize themselves and provide for their own security. Furthermore, this 1969 Cairo Agreement allowed the Palestinians to carry arms and to carry on their fight from Lebanon. They became a state within a state, and this development was seen as natural within the Lebanon context. Strong domestic parliamentary debate about the situation emerged, with a minority seeing it as a danger. Many were not conscious of the long-term meaning of the agreement and, pressured by Abdul Nasser, they agreed. The PLO moved in, and the guerrillas followed.

This situation brought the Muslim-Christian cleavage in Lebanon to the forefront, as a majority of Muslims supported the Palestinians. The Christians saw the situation as a threat to their control and, in response, they armed themselves and formed militias. Clashes erupted in 1973, and the Christian Phalangist militia came out strong in 1975. Meanwhile, an Israeli-Syrian dialogue of deterrence emerged in the late 70s and 80s.

Lebanese War

In 1978, Israel, in response to its insecurity about South Lebanon, launched an invasion into the area. It was later forced to withdraw, but it maintained, until today, control over a strip of territory - its "security zone." The invasion also resulted in UN Resolution 425, which is still the basis for Israeli-Lebanese talks. In 1982, Israel invaded again in an attempt to force out the PLO. Up until this time, the Israeli attitude was not to get involved in Lebanese domestic politics. It was primarily with the Likud government of 1977 that the idea to directly interfere in Lebanon's domestic situation developed. The 1985-85 invasion and occupation resulted in a large number of Israeli casualties, and it brought about a huge internal debate that led to Israel's retreat to the security zone in 1985.

At the same time, the War of the Camps erupted between the Shi'ite (Amal movement) and the Arafatists in the refugee camps. In 1985, more than 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the Lebanese Christians, and between 1983-85 more than 3,000 were killed by Amal.

As a consequence of the war, Syria was left as the major political actor in Lebanon, taking out all its rivals. Thus 1983-85 saw a new chapter in Lebanese politics, as Syria attempted to build a new political formula for Lebanon that would give Syria a stable role. In 1989, Syria, backed by other states, initiated the Ta'ife agreements in an attempt to stabilize the country.

Ta'ife Accords

The Ta'ife agreements do not change the system of confessionalism. The system remains institutionalized, but with some changes. The three-pillar government remains, with a strengthening in the role of the parliamentary president and an increased number of deputies. A significant change in the system is external - the establishment and recognition of the Syrian role in Lebanon. The agreement recognizes Lebanon's "national and security imperative" - which is to be protected by Syria: it recognizes the Syrian role of a strategic partner, as well as its strategic concerns in Lebanon.

Yet the political system was created in a way so that it cannot function. The equal power of the three pillars of government means a continual deadlock and thus a need for an arbiter. As a result, the Lebanese have to go to Syria when making any decision.
Syria

The May 1991 Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination gives further legal strengthening to the relationship built on Syrian dominance. It gives legality to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and establishes cooperation and coordination in all fields of life. Syrian withdrawal was to have come in two years, with the organization of the Lebanese government, but instead Syrians forces re-deployed. Nonetheless, a Syrian withdrawal could easily take place at the present time because Syria has built a system of Lebanese dependence. Moreover, Syria has a well-established intelligence apparatus. It has legitimized the Lebanese dependence on Syria for security.

Current Situation

Domestically, changes have been implemented, and Lebanon has a large level of autonomy in its economic reconstruction. Socially, a strong factor in the increased integration is the growing number of inter-religious or inter-communal marriages, although they all take place in civil courts outside the country. Another consensus exists with regard to the Palestinians. All Lebanese feel that they do not want the Palestinians in Lebanon, as they believe that a Palestinian presence could threaten their attempts to build their own consensus.

Politically, Prime Minister Hariri has built for himself a strong legitimacy and a large constituency without disturbing Syria. A national consensus on Syria - that its presence in Lebanon and its influence are both unacceptable - has also emerged. To the regret of the Lebanese, their system does not allow for a strategy to combat this military and economic presence.

The Hariri government has also developed a consensus on two issues: Lebanon is not to enter any war, and Lebanon needs to devise plans for the long term regarding Syria's heavy military presence, which has imposed a heavy economic burden on the country.

The government has attempted to establish itself as an independent actor through its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France, but many of these attempts have had limited results. For example, in the summer of 1996, after the Grapes of Wrath crisis, Lebanon called upon international countries to play a role. France was brought in to promote Lebanon as an actor, but this was only possible because it was in the Syrian interest as well. Another example is Lebanon's rejection of the Netanyahu government's proposed "Lebanon First" agreement: Lebanon feels it may get a better deal through Syrian instead.

Peace Process

Lebanon's position in the peace process is a reflection of the past 20 years. Yet, the prospect of the implementation of UN Resolution 425 is not so remote anymore. Israel, which used to state that it would not withdraw without a parallel Syrian withdrawal, is now willing to withdraw with security arrangements.

Discussion:

Participant: How stable is the current situation?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: The collapse in the 70s can be blamed to a great extent on the failure of the economic system. Following the prosperity in the early 70s, a large number of people became disheartened with the system. At the same time, the elites tried to maintain their interests. This horizontal solidarity between the ruling elites is strong. At the present time, the situation is still fragile because the Christian Maronite community is not well integrated: their role has been reduced and they feel that they are the losers in the
Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Hizballah was an Iranian creation, whose structure and activities were developed in cooperation with Iran, and later Syria. Yet, Hizballah has developed its own independent discourse and political strategy, independent of Iran. Hizballah has bowed out of a purely Islamic route and has evolved into a Lebanese political actor. It has become a national resistance movement whose legitimacy is based on its military role. However, it knows that it will be disarmed in the future, and it will then have to create a new role for itself. Disarming Hizballah is not part of the domestic Lebanese system, but of the regional agreement. Any agreement between Israel and Syria will have to address Hizballah and Iran. Iran will need to be involved in the discussion about how to enable Hizballah to develop into a purely political actor. While the group has acquired legitimacy, it has to find a role in the political system and must have political recognition through a representative in the parliament.

Participant: What about the Palestinian refugees?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: The Palestinians may be allowed to remain as civilians, but their legal status is still in question. The number of Palestinians in Lebanon is also unclear and UNRWA's figures are higher than those of the government. Since the War of the Camps in 1985, almost one-half of the Palestinians in Lebanon have left. About 280,000 remain, but the Lebanese government has been pushing them to leave. Their minimum requirements for daily sustenance are not being supplied and, over the years, many have gone to Scandinavian countries. The Lebanese government also sees the peace process as an opportunity to get the refugees to leave. The refugee problem is a very sensitive issue in Lebanon.

Participant: Would refugees in Syria be pushed out?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Syrian society has accepted the Palestinians and it will most likely keep its Palestinian refugees after the negotiations.

Participant: What is the solution?

Dr. Kodmani-Darwish: Peace in Lebanon should be a routine development. The political formula is not working because of Syria. If something positive occurs, it will most likely be in the economic sphere, in which Lebanon has a more dynamic role. Lebanon has expertise which could be of benefit in the future and it is currently assisting Syria economically by providing jobs. Peace may put Lebanon in a stronger, more independent and stable position.
Part Two:

Country Profiles

The following section contains basic background information on a selection of Arab States. The data provided was taken from the CIA World Factbook 1996.
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ALGERIA

**Geography**

**Location:** Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Morocco and Tunisia.

**Geographic coordinates:** 28 00 N, 3 00 E

**Area:**
- total area: 2,381,740 sq km
- land area: 2,381,740 sq km

**Land boundaries:**
- total: 6,343 km
- border countries: Libya 982 km, Mali 1,376 km, Mauritania 463 km, Morocco 1,559 km, Niger 956 km, Tunisia 965 km, Western Sahara 42 km

**Coastline:** 998 km

**Maritime claims:**
- exclusive fishing zone: 32-52 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

**International disputes:** part of southeastern region claimed by Libya; land boundary dispute with Tunisia settled in 1993.

**Climate:** arid to semiarid; mild, wet winters with hot, dry summers along coast; drier with cold winters and hot summers on high plateau; sirocco is a hot, dust/sand-laden wind mainly in summer.

**Terrain:** mostly high plateau and desert; some mountains; narrow, discontinuous coastal plain; lowest point: Chott Melhiri -40 m; highest point: Tahat 3,003 m.

**Natural resources:** petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead, zinc.

**Land use:**
- arable land: 3%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 13%
- forest and woodland: 2%
- other: 82%
- Irrigated land: 3,360 sq km (1989 est.)

**Environment:** current issues: soil erosion from overgrazing and other poor farming practices; desertification; dumping of raw sewage, petroleum refining wastes, and other industrial effluents is leading to the pollution of rivers and coastal waters; Mediterranean Sea, in particular, becoming polluted from oil wastes, soil erosion, and fertilizer runoff; inadequate supplies of potable water; natural hazards: mountainous areas subject to severe earthquakes; mud slides; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands; signed, but not ratified - Desertification, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban

**Note:** second-largest country in Africa (after Sudan)
Net migration rate: -0.49 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est).
Sex ratio: all ages: 1.02 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 48.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.).
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 68.31 years (male: 67.22; female: 69.46 - 1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.59 children born/woman (1996 est.)
Nationality: noun: Algerian(s) - adjective: Algerian
Ethnic divisions: Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1%
Religions: Sunni Muslim (state religion) 99%, Christian and Jewish 1%
Languages: Arabic (official), French, Berber dialects
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 61.6% (male: 73.9%; female: 49%)

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria;
- conventional short form: Algeria
- local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Jaza'iyyah ad Dimuqratiyah ash Shabiyah
- local short form: Al Jaza'ir

Data code: AG
Type of government: republic
Capital: Algiers

Administrative divisions: 48 provinces (wilayas, singular - wilaya): Adrar, Ain Defla, Ain Temouchent, Algiers, Annaba, Batna, Bechar, Bejaia, Biskra, Blida, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Bouira, Boumerdes, Chief, Constantine, Djelfa, El Bayadh, El Oued, El Tarf, Ghardaia, Guelma, Illizi, Jijel, Khemis, Laghouat, Mascara, Medea, Mila, Mostaganem, M'Sila, Naama, Oran, Ouargla, Oum el Bouaghi, Relizane, Saïda, Setif, Sidi Bel Abbes, Skikda, Souk Ahras, Tamanghasset, Tebessa, Tiaret, Tindouf, Tipaza, Tissemsilt, Tizi Ouzou, Tlemcen

Independence: 5 July 1962 (from France)
National holiday: Anniversary of the Revolution, 1 November (1954)
Legal system: socialist, based on French and Islamic law; judicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc Constitutional Council composed of various public officials, including several Supreme Court justices; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
Executive branch:
- Chief of state: President Lamine ZEROUAL (appointed president 31 January 1994, elected president 16 November 1995) was elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage; election last held 16 November 1995 (next to be held NA); results - percent of vote NA
- Head of government: Prime Minister Ahmed OUYAHIA (since 31 December 1995) was appointed by the president
- Cabinet: Council of Ministers was appointed by the prime minister

Legislative branch: unicameral; note - suspended since 1992
- National People's Assembly (Al-Majlis Ech-Chaabi Al-Watani): first-round elections held 26 December 1991; second round canceled by the military after President BENJEDID resigned 1 January 1992, effectively suspending the assembly (next election promised by late 1996 or early 1997); results - percent of vote by party NA; seats - (281 total) the fundamentalist FIS won 188 of the 231 seats contested in the first round

Judicial branch: Supreme Court (Cour Supreme)
Political parties and leaders: Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, outlawed April 1992), Ali BELHADJ, Dr. Abassi MADANI, Rabeh KEBIR (self-exile in Germany); National Liberation Front (FLN), Boualem BENHAMOUDA, secretary general; Socialist Forces Front (FFS), Hocine Ait AHMED, secretary general (self-exile in Switzerland); Hamas, Mahfoud NAHNAH, chairman; Rally for Culture and Democracy
Country Profiles: Algeria

(RCD). Said SAADI, secretary general; Algerian Renewal Party (PRA), Noureddine BOUKROUH, chairman [note: the government established a multiparty system in September 1989 and, as of 31 December 1990, over 50 legal parties existed.]


Flag: two equal vertical bands of green (hoist side) and white with a red, five-pointed star within a red crescent; the crescent, star, and color green are traditional symbols of Islam (the state religion).

Economy

Economic overview: The hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 57% of government revenues, 25% of GDP, and almost all export earnings. Algeria has the fifth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and ranks fourteenth for oil. Algiers' efforts to reform one of the most centrally planned economies in the Arab world began after the 1986 collapse of world oil prices plunged the country into a severe recession. In 1989, the government launched a comprehensive, IMF-supported program to achieve economic stabilization and to introduce market mechanisms into the economy. Despite substantial progress toward economic adjustment, in 1992 the reform drive stalled as Algiers became embroiled in political turmoil. In September 1993, a new government was formed, and one priority was the resumption and acceleration of the adjustment process. Buffeted by the slump in world oil prices and burdened with a heavy foreign debt, Algiers concluded a one-year standby arrangement with the IMF in April 1994. Following a Paris Club debt rescheduling in 1995 and a robust harvest, the economy experienced a strong recovery and key economic improvements.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $108.7 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 3.5% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $3,800 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 12%
  - industry: 50%
  - services: 38%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 28% (1995 est.)

Labor force: 6.2 million (1992 est.)
- by occupation: government 29.5%, agriculture 22%, construction and public works 16.2%, industry 13.6%, commerce and services 13.5%, transportation and communication 5.2% (1989)

Unemployment rate: 25% (1995 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $14.3 billion
- expenditures: $17.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1995 est.)

Industries: petroleum, light industries, natural gas, mining, electrical, petrochemical, food processing
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

Electricity:
- capacity: 5,370,000 kW
- production: 18.3 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 587 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: wheat, barley, oats, grapes, olives, citrus, fruits; sheep, cattle

Exports: $9.5 billion (f.o.b., 1995 est.)
- commodities: petroleum and natural gas 97%
- partners: Italy 21%, France 16%, US 14%, Germany 13%, Spain 9%

Imports: $10.6 billion (f.o.b., 1995 est.)
- commodities: capital goods 39.7%, food and beverages 21.7%, consumer goods 11.8% (1990)
- partners: France 29%, Italy 14%, Spain 9%, US 9%, Germany 7%

External debt: $26 billion (1994)


Currency: 1 Algerian dinar (DA) = 100 centimes
Location: Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Libya and the Gaza Strip

Geographic coordinates: 27 00 N, 30 00 E

Area:
- total area: 1,001,450 sq km
- land area: 995,450 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 2,689 km
- bordering countries: Gaza Strip 11 km, Israel 255 km, Libya 1,150 km, Sudan 1,273 km

Coastline: 2,450 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 24 nm
- continental shelf: 200-m depth or to the depth of exploitation
- exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: administrative boundary with Sudan does not coincide with international boundary creating the "Hala'ib Triangle," a barren area of 20,580 sq km, tensions over this disputed area began to escalate in 1992 and remain high.

Climate: desert; hot, dry summers with moderate winters

Terrain: vast desert plateau interrupted by Nile valley and delta; lowest point: Qattara Depression - 133m; highest point: Mt. Catherine 2,629 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, manganese, limestone, gypsum, talc, asbestos, lead, zinc.

Land use:
- arable land: 3%
- permanent crops: 2%
- meadows and pastures: 0%
- forest and woodland: 0%
- other: 95%
- irrigated land: 25,850 sq km (1989 est.)

Environment: current issues: agricultural land being lost to urbanization and windblown sands; increasing soil salinization below Aswan High Dam; desertification; oil pollution threatening coral reefs, beaches, and marine habitats; other water pollution from agricultural pesticides, raw sewage, and industrial effluents; very limited natural fresh water resources away from the Nile which is the only perennial water source; rapid growth in population overstraining natural resources; natural hazards: periodic droughts; frequent earthquakes, flash floods, landslides, volcanic activity; hot, driving windstorm called khamis occurs in spring; dust storms, sandstorms; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Wetlands, Whaling; signed, but not ratified - Tropical 94.

Note: controls Sinai Peninsula, only land bridge between Africa and remainder of Eastern Hemisphere; controls Suez Canal, shortest sea link between Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.

People

Population: 63,575,107 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 37% (male 11,970,197; female 11,462,689)
- 15-64 years: 60% (male 19,127,696; female 18,738,304)
- 65 years and over: 3% (male 1,028,916; female 1,247,305) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 1.91% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 28.18 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Country Profiles: Egypt

Death rate: 8.7 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.35 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Sex ratio: all ages: 1.02 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 72.8 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 61.43 years (male: 59.51; female: 63.46 - 1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.58 children born/woman (1996 est.)
Nationality: noun: Egyptian(s) - adjective: Egyptian
Ethnic divisions: Eastern Hamitic stock (Egyptians, Bedouins, and Berbers) 99%, Greek, Nubian, Armenian, other European (primarily Italian and French) 1%
Religions: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 94% (official estimate), Coptic Christian and other 6%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English and French widely understood by educated classes
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.), total: 51.4% (male: 63.6%; female: 38.8%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Arab Republic of Egypt
- conventional short form: Egypt
- local long form: Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiyah
- local short form: none
- former: United Arab Republic (with Syria)

Data code: EG

Type of government: republic
Capital: Cairo
Administrative divisions: 26 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Ad Daqahliyah, Al Bahr al Ahmar, Al Buhayrah, Al Fayyum, Al Gharbiyah, Al Iskandariyah, Al Ismailiyah, Al Jizah, Al Minufiyah, Al Minya, Al Qahirah, Al Qalyubiyah, Al Wadi al Jadid, Ash Sharqiyyah, Ass Suways, Asswan, Asyut, Bani Suwayf, Bur Sa'id, Dumyat, Janub Sina, Kafr ash Shaykh, Matruh, Qina, Shamal Sina, Suhaj

Independence: 28 February 1922 (from UK)
National holiday: Anniversary of the Revolution, 23 July (1952)
Constitution: 11 September 1971
Legal system: based on English common law, Islamic law, and Napoleonic codes; judicial review by Supreme Court and Council of State (oversees validity of administrative decisions); accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations.

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: President Mohammed Hosni MUBARAK (sworn in 14 Oct. 1981, eight days after the assassination of President SADAT); national referendum (4 Oct. 1993) validated MUBARAK's nomination by the People's Assembly (PA) to a third 6-year presidential term; [note - the president is nominated by the PA; nomination must be validated by a national, popular referendum.]
- Head of government: Prime Minister Kamal Ahmed al-GANZOURI (since 4 January 1996) was appointed by the president.
- Cabinet: Cabinet was appointed by the president.

Legislative branch: bicameral
- People's Assembly (Majlis al-Cha'b): last elections 29 Nov. 1995 (next NA 2000); results: NDP 72%, independents 25%, opposition 3%; seats (454 total, 444 elected, 10 appointed by the president) NDP 317, independents 114, NWP 6, NPUG 5, Nasserist Arab Democratic Party 1, Liberals 1.
- Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura): functions only in a consultative role; elections last held 7 June 1995 (next to be held NA); results - NDP 99%, independents 1%; seats - (264 total, 176 elected, 88 appointed by the president) seats by party NA

Judicial branch: Supreme Constitutional Court

Political parties and leaders: National Democratic Party (NDP), President Mohammed Hosni MUBARAK, leader, is the dominant party; legal opposition parties are as follows: New Wad Party (NWP), Fu'ad SIRAJ AL-DIN; Socialist Labor Party (SLP), Ibrahim SHUKRI; National Progressive Unionist Grouping (NPUG), Khalid Muhi al-DIN; Socialists Liberal Party, Mustafa Kamal MURAD;

Flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with the national emblem (a shield superimposed on a golden eagle facing the hoist side above a scroll bearing the name of the country in Arabic) centered in the white band.

Economy

Economic overview: Half of Egypt's GDP originates in the public sector, most industrial plants being owned by the government. Overregulation hinders technical modernization and foreign investment. Even so, the economy grew rapidly during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but in 1986 the collapse of world oil prices and an increasingly heavy burden of debt servicing led Egypt to begin negotiations with the IMF for balance-of-payments support. Egypt's first IMF standby arrangement, concluded in mid-1987, was suspended in early 1988 because of the government's failure to adopt promised reforms. Egypt signed a follow-on program with the IMF and also negotiated a structural adjustment loan with the World Bank in 1991. In 1991-93 the government made solid progress on administrative reforms such as liberalizing exchange and interest rates, but resisted implementing major structural reforms like streamlining the public sector. As a result, the economy has not gained enough momentum to tackle the growing problem of unemployment. Egypt made uneven progress in implementing the successor programs it signed onto in late 1993 with the IMF and World Bank; currently it is negotiating another successor program with the IMF. President MUBARAK has cited population growth as the main cause of the country's economic troubles. The addition of about 1.2 million people a year to the already huge population of 63 million exerts enormous pressure on the 5% of the land area available for agriculture.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $171 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 4% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $2,760 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector: NA%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.4% (year-end 1995)

Labor force: 16 million (1994 est.)
- by occupation: government, public sector enterprises, and armed forces 36%, agriculture 34%, privately owned service and manufacturing enterprises 20% (1984)
- note: shortage of skilled labor; 2.5 million work abroad, mostly in the Gulf states (1993 est.).

Unemployment rate: 20% (1995 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $18 billion
- expenditures: $19.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.8 billion (FY94/95 est.)

Industries: textiles, food processing, tourism, chemicals, petroleum, construction, cement, metals

Electricity:
- capacity: 11,830,000 kW
- production: 44.5 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 695 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables; cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats; annual fish catch about 140,000 metric tons.

Illicit drugs: a transit point for Southwest Asian and Southeast Asian heroin and opium moving to Europe and the US; large domestic consumption of hashish from Lebanon and Syria.

Exports: $5.4 billion (f.o.b., FY94/95 est.)
- commodities: crude oil/petroleum products, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals.
- partners: EU, US, Japan

Imports: $15.2 billion (c.i.f., FY94/95 est.)
- commodities: machinery/equipment, food, fertilizers, wood products, consumer/capital goods.
- partners: US, EU, Japan

External debt: $33.6 billion (FY93/94 est.)


Currency: 1 Egyptian pound (£E) = 100 piasters

Exchange rates: Egyptian pounds (£E) per US$1 market rate: 3.3920 (January 1996)

Fiscal year: 1 July - 30 June
IRAQ

**Country Profiles: Iraq**

**Geography**

**Location:** Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait

**Geographic coordinates:** 33° 00' N, 44° 00' E

**Area:**
- total area: 437,072 sq km
- land area: 432,162 sq km

**Land boundaries:**
- total: 3,631 km
- border countries: Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 181 km, Kuwait 242 km, Saudi Arabia 814 km, Syria 331 km

**Coastline:** 58 km

**Maritime claims:**
- continental shelf: not specified
- territorial sea: 12 nm

**International disputes:** Iran and Iraq restored diplomatic relations in 1990 but are still trying to work out written agreements settling outstanding disputes from their eight-year war concerning border demarcation, prisoners-of-war, and freedom of navigation and sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab waterway; in November 1994, Iraq formally accepted the UN-demarcated border with Kuwait which had been spelled out in Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 773 (1993), and 883 (1993); this formally ends earlier claims to Kuwait and to Bubiyan and Warbah islands; dispute over water development plans by Turkey for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers

**Climate:** mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows which melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq.

**Terrain:** mostly broad plains; reedy marshes along Iranian border in south; mountains along borders with Iran and Turkey; *lowest point:* Persian Gulf 0 m; *highest point:* Gundah Zhur 3,608 m.

**Natural resources:** petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur

**Land use:**
- arable land: 12%
- permanent crops: 1%
- meadows and pastures: 9%
- forest and woodland: 3%
- other: 75%
- Irrigated land: 25,500 sq km (1989 est.)

**Environment:** current issues: government water control projects have drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers; a once sizable population of Shi'a Muslims, who have inhabited these areas for thousands of years, has been displaced; furthermore, the destruction of the natural habitat poses serious threats to the area's wildlife populations; inadequate supplies of potable water; development of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey; air and water pollution; soil degradation (salinization) and erosion; desertification; *natural hazards:* dust storms, sandstorms, floods; *international agreements:* party to - Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban; signed, but not ratified - Environmental Modification.

**People**
Death rate: 6.57 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: 0.37 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.02 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 60 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 66.95 years (male: 65.92; female: 68.03 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 6.41 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Iraqi(s) - adjective: Iraqi

Ethnic divisions: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5%

Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%

Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 58% (male: 70.7%; female: 45%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Republic of Iraq
- conventional short form: Iraq
- local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Iraqiyyah
- local short form: Al Iraq

Data code: IZ

Type of government: republic

Capital: Baghdad

Administrative divisions: 18 provinces (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah): Al Anbar, Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Al Qadisiyah, An Najaf, Arbil, As Sulaymaniyah, At Ta'mim, Babil, Baghdad, Dahuk, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala', Maysan, Ninawa, Salah ad Din, Wasit

Independence: 3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration)

National holiday: Anniversary of the Revolution, 17 July (1968)


Legal system: based on Islamic law in special religious courts, civil law system elsewhere; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: President SAD DAM Husayn (since 16 July 1979); Vice President Taha Muhyi al-Din MARUF (since 21 April 1974); Vice President Taha Yasin RAMADAN (since 23 March 1991) were elected by a two-thirds majority of the Revolutionary Command Council
- Head of government: Prime Minister SAD DAM Husayn (since NA May 1994); Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Mikhail AZIZ (since NA 1979)
- Revolutionary Command Council: Chairman SAD DAM Husayn, Vice Chairman Izzat IBRAHIM al-Duri
- Cabinet: Council of Ministers

Legislative branch: unicameral
- National Assembly (Majlis a/-Watani): elections last held 24 March 1996 (next to be held NA); results - percent of vote NA; seats - (250 total, 30 appointed by SAD DAM to represent three northern provinces of Dahuk, Arbil, and As Sulaymaniyah) note: in northern Iraq, a "Kurdish Assembly" was elected in May 1992 and calls for Kurdish self-determination within a federated Iraq; the assembly is not recognized by the Baghdad government

Judicial branch: Court of Cassation

Political parties and leaders: Ba'th Party, SAD DAM Husayn, central party leader

Other political or pressure groups: political parties and activity severely restricted; opposition to regime from disaffected members of the Ba'th Party, Army officers, tribes, and Shi'a religious and ethnic Kurdish dissidents; the Green Party (government-controlled)

Flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with three green five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; the phrase ALLAHU AKBAR (God is Great) in green Arabic script - Allahu to the right of the middle star and Akbar to the left of the middle star - was added in January 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis.

Economic overview: The Ba'thist regime engages in extensive central planning and management of industrial production and foreign trade while leaving some small-scale industry and services and most agriculture to private enterprise. The economy has been dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. In the 1980s, financial problems caused by massive expenditures in the eight-year war with Iran and damage to oil export facilities by Iran, led the government to implement austerity measures and to borrow heavily and later reschedule foreign debt payments; Iraq suffered economic losses of at least $100 billion from the war. After the end of hostilities in 1988, oil exports gradually increased with the construction of new pipelines and restoration of damaged facilities. Agricultural development remained hampered by labor shortages, salinization, and dislocations caused by previous land reform and collectivization programs. The industrial sector, although accorded high priority by the government, also was under financial constraints. Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, subsequent international economic embargoes, and military action by an international coalition beginning in January 1991 drastically changed the economic picture. Industrial and transportation facilities, which suffered severe damage, have been partially restored. Oil exports remain at less than 5% of the previous level. Shortages of spare parts continue. Living standards deteriorated even further in 1994 and 1995; consumer prices have more than doubled in both 1994 and 1995. The UN-sponsored economic embargo has reduced exports and imports and has contributed to the sharp rise in prices. The Government has been unwilling to abide by UN resolutions so that the economic embargo can be removed. The government's policies of supporting large military and internal security forces and of allocating resources to key supporters of the regime have exacerbated shortages. In brief, per capita output for 1994-95 is well below the 1989-90 level, but any estimate has a wide range of error.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $41.1 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: NA%
- GDP per capita: $2,000 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector: NA%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): NA%

- by occupation: services 48%, agriculture 30%, industry 22%
- note: severe labor shortage; expatriate labor force was about 1,600,000 (July 1990); since then, it has declined substantially

Unemployment rate: NA%

Budget
- revenues: $NA
- expenditures: $NA, including capital expenditures of $NA

Industries: petroleum, chemicals, textiles, construction materials, food processing
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

Electricity:
- capacity: 7,170,000 kW
- production: 25.7 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 1,247 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, other fruit, cotton; cattle, sheep

Exports: $NA
- commodities: crude oil and refined products, fertilizer, sulfur
- partners: US, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, Netherlands, Spain (1990)

Imports: $NA
- commodities: manufactures, food
- partners: Germany, US, Turkey, France, UK (1990)

External debt: $50 billion (1989 est.), excluding debt of about $35 billion owed to Gulf Arab states

Economic aid recipient: ODA, $NA
Geographic coordinates: 31 00 N, 36 00 E

Area:
- total area: 89,213 sq km
- land area: 88,884 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 1,619 km
- border countries: Iraq 181 km, Israel 238 km, Saudi Arabia 728 km, Syria 375 km, West Bank 97 km

Coastline: 26 km

Maritime claims: territorial sea: 3 nm

International disputes: none

Climate: mostly arid desert; rainy season in west (November to April)

Terrain: mostly desert plateau in east, highland area in west; Great Rift Valley separates East and West Banks of the Jordan River; lowest point: Dead Sea -408 m; highest point: Jabal Ram 1,754 m.

Natural resources: phosphates, potash, shale oil

Land use:
- arable land: 4%
- permanent crops: 0.5%
- meadows and pastures: 1%
- forest and woodland: 0.5%
- other: 94%
- irrigated land: 570 sq km (1989 est.)

Environment current issues: limited natural fresh water resources; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; natural hazards: NA; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands; signed, but not ratified - Desertification, Law of the Sea.

Population: 4,212,152 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 44% (male 949,822; female 903,043)
- 15-64 years: 53% (male 1,153,360; female 1,091,416)
- 65 years and over: 3% (male 57,783; female 56,728) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 2.65% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 36.67 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 3.95 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: -6.23 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.05 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 31.5 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 72.48 years (male: 70.62; female: 74.45 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 5.1 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Jordanian(s) - adjective: Jordanian

Ethnic divisions: Arab 98%, Circassian 1%, Armenian 1%

Religions: Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 8%

Languages: Arabic (official), English widely understood among upper and middle classes.
Literate: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.): total: 86.6% (male: 93.4%; female: 79.4%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- conventional short form: Jordan
- local long form: AI Mamlakah al Urduniyah al Hashimiyah
- local short form: AI Urdun
- former: Transjordan

Data code: JO

Type of government: constitutional monarchy

Capital: Amman

Administrative divisions: 8 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazat); Al Balqa', Al Karak, Al Mafraq, 'Amman, At Tafilah, Az Zarqa', Irbid, Ma'an.

Independence: 25 May 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration)


Constitution: 8 January 1952

Legal system: based on Islamic law and French codes; judicial review of legislative acts in a specially provided High Tribunal; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: King HUSSEIN Bin Talal AI Hashimi (since 2 May 1953) is a constitutional monarch
- Head of government: Prime Minister Abd al-Karim al-KABARITI (since 4 February 1996), appointed by the king
- Cabinet: Cabinet was appointed by the king

Legislative branch: bicameral National Assembly (MaJlis al-'Umma)
- House of Notables (Majlis al-'A'ayan): consists of a 40-member body appointed by the king from designated categories of public figures.
- House of Representatives: elections last held 8 November 1993 (next to be held NA November 1997) results - percent of vote by party NA; seats - (80 total) IAF Jordanian National Alliance Party 4, AI-Yaqazah Party 2, Al-Watan Party 2, Al-'Ahd Party 2, Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 2, Al-Mustaqbal Party 1, Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba'th Party 1, Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party 1, Jordanian People's Democratic Party-Hashd 1, Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party 1, independents 47.
  [note: the House of Representatives has been convened and dissolved by the king several times since 1974; in November 1989 the first parliamentary elections in 22 years were held.
  [note: in 1995, the Jordanian Arab Democratic Party, the Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party, and the Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party merged to form the Jordanian Unionist Democratic Party]

Judicial branch: Court of Cassation


In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when its annual real GNP growth averaged more than 10%. In the remainder of the 1980s, however, reductions in both Arab aid and worker remittances slowed real economic growth to an average of roughly 2% per year. Imports - mainly oil, capital goods, consumer durables, and food - outstripped exports, with the difference covered by aid, remittances, and borrowing. In mid-1989, the Jordanian Government began debt-rescheduling negotiations and agreed to implement an IMF-supported program designed to gradually reduce the budget deficit and implement badly needed structural reforms. The Persian Gulf crisis that began in August 1990, however, aggravated Jordan's already serious economic problems, forcing the government to shelve the IMF program, stop most debt payments, and suspend rescheduling negotiations. Aid from Gulf Arab states, worker remittances, and trade contracted; and refugees flooded the country, producing serious balance-of-payments problems, stunting GDP growth, and straining government resources. The economy rebounded in 1992, largely due to the influx of capital repatriated by workers returning from the Gulf, but the recovery was uneven throughout 1994 and 1995. The government is implementing the reform program adopted in 1992 and continues to secure rescheduling and write-offs of its heavy foreign debt. Debt, poverty, and unemployment remain Jordan's biggest on-going problems.

**GDP:** purchasing power parity - $19.3 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 6.5% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $4,700 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 11%
  - industry: 25%
  - services: 64% (1994)

**Inflation rate** (consumer prices): 3% (1995 est.)

**Labor force**: 600,000 (1992)
- by occupation: industry 11.4%, commerce, restaurants, and hotels 10.5%, construction 10.0%, transport and communications 8.7%, agriculture 7.4%, other services 52.0% (1992)

**Unemployment rate**: 16% (1994 est.)

**Budget**:
- revenues: $2.5 billion
- expenditures: $2.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $640 million (1996 est.)

**Industries**: phosphate mining, petroleum refining, cement, potash, light manufacturing

**Industrial production growth rate**: 5.6% (1994 est.)

**Electricity**:
- capacity: 1,050,000 kW
- production: 4.2 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 1,072 kWh (1993)

**Agriculture**: wheat, barley, citrus, tomatoes, melons, olives; sheep, goats, poultry

**Exports**: $1.7 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: phosphates, fertilizers, potash, agricultural products, manufactures
- partners: India, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, EU, Indonesia, UAE

**Imports**: $3.8 billion (c.i.f., 1994)
- commodities: crude oil, machinery, transport equipment, food, live animals, manufactured goods
- partners: EU, US, Iraq, Japan, Turkey

**External debt**: $6.9 billion (1995 est.)

**Economic aid**: recipient: ODA, $238 million (1993)

**Currency**: 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = 1,000 fils

**Exchange rates**: Jordanian dinars (JD) per US$1 - 0.7090 (January 1996)

**Fiscal year**: calendar year
Country Profiles: Kuwait

KUWAIT

**Geography**

**Location:** Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia

**Geographic coordinates:** 29°30' N, 45°45' E

**Area:**
- total area: 17,820 sq km
- land area: 17,820 sq km

**Land boundaries:**
- total: 464 km
- border countries: Iraq 242 km, Saudi Arabia 222 km

**Coastline:** 499 km

**Maritime claims:** territorial sea: 12 nm

**International disputes:** in Nov. 1994, Iraq formally accepted the UN-demarcated border with Kuwait which had been spelled out in Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 773 (1993), and 883 (1993); this formally ends earlier claims to Kuwait and to Bubiyan and Warbah islands; ownership of Qaruh and Umm al Maradim islands disputed by Saudi Arabia.

**Climate:** dry desert; intensely hot summers; short, cool winters.

**Terrain:** flat to slightly undulating desert plain; lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m; highest point: unnamed location 306 m.

**Natural resources:** petroleum, fish, shrimp, natural gas.

**Land use:**
- arable land: 0%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 8%
- forest and woodland: 0%
- other: 92%
- Irrigated land: 20 sq km (1989 est.)

**Environment: current issues:** limited natural fresh water resources; some of world’s largest and most sophisticated desalination facilities provide much of the water; air and water pollution; desertification; natural hazards: sudden cloudbursts are common from October to April, they bring inordinate amounts of rain which can damage roads and houses; sandstorms and dust storms occur throughout the year, but are most common between March and August; international agreements: party to - Climate Change, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection; signed, but not ratified - Biodiversity, Desertification, Endangered Species, Marine Dumping.

**Note:** strategic location at head of Persian Gulf.

**People**

**Population:** 1,950,047 (July 1996 est.)

**Age structure:**
- 0-14 years: 33% (male 334,778; female 317,241)
- 15-64 years: 65% (male 757,535; female 507,064)
Infant mortality rate: 11.1 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 75.92 years (male: 73.59; female: 78.38 - 1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 2.82 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Kuwaiti(s) - adjective: Kuwaiti

Ethnic divisions: Kuwaiti 45%, other Arab 35%, South Asian 9%, Iranian 4%, other 7%.
Religions: Muslim 85% (Shi'a 30%, Sunni 45%, other 10%), Christian, Hindu, Parsi, and other 15%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English widely spoken

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 78.6% (male: 82.2%; female: 74.9%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: State of Kuwait
- conventional short form: Kuwait
- local long form: Dawlat al Kuwayt
- local short form: Al Kuwayt

Data code: KU

Type of government: nominal constitutional monarchy

Capital: Kuwait

Administrative divisions: 5 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Al Ahmadi, Al Jahrah, Al Kuwayt, Hawalli, Al Farwaniyah.

Independence: 19 June 1961 (from UK)


Constitution: approved and promulgated 11 November 1962

Legal system: civil law system with Islamic law significant in personal matters; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Suffrage: adult males who have been naturalized for 30 years or more or have resided in Kuwait since before 1920 and their male descendants at age 21. [note: only 10% of all citizens are eligible to vote; in 1996, naturalized citizens who do not meet the pre-1920 qualification but have been naturalized for 30 years will be eligible to vote].

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: Amir JABIR al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah (since 31 December 1977) is a hereditary monarch of the MUBARAK line of the ruling Sabah family
- Head of government: Prime Minister and Crown Prince SAAD al-Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah (since 8 February 1978), First Deputy Prime Minister SAHAB al-Ahmadi al-Jabir Al Sabah (since 17 October 1992), and Second Deputy Prime Minister Nasir Abdallah al-RUDAN were appointed by the Amir.
- Cabinet: Council of Ministers was appointed by the prime minister and approved by the amir

Legislative branch: unicameral
- National Assembly (Majlis al-umma): elected members serve four-year terms; elections last held 5 October 1992 (next to be held NA September 1996); results - percent of vote NA; seats - (50 total) independents 50; note - all cabinet ministers are also ex officio members of the National Assembly.

Judicial branch: High Court of Appeal

Political parties and leaders: none

Other political or pressure groups: several political groups act as de facto parties: Bedouins, merchants, Sunni and Shi'a activists, and secular leftists and nationalists.

International organization participation: ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AL, AMF, BDEAC, CAEU, CCC, ESCWA, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCs, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, ISO (correspondent), ITU, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WMO, WTO, WToO, WTrO.

Flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red with a black trapezoid based on the hoist side.
Country Profiles: Kuwait

Economic overview: Kuwait is a small and relatively open economy with proved crude oil reserves of about 94 billion barrels - 10% of world reserves. Kuwait has rebuilt its war-ravaged petroleum sector; its crude oil production averaged 2.0 million barrels per day in 1994. The government continues to record large fiscal deficits. Petroleum accounts for nearly half of GDP, 90% of export revenues, and 70% of government income. Kuwait lacks water and has practically no arable land, thus preventing development of agriculture. With the exception of fish, it depends almost wholly on food imports. About 75% of potable water must be distilled or imported. Because of its high per capita income, comparable with Western European incomes, Kuwait provides its citizens with extensive health, educational, and retirement benefits. Per capita military expenditures are among the highest in the world. The economy improved moderately in 1994-95, with the growth in industry and finance. The World Bank has urged Kuwait to push ahead with privatization, including in the oil industry, but the government will move slowly on this front.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $30.8 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 3% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $17,000 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 0%
  - industry: 55%
  - services: 45%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 5% (1994 est.)

Labor force: 1 million (1994 est.)
- by occupation: industry and agriculture 25.0%, services 25.0%, government and social services 50%.
- note: 80% of labor force non-Kuwaiti (1994 est.)

Unemployment rate: NEGL% (1992 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $9.7 billion
- expenditures: $14.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (FY95/96 est.)

Industries: petroleum, petrochemicals, desalination, food processing, construction materials, salt, construction.
- Industrial production growth rate: 1% (1995 est.)

Electricity:
- capacity: 7,070,000 kW
- production: 11 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 6,007 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: practically no crops; extensive fishing in territorial waters.

Exports: $11.9 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: oil
- partners: US 23%, Japan 13%, Germany 10%, UK 9%, France 8%

Imports: $6.7 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: food, construction materials, vehicles and parts, clothing
- partners: US 14%, Japan 12%, Germany 8%, UK 7%, France 6% (1994 est.)

External debt: $NA

Economic aid: $NA

Currency: 1 Kuwaiti dinar (KD) = 1,000 fils

Exchange rate: Kuwaiti dinars (KD) per US$1 - 0.2993 (January 1996)

Fiscal year: 1 July - 30 June
Under the Ta'if accord - the blueprint for national reconciliation - the Lebanese have established a more equitable political system, particularly by giving Muslims a greater say in the political process. Since December 1990, the Lebanese have formed four cabinets and conducted the first legislative election in 20 years. Most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has seized vast quantities of weapons used by the militias during the war and extended central government authority over about one-half of the country. Hizballah, the radical Shi'a party, retains most of its weapons. Foreign forces still occupy areas of Lebanon. Israel maintains troops in southern Lebanon and continues to support a proxy militia, the Army of South Lebanon (ASL), along a narrow stretch of territory contiguous to its border. The ASL's enclave encompasses this self-declared security zone and about 20 kilometers north to the strategic town of Jazmin. Syria maintains about 30,000 troops in Lebanon. These troops are based mainly in Beirut, North Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley. Syria's deployment was legitimized by the Arab League early in Lebanon's civil war and in the Ta'if accord. Citing the continued weakness of the LAF, Beirut's requests, and failure of the Lebanese Government to implement all of the constitutional reforms in the Ta'if accord, Damascus has so far refused to withdraw its troops from Beirut.

Geography

Location: Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Israel and Syria

Geographic coordinates: 33 50 N, 35 50 E

Area:
- total area: 10,400 sq km
- land area: 10,230 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 454 km
- border countries: Israel 79 km, Syria 375 km

Coastline: 225 km

Maritime claims:
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes:
- Israeli troops in southern Lebanon since June 1982; Syrian troops in northern, central, and eastern Lebanon since October 1976.

Climate: Mediterranean; mild to cool, wet winters with hot, dry summers; Lebanon mountains experience heavy winter snows.

Terrain: narrow coastal plain; Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley) separates Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains; lowest point: Mediterranean Sea 0 m; highest point: Jabal al Makmal 3,087 m.

Natural resources: limestone, iron ore, salt, water-surplus state in a water-deficit region.

Land use:
- arable land: 21%
- permanent crops: 9%
- meadows and pastures: 1%
- forest and woodland: 8%
- other: 61%
- irrigated land: 860 sq km (1990 est.)

Environment: current issues: deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; air pollution in Beirut from vehicular traffic and the burning of industrial wastes; pollution of coastal waters from raw sewage and oil spills; natural hazards: dust storms, sandstorms; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution; signed, but not ratified - Desertification, Environmental Modification, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation.

Note: Nahr al Litani: only major river in Near East not crossing an international boundary; rugged terrain; historically helped isolate, protect, and develop numerous factional groups based on religion, clan, and ethnicity.
People

**Population:** 3,776,317 (July 1996 est).  

**Age structure:**  
- 0-14 years: 36% (male 687,631; female 662,100)  
- 15-64 years: 59% (male 1,049,689; female 1,163,255)  
- 65 years and over: 5% (male 98,406; female 115,236) (July 1996 est.)

**Population growth rate:** 2.16% (1996 est.)

**Birth rate:** 27.93 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Death rate:** 6.35 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Net migration rate:** 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Sex ratio:** all ages: 0.95 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

**Infant mortality rate:** 36.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

**Life expectancy at birth:** total population: 69.99 years (male: 67.49; female: 72.62 - 1996 est.)

**Total fertility rate:** 3.24 children born/woman (1996 est.)

**Nationality:** noun: Lebanese (singular and plural) - adjective: Lebanese

**Ethnic divisions:** Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%

**Religions:** Islam 70% (5 legally recognized Islamic groups - Alawite or Nusayri, Druze, Isma'ilite, Shi'a, Sunni), Christian 30% (11 legally recognized Christian groups - 4 Orthodox Christian, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant), Judaismnegl%

**Languages:** Arabic (official), French (official), Armenian, English

**Literacy:** age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 92.4% (male: 94.7%; female: 90.3%)

Government

**Name of country:**
- conventional long form: Republic of Lebanon
- conventional short form: Lebanon
- local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Lubnaniyah
- local short form: none

**Data code:** LE

**Type of government:** republic

**Capital:** Beirut

**Administrative divisions:** 5 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Al Biqa', Al Janub, Ash Shamal, Bayrut, Jabal Lubnan.

**Independence:** 22 November 1943 (from League of Nations mandate under French administration)

**National holiday:** Independence Day, 22 November (1943)

**Constitution:** 23 May 1926, amended a number of times.

**Legal system:** mixture of Ottoman law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and civil law; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

**Suffrage:** 21 years of age; compulsory for all males; authorized for women at age 21 with elementary education.

**Executive branch:**
- **Chief of state:** President Ilyas HARAWI (since 24 November 1989) was elected for a six-year term by the National Assembly and in 1995 the National Assembly amended the constitution to extend his term by three years; note - by custom, the president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the legislature is a Shi'a Muslim.
- **Head of government:** Prime Minister Rafiq al-HARIRI (since 22 October 1992) and Deputy Prime Minister Michel al-MURR (since NA) were appointed by the president in consultation with the National Assembly.
- **Cabinet:** Cabinet was chosen by the prime minister in consultation with the members of the National Assembly; the current Cabinet was formed in 1995.

**Legislative branch:** unicameral
- **National Assembly (Arabic - Al Majlis Al Nuwab French - Assemblée); elections last held in the summer of **
Economic overview: The 1975-91 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon's economic infrastructure, cut national output by half, and all but ended Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern entrepot and banking hub. Peace has enabled the central government to restore control in Beirut, begin collecting taxes, and regain access to key port and government facilities. Economic recovery has been helped by a financially sound banking system and resilient small- and medium-scale manufacturers. Family remittances, banking services, manufactured and farm exports, and international aid are the main sources of foreign exchange. In the relatively settled year of 1991, industrial production, agricultural output, and exports showed substantial gains. The rebuilding of the war-ravaged country was delayed in 1992 because of an upturn in political wrangling. In October 1992, Rafiq al-HARIRI was appointed prime minister. A billionaire entrepreneur, al-HARIRI, announced plans for Lebanon's reconstruction, which involve a substantial influx of foreign aid and investment. The economy has posted considerable gains since 1992, with GDP rebounding, inflation falling, and foreign capital inflows jumping. Signs of strain have emerged in recent years, however, as the government budget deficit has risen and grassroots economic dissatisfaction has grown. Meantime, the future fate of Lebanon and its economy is being determined largely by outside forces - in Syria, other Arab nations, Israel, and the West.

**GDP**: purchasing power parity - $18.3 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 6.5% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $4,900 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 13%
  - industry: 28%
  - services: 59% (1995 est.)

**Inflation rate** (consumer prices): 9% (1995 est.)

**Labor force**: 650,000
- by occupation: services 60%, industry 28%, agriculture 12% (1990 est.)

**Unemployment rate**: 30% (1995 est.)

**Budget**:
- revenues: $1.4 billion
- expenditures: $3.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1994 est.)

**Industries**:
- banking, food processing, textiles, cement, oil refining, chemicals, jewelry, metal fabricating
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

**Electricity**:
- capacity: 1,220,000 kW
- production: 2.5 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 676 kWh (1993)

**Agriculture**:
- citrus, vegetables, potatoes, olives, tobacco, hemp (hashish); sheep, goats

**Illicit drugs**:
- illicit producer of hashish and heroin for the international drug trade; hashish production is shipped to Western Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America; a key locus of cocaine processing and trafficking; a Lebanese/Syrian 1994 eradication campaign practically eliminated the opium crop and caused a 50% decrease in the cannabis crop.

**Exports**:
- $1 billion (f.o.b., 1995 est.)
  - commodities: agricultural products, chemicals, textiles, precious and semiprecious metals and jewelry, metals and metal products
  - partners: Saudi Arabia 13%, Switzerland 12%, UAE 11%, Syria 9%, US 5%

**Imports**:
- $7.3 billion (c.i.f., 1995 est.)
  - commodities: consumer goods, machinery and transport equipment, petroleum products
  - partners: Italy 14%, France 9%, US 8%, Turkey 5%, Saudi Arabia 3%

**External debt**: $1.2 billion (July 1995)

**Economic aid**: recipient: ODA, $NA

**Currency**: 1 Lebanese pound (£L) = 100 piasters

**Exchange rates**: Lebanese pounds (£L) per US$1 - 1,584.0 (March 1996)

**Fiscal year**: calendar year
Country Profiles: Libya

LIBYA

Geography

Location: Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Tunisia

Geographic coordinates: 25 00 N, 17 00 E

Area:
- total area: 1,759,540 sq km
- land area: 1,759,540 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 4,383 km
- border countries: Algeria 982km, Chad 1,055km, Egypt 1,150km, Niger 354km, Sudan 383 km, Tunisia 459 km

Coastline: 1,770 km

Maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm; Gulf of Sidra closing line: 32 degrees 30 minutes north.

International disputes: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in February 1994 that the 100,000sq Rm Aozou Strip between Chad and Libya belongs to Chad and that Libya must withdraw from it by 31 May 1994; Libya has withdrawn some of its forces in response to the ICJ ruling, but still maintains part of the airfield and a small military presence at the airfield's water supply located in Chad; maritime boundary dispute with Tunisia; claims part of northern Niger and part of southeastern Algeria.

Climate: Mediterranean along coast; dry, desert interior.

Terrain: mostly barren, flat to undulating plains, plateaus, depressions; lowest point: Sabkhat Ghuzayyil -47 m; highest point: Bikku Bitti 2,267 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, gypsum.

Land use:
- arable land: 2%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 8%
- forest and woodland: 0%
- other: 90%
- Irrigated land: 2,420 sq km (1989 est.)

Environment current issues: desertification; very limited natural fresh water resources; the Great Mannmade River Project, the largest water development scheme in the world, is being built to bring water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities; natural hazards: hot, dry, dust-laden ghibli is a southern wind lasting one to four days in spring and fall; dust storms, sandstorms; international agreements: party to - Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection; signed, but not ratified - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Law of the Sea.

People

Population: 5,445,436 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 48% (male 1,319,696; female 1,274,865)
- 15-64 years: 49% (male 1,375,441; female 1,308,613)
- 65 years: 3% (male 103,059; female 122,062)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 64.67 years (male: 62.48; female: 66.97 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 6.26 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Libyan(s) - adjective: Libyan


Religions: Sunni Muslim 97%

Languages: Arabic, Italian, English, all are widely understood in the major cities

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 76.2% (male: 87.9%; female: 63%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
- conventional short form: Libya
- local long form: Al Jumahiriya al Arabiya al Libiya ash Shabiya al Ishtirakiya
- local short form: none

Data code: LY

Type of government: Jamahiriya (a state of the masses) in theory, governed by the populace through local councils; in fact, a military dictatorship.

Capital: Tripoli

Administrative divisions: 25 municipalities (baladiyah, singular - baladiyat); Ajdabiya, Al Aziziya, Al Fath, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Jufrah, Al Khums, Al Kufrah, An Nuqat al Khams, Ash Shati', Awbari, Az Zawiyah, Banghazi, Darnah, Ghadamis, Gharyan, Misratah, Murzuq, Sabha, Sawafjijin, Surt, Tarhunah, Tawergha, Zlitan [note: the 25 municipalities may have been replaced by 1,500 communes in 1992].

Independence: 24 December 1951 (from Italy)

National holiday: Revolution Day, 1 September (1969)

Constitution: 11 December amended 2 March 1977

Legal system: based on Italian civil law system and Islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: Revolutionary Leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI (since 1 September 1969) was elected by the General People's Congress
- Head of government: Secretary of the General People's Committee (Premier) Abd al Majid al-QA'UD (since 29 January 1984)
- Cabinet: General People's Committee was established by the General People's Congress
  [note: national elections are indirect through a hierarchy of peoples' committees]

Legislative branch: unicameral
- General People's Congress: national elections are indirect through a hierarchy of peoples' committees.

Judicial branch: Supreme Court

Political parties and leaders: none

Other political or pressure groups: various Arab nationalist movements with almost negligible memberships may be functioning clandestinely, as well as some Islamic elements.


Flag: plain green; green is the traditional color of Islam (the state religion)
**Economy**

**Economic overview.** The socialist-oriented economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, which contributes practically all export earnings and about one-third of GDP. In 1990 per capita GDP was the highest in Africa at $5,410, but subsequently GDP growth has slowed on average and has fluctuated sharply in response to changes in the world oil market. Import restrictions and inefficient resource allocations have led to periodic shortages of basic goods and foodstuffs. The nonoil manufacturing and construction sectors, which account for about 20% of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminum. Although agriculture accounts for only 5% of GDP, it employs 18% of the labor force. Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit farm output, and Libya imports about 75% of its food requirements. The UN sanctions imposed in April 1992 have not yet had a major impact on the economy because Libya's oil revenues generate sufficient foreign exchange to sustain imports of food, consumer goods, and equipment for the oil industry and ongoing development projects.

**GDP:**
- Purchasing power parity - $32.9 billion (1994 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: -0.9% (1994 est.)
- GDP per capita: $6,510 (1994 est.)
- GDP composition by sector: NA%

**Inflation rate** (consumer prices): 25% (1993 est.)

**Labor force:** 1 million (includes about 280,000 resident foreigners)
- by occupation: industry 31%, services 27%, government 24%, agriculture 18%

**Unemployment rate:** NA%

**Budget**
- Revenues: $8.1 billion
- Expenditures: $9.8 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.1 billion (1989 est.)

**Industries:** petroleum, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

**Electricity**
- Capacity: 4,600,000 kW
- Production: 16.1 billion kWh
- Consumption per capita: 3,078 kWh (1993)

**Agriculture:** wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus, vegetables, peanuts; meat, eggs

**Exports:** $7.2 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- Commodities: crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas
- Partners: Italy, Germany, Spain, France, UK, Turkey, Greece, Egypt

**Imports:** $6.9 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- Commodities: machinery, transport equipment, food, manufactured goods
- Partners: Italy, Germany, UK, France, Spain, Turkey, Tunisia, Eastern Europe

**External debt:** $3.5 billion excluding military debt (1991 est.)

**Economic aid:** NA

**Currency:** 1 Libyan dinar (LD) = 1,000 dirhams

**Exchange rate:** Libyan dinars (LD) per US$1 - 0.3617 (January 1996)

**Fiscal year:** calendar year
Location: North Africa, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea between Algeria and Western Sahara

**Geographic coordinates**: 32 00 N, 5 00 W

**Area**:  
- total area: 446,550 sq km  
- land area: 446,300 sq km

**Land boundaries**:  
- total: 2,002 km  
- border countries: Algeria 1,559 km, Western Sahara 443 km  
- note: excludes the length of the boundary between the places of sovereignty and Morocco

**Coastline**: 1,835 km

**Maritime claims**:  
- contiguous zone: 24 nm  
- continental shelf: 200-m depth or to the depth of exploitation  
- excl. economic zone: 200 nm  
- territorial sea: 12 nm

**International disputes**: claims and administers Western Sahara, but sovereignty is unresolved and the UN is attempting to hold a referendum on the issue; the UN-administered cease-fire has been in effect since September 1991; Spain controls five places of sovereignty (plazas de soberania) on and off the coast of Morocco - the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which Morocco contests as well as the islands of Penon de Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas

**Climate**: Mediterranean, becoming more extreme in the interior

**Terrain**: northern coast and interior: mountainous with large areas of bordering plateaus, intermontane valleys, and rich coastal plains; lowest point: Sebkha Tah -55 m; highest point: Jebel Toubkal 4,165 m.

**Natural resources**: phosphates, iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, fish, salt

**Land use**:  
- arable land: 18%  
- permanent crops: 1%  
- meadows and pastures: 28%  
- forest and woodland: 12%  
- other: 41%  
- Irrigated land: 12,650 sq km (1989 est.)

**Environment**: current issues: land degradation/desertification (soil erosion resulting from farming of marginal areas, overgrazing, destruction of vegetation); water supplies contaminated by raw sewage; siltation of reservoirs; oil pollution of coastal waters; natural hazards: northern mountains geologically unstable and subject to earthquakes; periodic droughts; international agreements: party to - Biological Diversity, Climate Change, Endangered Species, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands; signed, but not ratified - Desertification, Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea Geographic.

**Note**: strategic location along Strait of Gibraltar.

**People**

**Population**: 29,779,156 (July 1996 est.)

**Age structure**:  
- 0-14 years: 38% (male 5,696,731; female 5,522,077)  
- 15-64 years: 58% (male 8,577,918; female 8,700,521)  
- 65 years and over: 4% (male 613,712; female 668,197) (July 1996 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.05% (1996 est.)
Birth rate: 27.39 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Death rate: 5.77 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Net migration rate: -1.08 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Sex ratio: all ages: 1 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 43.2 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 69.52 years (male: 67.53; female: 71.61 - 1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.58 children born/woman (1996 est.)
Nationality: noun: Moroccan(s) - adjective: Moroccan
Ethnic divisions: Arab-Berber 99.1%, other 0.7%, Jewish 0.2%
Religions: Muslim 98.7%, Christian 1.1%, Jewish 0.2%
Languages: Arabic (official), Berber dialects, French often used in business, government, diplomacy.
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 43.7% (male: 56.6%; female: 31%)

Government

Name of country:
• conventional long form: Kingdom of Morocco
• conventional short form: Morocco
• local long form: Al Mamlakah al Maghribiyah
• local short form: Al Maghrib

Data code: MO

Type of government: constitutional monarchy

Capital: Rabat


Independence: 2 March 1956 (from France)

National holiday: National Day, 3 March (1961) (King HASSAN II's accession to the throne)

Constitution: 10 March 1972, revised 4 September 1992

Legal system: based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court.

 Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
• Chief of state: King HASSAN II (since 3 March 1961) is a hereditary monarch
• Head of government: Prime Minister Abdellatif FILALI (since 29 May 1994); appointed by the king.
• Cabinet: Council of Ministers was appointed by the king

Legislative branch: unicameral
• Chamber of Representatives (Majlis Nawab): two-thirds elected by direct, universal suffrage and one-third by an electoral college of government, professional, and labor representatives; direct, popular elections last held 15 June 1993 (next to be held NA 1999); results - percent of vote by party NA; seats: (333 total, 222 directly elected) USFP 48, IP 43, MP 33, RNI 28, UC 27, PND 14, MNP 14, PPS 6, PDI 3, SAP 2, PA 2, OADP 2; indirect, special interest elections last held 17 September 1993 (next to be held NA 1999); results - percent of vote by party NA; seats: (333 total, 111 indirectly elected) UC 27, MP 18, RNI 13, MNP 11, PND 10, IP 7, Party of Shura and Istiqlaal 6, USFP 4, PPS 4, PDI 4, CDT 4, UTM 3, UGTM 2, SAP 2.

Judicial branch: Supreme Court, judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, presided over by the king.

Political parties and leaders:
• opposition: Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Mohammad al-YAZGHI; Istiqlaal Party (IP), M'Hamed BOUCETTA; Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), Ali YATA; Organization of Democratic and Popular Action (OADP), Mohamed Ben SAID

* Wilayas: administrative regions in Morocco.
Economic overview: Morocco faces the typical problems of developing countries—restraining government spending, reducing constraints on private activity and foreign trade, and keeping inflation within bounds. Since the early 1980s the government has pursued an economic program toward these objectives with the support of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club of creditors. The economy has substantial assets to draw on: the world's largest phosphate reserves, diverse agricultural and fishing resources, a sizable tourist industry, a growing manufacturing sector, and remittances from Moroccans working abroad. A severe drought in 1992-93 depressed economic activity and held down exports. Real GDP contracted by 4.4% in 1992 and 1.1% in 1993. Despite these setbacks, initiatives to relax capital controls, strengthen the banking sector, and enterprises went forward in 1993-94. Favorable rainfall in 1994 boosted by 40%. In 1995, Morocco suffered from a drought said to be the worst in 30 years. Servicing the large debt, high unemployment, and vulnerability to external economic forces remain long-term problems for Morocco.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $87.4 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: -6.5% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $3,000 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 14.3%
  - industry: 32.2%
  - services: 53.5% (1993 est.)

Inflation rate: 5.4% (1994)

Labor force: 7.4 million
- by occupation: agriculture 50%, services 26%, industry 15%, other 9% (1985)

Unemployment rate: 16% (1994 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $8.1 billion
- expenditures: $8.9 billion, of which $NA (1994 est.)

Industries: phosphate rock mining and processing, food processing, leather goods, textiles, construction, tourism
- Industrial production growth rate: 0.1%

Electricity:
- capacity: 2,620,000 kW
- production: 9.9 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 361 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: barley, wheat, citrus, wine, vegetables, olives; livestock

Illicit drugs: illicit producer of hashish; trafficking on the increase for both domestic and international drug markets; shipments of hashish mostly directed to Western Europe; transit point for cocaine from South America for Western Europe.

Exports: $4 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: food/beverages 30%, semiprocessed goods 23%, consumer goods 21%, phosphates 17%
- partners: EC 70%, Japan 5%, US 4%, Libya 3%, India 2% (1993)

Imports: $7.2 billion (c.i.f., 1994)
- commodities: capital goods 24%, semiprocessed goods 22%, raw materials 16%, fuel and lubricants 16%, food and beverages 13%, consumer goods 9%
- partners: EC 59%, US 8%, Saudi Arabia 5%, UAE 3%, Russia 2% (1993)

External debt: $20.5 billion (1994 est.)


Currency: 1 Moroccan dirham (DH) = 100 centimes

Exchange rate: 1 Moroccan dirhams (DH) per US$1 - 8.607 (January 1996)

Fiscal year: calendar year
OMAN

Geography

Location: Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf, between Yemen and UAE.

Geographic coordinates: 21 00 N, 57 00 E

Area:
- total area: 212,460 sq km
- land area: 212,460 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 1,374 km
- border countries: Saudi Arabia 676 km, UAE 410 km, Yemen 288 km

Coastline: 2,092 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 24 nm
- excl. economic zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: no defined boundary with most of UAE, but Administrative Line in far north.

Climate: dry desert; hot, humid along coast; hot, dry interior; strong southwest summer monsoon (May to September) in far south.

Terrain: vast central desert plain, rugged mountains in north and south; lowest point: Arabian Sea 0 m; highest point: Jabal ash Sham 2,980 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, copper, asbestos, some marble, limestone, chromium, gypsum, natural gas.

Land use:
- arable land: 2%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 5%
- forest and woodland: 0%
- other: 93%
- Irrigated land: 410 sq km (1989 est.)

Environment: current issues: rising soil salinity; beach pollution from oil spills; very limited natural fresh water resources; natural hazards: summer winds often raise large sandstorms and dust storms in interior; periodic droughts; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ship Pollution; signed, but not ratified - Hazardous Wastes.

Note: strategic location with small foothold on Musandam Peninsula controlling Strait of Hormuz, a vital transit point for world crude oil.

People

Population: 2,186,548 (July 1996 est.)
**Death rate:** 4.74 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Net migration rate:** 1.84 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Sex ratio:** all ages: 1.1 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

**Infant mortality rate:** 27.3 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

**Life expectancy at birth:** total population: 70.53 years (male: 68.59; female: 72.57 - 1996 est.)

**Total fertility rate:** 6.09 children born/woman (1996 est.)

**Nationality:** noun: Omani(s) - adjective: Omani

**Ethnic divisions:** Arab, Baluchi, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi), African

**Religions:** Ibadhi Muslim 75%, Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, Hindu

**Languages:** Arabic (official), English, Baluchi, Urdu, Indian dialects

**Literacy:** NA

**Name of country:**
- conventional long form: Sultanate of Oman
- conventional short form: Oman
- local long form: Saltanat Uman
- local short form: Uman

**Data code:** MU

**Type of government:** monarchy

**Capital:** Muscat

**Administrative divisions:** 6 regions (mintaqah, singular - mintaqat) and 2 governorates (muḥafazah, singular - muḥafazat) Ad Dakhiliyah, Al Batinah, Al Wusta, Ash Sharqiyah, Az Zahirah, Masqat, Musandam, Zufar.

**Independence:** 1650 (expulsion of the Portuguese)

**National holiday:** National Day, 18 November (1940)

**Constitution:** none

**Legal system:** based on English common law and Islamic law; ultimate appeal to the sultan; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

**Suffrage:** none

**Executive branch:**
- Chief of state and head of government: Sultan and Prime Minister QABOOS bin Said Al Said (since 23 July 1970) is a hereditary monarch.
- Cabinet: Cabinet was appointed by the sultan

**Legislative branch:** unicameral
- Consultative Council (Majlis ash Shura): a 60-member body with advisory powers only

**Judicial branch:** none; traditional Islamic judges and a nascent civil court system, administered by region.

**Political parties and leaders:** none

**Other political or pressure groups:** NA

**International organization participation:** ABEDA, AFESD, AL, AMF, ESCWA, FAO, G-77, GCC, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, ISO (correspondent), ITU, NAM, OIC, UN, UN Security Council (temporary), UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WMO.
Flag: three horizontal bands of white (top, double width), red, and green (double width) with a broad, vertical, red band on the hoist side; the national emblem (a khanjar dagger in its sheath superimposed on two crossed swords in scabbards) in white is centered at the top of the vertical band.

Economy

Economic overview. Economic performance is closely tied to the fortunes of the oil industry. Petroleum accounts for nearly 90% of export earnings, about 75% of government revenues, and roughly 40% of GDP. Oman has proved oil reserves of 4 billion barrels, equivalent to about 20 years' supply at the current rate of extraction. Agriculture is carried on at a subsistence level and the general population depends on imported food. The government is encouraging private investment, both domestic and foreign, as a prime force for further economic development.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $19.1 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 3.5% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $10,800 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 3%
  - industry: 60%
  - services: 37%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): -0.7% (1994 est.)

Labor force: 454,000
- by occupation: agriculture 37% (1993 est.)

Unemployment rate: NA%

Budget:
- revenues: $4.7 billion
- expenditures: $5.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1995 est.)

Industries: crude oil production and refining, natural gas production, construction, cement, copper
- Industrial production growth rate: 3% (1994 est.)

Electricity:
- capacity: 1,540,000 kW
- production: 6 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 3,407 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: dates, limes, bananas, alfalfa, vegetables; camels, cattle; annual fish catch averages 100,000 metric tons.

Exports: $4.8 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: petroleum 87%, reexports, fish, processed copper, textiles
- partners: Japan 35%, South Korea 15.8%, US 9%, China 8%, Thailand 5% (1994)

Imports: $4 billion (c.i.f., 1994 est.)
- commodities: machinery, transportation equipment, manufactured goods, food, livestock, lubricants
- partners: UAE 27% (largely reexports), Japan 20%, UK 15%, US 5%, Germany 4% (1993)

External debt: $3 billion (1993)


Currency: 1 Omani rial (RO) = 1,000 baiza

Exchange rates: Omani rials (RO) per US$1 - 0.3845 (fixed rate since 1986)

Fiscal year: calendar year
**Location:** Middle East, west of Jordan

**Geographic coordinates:** 32 00 N, 35 15 E

**Area:**
- total area: 5,860 sq km
- land area: 360 sq km
- note: includes West Bank, Latrun Salient, and the northwest quarter of the Dead Sea; excludes Mt. Scopus; East Jerusalem and Jerusalem No Man's Land are included as a means of depicting the entire Israeli-occupied area (1967)

**Land boundaries:**
- total: 404 km
- border countries: Israel 307 km, Jordan 97 km

**Coastline:**
- 0 km (landlocked)

**Maritime claims:** none (landlocked)

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1. **Note:** The data for Palestine combines the Factbook's entries for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the sake of consistency we restricted the information provided to that source.
International disputes: West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation.

Climate: temperature/precipitation vary with altitude, warm to hot summers, cool to mild winters.

Terrain: mostly rugged dissected upland, some vegetation in west, but barren in east; flat to rolling, sand- and dune-covered coastal plain;

lowest point: Dead Sea -408 m; Mediterranean Sea 0 m;
highest point: Tall Asur 1,022 m; Abu 'Awdah (Joz Abu 'Auda) 105 m.

Natural resources: NEGL

Land use:
- arable land: 27% 13%
- permanent crops: 0% 32%
- meadows and pastures: 32% 0%
- forest and woodland: 1% 0%
- other: 40% 55%
- Irrigated land: NA sq km 115 sq km (1992 est.)

Environment:
current issues: NA
natural hazards: NA
international agreements: desertification

Note: landlocked; highlands are main recharge area for Israel's coastal aquifers; there are 202 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites in the West Bank and 25 in East Jerusalem (August 1995 est.).

Population: 1,427,741 (July 1996 est.) 923,940 (July 1996 est.)

[note: in addition, there are 127,600 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, 5,000 in Gaza and 153,700 in East Jerusalem - Aug. 1995 est.]

Age structure: (July 1996 est.)
- 0-14 yrs: 45% (male 332,628; female 315,968) 52% (male 244,026; female 231,976)
- 15-64 yrs: 51% (male 368,180; female 362,880) 46% (male 210,706; female 210,764)
- 65 and over: 4% (male 20,495; female 27,590) 2% (male 11,553; female 14,915)

Population growth rate: (1996 est.) 4.99% 6.79%

Birth rate: (1996 est.) 38.78 births/1,000 population 50.67 births/1,000 population

Death rate: (1996 est.) 4.66 deaths/1,000 population 4.4 deaths/1,000 population

Net migration rate: (1996 est.) 15.76 migrants/1,000 pop. 21.65 migrants/1,000 pop.

Sex ratio: all ages (1996 est.): 1.02 male(s)/female 1.02 male(s)/female

Infant mortality rate: (1996 est.) 28.6 deaths/1,000 live births 27.5 deaths/1,000 live births

Life expectancy at birth: (1996 est.)
- total population: 71.76 years 71.98 years
  male: 70.17; female: 73.44
  male: 70.69; female: 73.34

Total fertility rate: (1996 est.) 5.2 children born/woman 7.79 children born/woman

Nationality: noun: Palestinian(s) - adjective: Palestinian

Ethnic divisions:
- Palestinian Arab and other: 83% 99.4%
- Jewish: 17% 0.6%

Religions:
- Muslim (mainly Sunni): 75% 98.7%
- Jewish: 17% 0.6%
- Christian and other: 8% 0.7%
• conventional short form: West Bank
• local long form: none
• local short form: Diffe Qita Ghazzah

Data code: WE GZ

Note: Under the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("the DOP"), Israel agreed to transfer certain powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, which includes a Palestinian Legislative Council elected in January 1996, as part of interim self-governing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A transfer of powers and responsibilities for the Gaza Strip and Jericho has taken place pursuant to the Israel-PLO 4 May 1994 Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and in additional areas of the West Bank pursuant to the Israel-PLO 29 August 1994 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, as well as the Israel-PLO 28 September 1995 interim Agreement. The DOP provides that Israel will retain responsibility during the transitional period for external security and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Permanent status is to be determined through direct negotiations within five years.

Economic overview:
Economic progress in the West Bank has been hampered by Israeli military administration and the effects of the Palestinian uprising (intifada). Industries using advanced technology or requiring sizable investment have been discouraged by a lack of local capital and restrictive Israeli policies. Capital investment consists largely of residential housing, not productive assets that would enable local Palestinian firms to compete with Israeli industry. GDP has been substantially supplemented by remittances of workers employed in Israel and Persian Gulf states. Such transfers from the Gulf dropped after invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis, many Palestinians returned to the West Bank, increasing unemployment, and export revenues have dropped due to the decline of markets in Jordan and the Gulf states. The economic situation has worsened since Israel imposed stringent border restrictions in 1995 and 1996.

GDP: (1995 est.)
• purchasing power parity: $3.7 billion $1 billion
• GDP real growth rate: 3%-4%
• GDP per capita: $2,500 $1,200
• GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 33%
  - industry: 7%
  - services: 60% (includes Gaza Strip)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 14% (1995 est.)

Labor force:
by occupation:
• construction 28.2% 33.4%
• agriculture 21.6% 20.0%
• industry 14.5% 10.0%
• commerce, restaurants/hotels 12.6% 14.9%
• other services 22.9% (1991) 21.7% (1991)

[Note: excluding Israeli settlers]

Unemployment rate: (1995 est.)
25%-30% 30%-45%

Industries:
generally small family businesses that produce textiles, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs;

Israelis have established some small-scale modern industries and industrial centers

• Industrial production growth rate: NA%
Electricity:
- capacity: NA kW
- production: NA kWh
- consumption per capita: NA kWh
  note: most electricity imported from Israel; East power supplied by Israel
  Jerusalem Electric Company buys and distributes
  electricity to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and its
  concession in the West Bank; the Israel Electric Co.
  directly supplies electricity to most Jewish residents
  and military facilities; at the same time, some Palestinian
  municipalities (e.g., Nablus and Jenin), generate their
  own electricity from small power plants.

Agriculture: olives, citrus, other fruits, vegetables; beef, dairy products.

Exports: (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: $116 million
  olives, fruit, vegetables
- partners: $49 million
  Jordan, Israel

Imports: (c.i.f., 1994 est.)
- commodities: $791 million
  food, consumer goods, construction materials
- partners: $339 million
  Jordan, Israel

External debt: $NA

Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA; [note: $410 million (est.) disbursed from international aid
  pledged in 1995 (includes aid to Gaza)]

Currency: 1 new Israeli shekel (NIS) = 100 new agorot
1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = 1,000 fils

JD per US$1 - 0.7090 (Jan. 1996)

Fiscal year: calendar year (since 1 January 1992).
Location: Middle East, peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia

Geographic coordinates: 25 30 N, 51 15 E

Area:
- total area: 11,000 sq km
- land area: 11,000 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 60 km
- border country: Saudi Arabia 60 km

Coastline: 563 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 24 nm
- excl. economic zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: territorial dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands; maritime boundary with Bahrain; 1965 boundary with Saudi Arabia, renegotiated and revised in 1992, but not official depiction.

Climate: desert; hot, dry; humid and sultry in summer.

Terrain: mostly flat and barren desert covered with loose sand and gravel; lowest point Persian Gulf 0 m; highest point: Qurayn Aba al Bawl 103 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, fish

Land use:
- arable land: 0%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 5%
- forest and woodland: 0%
- other: 95%
- Irrigated land: NA sq km

Environment: current issues: limited natural fresh water resources are increasing dependence on large-scale desalination facilities; natural hazards: haze, dust storms, sandstorms common; international agreements: signed, but not ratified - Biodiversity, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea.

Note: strategic location in central Persian Gulf near major petroleum deposits.
Country Profiles: Qatar

**Population:** 547,761 (July 1996 est.)

**Age structure:**
- 0-14 years: 30% (male 82,147; female 83,552)
- 15-64 years: 68% (male 263,107; female 109,177)
- 65 years and over: 2% (male 6,609; female 3,169) (July 1996 est.)

**Population growth rate:** 2.39% (1996 est.)

**Birth rate:** 21.03 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Death rate:** 3.6 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Net migration rate:** 6.43 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Sex ratio:** all ages: 1.8 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

**Infant mortality rate:** 19.6 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

**Life expectancy at birth:** total population: 73.35 years (male: 70.75; female: 75.94 - 1996 est.)

**Total fertility rate:** 4.28 children born/woman (1996 est.)

**Nationality:** noun: Qatari(s) - adjective: Qatari

**Ethnic divisions:** Arab 40%, Pakistani 18%, Indian 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%

**Religions:** Muslim 95%

**Languages:** Arabic (official), English commonly used as a second language

**Literacy:** age 15 and over can read and write (1995 total: 79.4% (male: 79.2%, female: 79.9%)

**Government**

**Name of country:**
- conventional long form: State of Qatar
- conventional short form: Qatar
- local long form: Dawlat Qatar
- local short form: Qatar

**Data code:** QA

**Type of government:** traditional monarchy

**Capital:** Doha

**Administrative divisions:** 9 municipalities (baladiyat, singular - baladiyah); Ad Dawhah, Al Ghuwayriyah, Al Jumayliyah, Al Khawr, Al Wakrah, Ar Rayyan, Jarayan al Batnah, Ash Shamal, Umm Salal.

**Independence:** 3 September 1971 (from UK)

**National holiday:** Independence Day, 3 September (1971)

**Constitution:** provisional constitution enacted 2 April 1970

**Legal system:** discretionary system of law controlled by the amir, although civil codes are being implemented; Islamic law is significant in personal matters

**Suffrage:** none

**Executive branch:**
- Chief of state and head of government: Amir and Prime Minister HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 27 June 1995 when, as crown prince, he ousted his father, Amir KHALIFA bin Hamad Al Thani, in a bloodless coup) is an absolute monarch; Deputy Prime Minister ABDALLAH bin Khalifa Al Thani
Judicial branch: Court of Appeal

Political parties and leaders: none

International organization participation: ABEDA, AFESD, AL, AMF, CCC, ESCWA, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDB, IFAD, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO. Inmarsat, Interpol, IOC, ISO (correspondent), ITU, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTrO.

Flag: maroon with a broad white serrated band (nine white points) on the hoist side.

Economy

Economic overview: Oil is the backbone of the economy and accounts for more than 30% of GDP, roughly 75% of export earnings, and 70% of government revenues. Proved oil reserves of 3.3 billion barrels should ensure continued output at current levels for about 25 years. Oil has given Qatar a per capita GDP comparable to the leading West European industrial countries. Production and export of natural gas are becoming increasingly important. Long-term goals feature the development of off-shore petroleum and the diversification of the economy.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $10.7 billion (1994 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: -1% (1994 est.)
- GDP per capita: $20,820 (1994 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 1%
  - industry: 50%
  - services: 49% (1993 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 3% (1993 est.)

Labor force: 233,000 (1993 est.)

Unemployment rate: NA%

Budget:
- revenues: $2.5 billion
- expenditures: $3.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (FY95/96)

Industries: crude oil production and refining, fertilizers, petrochemicals, steel reinforcing bars, cement
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

Electricity:
- capacity: 1,520,000 kW
- production: 4.5 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 8,415 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: fruits, vegetables; poultry, dairy products, beef; fish (all on small scale)

Exports: $2.9 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: petroleum products 75%, steel, fertilizers
- partners: Japan 61%, Australia 5%, UAE 4%, Singapore 4% (1994)

Imports: $2 billion (c.i.f., 1994 est.)
- commodities: machinery and equipment, consumer goods, food, chemicals
- partners: Germany 14%, Japan 12%, UK 11%, US 9%, Italy 5% (1994)

External debt: $1.5 billion (1993 est.)

Economic aid: $NA

Currency: 1 Qatari riyal (QR) = 100 dirhams

Exchange rates: Qatari riyals (QR) per US$1 - 3.6400 riyals (fixed rate)

Fiscal year: 1 April - 31 March
SAUDI ARABIA

**Geography**

**Location:** Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, north of Yemen

**Geographic coordinates:** 25 00 N, 45 00 E

**Area:**
- total area: 1,960,582 sq km
- land area: 1,960,582 sq km

**Land boundaries:**
- total: 4,415 km
- border countries: Iraq 814 km, Jordan 728 km, Kuwait 222 km, Oman 676 km, Qatar 60 km, UAE 457 km, Yemen 1,458 km.

**Coastline:** 2,640 km

**Maritime claims:**
- contiguous zone: 18 nm
- continental shelf: not specified
- territorial sea: 12 nm

**International disputes:** large section of boundary with Yemen not defined; location and status of boundary with UAE is not final, de facto boundary reflects 1974 agreement; Kuwaiti ownership of Qaruh and Umm al Maradim islands is disputed by Saudi Arabia; 1965 boundary with Qatar, renegotiated and revised in 1992, but not official depiction.

**Climate:** harsh, dry desert with great extremes of temperature

**Terrain:** mostly uninhabited, sandy desert; lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m; highest point: Jabal Sawda' 3,133 m.

**Natural resources:** petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, gold, copper

**Land use:**
- arable land: 1%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 39%
- forest and woodland: 1%
- other: 59%
- Irrigated land: 4,350 sq km (1989 est.)

**Environment current issues:** desertification; depletion of underground water resources; the lack of perennial rivers or permanent water bodies has prompted the development of extensive seawater desalination facilities; coastal pollution from oil spills; natural hazards: frequent sand and dust storms; international agreements: party to - Climate Change, Hazardous Wastes, Ozone Layer Protection; signed, but not ratified - Law of the Sea

**Note:** extensive coastlines on Persian Gulf and Red Sea provide great leverage on shipping (especially crude oil) through Persian Gulf and Suez Canal.

**People**

**Population:** 19,409,058 (July 1996 est.)
Net migration rate: 1.55 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.27 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 46.4 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 69 years (male: 67.25; female: 70.84 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 6.45 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Saudi(s) - adjective: Saudi or Saudi Arabian

Ethnic divisions: Arab 90%, Afro-Asian 10%

Religions: Muslim 100%

Languages: Arabic

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 62.8% (male: 71.5%; female: 50.2%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- conventional short form: Saudi Arabia
- local long form: Al Mamlakah al Arabiyah as Suudiyah
- local short form: Al Arabiyah as Suudiyah

Data code: SA

Type of government: monarchy

Capital: Riyadh

Administrative divisions: 13 provinces (mintaqah, singular - mintaqat); Al Bahah, Al Hudud Ash Shamaliyah, Al Jawf, Al Madinah, Al Qasim, Ar Riyadh, Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern Province), 'Asir, Hall, Jizan, Makkah, Najran, Tabuk.

Independence: 23 September 1932 (unification)

National holiday: Unification of the Kingdom, 23 September (1932)

Constitution: none; governed according to Shari'a (Islamic law)

Legal system: based on Islamic law, several secular codes have been introduced; commercial disputes handled by special committees; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Suffrage: none

Executive branch:
- Chief of state and head of government: King and Prime Minister FAHD bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 13 June 1982) is an absolute monarch; Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (half-brother to the king, heir to the throne since 13 June 1982, regent from 1 January to 22 February 1996)
- Cabinet: Council of Ministers is dominated by royal family members appointed by the king

Legislative branch: a consultative council composed of 60 members and a chairman who are appointed by the king for a term of four years.

Judicial branch: Supreme Council of Justice

Political parties and leaders: none allowed

Flag: green with large white Arabic script (that may be translated as There is no God but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God) above a white horizontal saber (the tip points to the hoist side); green is the traditional color of Islam.

**Economy**

Economic overview: This is a well-to-do oil-based economy with strong government controls over major economic activities. About 40% of GDP comes from the private sector. Economic (as well as political) ties with the US are especially strong. The petroleum sector accounts for roughly 75% of budget revenues, 35% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings. Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of petroleum in the world (26% of the proved total), ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. For the 1990s the government intends to bring its budget, which has been in deficit since 1983, back into balance, and to encourage private economic activity. Roughly four million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy, for example, in the oil and banking sectors. For over a decade, Saudi Arabia's domestic and international outlays have outstripped its income, and the government has cut its foreign assistance and is beginning to rein in domestic programs. For 1996, the country looks to its policies of maintaining moderate fiscal reforms, restraining public spending, and encouraging non-oil exports.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $189.3 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 0% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $10,100 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 9%
  - industry: 50%
  - services: 41% (1994 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 5% (1995 est.)

Labor force: 6 million-7 million
- by occupation: government 40%, industry, construction, and oil 25%, services 30%, agriculture 5%

Unemployment rate: 6.5% (1992 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $35.1 billion
- expenditures: $40 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1996 est.)

Industries: crude oil production, petroleum refining, basic petrochemicals, cement, two small steel-rolling mills, construction, fertilizer, plastics.
- Industrial production growth rate: 17% (1994 est.)

Electricity:
- capacity: 17,550,000 kW
- production: 46 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 2,430 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: wheat, barley, tomatoes, melons, dates, citrus; mutton, chickens, eggs, milk

Illicit drugs: death penalty for traffickers; increasing consumption of heroin and cocaine

Exports: $41.7 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: petroleum and petroleum products 90%
- partners: US 17%, Japan 17%, South Korea 8%, Singapore 7%, France 5% (1994)

Imports: $21.3 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: machinery and equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs, motor vehicles, textiles
- partners: US 21%, Japan 12%, UK 8%, Germany 8%, Italy 5% (1994)

External debt: $18.9 billion (December 1989 est., includes short-term trade credits)

Economic aid: donor: pledged $100 million in 1993 to fund reconstruction of Lebanon

Currency: 1 Saudi riyal (SR) = 100 halalah

Exchange rate: Saudi riyals (SR) per US$1 - 3.7450 (fixed rate since late 1986)
Geographic coordinates: 15°00 N, 30°00 E

Area:
- total area: 2,505,810 sq km
- land area: 2.376 million sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 7,687 km
- border countries: Central African Republic 1,165 km, Chad 1,360 km, Egypt 1,273 km, Eritrea 605 km, Ethiopia 1,606 km, Kenya 232 km, Libya 383 km, Uganda 435 km, Zaire 628 km

Coastline: 853 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 18 nautical miles
- continental shelf: 200-m depth or to the depth of exploitation
- territorial sea: 12 nautical miles

International disputes: administrative boundary with Kenya does not coincide with international boundary; administrative boundary with Egypt does not coincide with international boundary creating the "Hala'ib Triangle," a barren area of 20,580 sq km, tensions over this disputed area began to escalate in 1992 and remain high.

Climate: tropical in south; arid desert in north; rainy season (April to October).

Terrain: generally flat, featureless plain; mountains in east and west; lowest point: Red Sea 0 meters; highest point: Kinyeti 3,187 meters.

Natural resources: petroleum; iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold.

Land use:
- arable land: 5%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 24%
- forest and woodland: 20%
- other: 51%
- irrigated land: 18,900 sq km (1989 est.)


Note: largest country in Africa; dominated by the Nile and its tributaries.

People

Population: 31,547,543 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 46% (male 7,389,616; female 7,080,044)
- 15-64 years: 52% (male 8,219,080; female 8,172,544)
- 65 years and over: 2% (male 387,961; female 298,298) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 3.48% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 41.08 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 11.46 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: 5.17 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.03 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 76 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 55.12 years (male: 54.2; female: 56.09 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 5.89 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Sudanese (singular and plural) - adjective: Sudanese

Ethnic divisions: black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%

Religions: Sunni Muslim 70% (north), indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 5% (mostly south/Khartoum).

Languages: Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English (note: program of Arabization in process).

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 46.1% (male: 57.7%; female: 34.6%)

**Government**

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Republic of the Sudan
- conventional short form: Sudan
- local long form: Jumhuriyat as-Sudan
- local short form: As-Sudan
- former: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

Data code: SU

**Type of government**: transitional - previously ruling military junta; presidential and National Assembly elections held in March 1996; new constitution to be drafted by the National Assembly.

**Capital**: Khartoum

**Administrative divisions**: 9 states (wilayat, singular - wilayah*); A’ali an Nil (Upper Nile), Al Wusta*, Al Istiwa’iyyah* (Equatoria), Al Khartum, Ash Shamaliyyah*, Ash Sharqiyah*, Bahr al Ghazal, Darfur, Kurdudan [note: on 14 February 1994, the 9 states comprising Sudan were divided into 26 new states; the following spellings have been reported but not approved (Bahr Aljebal, Blue Nile, Bohayrat, East Equatoria, Gedari, Gezira, Jungle, Kassala, Khartoum, North, North Bahr Alghazal, North Darfur, North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile, Sinner, South Darfur, South Kordofan, Unity, Upper Nile, Warab, West Bahr Alghazal, West Darfur, West Kordofan, West Equatoria, White Nile)].

Independence: 1 January 1956 (from Egypt and UK)

National holiday: Independence Day, 1 January (1956)

Constitution: 12 April 1973, suspended following coup of 6 April 1985; interim constitution of 10 October 1985 suspended following coup of 30 June 1989; new constitution to be drafted following national elections held in March 1996.

Legal system: based on English common law and Islamic law; as of 20 January 1991, the now defunct Revolutionary Command Council imposed Islamic law in the northern states; the council still studies criminal provisions under Islamic law: Islamic law applies to all residents of the northern states regardless of their religion; few separate religious courts; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations.

Suffrage: NA years of age; universal, but noncompulsory

Executive branch:
- Chief of state and head of government: President Lt. General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-BASHIR (since 16 October 1993), was elected to a five-year term by popular vote; election last held 6-17 March 1996 (next to be held NA 2001); results - President al-BASHIR won 75.7% of the vote and defeated about forty other candidates; First Vice President Major General al-Zubayr Muhammad SALIH (since 19 October 1993); Second Vice President (Police) Maj. General George KONGOR AROP (since NA February 1994) [note: al-BASHIR, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), assumed power on 30 June 1989 and served concurrently as chief of state, chairman of the RCC, prime minister, and minister of defense until 16 October 1993 when he was appointed president by the RCC; upon its dissolution on 16 October 1993, the RCC's executive and legislative powers were devolved to the president and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), Sudan's appointed legislative body, which has since been replaced by the National Assembly which was elected in March 1996].
- Cabinet: Cabinet was appointed by the president; note - on 30 October 1993, President al-BASHIR announced a new, predominantly civilian cabinet, consisting of 20 federal ministers, most of whom retained their previous cabinet positions; on 9 February 1995, he abolished three ministries and redivided their portfolios to create several new ministries; these changes increased National Islamic Front presence at the ministerial level and consolidated its control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; President al-BASHIR's government is dominated by members of Sudan's National Islamic Front, a fundamentalist political organization formed from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1986; front
Political parties and leaders: none; banned following 30 June 1989 coup.

Other political or pressure groups: National Islamic Front, Hasan al-TURABI


Flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white and black with a green isosceles triangle based on the hoist side.

Economy

Economic overview: Sudan is buffeted by civil war, chronic political instability, adverse weather, high inflation, a drop in remittances from abroad, and counterproductive economic policies. The private sector's main areas of activity are agriculture and trading, with most private industrial investment predating 1980. Agriculture employs 80% of the workforce. Industry mainly processes agricultural items. Sluggish economic performance over the past decade, attributable largely to declining annual rainfall, has reduced levels of per capita income and consumption. A large foreign debt and huge arrearages continue to cause difficulties. In 1990 the International Monetary Fund took the unusual step of declaring Sudan noncooperative because of its nonpayment of arrearages to the Fund. After Sudan backtracked on promised reforms in 1992-93, the IMF threatened to expel Sudan from the Fund. To avoid expulsion, Khartoum agreed to make payments on its arrears to the Fund, liberalize exchange rates, and reduce subsidies, measures that has partially implemented. The government's continued prosecution of the civil war and its growing international isolation continued to inhibit growth in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy during 1995. Agricultural production in 1995, was not up to the bumper crop level of 1994.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $25 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 0% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $800 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 33%
  - industry: 17%
  - services: 50% (1992 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 66% (1995 est.)

Labor force: 8.9 million (1993 est.)
- by occupation: agriculture 80%, industry and commerce 10%, government 6% [note: labor shortages for almost all categories of skilled employment (1983 est.)]

Unemployment rate: 30% (FY92/93 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $382 million
- expenditures: $1,06 billion, including capital expenditures of $91 million (1995 est.)

Industries: cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining
- Industrial production growth rate: 6.8% (FY92/93 est.)

Electricity:
- capacity: 500,000 kW
- production: 1.3 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 42 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: cotton, oilseed, sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic; sheep

Exports: $535 million (f.o.b., 1995 est.)
- commodities: cotton 24%, livestock/meat 13%, gum arabic 11%
- partners: EU 39%, Saudi Arabia 19%, Japan 9%, US 3% (1993)

Imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., 1995 est.)
- commodities: foodstuffs, petroleum products, manufactured goods, machinery and equipment, medicines and chemicals, textiles
- partners: EU 31%, Libya 19%, Egypt 5%, Saudi Arabia 5%, US 5% (1993)

External debt: $18 billion (yearend 1995 est.)


Currency: 1 Sudanese pound (£Sd) = 100 piastres

Exchange rates: Sudanese pounds (£Sd) per US$1 - official rate: 750.0 (November 1995)

Fiscal year: calendar year
SYRIA

Geography

Location: Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Lebanon and Turkey
Geographic coordinates: 35 00 N, 38 00 E

Area:
- total area: 185,180 sq km
- land area: 184,050 sq km
- note: includes 1,295 sq km of Israeli-occupied territory

Land boundaries:
- total: 2,253 km
- border countries: Iraq 605 km, Israel 76 km, Jordan 375 km, Lebanon 375 km, Turkey 822 km

Coastline: 193 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 41 nm
- territorial sea: 35 nm

International disputes: Israeli occupied Golan Heights; Hatay question with Turkey; dispute over Turkey's water development plans for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; Syrian troops in northern, central, and eastern Lebanon since October 1976.

Climate: mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast; cold weather with snow or sleet periodically hitting Damascus.

Terrain: primarily semiarid and desert plateau; narrow coastal plain; mountains in west; lowest point: unnamed location near Lake Tiberias -200 m; highest point: Mount Hermon 2,814 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, phosphates, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, iron ore, rock salt, marble, gypsum.

Land use:
- arable land: 28%
- permanent crops: 3%
- meadows and pastures: 46%
- forest and woodland: 3%
- other: 20%
- Irrigated land: 10,000 sq km (1992)

Environment: current issues: deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; water pollution from dumping of raw sewage and wastes from petroleum refining; inadequate supplies of potable water; natural hazards: dust storms, sandstorms; international agreements: party to - Hazardous Wastes, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution; signed, but not ratified - Biodiversity, Desertification, Environmental Modification.

Note: there are 42 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (August 1995 est.)

People

Population: 15,608,648 (July 1996 est) - [note: in addition, there are 31,300 people living in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights - 16,500 Arabs (15,000 Druze and 1,500 Alawites) and 14,800 Israeli settlers (August 1995 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 47% (male 3,738,671; female 3,557,474)
Sex ratio: all ages: 1.05 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 67.13 years (male: 65.94; female: 68.38 - 1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 5.91 children born/woman (1996 est.)
Nationality: noun: Syrian(s) - adjective: Syrian
Ethnic divisions: Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%
Religions: Sunni Muslim 74%, Alawite, Druze, and other Muslim sects 16%, Christian (various sects) 10%, Jewish (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo)
Languages: Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian, French widely understood
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.); total: 70.8% (male: 85.7%; female: 55.8%)

Government

Name of country:
• conventional long form: Syrian Arab Republic
• conventional short form: Syria
• local long form: Al Jumhuriyah Al Arabiyah Asuriyah
• local short form: Suriyah
• former: United Arab Republic (with Egypt)

Data code: SY

Type of government: republic under military regime since March 1963

Capital: Damascus

Administrative divisions: 14 provinces (muhaqafat, singular - muhaqafah); Al Hasakah, Al Ladhigiyah, Al Qunaytrah, Ar Raqqah, As Suwayda, Dar'a, Dayr az Zawr, Dimashq, Halab, Hamah, Hims, Idlib, Rif Dimashq, Tartus.

Independence: 17 April 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under French administration)

National holiday: National Day, 17 April (1946)

Constitution: 13 March 1973

Legal system: based on Islamic law and civil law system; special religious courts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
• Chief of state: President Hafiz al-ASAD (since 22 February 1971; see note) was reelected for a seven-year term by universal suffrage; election last held 2 December 1991 (next to be held NA December 1998); results - President Hafiz al-ASAD was reelected for a fourth seven-year term with 99.98% of the vote; note - President ASAD seized power in the November 1970 coup, assumed presidential powers 22 February 1971, and was confirmed as president in the 12 March 1971 national elections; Vice Presidents 'Abd al-Halim ibn Said KHADDAM (since NA), Rifaat al-ASAD (since NA), and Muhammad Zuhayr MASHARIQA (since 11 March 1984) were appointed by the president.
• Head of government: Prime Minister Mahmud ZUBI (since 1 November 1987), Deputy Prime Ministers Lt. Gen. Mustafa TALAS (since 11 March 1984), Salim YASIN (since NA December 1981), and Rashid AKHTARINI (since 4 July 1992) were appointed by the president.
• Cabinet: Council of Ministers was appointed by the president.

Legislative branch: unicameral

People's Council (Majlis al-Chaab): last elections 24-25 August 1994 (next to be held NA 1998); results - percent of vote by party NA; seats - (250 total) National Progressive Front 167, independents 83.

Judicial branch: Supreme Constitutional Court, justices are appointed for four-year terms by the president; High Judicial Council; Court of Cassation; State Security Courts.

Political parties and leaders: National Progressive Front includes: the ruling Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party, Hafiz al-ASAD, president of the republic, secretary general of the party, and chairman of the National Progressive Front; Syrian Arab Socialist Party (ASP), 'Abd al-Ghani KANNUT; Arab Socialists Union (ASU), Jamal ATASSI; Syrian Communist Party (SCP), Wisal FARHAN; Arab Socialist Union Movement, Sami SOUHAN; and Democratic Socialist Union Party, Ghassan UTHMAN.
Other political or pressure groups: non-Ba’th parties have little effective political influence; Communist party ineffective; conservative religious leaders; Muslim Brotherhood.


Flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with two small green five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; similar to the flag of Yemen, which has a plain white band and that of Iraq, which has three green stars (plus an Arabic inscription) in a horizontal line centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt, which has a symbolic eagle centered in the white band.

Economy:

Economic overview: During 1990-92 Syria’s state-dominated economy benefited from the Gulf war, increased oil production, good weather, and economic reform. Economic growth averaged roughly 10%. The war led to a Syrian aid windfall of nearly $5 billion from Arab, European, and Japanese donors. Most positive economic trends ended in 1993 due to the dissipation of the Gulf war boom, a domestic financial crisis, and economic policy missteps. Economic growth has dropped below 5%, income inequality is increasing, the government budget deficit is growing, and accounts are weakening. For the long run, Syria’s economy is saddled with a large number of poorly performing public sector firms and low industrial productivity. Oil production is likely to ebb by the end of the decade. Unemployment will likely rise as the more than 60% of the population under age 20 moves into the labor force. The economic benefits of any peace treaty with Israel will depend in large part on the pace of economic reform.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $91.2 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 4.4% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $5,900 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 30%
  - industry: 25%
  - services: 45% (1994 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 15.1% (1994 est.)

Labor force: 4.7 million (1995 est.)
- by occupation: services 42%, industry 36%, agriculture 22% (1990 est.)

Unemployment rate: 8% (1994 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $2.5 billion
- expenditures: $3.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1994 est.)

Industries: textiles, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, petroleum
- Industrial production growth rate: 5% (1994 est.)

Electricity:
- capacity: 4,160,000 kW
- production: 13.2 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 865 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas; beef, lamb, eggs, poultry, milk

Illicit drugs: a transit point for Lebanese and Turkish refined cocaine going to Europe and heroin and hashish bound for regional and Western markets.

Exports: $3.5 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: petroleum 66%, cotton, fruits and vegetables 14%, textiles 9%, animal products 4%, industrial products 3%.
- partners: EU 61%, Arab countries 24%, former CEMA countries, China, Yugoslavia 5%, US and Canada 3% (1993 est.)

Imports: $5.4 billion (c.i.f., 1994)
- commodities: machinery 25%, metal products 16%, transport equipment 15%, foodstuffs 12%, textiles 10%;
- partners: EU 37%, former CEMA countries, China, Yugoslavia 17%, US and Canada 7%, Arab countries 6% (1993 est.)

External debt: $21.2 billion (1995 est.)

Economic aid recipient: ODA $259 million (1993)
Geographic coordinates: 34 00 N, 9 00 E

Area:
- total area: 163,610 sq km
- land area: 155,360 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 1,424 km
- border countries: Algeria 965 km, Libya 459 km

Coastline: 1,148 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 24 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: maritime boundary dispute with Libya; land boundary dispute with Algeria settled in 1993; Malta and Tunisia are discussing the commercial exploitation of the continental shelf between their countries, particularly for oil exploration.

Climate: temperate in north with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers; desert in south.

Terrain: mountains in north; hot, dry central plain; semi-arid south merges into the Sahara; lowest point: Shatt al Gharsah -17 m; highest point: Jabal ash Shanabi 1,544 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, phosphates, iron ore, lead, zinc, salt.

Land use:
- arable land: 20%
- permanent crops: 10%
- meadows and pastures: 19%
- forest and woodland: 4%
- other: 47%
- Irrigated land: 2,750 sq km (1989)

Environment: current issues: toxic and hazardous waste disposal is ineffective and presents human health risks; water pollution from raw sewage; limited natural fresh water resources; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; natural hazards: NA; international agreements: party to - Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands; signed, but not ratified - Hazardous Wastes, Marine Life Conservation.

Note: strategic location in central Mediterranean.
Population: 9,019,687 (July 1996 est).

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 34% (male 1,583,636; female 1,489,784)
- 15-64 years: 61% (male 2,738,013; female 2,719,998)
- 65 years and over: 5% (male 254,403; female 233,853) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 1.81% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 24.03 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 5.18 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: -0.74 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.03 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 35.1 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 72.6 years (male: 71.27; female: 74.03 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 2.92 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality noun: Tunisian(s) - adjective: Tunisian

Ethnic divisions: Arab-Berber 98%, European 1%, Jewish less than 1%

Religions: Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish 1%

Languages: Arabic (official and one of the languages of commerce), French (commerce)

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 total: 66.7% (male: 78.6%; female: 54.6%)

Name of country:
- conventional long form: Republic of Tunisia
- conventional short form: Tunisia
- local long form: Al Jumhuriyah at Tunisiyah
- local short form: Tunis

Data code: TS

Type of government: republic

Capital: Tunis

Administrative divisions: 23 governorates; Beja, Ben Arous, Bizerte, Gabes, Gafsa, Jendouba, Kairouan, Kasserine, Kebili, L'Ariana, Le Kef, Mahdia, Medenine, Monastir, Nabeul, Sfax, Sidi Bou Zid, Siliana, Sousse, Tataouine, Tozeur, Tunis, Zaghouan.

Independence: 20 March 1956 (from France)


Constitution: 1 June 1959; amended 12 July 1988

Legal system: based on French civil law system and Islamic law; some judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court in joint session

 Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: President Zine El Abidine BEN ALI (since 7 November 1987) was reelected for a five-year term by universal suffrage; election last held 20 March 1994 (next to be held NA 1999); results - President Zine El Abidine BEN ALI was reelected without opposition.

- Head of government: Prime Minister Hamed KAROUI (since 26 September 1989) was appointed by the president.

- Cabinet: Council of Ministers was appointed by the president.

Legislative branch: unicameral
- Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwaab): elections last held 20 March 1994 (next to be held NA 1999); results - RCD 97.7%, MDS 1.0%, others 1.3%; seats - (163 total) RCD 144, MDS 10, others 9
**Other political or pressure groups:** the Islamic fundamentalist party, An Nahda (Rebirth), is outlawed.

**International organization participation:** ABEDA, ACCT, AIDB, AFESD, AL, AMF, AMU, BSEC (observer), CCC, ECA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, ISO, ITU, MINURSO, NAM, OAS (observer), OAU, OIC, OSCE (partner), UN, UNAMIR, UNCR, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, WTrO.

**Flag:** red with a white disk in the center bearing a red crescent nearly encircling a red five-pointed star; the crescent and star are traditional symbols of Islam

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### Economy

**Economic overview:** Tunisia has a diverse economy, with important agricultural, mining, energy, tourism, and manufacturing sectors. Detailed governmental control of economic affairs has gradually lessened over the past decade, including increasing privatization of trade and commerce, simplification of the tax structure, and a cautious approach to debt. Real growth has averaged 4.2% in 1991-95, and inflation has been moderate. Growth in tourism and IMF support have been key elements in this solid record. Drought, especially in the south, held back GDP growth in 1995. Further privatization and further improvements in government administrative efficiency are among the challenges for the future.

**GDP:** purchasing power parity - $37.1 billion (1994 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 4.4% (1994 est.)
- GDP per capita: $4,250 (1994 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 15%
  - industry: 30%
  - services: 55% (1995 est.)

**Inflation rate** (consumer prices): 5.5% (1995 est.)

**Labor force:** 2.917 million (1993 est.)
- by occupation: services 55%, industry 23%, agriculture 22% (1995 est.)
- note: shortage of skilled labor

**Unemployment rate:** 16.2% (1993 est.)

**Budget:**
- revenues: $4.3 billion
- expenditures: $5.5 billion, including capital expenditures to $NA (1993 est.)

**Industries:** petroleum, mining (particularly phosphate and iron ore), tourism, textiles, footwear, food, beverages
- Industrial production growth rate: 5% (1989)

**Electricity:**
- capacity: 1,410,000 kW
- production: 5.4 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 595 kWh (1993 est.)

**Agriculture:** olives, dates, oranges, almonds, grain, sugar beets, grapes, poultry, beef, dairy products

**Exports:** $4.7 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: hydrocarbons, agricultural products, phosphates and chemicals
- partners: EU countries 75%, Middle East 10%, Algeria 2%, India 2%, US 1%

**Imports:** $6.6 billion (c.i.f., 1994)
- commodities: industrial goods and equipment 57%, hydrocarbons 13%, food 12%, consumer goods
- partners: EU countries 70%, US 5%, Middle East 2%, Japan 2%, Switzerland 1%, Algeria 1%

**External debt:** $7.7 billion (1993 est.)

**Economic aid:** recipient: ODA, $221 million (1993)

**Currency:** 1 Tunisian dinar (TD) = 1,000 millimes

**Exchange rates:** Tunisian dinars (TD) per US$1 - 0.9635 (January 1996)

**Fiscal year:** calendar year
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Location: Middle East, bordering the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, between Oman and Saudi Arabia.

Geographic coordinates: 24 00 N, 54 00 E.

Area:
- total area: 75,581 sq km
- land area: 75,581 sq km

Land boundaries:
- total: 867 km
- border countries: Oman 410 km, Saudi Arabia 457 km

Coastline: 1,318 km.

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 24 nm
- continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin
- exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes:
- Location and status of boundary with Saudi Arabia is not final, de facto boundary reflects 1974 agreement; no defined boundary with most of Oman, but Administrative Line in far north; claims two islands in the Persian Gulf occupied by Iran: Lesser Tunb (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian by Iran) and Greater Tunb (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian by Iran); claims island in the Persian Gulf jointly administered with Iran (called Abu Musa in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran); in 1992, the dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands became more acute when Iran unilaterally tried to control the entry of third country nationals into the UAE portion of Abu Musa island, Tehran subsequently backed off in the face of significant diplomatic support for the UAE in the region.

Terrain: desert; cooler in eastern mountains.

Climate: flat, barren coastal plain merging into rolling sand dunes of vast desert wasteland; mountains in east; lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m; highest point: Jabal Yibir 1,527 m.

Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas.

Land use:
- arable land: 0%
Note: strategic location along southern approaches to Strait of Hormuz, a vital transit point for world crude oil.

People

Population: 3,057,337 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 35% (male 542,848; female 519,952)
- 15-64 years: 64% (male 1,277,829; female 683,282)
- 65 years and over: 1% (male 22,246; female 11,180) (July 1996 est.)

Population growth rate: 4.33% (1996 est.)

Birth rate: 26.43 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Death rate: 3.03 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Net migration rate: 19.91 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

Sex ratio: all ages: 1.52 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 20.4 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

Life expectancy at birth: total population: 72.74 years (male: 70.64; female: 74.94 - 1996 est.)

Total fertility rate: 4.46 children born/woman (1996 est.)

Nationality: noun: Emiri(s) - adjective: Emiri

Ethnic divisions: Emiri 19%, other Arab and Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8% (1982); [note: less than 20% are UAE citizens (1982)].

Religions: Muslim 96% (Shi’a 16%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4%

Languages: Arabic (official), Persian, English, Hindi, Urdu

Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write but definition of literacy not available (1995 est.); total population: 79.2% (male: 78.9%; female: 79.8%)

Government

Name of country:
- conventional long form: United Arab Emirates
- conventional short form: none
- local long form: Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah
- local short form: none
- former: Trucial States
- abbreviation: UAE

Data code: TC

Type of government: federation with specified powers delegated to the UAE central government and other powers reserved to member emirates.

Capital: Abu Dhabi

Administrative divisions: 7 emirates (imarat, singular - imarah); Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi), ‘Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Sharqiah (Sharjah), Dubayy (Dubai), Ra’s al Khaymah, Umm al Qaywayn.

Independence: 2 December 1971 (from UK)


Constitution: 2 December 1971 (provisional)

Legal system: federal court system introduced in 1971; all emirates except Dubayy (Dubai) and Ra’s al Khaymah have joined the federal system; all emirates have secular and Islamic law for civil, criminal, and high courts.

Suffrage: none

Executive branch:
- Chief of state: President ZAYID bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan (since 2 December 1971), ruler of Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) (since NA 1966) and Vice President MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum (since 8 October 1990), ruler of Dubayy (Dubai) were elected by the Supreme Council of Rulers.
- Head of government: Prime Minister MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum (since 8 October 1990), ruler of Dubayy (Dubai) and Deputy Prime Minister SULTAN bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan (since 20 November 1990) were appointed by the president.
**Supreme Council of Rulers:** composed of the seven emirate rulers, the council is the highest constitutional authority in the UAE; establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation, Abu Zaby (Abu Dhabi) and Dubayy (Dubai) rulers have effective veto power; council meets four times a year.

**Cabinet:** Council of Ministers was appointed by the president

**Legislative branch:** unicameral Federal National Council (Majlis Watani Itihad); no elections; reviews legislation, but cannot change or veto.

**Judicial branch:** Union Supreme Court, judges appointed by the president

**Political parties and leaders:** none

**Other political or pressure groups:** NA

**International organization participation:** ABEDA, AIDB, AFESD, AL, AMF, CAEU, CCC, ESCWA, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRC, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, ISO (correspondent), ITU, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WTO.

**Flag:** three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and black with a thicker vertical red band on the hoist side.

### Economy

**Economic overview:** The UAE has an open economy with one of the world's highest incomes per capita and with a sizable annual trade surplus. Its wealth is based on oil and gas output (about 33% of GDP), and the fortunes of the economy fluctuate with the prices of those commodities. Since 1973, the UAE has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. At present levels of production, crude oil reserves should last for over 100 years. Although much stronger economically than most Gulf states, the UAE faces similar problems with weak international oil prices and the pressures for cuts in OPEC oil production quotas. The UAE Government is encouraging increased privatization within the economy.

**GDP:** purchasing power parity - $70.1 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 3.3% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $24,000 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 2%
  - industry: 55%
  - services: 43% (1994 est.)

**Inflation rate** (consumer prices): 4.6% (1994 est.)

**Labor force:** 794,400 (1993 est.)
- by occupation: industry and commerce 56%, services 38%, agriculture 6% (1990 est.)
- note: 80% of labor force is foreign (est.)

**Unemployment rate:** NEG% (1988)

**Budget:**
- revenues: $4.6 billion
- expenditures: $4.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1995 est.)

**Industries:** petroleum, fishing, petrochemicals, construction materials, boat building, handicrafts, pearling
- **Industrial production growth rate:** -1.1% (1994 est.)

**Electricity:**
- capacity: 4,760,000 kW
- production: 16.5 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 5,796 kWh (1993)

**Agriculture:** dates, vegetables, watermelons; poultry, eggs, dairy products; fish

**Illicit drugs:** growing role as heroin transshipment and money-laundering center

**Exports:** $25.3 billion (f.o.b. 1994 est.)
- commodities: crude oil 66%, natural gas, reexports, dried fish, dates
- partners: Japan 45%, India 6%, Oman 6%, South Korea 5%, Iran 5% (1994)

**Imports:** $21.7 billion (f.o.b., 1994)
- commodities: manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, food
- partners: Japan 11%, UK 8%, Germany 8%, US 8%, Italy 7% (1994)

**External debt:** $11.6 billion (1994 est.)
Location: Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia

Geographic coordinates: 15°00' N, 48°00' E

Area:
- total area: 527,970 sq km
- land area: 527,970 sq km
- note: includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)

Land boundaries:
- total: 1,746 km
- border countries: Oman 288 km, Saudi Arabia 1,458 km

Coastline: 1,906 km

Maritime claims:
- contiguous zone: 18 nm in the North; 24 nm in the South
- continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin
- excl. economic zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm

International disputes: large section of boundary with Saudi Arabia not defined; a dispute with Eritrea over sovereignty of the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea has been submitted to arbitration under the auspices of the International Court of Justice.

Climate: mostly hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east

Terrain: narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula; lowest point: Arabian Sea 0 m; highest point: Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,760 m

Natural resources: petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble, small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper, fertile soil in west.

Land use:
- arable land: 6%
- permanent crops: 0%
- meadows and pastures: 30%
- forest and woodland: 7%
- other: 57%
- Irrigated land: 3,100 sq km (1989 est.)

Environment: current issues: very limited natural fresh water resources; inadequate supplies of potable water; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; natural hazards: sandstorms and dust storms in summer; international agreements: party to - Environmental Modification, Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban; signed, but not ratified - Biodiversity, Climate Change

Note: controls Bab el Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes.

People

Population: 13,483,178 (July 1996 est.)

Age structure:
- 0-14 years: 48% (male 3,302,489; female 3,122,246)
- 15-64 years: 50% (male 3,327,682; female 3,364,787)
- 65 years and over: 2% (male 158,018; female 207,956) (July 1996 est.)
Country Profiles: Yemen

**Population growth rate:** 3.56% (1996 est.)

**Birth rate:** 45.22 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Death rate:** 9.59 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Net migration rate:** 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)

**Sex ratio:** all ages: 1.01 male(s)/female (1996 est.)

**Infant mortality rate:** 71.5 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)

**Life expectancy at birth:** Total population: 59.58 years (male: 58.23; female: 60.99 - 1996 est.)

**Total fertility rate:** 7.29 children born/woman (1996 est.)

**Nationality:** noun: Yemeni(s) - adjective: Yemeni

**Ethnic divisions:** predominantly Arab; Afro-Arab concentrations in western coastal locations; South Asians in southern regions; small European communities in major metropolitan areas.

**Religions:** Muslim [Sha'fi (Sunnı) and Zaydi (Shi'a)], small numbers of Jewish, Christian and Hindu.

**Languages:** Arabic

**Literacy:** age 15 and over can read and write (1990 est.); total: 38% (male: 53%; female: 26%)

### Government

**Name of country:**
- conventional long form: Republic of Yemen
- conventional short form: Yemen
- local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Yamaniyah
- local short form: Al Yaman

**Data code:** YM

**Type of government:** republic

**Capital:** Sanaa

**Administrative divisions:** 17 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Ataq, Dhamar, Hadhramaut, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, San'a', Ta'izz [note: there may be a new governorate for the capital city of Sanaa].

**Independence:** 22 May 1990 Republic of Yemen was established on 22 May 1990 with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic (Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen) and the Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen); previously North Yemen had become independent on 29 November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and South Yemen had become independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK).

**National holiday:** Proclamation of the Republic, 22 May (1990)

**Constitution:** 16 May 1991; amended 29 September 1994

**Legal system:** based on Islamic law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

** Suffrage:** 18 years of age; universal

**Executive branch:**
- **Chief of state:** President Lt. Gen. Ali Abdallah SALIH (since 22 May 1990, the former president of North Yemen, assumed office upon the merger of North and South Yemen) was elected for a five-year term by the House of Representatives; election last held 1 October 1994 (next to be held NA 1999); Vice President Maj. Gen. Abd al-Rab Mansur al-HADI (since NA October 1994) was appointed by the president.
- **Head of government:** Prime Minister Abd al-Aziz ABD AL-GHANI (since NA October 1994) was appointed by the president; Deputy Prime Ministers Abd al-Wahhab al-ANISI (since NA October 1994), Dr. Abd al-Karim Ali al-IRYANI (since NA October 1994), Dr. Muhammad Said al-ATTAR (since NA October 1994), and Abd al-Qadir al-BAMAL (since NA October 1994).
- **Cabinet:** Council of Ministers was appointed by the president on advice of the prime minister Legislative branch: unicameral House of Representatives: elections last held 27 April 1993 (next to be held NA May 1997); results - percent of vote by party NA; seats - (301 total) GPC 124, Islaah 61, YSP 55, others 13, independents 47, election nullified 1.

**Judicial branch:** Supreme Court
Economic overview: Whereas the northern city Sanaa is the political capital of a united Yemen, the southern city Aden, with its refinery and port facilities, is the economic and commercial capital. Future economic development depends heavily on Western-assisted development of the country's moderate oil resources. Former South Yemen's willingness to merge stemmed partly from the steady decline in Soviet economic support. The low level of domestic industry and agriculture has made northern Yemen dependent on imports for practically all of its essential needs. Once self-sufficient in food production, northern Yemen has become a major importer. Land once used for export crops - cotton, fruit, and vegetables - has been turned over to growing a shrub called qat, whose leaves are chewed for their stimulant effect by Yemenis and which has no significant export market. Economic growth in former South Yemen has been constrained by a lack of incentives, partly stemming from centralized control over production decisions, investment allocation, and import choices. Yemen's large trade deficits have been compensated for by remittances from Yemenis working abroad and by foreign aid. Since the Gulf crisis, remittances have dropped substantially. High inflation and political divisions hinder the development of a forward-looking economic policy.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $37.1 billion (1995 est.)
- GDP real growth rate: 3.6% (1995 est.)
- GDP per capita: $2,520 (1995 est.)
- GDP composition by sector:
  - agriculture: 21%
  - industry: 24%
  - services: 55%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 71.3% (1994 est.)

Labor force: no reliable estimates; most people are employed in agriculture and herding or as expatriate laborers; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-half of the labor force.

Unemployment rate: 30% (1995 est.)

Budget:
- revenues: $1.4 billion
- expenditures: $1.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1996 est.)

Industries: crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles and leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; small aluminum products factory; cement
- Industrial production growth rate: NA%

Electricity:
- capacity: 810,000 kW
- production: 1.8 billion kWh
- consumption per capita: 149 kWh (1993)

Agriculture: grain, fruits, vegetables, qat (mildly narcotic shrub), coffee, cotton; dairy products, poultry, meat, fish

Exports: $1.1 billion (f.o.b., 1994 est.)
- commodities: crude oil, cotton, coffee, hides, vegetables, dried and salted fish
- partners: US 17%, Japan 16%, Singapore 15%, China 13% (1994)

Imports: $1.8 billion (c.i.f., 1994 est.)
- commodities: textiles and other manufactured consumer goods, petroleum products, sugar, grain, flour, other foodstuffs, cement, machinery, chemicals
- partners: US 11%, UK 7%, France 7%, Germany 5%, Japan 5% (1994)

External debt: $8 billion (1996)


Currency: Yemeni rial (new currency)

Exchange rates: Yemeni rials per US$1 - 12.010 (official fixed rate); 90 (market rate, December 1994)

Fiscal year: calendar year
Seminar 1996
The Foreign Policies of Arab States

Appendices

Lecture Program ................................. 131
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DAY ONE: Monday, December 9th

8:30-9:30 Registration and Group Photographs
9:30-11:00 Opening Remarks and Introduction
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi - Head of PASSIA
11:30-13:00 The State in the International System - Alternative Theoretical Frameworks
Dr. Rosemary Hollis - "Chatham House", London
15:00-16:15 The Arab States in the Regional and International System: I. Foundations
Dr. Bahgat Korany - University of Montreal, Canada
16:30-18:00 Decision-Making Theory: Three Approaches
Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY TWO: Tuesday, December 10th

9:00-10:30 The Arab States in the Regional and International System: II. Evolution
Dr. Bahgat Korany
11:00-13:00 The Arab States in the Regional and International System: III. Contemporary Concerns
Dr. Bahgat Korany
15:00-16:15 Second Track- The Multilateral Talks of the Middle East Peace Process
Dr. Joel Peters - Reading University
16:30-18:00 Country Profiles: a) Basic Data (size, population, resources, political system)
b) policy making institutions/processes
Presentation by the Participants

DAY THREE: Wednesday, December 11th

9:00-10:30 Defining the National Interest
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
11:00-13:00 The Arab League and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
15:00-18:00 Country Policy Positions: a) General Priorities and Positions
b) Positions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process
DAY FOUR: Thursday, December 12th

9:00-10:30  Egypt's Regional Role and Foreign Policy Imperatives
            H.E. Ahmad Kamal - Egyptian Diplomat

11:00-13:00 Syria: National Security and State-Building
            Dr. Volker Perthes - Institute for International Politics and Security, Ebenhausen

15:00-16:15 Syrian Interests and Role in Lebanon
            Dr. Volker Perthes

16:30-18:00 Arab States, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process: Some Comparisons and Contrasts. - Discussion with lecturers

DAY FIVE: Friday, December 13th

9:00-10:30  The Maghreb States: Foreign Policy Priorities
            Dr. Claire Spencer - The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London

11:00-13:00 The Maghreb States, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process
            Dr. Claire Spencer

15:00-16:15 The Arab States and Jerusalem
            H.E. Faisal Husseini - Orient House, Jerusalem

16:30-18:00 Writing Position Papers
            Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY SIX/SEVEN: Saturday/Sunday, December 14th-15th: WEEKEND

DAY EIGHT: Monday, December 16th

9:00-13:00  External Powers & the Arab States: Positions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict
            I: The US, Its Allies and Antagonists
            H.E. Edward Abington, US Consul General, Jerusalem
            II: Europe, the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Peace Process
            H.E. Richard Dalton, British Consul General, Jerusalem

15:00-18:00 Exercise: Lobbying the External Powers
            with Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY NINE: Tuesday, December 17th

9:00-10:30  Resources Scarcity as the New Regional Imperative
            Dr. Rosemary Hollis

11:00-13:00 War and Its Impact on Foreign Policy
            Dr. Yezid Sayigh

14:30-16:15 Film: "Palestine - The Story of a Land" (Followed by a discussion)
DAY TEN: Wednesday, December 18th

9:00-10:30  The Evolution of Palestine
            Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

11:00-13:00 The PLO's Foreign Policy
              Dr. Yezid Sayigh

15:00-18.00 Jordan's Foreign Policy
              Dr. Yezid Sayigh

DAY ELEVEN: Thursday, December 19th

9:00-10:30  Political Islam in the Arab World
            Sheikh Jamil Hamami - Director, Islamic & Cultural Society, Jerusalem

11:00-13:00 Foreign Policy Imperatives for Saudi Arabia
              Dr. Rosemary Hollis

15:00-16:15 Exercise: Responding to a Regional Crisis as Policy-Makers for the Arab States
              With Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY TWELVE: Friday, December 20th

9:00-10:30  Policy Imperatives for Palestine - View from the PNA
            Dr. Sami Musallam - Director of the President's Office, Jericho

11:00-13.00 Policy Imperatives for the Palestinians - Participants' Views

15.00-16.15 Lebanon's Place in the Region
              Dr. Basma Kodmani-Darwish, IFRI, Paris

16:30-18:00 Concluding Session/Round-up: Discussion & Feedback
DR. ROSEMARY HOLLIS
Head of the Middle East Programme at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) in London.

DR. MAHDI ABDUL HADI
Head and founder of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem.

DR. VOLKER PERTHES
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Research Institute for International Politics and Security, Ebenhausen, FRG

DR. YEZID SAYIGH
Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University, UK

PROF. BAHGAT KORANY
University of Montreal, Canada

DR. CLAIRE SPENCER
The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London.

DR. JOEL PETERS
Reading University, UK

DR. SAMI MUSALLAM
Director, President's Office, Jericho

SHEIKH JAMIL HAMAMI
Director, Society of the Islamic & Cultural Committee, Jerusalem

H.E. AHMAD KAMAL
Egyptian Diplomat

H.E. EDWARD ABINGTON
Consul General, US Consulate, Jerusalem

H.E. RICHARD DALTON
Consul General, British Consulate, Jerusalem
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*1972, Jerusalem; living and working in Jerusalem
U: B.A. International Relations, John Hopkins University, USA
P: Desk Officer ‘ASIA’, Orient House; previously, Research Assistant, Anthropology Dept., John Hopkins University
C: Morocco

ADAWIN, Basima Yosef
*1967, living and working in Jerusalem
U: B.A. Literature, and Diploma Education, Al-Quds University; currently, M.A. International Relations, Bir Zeit University.
P: Office Manager, Salaam Children; previously Correspondent, Press Agency and Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation.
C: Palestine

ARRAF, Huwaida George
*1976, USA; living and working in Jerusalem
U: Student (Political Science) Hebrew University, Jerusalem
C: Lebanon

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*1966, Hebron; living and working in Hebron
U: B.A. English, Hebron University
P: Field Officer, ICRC, Hebron; previously, Teacher Al-Azhar School; and Research Assistant, UNICEF.
C: Saudi Arabia

AL-HALAWANI, Saadeddin Hassan
*1975, Jerusalem; living in Jerusalem
U: B.A. Biology, Bir Zeit University
C: Egypt

HASSOUNEH, Firyal Sa'adeddin
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U: B.A. Business Management, Beirut University
P: Project Director, Ministry of Social Affairs.
C: Morocco
HUSARI, Ruba
*1964, Amman; living/working in Ramallah/Jerusalem
U: Diplome d'Études, Universitaires Génerales, Montpellier.
P: Correspondent, Al Hayat & BBC
C: Saudi Arabia

OMAR, Ali
*1965, Venezuela; living and working in Nablus
U: B.A. English Language
P: Assistant to Tahsin Fares, Governorate of Nablus
C: Lebanon

RAFA, Nidal Ali
*1973, Haifa; living and working in Jerusalem
U: B.A. Political Science, Haifa University
P: Research Assistant, Knesset Interior Committee, Jerusalem.
C: Jordan

AL-SA'DI, Mohammed Ibrahim
*1970, Jenin; living and working in Ramallah
U: B.A. English Literature, Yarmouk University, Jordan; Diploma in Broadcasting/Journalism, University of Wales, UK.
P: Editor/Reporter, PBC; previously reporter, Kull al-Arab
C: Jordan

SHAHIN, Najeh Mohd
*1962, Beit Ommar; living and working in Ramallah
U: B.A. English Literature; M.A. Philosophy, Jordan University
P: Faculty Instructor, RMTC, Ramallah; previously at M.C.C.; Teacher in Amman.
C: Palestine

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*1964, Dahran, Saudi Arabia; living in Nablus
U: B.A. International Affairs, The American College in Paris; M.A. International Relations, Boston University, USA
P: —; previously Legal & Diplomacy Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan.
C: Jordan

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*1968, Teqoa; living in Teqoa working in Bethlehem
U: B.A. English Language & Literature, Bir Zeit University.
P: Researcher, Civic Forum - NDI (Bethlehem)
C: Egypt
Appendices: Reading Material

Preparatory Reading


MOROCCO:


Joffe G., 'The European Union and the Maghreb'.


_____, 'An Island of Stability: An Interview with His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco', Middle East Insight, (January 1994), pp.10-16.

LEBANON:

Hanf, Theodor, 'The Lebanese Model: Co-existence Before the War', Lebanon: Co-existing in a Time of War, (Paris: Center of Arab-European studies, 1993), (Arabic)


Perthes, Volker, "Syrian Interests and Role in Lebanon", 1996. (Extended version)

EGYPT:


Appendices: Reading Material


Selim, M., *Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt’s Foreign Policy*, (Cairo: Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1995).

JORDAN:


Wilson, M. C., ‘Jordan: Bread, Freedom, or Both?’, *Current History*, vol. 93, no. 580, (February 1994), pp. 87-90.

Al-Zu’bi, B. & Kasasbeh, H., ‘Jordan’s Economy: Challenges and Opportunities’, *Jordan and Korea in their Respective Regional Contexts*, ed. Mohammad Mustafa (Amman: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 1994). (English)

SYRIA:


Perthes, Volker, ‘State Building, National Security and War Preparation in Syria’.


PALESTINE:


Shikaki, Khalil, ‘The Israeli Elections, the Future of Peace, and the Palestinian Options,’ Assiyasa al-Filistiniya, (Summer 1996), pp. 26-34. (Arabic)