The Palestine Question

in Maps

1878-2002
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PASSIA Publication 2002  
Tel: (02) 626 4426  Fax: (02) 628 2819  
E-mail: passia@palnet.com  
Website: www.passia.org  
PO Box 19545, Jerusalem
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<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>[Israeli] Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRS</td>
<td>Center for Policy Research and Studies (Nablus)</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dep.</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dept.</td>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Defense Minister / Ministry</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>excl.</td>
<td>excluding</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec.</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Foreign Minister / Ministry</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMEP</td>
<td>Foundation for Middle East Peace (Washington)</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Further Redeployment</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen.-Sec.</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>incl.</td>
<td>including</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Jewish Agency</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCA</td>
<td>Jewish Colonization Association</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNF</td>
<td>Jewish National Fund</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lit.</td>
<td>literally</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN</td>
<td>Movement of Arab Nationalism</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcm</td>
<td>million cubic meters</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>Minister / Ministry</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Member of Knesset</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Military Order</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli Shekel</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OETA</td>
<td>[British] Occupied Enemy Territories Administration</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALDIS-LDC</td>
<td>Palestinian Land Development Information System of the Land Defense General Committee</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Palestine Conciliation Commission</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Palestine National Council</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWA</td>
<td>Palestinian Water Authority</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Refugee Camp</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res.</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Registered Refugee(s) (with UNRWA)</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec.</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec.-Gen.</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPH</td>
<td>Temporary International Presence in Hebron</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Town Planning Scheme</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOP</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on Palestine</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBGS</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WJM</td>
<td>West Jerusalem Municipality</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI / WWII</td>
<td>World War I / II</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZO</td>
<td>World Zionist Organization</td>
<td>Polemics</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The accurate and responsible presentation of the Palestine Question, both in its current context and throughout the course of history, has long been a chief goal of PASSIA. With an extensive catalogue of in-depth works on crucial aspects and periods of Palestinian history to its name, PASSIA has also sought to create suitably concise publications presenting the core issues in a comprehensive, yet comprehensible format. *The Palestine Question in Maps, 1878-2002*, represents an important addition to this aspect of PASSIA's work.

Including over 50 color maps, this research study is hoped to provide a guide to the Palestine Question from the Ottoman period through to the present day. In addressing the unfolding geographic and demographic complexities of the period in review, the book sheds light on the real territorial dimensions of the conflict, its causes, and the numerous schemes posited over time for its resolution. Dissemination and explanation of clear and reliable maps has always been rare and a frequently baffling array of speculations has all too often led to confusion rather than comprehension, both abroad and in Palestinian society. By compiling and reviewing the most important historical and contemporary maps, this book offers researchers, readers and concerned individuals the opportunity to understand the geographic implications and motivations guiding the political and military aspects of the Palestine Question for over a hundred years.

A first series of maps follows the path of modern Palestinian history in chronological order, focusing on key demographic themes and political milestones, as well as identifying the various proposals posited for the resolution of the Palestine Question (Chapters 1-3). Jerusalem itself is of such intrinsic importance to Palestinian history and to the resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict, that a separate section is devoted, in detail, to its changing circumstances (Chapter 4). Core issues, such as water and refugees, are also addressed in isolation within a separate chapter (Chapter 5).

The text accompanying the maps is hoped to present a concise and clear overview of the historical, political and socio-economic circumstances providing the backdrop for the individual maps and illustrating their place within the broader frame of Palestinian history. Complete with reliable statistics, detailed references and notes, the text serves to illuminate the factors defining the territorial dimensions portrayed within the maps.

At its most fundamental level, the Palestine Question is a question of a land and its people, as well as their rights, identity and passage through time. For this reason, placing an accurate account of Palestinian history squarely within its territorial dimensions is not only advantageous for those seeking a deeper understanding of that history, but is an important step in repossessing a history that has so often been dislocated from its rightful context and placed within alien and imposed schemes so as to confuse, deny, and replace that history for the purposes of another.

As a part of PASSIA's ongoing documentation of Palestinian history, this work book in the wake of the publication of *100 Years of Palestinian History – A Twentieth Century Chronology* (2001), and, like that book, is intended to present the history of the Palestine Question in a responsible, accessible and compelling way so that it may be easily understood by readers today and properly preserved for future generations.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

Head of PASSIA

August 2002
Chapter One:

1878 – 1948

(Maps 1-15)
Some 386,320 Muslim Palestinian Arabs represented the overwhelming majority (88%) in a land, which had been under uninterrupted Muslim rule since 1187. This population included both Sunni (the vast majority) and Shi'ite communities, as well as members of the Druze sect. The overwhelming majority of the population was rural, with agriculture as the principal source of income and the center of traditional life.

There were 40,588 (9%) Christian Palestinian Arabs, belonging to the Greek Orthodox (63%) and Roman Catholic (24%), as well as the Armenian, Greek Catholic and Protestant denominations. Communities, many of which had roots going back to the dawn of Christianity - were generally, though not exclusively, urban, residing in Nazareth, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Haifa and Jaffa in significant numbers.

Some 13,942 Jews (3%) lived in predominantly urban communities, with centers in Safed and Jerusalem, as well as Hebron and Tiberias. Their economy was almost entirely dependent on remittances from Jewish communities abroad.

In addition to these three principle sectors, there were approximately 200 members of the ancient Samaritan community living on the edge of Nablus and a small number of Gypsies, who were a mixture of Christian and Muslim converts.

The existing Jewish population, prior to the advent of political Zionism, consisted primarily of Orthodox Jews without a nationalist agenda. Nonetheless, by 1878 pre-Zionist trends were already evincing a changing attitude towards the land of Palestine. Various European financiers, notably Moses Montefiore of London, were quietly negotiating with Ottoman officials in an effort to purchase land and establish settlements. Additionally, members of the established community sought a more ‘production’ oriented lifestyle, removed from their dependency on the community leaders’ distribution of foreign remittances. Thus, in 1878, led by Joel Salomon (who had, in 1869, established the first Jewish settlement outside Jerusalem’s Old City walls), 26 Jerusalem families purchased a tract of land some 9 km from Jaffa, on the banks of Al-Aujah River (near the Yarkon).

Naming the site “Petah Tikva” (Portal of Hope) the colonists set about cultivating the plot, which was part of the grazing land of the Arab village of Al-Abbasiyya, causing friction not due to their presence on the land, much as their lack of familiarity with established rural ways - particularly with regard to boundaries and the custom of loose-grazing. However, the initial colonists at “Petah Tikva” were to fail and return to Jerusalem in their second year, defeated by malaria, their lack of agricultural knowledge and, eventually, a flood. In their second, more successful settlement was established near the site in 1882 and is now a large town.

**The Population of Ottoman Palestine in 1878**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Muslim Arabs</td>
<td>386,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Christian Arabs</td>
<td>40,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>13,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>440,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 1

- Jewish colony
- Palestinian village
- Palestinian town
- Mixed town

Frontier of Mandate Palestine (excluding the Negev) in 1922

- Mediterranean Sea
- Dead Sea
some 60-63,000. The period in question straddles the first and second aliyahs in Palestine, which were combined with the beginnings of organized Zionist land acquisition and colonization in Palestine.1

By the early 1880s Russian proto-Zionist movements were actively promoting the idea of Jewish colonization in Palestine. These movements were not driven by religious conceptions, but rather by ideals of secular reform rooted in the currents of socialist populism in Europe. Their efforts, coterminous with an increase in the number of Russian Jews fleeing Tsarist repression, brought about the first aliyah (1881-1903), during which at least 25,000 Jews arrived in Palestine. Though later Zionist historians would claim otherwise, the majority was without nationalist ideals and instead fled rising discrimination at home. Only 5% of those arriving in this period participated in forming the early Zionist colonies, the first of which was Rish L'Zion (First to Zion) - founded in 1882 on land belonging to Arab villagers from 'Eyun Qara.2

The ineffectual and unpopular colonial enterprises of the young Zionists soon came to the attention of wealthy French Jewish philanthropist Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who invested enormous amounts of money in the new colonies, oversaw the provision of experts in plantation development and training and finally came to subsidize nearly the whole program. In 1900, following the rise of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), Rothschild transferred his plantations to the Jewish Colonization Agency (JCA), which he proceeded to generously finance. By then, 22 plantation-colonies were operating.3

From 1905-1914, the second mass immigration took place. This time, with the Zionist platform nearly 20 years old and its requirement for land acquisition and the demographic domination of Palestine official, the emphasis on colonization was more pronounced: "[i]t is necessary, first of all, that all, or at least most, Eretz Israel's lands will be the property of the Jewish people."4 It was this second wave of immigrants that established the political leadership of the new Jewish community, founded its first kibbutz and politicized its relationship with the pre-existing Jewish community and the Palestinian Arabs. By 1914, at least 11,000 Jews were working on 47 rural plantations and cooperatives supervised and subsidized by the WZO, its supporters or affiliate bodies.5

Zionist land acquisition throughout this period occurred at the cost of the Palestinian fellahin, who found themselves, as hired cultivators or tenant farmers under the Ottoman system, dispossessed of their livelihoods and often forced into plantation labor or unfamiliar and underpaid employment. Ottoman regulations limiting land sales were bypassed through bribery or intermediaries, as Jewish financiers as well as the JCA spent vast sums in this respect. Palestinian occupants willingly sold less than 10% of all the land acquired by the Zionists in this early period, while sales by Turkish Ottoman notables living elsewhere in the Empire accounted for the majority of the Zionists' acquisitions.6

In the first six months of 1914, Zionist immigration reached a peak, with the arrival of over 6,000 Jews from Europe saw up to 2.5 million Jews emigrate - the majority to the US.7 These figures confirmed the lack of popular Jewish support for the Zionist program. Nonetheless, even the early Zionist endeavors had already upset the demographic, economic and political balance in Palestine and incidents of violence and tensions were steadily rising, as the collision course that Zionist colonialism had set against the indigenous Palestinians, their land and their own rising nationalism, became daily more apparent.
British and French schemes for the post-WWI future of the Middle East were characterized by the two sides competing long-term strategic interests as well as by their wartime alliance against the Ottomans. Both sides recognized in the ascendance of an organized Arab nationalist movement an opportunity to galvanize local forces and bring about an effective revolt against the Ottomans. They also saw an alliance with accommodating and yet legitimate Arab leaders as essential to maintaining their regional interests in a post-Ottoman era.

The Hussein-MacMahon correspondence (1915-16), conducted between the British Government, through Sir Henry MacMahon, and the Hashemite leader Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca, saw Britain confer upon Hussein legitimacy as the political leader of the Arab people. The British vowed to, “recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions demanded by the Sharif...” In return, Hussein committed his Arab forces to revolt against the Ottomans in accordance with British plans and together with their forces.

However, even as the Arabs prepared for the promised revolt (begun in June 1916) the British and French were conducting the secret negotiations that led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Ignoring their pledges, the British - represented by the orientalist Sir Mark Sykes - sought to consolidate their control of a land ‘bridge’ stretching from Iraq and the Persian Gulf, to the Mediterranean via Palestine. The French - represented by their Beirut Consul General Charles Picot - opposed granting Britain such powerful leverage in the region without themselves retaining commensurate influence.

The compromise formula reached by the two rivals, and endorsed by their mutual ally Russia, whereby Palestine would be “shared” according to spheres of influence and a ‘condominium’ arrangement, with both parties respecting each other’s vital assets and interests therein, was never to eventuate. Six months after Sharif Hussein led the Arab Revolt, as part of which he declared Arab independence from Ottoman rule, British forces took control of southern Palestine and proceeded towards Jerusalem. British PM Lloyd George declared, “the French will have to accept our protectorate; we shall be there by conquest and shall remain.” By December 1917 Jerusalem was in British hands and both the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement were in tatters.

In the meantime, the British had stepped up their contact with the Zionist leadership, pledging their support for a Jewish national home in Palestine in November 1917 (the Balfour Declaration). The betrayal felt by the Palestinians, along with much of the Arab World, the reemergence of the bitter power rivalry between France and Britain in the post-war years, and the gains afforded the Zionist movement under British policy were to become the defining factors in regional tensions between 1918 and 1920.

The clash of British and French interests initially disrupted the nascent Palestinian national movement, with the appeal of union within a ‘Greater Syria’ - under French influence (1918-20) - seeming the most practical and immediate means of achieving liberation and thwarting Britain’s pro-Zionist policies. However, many within the Palestinian leadership had emerged from the bitter experience of betrayal with a strong suspicion of both British and French intentions. Their fears were confirmed when, in 1920, French forces took Damascus, expelling Syria’s leadership and placing the nation under their direct rule. With British military rule over Palestine and French rule over Syria, any remaining hope that either of the two powers considered Arab independence favorably evaporated. The third Palestinian Arab Conference, meeting in Haifa in 1920, called for the “independence of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon - each alone.”
Mandate Palestine was to be ruled by a civil administration - replacing the military one in place since 1917 - headed by a High Commissioner and based in Jerusalem. Though the terms of the Mandate were not formally finalized for three years, the military administration was terminated in 1920. The British Mandate was in place from July 1920 until May 1948.

The establishment of the Mandate came at a time when British approval of the Zionist program establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home was becoming apparent. Figures compiled by the British military administration in 1918 pointed to a Jewish population in Palestine of 58,728 - less than 10% of the total. Zionist immigration following the establishment of the military administration had not increased markedly, but with the creation of the Mandate, whose first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was a Jew and a great supporter of the Zionist platform, Zionist diplomatic efforts were immediately rewarded. One of Samuel’s first acts was the approval of 16,500 Jewish immigration certificates; the local Zionist leadership reported to WZO head Chaim Weizmann, that the Mandate was being, “enthusiastically welcomed” by the community. In 1920, Jewish immigration in fact rose by an unprecedented 450%, leading many Zionists to believe the British Mandate was to be simply an instrument for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration. Despite these important steps in empowering the Zionist movement, few European Jews were attracted to the program and even when the Zionist immigration reached these peaks, the vast majority of emigrating Jews made their way to the US. Of every 1,000 Jews in the world, only four made their way to Palestine during these immigration waves, impressing upon the WZO the imperative of expanding the political program abroad.

Since 1914, the WZO had adopted the stricture of so-called, “pure Jewish settlement” in its colonization efforts and strove to dispense with any reliance on non-Jewish labor or expertise. The concept of ‘Jewish labor on Jewish land,’ became a motto of the period and was expressed in London when the Interim Zionist Conference passed the July 1920 resolution to use its influence and funds, “as a means for making the land of Palestine the common property of the Jewish people [and]... to safeguard Jewish labor.”

In this atmosphere of growing Jewish exclusivity and increasing immigration, the Histadrut was founded (December 1920). Committed to the WZO's labor policy, the Histadrut set out to unite and expand the colonial and production forces of the Zionists, while building a “pure Jewish” administrative system in Palestine. At its first session it also resolved “to accept responsibility for setting up a country-wide clandestine and independent defense organization.”

In the face of a confidant and rapidly growing local Zionist movement in Palestine, the Palestinian leadership assembled numerous delegations and repeatedly petitioned both the local British administration and London, demanding that Britain live up to its commitments, slow immigration and examine the future of Palestine according to its demography and history. Their efforts were largely in vain. Leaders who raised their voices in opposition to British pro-Zionist policy were often removed from office, and the British prevented the Palestinian National (the national movement’s newly formed council) from holding its second conference, fearing it might awaken the dissent of the ‘street.’

Zionist land acquisition, guided geographically by the availability of pliant or ‘bribable’ Ottoman landlords focused on the arable northern and coastal regions. There, Palestinian tenant farmers were dispossessed of their livelihoods to make way for an expanding series of settlements as the WZO and its agencies sought to create the largest contiguous stretch of Jewish ownership possible. By 1921, with over 600,000 dunum of land already consumed by 71 Jewish colonies, immigration quotas continued to rise, as did tensions.
Turkish have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandate until such time as they are able to stand alone.”

The announcement made in 1920 at the San Remo Conference allotted the Mandate for Palestine to Britain, but it was not until 1923, after the League of Nations approved and ratified its terms, that the Mandate officially came into full force. Drawing up the terms of the Mandate, Britain drew on the Balfour Declaration and the government’s position, “in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Article IV of the Mandate document invited the Zionist Organization to “take steps for consultation with his Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.” Other articles committed Britain to facilitating a Zionist settlement and land acquisition. The final draft of the Mandate was drawn up in 1921. That same year, the first full British census was conducted in Palestine, revealing the Jewish population to be 11.4% of the total. Of these, at least 32.2% had immigrated since the British took power in 1918.

Winston Churchill’s June 1922 White Paper on Palestine officially divided the territory of the original Mandate (which had potentially conjoined Transjordan and Palestine), and thereby confined the terms of the Mandate to the territory of Palestine. With the approval of the League of Nations in September 1922, Britain thus formalized the territorial boundaries of Transjordan and Palestine, limiting its approval for the establishment of a Jewish national home to Palestine. Soon after, in April 1923, Britain recognized the Hashemite Amir Abdullah as the legitimate ruler of the autonomous Emirate of Transjordan.

Following the 1920 San Remo announcement, Palestinian leaders presented their case before the British government, in an effort to reverse the draft clauses of the Mandate relating to the Jewish national home, but again in vain. With the US Congress formally endorsing British pro-Zionist policies and the content of the Balfour Declaration on 21 September 1922, the Palestinians found themselves yet further distance from decision-making processes. Domestic political activities were relentlessly thwarted by the British, who were not afraid to employ force and severe punishments in their drive to smother the many popular protests, strikes and boycotts initiated by the Palestinian National Congress and the national political parties.

By virtue of Article IV of the Mandate, the Jewish Agency (JA) was formed in Palestine with the express purpose of facilitating the foundation of the Jewish national home in Palestine. The JA was to act as the unofficial Jewish government in Mandate Palestine and as such was tied closely with the British administration; its first head was Frederick Kisch, a British colonel and Zionist. Kisch encouraged his Zion colleagues to learn from his British compatriots and sponsors in order to facilitate their development of an independent administrative system in Palestine. The Zionist camp was, though, split over the exclusion of Transjordan from the terms of the Mandate. The WZO leadership was content to quietly seek Abdullah’s recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine, in exchange for the dropping of Zionist demands to settle east of the Jordan. Others, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky of Poland, rejected any compromise and insisted on the forcible and accelerated colonization of both Palestine and Transjordan.
**Map 5**

**LEBANON**
(French Mandate, Independent 1943)

**SYRIA**
(French Mandate, Independent 1946)

**IRAQ**
(Independent 1921, British interests)

**EGYPT**
(Independent 1922, British influence until 1952)

**SAUDI ARABIA**
(Independent)

**TRANSJORDAN**
Separated from the area becoming the Palestine Mandate by Great Britain in 1922

Approximate area in which the Zionists hoped to set up a Jewish National Home

The Palestine Mandate granted to Great Britain at the 1920 San Remo Conference as the region of a Jewish National Home

Area ceded by Great Britain to the French Mandate of Syria in 1923
Some 759,712 Muslims made up 73% of the total counted population - put at 1,035,821 - while 174,000 Jews represented 16.9% and 91,398 Christians 8.6% of the total. Comparison with the 1922 census revealed a growing urbanization within the Muslim population, though on the whole they remained predominantly rural. Christians too were seen to be moving in significant numbers toward the urban centers of Jaffa and Haifa, but had long been more urban than the Muslim sector. The impact of Zionist colonial activities evinced an increase in Jewish agriculturalists, though the Jewish community remained on whole distinctly urban.¹

Agricultural production reflected the dominance of the 63% of Muslims employed in the agricultural sector, with between 86% and 97% of every variety of agricultural crop being produced by Arab farmers.² Muslims (predominantly - being 88% of the rural population) and Christians (to a lesser extent) cultivated over 2 million dunums of cereal crops, 120,000 dunums of watermelons, nearly 600,000 dunums of olives and 293,000 dunums of vegetables, along with vineyards, banana plantations and tobacco fields as well as rearing nearly a million head of livestock.³

While the Muslims dominated the rural agricultural sector, Christians could be seen to have followed an opposite trend, with over 60% employed in industry, commerce, the liberal professions or public service. The overriding shift towards urbanization within the total Arab population amounted to a 47% Arab population growth in urban areas since 1922, as opposed to a 32% growth rate rurally.⁵

The Jewish population had more than doubled since 1922. In all, a full 58% of the 1931 population was born outside Palestine - the majority of these (80,347) in Europe. Over 74,000 had not taken up citizenship and remained foreign nationals. European education and the comparative prosperity of the community were reflected in the 72% literacy rate; markedly higher than the 48% and 10% rates recorded for the Christian and Muslim communities respectively.⁶ Two thirds of the urban Jewish population were found in the cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tel Aviv.⁷ Despite being only 16.9% of the total population, Jews made up 33% of the urban population.

The demographic and economic trends indicated in the census were to increase in momentum in coming years, bringing lasting changes in societal structure. By 1931, British policy had led to significant increases in capital investment in certain sectors, creating the beginnings of a new urban elite in Palestinian society. Modern infrastructure was being built apace, while financial pressures imposed on landowners and accelerating Zionist activities were rapidly undermining traditional hierarchies. Rural tenant farmers could already be identified as the primary losers in what was to be an era of economic redistribution.⁸ In 1929, John Hope Simpson, heading a commission of inquiry into issues of immigration, land and settlement, noted, “no occupancy right exists in favor of the Arab tenant in Palestine,” and expressed his belief that with over a million dunums of Palestinian rural land already acquired by the Zionists, “there is no room for a single additional settlement if the standard of life of the Arab fellahin is to remain at its present level.”⁹
Map 6

Source of Statistics:
Census of Palestine, Volume 1, 1931

Map: M. Davies, 2001
Unsurprisingly, the Palestinians were becoming increasingly frustrated with British policy, as the likelihood of their achieving their right to self-determination under the Mandate appeared to evaporate. In October 1933 nationwide strikes and demonstrations against Zionism and British collusion were met with force, leaving at least 12 Palestinians dead and fuelling outrage at Britain’s strong-arm tactics.

By 1936, seven years after the Hope Simpson Commission, the Jewish population had risen by more than further 150%, an additional 62 settlements had been created and nearly 1.5 million dunums of Palestinian land was the property of the Zionists. The Zionists saw the settlements as “[t]he guardians of Zionist land and recognized early on that “patterns of settlement would to a great extent determine the [future Jewish country’s borders].” JA Executive Chairman, David Ben-Gurion, called the settlers, “the army of Zion’s fulfillment.” In mid-April 1936, a series of Arab-Jewish clashes in the Jaffa area proved the inevitable trigger, as Palestinian National Committees sprang up across the country in support of a call for a general strike issued by the Palestinian representative leadership, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). The AHC was banned soon after by the British, but despite the arrest of its leaders and the nationwide imposition of curfews, the uprising surged and from April 1936 until October the Arab Revolt swept Mandate Palestine.

The extent of the revolt and its support throughout the region worried the British, who requisitioned additional troops in September to put down the uprising. Fearing domestic instability and under pressure from their British benefactor, regional Arab leaders provided the necessary mediation to bring about a lull in the uprising, while Britain again dispatched an investigative commission. Arriving in November 1936, the Palestine Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel, set out to assess the feasibility and future of the Mandate. Published in July 1937, the Peel Commission’s report concluded that “the Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System...” The proposed treaty envisioned a partition of Palestine, with Jerusalem and Bethlehem retained under a separate Mandate, reaching to the port at Jaffa. The part allotted the Palestinians was to be united with Transjordan and the resulting Jewish state made to pay a subsidy to the Arab state, to which Palestinians within the area allotted the Jewish state would be compelled to move. The Peel Plan, with its twin premises of partition and ‘population transfer’, was to become the point of reference for most future schemes to solve the Palestine Question.

The Palestinians flatly rejected the notion of a Zionist state on nearly 33% of Palestine and the dispossession of hundreds of thousands that this would entail. Encouraged by the legitimation it granted their program, but not content with the scale of conquest, the Zionist leadership accepted ‘in principle’ but rejected ‘in detail’ the partition plan, while Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement rejected the idea outright and by September 1937 had commenced a violent campaign against Palestinians and the British, marking the resumption of violence and resurgence of the Arab Revolt.
Map 7

Proposed Jewish State
Proposed Arab State
Area to remain under British Mandate
the need to resolve the crisis was becoming more urgent with the renewal of the Arab Revolt and escalating confrontations. In acknowledgment of the WZO’s August 1937 resolution to accept the principle of partition, though not the Peel boundaries, to work for its implementation on a more ‘generous’ basis, the British undertook to examine the question further.

Thus, the Technical Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir John Woodhead (and referred to as the Partiti or Woodhead, Commission) was sent to Palestine in April 1938, with the purpose of “ascertaining in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition.” Britain attempted to allay Palestinian concerns by declaring they had “not accepted the [Peel] Commission’s proposals for compulsory transfer...”1

But Palestinians remained doubtful that the Zionists were prepared to accept a state of any size on a basis of coexistence. Immediately following the Peel Plan, the WZO had formed the “Population Transmigration Committee.”2 Even while the Woodhead Commission was in Palestine the JA Executive held a series of meetings in Jerusalem, discussing in detail the issue of transfer. JA Exec. Chairman, David Ben-Gurion, declared his support for “compulsory transfer,” and the Agency noted, “...regarding the transfer individuals, we are always doing this. But the question will be the transfer of a much greater quantity.”3 All coinciding with the Commission’s visit was a series of bombing attacks in Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, carried out by the Zionist Irgun militia, as part of a campaign that would claim nearly 600 Palestinian lives through the end of the year.4 By the late 1930s, the British army and Zionist militias were all but operating in unison vis-à-vis the Arab Revolt. Special units, dominated by Haganah recruits and headed by British Zionists, earned a grisly reputation for ‘preemptive’ attacks on villages in the Galilee area; their cadre included the future elite of Israel’s armed forces.5

The Woodhead Commission took as the starting point of its inquiry the Peel Plan (Plan A), but examined at least three partition possibilities in all. The Zionists themselves drew up a plan calling for a large Jewish state while splitting a small Palestinian state into two cantons. While the Palestinian leadership refused to participate officially in the negotiation of what they saw as their own dispossession, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan again sought union with Palestine and submitted his plan for a “United Arab Kingdom.”6 The Woodhead Commission’s findings amounted to a forceful rejection of the feasibility and equity of any plan of partition. The Commission was bound by its terms of reference to identify territorial concentrations of Jewish and Palestinian demography and so posited, with much reservation, a plan affording what it deemed the “least objectionable” means of creating a Jewish state in Palestine (Plan C), while illustrating by way of another (Plan B) the only viable means of bringing together all the scattered Jewish landholdings of the Galilee.

Attaching a “Note of Reservations” to the final report, Commission member Thomas Reid emphatically pointed to the “absence of equity,” “absence of security” and “absence of consent” inherent in adopting any partition plan and concluded that even if Plan C adopted, “it would not and could not be implemented. In recognition of the rise in Zionist circles of the ‘transfer’ doctrine, his reservations called for “the abandonment of all schemes for carving up the country by artificial boundaries, of plans for its dismemberment and the logical sequel thereto, removal of Arabs from their homes and occupations to make room for the Jews.”7

With the ‘principle of partition’ thus dismissed, the British had little choice but to shelve the Peel formula. The government called for a general conference to discuss Jewish immigration and land acquisitions to be convened in London (The London St. James Conference in February 1939) with the participation of Jewish, Palestinian and other Arab representatives.
Map 8

Recommended: Plan C

Plan B

Plan A

Jewish Proposals to the Woodhead Commission

[Map showing various proposals for state divisions in the Middle East, including recommended Plan C, Plan B, and Plan A.]
When the British came to power in 1918, 2% of Palestine’s 6,500,000 acres were owned by Jews. By 1936 the Jewish population had risen from 8% of the total to 31% and the WZO’s actual land holdings had tripled. The acquisition of land was entrusted to the JA in 1929 and was carried out systematically in accordance with a goal of securing the maximum contiguous area of exclusively Jewish agricultural possible. Early acquisitions in the lower Galilee area, made through the aggressive methods of Zionist dealer Joshua Chankin, were expanded upon throughout the 1920s and 1930s, creating the irrigable area of Jewish ownership in Palestine: the so-called Jezreel Valley. Again, it was the tenant farmers and small holders who fell victim, while the landowners frequently resided abroad and stood to make enormous sums in a period of economic decline in agriculture and yet phenomenal rises in value. Sustaining and expanding the Zionist agricultural settlements was a WZO imperative; thus, the Jewish Agency and JNF were obliged to finance the farms, whose actual production value was negligible and unviable.

Between 1920 and 1945, the Mandate Land Registry recorded 584,191 transactions as Zionist holdings rose to 1.7 million dunums. A British “Employment Committee” established in 1944 noted that at least 47,000 Arabs had left the agricultural workforce in the preceding five-year period and by 1946, the Mandate reported that “the Jews [hold] over 15% of the cultivable area of Palestine.” Already by 1931, the external appraisal of the dispossession caused by the Zionists, particularly in the northern agricultural belt, had forced the British to establish a “Development Commission” charged with registering “landless Arabs” and preparing a “scheme for their resettlement.” The unpopular resettlement project was soon abandoned though, even when British attempts were made in the early 1940s to limit the pace and scale of the Zionists’ impact - these were next to futile. Repeatedly, land transfer regulations were circumvented or revoked. Contemporaneous British commentators have characterized the role of the British in the period as that of “an umpire trying in vain to implant new regulations into the land transfer game that, as time wore on, became increasingly complaisant, devious and uncontrollable.”

The Palestinians remained, in spite of the enormous pressures and massive losses, dominant in the agricultural sector throughout Palestine and the overwhelming majority of both large and small owners managed to hold onto their land. As the map indicates, in none of the 16 sub-districts of the Mandate did the Zionists own a majority of the land and in half of them Jewish ownership remained negligible (5% or less). Nonetheless, the speed and apparent ease with which the Zionists had gained a strong territorial foothold in the agricultural heart of rural Palestine stood as testimony to Britain’s failure to fulfill many of the terms of the Mandate.

The Mandate document had supposedly committed Britain to ensure that “[n]o discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language.” In 1945, the British Labour Party adopted a resolution on Palestine in favor of “the transfer of the population of Palestine, deciding it best that “the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in.” The following June, Clement Attlee led the Labour party to victory in the British general election.

Zionist Agricultural Colonization 1882–1944

12
Map 9

Palestinian and Zionist Percentages

Adapted from Village Statistics, Jerusalem: Government 1945, subsequently revised as United Nations map 94(b) 1950, Their Diaspora, Institute for Studies, 1984
During the six years of the war, only a tiny number of Jews were rescued - efforts to help were weak, and ineffectual. This was in part a result of the fact that news of the systematic killings took until 1943 to emerge and was even then not taken sufficiently seriously by the Allied Powers or the Zionists until 1944. But even after news of the Holocaust reached them, responses were often detached and even cynical. The Allied Powers convened a conference to discuss the issue, but neither Britain nor the US offered to open their doors to the Jewish refugees. The Zionists themselves failed to put aside their inter-divisional and ideological concerns in time to react effectively.

During the war approximately 50,000 Jewish refugees reached Palestine. At its end roughly one million remained destitute in Europe. The catastrophe demanded an immediate response from the victors, Great Powers, Britain and the US, and the plight of Europe’s remaining Jews stood foremost in the eyes of the world. Nonetheless, the US and Britain refused to relax their immigration laws and no initiative was proffered for the resettling of Jewish refugees in Europe.

A new power balance that solidified in the closing months of WWII saw the lines of the coming Cold War tentatively drawn. Both the US and Britain witnessed a change in leadership in 1945 and within months the German surrender, British PM Attlee was seeking US involvement in the Palestine Question. Attlee, aware of his predecessors’ failures in reaching a solution, knew rising pro-Zionist sentiment in the US and the crowded camps across Europe made the internationalization of the problem not only unavoidable, but also preferable. US involvement, ostensibly in favor of the Zionists, was quickened by a geopolitical race influence that had already begun. The USSR’s anti-Zionist policy was bound to result in Arab sympathy and the prospect of Soviet dominance in the oil-rich region was troubling to the US.

In November 1945, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed to examine the Jewish refugee problem. At US insistence, its terms of reference limited it to viewing resettlement in Palestine as the sole option. The Committee recommended issuing 100,000 immigration certificates immediately and removing all restrictions on land transfer in Palestine. No solution to the issue of sovereignty was found and instead the Committee suggested a long-term UN trusteeship.

The Arabs were horrified, while Britain deemed the plan unworkable in both the short and long-term. Three weeks later, British Deputy PM Herbert Morrison and US Ambassador Henry Grady began constructing an amended, alternative solution. The plan incorporated the Zionist-US demand for 100,000 immigrants immediately and the trusteeship premise, but envisioned a division of Jewish and Arab provinces, leaving open - they contended - the option of an eventual binational state or partition of Palestine. Zionist and US rejection consigned the plan to failure almost immediately and subsequent US public statements critical of Britain and supportive of the WZO signaled the end of the Anglo-American approach.
US President Truman's overt statements of support for the Zionists, which included his endorsement of a proposal for a state on 60% of Palestine, left Britain effectively unable to negotiate with either party. Meanwhile, since early 1944 the combined Zionist militias had waged a campaign against British forces at installations in Palestine. By mid-1946, British security forces were being shot, bombed or kidnapped on nearly weekly basis. Hundreds of civilians were killed. In a thinly veiled attack on the Zionist leaders, Prime Minister (PM) declared, "[i]f our dreams for Zionism... and our labours for its future are to produce new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past." But the violence was to continue, orchestrated for the most part directly by the JA. In June 1946, the British for the first time, arrested leading figures from within the JA and thereby closed the primary channel of Zionist-British coordination - one they had helped establish and worked with since 1923. The Mandate's contradictory terms of reference had forced Britain into an impossible position from the outset. Drawn up in 1922 at a time when Jews made up a little over 11% of the total population, the Mandate promised the Zionists their 'national home', guaranteed the Palestinians protection of their civil and economic status and put the British administration in the consequently absurd position of seeing that "no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants." By 1946, all attempts at smothering the inevitable disintegration of their authority were failing.

Between 1920 and 1945, the British presided over the immigration of 393,887 Jews, who made up fully two-thirds of the total Jewish population by the end of 1945. Since the Mandate census of 1922, the Jewish population had increased by 700% and in 1946 made up nearly 32% of the total. Despite the phenomenal immigration and the existence of over 260 Zionist agricultural colonies, the Jewish population remained urban. Thus with some 38% of the Jerusalem sub-district's population being Jewish, their actual landholdings in the area amounted to only 2% and a mere 3% of their number were rural (see Maps 38 & 40). A similar pattern could be observed in the Jaffa sub-district, where the greatest population density by far was found (1,116.5 persons per km²). Of the 295,000 Jews in the sub-district, 59% lived in the city of Tel Aviv (less than 400 Palestinians lived in Tel Aviv). Haifa followed the pattern of the Jaffa sub-district, while only in the Beisan, Tiberias and Nazareth sub-districts of the lower Galilee was the Jewish population significantly rural (see Map 13). 29% of all Jews lived in Tel Aviv, more than were found in the entire rural sector of Palestine.

The total population of Palestine in 1946 was put at 1,845,560. Of this number, 58% were Muslim Palestinians and 8% were Christian Palestinians. Muslims made up 79% of the rural population - that sector representing 52% of the total population - while Jews made up 50% of the urban population. The culmination of a long-standing demographic trend amongst the Christians saw 80% of their total number residing in urban centers. Only in the Jaffa sub-district did the Jewish population outnumber that of the Palestinians and elsewhere only three of the 16 sub-districts found Jews accounting for even a third of the population. The Arab population was found dominant in 15 sub-districts, while in terms of land holdings it remained so in all 16.
Map 11

The map shows the distribution of Palestinian and Jewish population in various cities in Palestine. The scale of population is indicated by the pie charts at each city, with the percentage of Palestinian and Jewish populations shown in different colors.

The map includes cities such as Acre, Safed, Nazareth, Tiberias, Hebron, and Jerusalem. The Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea are also marked on the map.

The pie charts are adapted from Supplement to a Survey of Palestine, Jerusalem: Government Printer 1947, and subsequently published as United Nations 93(b) 1950, Before Their Diaspora, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.
UNSCOP members arrived in Palestine in June 1947 and gathered information and testimonies until completing their report by late August. In September a so-called Ad-Hoc Committee was established to examine two proposals. The first called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with Jerusalem and its environs under an international Corpus Separatum administration. This plan had majority backing of the UNSCOP members, while a second plan, similar to the Morrison-Grady scheme (see Map 10), was supported by a minority. The Ad-Hoc Committee drew conflicting conclusions in examination of the majority plan. In real terms, the proposal granted the Zionists a state in 56.47% of Palestine, leaving the Palestinians with 42.88% and creating an international zone of around 0.65%. The proposed Jewish state was populated at 905,000 - 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Palestinian Arabs. However, the Ad-Hoc Committee’s discovery of an ‘oversight’ with regard to the Bedouin population added 105,000 Arabs to the demography, placing the Jews in a minority yet submitting over half a million indigenous Arabs to minority status. The plan gave the Zionists all or a part of 10 of the 16 sub-districts, in nine of which Jews were a minority. One report of the Ad-Hoc Committee noted that the proposal allotted the Beersheba district to the Jewish state, remarking “[i]t is surprising that the majority of an international committee such as [UNSCOP] should have recommended the transfer of a completely Arab territory and population to the control of the Jews, who form less than 1% of the population, against the wishes and interests of the Arabs, who form 99% of the population.”

The majority (partition) proposal was nonetheless adopted by the UNGA on 29 November 1947, with Resolution 181. The injustice of partition has been summarized by Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi as follows: “They [the Palestinians] failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population - the indigenous majority on its ancestral soil - to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.” Every represented regional state voted against the plan, Britain abstained. Res. 181 stipulated a two-month interim period following British withdrawal, wherein a UN Palestine Commission would transfer authority. This was never to happen.

The day after UN Res. 181 was passed, the Haganah called up all Jews between 17 and 25. The next week, the assault on Jaffa (an Arab enclave in the partition plan) commenced. In the six months before Britain abandoned Palestine (14 May 1948), 380,000 Palestinians were forced from their homes, and at Deir Yassin (part of the proposed Corpus Separatum), the first of a series of massacres was perpetrated. British support, both in terms of training and equipment, for the powerful Zionist forces contrasted sharply with the absolute prevention of Palestinian militarization during the Mandate period. As a result, when war finally broke out there was only one army in Palestine and the indigenous population was left heavily dependent on regional intervention; this marked by ulterior and competing motives. When Britain quit the Mandate, Zionist forces were already in control of some 70% of Palestine. By the end of the war they would occupy nearly 78% of Palestine, incl. half of all the territory allotted the smaller Arab state in the partition plan. Transjordan would be in control of the remainder of eastern Palestine - the West Bank - and Egypt would control the Gaza Strip.

By November 1948, the UNSC was able to initiate the process of demarcating a permanent armistice. Israel signed an agreement with Egypt in February 1949, with Lebanon in March, with Jordan in April and with Syria in July. The armistice agreements allowed for four demilitarized zones and four ‘no-man’s land’ areas (in Jerusalem and near Latrun Monastery).

International efforts to build permanent peace treaties between Israel and the Arab states were short-lived and ended in failure. The April 1949 Lausanne Conference, where delegates from Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Arab Higher Committee met under the auspices of the UN’s Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), collapsed when Israel quit in mid-summer. Israel’s position was simple: Delegate Abba Eban wrote Ben-Gurion, “There’s no need to run after peace. The armistice is enough for us. If we pursue peace, the Arabs will demand a price of us - borders or refugees or both. Let us wait a few years.”
Map 12

UNGA Partition Plan, 1947

- Proposed Jewish State
- Proposed Arab State
- Internationally administered 'Corpus Separatum' of Jerusalem

Armistice Lines, 1949

- Proposed Jewish State
- Arab territory
- Territories seized by Israel beyond the area for the proposed Jewish State
In December 1947, Palestinian landholdings totaled 1,734 km², or 6.6% of the total territory. The majority of the remainder was Palestinian ownership, either communal or private, while state lands and nature reserves were extensive in the area allotted the Jewish state in the plan. The exception was the Beersheba district, where 85% of the area was state land.

As illustrated on previous pages (see Map 11), Palestinians were, up until 1947, a mostly agricultural, rural people. Landownership was the foundation of the predominant culture and economy. Some 60-62% of the labor force in 1947 were fellahin living in the countryside. Their knowledge and expertise, in contrast to that of the Jewish population, was tied definitively to the land they lived and worked on for generations.

Long before 1948, the Zionists had confronted the question of land ownership and the obstacle it posed to achieving the desired territorial and demographic supremacy in Palestine. 10 years prior to the war, Menachem Ussishkin, head of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and a veteran proponent of the "transit" doctrine, had addressed the discrepancy between the mass-settlement policy of the WZO and the meager landholdings of the JA. He told the Agency, "[w]e must remove from here 60,000 Arab families in order to release land for the Jews." With the outbreak of hostilities following the 1947 UN vote, Ben-Gurion announced: "The war will give us the land. The concepts of 'ours' and 'not ours' are peace concepts, and war they lose their whole meaning."

The refugees who were forced from Palestine in the 20 months following Res. 181 left behind all they could not carry. It is impossible to calculate the extent of the land losses with any accuracy, but in terms of cultivated land, records show they left at least 40,000 dunums of vineyards, nearly 100,000 dunums of citrus groves and more than 80% of Mandate Palestine's 4.3 million dunums of field crops. Some 95% of what became Israel's olive groves were Palestinian owned in 1948. At the end of the Mandate, Palestinians had cultivated some 5,484,700 dunums. At the end of the war, the entire land area left under Arab rule amounted to only 5,948,320. Of Israel's 20,371,680 dunums, only 7.23% had been Jewish property before the war.

Having decided that "there could be no speaking of a return of Arabs," the new Israeli government set about consolidating its long-sought grasp on Palestinian land. Mid-way through the war, a Ministerial Committee for Abandoned [Arab] Property was formed to distribute and administer the new gains. The first act of the "provisional" government of Israel was the abolition of all restrictions on land transfers. After the war, Israel passed two key laws which 'legalized' (in domestic terms) their illegal (in international terms) war booty. The Absentees Property Law and the Development Authority Law gave the government and the JNF exclusive rights over virtually all Palestinian land in the new Jewish state. Even that minority of Palestinians who had remained within the boundaries of Israel was dispossessed by virtue of this legislation and the military orders which accompanied it. The amount of land expropriated from this minor source in 1948 alone exceeded all Jewish pre-1948 landholdings.

Uprooting the Palestinians from their land and taking possession thereof had - in one form or another - been the overarching goal of Zionism for 50 years. Between 1947 and 1949, this goal was mostly achieved - and the state of Israel was established.
684,000 Jews entered Israel, more than doubling the pre-war Jewish population. For the first six months of the war (Dec. 1947-May 1948), the British remained ultimately responsible for law and order in Palestine. During the same period, the JA's Haganah, with whom Britain had a "gentleman's agreement," was transformed from a powerful militia, comprising a single brigade, into a formidable arm with 10 brigades, artillery units, armored vehicles and a small air force. Within this period more than half of the war's total refugees were created, yet, while the British authorities described the Haganah's attacks on civilians as "an offence to civilization," they did nothing to intervene. Historical debate was long focused on the 'official' as opposed to 'opportunists' position of the Zionist leadership with regard to expulsion of the Palestinian population during the war. However, with the declassification of vital documents in the 1980s, the intention - both pre-1947 and during the war itself - to expel large numbers of Palestinians has become largely irrefutable. Initially it was the wealthier professionals of the urban centers who fled, leaving behind their homes and possessions in the hope of later returning. The December 1947 attack on Jaffa, followed by the razing of entire suburbs, was described by the Zionists as "a lesson to the rural communities." By March 1948, attacks on villages in the coastal plain led to a mass-exodus from the countryside. With news of the first massacres and mass expulsions - beginning with that at Deir Yassin on 9 April - the flight accelerated, as villagers sought refuge in the mountainous hinterland or neighboring Arab states. Following British withdrawal, the Zionists, already in control of much of the territory of the post-war state, increased their efforts to remove the remaining Palestinian population. On 9 July 1948, Israeli forces broke the first truce of the war. Over the next four days they expelled some 33,000 Palestinians from Lydda and Ramleh, after massacring hundreds in one of the most infamous and brutal 'operations' of the war. There, 'Operation Dani,' led by Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin, exemplified a pattern of intimidation and expulsion, which was repeated throughout the area falling under Israeli control until well after the armistice talks had begun. Israel's large-scale military expulsions ended only in the summer of 1950, with the removal to Gaza of 2,500 Palestinians who had remained in or fled to Al-Majdal. Approximately 150,000 Palestinians remained within the area of the Jewish state following the war, concentrated in the Nazareth area and the 'Little Triangle' - comprised of the villages and lands surrounding the three Palestinian towns of Umm Al-Fahm, Al-Khadeira and Kufa Qara' - bordering the northern West Bank. Many were 'internally displaced' refugees, denied return to their homes. From 1948 until 1966 they were to be ruled under Israeli 'Emergency Regulations,' drastically limiting their civil rights.

On 11 December 1948, the UNGA passed Res. 194, affirming the Palestinian refugees' right to return and to compensation. A year later, with Israel rejecting any responsibility for the de-population of Palestine, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was founded, to provide destitute refugees with humanitarian aid and shelter. By 1950, 914,221 refugees were registered with UNRWA and over the coming years 58 camps were established throughout the region.

Meanwhile, Israel wasted no time in settling a huge wave of immigrants on Palestinian land and in Palestinian homes. Less than 15% of these immigrants were refugees of the 'Displaced Persons' camps in Europe. The remainder was encouraged to come as part of the new Jewish state's drive to "gather in the exiles" and "re redeem the land." Between 1948 and 1953, 350 of 370 new Jewish settlements were established on the property of refugees. In the cities, a third of all the period's immigrants were settled in property belonging to Palestinians. By 1954 a full third of Israel's population was living on or in refugee property.
Map 14

**THE AMERICAS AND OCEANIA**

**WEST BANK**

**LEBANON**

**SYRIA**

**JORDAN**

**WEST BANK**

**JORDAN**

**EUROPE**

**AFRICA**

**GAZA**

**GAZA STRIP**

**Mediterranean Sea**

**Numbers of Migrants**

(proportional to width of bar)

- **Palestinian refugees by place of refuge, end of 1949**
- **Jewish immigrants by continent of birth, 15 May 1948 - end of 1951**

- 500,000
- 250,000
- 100,000
- 50,000

Map: PASSIA, 2002
echelons of the Zionist leadership. Thus, rather than crimes committed by individuals, the massacres, rapes, looting and destruction, which characterized the de-population of Palestine, were components of a designed military strategy developed and implemented by the leaders of the emerging Jewish state.

One of the systematically pursued objectives of this strategy was the eradication of all traces of the pre-1947 Palestinian presence. Of the nearly 600 purely Palestinian villages and towns overrun by the Zionists during the war, over 400 were subsequently completely destroyed or rendered permanently uninhabitable. At the outset of the war, the purpose of leveling the villages was the creation of panic, fear and flight. But as the ‘transfer’ picked up pace, the Zionists shifted their focus to the consolidation of their conquest. In early June 1948, the ‘Transfer Committee’ prepared a memorandum entitled, “Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel.” The document, endorsed by Israel’s PM Ben-Gurion, outlined means of “[p]reventing the Arabs from returning to their places,” and listed as the foremost method of achieving this goal, the, “[d]estruction of villages as much as possible...” along with “[s]ettlement of Jews in a number of villages and towns so that no ‘vacuum’ is created.”

From the summer of 1948, the ‘Transfer Committee’ set about the task of identifying villages to be destroyed and those to be settled by Jews for strategic reasons. Only 121 sites were spared destruction. Meanwhile, in the urban Palestinian neighborhoods, the Committee hurried to settle Jews in those Palestinian homes which had not been destroyed. 73,000 rooms and 7,800 shops or small industries were thus seized in what had been the ‘Arab Quarters’ of Palestine’s mixed towns.

The destruction of Palestinian villages continued unabated throughout all the war’s cease-fires and persisted into the 1950s. During the five years that followed the end of the war, israel recorded some 1,000 ‘border infiltrations’ every month, as Palestinian refugees tried to return to their homes and sought out missing family members. By then, Israel’s razing of remaining villages was driven by the desire to erase from the landscape all signs of its Palestinian identity. By removing the most vivid reminders of the Palestinian people - their homes, places of worship etc. - the Israelis hoped to counter any calls for the implementation of the Palestinian refugees’ right to return and present their own sudden domination of the territory as something seemingly ‘organic’ and without contradiction. They also sought to conceal evidence of their own atrocities.

Chaim Weizmann, veteran Zionist leader and Israel’s first president, would later refer to the elimination of the Palestinians, their communities and homes as, “a miraculous clearing of the land; the miraculous simplification of Israel’s task.”

At the time of the UN Partition Plan (29 November 1947), there were 279 Jewish settlements in Palestine. By August 1949, an additional 133 settlements had been established - nearly all on Palestinian land and many upon or within the Palestinian villages the ‘Transfer Committee’ had reserved for the purpose of Jewish settlement. By 1987, some 190 Israeli towns, kibbutzim and moshavs existed on the land of depopulated and destroyed Palestinian villages.
Map 15

Ownership in Palestine and the UN Partition Plan, 1947

- Jewish-owned land, 1947
- Jewish State according to UN Partition Plan, 1947
- Arab State according to UN Partition Plan, 1947

Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948 and Razed by Israel

- Jewish-owned land, 1947
- State of Israel according to the 1949 Armistice Agreement
- Palestinian villages depopulated in 1948 and 1967 and razed by Israel
- West Bank and Gaza Strip

2 The system of military conscription families to conceal the true number of their children. McCarthy attributes to the enumerations errors of point out that the system of military conscription encouraged families to conceal the true number of their children. Nevertheless, McCarthy’s reproductions employ statistical methods of correction which render the figures the most accurate available. McCarthy, Justin, The Population of Palestine, Columbia University Press, 1990, p.10 & pp. 2-44.

3 The of the Crusaders from Jerusalem by Salah Eddin in 1187 the demise of the Crusading Kingdom and brought about a period of religious tolerance and stability which not only saw Palestine return to Muslim rule but brought about a return of small numbers of Jewish pietists. The Crusaders did maintain a presence in the cities of Acre and Caesarea for a number of years but were eventually forced out.

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4 By far the largest Jewish community in 1878 was that of Safed, in the Ottoman Sanjak (administrative division) of Acre (in the northern portion of the Galilee). While without particular Biblical significance, Safed gained its place among the four Jewish “Holy Cities” in Palestine - along with Jerusalem, Tiberias and Hebron - by virtue of the presence there, since the expulsion from Spain in 1492, of the most productive and significant Jewish community of mystical pietists. Historians trace the authorship of the Kabbala to 16th Century Safed and the major seat of Jewish mystical learning remained in Safed well into the 19th Century. At no time was the religious Jewish community in Safed occupied by nationalist aspirations and the advent of the Zionist movement in Palestine signaled the departure of the last of the pietists. See Jacobs, Louis, The Jewish Religion - A Companion, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 438.

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The system of remittances and their distribution by Rabbinic authorities (known as Chalukkah) compelled the Jewish community to adhere to the judgments of their leaders to such an extent that parents who allowed their children to enroll in a secular trade school in 1856 were threatened with excommunication. Following the Crimean War, which had seen the blockade of Ottoman Palestine and hence the estrangement of the Jewish community from the European financial lifeline upon which it depended, opposition to dependence on the Chalukkah led Joel Moshe Salomon and six of his friends to purchase land in 1869 beyond the walls of Jerusalem (Nachlat Shiv’a - lit.: ‘Plot of the Seven’). The Jerusalem neighborhood now known as Mea Shearim (100 Gates) was settled for the same reasons by pious Jews in 1875. The subsequent decision by Salomon to seek land and engage in its cultivation on a financially productive scale was made in the face of intense opposition on the part of the Rabbinical authorities, who feared - among other things - losing their remittances if a transformation of the production status of the Jewish community became known to their benefactors abroad. The eventual settlement at Petah Tikva was considered “heresy” by the Jewish leadership in Palestine and its produce was not permitted for sale amongst the Jewish community. Sachar, Howard, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981, p. 24-26.

**MAP 3**


2. Ibid., p. 24. In addition to Britain’s success in securing a ‘bridge’ of control between Iraq, domination of Palestine reinforced their control over Egypt and the vital Suez Canal.

3. The Balfour Declaration was issued to Zionist leader and chemist Dr. Chaim Weizmann in the form of a letter by Lord Balfour. It contained a pledge to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. At first the Declaration was issued only as a ‘token of gratitude’ to the chemist for his invention of an important method of creating much-needed acetone (used in the manufacture of artillery shells) from maize at the height of the war. Weizmann’s important military research was conducted under the auspices of the British admiralty and Ministry of Munitions at a time when future FM, Arthur James Balfour was the ‘First Lord’ of the admiralty and future PM, David Lloyd George, was the Min. of Munitions. Both men considered the chemist’s contribution to the war effort worthy of reward - hence the Balfour Declaration. For the full text of the Declaration see Map 5, note 2. Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 33-57.

**MAP 4**

1. The Mandate’s terms were not drafted by Britain until 1922 and then were only ratified by the League of Nations in 1923, when they formally came into force. However, the period between Britain’s 1917-18 conquest of Palestine and 1920, during which the country was governed by the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (OETA), came to an end in March 1920 with the arrival of the first High Commissioner, Samuel. Thus, it is possible to date the Mandate from the termination of the OETA.


4. Herbert Samuel was not an official member of the WZO, but had himself presented the first British proposal for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. His memorandum suggesting the “…restoring [of] the Hebrew people to the land which was to be their inheritance,” through the immigration of 3-4 million Jews to Palestine was discussed by the British cabinet in January 1915. Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 33-36.

   Samuel’s appointment as the first High Commissioner was on account of his being a Zionist rather than having had any previous colonial administrative experience. He was greeted in Jaffa with a speech delivered in Hebrew by Meir Dizengoff, chairman of the Tel Aviv municipal council. Segev, *One Palestine..., p. 148.


7. The concept of “Pure Jewish Labor” was adopted by the WZO at least by 1914. Ibid. p. 196.


9. Thus, Musa Qassem Al-Husseini was removed from his post as mayor of Jerusalem in 1920. Though the second Palestinian National Congress was thwarted, the third, meeting in Haifa in December 1920, saw the election of the Exec. Committee that would lead it for the following 15 years, with Musa Qassem Al-Husseini at its head. PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 29-30.


**MAP 5**

1. The Covenant of the League of Nations was signed on 28 June 1919 at Versailles. Article 22 states as its guiding premise “to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the autonomous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well being and development of...”
The Balfour Declaration

"I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
On 22 September 1936 additional troops were requisitioned. Palestinian historian Abdelaziz Ayyad attributes a part of the urgency of the regional leaders in exerting efforts alongside and on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee to gain a cessation of the Revolt to this news.

Yehoshua Porath attributes lasting significance in terms of the development of the pan-Arab movement to the support for the Palestinian Arab Revolt throughout the region, but also notes the economic necessity for the Palestinians to ‘deescalate’ the revolt due to the vital citrus harvest season and the dire state of the rural economy.

Ayyad acknowledges the role though of the many Muslim Youth and other less pan-Arab groups in mobilizing support, finance and volunteers at the same time. In all, Porath’s assertion that the period represented a formative moment in the development of the Palestinian cause in the face of Zionism as a bedrock of Arab solidarity is born out by most commentators, Ayyad included. Yoav Gelber, among others, points out the many recurring elements of secretive collusion and twin-channel maneuvering which characterized the political strategies of the regional governments at the time, attributing to the period formative patterns of betrayal and manipulation that have persisted throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ayyad, Abdelaziz, *Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians 1850-1939*, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999, p. 161; Porath, Yehoshua, *In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945*, London: Frank Cass, 1986, p. 162; Gelber, Yoav, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-1948*, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 83-103.


*MAP 8*

1 Terms of Reference of the Technical Commission of Inquiry, as reproduced in *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, p. 44.
2 The Population Transfer Committee was established in early November 1937 as an ‘advisory committee’ following the approval by the 20th Zionist Congress of the principles embodied in the Peel Partition Plan. Yosef Weitz, director of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) Land Dept. became its first architect, though the plans he drew on had been part of the Zionist’s strategic vision for many years. On 21 November, Weitz presented his plan, remarking that “the transfer of Arab population from the area of the Jewish state does not serve only one aim - to diminish the Arab population. It also serves a second, no less important, aim which is to evacuate land presently held and cultivated by the Arabs and thus release it for the Jewish inhabitants.” His plan prioritized the eviction of three principal sectors of the Palestinian rural community: tenant farmers; landless villagers working as agricultural laborers or in other economic sectors; and farmers who owned less than three dunums per capita. By transferring these three “categories” as well as 10-15,000 Bedouin, Weitz calculated the Arab Palestinian population in the specified area would be reduced by one third. It was a process he envisioned being completed within a 2-3-year period. Masalha, Nur, “Expulsion of the Palestinians - The Concept of ‘Transfer’” in *Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992, pp. 25-37 & pp. 93-96.

3 *PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History*, p. 58. Ben-Gurion accepted the proposal after judging its shortcomings vis-à-vis Zionist territorial ambitions to be outweighed by the immense value of a non-Zionist plan which endorsed the concept of “forced transfer.” He wrote of the Peel Plan in his diary: “This will give us something we never had, even when we were under our own authority, neither in the period of the First Temple nor in the period of the Second Temple... forced transfer.” Segev, *One Palestine...*, p. 403.

4 Jabotinsky’s Revisionists took responsibility for the string of nearly weekly bombings throughout 1938, which were aimed at British as well as Palestinian targets. At least 598 Palestinians were killed in 1938. In addition, 216 Britons were killed by the militia over the year. The Arab Revolt’s armed bodies claimed lives too, but not on a scale comparable to that of the Revisionists. Despite this fact, of the 2,543 prisoners interned by the British during the year - 2,463 were Palestinian. On bombing attacks see Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, p. 194. On casualties and incarcerations see *A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1*, pp. 46-7.

5 Both Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon were among the ca. 150 Jewish members of British military commander Orde Wingate’s notorious 200-member ‘Special Night Squads.’ These squads terrorized the villagers of the Galilee and committed a number of well-documented massacres, after Wingate issued on the spot ‘death sentences’ to the male population for allegedly harboring rebels. Today’s Israeli army has issued a book in which it is stated: “The teachings of Orde Charles Wingate, his character and leadership were a cornerstone for many of the Haganah’s commanders, and his influence can be seen in the Israeli Defense Force’s combat doctrine.” Segev, *One Palestine...*, pp. 429-432. (And quoting *Lexicon of the Israeli Defense Force*, Tel Aviv: Min. of Defense, 1992.)

Ibid. p. 372


The single ‘Sursock Deal’ of 1921, involving the sale by the Beirut-based Sursock family of over 240,000 dunums saw at least 688 tenant farmers and their families rendered destitute. Stein, “Legal Protection and Circumvention of Rights...” pp. 258-260. See also, PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, p. 32.

The 1945-46 Survey of Palestine noted the “spectacular rises” in land prices brought about by the pressures of Zionist purchases, particularly in the vicinity of existing Jewish settlements. A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, p. 243.

Segev, One Palestine..., p. 260.


Taqqu notes that Zionist land policy was not the only force driving rural communities from their land. During the 1940s, the booming capital economy of the coastal region and a wartime demand for labor drew a large number of agriculturalists into the wage labor market of the urban sector, thus loosening the important financial and residential ties between many rural Palestinians and their land. Taqu, “Peasants into Workmen...” pp. 261-5.


Stein, “Legal Protection and Circumvention of Rights ...” p. 236.


MAP 10


The BBC broadcast one of the first unconfirmed reports of the extermination in December 1941. The Polish government, which was in exile at the time, reported to the US in mid-1942 on the use of gas chambers and incinerators. Polish Jewry was annihilated during the Holocaust. At least 2,800,000 Polish Jews were killed. Sachar, A History of Israel... p. 238 & p. 249. The Zionists apparently first came to learn of the death camps in June 1942. Segev, The Seventh Million, p. 73.

Sachar, A History of Israel... pp. 238-9.

In recognition of the scale of the disaster and their own limitations, the Zionist leadership at first resorted to attempts at saving those loyal to their agenda in Palestine. A memorandum issued by the JA’s ‘Rescue Committee’ in 1943 acknowledged that, “... if the efforts of the committee are likely, therefore, to lead to only the most minimal of results, we must at least achieve some political gain from them.” Segev, The Seventh Million, p. 98.

Ben-Gurion, prior to news of the concentration camps reaching him, had defined his priorities: “If I knew that it was possible to save all the children in Germany by transporting them to England, but only half of them by transporting them to Palestine, I would choose the second... Like every Jew, I am interested in saving every Jew wherever possible but nothing takes precedence over saving the Hebrew nation in its land.” Segev, One Palestine..., p. 394 (quoting Ben-Gurion’s memoirs). Segev’s research, first published in 1991, draws on an unprecedented range of declassified documents, interviews and personal memos. Its treatment of the Zionist movement’s various leaders and bodies during the war and immediately after it shattered many Israeli perceptions concerning the behavior of the Zionist leadership with regard to the extermination of European Jewry. Segev catalogues the disturbingly detached and cynical reactions of Israel’s future leaders and, while acknowledging their relative powerlessness to rescue any great number of survivors, is ultimately highly critical of the Zionist response. He resolves that, “only a few survivors owed their lives to the efforts of the Zionist movement,” and blames this in part on the predominantly secular and overarching
nationalist movement’s unwillingness to identify with the Jewish victims in Europe as anything more than lost potential settlers. Ben-Gurion himself remarked that, “[t]he disaster facing European Jewry is not directly my business.” Ibid. pp. 96-98.


3 Segev, The Seventh Million, p. 123.

4 British FM Bevin did raise the issue of resettling the displaced surviving Jews in Europe and claimed to be disturbed by the idea of ‘emptying’ Europe of its remaining Jews after the Holocaust. His position was rejected by the US and caused the Zionists to label him an Anti-Semite.

5 For an overview of the factors shaping Anglo-British strategies at the time see: Rubin, Barry, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947 - The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank Cass, 1980, pp. 132-150. The US was particularly vocal in its expressions of solidarity with the Zionists during the post-war years. On its strategic interests in the region, it was far less so. Later Truman would write, “it was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping...” Sachar, A History of Israel... p. 258.

MAP 11

1 Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora, p. 236.

2 In June 1947, the British High Commissioner in Palestine issued a memorandum itemizing, among other things, the victims and incidents of Zionist actions against Palestinians as well as Britons and British interests. Abdul Hadi, Ed., Documents on Palestine Vol. 1, pp. 146-148.

3 Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, p. 55.

4 On the significance of the July 1946 arrests: Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, p. 204. For an overview of Britain’s ‘proof’ linking the JA with the attacks by the Zionist militias: Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, p. 56-7.

5 Mandate Document, Article 15. The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate Document created this impossible position. Mid-way though the Mandate period, High Commissioner Sir John Herbert Chancellor referred to the Balfour Declaration as a “colossal blunder,” which he believed had left room for only four options: expelling the Arabs; expelling the Jews; maintaining the Mandate by military force; or canceling the Declaration. Segev, One Palestine..., p. 334. A Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, p. 7.


9 By 1941, only nine entirely Christian villages remained in Palestine.


MAP 12

1 Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, p. 60.

2 Ibid. p. 63.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 UNGA Res. 181 was passed with 33 votes in favor, 13 against and 10 abstentions. Arab states eligible were - Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria. They were joined by Afghanistan, Cuba, Greece, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in opposing the resolution. The Zionist leadership accepted the plan as a ‘step’ towards achieving sovereignty over all of ‘Eretz Israel’. The Palestinians, who had boycotted the UNSCOP mission to Palestine in July 1947, rejected it.


9 From the outset of the Mandate and the mass immigration waves that followed, the Zionist community had stuck firmly to its European identity, rejecting “native” inferiority. Ha’aretz, one of the earliest Hebrew papers declared: “We stand with Europe. Here in the East one thing is needed more than any other: European order and European government. This condition is more important than all the other conditions – even national rights.” (Ha’aretz, 28 March 1920.) Segev, One Palestine..., p. 153.

10 In submitting the Palestinian Question to the UN, Britain had stated that it would not take responsibility for the safety of the Jewish settlers. Segev, One Palestine..., p. 153.

It is impossible to be certain of this figure, due to the pace of the ongoing offensive. The rough figure of 70% is derived from available records. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, pp. 75-93.

One week after Britain left Palestine, the UNSC ordered a cease-fire, which held until early July - with notable exceptions - when fighting resumed. Another UNSC cease-fire was achieved later that month, which held until early October, when Israeli troops stormed the towns of Beersheba and Al-Auja. Again, the UNSC called for a cease-fire.

Following the 15 May 1948 declaration of Israel’s independence, recognized immediately by the US, the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Transjordan - along with a small Iraqi expeditionary force - invaded Palestine in a largely poorly coordinated and dubiously motivated effort to prevent total devastation. There had been long-running negotiations between the Zionists and Amir Abdullah, who was prepared to recognize a Jewish state in return for Zionist aid with and their acceptance of his ambition of absorbing eastern Palestine. As a consequence, it was unclear until late in the war if the Transjordanian forces were fighting in partial collusion with the Israeli army. In any event, although Transjordanian troops engaged the Israelis on many occasions throughout the course of the war, barring or incident they refrained from any such engagement within the area allotted the Zionists in the Partition Plan. Yohanan Gelber’s study of declassified telephone taps and Zionist archives from the period is inconclusive on the exact order of Abdullah’s priorities. He concludes that the purpose of the eventual mobilization of Abdullah’s forces against the Israeli army “was not to push the Jews into the Mediterranean but to save the Palestinians from total destruction, a contingency that appeared imminent towards the end of the Mandate. Abdullah, of course had ulterior motive for his participation - the annexation of Arab Palestine to his kingdom.” In July 1951, Palestinian Jerusalemite Shukri Esat assassinated Abdullah outside Al-Aqsa Mosque. Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, pp. 265-283.

Two weeks after signing the agreement with Egypt, which excluded access to the Gulf of Aqaba from the territory allotted Israel, Israeli forces staged an assault on the village of Umm Rashrash, expelling its inhabitants and founding Eilat on the site.


Summing up the failure of the Lausanne Conference, US delegate to the talks, Mark Ethridge wrote: “Israel must accept responsibility. Commission members... have consistently pointed out to the Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and delegation that the key to peace is some Israeli concession on refugees.” Ibid. p. 241.

Ben-Gurion waxed lyrical on the issue of borders as the negotiations floundered: “As for setting the borders – it’s an open-ended matter. In the Bible as well as in history there are all kinds of definitions of the country’s borders – there’s no real limit... The world has always been this way. Only the terms have changed. If they should find a way of reaching other stars, well then, perhaps the whole earth will no longer suffice...” Ben-Gurion speaking in late 1948, quoted in: Segev, 1949, p. 6.

MAP 13

2 Abufarha, Nasser, Land Ownership in Palestine/Israel, Al-Awda Information Paper, see: www.al-awda.org.
3 Jews owned less than 1% of the land in the Beersheba district; the remainder was in Palestinian ownership. Abdul Hadi, Ed., Documents on Palestine Vol. 1, p. 165.

Many Palestinian villages owned land collectively, divided according to hamulah (clan) lines and family size/structure. Since the late 1930s small purchases, influenced by the rising capital economy of the Mandate increased, creating a large number of smallholders in rural areas, but collective ownership and tenant farming remained dominant. Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, pp. 82-3; Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 9.
5 Masalha, Nur, Expulsion of the Palestinians, p. 82.
6 Ibid. p. 180.

Even as their forces advanced, the Israelis were taking advantage of their gains in cultivated Palestinian land. As spring arrived Palestinian crops were harvested by those who had taken possession of the land. By July 1948 Yitzhak Gvirtz was appointed to head an official department dedicated to this purpose. He reported that month that among his achievements he had “added 6-7,000 tons of grain to the Yishuv’s [Jewish pre-state community] economy...[and] earned more than IL (Israeli Lira) 100,000 for the Treasury.” Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 172.
tailed British land records indicate that 95% of Mandate Palestine’s land area classified as “Good Quality Soil” and 65% of that with “Medium Quality Soil” lay in the area conquered by Israel. Hadawi, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage*, p. 137.

Israel passed the Absentee Property Law in 1950. Prior to that date, the properties of refugees and the internally placed (later termed “present absentees”) was administered and transferred into government ownership via the so-called Custodian of Abandoned Property. The 1950 legislation created the Custodian of Absentee Property in its stead. I defined an ‘absentee’ as any person who “was a legal owner of any property situated in the area of Israel”, who, at his ordinary place of residence” or was at any time during the period 29 November 1947 [the UNGA Res. 181 (II)] and September 1948 in “a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment.” Thus, the definition could be applied to fully 60% of all Palestinians resident in the area which became Israel.


Israel’s war gains were not limited to the homes and lands they seized. Capital funds in Arab banks were requisitioned by the new Israeli Administration, and though exact figures are impossible to calculate the sums involved were plainly vast. In Haifa alone, 1.5 billion Palestine Pounds were seized. Segev, Tom, *1949, The First Israelis*, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1986 (1998 edition), p. 73.


The Partition Plan awarded the Zionists legitimacy and rendered their military actions against the British redundant. From that point on, their attentions turned immediately to the parallel objectives of affirming their dominance over the Arab population in the area allotted them in the plan and expanding the limits of that area through creating de facto Arab refugee camps. Their first military offensives were directed at areas, such as Jaffa and Jerusalem, which were excluded from the Jewish state in the partition plan. On the transformation of Haganah: Pappe, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 52. On refugees over specified period see ibid. p. 96; on British response to Haganah violence see Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 32-33; on early British collusion with Haganah see Segev, *One Palestine...,* p. 381.

Palestinian eyewitness accounts, affidavits and the many detailed works of Palestinian and other historians had been insistently denied by Zionist historians up until the 1980s. Israeli historian Benny Morris was amongst the first to lyze declassified Zionist documents describing the expulsions and his work has since forced other Israeli historians confront the issue more responsibly. Compelling and accurate Palestinian treatment of the 1947-1949 period has always pointed to the concerted and systematic nature of the “transfer.”

Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 32-33, p. 32.

The Arab population of Lydda-Ramleh in 1947 was 34,920. After the war, 2,000 Palestinians remained. In the course of the depopulation of these towns, at least 400 civilians were murdered in cold blood. A further 300-400 died from starvation, exhaustion and disease during the flight to Ramallah in the Jordanian-occupied area. The massacres precipitated a localized mass-exodus from within the surrounding communities, with the total numbers amounting to some 70,000. Ben-Gurion was not ashamed to take credit: “We decided to clean out Ramleh,” aid. Segev, *One Palestine...,* p. 511. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, p. 49.

Counts of ‘Operation Dani’ are given in: Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, pp. 204-211.

Chairman of the Zionist Exec. declared: “Even Jews who don’t wish to leave [their homes for Israel] must be drded to come...” Segev, 1949, p. 69.


ese regulations, based on those imposed by the British Mandate in its effort to quash the 1936-39 Arab Revolt, not prevented the Palestinians remaining in Israel from returning to their homes, but limited their freedom of emigration, curtailed their right to property and placed them under military rule for the best part of 20 years. Lustick, *In the Jewish State*, pp. 11-52; Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 144-155.


Chairman of the Zionist Exec. declared: “Even Jews who don’t wish to leave [their homes for Israel] must be driven to come...” Segev, 1949, p. 110.
Following the massacre at Lydda and Ramleh (see Map 14 & note 3), Yitzhak Rabin asked Deir-Yassin to be done with the Palestinians, whereupon Israel’s first PM ordered him to expel them. Rabin’s account of events was excised from his autobiography by the Israeli censor, but was published by the New York Times in 1979. See Palestinian Catastrophe, pp. 127-128.

Irrefutable evidence of Israeli war crimes during and after the war is plentiful. Israel’s own early political leaders discussed at length in correspondence and recorded meetings the instances of massacre, looting and rape. In addition, UN observers made detailed reports of such atrocities. At the time, there were those within the Zionist middle-rank leadership who were uncomfortable with the atrocities committed during the war and demanded explanations, but these were generally brushed aside. Aharon Cizling, Israel’s first Min. of Agriculture, addressed the first Israeli Cabinet: “Now Jews too have behaved like Nazis and my entire being has been shaken... Obviously we have to conceal these actions from the public, and I agree that we should not even reveal that we’re investigating them. But they must be investigated...” Segev, 1949, p. 26.

Calculating these figures poses a number of problems and cannot be done with absolute certainty. According to British records, the area conquered by the Zionists contained 469 purely Palestinian villages and nine purely Palestinian towns (totaling, therefore, 505). However, these figures do not account for purely Palestinian suburbs mixed towns (such as Haifa and Jerusalem) overrun and demolished during or after the war; nor do they include small ‘hamlets’ of the Bedouins in the Beersheba district. Dr. Salman Abu Sitta’s more comprehensive count of ‘populated’ localities, incl. suburbs and Bedouin sites, reveals a total of 531 locations. Walid Khalidi, meanwhile, has published an encyclopedia identifying 418 destroyed or depopulated villages. In any respect, the number of Palestinian villages left physically intact within the borders of Israel following the war has been put at 121. Thus, assuming the figure of 121 correct, and subtracting that from the total of 505 listed by the British, a figure of at least 384 destroyed villages and towns can be safely posited. Going further to include smaller ‘localities’ and ‘habitations’ increases these figures, showing 598 individual sites to be occupied during the war and 472 of these subsequently destroyed. Sal, Abdul Jawad & Mustafa, Walid, Palestine: The Collective Deconstruction of Palestinian Villages and Zion Colonization, 1882-1982, Jerusalem Center for Development Studies - London, (published in Amman), 1987, pp. 31; Hadawi, Palestine: Loss of a Heritage, p. 138; Abu Sitta, The Palestinian Nakba, 1948: The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine, London: The Palestine Return Center, 1998; Khalidi, Walid, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992; Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, p. 48.

Overall, approximately 75% of all occupied sites were destroyed - 96% of all villages in the Jaffa sub-district were destroyed, as were 95% in Beisan, 90% in Safad and 90% in Tiberias. Saleh, Abdul Jawad & Mustafa, Walid, Palestine: The Collective Deconstruction of Palestinian Villages..., p. 31.

Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, pp. 136-137.

Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, p. 48.


Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, p. 40.

Ian Lustick has summarized the post-war motivation for destroying or resettling (with Jews) Palestinian villages as follows: “The Israeli leadership anticipated that the buildings and lands of the refugees, if left deserted, would reinforce pressures for the return of their owners.” Ibid. p. 46.

Masalha, Nur, Expulsion of the Palestinians, p. 175.

Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 181. See also pp. xviii-xx.

In 1969, Moshe Dayan referred to the eradication of Palestinian villages saying: “Jewish villages were built in place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no longer exist; not only do the books no longer exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Na’ama in the place of Mahlul; Gvatt in the place of Jibta; Sarid in the place of Huneifs; and K. Yeheshu’a in the place of Tal al-Shuman. There is not a single place built in this country that did not have a for Arab population.” Moshe Dayan’s address to the Haifa Technion, quoted in Ha’aretz, 4 April 1969.
Chapter Two:

1949 – 1991

(Maps 16-26)
Israeli actions troubled the US and Britain, as the Cold War gained momentum and regional tensions Britain's pacts with Jordan and Iraq, along with US fear of Soviet penetration, left little room for emergence of a strong Arab leader, who might jeopardize their interests and challenge Isr intransigence. Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power in Egypt between 1952 and 1955 was the turning point. Britain and France controlled the Suez Canal by virtue of an 80-year Universal Suez Canal Concession - a remnant of Britain's colonial arrangements that meant control of oil resources and shipping. France was Britain's prize in the region. At the same time it stood as a stark reminder of the territorial economic limitations of Arab independence.

Nasser struck a popular regional chord with his uncompromising stance against subservience to the G Powers and his condemnations of Israel. Calls for Arab unity and, eventually, his procurement of an arm deal with the Soviet bloc, angered Britain, France and the US. Each had refused to supply arms and t made loans for the construction of Egypt's huge Aswan Dam project conditional on it surrendering economy to the World Bank. Nasser's resort to the Soviets brought the Cold War to the region in full swing. France rushed to supply Israel with arms and vehicles while Britain counseled its allies.

On 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, pledging to compensate Anglo-French sharehold and declaring his intention to use canal profits to finance the Aswan Dam. British PM Anthony Eden told cabinet, "...we shall never have a better pretext for intervention against him than we have as a result of the seizure of the Suez Canal." With the US cautious and much of the non-aligned world supportive of Nasser's stance, Israel, France and Britain colluded in secrecy.

On 29 October, in accordance with a prearranged pact (the Sevres Pact), Israel struck across the virtually undefended Sinai. The first victims were not, though, in Egypt. Back in Israel, 43 Palestinian civilians were killed in cold blood in yet another massacre, as Israel clamped down on Arab minority communities. After bombing Cairo and annihilating Egyptian air defenses, an Anglo-French force landed at Port Said, 15 minutes after a UN deadline for the cessation of hostilities expired. With French naval support, Israel consolidated its conquest of the Gaza Strip (3 November) and Sinai (5 November), and by the morning of 6 November, the war was over. Britain and France held the canal; Israel held the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

For Israel, the Sinai represented the Straits of Tiran through which Egypt had blockaded Israel's access to shipping channels. A new port was under construction at Eilat, and Israel wanted to ensure access via the Gulf of Aqaba. Thus, when worldwide criticism and US fear of regional instability eventuated in pressure from Washington for the aggressors to yield their conquests, Israel insisted on safe-passage guarantees from America. Britain and France left the Suez in late December 1956. Israel quit the Sinai and Gaza Strip in March 1957, as the UN deployed an Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure the area. UNEF remained alongside the Egyptian authorities in Gaza until the 1967 War.

The repercussions of the Suez War were enormous. Effectively, Britain's day in the region was over and the US stepped in as the major player. In 1958, Britain's regime in Iraq was dismissed in a military coup, and by the summer, US troops were deploying in Lebanon. Nasser's defiance won him huge popularity throughout the Arab World and beyond, securing his status as 'leader of the Arab people' for the coming decade. The rise of Arab unity and pride fuelled emerging Palestinian national movements, with the nuclei of the future liberation movements established between 1957-1958.
EGYPT
Suez
Monastery of St. Catherine
Sharm Esh-Sheikh
Tar
Khalet An-Nakhal
Kuntilla
El-Arish
Rafah
Gaza
Gulf of Suez
Mediterranean Sea

Egyptian Sinai Peninsula

Suez Canal

Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip - occupied by Israel, 5 Nov. 1956 - 6 March 1957

32-km wide Suez Canal zone - occupied by Britain and France, 7 Nov. - late Dec. 1956

Israeli advances, 29 Oct. - 5 Nov. 1956

Anglo-French invasion 1-7 Nov. 1956

French Naval Bombardment of Gaza

Beersheba
Aqaba
Eilat
Straits of Tiran

ISRAEL
SAUDI ARABIA
JORDAN
UNRWA was formally established in late 1949 and began operat
in May 1950. By then the need for a coordinated international program aimed at alleviating the sufferin
the dispossessed was acute. In December 1948, Israeli PM Ben Gurion had rejected UN Res. 194 ca
for the swift return of Palestinian refugees and restitution of their property, declaring, "...we will I
everything... [w]e will not allow the Arabs back." Three months earlier, Chief UN Mediator in Pales
Count Folke Bernadotte's assessment that, "...no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is
accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged;", resulted in his assassination by members of the Israeli military.

The scale of the refugee problem threatened the region with economic disaster. Initial 1947-48 waves
refugees had tripled the population of the Gaza Strip, doubled that of the West Bank and put unmanagea
stress on the underdeveloped and poor neighboring states of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. UNRWA ca
equipped with a mandate to provide refugees with shelter and educational, health and food progra
throughout the affected region and as such became the key public service provider for well over half of
the Palestinian people. The task was immense and in 1951 some 87% of refugee camp residents remain
in tents. Regional crises, especially Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip (November 1956-March 195
made UNRWA's work no easier and the lives of the refugees yet harder. The task was further complicate
by budget limitations and a high refugee growth rate, which peaked at 10% in 1958. Camps struggled
to provide even minimal shelter and sanitation services, with the overwhelming majority of residents with
running water, sewage networks or proper housing.

By 1958, 70% of Gaza's population were registered Palestinian refugees. Jordan's annexation of the We
Bank in 1950 meant that some 75% of the Hashemite Kingdom's population was Palestinian, 36% of who
were registered refugees. In Syria and Lebanon the figures were lower, at 2.5% and 8% respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jordan - 25</th>
<th>Gaza Strip - 8</th>
<th>Lebanon - 16</th>
<th>Syria - 9</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camps</td>
<td>RRs in RCs</td>
<td>RRs in RCs</td>
<td>RRs in RCs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Askar</td>
<td>2,917/201</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>7,559</td>
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<td>Balata</td>
<td>5,695/Beit Jibrin (Azzah)</td>
<td>1,118/Al-Maghazi</td>
<td>7,545/Jaf Al-Bara'ah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp No. 1</td>
<td>2,368/Fawwar</td>
<td>5,156/Khan Younis</td>
<td>19,761/Shatila</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far'a</td>
<td>5,955/Arroub</td>
<td>6,938/Nuseirat</td>
<td>14,701/Jass Al-Basha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janin</td>
<td>3,408/Janin</td>
<td>20,010/Rafah</td>
<td>19,043/Mieh Mieh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agabat Jabar</td>
<td>3,608/Zarga</td>
<td>6,466/Jabelia</td>
<td>22,308/Arab Al-Hilweh</td>
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<td>Nuweimeh</td>
<td>7,301/Irbit</td>
<td>7,621</td>
<td>10,650/Hama</td>
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<td>Ein Sultan</td>
<td>17,339/Al-Karamah</td>
<td>23,664</td>
<td>9,718/Dera'a</td>
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<td>Ama'r'i</td>
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<td>3,670/Rashidiyyah</td>
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<td>Deir Ammar</td>
<td>2,272</td>
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<td>4,151/Buj Ash-Shamali</td>
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<td>Jalazoun</td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,980/Nahr Al-Bared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qalandia</td>
<td>2,681</td>
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<td>3,129/Beddawi</td>
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<td>Mu'askar</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,418/Waveil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dheisheh</td>
<td>5,329</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,071/Gouraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Refugees Living in UNRWA Camps:</td>
<td>181,261</td>
<td>134,145</td>
<td>51,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Refugees Living Outside UNRWA RCs:</td>
<td>386,109</td>
<td>103,623</td>
<td>75,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Refugees:</td>
<td>567,370</td>
<td>237,968</td>
<td>126,485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNRWA
Publicly, Israel would always maintain that the war was an act of defense against Syrian border aggression and Nasser's deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Privately, the leading figures - Israeli PM L. Eshkol, DM Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin - admitted that the war was an opportunistic, haphazard act of aggressive expansion. In the years leading up to the war, Israel had been engaged in a minor war of attrition along its eastern border, as Palestinian guerillas infiltrated and attacked Israeli territory. Generally, Israel saw King Hussein's Jordan as a potential accomplice in controlling the Palestinians and the two states' Soviet weaponry troubled Israel, while the US supported Israel as a strategic means of challenging Soviet allies and regional Arab nationalism.

In early 1967, Israel commenced a concerted drive to escalate tensions on the Syrian border. According to Dayan, "it went this way: we would send a tractor to plow someplace... in the demilitarized zone, and kneel in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and lay the air force... that's how it was." One such incident, in April 1967, culminated in Israeli jets over flying Damascus to shoot down six Syrian planes. A month later, Rabin, in a newspaper interview, threatened to conquer Damascus. Nasser, the acknowledged leader of the Arab World, found himself obliged to make a show of strength and to act on Egypt's defense pact with Syria. After deploying troops in the Sinai, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

The US informed Israel it saw no sign of any imminent Arab invasion, but that in any event Israel would "whip the hell out of them," and pledged to replenish Israeli armaments in a post-war scenario. Israel acted on 5 June, attacking Egypt's air force on the ground and annihilating it in two hours. When Syrian and Jordanian forces engaged from the east, their air forces met a similar fate. Some 400 planes were destroyed in a single day. In the five subsequent days, Dayan and Rabin transformed an originally operational plan limited to securing the Straits of Tiran and effecting 'minor border adjustments' on the eastern front, into one of huge assaults and lightning territorial conquest. The attack on the Sinai was well-planned, but the occupation of the entire West Bank and Golan Heights had not been anticipated. The West Bank was 'grabbed' as soon as intelligence reports revealed that King Hussein had ordered his troops back across the Jordan. The Golan was captured last and without even the pretence of military justification. Dayan bypassed the Chief of Staff to order the Golan offensive on the penultimate day of the war, hours after Syria had requested a cease-fire. Dayan would later call his adventurism a 'failure of duty'. PM Eshkol called him a "vile man."

The war Israel had initiated with Egypt led their armies against Jordan and Syria and brought them massive unexpected gains on all fronts. PM Eshkol proclaimed "a new political reality in the Mideast." Following the cessation of hostilities on 10 June, the UNSC called on Israel to comply with the 4th Geneva Convention and to allow the "return of those inhabitants who have fled..." Israel did neither. During the war, Israel had again employed its 1948 tactic of razing entire Palestinian villages to the ground (in the Latrun area). Some 300,000 Palestinians had been added to the refugee Diaspora by the end of the war. Another 1.3 million Palestinians found themselves under Israeli military occupation, divided into two areas - the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Territories conquered and occupied by Israel as of 10 June 1967

- Villages depopulated and razed by Israel: Beit Nuba, Emwas and Yallo
to near unanimous world opinion, did not, however, recognize Jordanian or Egyptian rights over the West Bank or Gaza Strip, claiming to have 'liberated' these areas from 'illegal occupation'. But the demographic aspect of absorbing the indigenous Palestinian population into the Jewish State ruled out annexing these areas outright to Israel. In contrast, the conquest of Jerusalem was instantly deemed irreversible and, by 28 June, the Knesset had amended its laws and placed the entire city and expanded municipal area under Israeli sovereignty, later annexing the 70-km² area. Here the demographic problem was considered a price worth paying, though subsequent Israeli policy would aim at ridding Jerusalem of its Palestinian population (see Maps 38, 43, 44 & 52).

Thus, in the days following the Israeli occupation, frantic and often conflicting plans for the future of the occupied territories were drawn up in each of these areas: Jerusalem; the Golan; Sinai; the Gaza Strip; and the West Bank. While no single plan was ever officially sanctioned, the Allon Plan, drawn up by Labor Min. Yigal Allon, was the scheme most acceptable to the military and was the first to be presented before the cabinet - in late July, barely six weeks after the cease-fire. In deference to the government's early aim of preserving its territorial options in the Sinai and Golan, the Allon Plan initially focused on the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). Inevitably, the plan evolved and expanded according to the divergent views and levels of influence of other cabinet figures, but was nonetheless to remain Israel's loose master plan for the OPT for nearly a decade.

Once the decision to retain control over the OPT had been made, the systematic installation of civilian and military colonies on Palestinian land as a means of and that control commenced. The Allon Plan provided the initial boundaries and priorities for this settlement drive. Allon, with his assistant Dani Agmon, planned a broad corridor of paramilitary and civilian sites along the Jordan Valley, to run down the western shore of the Dead Sea in an even broader belt, reaching west to Hebron. This created a settlement strip from the Israeli town of Arad (in the northeastern Negev), north to Beit Shean (Beisan) in Israel's southern Galilee. The corridor between Israel's coastal plain and unilaterally annexed Jerusalem was broadened extensively, creating a wide settlement zone between Ramallah and Bethlehem. Allon tentatively planned for Gaza's refugees - ca. 75% of the Gaza population - to be transferred to the two militarily administered cantons created on the West Bank, followed by the annexation and settlement of the Gaza Strip, though this never eventuated.

By remaining unofficial and vaguely worded, the Allon Plan bridged the gap between the government's need to appear moderate to the international community and its desire to maintain the option of 'stretching settlement boundaries in the future. Indeed, only weeks after the initial plan, Allon submitted a supplementary plan for extensive settlement in the Golan. Some months later, Allon amended his plan to include a corridor linking Ramallah with Jordan and a 'highway' connecting the north and south Palestinian cantons from Bethlehem to Ramallah. Meanwhile, DM Moshe Dayan's separate proposal for military installations along the mountain ridges within the envisioned Palestinian cantons was also incorporated into the plan. By 1971, settlements were also being built in the Sinai Peninsula, as the Allon Plan was stretched yet further.

In 1976, PM Rabin and DM Peres eventually made the decision to break with Allon's settlement 'lines' and pursue settlement deep in the northern canton (i.e., in the Ramallah, Salfit and Qalqilya areas). The rise of ideological messianic settlement bodies and extensive unauthorized settlement activity throughout the OPT had made strict adherence to the Allon Plan a political liability, if not an impossibility. The Allon Plan's erosion - not least at the hands of its author, who had headed the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee - was confirmed by Rabin, but its guiding principles were only finally cast off with the 1977 Likud victory. The Likud came to power having adopted a pro-settlement platform highly critical of the Allon Plan limitations and having pledged their support for the initiation of unfettered settlement programs throughout the OPT. PM Begin appointed Agriculture Min. Ariel Sharon head of 'Allon's' Settlement Committee (see Map 24).
Map 19

Israel - prior to 1967

Territories for settlement according to plan

West Bank areas to be left unsettled in plan
Palestinian political movements they formed, such as Faten. Instead, in 1964, the Arab League formed the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Ostensibly under Nasser’s patronage, the PLO - headed by
Palestinian Ahmed Shuqeiri - professed an aim of, “organizing the Palestinian people and enabling them to
play their role in the liberation of their country,” but initially remained subservient to the established Arab
leaders.²

In late 1964, Yasser Arafat’s Fateh movement took the initiative and launched its first guerrilla attack on
Israel. The next year, Fateh ran 39 such operations and began recruiting volunteers from the refugee
camps.³ After the 1967 War and the defeat of the Arab armies, many saw the outgoing Palestinian efforts as
the only sign of Arab resistance and more volunteers joined as numerous other groups were formed.
Israel’s destruction of West Bank and Gaza networks following the war left Jordan as the main base for
guerrilla forces, which accrued a degree of virtual autonomy in a number of border villages.

Some 78 guerrilla attacks were launched across the Jordan River in as many days in early 1968, prompting a
massive Israeli retaliation on 21 March⁵ when 15,000 Israeli troops participated in the attack on Karameh.
Anticipating the offensive, Arafat ordered his 250 Fateh fighters to resist alongside 80 other guerrillas and
division of the Jordanian army. The guerrillas lost 116 men, the Jordanians 61, but at Karameh (which
means ‘dignity’ or ‘honor’) a vast Israeli force met real resistance: 28 soldiers were killed and a legend was
born. In the 48 hours following the battle, 5,000 recruits enlisted with Fateh. Other movements were also
inundated with volunteers and Yasser Arafat achieved near mythical status.⁷ He rode a wave of popular
endorsement to wrest control of the PLO in early 1969 and late that year was seen not only as the leader of the resistance but, in many instances, of the Palestinian people.

By 1970, PLO forces were operating their own police, courts, trade unions, media and armed forces
throughout the Jordanian refugee camps and beyond.⁸ As an umbrella organization whose constituent parties
ranged from revolutionary Marxists to separatist nationalists, the PLO was at once broad-based and
fractious. The tactics of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had, by 1969, drawn the
armed conflict firmly into the international arena, the same year Fateh was holding secret talks with
Israel in Paris.⁹ The presence of armed, often unruly, autonomous Palestinian forces posed a serious
challenge to the Hashemite regime.¹⁰ Then, in September 1970, the PFLP landed three hijacked airliners
an airfield near Amman, released the passengers and, after making their case before the assembled
international media, blew up the aircraft.¹¹ Humiliated by the display of his impotence, King Hussein
forced to finally impose his authority on the militias.

The next day, 16 September, the Jordanian army began its offensive, declaring martial law and using
artillery on PLO strongholds and camps. The ‘Black September’ civil war lasted until 27 September, leaving
over 3,000 dead and many camps and cities, incl. Amman, devastated.¹² Syrian military intervention to aid
the PLO raised regional stakes and Cold War concerns, eventuating in Nasser’s mediation of an urgent
cease-fire agreement in Cairo.¹³ The War of 1970 reduced the PLO’s presence to the ‘Ajlun and Jerash
strongholds, from which - in July 1971 - Hussein finally ousted them, leaving a further 3,000 Palestinian
dead.¹⁴

Arafat and his fighters fled to Lebanon, where the PLO set up its next headquarters. The ‘honeymoon’
Jordan had been brought to an end and Lebanon stood to become the next theater of conflict, as Israel
stepped up efforts to eliminate a Palestinian national movement that had proved itself highly capable and
had also exhibited its potential to divide as much as unite the Arab World.
successor Anwar Sadat, had responded to domestic and regional doubts about his credibility and the role of post-1967 Egypt by seeking a way out of the prevailing stalemate with Israel. Sadat came to power after the 17-month war of attrition (1969-70) waged along the closed Suez Canal had already pitched US-client Israel against Soviet-aligned Egypt in a struggle, which ended inconclusively and increased Arab malcontent with the status quo.

Hafez Al-Assad’s 1970 rise to power in Syria, like Sadat’s in Egypt, prompted awkward questions about the aims and worth of Arab solidarity in the face of Israel’s intransigent occupation. Both leaders sought a way to extract themselves with honor from the humiliating legacy of 1967. Meanwhile, in Israel, PM Golda Meir and DM Dayan led a distinctly ‘hawkish’ Labor government, wherein even FM Eban complained of his colleagues’ “...exaggerated vision of the role of war in international politics.”

With the Vietnam War raging, the US, guided by the so-called Nixon Doctrine, was set on limiting containment of the Arab-Israeli Cold War theater, opting to keep the sides engaged in “protracted and inconclusive negotiations,” through low-level channels. By late 1971, Nixon’s National Security Council head Henry Kissinger was pleased to see, “the stalemate for which I had striven by design.” Sadat repeated the quest for a diplomatic breakthrough, presenting UN Sec.-Gen. Jarring and US Sec. of State Rogers with a number of unprecedented concessions and formulations. Breaking with all prior stipulations, in 1971 he declared his willingness to accept a token Israeli withdrawal from the Suez zone as part of an interim deal in a significant move the US later regretted having missed. In any event, Israel, operating under an inflationary belief in its own might and Arab impotence, either rejected or ignored Sadat’s initiatives, and came under US pressure to acknowledge them. Turning instead to the OPT, in 1973 Israel prepared a new hard-line plan for expanded colonization in the Palestinian territories (the Galili Document). DM Dayan proclaimed “[a] new State of Israel, with broad frontiers, strong and solid, with the authority of the Israel Government extended from the Jordan to the Suez Canal.”

Sadat’s dramatic 1972 expulsion of some 15,000 Soviet personnel had loosened the Cold War restraints on military action and placed the strategist in unfettered command of Egypt’s Soviet weaponry. On 6 October 1973, he acted; Syria and Egypt launched a coordinated offensive against the Israeli forces occupying the Golan and Sinai on Yom Kippur - the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. The surprise was total, and initial Arab gains impressive, but after nearly three weeks and two separate cease-fires (Syria-Israel on 21 October, Egypt-Israel on 26 October), neither Israeli nor Arab armies had achieved a territorial victory.

Some 2,838 Israelis and 8,528 Arabs had paid their lives, but the deadlock was broken. UNSC Res. 338, ordering the cease-fire of 22 October, invoked UNSC Res. 242 of 1967, with its demand for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with International Law. UN troops were deployed to enforce the cease-fires; Israel was forced back from the Suez, which reopened under Egyptian control; and the US was finally forced into active, high-level shuttle diplomacy between Cairo, Damascus and Israel.

The October War brought down the Israeli government amid national crisis and laid the foundations for the first substantive Arab-Israeli peace talks. It also placed the US in the fateful position of Middle East mediator and reinvigorated the struggle to resist Israel’s expansionism - a goal which suddenly appeared eminently more possible.
Map 21

The Syrian Front at the Cease-Fire of 22 October 1973

- Damascus
- Tyre
- Beirut
- Haifa
- Tel Aviv
- Jerusalem
- Gaza
- Beirut
- Damascus
- Safed
- Nazareth
- Irbid
- Jez Canal
- Syrian Golan Heights occupied since 1967

The Egyptian Front at the Cease-Fire of 26 October 1973

- Port Said
- Suez
- Sharm Esh Sheikh
- Cairo
- Ismailia
- Egyptian Sinai occupied since 1967
- Mediterranean Sea
- Sinai
- SAUDI ARABIA
- EGYPT

rab territories occupied by Israel since 1967
occupied Egyptian territory regained during the October War and held at its end
Additional Arab territories captured by Israel during the October War and held at its end
remained in the central and western Galilee, ca. 31,000 in the area known as the ‘Little Triangle’ (bordering the north-western tip of the West Bank) and ca. 13,000 in the Negev. A further 10-12,000 were residing in the previously ‘mixed’ cities of Akko, Haifa and Jaffa. With the exception of the Galilee’s Nazareth (16,800) and Um Al- Fahm in the ‘Little Triangle’ (5,000) the remaining Palestinian localities were small hamlets and villages. About 70% of the Arab community were Muslim, 21% Christian and 9% Druze.¹

The existence of a 12.5% ‘non-Jewish’ minority was immediately conceived of by the leaders of the Jewish State as a threat - both in terms of the Zionist imperative of an ethnically exclusive nation and in terms of the Palestinians’ ‘suspect loyalties’ given the state of regional conflict.² Four days after Israel’s 15 May 1948 declaration of independence, the provisional government issued the ‘Defense Emergency Regulations’ invoking repressive British Mandate laws employed to crush the 1936-39 Revolt. These regulations paved the way for the creation of a dual, or two-tier, legal administration that placed the Palestinians under military rule until 1966. Among the first directives issued to the military governors was that to evacuate ‘sentient abandoned villages.’³

The military government was not merely an instrument of physical control, but was used to systematically erode and counter any efforts by the Palestinians to improve upon their fragmented and isolated status both as a community and vis-à-vis Jewish government and society. Some 170 military orders were issued, limiting the Palestinians’ basic rights to property, travel, political activity and freedom of speech.⁴ Israeli Arab Affairs Advisor described the Palestinians in Israel as, “sworn and everlasting enemies,” and that military commanders agreed: “they must be checked, patrolled and supervised.”⁵

Israel’s perception of the Palestinians as a ‘demographic threat’ fueled a drive to settle and control areas of ‘non-Jewish’ character. By 1966, when the military government was abolished, 35 post-1948 exclusive Jewish settlements had been established in the Galilee and over 100 in the Negev area.⁶ Many more were planned. Meanwhile, some 100 Palestinian villages were not even recognized by Israel, which ‘zoned’ them in ‘non-residential’ areas and has persistently denied them the most fundamental infrastructure and development. ‘Re-zoning’ later meant that Jewish towns were erected on the land of unrecognized villages, where they enjoy national development priority status.⁷

Within four decades of the 1948 War at least 80% of the Palestinian minority’s land would be expropriated by the state. By the mid-1970s, 533,800 Palestinians made up 15.3% of Israel’s population, yet only four of the 120 members of Knesset were ‘non-Jews’, the adult illiteracy rate among Palestinian women was near 60% and under 3% of higher education students were Palestinian.⁸ Persistent discrimination, both legal and de facto, the near total loss of landholdings, and the strengthening of their Palestinian identity following the 1967 War, hastened the emergence of an organized ‘civic struggle’ for rights and equality.⁹

In 1976, with Israel declaring its commitment to “populate the Galilee [with Jews],” so as to, “protect national land,” and expropriation accelerating, a general protest strike was called. On 30 March 1976, dozens of committees and emerging political bodies led a popular protest rally against expropriation in the Galilee. When Israeli forces attempted to impose a curfew to quell the protests, clashes erupted, in the course of which some 40 Palestinians were killed. ‘Land Day’ has thereafter been observed annually to commemorate and further the struggle of the oppressed Palestinian minority against dispossession, discrimination and marginalization.
Map 22

Arabs as % of Israeli Population by Region

- Less than 15%
- 15 - 35%
- 36 - 50%
- 51 - 65%
- 66 - 80%
- 81 - 95%
- More than 95%

Map: adapted from Lustick, Ian, Arabs in the Jewish State, 1980.
Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League and, in 1981, Sadat's assassination.

By 1977, the gains of the 1973 War had lost their worth in Egypt, where economic decline, coupled with the debilitating cost of maintaining a standing army, presented a fresh threat to the regime's credibility. A 1974 Sinai Disengagement Agreement, brokered by the US, had seen a realignment of Israeli and Egyptian forces to the east of the Suez Canal zone and, after leading to the 1975 'Sinai accord, created a UN buffer between them. However, the agreements were in truth US-Israeli 'engagement' accords, with the US pledging $4 billion annually over three years to Israel in exchange for a stabilization of the canal and lowering of regional tension. As such, the agreement fell far short of a peace treaty and in itself offered no prospect for an agreed Israeli withdrawal or even negotiations toward that end.¹

The Arab League's 1974 endorsement of the PLO's as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" had thwarted Israeli ambitions of achieving a separate peace deal with Jordan and placed a Palestinian leadership Israel refused to recognize central to the attainment of its "comprehensive" peace, upon which the Arab states insisted. Sadat's initial peace formulations were guided by this 'comprehensive' doctrine, calling for multilateral talks aimed not only at Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, but at its full implementation of UNSC Res. 242. But Israel's utter rejection of PLO involvement or discussion on the sovereignty of the OPT left Sadat isolated and the 1978 bilateral talks, held under US auspices, paid only lip-service to the Palestinians. Israeli PM Begin, recognizing Sadat's fear of appearing to 'sell out' the Palestinians and Arab unity for his own gain, eventually acceded to a watered-down framework for partial Palestinian autonomy in the OPT, but kept its definition vague and free of real commitment.²

The weak autonomy plan, unacceptable to the PLO and Arab states, provided Begin with the opportunity to combine normalization and mutual recognition with Israel's largest 'confrontation' state with an unstated international acknowledgment of de facto Israeli sovereignty over an expanded Israel, i.e., incl. the OPT. This was this factor, along with the gains of dividing the Arab World and diluting the pressure it could place on the UN or US, which allowed Begin's 'hawkish' Likud government to accept a three-year staged withdrawal from the Sinai in exchange for peace.³ The final treaty was signed in March 1979. Four days later, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) called the treaty, "a conspiracy which should be rejected and resisted by all means."⁴ The PLO saw the autonomy idea for what it was: a sop to the Palestinians that the Israelis had no plan to implement.⁵ Not only was the autonomy plan never begun, but the domestic repercussions of Israel's evacuation of its 17 illegal Sinai settlements (with a population of over 5,000) brought about a 'compensatory' buttressing of illegal colonization in the OPT.⁶ Settlement in Sinai had begun in 1967, but had only become a formal component of the extended Allon Plan in the early 1970s. The Labor governments of Meir and Rabin had pursued a plan to settle a thin strip along the eastern Sinai reaching Sharm Esh-Sheikh, while creating a settlement 'buffer' between Gaza and Egypt in the northeast of the peninsula. Thousands of indigenous Egyptian Bedouins were expelled from the target areas.⁷ Begin had encouraged and expanded the program even during the Camp David process - he planned to retire to the Sinai.⁸

The struggle waged against evacuation by the expansionist and settler lobby - both in the government and the activist movements - was bitter and sometimes violent. On 22 April 1982, Sinai's 'urban center' Yamr was forcibly evacuated by Israeli troops and the Sinai withdrawal completed, on time, by 25 April. On Taba, a 1.2-km² patch west of Eilat, was retained by Israel, but the Sinai evacuation galvanized the settlement movements, spurring greatly increased activity in the OPT.⁹

The Camp David accords, with their OPT autonomy component, laid the groundwork for future diplomatic initiatives - incl. the failed Oslo process - and ushered in a new era of US-Arab relations, with Egypt at the forefront of American regional defense plans.¹⁰ But Egypt's recognition of Israel also cost it the leadership of the Arab World and Sadat his life. Peace with Egypt had consolidated Israel's hold on Palestinian territory and freed it to focus on eradicating the newly developing PLO mini-state in Lebanon.¹¹

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Map 23

- UN buffer, Sept. 1975-1979
- Egyptian demilitarized zone, 1975-1979
- Israeli Sinai settlement zone, 1971-1979 (according to amended Allon Plan)
  - Principal Israeli Sinai settlement
  - Suez Canal
  - Egypt-Israel border after Israeli withdrawal, April 1982

Map: PASSIA, 2002
The Wachman, or ‘Double-Backbone Plan’, unofficially approved by PM Rabin in 1976, provided Shi with an overall long-term vision of mass settlement. Like Allon, Wachman called for settlement primarily in sparsely populated areas. The plan aimed at maximizing Jewish demography throughout the eastern C Coast, the Sinai and the Golan, while encircling - rather than settling - the major Palestinian population center. Wachman’s geo-strategic vision aimed at settling 2.5 million Jews in the Golan Heights-Sharm E-Sheikh coastline. Wachman’s vision of settling 2.5 million Jews in the Golan Heights-Sharm E-Sheikh coastline aimed at maximizing Jewish demography throughout the eastern C Coast, the Sinai and the Golan, while encircling - rather than settling - the major Palestinian population center.

When Wachman refused Sharon an amended plan incorporating ‘Judea, Samaria and Gaza,’ Sharot turned to Matityahu Drobles, head of the WZO’s Land Settlement Dept. and a Gush Emunim loyalist, to transform existing existing bureaucratic structures to allow separate planning in the OPT. Drobles endorsed the Drobles Plan in 1977. Drobles expanded the scope of the original plan by drawing together all existing settlements and 57 new ones into blocs controlling arterial routes, ridges and water sources, breaking Palestinian demographic continuity. Cities were encapsulated, while settlement control over west-east corridors to the Jordan Rift paralyzed Palestinian communication in a design meant to rule out forever a type of OPT autonomy.

Though the Gush-Drobles plan broke any remaining taboos on the location of settlements, its radical ideological basis failed to provide the practical necessities for its fulfillment. The messianic settler movement could only offer limited human resources to the project and Israel needed mass settlement if its colonization program was to be sustained. Sharon set out to transform the scheme into one affording ‘quality of life’ settlements: with immediate territorial unity and overall contiguity with Israel’s coastal plain. His 1981 plan remained loyal to the Gush-Drobles vision but split the Palestinian territories into three cantons and, while leaving the war open for ideological settlement deep in the populous heart of the OPT, encouraged more substantial suburban settlement in blocs. At the time of the plan, West Bank settlers outside East Jerusalem numbered only 16,000 (with 800-900 in Gaza). By exploiting the growing demand for cheap suburban housing, Sharon aimed at settling an additional 80,000 Jews in the OPT within five years. The plan was coupled with extraordinary investment in infrastructure and services. Within two years, the settler population had nearly doubled, and government expenditure on the enterprise had reached $1.5 billion. Settlements, access roads, and military camps consumed 41.6% of all West Bank land and 32% of the Gaza Strip. Sharon’s plan remained the loose Likud blueprint through the 1980s, guiding expropriation, settlement and investment in the OPT. By March 1991, of the OPT’s 185,000 settlers, roughly 100,000 were living in the areas his plan targeted, the remainder in East Jerusalem.

Approved by the Knesset in May 1991, the ‘Seven Stars’ plan served the dual purpose of binding the central West Bank settlements to an industrialized belt of new development towns, while eroding the demographic and geographic balance of the Green Line. The ‘star settlements’ were established on or just beyond the Green Line, targeting the ‘Little Triangle’ area, where the highest concentration of Arab-Israelis lived. With a projected population of 390,000 Jews, the plan aimed at reversing the demography of the border strip from its 1991 status: 71.5% Arab-Israelis and 28.5% Jewish - to 36% and 64% respectively by 2005. A new highway, Route 6, was begun to link the ‘stars’, beginning with Modi’in in the south and ending with Haris in the north, along with 14 industrial zones and numerous new towns, creating a north-south strip separating Arab-Israeli villages from one another, their land and the OPT. Mass confiscations were made to facilitate the plan, which brought high-level infrastructure closer to the suburban OPT settlements and shattered the socio-economic fiber of Arab-Israeli communities in the area.

The ‘Seven Star’ plan reflected the extent to which Israel’s entire national development program, with settlement at its heart, had been put to the service of destroying forever any possibility of Palestinian territorial or demographic contiguity. Though all master plans were based on long-term projections and underwent changes in implementation, their geo-political impact was immediate and long-term. Master plans were aimed not merely at delimiting areas of Jewish settlement, but at maximizing the confinement of Palestinian development, severing communication lines and robbing the indigenous population of its natural resources.
The Wachman Plan, 1976

Immediate priority settlement zone
Second priority settlement zone
Third priority settlement zone
Key settlement

The Gush-Drobles Plan, 1978

Planned settlement bloc
Existing outpost or settlement
Planned settlement

The Sharon Plan, 1981

Settlement zone
Palestinian canton
Rural settlement
Urban 'anchor' settlement

The 'Seven Stars' Plan, 1991

Settlement bloc
Palestinian canton
Rural settlement
Urban settlement
'Star' settlement
Settlement Pt.

Map 24
By 1975, Israeli counter-offensives against guerillas in the south had caused the dislocation of thousands of Lebanese civilians. Insecurities among the Christian Maronite leaders, who recognized a challenge to their status in the PLO para-state’s alliances with local Muslims, were exacerbating sectarian tensions. A bit complex civil war erupted in April 1975, lasting 18 months and leaving at least 20,000 dead, most of them civilians. Towards the end of the war, Israeli PM Rabin initiated an alliance with the PLO’s military adversaries, the Maronite Phalange, a large militia with ideological roots in Nazism. By the end of the war, Israel had also created a ‘proxy’ force in southern Lebanon, headed by Sa’ad Haddad. From late 1976, the PLO and Haddad’s forces vied inconclusively for control of the southern sector. Israel retaliated for a March 1978 PLO raid on Israel by invading the south, killing some 2,000 and displacing 250,000 civilians. Thereafter, unprovoked Israeli offensives in the south and bombing raids on Beirut persisted, despite US pressure applied in July 1981.

In December 1981, DM Ariel Sharon presented the Israeli cabinet and the US with his ‘Big Plan’ to “wipe them [the PLO] out completely in Lebanon.” Begin’s cabinet was concerned but endorsed a version of the plan. US envoy Philip Habib was shocked though, and told Sharon: “You can’t go around invading countries like that, spreading destruction and killing civilians!” But US Sec. of State Haig ceded tentatively, provided the assault followed “internationally recognized provocation.”

The failed assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to the UK, carried out by anti-PLO Ab Nidal forces on 3 June, provided Israel with the pretext it needed. On 6 June, a massive Israeli force invaded Lebanon. Within a week DM Sharon had broken every assurance he had given the US about his own PM, and rather than holding a 40-km ‘buffer’ in the south (the declared operational objective), the Israeli army was laying siege to Beirut. A 11 June US-sponsored cease-fire was brushed aside, as Sharon ordered his troops and their Phalange allies into the capital’s residential quarters. Last minute US threats of intervention stalled the advance and allowed US envoy Habib to negotiate an evacuation of the PLO forces holding out in the capital. After a two-month siege, the PLO agreed to ‘evacuation without surrender’ in return for US guarantees for a multinational protection force to ensure the safety of Beirut’s Palestinians and civilians.

On 21 August, the US 6th Fleet escorted the first contingent of PLO forces out to sea, bound for Tunis via Greece. On 30 August, Arafat left Beirut after an 11-year stay. In all, some 8,500 PLO cadre left by sea and a further 2,500 by land (to Syria, Yemen and Iraq). The Israelis, with US assistance, had in the meantime successfully installed their Phalange ally, Bashir Gemayal, as president on 23 August. His assassination three weeks later fouled Israel’s long-term Lebanon strategy, calling for a pliant Christian buffer-state ruled over by a military client, and led to the most horrific incident of the war.

Prior to evacuation, the PLO had demanded, and been given, “the assurances of the United States as regards safety and security... for the [refugee] camps in Beirut.” But following PLO withdrawal, the US-led multinational force charged with this undertaking was inexplicably pulled out well ahead of the agreed schedule, leaving the Palestinians at the mercy of Israel and its Phalange allies. On 16 September, Israeli forces sealed the Sabra and Shatila RCs, positioned tanks around their entrances and ordered their Haddad forces as well as the Phalange militia to “purify the area,” in an operation approved by DM Sharon himself. Up to 3,000 men, women and children were then mutilated, raped and murdered in a 42-hour massacre presided over by the Israeli army, whose flames lit up the camps during the night hours. Though Israel would later shift responsibility for the atrocities onto its allies, US officials noted at the time that regardless of Israel’s functional involvement in the killings, it was “…in absolute control of the area and therefore responsible.”

Israel’s ‘Peace for Galilee’ operation cost it 446 lives. At the very least, 21,000 Palestinians and Lebanese were killed during the fighting (and many more died later as a result of their injuries or unexploded ordinance). Some 84% of the dead were Arab civilians; 600,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were rendered homeless. On 17 May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed a cease-fire agreement and ended the war, but Israel was to remain - with its militia - in southern Lebanon for another 17 years.
Map 25

- **Mediterranean Sea**
- **LEBANON**
  - **Beirut**
  - **Tripoli**
  - **Nahr Al-Bared**
  - **Baalbek**
  - **Gouraud**
  - **Damascus**
  - **Byblos**
  - **Sidon**
  - **Nabatiyyeh**
  - **Al-Bass**
  - **Tyre**
  - **Naqoura**
  - **Golan Heights**

- **SYRIA**
  - **Gouraud**
  - **Wavell**

**Map Details:**
- **Shatilla**
- **PLO evacuation, 21-30 August (ca. 2,500 cadre to Syria, Iraq & Yemen)**
- **PLO evacuation, 21-30 August (ca. 8,500 cadre to Tunisia)**
- **Southern Lebanon zone - occupied by Israel and SLA proxy, 1982-2000**
- **Israeli invasion, 6-11 June 1982**
- **PLO evacuation from Beirut, 21-30 August 1982**

**Legends:**
- Blue indicating limits of invasion as presented by DM Sharon to the Israeli cabinet and US.
- Red indicating Israeli invasion, 6-11 June 1982.
- Yellow indicating PLO evacuation from Beirut, 21-30 August 1982.
...renounced all fo
the 22% of Palestine made up of the OPT. The outgoing Reagan Administration responded immediately opening dialogue with the PLO in Tunis. While encouraged by the Palestinian position, the was disturbed by the daily news footage of "savage Israeli beatings of Palestinian youngsters," which knew could easily ignite regional radicalism. The UN had described Israel's strong-hand measures against the Intifada as, "a grave subject of concern for the international community," and in May 1989, Sec. of St. Baker urged Israel to "lay aside the unrealistic vision of Greater Israel ... forswear annexation, s settlement activity [and]... reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights."

Reviving the stillborn Camp David 'autonomy' framework, the Bush Administration placed unprecedented pressure on Israel's extreme-right government. PM Shamir had come to power in 1988, pledging, "not I give land in return for peace," and "to strengthen settlement, to broaden and develop it." His government, which included advocates of mass-expulsion of 'non-Jews', snubbed all US pressure and infuriated Baker can only say; 'take this number: 202 456 1414 [the White House switchboard]. When you're serious about peace, call us." In October 1990, Israeli forces massacred 21 Muslim worshippers at Al-Haram Ash-Sha in Jerusalem, incurring worldwide and UNSC condemnation. But despite the increased pressure, Isra rejected US demands that it engage in talks with freely chosen Palestinian representatives and instead pursued its increasingly brutal attempt to suppress the popular uprising.

The PLO's misguided attempt to elevate international engagement by demanding 'linkage' between th occupation of Palestine and Iraq's 1990-1991 occupation of Kuwait cost it the diplomatic advantage it has gained as a result of Israel's belligerence. In the wake of the Gulf War, the US was able to limit the enhanced PLO's role in proposed talks and thus increase its pressure on Israel. By assuring PM Shamir that no PLO representatives would be involved and then threatening to withhold a $10 billion loan guarantee by which Israel planned to absorb Russian immigrants - partly through settlement construction - the US finally coaxed the Israelis to talks.

The Madrid Middle East Peace Talks convened on 30 October 1991 under the guidance of US Sec. of Stat Baker and with the symbolic co-sponsorship of the Soviet Union. The basis of the talks was UNSC Res. 242 and 338, embodying the formula of land-for-peace. Due to stubborn Israeli insistence and the PLO's Gulf War error, the non-PLO Palestinian delegates were further limited to non-Jerusalenmites from inside the OPT. Gaza physician Haidar Abdel Shafi led the Palestinian delegation, telling the assembled that "[m]utuality and reciprocity must replace domination and hostility for genuine reconciliation and coexistence under international legality."

Madrid saw Israelis and Palestinian leaders enter formal peace talks for the first time. The powerful symbolism of the event was matched by a concerted US drive for Israeli acceptance of the land-for-peace formula, and set in motion a series of multilateral and bilateral talks. Shamir proved unequal to the histori role assigned him and returned from Madrid to inaugurate yet another new settlement in the OPT. Shunn by his right-wing allies, Shamir lost the 1992 elections as he tried to excuse his attendance at Madrid: "I would have continued talks for 10 years and by that time we would have half a million in Judea Samaria and Gaza [the OPT]," he promised.

By 1991, more than 150 settlements had been established throughout the OPT. With Palestinian building barred in 68% of the OPT, the incoming Rabin government prepared to spend 20% of its national housin budget on settlements. Of the 220,000 settlers, 120,000 were living in East Jerusalem, where three new sites had been started in 1991 alone. As US brokers prepared to build on the land-for-peace formula, th new Labor government stepped up Israel's campaign to create intractable facts on the ground. Armed wit a new master plan (N[ational] M[aster] P[lan] #31) aimed at adding 140,000 settlers over five years, PM Rabin announced, "[w]e are in control of the territory and we will not move one inch."
Map 26

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Principal Israeli settlement

Major city

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Map: adapted from Map NO. 3639 United Nations, June 1991
cause destruction and maximum killing.” Unit 101 dynamited Qibya, leveling a mosque, school, shops and livestock, and massacring over 50 civilians. Even Israeli FM Sharett was stunned noting that a report “of this magnitude has never been carried out before.” In Khan Younis, on 20 February 1956, the same unit attacked Egyptian posts and a water pumping station, leaving 40 dead. In Qalqilya, on 10 October 1956, 75 Palestinians killed. Sharett quoted in: PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, pp. 102. On massacres and casualties: Had Bitter Harvest, pp. 114-6. Also, Kyle, Keith, Suez, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991, p. 34 & p. 64.

2 The Universal Suez Canal Company had previously paid a token 3% of annual profits to the Egyptian Treasury. Nasser, refusal of the US, Britain and France to grant the arms deals he had requested, coupled with their rejection of appeals for a loan for the Aswan Dam construction, justified the nationalization of the canal. Kyle, Keith, Suez, p. 1.

3 Having declared a curfew on all Palestinians in Israel at the outset of the offensive, Israel sent forces to the village Kuf Qassem, some 20 km north of Tel Aviv. Finding Palestinians returning from work unaware of the 5 pm curfew, patrol massacred 43 civilians, incl. women and children.

4 Britain, France and Israel had made a pact at Sevres, France, detailing the course of the offensive. Israel was to attack through the Sinai, whereupon the Anglo-French alliance would condemn the attack, call for a ceasefire and issue an ultimatum for Nasser to hand over the canal to ‘international’ protectors, rather than allow a regional war. The Sev- Pact allowed Israel to remain up to 10 miles from the Canal Zone and occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula. Nash rejected the 12-hour ultimatum, as expected, and the bombing of Cairo commenced on 31 October. US Sec. of St. John Foster Dulles described the collision as, “about as crude and brutal as anything.” In all, some 268 Egyptian fighter planes were destroyed on the ground in the first stage of the offensive. Dulles quoted in: Ibid. p. 361.

5 Mass graves of bound male Palestinian civilians, all shot in the back of the head, were found in Khan Younis following the Israeli withdrawal. PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, p. 109. According to UNRWA, at least 400 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces during the occupation of the Gaza Strip.


6 The UN reported that in Sinai, “As the Israelis withdrew... they began a systematic destruction of the surfaced roads, the railway and what few buildings there were.” UNTSO Chief General Burns, quoted in: Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, p. 221.

7 Suez was a turning point globally. French colonies and protectorates in Africa and Asia fell in subsequent years while American influence jostled with Soviet influence, as the Non-Aligned Movement picked up the pieces and attempted to protect the fragile semi-independent stance of its members. All were factors on the global stage precipitated by the Suez crisis.

MAP 17

1 Statistics according to UNRWA, as reproduced in: Morris, Benny, 1948 and After, pp. 220-221.

2 UNRWA’s mandate limited it to classifying as a refugee only those dispossessed Palestinians whose place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, and who had lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1947-48 War. Registration must have been made with the Agency prior to July 1952. Thus, an undetermined number of refugees who lost their homes and livelihood in the war but who were residing elsewhere in the specified period exists, as does a number - estimated at 50,000 - of so-called ‘late-comers’, who missed the 1952 deadline, as well as those whose ‘means of livelihood’ was not lost with their home in the course of the war. It is impossible to know how many Palestinians fall in this “unregistered refugee” category, but by 2001 (when the registered refugee population reached 3.7 million) it was estimated that 48% of all Palestinian refugees were actually unregistered. See UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2000, Gaza: UNRWA Headquarters, 2000, p. 23, and PASSIA, Palestinian Refugees Special Bulletin, Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2001.

3 UNGA Res. 194 was passed on 11 December 1948. Ben-Gurion’s statement was made on 18 December. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 186.

4 Bernadotte was killed the day after this statement was made. Members of the Lehi carried out the attack. No one was ever charged with the murder of the high-ranking UN official, but years later it was revealed that future Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had participated in ordering the assassination. Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, p. 121; Shaiam, Avi, The Israeli Wall - Israel and the Arab World, London: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 37; Pappe, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 162-3.


6 In 1948 ca. 150,000 Palestinians had remained in what became Israel, ca. 320,000 Palestinians were pre-1948 residents of the West Bank; pre-1948 Gaza residents amounted to less than 100,000. Thus, at the end of the war, some
00 Palestinians were non-refugees, while in 1950 UNRWA registered at least 914,221 refugees. PASSIA, *Timian Refugees* - Special Bulletin; UNRWA, *The Long Journey*, p. 7.

According to UNRWA officials, during Israel's 1956-57 occupation, "almost 400 Gazans [sic] were killed. UNRWA lines were cut, curfews were imposed, Agency services were disrupted and food supplies were looted." Ibid, p. 8.


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> 18


Acham Begin would later summarize Israel's position as follows: "In June 1967 we had another opportunity. The concentration of Egyptian troops in the Sinai was not evidence of Nasser's readiness to attack us. We have to be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." Ibid, p. 24.


Ayan's admissions were only published - with the permission of his daughter - in 1997, 16 years after his death. Dayan stated that over 80% of all instances on the Syrian border leading up to the war were instigated this way. Ibid. p. 235.


A result of the withdrawal agreements following the Suez War, the US was technically responsible for guaranteeing the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran - the *casus belli* Israel presented for its attack. But with the US engaged on one Cold War front already with Vietnam, the administration was unwilling to open another front. Instead, y gave Israel the green light to go alone.

General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force later acknowledged that, "[s]ixteen years' planning... into those initial 80 minutes... we lived the plan, we slept the plan, we ate the plan. Constantly we perfected it." Dawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 227-229.

In contrast, the opportunities taken up in the West Bank and Golan were either capitalized upon as the war proceeded, 'created' during the adventurism the war inspired in its generals.

Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 248-249. Historian Avi Shlaim's, explanation of the unraveling expansionism of the war and the territorial greed of its main Israeli protagonists is simple: "appetite comes with eating." The aggressive expansion into the Golan may have been a mistake for Israel. The USSR - who had supported Syria's call for a cease-fire, along with almost all the Soviet bloc states, immediately severed their ties with Israel and in subsequent years, that regional policy toward Israel hardened considerably.


This was UNSC Res. 237 of 14 June. UNSC Res. 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied during the recent conflict was not passed until 22 November 1967.

The 4th Geneva Convention and Hague Convention lay down stipulations for the behavior of a "belligerent occupant" in times of war or belligerent occupation. Israel's refusal to recognize the Jordanians or Egyptians as the interim rulers of the West Bank and Gaza Strip led it to deny the applicability of the status of "belligerent occupant" - thereby itself rather a "liberator" of illegally held land.


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> 19

The pre-June 1967 population of the West Bank, excl. Jerusalem, amounted to over 800,000 Palestinians, that of the Gaza Strip to 400,000. Unlike the protracted ethnic cleansing that accompanied and followed the 1948-49 war, Israel's planned and haphazard advances in the Six-Day-War had not depopulated these areas. Only in the Golan Heights and Jordan Valley had the majority of the population been put to flight. Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 16.

Faced with the prospect of upsetting Israel's demographic imperatives in exchange for achieving much of its territorial objectives, PM Eshkol joked to Golda Meir, "The dowry pleases you, but the bride does not." Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 255.

Vigil Allon was a leading spokesman for the Labor Party (later Dep. PM, 1968-1977), chairman of its kibbutz movement body and rival of DM Moshe Dayan. In 1948, he had served as the commander of the southern front in the American-sponsored Palmach. On becoming foreign minister, he attempted to accommodate the US and the USSR and thereby avoid the risk of falling under the US's wing with its policy toward Vietnam.

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1 Israel’s 1967 leadership (military and political) knew the extent to which the role of settlements had defined legitimized pre-state partition proposals, as well as the military role these sites had played in the 1948-49 Commenting on the role of settlements in the creation of Israel, Benny Morris concludes: "[s]ettlements ultimate meant sovereignty. Each new settlement or cluster of settlements staked out the Jewish claim to a new area." Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, p. 179.

Observing the same phenomenon, Peter Demant suggests that, "settlements may be said to have fathered the star Israel." Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 84; Also, Segev, *One Palestine*, p. 249.


Allon later asserted that the need to settle the Golan Heights had been clear to him from the outset. His reason hesitancy can be ascribed to the initial position in favor of relinquishing land for peace with Syria and Egypt, which government was presenting to the US. This position, likely never more than a bluff, evaporated rapidly, and carefully not expressed to the Syrians or Egyptians - who would likely have rejected it in any case. The Golan Heights represented a militarily strategic prize and simultaneously granted Israel unchallenged control over the vital surface wa feeding the Sea of Galilee. The water issue was to become the prime mover in the settlement of the area and to remain the ultimate factor preventing any negotiated withdrawal (see Map 49). Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 1

In practical terms settlement in the Golan presented serious advantages to the government. Some 93% of the area had been depopulated in the war and the depopulated Heights represented a strategic opportunity military were anxious to secure. In fact, the first post-war settlement - Merom Golan - was officially established the Golan in August 1967; within a year there were nine Golan sites officially established by the Jewish Agency and affiliate arms. Harris, *Taking Root*, p. 16; Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 151.

4 Peres and Rabin, under pressure from Gush Emunim and the Likud bloc, endorsed a plan to settle it in the west-east lateral running from Elkana (in Salit Governorate), through the West Bank to meet the main Ramallah Nablus highway. This would later become the so-called "Shomron [Samaria] Bloc", the largest settlement cluster outside Jerusalem, with Ariel at its heart. However, both Rabin and Peres would be ousted by Begin’s Likud in 1977 which proceeded to oversee and expand the plan.

MAP 20

1 The dispersal of the Palestinian refugees placed the emergence of an independent unifying leadership very much in the mercy of the Arab states, who were themselves engaged in intense and competitive ideological struggles throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In Nasser’s post-Suez-War Egypt, for example, embryonic guerrilla movements - once encouraged by the regime - were suddenly seen as a threat to Nasser’s standing with the UNEF, deployed in the Gaza Strip. This combined with Nasser’s popularity, paralyzed the first Palestinian resistance units and caused some to flee Egypt, including the young Yasser Arafat, who had studied there. O’Neill, Bard, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political - Military Analysis*, Colorado: Westview Press (in cooperation with the National Defense University), 1978, pp. 4-6.


3 Fateh operated its guerrilla activities under the name Al-’Asifa (The Storm). The first attack was on 31 December 1964. The following day Fateh issued a communiqué stating, "...Al-’Asifa forces have been launched forth to retake the enemy and the world at large that this people did not die and that armed revolution is the road to return and victory." Fateh (New Year’s Day) communiqué, quoted in: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 196. For number of Fateh attacks see: Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 33.


The shift to separatist nationalism was reflected in the transformations undergone by previously hard-line pan-Arab movements, such as the MAN (Movement for Arab Nationalism), led by George Habash. In December 1967, MAN announced the formation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, p. 41.
 credits the resistance bodies with 42 attacks in January and February, and 36 in the first three weeks of March.


heroism of the battle of Karamah propelled Arafat and Fateh into the spotlight well before either amounted to a political or military entity. Said Aburish writes of the incident: “To a world tiring of Israeli victories and ghastly tactics, the two easy, memorable names [Arafat & Fateh] became a symbol which transcended the stultitudes of what had happened in a small, dusty town in the middle of nowhere.” Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, p. 84.

the end of the year Arafat had appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine and Fateh had opened a ‘Permanent Representative Office’ in Paris. Ibid. p. 90.

June 1969, Golda Meir told Britain’s *Sunday Times*, “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine siring itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. ..they did not exist.” PM Golda Meir quoted in: Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 195. Her comments looked increasingly urd, as - according to the Israeli army - between 1968-1970 Palestinian raids across the Jordan claimed over 500 Israeli lives, averaging over 20 a month. Some 2432 Palestinian guerilla attacks were launched across the Jordan in 1969 alone. O’Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine*, pp. 237-242.


Jordan’s large proportion of Palestinians exacerbated tensions and threatened anarchy on a number of occasions. In at least one instance, vital Jordanian diplomatic opportunities were ‘sabotaged’ by PLO groups who opposed them: In April 70, US Under Sec. of State, Joseph Sisco was due to arrive in Amman as part of a US plan to stabilize the 1969-1970 Egypt-Israel war of attrition. The meeting would likely have seen Hussein sounded out on the Rogers Plan, and as such as opposed by the PLO. PFLP activists, along with other ‘leftist’ guerillas, infiltrated the US embassy compound and Sisco canceled his visit. Meanwhile, forces stepped up their attacks on the Jordan-Israel border area to disrupt the US initiative further. Such humiliations were recurrent and enraged the Jordanian leadership. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 251.

Two planes were landed at the airstrip on 6 September, a third on 9 September. The passengers, incl. a Rabbi and a number of American-Israeli civilians, were apparently treated well and the PFLP activists even made efforts to ‘educate’ them regarding Palestinian history and their struggle. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator*, pp. 108-109.

The exact casualties are not clear. Up to 5000 people may have died. The Jordanian army lost 600 men, the Palestinians lost between 910-960 armed personnel and the remaining ca. 1,500 casualties were civilians, mostly Palestinians from the Amman battles. In addition, some 600 Syrian casualties are estimated. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 267.

Nasser brokered the cease-fire over two days. A few hours after concluding the arrangement, he suffered a cardiac arrest and died.


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Coming to power in the shadow of the immensely popular and charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sadat was under greater scrutiny from the start. Fouad Ajami has noted that until the 1973 War, this left Sadat, “...paralyzed; he needed some great act if his Egypt was to come into being.” Ajami, Fouad, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 95.

Soon after coming to power, Assad flew to Cairo for talks with Sadat and, in April 1971, Sadat, Assad and Mu’ammar Gaddafi of Libya announced their states’ “federation.” In subsequent meetings the three leaders reiterated their intention to “liberate the occupied territories.” PASSIA, *100 Years of Palestinian History*, pp. 136-137.


Kissinger claims he aimed “...to produce a stalemate until Moscow urged [Arab] compromise or until, even better, one moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington.” But this is likely an exaggeration afforded by hindsight, and Kissinger’s hostility towards Sec. of State William Rogers, who was insistently pursuing both Israeli and Egyptian concessions from 1969 (with the first ‘Rogers Plan’), seems the more likely reason for his dismissal of all progress on the Egyptian track. Kissinger’s recollections are peppered with comments from Israeli leading Palestinian writer Said Aburish to conclude that, “only the selfish politics of...
n 2001, 25 years after the political fight for rights began in earnest, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, presented the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance with a document entitled “Institutionalized Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” detailing over 20 Israeli laws discriminating against Palestinians in Israel. See Adalah website: www.adalah.org.

In an earlier report (1998), Adalah noted that “the Arab minority is afforded no constitutional protection against discrimination” and that “the Supreme Court, since 1948, has dismissed all cases which deal with equal rights for Arab citizens of the state.” Adalah, Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel, p. 11.

MAP 23

1 The additional US aid to Israel granted as a ‘sweetener’ within the 1975 Sinai Disengagement Agreement amounted to a 200% increase in US annual aid to Israel, setting a precedent for US financial incentives for Israeli territorial redeployments. See Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 338.

2 Begin correctly calculated that once Sadat had been ostracized by the other ‘confrontation states’ and the PLO, he would soften on his stance over the form of the autonomy plan. Begin’s formulations were often absurd, driven by his ideological refusal to cede any territorial administration in the OPT to non-Jews. One component of the Begin autonomy plan was the notion of ‘personal autonomy’ as opposed to ‘territorial autonomy’ - the system ensured that Israeli citizens (settlers) would be permitted to purchase land, the ‘autonomous’ areas.


4 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, p. 103.

5 As the PLO’s Salah Khalaf put it: “...the Palestinians are not demanding this form of self-administration; I, for example, want an identity, a homeland, a flag... even if [it] were implemented, and I don’t believe it will be anyway, because the Israelis, and Begin in particular, are not in agreement with it, it would not solve the Palestinian problem.” Khalaf, interviewed in March 1979, in: Ibid., p. 103.


7 Moshe Dayan, Allon’s rival and the Labor DM who went on to become Begin’s FM, was a leading architect of the Labor Party’s so-called ‘Oral Doctrine’, which elaborated on the Allon Plan. In it, were guidelines for Sinai settlement: “Freedom of navigation from Eilat southward will be assured by[...] control of the Straits [of Tiran] region, which will be connected to Israel by a territorial strip...” Extract from the ‘Oral Doctrine’ in: Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, p. 166. Dayan went on to plan the town of Yammit, which he envisioned as a city of 230,000 people with a major shipping port. Responding to the Rogers Plan and UN Sec.-Gen. Jarring’s 1970-71 endeavors to get Israel to enter talks based on UNSC Res. 242, Dayan remarked: “While they talk bla-bla in the UN we’ll make settlements.” Dayan quoted in: Ibid. p. 238.

8 Begin had planned to retire to the Neot Sinai settlement. Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 374.

9 Quandt, William, Peace Process - American Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1993, p. 341. William Quandt suggests a total of 15,000 settlers were evacuated from Sinai. This figure is likely one presented him by the Israeli negotiators, with whom he was engaged at the time, and seems inflated. See Demant, Ploughshares into Swords & Harris, Taking Root, where totals of a little over 5,000 are calculated.

10 As part of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the US committed $3.5 billion in economic development to Egypt, along with a five-year $1.5 billion arms package. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 324.

11 Carter, though apparently unaware of the ramifications of Israel’s separate peace with Egypt at the time he brokered the treaty, later realized that Camp David had, “removed Egypt’s considerable strength from the military equation of the Middle East and thus gave the Israelis renewed freedom to pursue their goals of fortifying and settling the occupied territories and removing perceived threats by preemptive military strikes against some of their neighbors.” Carter, The Blood of Abraham, p. 45.

In 2001, 25 years after the political fight for rights began in earnest, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, presented the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance with a document entitled “Institutionalized Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” detailing over 20 Israeli laws discriminating against Palestinians in Israel. See Adalah website: www.adalah.org.

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US Pres. Carter, who convened the Camp David talks, later noted that, “[f]rom Begin’s point of view, the peace agreement with Egypt was the significant act... references to the West Bank and Palestinians were to be finessed.” Carter, Jimmy, *The Blood of Abraham*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985, p. 45.


5 As the PLO’s Salah Khalaf put it: “...the Palestinians are not demanding this form of self-administration; I, for example, want an identity, a homeland, a flag... even if [it] were implemented, and I don’t believe it will be anyway, because the Israelis, and Begin in particular, are not in agreement with it, it would not solve the Palestinian problem.” Khalaf, interviewed in March 1979, in: Ibid., p. 103.


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William Quandt, a member of the National Security Council staff who participated at Camp David, also draws a direct
Benvenisti, to the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these regions.

Sharon "stole the plan and then finished it off." Sharon had asked Wachman's permission to quote from his plan in a televised interview in order to bolster his military credentials with those of a respected and non-ideological academic. Sharon refused, but Sharon went ahead and quoted him anyway. In any event, by the time Sharon had developed his first Likud settlement plan it differed substantially from the Wachman concept. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, pp. 534-538.

Though much is, correctly, made of Sharon's personal input in the settlement program, the historic program drew upon religious, academic and grassroots support from across the political spectrum and Sharon alone lacked both the political tact and ideological credentials to bring together all the essential elements of the program. He was undoubtedly instrumental in passing plans through approval stages but was assisted in their creation by strategists such as Moshe Dayan and Rehavam Ze'evi; ideological settler leaders such as Ya'akov Aiges, Ezra Zohar and Avraham Shvut; and - vitally - political heavyweights, incl. Begin and Shamir.

Sharon and the secular academic Avraham Wachman apparently fell out early on and Wachman would later claim that Sharon "stole the plan and then finished it off." Sharon had asked Wachman's permission to quote from his plan in a televised interview in order to bolster his military credentials with those of a respected and non-ideological academic. Wachman refused, but Sharon went ahead and quoted him anyway. In any event, by the time Sharon had developed his first Likud settlement plan it differed substantially from the Wachman concept. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, pp. 534-538.

The Drobles Plan was formalized as the Camp David ‘autonomy’ talks began. Regarding the plan, Drobles said, "...State land [sic.] and uncultivated land must be seized immediately in order to settle the areas between the concentrations of the minority population [meaning the Palestinians] and around them, with the objective of reducing to the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these regions. It would be difficult for the minority [Palestinian] population to form territorial continuity and political unity when it is fragmented by Jewish settlements." Drobles quoted in: Benvenisti, Meron, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984, p. 52.

The original Gush Emunim plan (drafted by Aiges and Zohar in 1976-77) had demanded 60 rather than the eventual 57 sites, otherwise the Drobles Plan was basically identical. Demant, *Ploughshares into Swords*, p. 448.

This figure excludes sums spent in the East Jerusalem settlement program. Thus, between 1967 and 1983, the government of Israel invested around $500,000 per settler in the West Bank, excl. East Jerusalem. Obviously the investment was long-term in many instances and paved the way for a far larger population. However, the Sharon Plan, like the Drobles Plan before it, projected a population in the target areas of 100,000. Therefore, even calculating based on the public expenditure already invested by 1983, each of these predicted 100,000 settlers would have cost the government over $150,000 in up-front investment, not incl. military and 'hidden' costs such as those channeled through the WZO or JA. Ibid. pp. 55-58.

Planned and existing settlements, their roads, military camps and industrial zones and the expropriations made in connection with them by 1983 would provide the basis for all following settlement activity. In Gaza, 1983 plans envisioned a future population of up to 8,000 settlers. 1982 figures put the Gaza Palestinian population at 476,300. Thus, the expropriations theoretically reduced relative land use in the Strip to 0.52 dunums per Palestinian, while awarding the projected 8,000 settlers with 14.25 dunums per person. In effect, the disparity was far more severe, as the 8,000 figure was not reached even by the end of the century - though expropriations increased - and the Palestinian population had by then more than doubled. Ibid. p. 2 & pp. 19-21 (and derived thereof).

This was not the case however. In 2002, an investigative report into government misuse of public funds found that the city of Harish - the northernmost of the 'stars', in the Wadi 'Ara area - was virtually uninhabited despite minimum government expenditure of NIS 300 million in the original development. Vast areas of land were expropriated for the Harish site, where up to 35,000 Jews were to settle, yet in 2002, according to the head of the Harish local council, "nobody wants to come here... of their own will." Reported by HaShavu 'a, Israel Channel 2, 6 May 2002.

MAP 25

According to Rashid Khalidi, by the mid-1970s the PLO ran “a vigorous para-state, with a growing bureaucracy administering the affairs of Palestinians everywhere, and with a budget bigger than that of many small sovereign states.” Khalidi, Rashid, Under Siege: PLO Decision-making During the 1982 War, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 29; also, Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator, p. 146.

Some 14,000 civilians were killed during the civil war, 9,000-11,000 of these by the Christian Maronite rightist militias and Syrian forces. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 408-409.

In the Palestinian Tel Az-Za’atar RC, 1,500 residents were massacred in one day (12 August 1976), prompting PLO head Arafat to call on the Arab heads of state to convene an emergency summit. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, pp. 73-74.

Rabin’s alliance with the Christian Maronite Phalange echoed much earlier schemes contemplated by his mentors Ben-Gurion and Dayan. During the 1948 War and in the years following it, Ben-Gurion repeatedly put forward a nearly identical proposal: “The Muslim rule in Lebanon is artificial and easily undermined. A Christian state ought to be set up, whose southern border would be the Litani River. Then we’ll form an alliance with it.” Moshe Dayan approved, believing, “...all we need to do is to find a Christian Lebanese officer, perhaps no higher than a captain, and win him over or buy him with money, so that he would declare himself the savior of the Maronite population. Then the Israeli army would enter Lebanon, occupy the territory in question and establish a Christian government which would form an alliance with Israel.” Segev, 1949, p. 10.


Israeli ‘retaliation’ was largely planned to escalate and create incidents rather than respond to them. UNIFIL, the UN body brought in to monitor the south following Israel’s 1978 invasion, issued a report covering the period between mid-March and end of August 1979; it detailed 148 Israeli initiated attacks, wherein an estimated 19,000 artillery or mortar rounds were fired. The same report detailed only 10 PLO initiated attacks in the area. Khalidi, Under Siege, p. 195.

For the period June 1981-June 1982 (when Israel invaded), the UN Sec.-Gen. charged the PLO forces with 47 incidents in the border area, while Israel and its Haddad forces were charged with 218. For the period August 1981-May 1982, the report counted 2,096 Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, p. 112.


Sharon’s ‘Big Plan’, as Shlaim surmises, “...was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state,... Jordan’s conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.” Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 396.

In terms of the “breaking the backbone” component of the strategy chosen by Sharon and his colleagues, a further mid-term analysis of the plan was offered at the time by one of Israel’s most respected scholars on Arab affairs, Yehoshua Porath. He wrote that, “[t]he government’s plan is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism [sic]: it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained... undercutting the danger that elements will develop among the Palestinians that might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodations.” Porath in Ha’aretz 25 June 1982, quoted in: Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, p. 201.

Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 413.

The Israeli plan, dating back to Rabin’s first dealings with the Phalange, was for a client administration in Lebanon to follow their occupation and sign a peace treaty thereafter. To this end, Israel did its best to prevent the non-Phalange delegates from reaching the election point, while facilitating the access of large numbers of Gemayal loyalists. Ibid. pp. 413-414.

The US role is more opaque, but it appears Habib was charged with ensuring the pro-West Gemayal take control and that he placed appropriate pressure on the Lebanese to achieve this end. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 344.

Khalidi, Under Siege, p. 177.


Upon hearing that the operation had been started with IDF coordination, Sharon told his Beirut sector commander, “Congratulations. ‘Our friends’ operation is approved.” Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, p. 129.

The death toll of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre is unknown. Israeli officials incl. Sharon, conceded a minimal figure of some 800, while an Israeli journalist - one of the first into the camps after the massacre - put the figure at over 4,000. Shlaim, p. 416.
MAP 26

1 The 12-15 November 1988 PNC session culminated in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Kissinger had laid down the US preconditions for dialogue with the PLO in 1975. Arafat reiterated and clarified the PLO’s unconditional acceptance of all the relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions after his address at a special session of the UNGA held in Geneva following US refusal to allow the PLO leader an entry visa to address the UNGA at its New York headquarters. Arafat's 14 December renunciation of terrorism in all its forms included the renunciation of “state terrorism,” and was met the same day by a US lift on the 13-year ban on PLO talks. Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 370-375.

2 Ibid. p. 364.


6 Ibid. p. 488.

7 Shamir to Ma‘ariv reporters after losing the 1992 election. PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, p. 252.


9 PASSIA, 100 Years of Palestinian History, p. 253.
Chapter Three:

1993 – 2002

(Maps 27-37)
November 1993) saw it relinquish claims to 78% of historic Palestine (pre-1967 Israel). By late 1992, year on from the Madrid conference, lack of progress in bilateral talks was fuelling doubts about the wis of this huge concession and stood to undermine PLO credibility. With the initial and official Washin

trol and Maher Al-Kurd were, meanwhile, making more progress: the face of the stalled official track, Israeli PM Rabin formalized the secret Oslo channel in May 1993. E

tems attempted to 'improve' upon the 1979 Camp David autonomy framework in accordance with t

own appraisal of that plan. What emerged, after six months of wrangling, was an exchange of letters: mutual recognition between PLO head Arafat and Israeli PM Rabin and the subsequent signing of Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP) in September 1993.

Despite the enthusiasm behind the perceived breakthrough, which culminated in the White House ha

shake between Arafat and Rabin on 13 September 1993, the DoP was an ambiguous document. Steer

clear of the essential and difficult core issues (settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, borders and natural

ources), the agreement paid near exclusive attention to Israeli 'security' demands and proposed econo 'cooperation.' Nonetheless, the DoP stipulated a five-year interim timetable leading to a final status

termination of the conflict. The nature of this final status was unspecified though, and made no expi

tion of Palestinian independent statehood.

Implementation of the DoP was negotiated in an entirely different atmosphere to that of the Oslo talks. Isr,

replaced most of its FM officials with a team of military strategists and proceeded to whittle away at its

al withdrawals discussed in Oslo. The 'Gaza-First' concept - which predated Oslo - had been expand

t PLO insistence to afford the Palestinians a 'foothold' in the West Bank and so became the 'Gaza-Jerich

plan. But Oslo's vagueness left the Israelis ample room to impose limitations on even this, while the PL(

need to detract from criticism of the DoP by manifesting a presence on 'liberated' Palestinian soil left thE

all but powerless to object. Meanwhile, the co-sponsors of the DoP were notably silent and refrained fr

high-profile engagement during the crucial first stages of the peace process, leaving Israel a free hand. O

4 May 1994, in Cairo, Rabin and Arafat signed the Gaza-Jericho (or Oslo I) Accord. On 12 May, the fi

Palestinian police crossed the Jordan to take up posts in Jericho. On 1 July 1994, amidst enormo

celebrations across the OPT, Arafat returned to Palestine after almost 30 years in exile, arriving in Gaza

head the new Palestinian Authority (PA).

As a first stage, the Gaza-Jericho deal offered little promise of eventual statehood and drew criticism fr

across the Palestinian political spectrum. The Israelis had severely limited their withdrawal from Gaza,

aining all settlements, connecting roads and a broad 'security' strip while redeploying from the populat

areas. In all, the 'withdrawal' from Gaza saw the Israelis retain and, by virtue of the accord, partial

egitimate their presence in some 40% of the strip. At Jericho, Israel began work on a bypass road to li

the surrounding settlements into a retaining perimeter ensuring the small pocket under PA control wou

remain isolated from other Palestinian sites and with no access to the border crossing with Jordan. The tw

redeployments placed the Palestinians in control of desperately underdeveloped populated areas wh

deny them access to essential resources or any jurisdiction over integral outlying territories. A provisi

in the agreement for so-called "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank was not implemented.

Human rights groups and democracy activists were disturbed by concessions the PLO had made in t

name of Israeli 'security,' detecting the makings of an authoritarian regime. Indeed, the accord included

 provision whereby all but 70 of the 1,000 Israeli military orders issued in Gaza since 1967 were to remain

place during the transitional phase. Powers pertaining to water, land use, zoning and development rema

subject to Israeli veto, and economic integration leaned heavily in Israel's favor. But while the controver

cial agreement came under intense criticism - in Israel as well - Oslo I finally released over one mille

million Palestinians from the immediate ordeal of Israeli occupation after 27 years.